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Dennis J. Mulvihill
Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill
500 Grant Street
BNY Mellon Center, 23rd Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Aaron D. Rihn (argued)
Robert F. Daley
Robert Peirce & Associates
707 Grant Street, Suite 2500
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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OPINION
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant James Meyer
(Plaintiff or Meyer), a Union Railroad employee for
approximately 31 years, purchased a credit disability
insurance policy from Appellant CUNA Mutual Group
(CUNA) in connection with the financing by the URE
Federal Credit Union (the credit union) of an automobile
Meyer purchased. The policy would make the car loan
payment on Meyers behalf in the event he was deemed
disabled. Following an injury on the job, Meyer received,
pursuant to the policy, disability benefits in the form of credit
union payments on the loan for his vehicle. After covering
Meyers payments for approximately three years, CUNA
notified him that it would not continue to pay his disability
benefits. CUNA found that Meyer no longer met the
definition of Total Disability, as defined under CUNAs
policy.
Meyer filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania on his own behalf and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, each
claiming disability insurance benefits that had been initially
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II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Interpretation
of
Total
Disability
Definition in Summary Judgment Ruling
Marine & Fire Ins. Co. (Europe) Ltd., 707 F.2d 775, 778 (3d
Cir. 1983) (citing Celley v. Mut. Benefit Health and Accident
Assn, 324 A.2d 430, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Here, if CUNA had used the word
and instead of or to convey that it indeed intended a
conjunctive meaning in the second clause of the definition, it
would have put the matter beyond reasonable question in
resolving ambiguity.9
CUNA advances numerous arguments about why
Meyers interpretation, the interpretation ultimately adopted
by the District Court, is unreasonable. Based on our analysis
of a plain reading of the language and common, disjunctive
meaning of the word or, we find that Meyers interpretation
is not unreasonable.
Regarding CUNAs next argument that Meyers
interpretation is unreasonable as repugnant to Pennsylvania
law, we recognize that in Pennsylvania, stipulations in a
contract of insurance in conflict with, or repugnant to,
statutory provisions which are applicable to, and
consequently form a part of, the contract, must yield to the
statute, and are invalid, since contracts cannot change existing
statutory laws. Pennsylvania Natl Mut. Cas. Co. v. Black,
916 A.2d 569, 579 (Pa. 2007) (citing Prudential Prop. and
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 813 A.2d 747, 751 (Pa. 2002)
(internal citations omitted)).
Contrans, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 836 F.2d 163, 169
(3d Cir. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania law)).
CUNAs argument, however, is unavailing, by looking
at the language of the definition in context. The plain
language in the first clause, modifying own occupation, could
certainly be read to shift from requiring a claimant to show
that he cannot perform substantially all of the dutiesless
than all of those dutiesto not being able to perform any of
the duties. This puts a greater onus on a claimant to meet the
threshold for coverage after the first 12 months of disability.
However, we recognize that reading the phrase
conjunctively creates an ambiguity if the duties of any
occupation for which a claimant is reasonably qualified is
read as being inclusive of his prior occupation. Looking at
the post-12 month clause in the order in which it is written
first to ones abilities with respect to his own occupation
would eliminate a need to continue reading the second part of
the clause to determine whether one can perform duties of
any occupation, if any occupation includes the duties of
ones former occupation.
Under that premise, after 12 months, an insured could
be in one of two situations with respect to his own
occupation. He could either (1) be able to perform none of
the duties of his former occupation; or (2) be able to perform
one or some of the duties of his former occupation. If he
cannot perform any of the duties of his occupation, construing
'or' disjunctively, he is qualified for coverage, and there is no
need to move to the second part of the clausewhether he
can perform the duties of any occupation for which he is
qualifiedto determine coverage. If, on the other hand, an
insured can perform one or more tasks of his former
occupation, he is not qualified for coverage and there is no
need to look to the second part of the clause because he has
already failed to qualify for coveragehis own occupation is
a subset of any occupation for which he is qualified. Courts
should not distort the meaning of the language or strain to
find an ambiguity. Madison, 735 A.2d at 106. However,
such a reading is not a distortion; it does create some degree
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12
B.
17
C.
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