Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
2d 1269
1 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 42
This appeal from an order granting the dismissal of a complaint filed under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b),1 requires us to decide whether
Pennsylvania courts would be hospitable to a tort claim, sounding in
negligence, for damages resulting from an employer's failure to use due care in
maintaining the record of an employee's performance and work history, and
whether such a claim would be barred by the 'libelslander' exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2680(h).2 Reasoning that the interest
sought to be protected by the plaintiff-- freedom from injury to one's image or
reputation-- was identical to that protected by the defamatory torts, the district
court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was barred by Section 2680(h) since it
was 'purely and simply one of libel and slander.' The plaintiff, a former agent of
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), has appealed. We
reverse.
2
9(b). Having undertaken and accepted the status of plaintiff's employer, the
defendants herein assumed the duty and obligation to plaintiff to maintain
accurate records of plaintiff's performance and employment history and to
maintain such information concerning plaintiff available to all government
employees and other persons having a reasonable and justifiable interest
We take as our threshold inquiry whether plaintiff's averments set forth a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 'In appraising the sufficiency of the
complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2
L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). And to do substantial justice, reasonable factual inferences
will be drawn to aid the pleader. F.R.C.P. 8(f); 5 Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure, 1363 at 657.
Section 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act commands that we look to 'the
law of the place where the (negligent or wrongful) act or omission occurred.'
Since the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is the negligent maintenance of
employment records, and since plaintiff averred that he was last stationed in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, it is reasonable to infer that his records were
maintained in that state. Thus, we must decide if the state of Pennsylvania
would recognize a tort of negligently maintaining employment records as
distinguished from the tort of defamation.
Plaintiff argues that the law imposes a duty on an employer to use due care in
maintaining an employee's work history once it has undertaken the task of such
recordkeeping and that injury to the ex-employee's reputation is foreseeable
when an employer disseminates such information to prospective employers. For
its part, the government argues: 'In the instant case, there is present no tort
principle which makes an employer's failure to compile and maintain complete
employment records actionable.'
10
. . . In this respect, it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court." 'It is
incumbent on us to make our own determination of what the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would probably rule in a similar case.' Gerr v. Emrick, 283 F.2d
293, 294 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 817, 81 S.Ct. 698, 5 L.Ed.2d
695 (1961). In doing so, we perceive our analysis to require two determinations:
whether the Pennsylvania law of libel and slander would pre-empt such a claim
in negligence; if not, whether that state would recognize plaintiff's averments as
constituting a recognized cause of action in negligence.4 We have concluded
that there would be no pre-emption and that, under the facts as alleged,
Pennsylvania courts would be hospitable to a cause of action in negligence.
A.
11
It is essential to define and analyze the elements of the two torts as recognized
by Pennsylvania, a common law state. Conduct is negligent 'if the harmful
consequences could reasonably have been foreseen and prevented by the
exercise of reasonable care.' Lerro v. Thomas Wynne, Inc.,451 Pa. 37, 301 A.2d
705, 708 (1973). Restated, the act of negligence consists of the existence of a
legal duty and a breach thereof.5 'Libel is the malicious publication of printed or
written matter which tends to blacken a person's reputation and expose him to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule.'6 The word 'slander' is the general and
original word for all kinds of defamation.7 However, in modern usage it has
been limited to defamation by words spoken rather than written, that is, to the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice anotherhs
reputation, office, trade, business, or means of making a living.8 Malice is
essential to an action for defamation.9
12
14
15
protecting his interest in his reputation and is not restricted to the choice of one
remedy. Similarly, in federal practice one civil remedy will not pre-empt
another, and specifically, it has been held that one remedy will not pre-empt
others under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12,
15 (4th Cir. 1968). 16
16
17
18
Plaintiff must bring himself within the scope of a definite legal obligation, so
that it might be regarded as personal to him. 'Negligence in the air, so to speak,
will not do.'17 Professor Leon Green reminds us: 'The scope of a defendant's
duty depends on how far the law's protection will be extended . . ..
19
The determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes the particular
risk imposed on the victim ultimately rests upon broad policies which underlie
the law.'18
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
(d) applied to the facts of the case by the trial judge or the jury, if there is no
such enactment, regulation, or decision.
27
28
30
Having due regard for those principles of tort law followed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, we are persuaded that the state courts would recognize a duty
of the defendant personal to the plaintiff to use due care in keeping and
maintaining employment records, and that for breach of that duty, plaintiff may
have a cause of action if he is injured thereby and if the defendant's breach was
the proximate cause of his injury. We do nothing more than continue 'in the
tradition of spinning out applications of accepted precedents . . ..' Keeton,
Judicial Law Reform-- A Perspective in the Performance of Appellate Courts,
44 Taxas L.Rev. 1254, 1254-1255 (1966). We find nothing in the recent history
of the pennsylvania Supreme Court to the contrary.23 'New and nameless torts
are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the common law is marked
by many cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to
create a new cause of action, where none had been recognized before . . .. When
it becomes clear that the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection
against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will
not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy.'24 Although negligence law is
generally associated with bodily or physical injuries, there is no conceptual
impediment to the recovery for non-traumatic injury. As a leading case
expresses the scope of the law's protection: 'We see no good reason why a
wrongful invasion of a legal right, causing an injury to the body or mind . . .
should not give rise to a right of action . . ..'25
31
32
Concluding that plaintiff has set forth a claim for relief recognizable by
Pennsylvania courts does not end our inquiry, for we must also determine
whether, as a matter of federal law, such a claim is one 'arising out of . . . libel
(or) slander . . .' within the meaning of 2680(h). If it does arise out of libel and
slander, then the claim is simply not one for which relief may be had against
the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Our analysis of this
question of interpretation is not without its precedential guideposts.
33
When Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act it used neither intricate nor
restrictive language in waiving the Government's sovereign immunity. United
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 152, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963). At
the same time, Congress qualified this broad waiver of immunity in 28 U.S.C.
2680, 'for certain specified torts of federal employees.' Delehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 17, 73 S.Ct. 956, 958, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). The reason
for Congressional passage of the Act has been succinctly stated:
34
It was the offspring of a feeling that the Government should assume the
obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its
work. And the private bill device was notoriously clumsy. Some simplified
recovery procedure for the mass of claims was imperative.
35
36
37
38
39
As the tort of misrepresentation differs conceptually from the tort of deceit, the
tort of negligently of an employee differs personnel records of an employee
differs from the defamatory torts of libel and slander. But here the resemblance
between this case and the cases of Neustadt, Cenna and Dupree comes to an
end. Here only 'libel, slander' are specifically excluded; generic negligent
claims are not. In Neustadt and Cenna there was a specific statutory exclusion
of 'misrepresentation'; here there is no express exclusion of the remedy
pursued. In Dupree there was a specific statutory exclusion of 'interference with
contract rights'; again, here there is no express exclusion of the remedy
pursued. To hold that a claim for negligent maintenance of employee records is
excluded by the statutory language 'libel, slander' would be to read into the Act
an exclusion that does not exist by language or by implication. Moreover, to so
interpret the statute would require an assumption that Congress was unaware of
established tort definitions.27 This we simply cannot and will not do. We
hearken to the teachings of Chief Justice Warren in United States v. Muniz:
40
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides much-needed relief to those suffering
injury from the negligence of government employees. We should not, at the
same time that state courts are striving to mitigate the hardships caused by
sovereign immunity, narrow the remedies provided by Congress. As we said in
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, . . . (352 U.S. 315 (1957)) at 320, 77 S.Ct. 374,
1 L.Ed.2d 354, 'There is no justification for this Court to read exemptions into
the Act beyond those provided by Congress. If the Act is to be altered that is a
function for the same body that adopted it.'28
41
In excluding certain tort causes of action from the Federal Tort Claims Act,
Congress focused its attention upon the type of government activity that might
cause harm, not upon the type of harm caused. In excluding actions in libel and
slander, Congress, in our view, was not concerned with the difficulties involved
in proof of injury to reputation, as the government here urges. Rather the
concern was that government officials should not be harmpered in their writing
and speaking by the possibility that their actions would give rise to government
liability.
42
The plaintiff alleges that two distinct duties were breached by the defendant:
(1) the duty to maintain complete and accurate records of plaintiff's
employment history, and (2) the duty to accurately represent plaintiff's past
employment history to prospective employers. The district court, considering
these contentions together, held that they amonted to a complaint for damage
from publication of false information, and that such a complaint was, in
essence, one of libel or slander, which causes of action cannot be brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
43
All that we decide here is that the first duty exists and that it can be enforced
through an action based on a general negligence theory. Plaintiff's complaint
states a claim here not only because negligence is conceptually distinct from
defamation, but also because the negligence alleged here was distinct from the
mere writing or speaking for which Congress did not provide liability. To the
extent the complaint before us is based on allegations respecting this second
alleged duty, i.e., the duty on the part of the government to disseminate accurate
information, such a claim is barred by the libel and slander exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, as conceded by appellant at oral argument.
44
28 U.S.C. 1346:
(b) The district courts . . ., shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
The provisions of . . . section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-. . . .ion
(h) Any claim arising out or assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights.
Additionally, he averred:
13
of commission and omission, thereby failing to exercise that degree of due and
reasonable care for the rights of plaintiff required under the circumstances
4
In federal practice a complaint sets forth 'a claim for relief,' F.R.C.P. 8(a);
under Pennsylvania practice a complaint states 'a cause of action,' Pa.R.Civ.Pro.
1019(a), 12 P.S.Appendix
Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860, 862 (1954), citing Collins v.
Dispatch Publishing Co., 152 Pa. 187, 25 A. 546 (1893)
Williams v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 133 Pa.Super. 1, 1 A.2d 495, 498 n.
1 (1938), aff'd 337 Pa. 17, 10 A.2d 8 (1940)
Solosko v. Paxton, 383 Pa. 419, 119 A.2d 230, 232 (1956). See 2 U.Pitt.L.Rev.
1 (1935). It is not necessary that there be proof of any actual ill will against any
particular person. See infra, p. 1274
Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. 145, 2 A. 568 (1886); Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385 (1878)
10
It has often been said that malice is one of the elements of liability, and the
doctrine is commonly stated in this way: that malice must exist, but that it is
presumed by law from the mere speaking of the words; that again you may
rebut this presumption of malice by showing that the words were spoken under
circumstances which made the communication privileged,-- as, for instance, by
a lawyer if the necessary course of his argument, or by a person answering in
good faith to inquiries as to the character of a former servant,-- and then, it is
said, the plaintiff may meet this defence in some cases by showing that the
12
See, Act of April 11, 1901, P.L. 74, 2, 3, 12 Pa.Stat.Anno. 1582, 1583; Act of
August 21, 1953, P.L. 1291, 1, 12 Pa.Stat.Anno. 1584a (burden of proof)
13
Act of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm.L. 76, 1, 12 Pa.Stat.Anno. 31, provides a six-year
statute of limitations for all 'actions upon the case, other than for slander, and
the said actions for account, . . . trespass, debt, detinue and replevin, for goods
or cattle . . ..' Trespass actions for personal injuries 'within two years next after
the cause of such actions or suit . . ..' For defamatory torts, 'the said actions
upon the case for words, within one year next after the words spoken, and not
after.'
14
15
This phenomenon is not new to the procedural law of the federal and
Pennsylvania courts. Under Pennsylvania practice 'the plaintiff may state in his
complaint two or more causes of action in trespass . . ..' Pa.R.Civ.Pro. 1044(a),
12 P.S.Appendix. In federal court a party may state 'as many separate claims . .
. as he has regardless of consistency . . ..' F.R.C.P. 8(e)(2)
16
17
Prosser, supra, 53 at 332, quoting Pollock, Law of Torts, 13th Ed.1929, 468
The statement that there is or not a duty begs the essential question-- whether
the plaintiff's inteests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's
conduct. It is therefore not surprising to find that the problem of duty is as
broad as the whole law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has
been formulated.
Ibid.
18
19
Griswold, 'The Judicial Process'; 31 Fed.Bar J. 309, 311 (1973), citing Cardozo,
Nature of the Judicial Process, 141 (1921)
20
(b) In addition to the information that may be made available (to the public)
under paragraph (a) of this section, the following information may be made
available to a prospective employer of a Government employee or former
Government employee
. . . .dit
(1) Tenure of employment; (2) Civil service status; (3) Length of service in the
agency and the Government; and (4) When separated, the date and reason for
separation shown on the Notification of Personnel Action, Standard Form 50.
This section is explained in detail in FPM 294-15.
21
22
Cf., Restatement, Torts 2d, 323; De-Jesus v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 423
Pa. 198, 223 A.2d 849 (1966)
23
It is one of the many states described by Professor Robert E. Keeton which has
recently participated in 'candid, openly acknowledged change' in the law of
torts. 44 Texas L.Rev. at 1254
24
Prosser, supra, 1 at 3, 4
25
26
Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814, 816 (1926)
Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877
(1973) (doctrine of governmental immunity abolished); Hopkins v. Blanco, 224
Pa.Super. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973) (allocatur granted and appeal pending in
Supreme Court) (wife entitled to recover for loss of consortium); Gray v.
Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966) (doctrine of informed consent
adopted in malpractice cases); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771
(1972) (sale of new home by builder is accompanied by implied warrantly);
Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (doctrine of parental
immunity abolished); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital of Philadelphia, 439
Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970) (implied warranty of fitness accompanies blood
transfusion even though no sale involved); Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373,
263 A.2d 118 (1970) (new action for mishanding of dead body recognized);
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (impact rule
abolished); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968)
(requirement of privity in breach of warranty actions abolished); Reitmeyer v.
Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968) (responsibility of landlord
recognized for injuries to tenant resulting from certain defects in the premises);
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (strict liability of vendor of
defective product recognized); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486,
208 A.2d 193 (1965) (doctrine of charitable immunity abolished); Griffith v.
United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (contact theory of
conflict of laws adopted); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960)
(right of child to recover for prepartum injuries recognized); Karchner v.
Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959) (right of married woman to sue for
criminal conversation recognized); Acquino v. Bulletin Company, 190
Pa.Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959) (allocatur denied) (right of action for
invasion of privacy recognized)
27
'There is no warrant for assuming that Congress was unaware of established tort
definitions when it enacted the Tort Claims Act . . ..' United States v. Neustadr,
supra, 366 U.S. at 707, 81 S.Ct. at 1301
28