Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
444
THOMAS E. GASKILL
445
the science of logic as the only science which has any hope of fastening
Being within our souls.
This, indeed, must be the case for Avicenna, since the path to the dual
source ofhuman salvation is by knowledge. That which may masquerade
as knowledge but which is not made sure by the tests oflogic is not, in its
true reality, knowledge at all. Hence, in order to attain knowledge, and
thence to attain salvation, in our present condition, "there is no remedy
but to teach the science oflogic."
To at least the following extent, Avicenna was clearly consonant with
Peripatetic traditions: that which is truly knowledge can be only of that
which is universal (kullf), not particular. Although we may say that we
have knowledge of particulars, we have mere opinion and call it
'knowledge' only quite loosely. Toward the end of attaining real
knowledge, Avicenna provided a list of the types of premises and a
7
discussion of which of those are suitable for use in syllogisms. Of
thirteen types of premises, all but five are eliminated altogether. Of the
remaining five (first principle, perceptual, experimental, testimonial, and
implicative premises), only one will be able to provide us with the proper
starting-point of inquiry.
Implicative premises do not contribute to new, positive knowledge,
since they are merely implications of an opponent's argument, for use in
reductio ad absurdum. Testimonial premises are subject to more or less
doubt (depending on the amount of testimony), and hence do not
provide certainty. Perceptual premises are very much like Humean
'constant conjunctions' ("the moon rises and sets"). Even though they
are premises apprehended by the senses, they are not of particulars.
Nevertheless, because their subject-matter is necessarily united to determinate natures, we can only attain knowledge through them by
abstracting from sense-information. Experimental premises, too, begin
with sense-experience, but what we abstract in this case is the cause of the
perceived phenomena.
In the cases of both perceptual and experimental premises, abstraction
from sense-experience is necessary, but Avicenna is not an empiricist.
Sense-experience is filtered through a complex series of faculties, and
much of what we abstract from experience is the form of those faculties,
rather than the reality of the external world. (Geometry, for example, is
the study of the abstract forms which imagination [guman or takhayyu~
imposes on our external experience.) Hence, even when we abstract well
7. DN, Mantiq, 28.
JII!
446
447
THOMAS E. GASKILL
in the investigation of the subject, and the principles are the means for
investigation of the problems.
The subject-matter of philosophy, however, is not a particular
(juz'0 thing; rather, it is absolute being (hast-i mutlaq), and thus
first philosophy is absolute. Its problems result from those conditions whose being arises out of itself and has essence, as was
discussed under the doctrine of demonstration (burhan). The
"whichness" (kuddm-t) of these states is determined by those
states (hal-ha) in which being an existent (maujuC) and having
being are not due to (qiba0 quantity nor to movement (haraka).
All in all, the subject-matter (mauduC) of this one science .. .is
different from the subject-matter of the other two sciences since
its subject-matter is that aspect of being which is being-quabeing. 12
So far, this may not seem significantly different from Aristotle's project in
the Metaphysics. Indeed, Avicenna argues in the name of the 'first teacher' ,
Aristotle. The key difference - and one which will lead Avicenna directly
into mysticism - is that this absolute science, because it is the science of
hastf-i mutlaq (not ousia) , must begin with the one remaining kind of
premise which we have yet to consider: first principle premises.
This science will avoid the difficulties inherent in the study of that which
is 'related to matter and movement'.
Every science must, according to Avicenna, have a proper subject,
essence and principles. 11 The essence is that set of problems which arise
8. DN, Ildhiyyat, 1.
9. I have not found an adequate English equivalent for cilm-i nazar!. Nazar (Arabic, 'to
see') is used uniformly by the translators for theoria in the Arabic translations of Aristotle's
Aletaphysics. Hence, cilm-i fUlzar! is equivalent to the Aristotelian he theoretike episteme. See
Soheil Afnan, Philosophical TennirlOlogy ill Arabic and PerSial1, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964),65.
10. DN, Ildhiyyat, 2, Morewedge's translation (The "Metaphysica" ofAvicerma, translated
by Parviz Morewedge [New York: Columbia University Press, 1973]), 12-13.
11. DN, Mantiq, 30-32.
(rasm)."14
A few moments of reflection, though, show this to be quite a peculiar
premise. It cannot be categorical, since Being" ... has no definition, it has
I
I
I
~
!I
I'
Iii
II
i'
448
THOMAS E. GASKILL
neither genus (fins) nor species (fasD because nothing is more general
(Cammtar) than it." Furthermore, 'Being' cannot be a denotative term of
any sort, since "Being does not have a description since nothing is better
known (macruj) than it."IS The 'recognition' ofBeing must, therefore, be
of a different kind than one would find in other premises. 16
Since nothing is more macruf (known or celebrated), there can be no
marks or differentia ofBeing. Hence, Avicenna continued,
exist (i.e., that we partICipate in Being), we have a primary, preconceptual understanding of Being which can only be indicated by
language.
This is not, I should add, a primary understanding of substance, but
rather is of Being as such. Avicenna argued vociferously against the more
traditionally peripatetic philosophers of Baghdad who began inquiry
with substance (fauhar, ousia).2o
. d . 17
t h mgs
are d enve
Those whose observations are not subtle believe that the word
'Being' applies to (lit.: falls above) the ten [categories] by homonymous naming, such that all ten [categories] have one name, and
the meaning of that name is not univocal [yak]o This is not
correct, because if such were [the case], [then] our discourse
about substance and its being would be such that [we would say]
"substance exists," and the meaning of the being of substance
would not be other than the meaning of substance. In the same
way, ifbeing were applied to quality, the meaning would not be
other than quality. Hence, if someone were to say, "a quality
exists," that would be the same as saying, "a quality, a quality."
And that would be like saying, "a substance exists," which would
be like saying, "a substance, a substance." It would not be correct
that every thing either exists or does not exist, because 'being'
would not have one meaning but would have ten meanings.
'Non-being' also would not have one meaning but would have
ten meanings. Hence, the division [i.e., between being and nonbeing] would not be into two - but this reasoning would not itself
have any meaning. All the wise know that every time we say that
a substance exists and an accident exists, we know one meaning
by 'being'. Likewise, there is one meaning of 'non-being'.
Indeed, when being is applied to a particular, in that instance
'being' is of every other thing, just as the substance of a particular
is the substance of every other thing. 21
449
'Being', then, is not substance (or the being of a being), but is Being
considered absolutely (Being haplos or simpliciter). It is what is meant by
the verb 'to be' absolutely, not when applied to a specific thing, and that
is something which can only be indicated. 22 For the moment, though, let
f
20. See his "Letter to Kiya" translated in Gutas, op. cit., 60.
21. DN, Ilahiyyat, 11.
450
THOMAS
E.
GASKILL
451
452
THOMAS
E.
GASKILL
yr
,,)
;1'.
~\
453
Ifwe are concerned with the salvation of the soul, then we wish to avoid
that which is transitory and attain that which is unchangeable. When we
actualize the internal faculties, we actualize that which is 'not susceptible
to change'.
In order to do so, we must actualize that which receives that which is
not susceptible to rectilinear motion or to generation and corruption:
Furthermore, intellectual perception and sense perception are
different in several aspects ... .Intellect perceives the thing without
a veil (or disjoined; mujarrad) as it is, or it does not perceive it in
any manner at all. Sense perception perceives vile and changeable
accidents, and intellect perceives unchanging substances and
attributes (sifatha0 and that thing from which goodness and order
(nizdm) and happiness all arise. Hence, of what kind is the state
(haD of happiness in which intellect is found when it receives the
First Truth (haqq awwaD, that from which all beauty and order and
splendor proceed, and how can such happiness be compared to
the pleasures of the senses?31
Supposing that Avicenna is correct here, we would certainly want to
receive that First Truth, which is accomplished through contemplation
of Necessary Existence or Pure Being. But, then, how is it that so many
of us are so often led astray from this ultimate bliss?
... [W]e may also be inattentive to perceiving the pleasures of the
intelligibles (maCquldt), for example, when we are distracted from
them and the faculty of intellect is weakened from the first action
and completely, when we are embodied and are accustomed to
and familiar with sensible things. It is often the case that pleasant
things are unpleasant for these causes, and it is often the case that
one has awareness neither of pleasure nor of unpleasantness, such
as someone whose body has become numb, who does not know
pleasure or unpleasantness when it is received, and when the
numbness dissipates, one is able to perceive painful things which
have happened, such as a burn or a wound. And it is often the
case that a faculty has in it a thing either bad or pleasant , and it
does not perceive it because of a disease. For example, in the
disease which the physicians call boulimia, the entire body is
starving and [yet] hunger becomes diminished, but the stomach is
unaware, because of this sickness, that it is ill from weakness or
from moisture. When the cause of the illness is removed, misery
arises from the lack of food.
31. Ibid.
454
455
THOMAS E. GASKILL
The state (han of our soul (ncifs) in this world is just the same, for it
is in a state of hunger. In one in whom there is not the perfect
intelligible, there is misery [see TabfCiyyat 43]. One possesses
perfection who possesses happiness or to whose very self it is
bound. However, when one is embodied, one is distracted from
[true] happiness and pain, and when one is separated [from the
body], one perceives them. 32
32. Ihid.
33. See DN, Manfiq, 2.
I
1
:1
II'
rl
I,ll
I,'II
Ii'
456
THOMAS
E. GASKILL
in the first creation, were found complete, and which are pure
intellect (CaqI mahz), and which are not like US, having no need of
external things, and are not attached to lower things, are occupied
with their own perfection, which is intelligible to them, and in
that which they contemplate of the perfection and splendor of
Necessary Existence, which illuminates them in the mirror of
their substance. Their ultimate happiness and delight is the
happiness in which they are in contemplation of Necessary
Existence, in addition to the happiness which they have in the
perception of their own perfection. They are occupied with the
highest happiness and delight, because, eternally, they do not turn
from the highest to the lower aspect [of what is]. Their whole
selves (khwudi khwish) are consecrated to the contemplation of
grandeur, that is, the regal presence, and to receiving the greatest
happiness.
457
Series I
OF NEOPLATONISM
edited by
]OHN]. CLEARY
Leuven
University Press
1997
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
.. __
vii
John J. Cleary
Introduction
_. _
.ix
John J. Cleary
CHAPTER
NEOPLATONIC THEOLOGY
b
r ! "-'"'1
-t"
v,
_ .. 1
_. . . . . . . . . . . 19
.",
CHAPTER
29
37
_ .. _
39
133
135
Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd en/of openbaar gemaakt
door middel van druk, fotokopie, microfilm of op welke andere wijze ook
zander voorafgaande schrifteIijke toestemming van de uitgever.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint,
microfilm or any other means without written permission from the publisher.
ISBN 90 6186 847 5
D/1997/1869/62
PLOTINIAN Nous
_. 153
PLOTINIAN MYSTICISM
175
_.. _ 177
_. _. _. 188
Vl
VB
CHAPTER 5
CHAPTER
207
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
10
417
. 419
443
458
237
269
CHAPTER 6
CHAPTER 7
CHAPTER
11
. 471
. 486
291
293
CHAPTER
310
CHAPTER
329
331
347
369
CHAPTER 9
PATRISTIC AND MEDIEVAL NEOPLATONISM
381
383
The Mysticism of Number in the Medieval Period before Eriugena ..... 397
Thomas O'Loughlin
469
12
MODERN NEOPLATONISTS
517
519