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  • Hitlers Aims and Strategies

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    Hitlers Aims and Strategies

    Transféré par

    api-299934977

    Droits d'auteur :

    © All Rights Reserved
    Téléchargez comme PDF, TXT ou lisez en ligne sur Scribd
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    NAZI FOREIGN POLICY

    AIMS AND STRATEGIES TO 1939


    When Hitler came to power in 1933, his stated aim was to revise the Treaty of Versailles. For the first two
    years he was more preoccupied with establishing domestic control, but by 1935 he was able to turn his
    attention to unilaterally revising some of the treaty terms.
    In March 1935 he reintroduced conscription and rearmament, and noted that there was no hostile
    response from Britain or France. Between 1935 and 1939 everything appeared to work in Hitlers favour.
    He freed Germany from the military and territorial limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and
    began to create a Greater Germany. Some of the key events are outlined below:
    r The Saar *O+BOVBSZUIFQFPQMFPGUIF4BBS BTNBMMUFSSJUPSZPOUIFCPSEFSXJUI'SBODFUIBU
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    B A L T I C
    S E A

    N O R T H

    EAST PRUSSIA

    S E A

    POLAND
    1939

    NETHERLANDS
    GERMANY
    Rhineland
    1936

    BELGIUM

    Sudetenland
    1938
    REST OF
    CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1939

    LUXEMBOURG
    Saar 1935

    KEY

    FRANCE

    Germany
    in 1933

    SWITZERLAND
    0

    100

    200

    300

    400

    500 km

    Figure 11.43 The expansion of Germany, 193539

    348 | Key Features of Modern History

    AUSTRIA 1938

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    R E VI E W Q UE S TI O N S
    1 Why was the Rhineland called a demilitarised zone?
    2 When was the Anschluss with Austria?
    3 What was Hitlers excuse for starting the Sudetenland crisis?
    4 Why didnt Hitler expect Britain and France to help Poland?

    Historians differ in their attempts to explain Hitlers foreign policy. Intentionalists argue that Hitler
    had long-term and detailed plans for war, whereas the Structuralist view is that Hitler had no specific
    plans, but just took advantage of opportunities as they arose.

    Germany 19181939 | 349

    DO CUM E NT S T U DY: DID H IT LER H AVE A LO N G- TERM PLAN FO R WAR?


    Source 11.23
    The Intentionalist case:
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    Mein Kampf.
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    He did both by 1939.
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    The Structuralist case:
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    as deliberate plans.
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    That doesnt mean that he planned to risk it all in a war.
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     7KHUHLVQRFOHDUHYLGHQFHRIDGHOLEHUDWHSODQIRUZDU+LWOHUWRRNULVNVKHWKUHDWHQHGDQGEOXHG
    These risks led to war.

    Source 11.24

    Source 11.25

    Until the 1980s it was argued that:

    Recent research, using improved and more sophisticated


    data sampling techniques has challenged this
    interpretation.

    Hitler decided to gamble on small forces to fight


    opportunistic wars (Blitzkrieg) in order to avoid strains
    on the population.
    The economy operated on a peace-like war basis
    throughout 193941 and only changed when Speer
    became minister of armaments in 1942, while a fullscale commitment was not fully realised until 1944.
    There was a clear gap between Hitlers ambitions and
    economic and military policy.

    Hitler was not really planning for war in 1939. The proof of
    this lay in the level of German rearmament which by 1939
    was by no means great enough to sustain a European, let
    alone a world, war.
    A. J. P. Taylor cited in J. Jenkins, Hitler and Nazism,
    Longman, 1998, p. 11213.

    Overy argues that the Blitzkrieg theory does not fit the
    facts. Hitler planned for a total war, though well after 1939,
    and when war broke out Germany mobilised as fast as it
    could. Things went wrong when economic planning got
    out of phase with foreign policy. He supports this argument
    by citing:
    
    
    
    

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    was much bigger than was needed for Blitzkrieg.
    War coming in 1939 threw the long-term plans into
    confusion showing up unsolved structural problems in
    the Nazi economy.

    R. J. Overy, cited in J. Jenkins, Hitler and Nazism,


    Longman, 1998, p. 114.

    D O C U M E N T ST UDY Q UE S TI O N S
    1 How do Taylor in Source 11.24 and Overy in Source 11.25 differ in their interpretation
    of German foreign policy?
    2 Read and discuss the points outlined in the section on Hitlers foreign policy, then,
    aided by your own research, indicate which view you support and why. For more
    information on Nazi foreign policy from 1935 to 1939, read Chapter 15.

    350 | Key Features of Modern History

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