BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN (OCT.

2011)
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 172777, OCTOBER 19, 2011 ]
BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 172792]
RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN, PETITIONER, VS. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the March 14, 2006 Decision[1] and the May 22, 2006 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83704 entitled "Sally Go-Bangayan v. Hon. Luisito C. Sardillo, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 126, Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally
de Asis Delfin."
The Facts
This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally Go-Bangayan(Sally Go) accusing
petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally) of having
committed the crime of bigamy.[3]
On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two children. [4] Later, Sally
Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on
January 5, 2001 under the false name, "Benjamin Z. Sojayco." [5]Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with
Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a
certain Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a
Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr.
and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally married to
Sally Go.[6] The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002 and was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC) where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-66783. [7]
After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, the
prosecution presented and offered its evidence.[8] On September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. and Resally
separately filed their respective motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. [9] This was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003.[10]
On October 20, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for
bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his guilt.
[11]
His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to Sally Go because of
the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was unable to show that he and
the "Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.," who married Resally, were one and the same person. [12]

In its December 3, 2003 Order,[13] the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally
for insufficiency of evidence.[14] It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with
Resally.[15] Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy because the prosecution failed to establish
that Resally married Benjamin, Jr.[16]
Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006, the CA
promulgated its Decision[17] granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were
sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to
Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the
admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.'s
admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a relationship. [18] The CA further stated that Benjamin,
Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was
null and void in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity
was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.
[19]

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 22, 2006.
[20]

Hence, these petitions.

The Issues
Petitioner Benjamin, Jr. raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may inquire into the factual
matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without violating the constitutional right of herein
petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the order of the trial court that granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the petitioners
as accused therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction or
excess of jurisdiction as to warrant the grant of the relief as prayed for in the Petition for Certiorari filed by
respondent Sally [Go-Bangayan].
3. Whether or not the prosecution was indeed denied due process when the trial court allegedly ignored
the existence [of the] pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. [21]
On the other hand, petitioner Resally poses the following questions:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in giving due course to
the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the lack of legal standing of the herein respondent (petitioner
therein) as the said petition was filed without the prior conformity and/or imprimatur of the Office of the
Solicitor General, or even the City Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City

2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ordering the further
proceedings of the case as it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.[22]
Essentially, the issues which must be resolved by this Court are:
1. Whether Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite the lack of
consent of either the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Caloocan.
2. Whether petitioners' right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed the
December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petitions.
Only the OSG, and not the private offended party,
has the authority to question the order granting
the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.
Petitioner Resally argues that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before the CA
because the case against them (Resally and Benjamin, Jr.) is criminal in nature. It being so, only the OSG
or the OCP of Caloocan may question the RTC Order dismissing the case against them. [23] Respondent's
intervention as the offended party in the prosecution of the criminal case is only limited to the enforcement
of the civil liability.[24]
Sally Go counters that as the offended party, she has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal
prosecution against petitioners and quotes Merciales v. Court of Appeals[25] to support her position: "The
right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has
always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so
would place the accused in doublejeopardy." Moreover, the OSG and the OCP had impliedly consented to
the filing of the petition before the CA because they did not interpose any objection. [26]
This Court leans toward Resally's contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for
certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of
the State.[27] The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only
insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.[28] As explained in the case of People v. Santiago:
[29]

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party
or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant
has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of
said complainant. [Emphases Supplied]
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial
court's order granting petitioners' demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the criminal
case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is apparent that
her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners. Because bigamy
is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute the case on appeal. Thus, Sally Go did not
have the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.
Sally Go was mistaken in her reading of the ruling in Merciales. First, in the said case, the OSG joined the
cause of the petitioner, thereby meeting the requirement that criminal actions be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.[30] Second,the acquittal of the accused was done without
due process and was declared null and void because of the nonfeasance on the part of the public
prosecutor and the trial court.[31]There being no valid acquittal, the accused therein could not invoke the
protection ofdouble jeopardy.
In this case, however, neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City joined the
cause of Sally Go, much less consented to the filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate court.
Furthermore, she cannot claim to have been denied due process because the records show that the trial
court heard all the evidence against the accused and that the prosecution had formally offered the
evidence before the court granted the demurrer to evidence. Thus, the petitioners' acquittal was valid,
entitling them to invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy had already set-in
Petitioners contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued by the RTC on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred from appealing the
RTC Order because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy.
[32]
They insist that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the lower court for further
proceedings because it disregarded the constitutional proscription on the prosecution of the accused for
the same offense.[33]
On the other hand, Sally Go counters that the petitioners cannot invoke their right
againstdouble jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was issued with grave abuse of
discretion, rendering the same null and void.[34]
A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to
evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants
the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the
acquittal of the accused.[35]Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the

demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to
do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.[36]
The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights (Article III)
contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.[37] However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is
considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit:
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution
has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. [38]
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against doublejeopardy is
when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case
against the accused or where the trial was a sham. [39] For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where
the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith
dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; [40] and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time
when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication. [41]
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for the crime
of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them
before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case
was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial
court's order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy.
As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. [42]
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. "The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility."[43] The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly
establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to
dispense justice.[44]

The CA determined that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the evidence
presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners' demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime. [45] An examination of the
decision of the trial court, however, yields the conclusion that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
its part. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it only
committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for
certiorari because double jeopardy had already set in.[46]
As regards Sally Go's assertion that she had been denied due process, an evaluation of the records of
the case proves that nothing can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a
decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a
party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.[47]Sally Go cannot deny that she was given ample
opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners. Thus, her claim that she was
denied due process is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The March 14, 2006 Decision and the May 22, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 3, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 126, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66783, granting the Demurrer to
Evidence of petitioners Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin and dismissing the case
against them is herebyREINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

[1]

Rollo (G.R. No. 172777), pp. 29-37. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos and
concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag.
[2]

Id. at 38-40.

[3]

Id. at 30.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES

MARILYN and FRANCISCO GARCIA,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 148226

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,*
- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

JOSEPH TERRADO, and HONORABLESALVADOR P.

VEDAA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 68, Lingayen, Pangasinan,

NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Respondents.
Promulgated:

July 14, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] assailing the April 6, 2001 Decision[2] of Honorable Judge
Salvador P. Vedaa of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, of Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal
Case No. L-5813, People v. Joseph Terrado, a.k.a. Hapon, finding the accused Hapon not guilty of
Carnapping (punished under Republic Act 6538, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972).
Accused Joseph Terrado was charged with Carnapping in the Information filed by 4 th Assistant
Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II, dated March 9, 1998, to wit:

That on or about 8th day of August, 1997 in the afternoon, in barangay Malindong,
Municipality of Binmaley, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a fan knife (balisong), by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there threaten with fan knife, Leoncio
Dalmacio driver of motorized tricycle with Plate No. AE-8082 and thereafter with intent to
gain, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took and carted away said motorized tricycle
without the consent and against the will of Leoncio Dalmacio and/or Marilyn Garcia.

Contrary to R.A. 6538 [sic], as amended.[3]

The case was originally raffled to Judge Nicodemo T. Ferrer of Branch 37, RTC. On May 14,
1998, the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On July 22, 1998, the prosecution, through 3rd Asst. City Prosecutor Borromeo R. Bustamante,
filed a Motion to Dismiss,[4] and prayed for the provisional dismissal of the case. In an Affidavit of
Desistance[5] executed by private complainant, Marilyn Garcia, the latter stated that they were leaving for
the US and would not be able to pursue the case. The trial court granted the Motion in its
Order[6] dated August 19, 1998.

On November 16, 1998, a Motion to Revive the Case [7] was filed by the private complainant
through Prosecutor I Marlon Meneses, which was granted by the court in an Order [8] dated November 17,
1998. A Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift/Set Aside Order of Revival was filed by the
accused. On January 14, 1999, the trial court denied the motion [9] for reconsideration and set the case for
hearing on January 26, 1999. However, the accused sought the inhibition of Judge Nicodemo T. Ferrer
from trying the case, which the latter granted. The case was re-raffled and was assigned to the sala of
Judge Salvador Vedaa, Branch 68, RTC.

On March 5, 1999, the accused reiterated his Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift/Set Aside
Order of Revival. Acting on the above motion, the court denied the same for lack of merit in its
Resolution[10] dated March 9, 1999, and set the case for hearing on April 5, 1999.

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the orders of the trial
court. Then, on April 5, 1999, he filed with the trial court a Motion to Archive the case. On April 12, 1999,
the complainant through the private prosecutor, under the direct control and supervision of the public
prosecutor, filed her Comment/Opposition to the motion. In a Resolution [11] dated June 30, 1999, the trial
court denied the Motion to Archive filed by the defense in order not to unduly delay the proceedings,
considering that the petition for certiorari filed by the defense was not yet given due course by the Court
of Appeals (CA).

On July 31, 2000, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused which was
returned unserved because accused person could not be located at his given address. [12]
On March 27, 2001, the trial court received from the CA the entry of judgment of the resolution
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the accused.[13]

Trial of the case thereafter ensued.

For the prosecution, the following witnesses were presented: Leoncio Dalmacio, PO1 Mardy
delos Santos, PO1 Ferdinand Ferrer, Marilyn Garcia and Marcelino Flores.

The version of the prosecution states that in the afternoon of August 8, 1997, while Leoncio
Dalmacio (Dalmacio) was driving a tricycle owned by Spouses Marilyn and Francisco Garcia, the accused
hailed him, boarded the tricycle, and then asked to be brought to Barangay Libsong, Lingayen,
Pangasinan. When they reached the place, the accused alighted from the sidecar and suddenly picked up
a stone and struck the tricycle.[14] Dalmacio dismounted from the tricycle and tried to pacify the accused
but he noticed that Terrado was armed with a fan knife (balisong). The accused then took the tricycle,
drove away and left Dalmacio behind. Dalmacio reported the incident to the Binmaley Police Station and,
subsequently, to the Lingayen Police Station. He then executed a Sworn Statement[15] before the
municipal judge of the Binmaley Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

For the defense, the accused claimed that he was on his way to his parents-in-law at Libsong
when he met Dalmacio and asked him if he could borrow the tricycle.Dalmacio answered in the
affirmative and even told him: Please put some gasoline in it and I will go to my in-law. [16] One of the
witnesses, Joseph Estrada, testified that on the day of the alleged incident, he saw the accused speaking
with Dalmacio. Afterwards, he saw Dalmacio alight from the tricycle, then the accused took over the
drivers seat and left in the direction of Lingayen. Dalmacio then boarded a jeepney bound for Dagupan.
Estrada testified that during the conversation of the accused and Dalmacio, he heard no shouts or
altercation between the two. [17] The defense claimed that the accused merely borrowed the tricycle from
Dalmacio. However, when accused was about to return the same, he hit a stone, lost control of the
tricycle and bumped a tree.[18] Three persons came and helped him bring the tricycle back to the roadside.
[19]
The accused returned the tricycle at around 11:00 pm of the same day to the Spouses Garcia. The
defense did not deny that the tricycle, when returned, was damaged and, in fact, the accused voluntarily
paid the amount of P8,000.00 as partial remuneration for the repair which was estimated to
cost P25,000.00.[20]

In its Decision dated April 6, 2001, the trial court acquitted accused Joseph Terrado for failure of
the prosecution to establish intent to take the tricycle and intent to gain from the same. Thus, the court
held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment

ACQUITTING the accused Joseph Terrado for violation of R.A. 6538 otherwise known as
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.

However, as regard the civil liability of accused Joseph Terrado, the [court]
hereby orders him to pay the complainant Marilyn Garcia the following: 1) Actual
damages amounting toP25,000.00 P8,000.00 = P17,000.00 and 2) Moral damages
amounting to P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

The prosecution filed a Motion

Resolution[22] dated May 21, 2001.

for

Reconsideration [21] which

the

trial

court

denied

in

Aggrieved, the complainants come to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision dated April 6, 2001.

The issues which the petitioners raise before the Court may be summarized as follows:

1.

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF RA 6538 OTHERWISE

KNOWN AS ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972;

2.

WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED

DECISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION.

The petitioners allege that there was misapprehension of facts, and that the trial court reached its
conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures, and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction as the judgment of acquittal was rendered on dubious factual
and legal basis.

The trial courts decision is being questioned before us through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Court. It may be noted that the petition was filed by the private prosecutor and without
the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General.

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[23]

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or
to act at all in contemplation of law.[24]

While petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
imputation is premised on the averment that the trial court reached its conclusions based on speculation,
surmises and conjectures. As alleged by the petitioners, the accused forcibly took the vehicle from the
complainants driver and the public respondent acquitted the accused for alleged failure to meet the
element of intent to gain.[25] Specifically, the allegations delve on the misapprehension of facts by the trial
court. Petitioners were persistent that the records of the trial be reviewed, as they were not convinced by
the validity of the trial courts factual conclusion.

It should be remembered that, as a rule, factual matters cannot be normally inquired into by the
Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. As earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not
the province of the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of appeal.
[26]

At least, the mistakes ascribed to the trial court are not errors of jurisdiction correctible by the
special civil action for certiorari, but errors of judgment, which is correctible by a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The mere fact that a court erroneously decides
a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that the trial court
committed a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has
jurisdiction over the case.[27] For this reason, the dismissal of the instant petition is called for.

In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal may be allowed
in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, and more serious than the
procedural infraction, if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a
quo, we would run afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount

to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, which is proscribed by the Constitution, the Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.[28] Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as
absolutely final and irreviewable. The fundamental philosophy behind the principle is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and to safeguard him from government oppression
through the abuse of criminal processes. [29]

This Court cannot rule any other way. Accused Joseph Terrado, after being acquitted of the crime
charged, must be afforded the protection against repeated attempts for conviction, in faithful adherence to
the constitutional rule against double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

Spouses Algura v.The Local Government Spouses Algura v.The Local Government Unit of the City of
Naga: Unit of the City of Naga:* Access to Justice by the Impoverished Algura v. The Local Government
Unit of the City of Naga was a case that involved the litigants privilege as indigents to seek exemption
from the payment of docket and legal fees. The Court recognized that one of the most precious rights
which may be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the

underprivileged, and the marginalized. Filing fees, though essential in court procedures, should not be an
obstacle to poor litigants opportunity to seek redress for their grievances before the courts. The Facts On
September 1, 1999, Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S. J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint for
damages against the Naga City government and its officers. They alleged that the defendants had caused
the illegal demolition of their residence, thus depriving them of income in the form of monthly rentals
amounting to P7,000 paid by their boarders. Accompanying the Complaint was petitioners ex parte
Motion to institute action as indigent litigants. To this Motion was appended Antonio Alguras pay slip
showing a gross monthly income of P10,474.00 and a net pay of P3,616.99 for the month of July 1999.
Also attached was a certification by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, stating that petitioners
had no property declared in their names for taxation purposes. The city government filed a Motion to
Disqualify the spouses for nonpayment of filing fees. Respondents had asserted that in addition to the net
income of Antonio, who was a member of the Philippine National Police, Lorencita had a ministore and a
computer shop on the ground floor of their residence. Allegedly, petitioners were not indigent litigants, as
they also derived additional income from several boarders who paid them rentals, according to
respondents. On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners from being
recognized as indigent litigants. They had allegedly failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from
payment of legal fees and from compliance with the third paragraph of Section 18 of Rule 141 of the
Revised Rules of Court, directing them to pay the requisite filing fees. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. On May 5, 2000, the trial court issued an Order giving them the opportunity to comply
with Section 18 of Rule 141, which had laid down the requisites for qualifying as an indigent litigant.
Petitioners subsequently submitted their Compliance, to which was attached the Affidavits of Petitioner
Lorencita Algura and one Erlinda Bangate. In her Affidavit, Lorencita claimed that the demolition of their
small dwelling deprived them of a monthly income amounting to P7,000. This situation forced them,
including their six minor children, to rely mainly on her husbands P3,500 monthly salary as a policeman.
She said that the familys basic necessities could not be covered sufficiently by this salary, the meager
income from her small sari-sari store, and the rentals from some boarders. Furthermore, they did not own
any real property, as certified by the Naga City assessors office. On the other hand, Erlinda Bangate
attested under oath that she personally knew the Algura spouses, who were her neighbors. She
corroborated Lorencitas statements. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Naga City
RTC. The lower court held that the gross income or total earnings of the Alguras amounted to P10,474,
which was over and above the amount of P3,000 a month set under Rule 141, Section 18, for pauper
litigants residing outside Metro Manila. Nowhere in her Affidavit did Lorencita deny that she and her
immediate family earned a gross income of P3,000. The Issue The Alguras raised the solitary issue of
whether they should be considered indigent litigants qualified for exemption from the payment of filing
fees. The Courts Ruling Tracing the history of the Rules of Court on suits in forma pauperis (pauper
litigant), the High Court, through Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.,[1] clarified the pertinent rules as
follows: 1. When an application to litigate as an indigent party is filed, the court shall scrutinize the
affidavits and supporting documents submitted, in order to determine if the income and property
standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141 have been met. The court must determine if:
(1) the applicants gross income and that of the immediate family do not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee; and (2) the applicant does not own real property with a fair
market value of more than P300,000. If the trial court finds that these income and property requirements
have been met, it automatically grants the applicant the authority to litigate as an indigent litigant, and the
grant is a matter of right. 2. If the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, it shall
set a hearing to enable the presentation of proof that the applicant has no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. In that hearing, the
adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant.
Afterwards, the trial court will rule on the application, depending on these presentations. Section 21 of
Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may still contest the grant of the authority later, at any time

before judgment is rendered by the trial court. This challenge may be based on newly discovered
evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing that the
party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and
other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the
time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without
prejudice to other sanctions the court may impose. In the instant case, the Affidavits and Certifications
submitted by Petitioners Algura showed that they did not own real property; hence, the property
requirement was met. With respect to the income requirement, however, it was clear that the combined
gross monthly incomes of Antonio and Lorencita -- in the amounts of P10,474 and P3,000 respectively -were above the P1,500 monthly income threshold prescribed by the earlier Rule 141. As the income
requirement was not satisfied, the trial court should have set a hearing to give the Alguras the opportunity
to prove that they had no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family. Because of the failure of the RTC to set a hearing for the Motion of
the spouses to litigate as paupers, its Orders disqualifying them from doing so were set aside by the
Supreme Court.

Spouses Antonio and Lorencita Algura vs City of Naga

November 28, 2013
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506 SCRA 81 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Rule 141 Indigent Litigants

In 1999, the City of Naga demolished a portion of the house owned by spouses Antonio and Lorencita
Algura for allegedly being a nuisance as the said portion of the house was allegedly blocking the road
right of way.
In September, the spouses then sued Naga for damages arising from the said demolition (loss of income
from boarders), which to the spouses is an illegal demolition. Simultaneous to their complaint was an exparte motion for them to litigate as indigent litigants. The motion was granted and the spouses were
exempted from paying the required filing fees.
In February 2000, during pre-trial, the City of Naga asked for 5 days within which to file a Motion to
Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants. Under the Rules of Court (then Sec. 16, Rule 141), a party
may be qualified as a pauper litigant (for those residing outside Metro Manila) if he submits an affidavit
attesting that a.) his gross monthly income does not exceed P1,500.00 (now not more than double the
monthly minimum wage) and b.) he should not own property with an assessed value of not more than
P18,000.00 (now not more than P300k market value). The City asserted that the combined income of the
Alguras is at least P13,400 which is way beyond the threshold P1.5k. The City presented as proof
Antonios pay slip as a policeman (P10,400) and Lorencitas estimated income from her sari-sari store.
The claim of the spouses that they were property-less, as proven by the City Assessors Certification, was
not disputed by the City.
The spouses argued that since the boarding house was demolished by the city, they only relied on the
income of Antonio which was barely enough to cover their familys need like food, shelter, and other basic
necessities for them and their family (they have 6 children).
The judge, however, granted the motion of the City and so the spouses were disqualified as pauperlitigants. Subsequently, the case filed by the spouses against the City was dismissed for the spouses
failure to pay the required filing fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses should be disqualified as pauper-litigants.
HELD: No, there was no hearing on the matter hence the case was remanded back to the lower court. In
this case, the Supreme Court reconciled the provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19, Rule 141 (then
Sec. 16, Rule 141).
Sec. 21, Rule 3, merely provides a general statement that indigent litigants may not be required to pay the
filing fees. On the other hand, Sec. 19, Rule 141 provides the specific standards that a party must meet
before he can be qualified as an indigent party and thus be exempt from paying the required fees.
If Sec. 19, Rule 141 (in this case, then Sec. 16, Rule 141) is strictly applied, then the spouses could not
qualify because their income exceeds P1.5k, which was the threshold prior to 2000. But if Sec. 21, Rule 3
is to be applied, the applicant (the Spouses) should be given a chance in a hearing to satisfy the court
that notwithstanding the evidence presented by the opposing party (Naga), they have no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and other basic necessities for their family, and are thus,
qualified as indigent litigants under said Rule. Therefore, the court should have conducted a trial in order
to let the spouses satisfy the court that indeed the income theyre having, even though above the P1.5k
limit, was not sufficient to cover food, shelter, and their other basic needs.

G.R. No. 175430 : June 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. KERRY LAO ONG, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. Ong alleged in his petition that he
has been a "businessman/business manager" since 1989, earning an average annual income of
P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated
from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business.
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997. Based on these
returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for
1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997. On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition.
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for
granting Ong's petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession
or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation
that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His
income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of
his profession or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all
attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has
not declared owning a family home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the
circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a
definite and existing business or trade.
The appellate court dismissed the Republic's appeal. The appellate court denied the Republic's motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession
or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: naturalization
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public
interest.Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of law.
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in

the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of
charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization."
It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only
the applicant's income; his or her spouses income should not be included in the assessment. The
spouses additional income is immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess
some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen."
Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant's qualifications must be determined as of the time
of the filing of his petition.
A review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the factual existence of the applicant's qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire
records of the naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "[a]
naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and
given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for
naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another
opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res
judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of
naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the
same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters
brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower
court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate
for the purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and
extant jurisprudence." In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review
of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a "known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for naturalization.
Republic won the case.

VILANDO VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese
citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization
of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a
persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

toral tribunal (2011)

EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011 ]

RENALD F. VILANDO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1 st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent,
Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged
that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father
was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichongs father. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC,
Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.
COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes,
COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however,
notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation
announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is
in compliance withResolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the
proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras petition arguing
that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction over the
matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
Issues:
WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines
Held:
1.
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her
motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the
COMELECs Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no
impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2.

The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before
it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in
a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latters election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250
of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members.

3.

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing
law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the
presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino

absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of
transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voter's
affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in
2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re:Florencio Mallare,
elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We
note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973
Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with
the 1935 Constitution.
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of
the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives
representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:32 PM
G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship; Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]
FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for,
be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros
Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born
citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In
the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the
highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because
her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for
the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial
defects.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based
on citizenship.
RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be in
accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State,
through the Solicitor General or the representative designated by statute, that may question in the

appropriate denaturalization proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of
office, and she was allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction
over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of the
OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.
3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification
based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure.