Matthews vs. Taylor G.R. no.

164584

facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject,
married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.[4] On June 9, 1989, while
their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 squaremeter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,
for and in consideration of P129,000.00.[5] The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin.[6] Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed
improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist
resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.[7] All required permits and licenses for the
operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
[8]
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and
otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.

Issue: can an alien nullify a lease contract entered into by his filipina wife over a land
bought during their marriage?

ruling: No, he does not have any right, Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited
from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn
appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she
acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it
was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses
can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of
the conjugal/community property of the spouses.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael

G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001

Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners
of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his
mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which
the latter waived her share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in
his name. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked
his niece Leticia, the latters cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care
of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila
and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the
same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On
the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an instrument denominated Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to
Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the faithful services she had rendered
over the past ten years. Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a
complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and
heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife
of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco
Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons
lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion
is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the
Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation
inter vivos is considered null and void.

Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)

FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After
the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the
donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and
were simply cohabitating.

ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on
donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of
undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there
is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.The
court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights
to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were
legitimated by marriage.

Wong vs. IAC

GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991

FACTS:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even
during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living
separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a
parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate.
Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter
consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return
the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina
issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of
funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of
money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed
was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of
execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction
to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such
redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ
and levy of execution.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied
through the conjugal property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal
with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the
marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan.
Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that
they are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living
separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against
Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the
judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as
she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the
administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before
said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the
debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.

Partosa-Jo vs CA
GR 82606, December 18, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent.
The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima
filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in
addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a
definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial
separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings
of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of
cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178
of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for
her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for
him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She
even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation
of conjugal property.

HELD:

SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary
modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must
be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of
perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to
provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties,
coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their
conjugal property.
Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court
ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and
share alike. The division will be implemented after the determination of all the
properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have
been illegally registered in the name of the persons.

Johnson & Johnson (Phils.) Inc. vs. Court Of Appeals And Alejo M. Vinluan
G.R. No. 102692 23 September 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
On several occasions in 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of
Johnson & Johnson, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson
products, among others. The defendants, under the name and style of Vinluan
Enterprises, thus incurred an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven
Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates. However,
the checks were dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Several
extensions were given to the spouses to settle the obligation. On 05 January 1983, the
defendant spouses made a partial payment of P5,000.00, but made no further
payments afterwards. The trial court found that Alejo Vinluan, had no privity of contract,
whether direct or indirect, regarding those obligations incurred by his wife, as he only
became a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises after the obligations involved in this action
had been incurred by Delilah. In addition, said obligations were contracted without the
husbands knowledge or consent, and that the conjugal partnership never derived
benefit therefrom.
The trial court decided that Alejo should not be held liable for the obligations incurred by
his wife without his knowledge or consent. However, when notices of levy on execution
were issued, these covered not only Delilahs exclusive or paraphernal properties, but
also the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Vinluan.
This has caused Alejo to file a third-party claim, which was denied by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of the trial court denying private respondents third-party claim
and motion to quash levy on execution in effect amended the dispositive portion of the
trial courts decision which had long become final and executory.
HELD:
NO, THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT, IN THE GUISE OF DECIDING THE THIRD-PARTY
CLAIM, REVERSE ITS FINAL DECISION.
In order to bind the conjugal partnership and its properties, the law provides that the
debts and obligations contracted must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership; and
that the husband must consent to his wifes engaging in business. The text of the trial
courts decision points to no other person liable but Delilah Vinluan, and in fact made a
rather lengthy discussion on the exemption from liability of the conjugal partnership;
hence, there can be no ambiguity to speak of in the decision. And even more clearly,
the body of the decision of the trial court expressly exempted private respondent from
liability by categorically ruling that the defendant-husband cannot, together, with the codefendant legally be made liable for the obligations contracted by the wife.

Arturo Abalos vs Galicano Macatangay, Jr.

439 SCRA 649 Civil Law Law on Sales Option Earnest Money

Arturo and Esther Abalos were husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in Makati.
On June 2, 1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney, executed a
Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano Macatangay, Jr. in which
Arturo acknowledged he received a P5k check from Galicano as earnest money to be
deducted from the purchase price and that Arturo binds himself to sell the land to
Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k. The purchase price agreed upon was
P1.3 M. However, the P5k check was dishonored due to insufficiency.
Apparently however, Esther and Arturo were having a rocky relationship. Esther
executed a SPA in favor of her sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal
property to Galicano. It was alleged that that the RMOA is not valid for Esthers
signature was not affixed thereto. And that Esther never executed a SPA in favor of
Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has prepared a check to cover the
remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He demanded that the land
be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the
spouses.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano.
Whether or not the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding and
that it cured the defect of the earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano.

HELD: No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At best,
the agreement between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to purchase to
Galicano. The promise to sell is not binding to Arturo for there was actually no
consideration distinct from the price. Be it noted that the parties considered the P5k as
an earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price.
Assuming arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still not
binding for Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a legal
tender.
Still assuming arguendo, that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly
perfected a contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esthers signature was not
affixed. The property is conjugal and under the Family Code, the spouses consents are
required. Further, the earnest money here is not actually the earnest money
contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil Code.
The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier
transaction between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.