The Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam

Author(s): Eric R. Wolf

Source: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter, 1951), pp. 329-356
Published by: University of New Mexico
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3628510
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SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL
OF ANTHROPOLOGY
VOLUME 7

NUMBER 4

WINTER

1951

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF MECCA

AND THE ORIGINS OF ISLAM
ERIC R. WOLF
INTRODUCTION

THE PRESENT PAPER attempts to analyze some aspects of the early developmentof Islam in terms of certain anthropologicalconcepts. It would
like to take issue with the popularview best expressedin the wordsof Harrison1
that "Mohammedanismis little more than the Bedouin mind projectedinto the
realm of religion." It is concernedprimarilywith the change from a type of
society organizedon the basis of kin relationshipsto a type of society possessed
of an organized,if rudimentary,state. It will attempt to show that this change
took place in an urbanenvironmentand was causally connectedwith the spread
of trade. No cross-culturalcomparisonswill be attempted, though it is hoped
that the material presentedmay have applicabilityelsewhere,especially in the
study of areasin which settled populationsand pastoralpeoples interact.
Many writershave dealt with the rise of Islam primarilyin termsof diffusion.
Thus Torrey analyzed"the Jewish foundationsof Islam."2Bell dealt with "the
origin of Islam in its Christianenvironment."3HirschbergdiscussedJewish and
Christian teaching in pre-IslamicArabia and early Islamic times.4 Grimme,
Nielsen, and Philby have tracedIslamic elementsto southernArabia as the prin.
cipal source of diffusion.5Kroeberhas included Islam in the "exclusive-monotheisticpattern"which is said to characterizeJudaism,Christianity,and Mohammedanismand serves as an instance of his concept of "systemicpatterns" of
diffusion.6The work of these writersis aimed at an understandingof the deriva1 Harrison, 1924, p. 42.
3 Bell, 1926.
5 Grimme, 1892; Nielsen, 1927; Philby, 1947.
329

2 Torrey, 1933.
4 Hirschberg, 1939.
6 Kroeber,1948, p. 314.

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SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

tion of some of the culture elements utilized by Islam, or has pointed to the
existenceof elementsanalogousto Islam in other religious traditionsdeveloped
within the same generalarea.
Our presentemphasisis somewhatdifferent.We are interestedprimarilyin
the way in which people relate themselvesto each other in terms of the material
culturallyavailableto them, and how such systemsof relationshipchangedue to
the impact of internal and external factors. The present approachis thus functional and historical.It is also evolutionary.The writer is interestedin one case
history,to show up certainchangesin social organizationwhich appearto occur
at the thresholdof transitionfrom one level of organizationto another.
The presentationdoes not aspire in any way to completeness.It must needs
disregardlarge areas of culture which are peripheralto the present problem.
Thus, for example,the change in the position of women from pre-Islamictimes
to the period of Islam has been disregardedhere. Certain areas of culture are
isolated for observation,so that hypotheseson the characterof systemicchange
may be derived.
THE ECONOMICBASIS OF MECCAN SOCIETY

During the first century AD, the discovery of the regular change of the
monsoon made possible the rise of regular coastwisetrade around the Arabian
peninsula.This loweredfreight ratessufficientlyto cause the main overlandroute
from Yemen to Syria to lose much of its importance.While most of the coastwise
tradepassedinto non-Arabhands, the Arab inhabitantsof the Hejaz seized what
was left of the carryingtrade along the main caravanroute. This marginaleconomic developmentled to the establishmentof a permanentsettlement in the
valley of Mecca, aroundthe year 400 AD.7
This permanentsettlementwas founded by membersof the tribe of Koreish,
an impoverishedsubdivisionof the larger pastoraltribe Kinana. Before settling
at Mecca, the Koreishlived as pastoralnomadsin scatteredmigratorykin groups
which added to their livelihood by selling protectionto passing caravans.8The
social organizationof these groups appearsto have followed the general pattern
of such organizationamong the Bedouins of the pre-Islamicperiod. They were
"local groups habituallymoving together,"9composedof a chief and his family,
free families,protectedstrangerswho were not blood relatives,and slaves.10The
chief, usually the oldest or most respectedmale of the group, was responsible
7 Lammens, 1926, p. 13.
9 Smith, 1903, p. 43.

8 Lammens, 1928, p. 239.

10 Levy, 1933, vol. 1, p. 278.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

331

for the care of poor, widows, and orphans,for hospitalityto strangers,for payments of blood money,1l and for the maintenanceof order within the group.12
Yet, then as now, "it is only in war, or on the march,which is conductedwith all
the precautionsof war, that the sheikh of a tribe exercisesan active authority."13
Chief and free families were linked together by bonds of kinship. Those individuals who travelled with the group but were not blood relatives of the rest
were tied to them by a numberof ritual kin relationshipswhich we shall have
occasion to discuss more fully at a later point. These relationshipsenabled the
componentelements of the group to "combineon the model or principleof an
associationof kindred,"14and made it possible for outsidersto "feign themselves
to be descended from the same stock as the people on whom they were
engrafted." 15

The name of Koreish has received two interpretations,both of sociological

ratherthan etymologicalinterest. One interpretationtraces the name back to a
word meaning "to collect together."The Koreish are said to carry this name,
either because their ancestor "collected together" all migratory kinship units
around an already existing religioussanctuaryat Mecca16 or becausethey "collected together commoditiesfrom all sides for sale."'7 Another interpretation
derivesthe name from a word meaning "to trade and make profit."'8 The two
interpretationsadequatelycharacterizethe Koreish as a tribe of traders, living
in a permanent settlement.

The settled characterof their life set them off from the pastoralnomads of
the desert,those who "stayedon the heights of the Hedjaz."'1 "They have lived
in towns, when only the heads of the Benu Amr lived in them, and others still
led an unsettled existence.They have built many habitationsin them, and dug
wells," sang one pre-Islamicpoet.20Another said that if he had chosen to stay
with the Koreish,he would not have had to wanderabout the desertin search of
pasture, spending the night at "brackish water . . . in an evil lodging."2l The

Koreishthemselvesset up
a set of arbitraryregulationsof the followingkind; they declaredthemselvesexempt
from the obligationwhichrequiredthat they make sour milk, turn milk into butter,
and live in tentsmadeof camelhair,thus renouncingall the customsof the Bedouin
desert nomads,from whom they wanted to distinguishthemselvescompletely."22
11
13
15
17
19
21

Procksch, 1899, pp. 7-9.

Smith, 1903, p. 68.
Idem, p. 126.
Idem, p. 25.
Ibn Hisham, 1864, p. 85.
Mufaddaliyit, 1918, p. 254

12
14
16
18
20
22

Ashkenazi, 1946-49, p. 665

Maine, 1888, p. 127.
Wiistenfeld, 1864, p. 28.
Ibn Hisham, 1864, vol. 1, p. 46
Ibid.
Caetani, 1905, p. 148

332

SOUTHWESTERN

JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

The permanentsettlementat Mecca existed solely for the purposesof commerce.A pre-Islamicpoet testifiedto this:
If Mecca had any attractionsto offer, Himyariteprincesat the head of their
armieswould long since have hurriedthere.There winterand summerare equally
desolate.No bird flies over Mecca,no grassgrows.There are no wild beaststo be
hunted.Only the mostmiserableof all occupationsflourishesthere,trade.23
When Mohammedattemptedto ruin Mecca by destroyingits Syrian trade, after
his flight from Mecca to Medina,a merchantof the Koreishclan of Umaiya said:
Mohammedhas stoppedup our trade,his men do not leave the coast clear,and
the inhabitantshave a pact with them and are largelyin understanding
with them,
so we don'tknowwhereto go; but if we remainat home,we shall eat up our capital
and cannotmaintainourselvesin Mecca over a long periodof time, becauseit is
only a settlementfor the purposeof carryingon trade,with Syria in the summer
timeand with Abyssiniain winter.24
Without trade, the Meccanswould have perishedin their "unfruitful valley."25
The Koreishappearto have becomethe dominanttradersin westernArabia
by stages. First, they sold protectionto caravans.Then they began to offer wares
"for sale along the overland routes leading through their territory."26Finally,
they entered the large markets located outside their area, coming into direct
tradecontactswith Syria and Abyssinia,27and with Persia.28The Koreish
skimmedthe fat off the fairs of the neighboringplaces. Mina, Maganna,Dhul
Magaz and not least Ukaz were like outpostsof Meccantrade.In all these places
we find the Koreish;they concentrated
businessin theirhands.The esteemin which
they were held can be seen from the fact that the weaponswhich had to be surrenderedfor the durationof the marketsand the pilgrimagewere depositedwith a
Koreish.29
The Koreish thus played an importantpart in centralizingthe economyof the
peninsula.Their trading venturesturned Mecca into "a city, secure and at ease,
to which supplies come from every side";30into a "place of crowding";31filled
with "their movements,their comings and goings";32into "the mother city."33
The main article of trade carriednorth from Mecca was leather, especially
tanned camel, cattle, and gazelle hides,34productsof numeroustannerieslocated
23
25
27
29
31
33

Essad Bey, 1936, p. 44.

Koran 14, 40; p. 229.
Ibid.
Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 3, p. 88.
Idem, 3, 90; p. 395.
Idem, 42, 5; p. 271.

24
26
28
30
32
34

Wakidi, 1882, p. 100.

Wistenfeld, 1864, p. 35.
Idem, p. 38.
Koran 16, 113; p. 208.
Idem, 3, 196; p. 405.
Sprenger, 1869, vol. 3, p. 94.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

333

in the towns betweenTaif and Aden. Other export items were preciousmetals,
dry raisins, and incense.35Items of trade carried to Mecca were cereals, oil,
wine, mule skins, silk, and luxury goods.36
Large amountsof capital were investedin this trade. Caravanscomprisedup
to 2,500 camels37and were valued up to 50,000 mithkal, or the equivalentof
2,250 kg of gold.38Sprengerhas attempted to calculate the annual volume of
trade flowingin and out of Mecca:
We mustassumethatthe Meccanssent annuallymorethan 1,200,000kg of goods
to Syria,and importedas muchfrom there.But we set the value at only 10 mithkal
per 100 kg, becausethey also tradedin cereals.Exportand importin this direction
amountedto roughlya quarterof a millionmithkal[or the equivalentof 11,250kg
of gold]. If tradewith the southwas of equalimportance,then they had an annual
turnoverof half a million.The profitswere seldomless than 50 percent,and thus
they earneda pureincrementof at least250,000mithkal.39
The sums of needed capital for these operations were brought together
through the "developmentof credit institutions [by means of which] the most
humblesums could be turnedinto capital down to the participationof a dinar or
a piece of gold, or even . . . half a ducat of gold."40"Few caravansset forth
in which the whole population, men and women, had not a financial interest.
On their return, every one received a part of the profits proportionateto his
stake and the numberof shares subscribed."41Thus, for example,a caravanin
the year 624 AD
numbered1,000 camels,almost every man of Koreishhad participatedin it, even
if only with smallstakes.50,000dinarsare said to have been investedin it; most of
it belongingto the familyof Sa'idb. al Oc Abu Uxaixa, eitherhis own or borrowed
in returnfor a shareof half the profit.The Banu Makzumare said to havehad 200
camelsand 4000 to 5000 mithkalof gold investedin it, al Xarithb. Amirb. Naufal
and Umayya b. Xalaf each 1000 mithkal. A numberof caravans,belongingto
individualMeccanfamilies,were unitedin this one caravan;the marketdestination
was Gaza.42

This "union of the Koreish,their union in equippingcaravanswinter and summer"43centralizedtrading operationsin the hands of the few best equippedto
carryon such large-scaleventures.
35 Lammens,1928,pp. 22-23;Sprenger,1869,p. 95.
36 Lammens,1928,pp. 22-23;Sprenger,1869,p. 95.
38 Idem,p. 39.
37 Wakidi, 1882,p. 34
40 Lammens,1924,p. 233.
39 Sprenger,1869,p. 96.
42 Wakidi, 1882,p. 39.
41 Lammens,1926,p. 16
43 Koran61, 1; p. 36.

SOUTHWESTERN

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JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Money in this society had not yet reached the stage of the universalcommodity. Yet precious metals served as a means by which the value of other
commoditiescould be measured.Byzantineand Persian coins were in use,44and
gold was mined in the Hejaz.45As yet, however,"it was not customaryto buy
and sell with them [coins] except by consideringthe coins as bullion,"46i.e. by
weighing ratherthan by counting them. This may perhapsbe attributedto the
lack of a centralpolitical power whose imprintmight have served to standardize
the value of the different coins in circulation.At any rate, commoditieslike
food, milk, and wine were sold.47Bad harvestsaround Mecca are said to have
caused the prices of bread to rise.48Clothing was sold.49Abu Sufyan is said
to have sold a house for 400 dinars,with 100 dinars for down-payment,and the
rest payablein installments.50Slaves were sold in what was Arabia'slargest slave
market.51Camels obtained in raids were sold in the open market in Mecca,52
and the price of horses is said to have been determinedby market conditions.53
Camelswerehiredout for caravanduty.54Ransomwas calculatedin moneyterms
on certainoccasions.55Certain occupations,such as sheepherding,guiding caravans, wall building,leeching,etc., were paid in wages.56While wages in Medina
were usually paid in kind, in Mecca they were usually paid in money.57
Credit,pricing,and wagesset up relationshipsbetweenindividualsand groups
of individuals which were not comprisedwithin the preceding system of kin
relationships.Under the impact of commercialdevelopment, Meccan society
changed from a social order determinedprimarilyby kinship and characterized
by considerablehomogeneityof ethnic origin into a social order in which the
fiction of kinship served to mask a developing division of society into classes,
possessedof considerableethnic diversity
Accumulationof wealth and powerin some clans of the Koreishtribedivided
the Koreishinto rich and poor. To some extent, this was mirroredin the pattern
of settlement.58The two dominantKoreishclans, Makhzum and Umaiya, occupied the "innercity" aroundthe centralsanctuaryof the Ka'ba, and were called
"Koreishof the center."The other eight and poorerKoreishclans occupiedthe
44
46
47
48
50
52
54
56
57

45 Buhl, 1930, p. 51.

Baladhuri, 1916-24, p. 233
Baladhuri, 1916-24.
Ibn Hisham, 1864, vol. 2, pp. 3, 7; Mufaddaliyat,, 1918, p. 34.
49 Ibn Hisham, 1864, p. 9.
Wiistenfeld, 1864, p. 36.
51 Lammens, 1928, p. 12.
Wakidi, 1882, p. 340.
53 Mufaddaliyat, 1918, p. 308.
Ibn Hisham, 1864, pp. 21-22.
55 Wakidi, 1882, p. 76.
Idem, p. 318.
Bukhari, 1903-14, vol. 2, pp. 62-64; Sprenger, 1869, vol. 1, p. 275.
58 Wiistenfeld, 1864, pp. 58-75, passim.
Sprenger, 1869, vol. 3, p. 141.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

335

"outer city" and were called "Koreishof the outskirts." The real functional
units of Meccan society, however,were no longer clans as such, nor localized
groupsof kin, but clustersof rich merchants,their familiesand their dependents.
The dependentpopulation was made up of several groups. Differentiationof
status, minor among the pastoralnomads,assumedmajor importancein Mecca.
First, there were the slaves.Secondly,there existed a group of mercenaries,many
of whom were of slave origin.59Thirdly, merchantsmaintained the necessary
personnel for their caravans.Fourthly, there were middlemen,like the future
Caliph Omar. Fifthly, there were people who had come under the domination
of the wealthythroughdebts, like the dependentsof al-'Abbaswho had brought
them under his sway through usury.60Sixthly, there existed a group of people
who workedfor wages. Finally, there were the clients or protectedpersons,called
mawall (sing. mawla).
This group of clients deserves special consideration.A client stood in a
relationof dependency,called Jiwar, to a patronor protector.The word for client
is derived from a root signifying "closeness."Two kinds of closenesswere distinguished.A pre-Islamicpoet speaks of "cousinsof our cousins, of the same
stock by birth, and a cousin knit to us by an oath."61Clients, called cousins by
oath, are contrastedwith cousins by birth.62The client-patronrelationshipin
its pure form involved a tie of ritual kinship, sealed by comminglingof blood
and by an oath swornat the centralreligioussanctuary,the Ka'ba.63
Within Mecca, there were thirteenmajor groups of clients, each affiliatedto
a patron family or patron clan.64The clients were of diverseorigins. Some were
freed slaves.65Others were outlaws from tribal groups who sought refuge. Some
were individualswho had moved into the protectionof the group through matrilocal marriage.Some were adoptedpersons.66
Just as settlementin Mecca was nominallyorganizedon a genealogicalbasis,
with two clans at the center and eight clans at the outskirts,so the functioning
social groups within Meccansociety tended to be formallyorganizedon the principle of the fiction of kinship by blood. This fiction was the only means by
which, apart from slavery, individualscould be related to each other. Within
the social clusters,the clientsrepresenteda group not linked by birth but through
ritualkin arrangements.
Due to the commercialorientationof Meccan society, this patron-clienttie,
59 Lammens, 1928, p. 244.
61 Mufaddaliyit, 1918, p. 34.

63 Smith,1903,pp. 50-51.
65 Smith,1903,p. 51.

60 Buhl, 1930, p. 109.

62 Goldziher, 1889, vol. 1, p. 105.

64 Wiistenfeld,1864,pp. 59-75,passim.
66 Idem,pp. 49-52,passim.

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

336

formally based on a fictional relation of kin, actually took on more and more
the guise of an exploitativerelationbetweenmembersof different class groups.
This relationshipwas reinforcedby the prevalenceof wage-paymentand by the
institutionof debt slavery.67It has been pointed out repeatedlythat the bulk of
Mohammed'sfirst convertscame from this group of clients and from the slaves
of the city.68Caetani has even argued that Mohammedhimself was a client of
the Koreish,ratherthan a blood relative,69and in this he is supportedby a curious
remarkby Mohammed:"And they say, 'Had but this Koranbeen sent down to
some great one of the two cities .. .!',",70as well as by other evidence.71When
Mohammed first embarkedon his career, the excitementamong the slaves of
Mecca was so intense that a leading slave owner who had one hundred slaves
removedthem from the city becausehe fearedthat they might becomeconverts.72
When MohammedbesiegedTaif, he called on the slaves of the town to desert
to his camp wherethey would receivetheir freedom.73
The mechanismof kinship betweenpatron and client providedbacking for
the individualwho was poor or powerless.It put the weight of a powerful group
of ritual kin behind him. The isolated individual without such backing was
exposed to attack or to unobstructedkilling in a blood feud.74 Yet the same
mechanismwas also potentially disruptive of social stability. If a client was
attacked,the protectinggroup had to make a show of force. This demonstration
of force, in turn, involved the protecting group in every-wideningcircles of
conflict.For example,during an encounterbetweenMohammedand the Koreish,
the client of a leading Koreishmerchantwas killed by the Muslims. His brother
demandedthat the dead man's patron exercisethe duty of blood revenge.The
merchanttried to avoid this duty, fully cognizant of the fact that its exercise
would only involve Mecca more deeply in war with the Muslims,but was forced
to give in.75 Like the relationshipbetween sworn allies (hilf) which involved
mutual aid between two equal parties and which we shall touch on more fully
later, the relations between patron and client acted as a double-edgedsword.
The extensionof kinship bonds to the individualmerely increasedthe possibility
of conflictbetweengroups organizedon the kinshipmodel.
As Mecca came to be characterizedby growing heterogeneityof status, its
populationalso becamemoreheterogeneousethnically.Mentionis made of Syrian
67
68
69
71
72
74

Lammens, 1924, pp. 236-237.

Caetani, 1905, p. 240; Procksch, 1899, pp. 81-82,
70 Koran, 43, 30; p. 136.
Caetani, 1905, pp. 68-69.
Caetani, 1905, pp. 233-234, note 1 to p. 225.
73 Encylopediaof Islam, vol. 1, p. 80.
Sprenger, 1851, p. 159.
75 Procksch, 1899, p. 38.
Buhl, 1930, pp. 36-37.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

337

caravanleaders; of travelling monks and curers; of Syrian merchants;foreign

smiths and healers; Copt carpenters;Negro idol sculptors; Christian doctors,
surgeons, dentists and scribes; Christian women married into a Koreish clan;
Abyssinian sailors and mercenaries.76Abyssinian, Mesopotamian, Egyptian,
Syrian, and Byzantineslaves were sold in the marketplace.77The market center
of Mecca exercisedan attractionon groups and individualsbeyond the Arabian
periphery,as well as within the confinesof the peninsulaitself.
RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT IN MECCAN SOCIETY

Economicdevelopmentset off relatedtendenciesin the field of religion.Gibb

has spoken of "the abandonmentof local shrinesand the growingpracticeof pilgrimageto central shrinesveneratedby groups of tribes (of which the Ka'ba in
Mecca was one of the most important)."78
The leading Koreishheld the rankingpositions in the Meccan religioushierarchy as well as the dominant positions in the economic system. The Umaiya
clan, especially,appearsto have owed its predominance,at least in part, to its
possession of special religious prerogativesin the past. One pre-Islamicpoet
swears "by the holy month of the sons of Umaiya" and another is quoted as
saying that the Banu Umaiya in Koreish were like the [priestly] family of
the Banu Khafajahin the tribeof 'Uqail.79At any rate, the stronglymonopolistic
characterof this Koreish religious oligarchy is evident in their attempt to pass
their religiousofficesdown to their first born in the direct line of descent.80The
major offices,that of the priesthood,the presidencyof the council house, and the
officesconcernedwith the distributionof food and water to the pilgrims, were
apparentlydeveloped by the Koreish themselves,and were preemptedby them.
Three minor officeswhich seem to have been traditionalin the worship of the
Ka'ba8s were held by three minor tribal groups. The religious society of the
Hums, again headed by the Koreish,further served to reinforcetheir dominance
in the religioussphere.82
Like other Arabian sanctuaries,the Ka'ba was surroundedby a sacred area,
called the haram.Within this precinctno blood could be shed. As the economic
importanceof Mecca grew, the Koreish self-consciouslysought to extend the
sacredprecinctas a means for increasingthe stability of social relationsin their
76
78
80
81
82

77 Idem, pp. 18-19.

Lammens, 1928, pp. 12-32, passim.
79 Mufaddaliyat, 1918, pp. 125-126.
Gibb, 1948, p. 113.
Wiistenfeld, 1864, p. 34.
Caetani, 1905, p. 105; Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 3, p. 77.
Caetani, 1905, p. 148.

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trading territory.They sought to "put their warehouses,their strong boxes, at

greaterdistancefrom their turbulentneighbors."83The story of Amr b. Luhaiy
illustratesthe secular interest involved in this effort. It shows that the Meccan
tradersringedthe Ka'bawith the idols of other tribalgroups,in orderto increase
the importanceof the sanctuaryand to attractmorevisitorsto the growingcity.84
The extensionof the conceptof an inviolablezone in which blood feuds were
outlawed, and new fights could not develop, appearsto have resulted from the
developmentof trade and to have fostered a further developmentof it. Wellhausenwrites:
Within the tumultuousconfusionwhich fills the desert, the festivitiesat the
beginningof each seasonrepresentthe only enjoyableperiodsof rest. A peace of
God at this time interruptsthe continuousfeuds for a fair period of time. The
most diversetribeswhichotherwisedid not trust each other at all, make common
pilgrimageto the sameholy placeswithoutfear, throughthe landof friendand foe.
Trade raisesits head, and generaland lively exchangeresults .... The exchange
of commoditiesis followedby an exchangeof ideas. A communityof ideological
interestdevelopsthatcomprisesall of Arabia ... 85
The Koreishdevelopeda special pact with other tribal groups to guarantee
the inviolabilityof pilgrims on their journeys to the religious center.86Their
attempts to maintainpeace earned them the scorn of the more war-like desert
tribes. "No one has yet lived through a terror [raid] by them," said a Hudail
poet.87"They are peoplewho do not know how to fight,"said a Jew of Medina.88
"Your couragefails you in battle,"sneeredanotherpoet, "at best, you are [only]
good at figuringin the ranks of the processions!"89
In stressingthe Ka'ba as the center of their power, the Koreish broke with
the traditionalnotion of a territorybelonging to a certainkin group, and representingits inviolableproperty.
Under holy protection,there had here developeda generalsecurityunder law,
unheardof in Arabiawhere law does not otherwiseextend beyond the tribe and
this limitcan only be extendedthroughclientage.No strangerstoodhere in need of
a pass,none neededthe protectionof a nativepatron,. . . everyonewas securein
this free state of God, and if he was subjectedto injusticeand force, he always
found someonewho backedhim up.90
83
85
87
89

Lammens,1928, p. 239.
Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 3, p. 183.
Hell, 1933, p. 10.
Lammens, 1928, p. 145.

84
86
88
90

Ibn Hisham, 1864, vol. 1, p. 39.

Caetani, 1905, p. 165.
Ibn Hisham, 1864, vol. 2, p. 2.
Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 3, p. 88.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

339

The Koreishthus laid the basis for a transitionfrom a conceptof territoriality

circumscribedby kin relationsto a concept of territorialityin which considerations of kinshipdo not play a prominentpart. Caetanistates that they
admittedthat if Arabsnot of their own kin wereborn in the precinctof the Ka'ba
or in its vicinity,they had the same rights as the Koreish,in orderto validatethe
idea that settlementnear the Ka'bagave them precedenceover all other Arabs.91
Parallel to the abandonmentof local shrines and growing centralizationof
worship,there occurredan increasingtendencyto stress one deity above others.
There existed religious symbols denoting the different social units of the older
kinship society. Thus, each Koreish clan appears to have had its special clan
symbol,92and each Meccan household had its household god.93 The extension
of kinship ties into ritual kin ties of clientagehad led to a special predominance
of "the conceptionof god and worshipperas patron and client."94But as the
new and non-kin based relationsbegan to emerge in increasedstrength, the importance of one god, Allah, grew concomitantly.Allah was preeminentlythe
guardianof social relationswhichextendedbeyondthe scope of kinship.In terms
of the pre-Islamicformulae, he is "the guardian of faith and the avenger of
treason,"the god in whose name people are supposedto "fulfill their contracts,
honor their relativesby oath, and feed their guest."95
Allah is the Zeus Xenios, the protectorof gar and daif, of client and guest.
Within the lineageand to a lesserdegreewithinthe tribe,rahim,the piety of family
relationship,the holinessof the blood, exercisesprotection.But when rights and
dutiesexist whichgo beyondthe lineage,then Allah is the one who imposesthem
and guaranteesthem.He is the protectorof giwar[the patron-client
relationship]by
whichthe naturalcircleof the communityis widenedand supplementedin a fashion
whichbenefitsaboveall the clientand the guest.96
We have seen that the economic centralizationof western Arabia through
trade was accompaniedby a related tendency in the centralizationof religious
worship.Here we venturethe hypothesisthat the emergenceof social classes out
of the network of a society based primarilyon actual or fictive ties of kinship
was accompanied,in the sphere of religion, by an increasedemphasis on the
deity associatedwith non-kinrelationship.
91 Caetani, 1905, p. 148.
93 Wakidi, 1882, p. 370.
95 Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 3, p. 191.

92 Lammens, 1928, p. 145.

94 Smith, 1927, p. 79.
96 Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 3, p. 190.

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THE ORGANIZATIONOF POWERIN MECCAN SOCIETY

The way in which power is organizedin a given society must be considered

both in terms of internal,or endogenous,and in terms of externalor exogenous
factors.97
In termsof internaldevelopment,the lines of politicalpowerin Mecca tended
to coincide with the lines of economic power. In theory, power in Mecca was
located in a town council, made up of adult males. In actuality, however,the
councilwas dominatedby the same wealthymerchantswho ruled over the clusters
of kin and dependents,and who held the main religious offices.They decided
general policy and made alliances.They representedthe "unionof the Koreish"
and their representativesmade formal trade agreementswith the Abyssinianand
the Persian courts.98They permittedforeignersto address the town council on
specific matters; and receivedthe taxes which all foreignerswho were not kin
or ritual kin had to pay if they wantedto trade in the area.
Despite its oligarchiccharacter,the council had no direct legislative power
and lacked a centralexecutiveorgan.In a society which was rapidlymovingaway
from primaryreliance on kinship ties, its power was still largely kin-based.It
lay in the council'sability to break a recalcitrantby refusing to grant him protection.The mechanismfor enforcingsuch decisionswas the blood feud, and law
was maintainedonly by the unwillingnessof potentialculpritsto risk the dangers
of an encounterwith the powerful "Koreishof the center."The limitationsof
this negativepoweras a meansof effectivesocial controlare shown clearlyin the
story of the supposed boycott against Mohammed at the end of his Meccan
period.Whether apocryphalor not,99the story demonstratesthat
the ideologicalmovementcreatedby the prophettore apartthe ancientArab order
whichwas basedon kinship.Most membersof the boycottedlineagedid not believe
in Mohammed. . . and on the otherhand,someof Mohammed'smost ferventadherentslike Abu Bekrand Umar wereleft untouchedby this rule of conduct,since
they did not belongto his lineage.100
Just as the blood feud as a means of social control in a class-dividedsociety
could not governinternalfriction,so kin-basedmechanismsused to ensuresecurity
against the outside world failed of their purpose.We have alreadyseen that the
patron-clientrelation,extendingprotectionto individualsor groups, at the same
98 Wiistenfeld, 1864, pp. 35, 38.
97 Wittfogel, 1932, pp. 542-551.
99 Caetani, 1905, pp. 290-291; Buhl, 1930, p. 175.

100 Buhl,1930,p. 176.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

341

time extendedthe possibilityof inter-tribalconflict.The same may be said of the

so-calledhilf relationship.The hilf generallydesignatesa relationof co6peration
between roughly equal partners,in contrast to the patron-clientrelation which
involves a strongerand a weakerparty.10'Such a pact of cooperationcould be
enteredinto temporarilyfor a specificpurposelike joint action in war or for the
purposeof protectinga caravan.Or it could developinto a permanenttie between
tribes and tribal groups.102The tie was sanctifiedby a ceremonyin which both
partiesmixedtheir blood,103and might be surroundedby a mythologyof common
descent.'04Wellhausen has spoken of the Arab genealogy as a statistical device,105and both he and Caetani106have stressedthe fictionalcharacterof descent
in Arabiain general.The Koreishmaintainedsuch pacts, for example,with many
membersof the tribe Sulaim who possessedmineralresourcesand commandedthe
road from Medina as well as accessto Nejd and the Persian Gulf;107with individual Syrianmerchants;08 with a Bedouinmarauderlike al-Barrad;and others.
While these kin-basedmechanismspermittedthe formationof more extensive
social bonds, they were also charged with potential for further friction. Fights
between far-off desert tribes, involving partnersto a pact with the Koreish, involved the Koreishagainst their better interests.When a chain of petty insults
started a war betweenthe tribes Kinana and Hawazin, the Koreishhad to enter
the fight on the side of their Kinana relatives.When their sworn ally al-Barrad
plunderedthe caravanof the king of Hira, they were drawn into the quarrelon
his side. Thus the system of ritual kin on which the Koreishrelied for increased
securityat the same time counteractedtheir interestin peaceful relationsof trade.
Lammenshas discussed the reaction against direct blood revenge and the
growing preferencefor settlementof blood feuds through arbitrationand payment of blood money which came to the fore in pre-IslamicArabia.109It is
possiblethat this reactionwas relatedto a growing realizationthat the prevailing
kinship mechanismsproved disruptiveof the peace they were supposedto maintain. It may also have been conditionedby the growing utility and ubiquity of
money,by meansof whichblood claimscould be reducedmoreeasily to a common
denominator.
An elementin the social organizationof Mecca which was not disguisedas a
kinship unit was the military force at the disposal of the Koreish, the so-called
101
102
103
104
106
108

Pedersen, 1914, p. 29; Braunlich, 1934, p. 191.

Briunlich, 1934, p. 194.
Pedersen, 1914, p. 21; Smith, 1903, pp. 60-61.
105 Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 4, p. 27.
Nallino, 1941, pp. 77-78.
107 Encyclopediaof Islam, vol. 4, p. 518.
Caetani, 1905, p. 59.
109 Lammens, 1928, p. 232.
Lammens, 1914, p. 79.

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Ahabis. This group of soldiers may have consisted either of splinter elements
drawn from different tribal groups; or they may have been Abyssinianmercenaries, if one may put credencein Lammens'interpretationof the textual material.110They may have resembledthe "men of different Arab elementswhich
followed the kings . . a type of Praetorian guard" characteristicof the
Himyarite kingdom of Kinda and the Persian satellite kingdom of Hira.1l
Their main function was to provideprotectionfor caravans112and to assist the
Koreish in warfare. The cadre for these troops was drawn from the Kinana,
genealogicalrelativesof the Koreish.While these militaryguards were thus nontribal in character,and were organizedon the basis of a non-kin principle,they
were integratedinto the social structureby subordinatingthem to the command
of tribesmenrelatedby kinship to the Meccanoligarchy.
If interactionwith the tribalgroupsnear Mecca could be phrasedin terms of
ritualkin relations,interactionwith societiesbeyondthe Arabianperipherymeant
contactwith developedstate organizations.These were, first, the satellitestates of
the greaterpowers,like the HimyariteKinda,the PersianHira, and the Byzantine
Ghassan; secondly, the great powers themselves:Byzantium and Persia in the
north and first Himyar and later Abyssiniain the south. Hira and Ghassanwere
outpostswhichkept the pastoralnomadsin check.Built up by nomadsthemselves,
they were used "as barriersagainst their brotherswho pushed after them."113
They also set the "termsof trade" against the pastoralnomads in the exchange
of productsbetweendesert and agriculturalarea. The cultivatedzone furnishes
the nomadswith cerealsand handicraftproducts,permittingthem free access to
pasture,meadowlandand wateringplacesafter harvest.The nomadsin turn supply the settled area with livestock and livestockproducts.When the nomadsare
strong, they rig the terms of exchangeagainst the settlers, by adding tribute in
kind to their other demands.Sometimesthey may be compensatedby outright
paymentby a larger power. When the settled area is strongly organizedpolitically, it can exploit the need of the nomads for pasture to exact tribute from
them in turn.114Thus the kings of Hira receivedleather,truffles,and horsesfrom
the nomads,15 in exchangefor pasturingrights in Iraq. Ghassanand Hira even
fought each other over the right to exact tribute from a certainarea.1l
These satellites had certain characteristicsin common. They maintained
armed "Praetorianguards" consistingof detribalizedelements117 and a system
110
112
114
116

Lammens, 1928, pp. 244-283, passim.

Lammens, 1928, p. 283.
Dussaud, 1907, pp. 3-4.
Rothstein, 1899, pp. 130-131.

111
113
115
117

Rothstein, 1899, pp. 136-137.

Rothstein, 1899, p. 130.
Fraenkel,1886, p. 178.
Idem, pp. 136-137.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONOF MECCA

343

of taxation.118Their very existenceconstituteda dilemma for the larger dominant power. If they grew too strong politically,they had to be incorporatedinto
the domainof the dominantpower.119When they were incorporated,the lack of
an independentbuffer was immediatelyfelt in new exactionsand incursionson
the part of the nomads.
The state of Kinda demandssome specialconsideration.It representsthe first
attempt of which we know to set up a more encompassingsocial structure in
central Arabia, with a center of gravity in the Nejd, around the end of the 5th
century AD. The first Kinda prince apparentlyowed his dominanceover the
tribal groups included in the Kinda coalition to the desire of the kingdom of
Himyar in south Arabia to erect a buffer against Persia.l20As soon as the
coalition was organized,it began to raid Byzantineand Persian territory.121"It
is evident that not only all Nejd but also great parts of al-Higaz, al-Bahrain,
and al-Yamamaweresubjectto al-Harit's [Kindite] sceptre,"'122
and the Kinana,
mother-tribeof the Koreish, the Asad and the Kais-'Ailan of the Hejaz are
mentionedas part of the federation.l23The Kinda state maintaineda "Praetorian
guard"similar to that of the Hira and Ghassan,and tax collectors.124It broke
up as quickly as it had developed,apparentlydue to an inability to collect the
requisitetaxes from its componentnomadicgroups.125
The position of Mecca in relationto these organizedareas is of considerable
importance.Lattimorehas pointed out, in connectionwith anotherarea of interaction betweennomadsand settled populations,that the probabilityfor independent socio-politicaldevelopment increases beyond a certain distance from the
dominantcenter.126In this connection,it is significantthat Meccan power rose
after the Kindite power disintegrated,and that it was able to maintainits independencefrom Abyssinia,Byzantium,and Persia. Ghassanidexpansionreached
as far south as al-Ela, Khaibarand Hajel,27 but never reachedMecca. At least
one attempt was made to include Mecca in the Byzantine zone, but it failed.
'Uthman Ibn Huwairith attemptedto seize leadershipin Mecca by threatening
it with Byzantinereprisalsagainst its Syrian trade. The attempt was foiled, permitting the Umaiya clan to rise to unchallengeddominationin the city.128The
Abyssinianattemptto attack the Persiansfrom the south129 was similarlydoomed
118
119
120
122
124
126
128

Ibid.
Idem, pp. 117-120; Noldeke, 1887, p. 31.
Olinder, 1927, pp. 37-40.
Idem, p. 75.
Idem, p. 81.
Lattimore,1940, pp. 238-240.
Sprenger, 1869, vol. 1, p. 91.

121
123
125
127
129

Idem, p. 57.
Idem, p. 74.
Idem, pp. 77-78.
Musil, 1926, p. 259.
Tabari, 1879, pp. 204-205.

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to failure.The legend of the Battle of the Elephantsin whichGod is said to have

saved the Ka'ba from destructionby the Abyssiniansappearsto reflect the fact
that the Abyssinianshad reached the outer limits of their ability to expand.
With leatheras its principalexportto the north, and with cerealsas its principal
import,Mecca participatedin the generalexchangebetweenpastoraland settled
area. Its relative distance from the center, and its ability to capitalize on a
peripheraltrade route permittedthe independentgrowth of state organizationin
this zone.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

The religiousrevolutionassociatedwith the name of Mohammedmade possible the transition from Meccan society as we have describedit to a society
possessed of the elements which permit state organization. The success of
Mohammed'spropheticmissionpermittedthese elementsto crystallizeout of the
preceding social network in which kin relationshipshad become increasingly
fictional and disruptive.
The emergenceof Islam completedthe centralizationof worshipby making
Mecca the sole religiouscenter. It completedthe trend towardsworshipof the
deity governing non-kin relations by making this deity the supreme and only
god, "the personificationof state supremacy."l30In Islam-"voluntary surrender" or "self-surrender"to a supremedeityl31-all men were to be clients of
God, the only patron. "And warn those who dread being gatheredto their Lord,
that patronor intercessorthey shall have none but Him," says the Koran.132"God
is the patron of believers."133
"There are no genealogiesin Islam,"states a traditionalsaying.l34The very
act of adherenceto Islam impliedan individualdecisioninto which considerations
of kin did not enter. The story of the boycott of the Prophet's lineage shows
how completely the principles of kin relationships failed to cope with the
new force. "Truly, the most worthyof honor in the sight of God is he who fears
him most,"135not the individualwhose lineage is the most famous or the most
powerful.When MohammedenteredMecca, he declared:"God has put an end
to the pride in noble ancestry,you are all descended from Adam and Adam
from dust, the noblestamongyou is the man who is most pious."136Adherenceto
Islam was not a matter of kin relationships:"Mohammedis not the father of
13
any man amongyou, but he is the Apostle of God." Islam set kinsmanagainst
130
132
134
136

Wellhausen, 1927, p. 8.
Koran 6, 51; p. 321.
Levy, 1933, vol. 2, p. 79.
Wakidi, 1882, p. 338.

131
133
135
137

Smith, 1927, p. 80; Lyall, 1903, p. 784.

Idem, 2, 258; p. 367.
Koran 49, 13; p. 470.
Koran33, 40; p. 438.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

345

kinsman. "The swords of the sons of his father were drawn against him,"
mourns a song about the battle of Badr, "oh God! Love among relatives was
deeply injured there!"138A son turned Muslim could approvethe death of his
father who had fought with the Koreishagainst the new faith.'39
As Islam built on ties other than those of kinship,it had to put a limit on the
disruptiveexerciseof power and protectionimplicit in the blood feud. On the
occasion of his entrance into Mecca, Mohammed "declared all demands for
interest payments, for blood revenge or blood money stemming from pagan
times as null and void."140The same demand was expressedin a letter to the
people of Najran: "There are no interest paymentsand no demands for blood
revenge from pagan times."14 God permits a relaxationof the lex talionis.142
A believerkillethnot a believerbut by mischance:and whoso killeth a believer
by mischanceshall be boundto free a believerfrom slavery;and the blood money
shall be paid to the family of the slain, unlessthey convertit into alms. But if the
slain believerbe of a hostilepeople,then let him confer freedomon a slave who is
a believer;and if he be of a peoplebetweenwhomand yourselvesthereis an alliance,
then let the blood-moneybe paid to his family, and let him set free a slave who is
a believer:and let him who hath not the means,fast two consecutivemonths.This
is the penanceenjoinedby God; and God is Knowing,Wise!143
The passagecited showsthat the incipientIslamic state did not suppressthe talio
as such. It even left the settlementof such disputes to the families concerned.
It did, however,insist that the mannerin which they were settled conformedto
the "penanceenjoinedby God," and attemptedto convertthe demand for blood
into a demand for wergild. In pre-Islamictimes, the duty of carrying on the
blood feud passed from father to son in direct inheritance.144Islam demanded
early and peaceful settlement.The moratoriumon blood feud was so much part
of the new creed that certaintribes postponedtheir affiliationwith Mohammed,
until they had settled all questionsof blood revenge.145
Another set of kin-like relationssupersededby Islam were the relations involvingpast allies. There was to be "no hilf in Islam."''146
The social relationswithin Arab tribal life representedby the tahalluf (hilf)
were of necessityas undesirableto representatives
of Mohammed'sideas as the
of
For
the
tribes.
furthered
particularism
they
feudingbetweenthe tribesand were
to be overcomein Islamby the brotherhood
of all who professedIslam.147
138
140
142
144
146

Ibn Hisham, 1864, vol. 1, p. 390.

Wikidi, 1882, p. 338.
Koran 2, 173-174; p. 356.
Lammens, 1928, p. 202.
Encyclopediaof Islam, vol. 2, p. 308.

139
141
143
145
147

Idem, p. 340.
Sperber,1916, p. 91.
Koran, 4, 94; p. 421.
Idem, p. 197.
Goldziher, 1889, p. 69.

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

346

The core of the new society was the militant brotherhoodof MuhajJirinand
Ansar. The MuhaJJirinwerethe Muslimswho fled with Mohammedfrom Mecca
to Medina.The Ansar were their Medinesehosts. Armed, and without ties of kin
to bind them, they resembledthe "Praetorianguard" of the kings of Hira and
Kinda. They were the storm troops of Islam. A Hudail poet comparedthem to
his own tribes.The Hudail were called "a luxuriouspeople of [many] subdivisions." The Muslims were "a multitude drawn together from many sources of
[warriors]clad in iron."148They rent the ties of kinship which had bound them
in the past. The Ansar were commandedto inform on those "who have been
forbidden secret talk, and return to what they have been forbidden, and talk
privately together with wickedness, and hate and disobedience towards the
Apostle."149"The foundationsof society, faithful co6perationof kin, were so
underminedthat they were not safe from espionageon the part of their closest
relatives."150Disaffected individualswere threatenedwith use of force.l51
It is interestingto note how, initially, attempts were made to invent a new
functional kind of kinship for this group. Mohammedordered
that thosewho migratedwith him and the believersin Medinashouldregardthemselvesas brethrenand thereforeable to inheritfromone another,whileall the bonds
of relationshipbetweenthe Muhadjurunand theirrelativesleft in Meccawereto be
regardedas broken.152
The Koranstates:
Verily, they who have believedand fled their homesand spent their substancefor
the causeof God, and they who have takenin the prophetand beenhelpful to him,
shallbe nearof kin the one to the other.153
They were to form a special aristocracy:
They who have believed,and fled theirhomes,and strivenwith theirsubstanceand
withtheirpersonson the pathof God,shallbe of highestgradewithGod.154
The new society which arose in Medina and was given organized form by
means of a town charterpromulgatedby Mohammed,155was called umma, i.e.
community.The communityincludednot only Muslims,but non-Muslimsas well.
The umma comprisedthe whole territoryof Medina, embracingall who lived
within it.156These were all includedin the incipientIslamic state, "one commu148
150
152
154
156

Hell, 1933, p. 6.
Sprenger, 1869, vol. 3, p. 27.
Encyclopediaof Islam, vol. 3, p. 508.
Koran 9, 20; p. 472.
Idem, p. 74.

149
151
153
155

Koran 58, 9; p. 451.

Ibn Hisham, 1864, vol. 1, pp. 266-267.
Koran8, 73; p. 381.
Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 4, pp. 68-73.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

347

nity overagainstmankind."The core of the new communitywerethe Muslims,"a

unit with its own laws within the whole society, destined of necessityto disrupt
the ties of the whole."157
The elements of state power developed gradually. In his deportmentas a
prophet,Mohammedfollowed pre-Islamicprecedents.
The mantic knowledge[of the pagan seer, called kahin] is based on ecstatic
inspiration.. . . They are interrogatedin all importanttribal and state occasions
... in privatethe kahinsespeciallyact as judges. . . . They interpretdreams,find
lost camels,establishadulteries,clearup othercrimes.. . . The prophetMohammed
disclaimedbeing a kahin.But . . . his earliestappearanceas a prophetremindsus
stronglyof the mannerof the soothsayer.He was an ecstaticand had "truedreams"
like them. . . . Eventhe formswhichhe wasstill using for administering
justiceand
in
the
of
his
there
Medina
settling disputes
during
early years
stay
correspondin
theirmainfeaturesto thoseof the pagankahinandhakam.15l
Mohammedhimself acted as judge in a few known cases only.159Yet his very
word, said to be the word of God, acted as law in the new state. During his
life-time,the prophethimself was the final judicial authority.He deposedlineage
chiefs and replacedthem with his own candidates.l60He appointed officials,in
the majorityof cases apparentlyon a temporarybasis.16lThe incipientstate did
not take on itself direct governing power over groups which became affiliated
with it. Usually, its "emissariesexercised a sort of supervisionand collected
taxes."162In manycases,local authoritiescontinued,themselvesbecomingofficials
of the new state.163In one case, a Christianchief becamecollectorof the Islamic
tax from his own people.164
The subordinationof the right of the blood feud to the power of the state
brings out more clearly the characterof the new organization.The blood feud
impliedexerciseof power based on kinship.The consequencesof its exercisewas
warfarebetweenkin groups. With the limitationof the blood feud under Islam
there was accomplisheda separationof war and blood revengewhich had been
impossiblein such claritybefore.The notionof bloodrevengeis still appliedto war.
The faithful are each other'savengersof blood on the war path of God, but tribal
law and familysentimentare whollyignored.165
The family remainedthe executorof the civil feud, but the use of force in
the form of war becamean attributeof the state. Due to the limiteddevelopment
157 Buhl, 1930, p. 210.
159 Caetani, 1905, pp. 645-646.

161 'Abdurraziq,
1934,p. 168.
163 Wellhausen,idem,p. 30.
165 Procksch,1899,p. 66.

158 Encyclopediaof Islam, vol. 2, pp. 625-626.

160 Margoliouth, 1905, p. 216.

162 Wellhausen,1884-99,vol. 3, p. 29.

164 Husain,1938,pp. 126-127.

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of the judicial power in the new state, writers have often misunderstoodthe
meaningof warfarein Islam. 'Abdurraziqhas criticizedtraditionalviews of vihad
(the holy war) as a war of conversionby fire and sword,as follows:
All evidenceshowsthat the purposeof the holy warwasnot to be religiouspropagandaand to bringthe peopleto believein Allah and his prophetalone.The holy
war is carriedon only for the purposeof affirmingthe authorityof the state and
of enlargingthe kingdom.66 . . . A governmentmustbase itself on its armedforce
andabilityto exercisepower.l67
The new state was capablenot only of the essentialshow of force, but also
possessedof effective taxing power. One fifth of all booty was assigned to the
Prophet as "the part of God." Among pre-IslamicBedouins, one fourth or one
fifth of all bootyl68was assignedto the chief "as a kind of state treasurewhich
was of course in the hands of physical individualsdue to the lack of judicial
persons."'69The chief was supposedto use this wealthto settle blood feuds, grant
hospitality,feed guests and the poor, and care for widows and orphans.l70The
prophet's"fifth" representsthe transferof this mechanismfrom the level of the
kin group to the level of the state. In pre-Islamictimes, areas of pasturelocated
in the sacredprecinctsaroundsanctuariescould be used as commonpasturesnot
monopolizedby any one tribe.171In Islam, the sacredprecinctsand the pastures
located in them became state property,with "Allah the legal successorof the
172
pagan deity," wheretax camelsand other livestockcould be kept.173
Muslimshad to pay a so-calledpoor tax or alms tax (zakat), as one of their
five essentialreligiousduties. It soon becamea graduatedincometax.174Payment
or non-paymentof this tax quickly becamethe chief test of adherenceto Islam.
When Mohammeddied, many affiliatedtribal groups broke away from the new
state, maintainingtheir newly acquiredreligiousfaith, but refusing to pay taxes.
Mohammed,during his lifetime, had alreadycastigated"the Arabs of the desert
. . . who reckonwhat they expendin the cause of God as tribute,and wait for
some change of fortune to befall you."175The leadersof the revolts against the
state proclaimedtheir missions"like Mohammedin the name of Allah and not
in the name of some pagan deity. ... They wanted to carry on divine worship,
but not to pay taxes."176The new officials"causedanger among the populace,
166
168
170
172
174
176

'Abdurraziq, 1934, p. 175.

Mufaddaliyat, 1918, p. 237.
Idem, pp. 7, 59-60.
Idem, p. 104.
ldem, pp. 51-52.
Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 6, p. 7.

167
169
171
173
175

Idem, p. 176.
Procksch, 1899, p. 9.
Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 3, p. 104.
Kremer,1875-77, vol. 1, p. 57.
Koran 9, 99; p. 481.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

OF MECCA

349

Among the Tamim, "after the

especiallyin their capacity as tax collectors."177
death of Mohammedthe question was whether the tax camels which had been
brought together were to be handed over at the proper station or not; this was
the criterionof faith in Islam or of defection."'78When the Muslims won, the
camelswerehandedover.179
The use of the poor-taxto financethe newly establishedstate structureimplies
the transferenceof a mechanismwhich had previouslyfunctionedon the lineage
level to the level of the state. The tribalchief or head of the sub-tribewas responsible for the care and feeding of the poor. The necessarysums were obtained
from a portion of the booty allocated to him for such purposes. He was also
responsiblefor hospitalityto strangers.Under Islam, care for the poor as well as
the responsibilityfor entertainingstrangerswas shifted to the level of the state.
The use of taxation for this purpose led to an argumentamong scholars as
to whetherMohammedcould be called a socialist.l80It must be pointed out that
Mohammeddid not touch the basic dynamicof the society which had produced
him. To followerswho feared that combiningthe religiouspilgrimagewith irreligious trademight be a sacrilege,he is supposedto have said: "There are no sins
for you during the festivals of pilgrimage."s18Mohammed, Abu Bekr, and
Omar all owed their personalwealth to trade. Torrey has pointed to the abunterms in the Koran.182Mohammed and his
dance of "commercial-theological"
adherents continued to trade while in exile in Medina, an often over-looked
fact.'83 Continuedtrade, as well as the plunderingof Meccan caravans,fortified
the positionof the faithful in Medina, wherewide-travelledmerchantswere used
as well as valued spies and informerson other areas.184Mohammed,did, however,
transferto the state the responsibilityfor the care of the poor whose status had
becomeincreasinglyexploitativeunder the guise of traditionalkin relationships.
We have seen above that he declaredall interestpaymentsstemmingfrom pagan
times to be null and void. Usury was made illegal: "God hath allowed selling,
but forbiddenusury."185 Both acts seem to have been aimed at undercuttingthe
Koreishpowerand raisingresistanceagainstit. Poor MuhaJJirinwere also granted
a specialpart of the spoils,l86and poor Muslims were assignedland.l87
Non-Muslims paid a special tax, but were integratedinto the new state with177
179
180
181
183
185
187

178 Idem, p. 13.

Idem, p. 31.
Idem, p. 15.
Grimme, 1892; Snouck Hurgronje, 1894, pp. 48-70, 149-178.
182 Torrey, 1892.
Bukhari, 1903-14, p. 20.
184 Ibid.
Lammens, 1924, pp. 257-260.
186 Koran 59, 8; p. 432.
Koran 2, 276; p. 369.
BalIdhuri 1916-24, vol. I, p. 37.

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

350

out forced conversion.Where they resisted the encroachmentof the new state
by force, they were indeed subjected to serious economic disabilities, as, for
example,werethe Jews of Khaibar.88But the popularnotion that the beginnings
of Islam were marked by wholesale conversions,achieved by force, is wholly
unwarranted.The Koran says: "Dispute not, unless in kindly sort, with the
people of the Book; save with such of them as have wrongfully dealt with
you,"189 and "let there be no compulsionin religion."'90If these non-Muslims
paid taxes, as did the Christiansof Aila, the Jews of Adruh, Garba,and Makna,
and the Jewish and Christian communitiesof southern Arabia, their security
was guaranteed.They became "people [living] under contractuallyguaranteed
protection."'l9Such relationshipshad previouslybeen phrased in terms of kin
or ritual kin relationshipsbetween patrons and clients, as in the case of the
protectiverelation in existencebetweenthe Jewish communitiesof Medina and
Khaibarand their Bedouin patrons.192Under Islam, this type of relation was
transferredto the level of the state.
Conversion to Islam was in fact not primarilya religious demand, but a
politicalone. During the initial Medineseperiod
Mohammeddoes not call on the tribesto convertthemselvesto Islam. . .. He concludes with them pacts of protectionand mutual aid in aggression,in which he
guaranteeshis clientssecurityof personand propertyand promisesthem the protection of God and his messenger.In exchange,they assumethe duty of puttingthemselvesat the disposalof the prophetwhen he calls on them to fight. Exceptedare
warsin the causeof religion!193
Only after the unsuccessfulsiege of Medina by the Koreish did Mohammed
begin to demand that affiliated tribes take on Islam "as a sign of political
affiliation."94 Conversion
only servedas a manifestationof politicalaffiliationwith Mohammedand remained
thereforelimitedto the circleswhichsought this affiliation.The remainderpaid the
gizja [the specialtax paidby non-Muslims].Mohammedwas moreinterestedin the
tax whichthesetribesbroughtin thanin theirbelief.l95
Mohammedwas statesmanenough to grant the status of Muhafjirinto the
Aslam, a tribe which ownedpasturegroundson the road from Medina to Mecca
and without whose cooperationthe war against the Koreishcould not have been
188
190
192
194

Ibn Hisham, 1864, vol. 2, p. 170 ff.

Koran, 2, 257; p. 367.
Lammens, 1928, pp. 70-71, 79.
Idem, p. 5.

189
191
193
195

Koran 29, 45; p. 265.

Buhl, 1930, p. 346.
Sperber, 1916, p. 4.
Ibid.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF MECCA

351

carriedon,'96and to permitthe inhabitantsof Taif to includethe sacredprecinct

aroundtheir pagan sanctuaryinto the sacredprecinctof Mecca, thus getting the
same prerogativesas the inhabitants of Mecca.197Within the various tribal
groupsand settlementswhich joined Mohammed,only certainminoritiesaccepted
Islam as a religiousfaith. These were usually groups attemptingto improvetheir
status within their own societies.198Mohammedhad already begun in Mecca to
"introducehimself to individuals[among the Bedouins] of whom he knew that
they were held in great esteem and to lecture them about his vision of God's
guidanceand mercy."'99The use of the state treasuryto win over such interested
nomad leadersis impliedin the Koran:
But alms are to be given only to the poor and needy, and to those who collect
them,and to thosewhoseheartsarewon for Islam,and for ransoms,and for debtors,
and for the causeof God, and the wayfarer.200
The inclusionof petty chiefs in participationin booty served to attract
ambitiousshiekswho werethen interestedin spreadingIslam amongthe membersof
their tribe.These in turn sought their allies amongthe Muslims,in orderto maintain themselvesagainstthe rulingfamilieswith theirhelp.201
Their titles to propertiesand perquisitesacquiredthrough their affiliationwith
Islam depended on the continued existence of the Islamic state, and were
strengthenedby the progressof Islam. When the death of Mohammedthreatened the young state with disintegration,these minoritiesacted to keep the tribal
groupswithin the new structure.Victory was based on the ability of the Muslims
to keep the adherenceof
the loyal minoritiesamongthe Bedouintribes,with whomthey weresuperiorto the
majorities,becausetheseneveralliedthemselves,nor closedtheir rankswith determination. . . . There were also Bedouinswho, togetherwith the Muslims,carriedon
successfuloperationsagainstdissenterswithin their own tribe.202
The alliancewith Bedouintribes,finally,enabledthe young state to challenge
the dominantpowersalong the Arab periphery.This task would have been impossible without the active co6perationof tribes in Syria203and tribes ranging
along the Persianfrontier.204
The centerof the Islamicstate, however,remainedin the settled communities,
196
198
200
202
204

Idem, pp. 18-19.

Idem, pp. 33-79, passim.
Koran 9, 60; p. 477.
Wellhausen, 1884-99, vol. 6, p. 11.
Musil, 1927, pp. 284-285, 292.

197
199
201
203

Idem, p. 72.
Ibn Hishim, 1864, vol. 1, p. 211.
Sperber, 1916, p. 74.
Kremer, 1875-77, pp. 85-96.

352

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

where it had originated. It might be said that the state was "oasis-bound."
Mar;ais has noted that
if the Muslimarmycontingents. . . compriseda nomadmajority,the cadreswere
town merrecruitedamongthe settledpeopleof the Hejaz, Medineseagriculturists,
chantsof Meccaand Taif.205
Von Grunebaumstates:
Islam, from its very outset unfoldingin an urbanmilieu, favoredcity development. The legislationof the Koranenvisagescity life. The nomadis viewedwith
distrust.... Only in a city, that is, a settlementharboringa centralmosque,jami',
fit for the Fridayserviceand a market (and preferablya publicbath) can all the
of the faith be properlyfulfilled.Migrationinto town,hijra,is recomrequirements
mendedand almostequalizedin meritto that more famousmigration,again called
hijra, of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina. To forsake town for countryis
severelycondemned.206
CONCLUSION

Our brief historicalsurvey has shown that the tendencieswhich Mohammed

broughtto fruitionwere reachingtheir peak of developmentin pre-Islamictimes.
Commercialdevelopmentin urbansettlementshad causedthe emergenceof class
groupings from the precedingnetwork of kin relations.Centralizationof worship and the emergenceof a deity specifically linked with the regulation of
non-kin relationsas the chief deity went hand in hand with the centralizationof
trade and the disintegrationof the kinshipstructure.Yet in the political sphere,
the use of kinship mechanismsin situations which increasinglyexposed their
non-functionalcharacterin the new setting led to disruptionand conflict,rather
that to furtherorganizationand consolidation.
The religious revolutionassociatedwith the name of Mohammedpermitted
the establishmentof an incipient state structure. It replaced allegiance to the
kinshipunit with allegianceto a state structure,an allegiancephrasedin religious
terms.It limited the disruptiveexerciseof the kin-basedmechanismof the blood
feud. It put an end to the extensionof ritual kin ties to serve as links between
tribes. It based itself insteadon the armed force of the faithful as the core of a
social order which included both believersand unbelievers.It evolved a rudimentaryjudicial authority,patternedafter the role of the pre-Islamicsoothsayer,
but possessedof new significance.The limitation of the blood feud permitted
war to emergeas a special prerogativeof the state power. The state taxed both
Muslims and non-Muslims,in ways patterned after pre-Islamicmodels, but to
205 MarCais,1928, p. 88.

206 Von Grunebaum,1946, pp. 173-174.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF MECCA

353

new ends. Finally, it located the center of the state in urban settlements,surrounding the town with a set of religious symbols that served functionally to
increaseits prestigeand role.
The revolutionaccomplished,power quickly passed out of the hands of the
armedbrotherhoodof the faithful into the hands of the Koreishwho had fought
against them. It may be said that Mohammed accomplishedfor the Meccan
traders that which they could not accomplishthemselves: the organizationof
state power.
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