Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184823

October 6, 2010

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right,
privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return
of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his
entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process as nonobservance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial
claims would result in the denial of his claim.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
July 30, 2008 Decision1 and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing, producing,
and processing of steel and its by-products.3 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) as a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity4 and its products, "close impression die steel forgings"
and "tool and dies," are registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer status.5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period
July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total amount of P3,891,123.82 with the petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review7 with the CTA for the refund/credit of the
same input VAT. The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 7065 and was raffled to the Second
Division of the CTA.

In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002, it generated and recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of P131,791,399.00,8 which was
paid pursuant to Section 106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997 (NIRC);9 that for the said period, it incurred and paid input VAT amounting to
P3,912,088.14 from purchases and importation attributable to its zero-rated sales;10 and that in its
application for refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and
Duty Drawback Center, it only claimed the amount of P3,891,123.82.11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following special and affirmative defenses,
to wit:
4. Petitioners alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation by the
Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the period in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales contemplated under Sections
106(A) (2) (a), and 108(B) (1) of the Tax Code of 1997;
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2) year period prescribed
in Section 229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to
refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake of the
nature of exemption from taxation.13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a
Decision partially granting respondents claim for refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the
Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A)
of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the
extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the following requisites: (1) the
taxpayer is engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is
VAT-registered; (3) the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter

when such sales were made; and (4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to
such sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied
against the output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied [with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices
(Exhibits "II" to "II-262," "JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is
engaged in sales which are zero-rated.
The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate of Registration with OCN
1RC0000148499 (Exhibit "C") with the BIR proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on
September 30, 2004 (Exhibit "N") and the present Petition for Review on September 30, 2004,
both within the two (2) year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, which is from September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some documents and claims of
petitioner that are baseless and have not been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit
certificate representing unutilized excess input VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002, which are attributable to its zero-rated sales for the same period, but in the
reduced amount of P3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT
Less:
Exceptions as found by the ICPA

P 3,891,123.82

Net Creditable Input VAT

Less:
Output VAT Due
Excess Creditable Input VAT

P 3,850,103.45

41,020.37

610,984.20
P 3,239,119.25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX
CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in] the reduced amount of THREE MILLION
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100
PESOS (P3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input VAT incurred for the months of July to
September 2002.
SO ORDERED.14

Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,15 insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the
two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the
NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax
refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on
September 29, 2004.16 He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,17 which provides that when
the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the
simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and
229 of the NIRC.18 According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a
"condition precedent"19 before a judicial claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale of
such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies but also
on the fact that the CTA is an appellate body which exercises the power of judicial review over
administrative actions of the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioners Motion for Partial
Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc via a
Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Divisions Decision allowing the partial
tax refund/credit in favor of respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for counting the twoyear period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed beyond the period allowed
by law and hence, the honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner
further contends that respondent's filing of the administrative and judicial [claims] effectively
eliminates the authority of the honorable Court to exercise jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(A) In General. Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall
file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days
following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however,
That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25) days from the close of each
taxable quarter within which to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts.
In the case at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period of July 1, 2002 to September
30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, respondent has until October 25, 2002 within

which to file its quarterly return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied when it
filed its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under Section 229 of the 1997
NIRC should start from the payment of tax subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent
filed its VAT Return for the taxable third quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus,
respondent's administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on September 30, 2004 were filed
on time because AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the 1997 NIRC requires the
previous filing of an administrative claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not
be the case as the law does not prohibit the simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial
claims for refund. What is controlling is that both claims for refund must be filed within the twoyear prescriptive period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the findings and conclusion
spelled out in the assailed January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA
Second Division. What the instant petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and appreciate
the evidence in their own perspective of things, which unfortunately had already been considered
and passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008
Resolution of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging
Company of Asia, Inc. petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent" are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of whether respondents judicial
and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period
provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of
the NIRC.24
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondents administrative and judicial claims for tax refund/credit
were filed in violation of Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to
Article 13 of the Civil Code,26 since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax
refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on
September 29, 2004.27

Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in
determining the start of the two-year period as the said provision pertains to the compliance
requirements in the payment of VAT.28 He asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of the
same Code that should apply because it specifically provides for the period within which a claim
for tax refund/ credit should be made.29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim with the BIR and the
judicial claim with the CTA were filed on the same day.30 He opines that the simultaneous filing
of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which
requires the prior filing of an administrative claim.31 He insists that such procedural requirement
is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA is an
appellate body exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR.32
Respondents Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for
the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 as a matter of right because it has substantially
complied with all the requirements provided by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the CTA En
Banc in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the prescriptive period for the claim
for tax refund/credit. Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC must be read together
with Section 114(A) of the same Code.34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial claims, respondent
contends that it first filed an administrative claim with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF before it filed a judicial claim with the CTA.35 To
prove this, respondent points out that its Claimant Information Sheet No. 4970236 and BIR Form
No. 1914 for the third quarter of 2002,37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as
Annexes "M" and "N," respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the CTA.38 Respondent
further contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the
claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both
claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period.39 In support thereof, respondent cites
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc.40 where it was ruled that "[i]f,
however, the [CIR] takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end,
the suit or proceeding must be started in the [CTA] before the end of the two-year period without
awaiting the decision of the [CIR]."41 Lastly, respondent argues that even if the period had
already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity considering that it is not a
jurisdictional requirement.42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made

In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input
VAT, the Second Division of the CTA applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the
extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the
case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and
(2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided,
further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in
taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax
due or paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be
allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC,
which read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax.
(A) In General. Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall
file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days
following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however,
That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with Section 236, shall file a
return and pay the tax due thereon within twenty-five (25) days from the date of cancellation of
registration: Provided, That only one consolidated return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his
principal place of business or head office and all branches.
xxxx
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected.
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal
revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of
any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not
such tax, penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after

payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without written claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year period for filing a claim for
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT should start from the date of payment of tax and not from
the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however,
has already been resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation,44 where we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in
determining the start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT,
and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply only to
instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes."45 We explained
that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms that
unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the
taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter
when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said
tax was paid or not. As the CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec.
112 (A), "[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales
were made and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the official receipt
was issued." Thus, when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent
transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized
creditable input VAT. The reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the
pertinent sales or transaction was made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be that as it
may, and given that the last creditable input VAT due for the period covering the progress billing
of September 6, 1996 is the third quarter of 1996 ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for
unutilized creditable input VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years after
September 30, 1996 or, to be precise, on September 30, 1998. Consequently, MPCs claim for
refund or tax credit filed on December 10, 1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC
which, for the purpose of refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year
prescriptive limit for the filing of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C) and 229 respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes.
The Commissioner may
xxxx

(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without
authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition
by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered
unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or
penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for
credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however,
That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or
refund.
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any
manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty,
or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from date of
payment of the tax or penalty, for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both
provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal
revenue taxes.
MPCs creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can
be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of
the taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt client,
resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive
the taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the erroneous,
illegal, or wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of the NIRC, providing a
two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the
relevant sales or transactions were made pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to

the instant case, and not to the other actions which refer to erroneous payment of taxes.46
(Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and
229 of the NIRC in computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of
unutilized input VAT. To be clear, Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the
refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the administrative claim was
timely filed.
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code,47 which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days,
and taking into account the fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the
two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002 expired on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,49 we said that as
between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is
the latter that must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.50 Thus:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the
Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this
reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being
the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the
two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return on
April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1 1st calendar month

April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

2nd calendar month

May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

3rd calendar month

June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

4th calendar month

July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

5th calendar month

August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998

6th calendar month

September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

7th calendar month

October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

8th calendar month

November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

9th calendar month

December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

10th calendar month

January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

11th calendar month

February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

12th calendar month

March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

Year 2 13th calendar month

April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

14th calendar month

May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

15th calendar month

June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

16th calendar month

July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

17th calendar month

August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

18th calendar month

September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

19th calendar month

October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

20th calendar month

November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

21st calendar month

December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

22nd calendar month

January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

23rd calendar month

February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

24th calendar month

March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of
the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.51
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondents
administrative claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was premature
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we

are constrained to deny respondents claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation
of Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which provides that:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases,
the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in
support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part
of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after
the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim
with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the
submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit],"
within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the
taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the
decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application
for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA
within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September
30, 2004. Obviously, respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120day period. For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondents assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of
a judicial claim as long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the
two-year prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondents view. Subsection (A) of the
said provision states that "any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid
attributable to such sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to
appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same
provision, which states that the CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete documents
in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to
decide on the claim.

In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) of
the NIRC, which already provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal
the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC
envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day
period; and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the
taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day
period is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by
respondent, we find the same inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section
306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. And as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to
refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA
warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the
October 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No.
7065 for having been prematurely filed.
SO ORDERED.

CIR v. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.

G.R. No. 184823 October 6, 2010
Del Castillo, J.
Doctrine:
The CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents within which
to grant or deny the claim for refund/credit of input vat. In case of full or partial denial by the
CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of
the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the
application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR
to CTA within 30 days.
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right,
privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return
of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his
entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process.
As between the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the latter that must
prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.

 The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund under Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC refers to applications for refund/credit
filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially granted respondents claim for
refund/credit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the
judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for
under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap
year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year
period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,
which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition,
petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims
contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an
administrative claim is a condition precedent before a judicial claim can be filed.
The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for review. The
decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on
the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that
both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent cited
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it
was ruled that if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about
to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the end of the two-year period
without awaiting the decision of the CIR.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period
2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims
contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an administrative claim,
and violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
Held:
1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period should be reckoned
from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155,
August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a
year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is
composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law,
following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit
for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence,
respondents administrative claim was timely filed.
2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days, from the date of the
submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit],
within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the
taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the
decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application
for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA
within 30 days.
Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that any VAT-registered person, whose sales
are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund
of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales. The phrase within two (2) years x
x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund refers to applications for
refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.
The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc. is inapplicable as
the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. Section 229
does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT.
The premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA
warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.

G.R. No. 183994

June 30, 2014

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,

vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,
Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed the petition and denied the motion
for reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the
Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634.
2

The facts are simple and undisputed:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the
MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules). Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on
July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after. On July 2, 2004, Uy,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases. Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then
Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied
Cos motion for reconsideration. When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself
from handling the criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005. The cases were, thereafter,
raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the
revival of the criminal cases. It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.
Cos motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005. Co then filed
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 171096. We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. There
7

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March
20, 2006.
17

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were
re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on
July 13, 2006. Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues
already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Judge Esteban
V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Cos motion. When the court
subsequently denied Uys motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006, Uy filed a petition
for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the
Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to
proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
18

19

20

21

22

According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ONTHE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE CASES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING
THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON
THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and
3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY
PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:
a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS
COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL
DISMISSAL;
b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS
FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;
c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ARE REVIVED IPSO FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION
TO REVIVE THESE CASES.
23

Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to

speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the
initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay,
which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) and Section
2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandating that the entire
trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed
final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire
jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion because its revival would already put him in
double jeopardy.
24

25

Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after
notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the
trial courts issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly,
even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when
Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year
2004 was a leap year.
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the meat of the
controversy in Cos previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed per Resolution
dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While
the first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, this Court nonetheless
stated therein that "[i]n any event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court
of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our February
13, 2006 Resolution in G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res judicata between the
parties. On this ground alone, this petition should have been dismissed outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present petition, Cos
arguments are nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Cos charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to
show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was
attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the
part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "speedy trial is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept." In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors
to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the
right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
26

27

28

regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. "While the Court
recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of
justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."
29

30

Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused
or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party
is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order
granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served
with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, it is apparent from the
records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private
complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules. The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal
"considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her
complaint." The importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional
dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson:
31

32

33

34

x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires
that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori
notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be
served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is
one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or
the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court
during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the
offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment
on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution
and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its
right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal
of the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to
threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine
jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and
other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of
the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of
the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.
35

Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Cos supposition that the dismissal of
the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not after
notice to the offended party. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not
be literally interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of
due process; thus, said in one case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.

36

We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better
rule is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was
actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a counsel,
notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address.
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel,
service upon the former shall be made upon the latter.

37

38

Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order
reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such
interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the
offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal
with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could
not be expected to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within
the prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or
malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of
Uys motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Cos categorical admission
that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order
on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period
for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent
dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a
leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of

receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the
criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of
whether it is a regular year or a leap year. Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a
yearis composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., which was subsequently
reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., thus:
39

40

41

x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of
thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four
hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain." It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up
to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."
To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to
January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008.
42

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the
one-year period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003
2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003
3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003
4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003
5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003
6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004
7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004

9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004

10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004
11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004
12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a dilatory
tactic to prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As correctly pointed
out by Uy since the time when the "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised
herein were already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting
through the guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless
and vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It
appears that Atty. Maglaques conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court
processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyers Oath also upholds in particular:
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients x x x.
1wphi1

This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of
litigation is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v.
Manila Banking Corporation, We said:
43

The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must
see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a
counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
client's propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty
to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
44

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1,
2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which
affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan
City, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of

the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal
Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid
by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to
investigate Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rule on Forum Shopping.
SO ORDERED.

PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL:
The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to
wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the
order of provisional dismissal of the case. (WILLIAM CO VS. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC
PRODUCTS [2014]).