Académique Documents
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Culture Documents
No. 13-6186
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:99-cr-00189-AW-1)
Argued:
Decided:
before
his
term
of
imprisonment
on
child
sex
Neuhauser then
in
conjunction
with
his
term
of
imprisonment.
He
asserted that his term of supervised release began when his term
of
imprisonment
ended,
and
thus,
his
supervised
denied
supervised
the
confinement.
release
motion,
did
holding
not
begin
that
until
release
The district
Neuhausers
he
ran
was
term
freed
of
from
I.
In September 1999, Neuhauser pled guilty to one count of
interstate travel with intent to engage in sex with a minor and
one count of distribution of child pornography.
2423(b) and 2252(a)(1).
See 18 U.S.C.
and
Neuhauser
served
his
time
two
weeks
in
prison
without
significant incident.
On
May
22,
2007,
just
scheduled
release
date,
the
sexually
dangerous
person
Government
under
the
before
Neuhausers
certified
Adam
Walsh
him
as
Act.
a
The
district
court
could
determine
whether
he
met
the
On
there
for
the
next
four-and-a-half
years
He
while
On
January
district
19,
court
commitment.
2012,
refused
The
after
to
court
an
evidentiary
certify
reasoned
hearing,
Neuhauser
that
for
although
the
civil
Neuhauser
months
later,
on
June
6,
2012,
Neuhauser
moved
to
no
longer
sanction,
but
June 6, 2007.
serving
rather
time
he
in
remained
unlike
imprisonment.
criminal
prison
in
pursuant
prison
to
pursuant
criminal
to
the
confinement,
does
not
constitute
See 18 U.S.C.
The
district
court
disagreed.
It
credited
Neuhausers
confinement.
until
the
Because
resolution
of
the
Government
his
confined
civil-commitment
Neuhauser
hearing,
the
II.
The sole dispute in this case concerns the date on which
Neuhausers supervised release began.
prison
sentence
ended.
The
Government
maintains
that
his
actual
confinement
ended.
The
parties
thus
dispute
Holland v. Pardee
3624,
defendants
term
of
supervised
release
person
. . .
stay[s]
[his]
release
pending
the
18 U.S.C. 4248(a).
Id.
is
no
dispute
that
Neuhauser
remained
confined
release
date
qualifies
as
imprisonment
under
3624.
In
Broughman v. Carter,
(1979).
Chasanow
As
Judge
has
recently
noted,
numerous
nature
imposition.
of
. . .
confinement,
not
the
reason
for
its
as
the
state
of
being
confined;
period
of
as
detention
in
prison
or
place
of
Indeed, in other
legal
contexts,
the
term
imprisonment
describes
something
See 18
Thus, we
contains
two
provisions
regulating
supervised
U.S.C.
3624(e).
According
to
the
statute,
term
See
of
Neuhauser notes that persons detained under civilcommitment statutes are not prisoners for the purposes of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). See Michau v. Charleston
Cnty., 434 F.3d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 2006).
The PLRA, however,
provides no analogy helpful to Neuhauser. For the PLRA applies
only to persons incarcerated or detained in a federal facility
who [are] accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.
28
U.S.C. 1915A(c) (emphasis added).
The supervised-release
statute, by contrast, applies to all imprisoned persons.
18
U.S.C. 3624(e). The lack of limiting qualification in 3624
indicates that it has a much broader scope than the PLRA, and
thus, cases like Michau are not relevant here.
Neuhausers reliance on 18 U.S.C. 3585(b) fails for a
similar reason.
That statute provides for a reduction in a
persons term of imprisonment if the person has spent time in
prison prior to the date [of his] sentence as a result of,
inter alia, the offense for which the sentence was imposed.
Id.
Neuhauser finds it notable that this credit does not
obtain for periods spent in civil detention. It is unclear why
this is notable or what bearing 3585(b) has on the case at
hand, given that both parties agree that Neuhauser remained
confined past his term of imprisonment.
Perhaps Neuhauser
intends to suggest that 3585(b) states a universal definition
of
imprisonment,
which
excludes
confinement
in
civil
detention, but nothing in the text of 3585(b) - or any other
statute - indicates that this is the case.
8
between
imprisonment,
on
the
one
The
hand,
and
If
Neuhauser
were
correct,
and
imprisonment
always
inclusion
of
be
that
connection
phrase
entirely unnecessary.
in
the
with
conviction,
tolling
provision
and
would
the
be
we
note
comports
that
with
only
the
broad
purpose
of
definition
3624.
As
of
we
See
confinement
supervision
that
fulfills
rehabilitative
ends
analysis
accords
with
that
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Id. at 54.
Johnson originally
six
sentence.
Id.
at
years
Id.
5455.
in
Unfortunately,
prison
at 55.
before
Johnson
receiving
had
the
already
modified
his
term
of
supervised
release.
Id.
at
5455.
He
Id. at 5556.
commence
until
imprisonment.
[the]
Id.
individual
at
57.
That
is
released
phrase,
it
from
explained,
Id.
Id. at 59.
case
because
is
Neuhauser,
clearly
distinguishable
conceded
the
fact
of
his
Johnson,
unlike
imprisonment.
This
case.
While
Johnson
freely
admitted
that
he
had
been
Neuhauser
makes
no
similar
admission.
Instead,
pursuant
to
civil
statute
does
not
constitute
important respects.
As
thus
commences
lends
on
support
the
date
to
the
view
that
that
person
is
supervised
freed
from
from
other
courts
that
recently
held
that
925, 930 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding as a matter of law that 4248
detainees supervised release commences on the day he was freed
from confinement), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014); Tobey,
794 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (same).
12
We
1117,
recognize
1126
(9th
different result.
that
in
United
Cir.
2012),
States
the
v.
Ninth
Turner,
Circuit
689
F.3d
reached
release
when
defendant
is
imprisoned
in
civil
provision.
statute
cannot
be
subject
to
3624s
tolling
of
3624:
tolling provision.
the
commencement
provision
and
the
These statutory
624 F.3d 666, 669 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Tobey, 794 F. Supp.
2d at 600.
which
supervised
release
begins,
while
the
tolling
provision
Of
course,
[w]hat
never
begins
cannot
end.
Thus, a court
above,
suspension
different events.
a
person
is
and
commencement
are
triggered
by
imprisoned
in
connection
with
conviction,
Of
Under
regardless
the
of
statutes
whether
it
plain
is
language,
imposed
any
pursuant
imprisonment,
to
criminal
thus
falters
in
light
of
the
plain
language
of
that
this
kind
of
detention
is
not
imprisonment
in
But
conviction
release.
to
stave
Because
distinction
off
Turner
between
the
does
3624s
commencement
not
take
of
supervised
account
commencement
and
of
the
tolling
III.
For all of these reasons, we hold that a defendants term
of
supervised
release
does
not
commence
while
he
remains
in
detainees
criminal
conviction
constitutional. Id. at 136.
5
that
rendered
the
statute