Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
2d 859
54 USLW 2046
* Ronald L. Goldfarb has lived in Virginia and practiced law in the District of
Columbia for almost twenty-five years.1 After several clients asked that he
represent them in Virginia, Goldfarb applied in January 1983 for admission
without examination to the Virginia bar. The Supreme Court of Virginia,
pursuant to Va.Code Sec. 54-67 and its Rule 1A:1(4)(d), permits admission
without examination only if an applicant who has been licensed five years in
another state "intends to practice fulltime as a member of the Virginia bar."2
Because Goldfarb intended to divide his practice between an office in Virginia
and an office in Washington, he did not satisfy the Supreme Court requirement
and his application was denied in November 1983.
The Supreme Court decision left open to Goldfarb two paths by which he could
practice in both Virginia and Washington, D.C. First, he could take the Virginia
bar examination: if he passed, he would then be free to open a part-time office
in the Commonwealth. Second, he could appear pro hac vice when asked to
represent clients in Virginia, a procedure that he had previously followed but
that he found unattractive due to the cost of paying affiliated local counsel.
II
5
Goldfarb first suggests that Rule 1A:1(4)(d) violates the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution. He notes that "a state can require high standards of
qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it
admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756,
1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957). The full-time commitment required for admission
without examination, according to Goldfarb's analysis, shares no rational
connection with his ability to practice law.
This due process challenge to the Virginia rule has been authoritatively rejected
in Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 359 F.Supp. 549 (E.D.Va.), aff'd mem.
414 U.S. 1034, 94 S.Ct. 533, 38 L.Ed.2d 327 (1973), a case essentially identical
to the present action. Brown raised the same due process claims that Goldfarb
now urges, along with additional equal protection arguments, when the
Supreme Court of Virginia denied his application for admission without
examination because he intended to divide his time between Virginia and
Washington, D.C. Application of Brown, 213 Va. 282, 191 S.E.2d 812 (1972).
A three-judge federal panel upheld the rule against Brown's constitutional
challenge, finding that the requirement rationally served the interest of Virginia
in insuring the competence of attorneys practicing in the Commonwealth.
Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 359 F.Supp. at 561-562. The summary
affirmance of this decision by the United States Supreme Court necessarily
agreed that a rational basis lay beneath Rule 1A:1(4)(d), and we may not reopen that foreclosed question. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 and
n. 14, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289, and n. 14, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975).
We recognize that Goldfarb's experience and familiarity with state law may be
such that the full-time practice requirement is unnecessary to guarantee that he
would ably serve the clients and courts that would depend on him in Virginia.
But surely he suffers no more from the presumptions of Rule 1A:1(4)(d) than
did his counterpart in Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 82 S.Ct. 1, 7 L.Ed.2d 5
(1961). The petitioner in that case lived in Kansas and practiced in Kansas City,
Missouri. A Kansas rule required him, as a part-time practitioner, to affiliate
with local counsel for his Kansas appearances even though he had passed the
Kansas bar examination, had published an article on Kansas procedure, and had
served as city attorney for his Kansas town and as a member of the Kansas
Board of Tax Appeals. See Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782
(1960). The Supreme Court dismissed his due process challenge to the Kansas
rule for want of a substantial federal question, holding that the full-time
practice requirement--both on its face and as applied--was "not beyond the
allowable range of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment." Martin v.
Walton, 368 U.S. at 25-26, 82 S.Ct. at 1-2. The same deference to state
regulation is appropriate here. Our role is not to conduct an individual inquiry
into Goldfarb's qualifications; Virginia offers a special hearing on that question
through its bar examination. Our role is instead to determine whether Virginia
has adopted a rational approach to the serious problem of attorney
incompetence. We can only conclude that it has.
III
8
The "putative local benefit" of Rule 1A:1(4)(d), as noted earlier, is that the fulltime practice requirement promotes familiarity with Virginia law among
attorneys who have not passed the state bar examination. Brown v. Supreme
Court of Virginia, 359 F.Supp. at 561-562. This is surely a legitimate state
purpose. The Supreme Court has recognized "the traditional authority of state
courts to control who may be admitted to practice before them," Leis v. Flynt,
439 U.S. 438, 444 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 698, 701 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 717 (1979) and
"their broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and
regulating the practice of professions," Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2016, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975). At a time when
proposals for specialty certification and continuing legal education have
emerged to address public concern about lawyer competency, we decline to
derogate the importance of Virginia's attempt to ensure that those who practice
in its borders have some knowledge of its law.
10
In promoting this interest, Virginia could have required that all lawyers,
including Goldfarb, take and pass the bar examination. Goldfarb concedes that
this maximum burden lies within the state's power to impose. Virginia,
however, has elected to provide the full-time practice option in lieu of an
examination for those lawyers who have practiced elsewhere for five years.
The state can hardly be penalized for offering a choice between a requirement it
can concededly exact and one that many attorneys may find less onerous.
11
however, that every regulation imposed pursuant to the state's police power
must automatically undergo strict scrutiny of means if plaintiff is able to point
to some effect, however indirect, upon interstate commerce. Here the means
chosen are, as noted earlier, concededly legitimate. Courts have consistently
shown deference to special conditions imposed by states on applications for
admission without examination. See, e.g., Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401
(7th Cir.1983); Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir.1974). To require a
hearing to weigh the relative impacts of all the other means the state might have
chosen would deal a serious blow to the capacities of the states and localities to
further even the most basic regulatory purposes. As the Commerce Clause is
implicated by almost every economic regulation, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), and its shadow extends equally far,
see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-623, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 25342535, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978), such hearings would be an almost constant
process.
12
IV
13
Goldfarb argues that this reasoning mingles two different regulations when
each rule must independently satisfy the Constitution. He notes that if the state
offers admission without examination, it may not do so, for example, only for
applicants of a particular race or religion or political affiliation. Eligibility for
admission without examination, if conditioned on those grounds, would
presumably have to withstand constitutional challenge on its own legs, not on
the borrowed legs of the bar examination. Goldfarb reasons that the burden on
interstate commerce of the full-time practice requirement must similarly be
assessed in a factual inquiry that does not consider the alternative of the bar
examination. According to his reply brief, "one's rights under the Commerce
Clause are not different from, or inferior to, rights arising under other
15
The decisive point is that the Commerce Clause is very different from even
Goldfarb's most forceful interpretation of his offered parallel, the Equal
Protection Clause. The Commerce Clause limits state authority in its grant of
federal supremacy. The Equal Protection Clause, on the other hand, explicitly
overrides state authority in its guarantee of individual rights. Goldfarb's
hypothetical Rule 1A:1(4)(d) would violate his Equal Protection Clause,
regardless of the bar examination, because it violates an ineligible applicant's
independent right to be treated like the candidates who are eligible under the
rule.6 The Commerce Clause in contrast creates no such personal claims. The
relevant issue there is whether Virginia has in Rule 1A:1(4)(d) exceeded the
province of its state power by asserting unreasonable control over interstate
commerce. And because the availability of the bar examination helps to define
the extent of that assertion in a way that it cannot define the independent
existence of identical treatment, we include the examination alternative in our
Commerce Clause calculus although we ignore it for equal protection purposes.
Cf. Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F.Supp. 581 (N.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd 702 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir.1983) ("if a state may constitutionally require all applicants to take the
examination, the Commerce Clause is not offended by a rule which permits
some, but not all, out-of-state attorneys to be admitted on waiver of the
examination.")
V
16
admission under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See especially Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205
(1985). Goldfarb may not rely directly on the decisions because he is a Virginia
resident, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause provides "no security for
the citizen of the State in which [the privileges] were claimed." The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).7
Therefore, he attempts to rely on analogy to the decisions, alluding to the
common history and the common purpose shared by the Commerce Clause and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518,
531, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 2490, 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978).
17
We, however, see no logical path from the challenged rule in Supreme Court v.
Piper, which excluded from New Hampshire practice out-of-state residents who
had passed the examination, to the challenged rule here, which would admit
Goldfarb to Virginia practice if he but passed the bar. Given the important
structural differences between the clauses, see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law Sec. 6-33, we cannot find such a route of correspondence in
vague generalizations about "discrimination against those out-of-state." Several
of the concepts involved in Piper are certainly implicated here on varying levels
of abstraction, but the angle of connection is far too oblique to provide any
leverage for overturning Rule 1A:1(4)(d).
VI
18
19
AFFIRMED.
As the district court dismissed this suit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we accept
as true the facts stated in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that favor
the plaintiff. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. 167, 172, 87 S.Ct.
1526, 1529, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967)
2
Upon the applicant's admission he shall thereupon in open court take and
subscribe to the oaths required of attorneys at law, whereupon he shall become
an active member of the Virginia State Bar.
3
Goldfarb argues that this balancing test prescribed by Bruce Church involves
close consideration of the facts presented by each case and stresses that a
complaint may not be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78
S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The district court concluded, as do we,
that the benefit-burden analysis of Pike v. Bruce Church may be performed in
this case without taking discovery or hearing evidence
We therefore need not and do not determine the validity of Rule 1A:1(c), which
limits admission without examination to Virginia residents, in the face of a
constitutional challenge by a nonresident