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PUBLISHER'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank the following individuals who have contributed to the publishing
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John Fedorowicz
Books published by J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing
THE LEIBSTANDARTE (1 SS Panzer Division) volumes I, II, and III
EUROPEAN VOLUNTEERS (5 SS Panzer Division)
DAS REICH I (2 SS Panzer Division)
OTTO WEIDINGER
OTTO KUMM
MANHAY, THE ARDENNES; CHRISTMAS 1944
ARMOR BATTLES OF THE WAFFEN - SS 1943-1945
TIGER; THE HISTORY OF A LEGENDARY WEAPON 1942-45
HITLER MOVES EAST
In preparation for publication in the coming year
PANZER ACES
TIGERS IN THE MUD
EASTFRONT DRAMA 1944
THE HISTORY OF THE 12 SS PANZER DIVISION HITLERJUGEND
SCORCHED EARTH
INFANTRY ACES
DAS REICH II
THE LEIBSTANDARTE IV/1
CONTENTS
Introduction
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Chapter Two The History of Wachregiment Berlin
Chapter Three The Infanterie-Lehrregiment
Chapter Four Reorganisation of the Wachregiment
20
21
29
33
41
52
55
60
75
85
98
112
126
136
144
149
153
156
171
174
189
193
205
223
232
238
247
261
265
290
293
313
319
365
384
388
391
436
INTRODUCTION
HISTORICAL UNDERTONES
GrenadierFusilierMusketeer
In the beginning the role of the Grenadier was to throw hand
grenades at the enemy. The grenades which in the modern sense
would be termed hand grenades were hollow spheres of iron or
lead, or sometimes glass, weighing two to three pounds. Because of
their weight, the handling of these weapons demanded especially
brawny and daring men, possessing great stamina. The Grenadier
had to carry his grenades close enough to the enemy to be sure of
hitting him, but also close enough to ensure that the resulting
explosions did not inflict casualties on his own troops.
Because of the unique nature of his fighting style, the Grenadier
was especially well suited to dispersed actions such as the taking of
important defensive strongpoints. Distinguished by their physical
stature, strength, manly appearance and independence in action,
they sought to make their outward appearance even more fearsome
and impressive through distinguishing features which could identify
them as elite troops even from a distance. Their most conspicuous
badge was the Grenadier cap or helmet.
In the same way Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, the
oldest regiment in the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Panzer Corps, was
justifiably proud to bear the title Panzergrenadier Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND as the new elite of the German Army. In
1940 and 1941 its soldiers earned the right to bear the title of
grenadier in combat on the battlefields in the west and the east. They
laid the foundation for the reputation of the division which took the
name GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and from which other divisions
later emerged.
By this time the colourful jacket had given way to the grey field
uniform; the grenadier's cap had been replaced by the functional
steel helmet suited to modern warfare; instead of the long grenadier's
pike, non-commissioned officers carried the short, compact submachine gun; the attack was carried to the enemy in fast armoured
the mass of the foot soldiery; his title is much older than that of the
Grenadier or Fusilier.
By 1520 the then new musket was introduced into Spain and the
Netherlands by the Duke of Alba. However, with a weight of fifteen
to twenty pounds, it remained a rather heavy and unwieldy weapon.
The musket required support in the form of the so-called "musketfork" in order to fire its approximately 60-gram ball. Under King
Gustav Adolf in the Thirty Year's War the weight of the musket was
reduced to about five pounds. In Germany in the Sixteenth Century
each troop received fifty men armed with muskets, who were
designated Musketiere. The Musketiere of Frederick the Great were
capable of getting off five shots per minute.
At first the musket was issued only to the best and most favoured
marksmen. Later the weapon was also issued to the common foot
soldiery, who were likewise designated Musketeers, even after the
contemporary musket had been replaced by newer, technically
improved weapons. As well, their uniforms continued to identify
them as Musketeers at first.
When, in the last months of the Second World War, the two
armoured and motorised infantry regiments of the Panzergrenadier
Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND were joined by a third regiment
of the same style, it was designated Panzermusketier Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in recognition of this oldest name for the
firearm-bearing soldier. Originating from units of the Panzergrenadier Regiment GD, after its formation the unit initially bore the
title Panzerkorps Fusilier Regiment GD in order to identify it as a
regiment of the Corps. As a result of the situation in the East,
however, it went into action in March 1945 as Panzermusketier
Regiment GD under the command of the Panzergrenadier Regiment
GD.
T h e Artillery
By its nature the artillery is characterised as a weapon which
supports the infantry in the attack or the defence. Like its sister
weapon the anti-aircraft artillery, the heavy weapons of the artillery
were indispensable in land warfare. The crash of artillery fire was
music to the ears of the infantry.
The development of artillery followed a different path from that of
the infantry. The origin of the word artillery which first appeared
in the German language around 1500 is uncertain. The appearance of artillery, however, goes back to antiquity, when the
Roman legions were supported in their attacks on fortified strongholds by catapults which flung heavy stones at the enemy. These
machines were the forerunners of actual artillery.
11
13
14
15
Above all it was upon the last two types that the reputation of the
German Panzer Arm was built in the first two years of the war.
Additional factors were the thorough training of the crews, as well
as the fighting spirit of the troops and the superior command of the
German tank units. With the beginning of the Russian Campaign in
1941 the clear superiority of the German Panzers decreased. Although the Russians initially committed heavily armoured and powerfully armed but unwieldy types such as the 52-ton KV II, in the
autumn of 1941 they sent the improved 44-ton KV I and the feared
26-ton T-34 into battle. It was the latter type which was subsequently
to dominate the war in the East. Without doubt the T-34 combined
qualities which came close to the ideal of the modern tank: speed,
mobility and relatively strong armour combined with a favourable
exterior shape (sloped surfaces). An additional advantage was the
firepower of its 7.62-cm cannon and two machine guns. The Panzer
III was no match for the T-34 and the Panzer IV could deal with the
Russian tank only under favourable conditions. But just as every
action results in a reaction, so the appearance of this Russian tank
called every German tank-producing firm into action. This development work resulted in the Panzer V (Panther) and Panzer VI (Tiger).
The Panther weighed approximately 44 tons, carried a crew of five
and was armed with a long-barrelled 7.5-cm KwK and two machine
guns.
The Tiger weighed approximately 55 tons, carried a crew of five
and was armed with an 8.8-cm KwK and two machine guns.
The Tiger II appeared towards the end of the war. It weighed 70
tons, had a five man crew and was armed with an 8.8-cm KwK and
two machine guns.
These German Panzer types restored the balance between the
warring nations in the field of tank construction.
Working as a unit, the tank crew formed a fighting team. The
success of the Panzer Arm depended largely on the fighting spirit of
the crews.
At the beginning of 1942 the I.(Flammpanzer) Abt./Pz.-Rgt.100
was formed for the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Infantry Division. In
February it was incorporated into the Division as Panzer-Abteilung
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. This unit constituted the cadre battalion
of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Panzer Regiment. Possessing a
battalion each of Panzer IVs, Panthers and Tigers, the Panzer
regiment was the sharp sword in the hands of the division's commanders and saw action in offensive and defensive roles on the
Eastern Front as well as in the West. Even in the hopeless situations
of the final months of the war, many enemy attacks failed in the face
of the defence put up by the division's tanks.
16
C o m b a t E n g i n e e r s (Pioniere)
The Pionier, whose name perhaps came from the French pion
(walker), or even more probably from the Italian piccone (pickaxe),
was first trained and employed in France around 1500 as a builder
of field fortifications; hence the present-day meaning of the name.
In the Prussian Army the term first appeared in the Imperial Order
of 8 January 1742 from General von Walrave, the fortress builder
of Frederick the Great, which created the Regiment Pionniers,
whose first assignment was the improvement of the fortress works
on the Nei.
The designation Pionier in the present-day sense first appeared in
1810, when the existing mining and pontooning companies were
united in a Pionier Corps. The members of the corps were called
miners, sappers and pontooneers, indicating their specialised roles.
The Pionier s role included the duties of close combat; he was
trained not just for the technical role of a combat engineer, but also
on all infantry weapons. The flamethrower was the Pionier's best
means of dealing with enemy fortifications.
When, in 1940, the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
joined the fighting in the West, it was soon followed by the then 18th
(Pionier) Company. But it was to be Sturm-Pionier-Bataillon 43,
which was not incorporated, but which was attached to the regiment,
that accompanied it in the East and West. Cooperation and joint
success led, with the formation of the division, to the incorporation
of this unit as Sturm-Pionier-Bataillon GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
The "Sturm" prefix was a special honour which indicated that the
unit had distinguished itself in action, specifically in the storming of
the fortress of Brest-Litovsk. This tradition was enhanced by the later
Panzer-Sturm-Pionier-Bataillon
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in
all
of its actions and, with the reorganisation as Panzer-Corps
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, was carried on by its successors, the
Panzer-Pionier-Regiment and the Panzer-Corps-Pionier-Bataillon 500 GD
When the Pioniers fought their last great battle at the Wolittnick
railway embankment in East Prussia in March 1945, they did so as
members of Panzer-Pionier-Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
17
Evolution from Wach. Rgt. BERLIN to Pz. Korps GD, from 1937 to 8 May 1945.
Illustrated on Pages 18 + 19.
Part I
BETWEEN
THE
WARS
Chapter One
The Origins of GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
W i t h the a b o v e l a c o n i c a n n o u n c e m e n t i n the A r m y
Verordnungsblatt, the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND came into being. Well known in Germany at that time was
the ceremonial guard in Berlin. Three times per week, accompanied
by the beating of drums, the guard was drawn up on the Unter den
Linden. At the stroke of twelve noon it marched through the
Brandenburg Gate to relieve the guards in front of the memorial in
the Schinkel Building. This guard, or " Wache` as it had been known
in the local Berlin dialect for many decades, was drawn from a
company of the unit which was quartered at the Moabit barracks.
Wachregiment Berlin, which was stationed there, produced the best
drill soldiers in the German Army.
It was decreed that this regiment was to form the basis of the new
unit. The new regiment was to represent the entire German Reich
in one unit. Only with this in mind can one understand the words of
the new regiment's first commander, Oberst von Stockhausen, on
the occasion of the unit's naming ceremony:
In our proud name we wish to embody the greater German
Wehrmacht, and we wish to do our duty like every unit of the German
Army. But just as we now march at the head of parades, so to we
wish, if it should someday come to that, to be able to lead the way
in the attack."
The choice of duties was appropriate, as the Wachregiment had
already carried out similar tasks for years. But it was also a requirement that the regiment's members all be volunteers and moreover
that it be volunteers from every region of Germany that formed the
the new unit.
20
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Chapter Two
The History of Wachregiment Berlin
The Versailles Treaty of 1919, which carried the seeds of the
Second World War, permitted Germany, in addition to the police,
the formation of a professional army. Because of its numerical limits
it was called the 100,000-man-Army or Reichswehr. It was intended
strictly to be a force for maintaining order, countering internal unrest
and preventing possible attacks against Germany.
In the course of the creation of the Reichswehr it became apparent
that it would be necessary to station a unit in the capital city of Berlin.
Tasks had arisen there which could not be carried out by the police
alone. The possibility of putting down attempted coups in the capital,
the question of guarding military installations and command centres
(such as the newly-constructed Reichswehr Ministry), the provision
of honour guards for state visits, funerals, memorial days etc., as well
as the necessity of having a reliable unit available, led in early 1921
(H.V.-Blatt Nr. 35 of 1921) to the formation of the Wachregiment
Berlin. In order to create an operationally- ready unit as quickly as
possible, whole companies and battalions were ordered to Berlin
from the available regiments in Germany.
The Wachregiment Berlin soon became a thorn in the side of the
left-wing parliamentary group in the Reichstag, which believed that
it perceived a threat in the new unit. Therefore, on 19 June 1921
(H.V.-Blatt Nr. 35 of 24 June 1921) the Wachregiment was
disbanded.
21
retained its regional characteristics, which often gave rise to goodnatured comparisons, but also to much welcome rivalry in routine
duties.
Franz Bischoff, then a member of the 7th (Bavarian) Company,
described the maintenance of regional customs and practices:
"The furnishings in the halls and rooms of the companies' quarters
reflected the origins of each unit. Everywhere there were slogans on
the walls, pictures of home and so on, and everywhere were the
respective state colours. In addition there were the unadulterated
regional accents among all ranks no one could go wrong when
looking for someone from his own state. Company festivals,
Christmas celebrations and other events always exhibited a regional
character. When considering the maintenance of regional customs
the 7th Company always comes to mind. That company's long-serving company commander, Major Hofmeister, saw to it that his
countrymen remained Bavarians even in the Reich capital and felt
at home there. Their presentations at the well- arranged Oktoberfests, Christmas celebrations, carnival evenings and so on were
always very original and entertaining. When they danced and
yodelled in their Bavarian costumes it thrilled even the hearts of the
Prussian guests. Another great attraction was the so-called 'Bavarian
mess,' which was actually only a beer cellar. It had been set up by
the company from its own resources and was simply, but pleasantly,
decorated. After their duties were over, soldiers of all ranks could sit
together on long, whitewashed wooden tables and exchange
opinions over something to eat and a Moa of real Bavarian beer.
Officers, senior commanders and government ministers, among
others, also met there frequently, taking an interested part in the
enjoyable activities of their Bavarian comrades, with some even
becoming regular guests. The mess was provisioned mainly from
Bavaria; Geselchtes, Leberks, Weiwurst and Brathnd'l were
flown to Berlin, while the good Ingolstdter beer came by truck
directly from the brewery. On leaving this familiar, hospitable spot
for home, the eyes of every soldier fell on the mural painted on the
broadside of the cellar:
"Never reproach the acts of soldiers,
Let them have fun let them kiss;
Who knows, how soon they will have to die."
At that time probably no one suspected. . . how soon.
Each company led its individual existence according to its native
customs and practices, but differences disappeared in the fulfilment
of their common duties. Among their duties was the provision of
guards, including the following:
23
24
25
28
Chapter Three
The Infantry Lehrregiment
For some time the armies of the leading military states had created
dedicated instructional units. The primary task of such units was the
testing and development of weapons, equipment, battle tactics and
techniques. The dissemination of the knowledge gained was carried
out in the form of information circulars or practical demonstrations.
In 1819, in answer to the need for such a unit, particularly for the
infantry, which was the largest component of the Army, the German
Army set up the Lehr- Infanterie-Batailon which was based in
Potsdam, Neues Palais. The men of the battalion saw active duty in
the First World War and the memorial tablet in the Olympic Village
in Berlin showed that this unit alone lost 5,567 officers, NCOs and
men between 1914 and 1918.
With the establishment of the Reichswehr following the First World
War, a unit was formed to carry out similar duties: the Lehr-und
Versuchs-Kommando fr Infanterie-Waffen in Dberitz, near
Berlin. The unit's scope was narrow, limited by the constraints faced
by the Reichswehr at that time. In 1934 an infantry battalion was
created from the Kommando which first took in its own recruits in
October 1934. At that time the battalion was organised as follows:
Battalion headquarters, with signals platoon, band
Commanding officer:
Major Fleischhauer
Adjutant:
Obit. Masius
1st (Rifle) Company:
Hptm. Gronau
2nd (Rifle) Company:
Hptm. Kokott
3rd (Rifle) Company:
Hptm. v. Rhaden, Hptm. Blochwitz, Hptm. Grell
4th (Machine Gun) Company:
Hptm. Einstmann
5th (Infantry Gun) Company:
Hptm. Greim
It was also at about this time that the Dberitz Infantry School was
created as a training school for infantry officers. The Lehrtruppe
(instructional unit) was under the command of the school for its
purposes, while the school was under the direct command of the
Inspektion fr Infanterie im Oberkommando des Heeres (IN 2).
The troops were housed in Dberitz on the edge of the well-known
troop training grounds, which had absorbed the sweat of generations
of soldiers. This was the practice field used by the Lehrtruppe for
unit trials and the testing of new infantry weapons and equipment,
29
platoon
Major Jais
Obit, von Selle
Hptm. Reuter
Hptm. v. d. Mosel
Hptm. Einstmann
Hptm. Greim (with mounted
platoon)
30
which had been built for the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The
former II Battalion (mot.) was renamed III Battalion (mot.) and the
new II Battalion was fully motorised for the training of the so-called
fast units (Panzergrenadiers etc.).
Commander of the Infantry School was the one-armed Oberst
Hube, who demanded much of his men as well as the prospective
officers attending courses. The jump from the ten-meter tower in the
newly-constructed aquatic centre was just as much a matter of course
he demonstrated the dive himself as was soldierly conduct during
exercises with live ammunition.
On 1 September 1939, while courses for the infantry were still
running at an increasing rate in the Olympic Village to bolster the
almost too rapid expansion of the new Wehrmacht, and while the
Lehrregiment continued to strive to keep up with its growing
responsibilities, war broke out with Poland. The majority of the
German divisions marched to the East and both sides suffered their
first casualties, while in the homeland more divisions were quickly
raised and mobilised. Meanwhile, the Lehrregiment remained the
instructional unit for the new generation of officers who would serve
in the divisions then being formed. The regiment's commander,
Oberst Hube, who also commanded the Infantry School, saw to it
that they were well- trained.
Inevitable changes and shuffling of personnel took place in the
command of the Lehrregiment. I Battalion came to be commanded
by Oberstleutnant Garski, who would later play a significant role in
the success of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment. II Battalion
passed into the hands of Major Mller- Blow, while Oberstleutnant
Khler, who later also became a battalion and regimental commander of high quality with the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment, assumed command of III Battalion.
Two days after the beginning of the Polish Campaign, England and
France declared war on Germany. The war against the two western
powers initially assumed the form of positional warfare in and around
the bunkers of the Maginot Line and the Westwall. Mobilised
third-line German divisions occupied positions in the Westwall to
prevent an incursion by the French. At first the war brought no
changes to the routine of the Lehrregiment, except that many of
the regiment's members were annoyed that they were unable to play
a part in the success of Germany's Army in the East.
This may have been the reason, perhaps also as a result of the
insight of higher command authorities and of Oberst Hube, that
u
Sturm-Bataillon Garski"was formed in September 1939 from the
Infanterie-Lehrregiment. The battalion consisted of elements of the
regimental headquarters and the 1st, 3rd and 4th Companies as well
as a company of engineers from a Sturm- Pionier Regiment.
Commander of the unit was Oberstleutnant Garski. The battalion
31
was sent by truck over the Potsdam Mannheim autobahn into the
area of Kaiserslautern. Arriving near Altenkessel and Fllgarten, the
troops dug in and built positions.
The official entry for this period read:
1.9. 10. 10. 39 Positional warfare near Saarbrcken.
There was not much fighting in the actual, and especially the later,
sense; when there was firing it was just to accustom the men and to
show the French that they were still there. Otherwise the training
went on just as it had back in Germany, albeit under somewhat more
difficult conditions.
In Germany, as part of the reorganisation of the Wachregiment
Berlin
into the
Infanterie-Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND,
the guard soldiers were being trained on the MG 34 machine gun
and the Panzerbchse 38 (anti-tank rifle) for a combat role by
instructors seconded from the Lehrregiment. Live firing was carried
out in the incomplete excavations for the new barracks.
The Infanterie-Lehr-Sturmbataillon, which was manning positions in the Westwall the line of bunkers built on the German side
went on with its combat training. The battalion was regularly
employed in the front lines. The single outstanding event from this
period, which resulted in the award of the Iron Cross, Second Class
to Hptm. Grell, Lt. Goeldel, Uffz. Kaufmann, Uffz. Torhauer and
Uffz. Luer, was Operation Ransbacher Berg (Westwall), which is
included in the official record. The decoration certificates bear the
signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the First Army, General der
Infanterie von Witzleben, dated 25 September 1939.
The time in the Westwall for the Infanterie-Sturm- Lehr-Bataillon as it called itself came to an end on 8 and 9 October 1939
when it returned to DberitzOlympic Village. Soon after its return,
Obstlt. Garski announced that it was to be incorporated as III
Battalion of the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND,
which was then being formed. In doing so, he pointed out the
associated responsibility to everyone. From then on, as an outward
sign of their new unit, a white stripe was worn on their shoulder
straps.
All the preparations needed to carry out this order were completed.
The former Wachtruppe Berlin joined with the elements of the
Infanterie-Lehrregiment which had already seen some combat to
form the Infanterie-Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. It was 1
October 1939.
32
Chapter Four
Reorganisation of the Wachregiment
In the Moabit barracks, where the Wachregiment Berlin was
housed, there was great activity. A so-called "formation headquarters" under the direction of the future regimental commander
Oberst von Stockhausen, assisted by Hptm. Beckschfer and Major
Krger, as well as the motor-vehicle specialist Government Surveyor
Dr. Nielsen and Chief-Inspector Biesinger were initiating the first
steps toward the reorganisation of the unit. First of all, steps were
taken to bring the companies back up to strength; requisitions were
sent out for the appropriate personnel. The government surveyor
concerned himself with vehicles which gave rise to speculation
that they had a motorised regiment in mind. Some of the first vehicles
to arrive were initially parked in temporary shelters such as the
barracks in Dberitz and in buildings on Rathenower Stra which
were under renovation. Field kitchens, equipment, weapons and
other articles were requisitioned so that the regiment, which had to
reckon on seeing action at the front, would be ready for the field and
equipped with the appropriate rear echelon units. At this time the
regiment's personnel complement was as follows:
Regimental Headquarters
Commanding officer
Adjutant
Staff Hauptmann
lb
Ila
Ic/mob.
Doctor
Medical Assistant
Music
IVa
Rgt. Clerk
Rgt. Bugler
Senior NCO
33
1st Company
Commander
Senior NCO
2nd Company
Commander
Senior NCO
3rd Company
Commander
Senior NCO
4th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
5th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
6th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
7th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
8th Company
Commander
Senior NCO
Hauptmann Wolkewitz
Hauptfeldwebel Schttler
Major v. d. Lancken
Hauptfeldwebel Pflug
Major Krger
Hauptfeldwebel Fromm
Major von Rheinbaben
Hauptfeldwebel Werner
Major Frotscher
Hauptfeldwebel Waldmann
Major Aschen
Hauptfeldwebel Fuhrmann
Hauptmann Graf
Hauptfeldwebel Manz
Hauptmann Ewert
Hauptfeldwebel Wellmann
34
later Feldwebel
later Wachmeister
later
Fahnenjunker-Oberfeldwebel (KIA)
later Oberfeldwebel
later Feldwebel
later Stabsgefreiter
later Stabsgefreiter (KIA)
Gefr. Lehmann
Gefr. Lippold
Gefr. Kalinowski
Gefr. Ihle
Gefr. Gerber
Schtze Keller
Schtze Gottbeht
35
36
37
38
39
40
Part II
THE WAR IN THE WEST
Chapter One
I.R.
1. 10. 5. 11. 39
6. 11. 9. 5. 40
The occupation of Poland was formally decided in the GermanRussian Border and Friendship Pact of 28 September 1939. The
respective forces occupied Polish territory up to the demarcation line
between German and Russian territory which had been laid down in
August. As a result, the German frontier of 1914 was pushed forward
to the gates of Warsaw, and the area as far as Litzmannstadt (the
old German province of Posen) was incorporated into the Warthe
District. Germany and Russia had now become direct neighbours
and both states were careful not to injure the interests of the other.
The Germans soon stripped the East of troops except for several
police and occupation units. The civilian government took over the
Reich's interests in these areas.
While the Allies wished to sustain the existing state suspended
between peace and war, Hitler was making new plans. Emboldened
by his lightning victory in Poland, he decided to attack the West as
soon as possible. Hitler declared his intentions in an order from 9
October 1939:
"If it should become apparent in the near future that England and
France are unwilling to end the war, I am determined to take the
offensive without waiting for too much time to pass."
Despite the objections of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
Hitler had the General Staff draw up 'Deployment Order Yellow,"
which he issued on 29 October 1939. A-Day was fixed as 7
41
42
Obstlt. Doege
Obit. Brockmann
Obit. Beug
Obit. Pankow
AO
44
in addition:
45
The year 1940, which began with snow and even colder temperatures, saw the regiment still in its quarters in the Westerwald around
the city of Montabaur. Following the break for the Christmas
holidays, which saw light duties on New Year's Day at least for
the 6th Company preparations by the entire regiment for the
46
coming action were pushed ahead with new enthusiasm. Despite the
snow, the 11th Company under Hptm. Krger organised route-marches to toughen the troops. On 18 January 1940 the 11th Company
carried out an exercise with white- painted tanks to test the effectiveness of the winter camouflage.
In the meantime tactical symbols appeared on all of the regiment's
vehicles, consisting of the white Stahlhelm on backgrounds of
various colours. The symbols served to distinguish the various units
and were the result of experience in Poland.
In preparation for X-Day (the attack date) the regiment, which until
now had been in the rear operations area of the Western front, was
moved forward. This began, in deep snow, on 29 January 1940 with
a move from the Montabaur area to the Mosel and into the Hunsrck
area. The move was carried out for the most part by motor vehicle
through Koblenz-Geisfeld (near Trier) in the direction of the
Hunsrck or through Koblenz along the Mosel valley.
The headquarters of the I.R. GD took up quarters in Zell on the
Mosel, I Battalion in Neef on the Mosel, III Battalion in the Hunsrck
villages of Biebern and Plter, and IV Battalion in Merl and Zell on
the Mosel. While the 11th Company of III Battalion had to shovel
its way into the village, the more mobile 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company
simply drove into Merl on the Mosel in its vehicles. The villages,
especially those on the Mosel, were jammed with troops and units;
it was difficult to find room for them all.
Even though the companies' accommodations were almost as
basic as those in the field the 11th Company, for example, slept
on straw mattresses they soon resumed normal duties, even
though they began by shovelling snow.
More and more all measures were directed towards preparing the
regiment for its special role an attack through fortified positions.
Map exercises were held regularly at the regimental and battalion
headquarters, with all available sources of information such as slides,
maps and aerial photographs providing the necessary realism. There
was also a continuous flow of fortifications maps from the northern
wing of the Maginot Line and the Meuse near Sedan, as well as
border fortifications on the Belgian and Luxemburg borders, which
were immediately analyzed. The regiment was informed of its
planned assignment in the first phase of the attack which, briefly,
was to smash a breach through Luxemburg and the Belgian fortifications for the tanks which were to follow. The assignment was
reflected in the following teletype from the Army's Operations
Department received on 11 November 1939:
47
C O M M A N D MATTER
O n l y to be Viewed by Officers!
Oberkommando des Heeres
10 copies
5th
copyTeletype
(with copies dispatched)
To
Heeresgruppenkommando A
Heeresgruppenkommando B
The Fhrer has issued the following order:
"A third group of fast units will be formed on the south wing of
the Twelfth or in the sector of the Sixteenth Army and, taking
advantage of the forest-free sector on both sides of Arlons TintignyFlorenville, will be committed in the direction of Sedan and east.
Composition:
Like all of the other units in the first wave, the I.R. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND received information concerning new fortifications on the Allied side of the frontier as they were discovered by
aerial reconnaissance. The steady flow of new information was
processed and the bunkers and defensive positions were entered on
the unit's maps. The resulting overall picture gave rise to mild
anxiety, as the extent of the installations appeared to be considerable.
A map exercise took place sometime in February 1940 at the H . Q .
of XIX Pz.A.K. in Koblenz under the direction of its commander,
General Guderian, w h o was slated to lead the armoured
breakthrough group. Guderian informed the commander of the I.R.
G D , Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin, that his regiment's role would be to
smash a breach through the enemy fortifications and that his - Guderian's Panzers would stream forward through this gap during
the night. GD would then follow the next morning. From this remark
Graf von Schwerin determined that not only was GD to be given the
task of piercing the fortifications, but also that of pursuing the enemy
deep into the interior. He was not convinced that the Panzer units
would be able to catch up during the night. Graf von Schwerin
countered Guderian's reply that, according to his experiences in
Poland, the infantry slept during the night and advanced no farther,
with a wager of a crate of champagne that such would not be the
case with GD. In fact, the infantry got through the fortifications
and reached the Meuse ahead of the Panzer units.
Special measures were taken in connection with these intensive
preparations which affected the I.R. GD. Elements of III Battalion
under the command of Obstlt. Garski including the battalion's
11th Company and elements of Sturm-Pi.Btl. 43 were transferred
on 28 February by rail to Crailsheim, where they were quartered on
the local airfield. These units were earmarked for a special operation
bearing the name "NIWI," which was to consist of airborne landings
behind the Belgian line of fortifications. No one knew any more
details about the operation. Some indication of its nature was gained
when practice flights in Fieseler Storch aircraft began in the early
days of March 1940. On 9 March General der Flieger Sperrle
watched one of the company's exercises.
Meanwhile, on the Mosel, the regiment continued to practise, train
and conduct map exercises. The unit's organisation was also improved; Regimental Order No. 49 of 4 March 1940 gave the following instructions under heading No. 4:
Regiment Abteilung lb
Effective 5. 3. 1940, all sections of the regimental H.Q. which deal
with the area of supply will be concentrated in Section lb (Abteilung
lb). Leader of this section: Hauptmann Gericke.
49
In April 1940 there were increasing signs that the unit would soon
see action. There were many indications that the date of the attack
was not far off.
On 4 April Sturm-Batterie 640 arrived and was incorporated into
IV Battalion as the 16th Company. Equipped with six assault guns
armed with short-barrelled 7.5-cm cannon, the battery represented
a considerable amount of firepower in the attack as well as the
defence, especially against tank attack. The battery had been sent to
the GD Regiment at the suggestion of Oberst Schmundt, Chief
Adjutant to the Supreme Commander, after the Leibstandarte SS
Adolf Hitler, the first regiment of the Waffen-SS, was promised an
assault gun battery.
On 10 April 1940 the commanding general of XIX Pz.A.K.,
General Guderian, appeared in person to assess the I.R. GD's state
of training. I Battalion, supported by heavy weapons (including the
heavy infantry guns of 15th Company), conducted live firing near
Tellich. The demonstration went well, much to the satisfaction of the
Panzer General. In his address to the troops Guderian stated:
"The tasks which await the regiment are great! They will bring
it days of uninterrupted driving and fighting, without rest, without
sufficient food. A piece of army bread, some Schokacola and a
canteen of coffee will have to suffice. After a victorious breakthrough
following a successful battle there can simply be no halt or rest,
we must maintain our pursuit of the enemy to prevent him from
settling in somewhere else! That would only cost new sacrifices,
which should be avoided as much as possible."
His words were simple and clear; the regiment and its soldiers
understood them only too well. Preparation down to the last detail
was the answer to Guderian's address.
River crossing exercises using assault boats of the nearby SturmPionier-Btl. 43 alternated with practice assaults on bunkers with
close-range weapons including, for the first time, magnetic hollow
charges. The newly-arrived assault gun battery, the 16th Company,
demonstrated its ability, participating in joint infantry-tank exercises.
Meanwhile, the elements of III Battalion which had been detached
to Crailsheim, in particular the 11th Company, returned to the Mosel
via Baumholder, where they resumed their training activities with the
regiment's other companies.
May arrived; morale in the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment
was at its highest, the headquarters and operations sections were
working flat out, everything was leading up to the day of the attack.
50
51
Chapter Two
In the Homeland
In the shadow of larger events taking place elsewhere, but no less
a part of the unit, the Wachkompanie Berlin continued to carry out
its duties. It consolidated its internal structure in an attempt to once
again become something like a parade unit and provided, albeit with
a limited number of sentries, security for the Berlin headquarters.
On 1 April 1940 the Wachkompanie Berlin was expanded to
become the Wachbataillon Berlin. This move brought some recognition for the work it had been quietly carrying out, and showed that,
in spite of the war, the unit had important duties to perform. In
Moabit the Wachbataillon Berlin continued to occupy the quarters
of the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, which was in
the field, and expanded its establishment to a headquarters company
and six infantry companies.
The officer complement of the battalion headquarters was as
follows:
Major von Boguslawski
Hauptmann Frotscher
Stabszahlmeister Bischoff
Oberstabsarzt Dr. Zeidler
Musikmeister Guido Grosch
Hauptmann Khn
Commanding Officer:
Adjutant:
IVa:
IVb:
Band:
Commander H.Q. Company:
road journey from Berlin-Reinickendorf through Braunschweig, Offenbach, Frankfurt/Main and Kaiserslautern to Hasloch. Driving
conditions were poor as the roads were covered with ice and snow.
On 24 December 1939, Hitler visited the Leibstandarte SS Adolf
Hitler in its quarters in Hasloch to share in the unit's Christmas
celebrations. The 1st Watch Company of the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon provided security. The battalion also had to provide detachments
for duties such as guarding special trains.
Separate from these detachments was a special detachment which
accompanied construction battalions of the Todt Organisation which
were constructing permanent headquarters whose installations and
facilities required constant supervision. The locations of these installations which were designated as "objects" provided an initial
indication of Hitler's intentions for the immediate future. The sites
were therefore top secret, and for that reason alone they demanded
constant guarding, even during construction.
One such site was Objekt Grnberg in Hesse, which was later
occupied by the Army High Command. Under construction was the
headquarters in Mnstereifel, designated Installation W O, cover
name Objekt Felsennest. Elements of the Watch Companies were
stationed there in early 1939, in rotation with guards at the
Reichskanzlei.
In about April of 1940, Oberst Rommel left his post as commander
of the Fhrer Headquarters, which he had set up, to take command
of a division (the 7th Panzer Division) before the beginning of the
attack in the West. An exchange of officers took place at the same
time, as some of those in the headquarters reported back to their
units prior to the attack in the West. This applied in particular to the
I.R. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, which had supplied the bulk of the
headquarters' officers, NCOs and men. Among these were Oberleutnants Rssert and Schneider, who had led the 1st Platoon of the
Begleit-Kommando since 1939. The two went to Neuruppin, while
others reported directly back to the regiment.
After the outbreak of war had become a fait accompli in September
1939, those active and therefore immediately available units were
moved to the front. In the course of mobilisation new contingents
were raised, uniformed, armed and trained in weapons and combat
tactics.
The replacement units which remained behind in Germany had to
take over important duties. With the departure of the active regiments these were raised at their garrisons, for the most part from
cadre units, men left behind and instructors specially detached for
that purpose. It was in every regiment's interests not to leave inferior
units behind in Germany, and through a continuous exchange of
combat-experienced soldiers they ensured that the replacements
received training which approximated conditions at the front.
53
54
Chapter Three
The Day before the Attack
The German plan for the campaign against France, a modified
version of "Fall Gelb" based on the Manstein Plan, foresaw the main
thrust taking place through LuxembourgBelgium toward Sedan.
The decision would lay in breakthrough, not envelopment!
The Meuse was to be crossed near and north of Sedan, the
extended Maginot Line pierced and bridgeheads won on the west
bank of the Meuse from which to continue the advance to the west.
Remembering the Schlieffen Plan, the French Commander-inChief Gamelin expected the main thrust of the German attack to be
in the direction of Antwerp. Contributing to this conviction were
careful security measures on the German side, as well as rumours
planted by various means in the Allied camp that the Germans were
retaining a strong northern wing. In any case, it seemed highly
doubtful that the Germans would attempt to send powerful armoured
forces through the difficult terrain of the Ardennes. So the Allies
persisted with their deployment, which saw their forces spread
almost equally along the entire Eastern Front.
On the German side the focus of the attack lay with Heeresgruppe
A (Army Group A). The main task had fallen to the spearhead of
Gen. d. Kav. von Kleist's Panzergruppe, which boasted a strength
of three corps with a total of five Panzer and three motorized infantry
divisions, as well as several army units including engineers and
artillery. The most stalwart advocate of a concentration of armoured
forces for the planned breakthrough was General Guderian, who was
to play a leading role in the campaign.
Panzergruppe von Kleist was organised as follows:
XIX Pz.Corps
XXXXI Pz.Corps
Gen. Guderian
1st, 2nd, 10th Panzer Divisions with attached
Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Gen. Reinhardt
6th and 8th Panzer Divisions and 2nd Infantry
Division (mot.)
Gen. von Wietersheim
13th and 29th Infantry Divisions (mot.)
55
Headquarters
Commanding Officer
Regimental Adjutant
Staff Officer
lb
IVa
IVb
I (Rifle)
Battalion
Battalion
56
5th
6th
7th
8th
Obit.
Obit,
Obit.
Obit.
(Rifle) Company
(Rifle) Company
(Rifle) Company
(MG) Company
Schneider
von Courbire
Wackernagel
Bethke
IV (Heavy) Battalion
13th (Lt.InfGun) Company
14th (Pz.Jg) Company
57
58
aircraft and landed about 15 km behind the enemy's front lines. Its
assignments were:
1. cut signals and courier traffic on the Neufchateau Bastogne and
NeufchateauMartelange roads;
2. hinder the approach of reserves from the Neufchateau area, and
3. by exerting pressure from the rear on the bunker line along the
border, ease the capture of the bunkers and facilitate the advance.
The force consisted of two groups which were to land near Nives
and Witry. Since the aircraft had room for only two soldiers, each
would have to make two trips to the landing site. According to
calculations which later proved to be correct the arrival of the
second flight would take place approximately two hours after the
initial landings.
Since the focal point of the operation lay in the area assigned the
southern Witry group, it was allocated more resources than the
northern Nives group.
The northern group was to consist of a company reinforced by a
heavy machine gun section and a section of Pioniers, while the
southern group was made up of the battalion headquarters and a
company, reinforced by a heavy machine gun section, a heavy
mortar section and two sections of Pioniers.
For defence against tanks, the landing force carried twice the usual
number of anti-tank rifles and a double issue of smkh ammunition.
As signals equipment the battalion had at its disposal one 15 watt
set (for communication with XIX Pz.Corps) and two 5 watt sets (for
communication between the two groups).
Transport of the northern group required 42 aircraft, the southern
group 56. Two aircraft remained behind in reserve and were later
flown from the Witry landing site on reconnaissance and courier
duties.
Space and weight limitations permitted the carriage of only a basic
supply of ammunition which might have been inadequate if the
battalion had become involved in heavy fighting. Three JU 52 aircraft
were therefore assigned to drop additional ammunition to ensure an
adequate supply."
The empty trucks of III Battalion rolled back to the regiment, from
where they were sent on under Hptm. Grosser, commander of 12th
Company.
59
Chapter Four
The Initial Days of the Attack 1940
10. 5.12. 5. 40
13. 5.14. 5.40
15. 5 --17. 5. 40
18. 5.--21. 5. 40
22. 5.--26. 5. 40
27. 5.--28. 5. 40
29. 5.-- 4. 6. 40
5.
8.
10.
15.
6.-- 8.
6.--10.
6.--14.
6.--19.
6. 40
6. 40
6. 40
6. 40
The attack order in the West was issued on 9 May. It fixed the
attack for 05.30 on 10 May 1940. For the Germans everything
depended on the Allies not recognising the threat to their northern
wing until it was too late. The spearhead of Von Rundstedt's Army
Group A tipped by Panzergruppe von Kleist would move out
of the Ardennes, cross the Meuse and head for the sea. To achieve
this, the armoured forces of Guderian's corp, including the I.R. GD,
would first have to press forward to the Meuse, deep into enemy
territory.
60
61
Our drivers had to push their vehicles hard. Forests, lakes, magnificent scenery and silent villages passed by. All this, together with
the roar of the motors and the rattling of the tailgates, occasionally
made us forget all thoughts of the advance detachment and battle.
The changing scenery, the ever- prettier views of this small, well-ordered, clean country left us with the impression of a pleasant drive
in the country.
Forward! Forward! The thundering song of the hot machines
became louder. Quickly and fleetingly, as if in a dream, we passed
through Luxembourg."
The main body of the regiment followed through Medernach
CrychtenRelange. Soon it was midday. Again a brief stop; the
regiment was standing before the Belgian frontier. It was 14.00. The
hot sun shone down and tremendous swaths of dust hung behind
the column. Overhead, major air battles were raging in the blue,
cloudless sky.
A sensational report from the spearhead of II Battalion soon
brought the halt to an end: 'Belgian frontier barricade line undefended!' The watchword was onward! onward!
The following account was provided by a member of the leading
elements of II Battalion, which were driving just behind the advance
battalion:
"We reached the Belgian border and drove across. Then suddenly
a cry: 'enemy tanks from the left!' We jumped down from the vehicles
and took cover. Our anti-tank guns went into position, but the enemy
disappeared just in time. We rattled slowly on and approached a
village. All at once Major Fst shouted, 'Attert is free of the enemy!'
Astounded, we looked at one another. Attert, which we had attacked
in so many sand-table exercises? It was hard to believe. But on we
went like Satan's fury. We left the main road and took to the
secondary roads. Shrouded in a brown-grey cloud of dust we roared
onward. We could scarcely recognise one another, so filthy had we
become. Soon the broad, green meadows with the black and white
cows disappeared.
The village through which we now passed appeared more warlike:
wooden barricades, barbed wire and so on. All this failed to hold us
up, however. Major Fst, this old campaigner of the First World War,
was a cool daredevil. He lay across the folded-down windscreen of
his vehicle armed with a rifle and a spade. Pumping his hand up and
down he gave the signal: Full throttle faster! We roared down the
roads. There. . . to the right, the first Frenchmen! They strolled
along, oblivious to the approaching danger. There were two men, it
wasn't worth our while to stop and get down. We let them continue
peacefully on their way, and soon we overtook our infantry ahead.
Suddenly. . . halt! What's up? . . . To the right of us in the clover
field a bunch of Frenchmen were marching into position. Startled,
62
63
they stared at us; we, too, were somewhat taken aback. Should we
fire? Major Fst gave the order. We got down from our vehicles and
fired our first shots at the enemy. There! one of them had been
hit! One of the Frenchmen rolled in the clover, got up again and then
collapsed. The rest came toward us at once with their hands raised,
an entire platoon. Most of them were older men.
Cautiously we drove on. On the right lay the first dead; they looked
quite pale. Dead! A chill gripped our hearts, a shiver ran down our
spines. We would have to get used to that sight.
Again the column halted; there was the crackling and rattling of
gunfire. A sharp report. . . there, our anti-tank guns had gone into
action. But now we must get down and move out. They greeted us
with several well-aimed bursts of machine gun fire. The first houses
had already been taken.
We looked around: what was this blasted place called? Ah, there
it was: Etalle."
The report of the first serious resistance reached the regiment after
it crossed the Belgian frontier near Upper and Lower Colpach, south
of Attert. The forces which had taken up positions in Etalle were
elements of French cavalry and motorised reconnaissance units.
Armoured cars had been spotted. The regiment moved up. The
regiment's commanding officer drove forward as did the chief of the
14th (Pz.Jg.) Company who reported:
"We could hear machine gun and rifle fire. Now it had really started!
I drove forward. The advance guard's trucks stood there empty,
parked close together in a disorderly fashion. Several motorcars
drove towards me wounded from my advance platoon! The
regiment's CO was also there, completely calm. Although it was hot,
he had two coats on. 'Help the advance guard up ahead in the
village.' There was no time for questions. He likely didn't know any
more anyway.
Uffz. Kellermann went back to lead the platoons forward. They
arrived a few moments later, running at a crouch. We halted before
the village. There the machine gun fire was more audible. I went
forward on foot with Kellermann. Ahead was the marketplace of
Etalle. On the way we met an Oberleutnant Chrapkowski of the
Pioniers who had won the Iron Cross, 1st Class in Poland. He must
know what's going on. Together we moved farther forward. At the
marketplace Chrapkowski began to run. We followed. During a
breather he mentioned that we had been under fire. So that's what
it sounded like! I, too, had heard sharp hissing sounds, but hadn't
taken them seriously.
In the village of Etalle the fighting was serious. Houses had been
shot up, telephone wires hung down everywhere; on the comer sat
a bullet-riddled civilian automobile. There was a barricade up ahead
at the bridge. Rifle and machine gun fire was coming from the houses
64
Now back to the early morning of the first day, to III Battalion
which, together with its commander Obstlt. Garski, had set off for
Operation "NIWI." At roughly 05.00 the first Storch took off in a
westerly direction toward B e l g i u m . The aircraft had been
positioned in a horseshoe formation for takeoff, and the wind was
such that the first machines had to take off over the last. They were
to land in two groups near Witry and Nives. Events were to turn out
differently, however, but had little effect on the overall operation.
The pilot of the aircraft carrying the commander of the Nives group,
Hptm. Krger, veered off course and landed fourteen kilometres
south of his objective near the town of L'Eglise. The following aircraft
landed three kilometres farther to the east near Rancimont. It was
there that Krger linked up with some of his men. The following
report was made by an N C O of 11th Company who took part in the
operation:
"Soon after takeoff we lost contact with the Storks flying ahead of
us. We stared out at the countryside over which we were flying at
low altitude. On the roads were the endless columns of our advancing
army. They waved to us. Behind us were the other two machines of
the platoon command flight; we signalled them and landed in
Belgium in a field. We had landed in the wrong place and amid
loud cursing the three aircraft took off again. There smoke forming
ahead of us! It wasn't burning houses, but a burning Stork, and
around the aircraft were our comrades. We descended and landed.
There was much confusion. The ammunition was taken to a nearby
wood and the road barricaded. The first brown Belgian uniforms
appeared and soon the first civilians had also been detained. These
informed us that we were near L'Eglise and that this was the road
to Witry.
We reinforced our perimeter and set up machine gun positions.
Order replaced confusion; the Oberleutnant took charge. We commandeered several automobiles. Among the prisoners who had
unsuspectingly walked into our hands were several high-ranking
officers; they were thunderstruck.
Then, suddenly, our messenger Preusch arrived on a motorcycle.
He had landed with the Hauptmann about two kilometres away. We
were to go there immediately. A JU 52 appeared and dropped
munitions containers by parachute. However, we left them where
they landed; we had no time for them. Our automobile column set
out. I heard the voice of Goebbels on the radio. We soon reached
the Hauptmann and the prisoners were locked up in a house.
Hauptmann Krger now took command of the party. He wanted to
try and reach the battalion, which he estimated was eight to ten
kilometres away, by motor vehicle. But then the first shots rang out;
a Belgian troop convoy had been spotted. Again the machine guns
and anti- tank rifles were moved into position. And as if that were
68
9 dead
7 wounded
3 missing
The units involved brought in 82 prisoners, among them 1 Major
and 5 other officers."
As a result of the progress made by X I X Pz.Corps, the
Panzergruppe's orders of 10 May were to stay on the enemy's heels
and continue the advance toward the Meuse.
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment - as a part of the 10th
Panzer Division spent the night on the hills northwest of Villiers
sur Semois screened by a thin line of pickets. The first day of the
campaign against France had come to an end; while many had
received their baptism of fire, it had been a day of trial for everyone.
Orders for the continuation of the advance arrived during the night;
the regiment was to veer to the north and march in the direction of
Rossignol. It was a beautiful spring night, but one with burning
villages, bawling cattle and a terrible jumble of men, vehicles and
equipment.
The morning of 11 May found the regiment regrouped including
the recently arrived artillery for the continuation of the attack. The
forces of the 10th Panzer Division, with GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
in the front and the tanks still far to the rear, wheeled toward the
north. The men moved ahead on foot, leaving the vehicles behind,
as these would be slowed greatly by the numerous barricades. As a
result, the advance was extremely exhausting for the troops. The
commander of I Battalion, Obstlt. Khler, was temporarily detached
to take command of the 69th Infantry Regiment and was replaced
by Hptm. Fllmer. The 69th Regiment's previous commander had
been killed the day before.
In wide open formation, the infantry of I Battalion advanced across
the slope toward Rulles. Machine guns, ammunition canisters and
mortar bases weighed heavy on the men. Panting and sweating, they
plodded along under the hot morning sun.
Deployed on the left was II Battalion, which was moving toward
Rossignol as flanking protection for I Battalion.
Rulles proved to be free of enemy forces, and I Battalion continued on
toward the forested area which spread out before it. The deciduous forest
provided some protection from the burning sun of the late morning, but
the uninterrupted series of hills that had to be climbed demanded the utmost
of the men. Among them in the 4th (MG.) Company was Gefreiter
Baldur von Schirach who, like the other Grenadiers, carried his burden and
kept advancing.
Passing west of Mellier, I Battalion pushed on toward the village
of Suxy, which reconnaissance had reported occupied by the enemy.
70
71
72
a battalion which was sent ahead during the night was able to reach
the river at approximately 03.00.
While this was going on, II Battalion advanced farther to the
northwest through the wooded country but, due to the difficult
terrain, did not arrive in St. Menard until the morning hours of 12
May. When it did arrive, II Battalion found that the leading elements
of I Battalion had already reached the area. Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin
was decorated with the Iron Cross, Second Class in the field by
Gen.Lt. Schaal for his exemplary leadership during the battle.
During the course of the evening, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was
released from its secondment to 10th Panzer Division and withdrawn
through St. Menard for employment by XIX Panzer Corps.
The 1st Panzer Division under Gen.Lt. Kirchner, which was
attacking farther to the right, and whose III Battalion had made
contact with the enemy in Fauvilliers on 10 May, reached the Semois
river and took the city of Bouillon on the evening of the 11th, while
the 2nd Panzer Division, which was part of the same Panzer Corps,
was able to advance through Libramont. Further pursuit brought
Panzer Corps Guderian up to the river Meuse, where the first serious
enemy resistance was expected.
While, on 11 May the French still had the impression that the main
German attack was under way on both sides of Lttich in the
direction of BrusselsAntwerp, during 12 May it gradually became
clear to the French high command that the greatest threat lay
between Sedan and Namur the sectors held by the Ninth and
Second French Armies. Thus, the armies that were to meet the
spearhead of the German attack were those whose defensive
capabilities were rated the lowest, and this situation had been brought
about by the French high command's inaccurate assessment of the
situation.
The French Army strove to occupy positions along the Meuse, but
this move was only partially complete by the evening of 12 May. By
then, however, the first German Panzer units had already been
reported moving fast towards the river. Everything that the French
command could scrape together in the way of troops was rushed
forward to the Meuse to occupy Maginot Line bunkers or reinforce
the existing crews. The Germans spent 12 May clearing the east
bank of the Meuse and securing their assembly areas for the crossing.
That evening, General von Kleist gave the order for the crossing to
take place at 16.00 on 13 May 1940. The Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was placed under the command of the
1st Panzer Division for the attack.
". . .on 13 May 1940, the focus of the battle in the west will lay with
Gruppe von Kleist. . ."
73
74
Chapter Five
Crossing the Meuse near Sedan
The three divisions of Panzer Corps Guderian 2nd Panzer
Division on the right, 1st Panzer Division in the centre and 10th
Panzer Division on the left readied themselves in the front lines.
The focus of the attack was to lay in the attack sector of the 1st
Panzer Division and the attached GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment. The assignment given GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was to clear
the bend of the Meuse, advancing initially as far as the Bellevue
Torcy road, carry forward the attack on the heights of the Bois de
la Marfe, and subsequently push through as far as the line
ChemeryChaumont.
The regiment had been given several days of rest after advancing
into the Orego area on 11 May. After recovering its vehicles, the
previously detached III Battalion under Obstlt. Garski rejoined the
regiment and took up positions in Nevraument. During the absence
of the rest of the company, the two remaining sections of the 9th
Company joined the battalion headquarters. A period of quiet began
the calm before the storm.
The night of 1 2 / 1 3 May 1940 was short. Setting out at approximately 03.00, the regiment's leading elements rolled through
the forest in the darkness towards Bouillon. Order of march was: II
Battalion, III Battalion and, in the rear, I Battalion. A participant
related:
"The darkness hung like a curtain on the night of 1 2 / 1 3 May,
when we were awakened after an hour's sleep by an unexpected
alert. It was to be one of those uncomfortable nighttime drives - more slow feeling our way forwards, the only comforting sign the
feeble blinking of the preceding vehicle's brake lights. In the light of
dawn a burning, badly ravaged Belgian city: Bouillon, with its castle
of the ancient crusader perched on a rugged crag."
The regiment moved into its assembly area. The approach march
was carried out over jammed roads, past the foul-smelling bodies of
decomposing horses and under intermittent harassing attacks by
individual French bombers. After passing Bouillon, however, the
route again took the regiment through a forest, although it was less
dense than before. Along the sides of the road were the positions of
the German artillery, whose guns were firing single rounds at French
targets. Beside the guns the gunners were hurriedly digging in. In the
distance could be heard the loud explosions of bombs the Stukas
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76
77
Company, Lt. Graf Medem, and two Pioniers paid for their bravery
with their lives; the wounded were brought back. Once again a heavy
Flak intervened in the battle and, under its covering fire, the first
elements of the lead (7th) company set out in inflatable boats across
the Meuse. The crossing was a success! Quickly, as practised during
the winter, the spearhead of the "sixth' followed. In the lead was the
1st Platoon with Leutnant Prachowski at its head; behind it were the
company headquarters personnel with elements of 2nd Platoon and
a heavy machine gun section. The rest of the company was below
in inflatable boats on the Meuse. Four kilometres in the distance we
could clearly see Hill 247, whose eastern slope the company was to
assault. The units quickly regrouped. Then began an attack which
was to become a glorious page in the battalion's war history."
There was some confusion when the leading elements of II
Battalion reached the far shore of the Meuse, but order slowly
returned. The enemy was now firing from his embrasures. The
crossing point came under rifle fire, but only the occasional artillery
shell landed. Several men were wounded by snipers and were
assembled at the riverbank near the crossing point. More and more
inflatable boats and now also assault boats were crossing the river.
The crossing was gaining momentum, and more soldiers were
arriving at the crossing point. As the companies arrived, they were
ferried across the river.
The enemy fire died down; the first bunkers had been destroyed
or had surrendered. The Stukas continued to drop their bombs on
the fortifications on the slope, often only metres ahead of the
advancing German troops. It was approximately 19.00 and the sun
was setting in the west. The assault by II Battalion went on, however.
The commander of 6th Company reported:
"Scarcely had the lead platoon set out from the shore of the Meuse,
when it came under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the first
French field positions. Just like on the troop training grounds the
sections worked their way up to assault range and, after lobbing hand
grenades, broke into the French positions. The first prisoners were
soon making their way to the rear, hands raised. They left their
weapons and equipment behind, glad to have escaped the raging
inferno of this day with their lives.
The advance continued with only one objective in our minds: Hill
247.
The leading soldiers disappeared into the suburb which lay across
the path of the advance. There was house-to-house fighting and
some prisoners were taken. Onward, onward, ever forward, we
haven't reached the bunkers yet. The blue-painted window panes of
the factory stared eerily at us. Flames and biting smoke gushed from
the buildings, while bullets whizzed about. We crossed the Sedan
Mezire railway line and reached the SedanDonchery road.
79
A look to the left revealed that the large road bridge had been
blown; on the right were elements of 7th Company. When communication was established between the two company commanders
it was learned that the "Seventh' was pinned down on the road by
fire from several bunkers. Despite its lack of heavy weapons, 6th
Company decided to attack. A quick reconnaissance revealed that a
large bunker with six embrasures about 200 metres south of the road
at the edge of an orchard offered good approach possibilities; a
further, somewhat smaller, bunker lay about 250 meters behind and
to the right.
There was a brief conference, orders were issued to the platoon
and section leaders: the company would take the large bunker first.
1st Platoon attacked from the orchard, while 2nd Platoon struck out
to the left and worked its way forward from the cluster of trees.
As difficult as the attack at first seemed, it proved to be a complete
success. After a brief battle an N C O and two men reached the
bunker. The enemy were smoked out with hand grenades; completely demoralised, they came out from the bunker. The strain of the
battle showed in their faces. They lined up with their backs to their
bunker and raised their hands. Tirez, shoot!, they called. When the
astonished company commander asked what they meant, the French
soldiers replied that they had been told that any poilu captured by
the Germans in a bunker would be shot.
We were quite alone, no other German troops were to be seen to
the left or right. Heavy machine gun fire was coming from the Frenois
manor house and grounds. An anti-tank gun kept up an unrelenting
fire, but we were unable to make out its position. The first wounded
called out for help. O n e soldier entrusted his platoon leader with his
last farewell to his mother and then closed his eyes forever. But there
was no time to linger; the objective had to be reached while it was
still light. We could not afford to allow the enemy any respite.
The second enemy bunker fell and we could then see the position
of the anti-tank gun. On a slope at the edge of the grounds was a
barn on which rested a suspicious grey shape, in which we could
now clearly see an embrasure. The assault squad was redeployed
while the machine gun sections engaged the enemy rifle nests. Soon
we had taken this bunker too. Afterward we were able to quench our
thirst ten to twenty bottles of mineral water had been found in the
bunker.
By then it was 18.00. We sat down for a brief rest. During the
well-deserved break, contact was established with the 1st Infantry
Regiment of 1st Panzer Division which was advancing on our right.
The Grenadiers set out once again. Advancing through deep bomb
craters and wide barbed wire entanglements, things were looking up,
until the French suddenly opened up a terrific fire from a strong
reverse-slope position. Three of our men fell. Ignoring the enemy
80
the 2nd Pz.Div. had been unable to force a crossing over the Meuse.
In contrast, the 1st Pz.Div. had the entire reinforced Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, equivalent to an entire infantry brigade, on the
far side of the Meuse, while on the left, the 10th Pz.Div. had only
been able to establish a small bridgehead.
During the night troops continued to roll across the bridge which
had been thrown across the river near Floing, with the heavy
weapons and tanks in the lead. While darkness settled over the events
of the day, the 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company under Obit. Beck-Broichsitter
waited for the enemy counterattack. The battle which followed was
to be recorded in the regiment's history as "The Panzer Battle near
Chemery." The following is an extract from the combat report:
"During the night of 1 3 / 1 4 May 1940, on orders from Major
Schneider (IV Btl.), two platoons of the 14th Company moved into
Gloire et Villette, northwest of Sedan. Enemy artillery fire of every
calibre. At dawn the two platoons drove to Frenois to offer their
services to the regimental headquarters or a battalion. Nothing was
known of the regiment's formation or direction of attack or the
employment of the other heavy weapons. Encountered the
regiment's C O , Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin, at a bend in the road
about 2 km south of Frenois.
He gave the following orders to the company commanders:
I Battalion's objective is Bulson. Your platoons are to take over
the anti-tank role with I Battalion. Move out at once!
While searching for I Battalion, the two platoons of 14th Company
were stopped by a Panzer-Oberleutnant of 1st Panzer Division. At
approximately 06.00 he verbally informed the company commander
of the orders given him by division:
T h e division's commander, Herr General Kirchner, is of the
opinion that the village of Chemery (roughly 12 km to the south) is
free of the enemy or very weakly occupied. I have been assigned to
capture and hold the bridge there with several armoured cars and
your two platoons. Please move quickly.'
The two platoons under Lt. Hintze and Feldw. Albers were called
back for the new assignment. The Panzer-Oberleutnant climbed back
into his armoured car and the vehicles started their engines. The road
to Chemery had been torn up by shells and bombs. The armoured
cars were able to cross these obstacles immediately. However, in the
twenty minutes it took our trucks to get by, contact was lost with the
armoured cars. The anti-tank platoons continued on in the direction
of Chemery, reaching the crossroads east of Connage at approximately 07.00. While driving up, the detachment came under
fire from the left, and then several French tanks appeared from the
right. Both platoons went straight into position and the guns immediately put the enemy tanks out of action. Machine gun fire forced a
French cavalry unit of approximately squadron strength, which had
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broken out of the forest 800 metres south of the crossroads, to turn
back.
More French tanks approached from south and southeast of
Connage; they were allowed to approach to within 200 metres and
then knocked out. Other French tanks attempted to go around our
position and attack from the flank and rear. To counter this move,
the six guns formed a hedgehog position. This was the situation
when, between 08.00 and 09.00, a very excited Panzer- Oberleutnant came and told us that the Oberleutnant driving in the armoured
car ahead of him had been pinned down by heavy fire in Chemery.
Several of his men had been wounded. He wanted us to take the
two platoons to Chemery and get him out.
The commander of 14th Company had to refuse this request as
further French tanks were approaching, and moving to Chemery
would mean the destruction of the two Pak platoons. This would
have left a gap between two German Panzer divisions and a clear
route to the Meuse bridges for the attacking French tanks. As the
French tank forces involved were of considerable strength, this would
have endangered the success of the, entire German attack. It was
decided, therefore, that the ground which had been won would be
held by the two platoons east of Connage.
During the course of the battle, two 8.8 cm Flak went into position
farther back and joined in the defence against the attacking French
tanks. They met with no success, however, as they opened fire from
too great a range. At roughly 09.00 a Hauptmann of a reconnaissance battalion appeared with a weak infantry platoon. He was asked
to take over the task of securing against the French cavalry, which
he agreed to do. At approximately 10.00 the leaders of the 1st and
4th Platoons reported to the company commander that Stu.Pi.Btl.
43 was advancing along the road.
Soon afterward, 14th Company received the following order from
the commander of the Stu.Pi.Btl., Obstlt. Mahler:
T h e enemy holds Chemery. Stu.Pi.Btl. 43 is to take Chemery.
14th Company is placed under the command of the Stu.Pi.Btl. to
support the attack by engaging tanks and machine guns. The
company will be released following the capture of Chemery.'
While the Stu.Pi.Btl. carried out its attack on both sides of the road,
the twelve guns of 14th Company went into position on the asphalt,
silencing enemy tanks and machine gun nests which had been
spotted to the southwest.
Just outside Chemery, Ogefr. Frauenknecht discovered that the
machine gun fire was coming from a bunker which was built into the
bridge which stood 500 metres west of the town. Under continuous
enemy fire, he and Gefr. Bierwagen silenced the bunker with several
direct hits.
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Chapter Six
The Battle for the Stonne Heights
While the main body of the Guderian Corps continued to attack
toward the northwest in the direction of Abbeville and the English
Channel, Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was given
the task of covering its left flank. On the afternoon of 14 May,
following the conclusion of the battles against the tanks of the French
3rd Armoured Division near Bulson and Chemery, the regiment set
out in the direction of Stonne to carry out its new assignment.
Repeated bombing attacks by French aircraft, especially the fast
Moranes, were unable to halt the advance, but they did inflict serious
casualties. T h e following account was provided by 15th
(Hvy.Inf.Gun) Company:
"Strafing attack! A Morane roared straight overhead, took a look
and opened fire! We dove under our vehicles. The noise from his
motor grew louder as he came nearer and nearer on his second pass.
Two bombs fell. Helpless, we fired back with our rifles. Then we
looked at one another: where was the explosion? Someone shouted:
it's a dud! Gefreiter Waldemar Kiedrowski, from Essen in the Ruhr,
who had formerly been mess orderly in the Olympic Village, jumped
up from the ditch toward one of the bombs. The sinister, khaki-yellow
thing was still rolling. As Kiedrowski lifted it from the road, the bomb
exploded. Gefr. Kiedrowski was no more. Gefr. Schieg lost a leg. In
the meantime, the Morane crashed behind us, a victim of our
machine guns. Kiedrowski was our first fatal casualty. Not a trace of
him could be found; there was nothing to bury. A simple, hurriedlyerected cross marked the spot where the bomb had torn him to
pieces. A few flowers hung their heads in the sun, as if they wanted
to express their sorrow by doing so. But we had to carry on."
The regiment drove to Maisoncelle, east of Chemery. II Battalion
continued on foot to Artaise le Vivier and went into position at the
edge of the village. Powerful enemy tank forces had been reported
in the Bois de Mond. The battalion quickly dug in and the attached
light infantry guns moved into firing positions. Ill Battalion had been
given the job of capturing the main road to the south by moving
through Artaise to the crossroads two kilometres to the west. As
darkness fell, the advancing 11th Company, which was spearheading the battalion, came under surprise heavy machine gun fire near
Point 170. There was also rifle and machine gun fire from the woods
to the left and right of the road. The deep ditches and metal guard
85
rails on both sides of the road offered good cover. A probing French
tank was driven off. In the meantime, elements of the 12th (MG.)
Company opened fire on the edge of the wood and 11th Company
was able to withdraw from its dangerous position. These elements
of III Battalion returned to Artaise without loss. I Battalion was still
behind in the Maisoncelle area. The regimental order for III Battalion
for the next day read:
"III Battalion is to occupy the wooded areas west of Artaise, and
from there secure the advance road of the XIX Panzer Corps."
As the force covering the left flank of the advancing XIX Panzer
Corps, Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND could expect heavy fighting. The German penetrations against the French Ninth Army near
Dinant and Charleville on 14 May were so deep that they had reached
the French artillery batteries. At the junction of the French Ninth and
Second Armies which lay before the GD the German spearheads had reached Donchery, approximately fifteen kilometres in
the enemy's rear. As a result of the rapid German occupation of
Bulson and Omicourt, the French 55th Reserve Division was forced
to fall back to the south and southwest. The two divisions to the east,
the 3rd and 71st Reserve, were forced together as they withdrew
toward BeaumontStonng. Their losses were considerable. On the
evening of 14 May the mass of the French Second Army was holding
the line BeaumontStonne.
The crisis facing the French Second Army was obvious. The front
was threatening to collapse. On the French side they tried everything
possible; every available reserve was thrown into the gap in an
attempt to master the situation at the critical point at Stonne.
While, on the German side, the objective at hand was to hold open
the Meuse crossings and take the high ground on both sides of
Stonne, that of the French were to prevent this at all costs, close
their front and, where possible, throw the Germans back across the
Meuse. If they succeeded, the German attack plan would fail. It was
expected, therefore, that the outcome would be decided in the area
of Stonne. It was there that the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, with its artillery and the attached Stu.Pi.Btl. 43,
were situated. The following report is typical of the regiment's
situation at that time:
"The village had to be secured on all sides for the night. Once again
there was no rest. The ongoing lack of sleep had the greatest effect
on the tactical commanders. Day and night, without pause, they had
to organise their men, issue orders and lead the attack. The
Grenadiers were exhausted. Despite this there was only one thought
in their minds: attack!
On the following morning, the 15th of May 1940, we climbed out
of our holes. Our faces were pale, unshaven and dirty, our eyes
sunken and yet we were all filled with an eagerness to fight. We
86
THE SITUATION AS OF
10:00,
14 MAY 1940
THE SITUATION AS OF
14 MAY, AFTERNOON AND
15
88
MAY,
MORNING
drove into the morning mist, through burning Artaise. To the right
and left lay half-finished bunkers, abandoned in haste by the enemy.
We drove along a freshly-paved road deep into a wooded valley."
The orders for the attack on Stonne were issued at dawn on 15
May: I Battalion was to attack the town from the north; II Battalion
was to advance over Hill 208 (southeast of Artaise) in the direction
of Bois de Raucourt, providing flanking cover for German tanks
advancing on the left. At about 04.15, III Battalion was to take the
wooded areas west of Artaise to protect the advance by XIX Panzer
Corps. Hptm. Grosser, commander of 12th Company, temporarily
took over command of Stu.Pi.Btl 43 and assembled the unit to hold
the southern edge of the Bois de la Grand Cte, or if need be, to
take it and then hold it.
While I Battalion was advancing, II Battalion committed the 5th,
6th, 7th and 8th Companies as well as the battalion staff. On
reaching the northern edge of the Bois de Raucourt, the companies
were met by enemy fire from camouflaged machine gun nests.
Progress by the exhausted infantry was slow. Nevertheless, II Battalion (5th and 8th Companies) captured its defence sector, occupying the key Hill 225. At this time the regimental command post was
located approximately 800 metres northwest of Stonne.
By 06.00 III Battalion had occupied its designated positions in the
wooded area west of Stonne and was digging in. The French kept
the position under constant artillery fire.
The town of Stonne was situated on a commanding hill. The steep
slope to the north was unforested; at the foot of the slope were
woods which could be overseen from Stonne. The inhabitants of the
town could even see as far as the Meuse valley when the visibility
was good. Whoever held Stonne would be able to see far into the
French countryside to the south and southwest.
Uffz. Gnter Krupp provided the following account which
describes the advance by II Battalion and, in particular, the part
played by 6th Company:
"The regiment was attacking Stonne! Our company moved
through the meadows to the left of the road, the sections widely
spaced in a skirmishing line. The sound of battle rumbled over from
the right. Ahead of us lay a large wood. The sections closed up so
as not to lose contact with each other. The enemy scattered fire
through the wood; shells burst with loud crashes among the treetops.
The smell of horses was mixed with powder smoke. Wellcamouflaged, improvised stalls stood in the woods to the left and
right. Large numbers of French baggage wagons loaded with equipment sat abandoned in a broad clearing. Steel helmets lay scattered
about; everything pointed to a desperate flight.
Finally we approached the edge of the wood. Before us lay a wide
meadow dotted with scattered bushes. To our right we could see the
89
terrain climbing toward the hill. A path snaked its way up the only
negotiable approach.
The enemy's defensive fire intensified. His situation was extremely
favourable. From the hill he had a perfect view far into our rear.
Initially, our battalion had orders to advance no farther. Orders were
orders! therefore we stayed put. Security detachments were set
up. Enemy aircraft and artillery give us no rest."
Ill Battalion remained in its positions in the forest west of Artaise
and secured there. It was now midday. Following a Stuka attack, I
Battalion and elements of II Battalion were able to enter the village
of Stonne. The following account was provided by the commander
of 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company:
"It was difficult to say exactly where the front line was. There was
firing from ahead, from the left and the right. It was mostly rifle fire.
The thickly-wooded hill which lay before Stonne was quite eerie. The
regimental command post was forward in a hunting lodge.
The commander of IV Battalion (Major Schneider), the leader of
the infantry gun company, Obit, von Massow and I went ahead to
reconnoitre. On the way to Stonne we had to jump into the ditch at
the side of the road; someone was firing at us from the cover of the
forest. Pistols in hand, we climbed the wooded slope, but nothing
else happened.
Moving carefully, we worked our way into Stonne. We found
abandoned houses, overgrown gardens, romantic old wells, ruins of
bakeries and makeshift shelters. A high water tower commanded the
entire village.
We walked along the village street. Individual Grenadiers from
every company were running here and there. They had no orders.
A knocked-out German tank lay tipped over in a ditch. An officer
and an NCO stood next to the tank, pistols in hand. A dead crewman,
his face waxy and yellowish, lay in the grass in his dusty black
uniform. Rifle fire rang out from the water tower, kicking up dust in
the street. A French tank drove towards us. We leapt behind a house;
the tank thundered past close by. The decisive hill appeared to lay
several hundred metres farther on. We worked our way towards it
through a ravine and several gardens. When we got there we found
a few men of my old mortar platoon standing around. Led by their
dashing Leutnant Schiller, they had gone a little too far forward.
Enthusiastically they joined us and fell in behind.
In an open planted field we came under machine gun fire from
behind. We waved, thinking that it was our own people. Then they
really began to fire, and we ran for our lives to some bushes fifty
metres away. The fire was coming from the water tower.
About 30 Frenchmen approached us, deployed for an attack. We
were only ten. A mortar was hurriedly moved into position, but the
sight mount could not be found. The Frenchmen approached to 400
90
metres; they probably didn't suspect that we were this far forward
yet. After a few mortar rounds they disappeared into a hollow. We
wanted to move everyone we could find forward into position, as
this was in fact the commanding hill. The way back across the planted
field was no joy ride. Halfway back, in the gardens, we looked
around: several French tanks were driving straight for the other part
of the village.
The edge of the village lay under machine gun fire from the water
tower. Concealed riflemen fired unexpectedly from the wooded hill
behind us. A completely confused situation!
By chance we ran into a couple of machine gun crews from the
machine gun company. They were led by Hauptfeldwebel Spierling.
We now gave up any thoughts of the strategic hill.
Artillery began to fire into the village, while the infantry fire
intensified. Fire swept overhead; it must be from the French tanks
we had spotted earlier. A messenger was sent back to bring forward
Oberfeldwebel Harold's platoon.
The brave Oberfeldwebel brought his platoon forward in an
exemplary fashion and quickly sized up the situation. His three guns
moved into the ravine so that they could not be seen by the enemy
and waited in readiness.
The enemy tanks attacked. We could see six, with infantry advancing between them. A brief command and the guns were moved into
position with a jerk. A few seconds more and targets were assigned
to the gun commanders, and then: crack!
The firefight lasted quite a while. The tanks were difficult to knock
out. In addition, they were aided by the numerous bushes and
gardens. Often the gunners could see only a small part of the whole
target. At that moment, of course, the enemy machine gun fire was
concentrated exclusively on the three guns. Nevertheless, the Herold
platoon disabled all the enemy tanks in sight. Next to me Uffz. Anding
received a bullet wound in the leg.
The anti-tank guns disappeared again into the cover of the ravine.
More French tanks appeared and fired over our heads. There was a
low whistle and a shell smacked into the earth wall behind us.
A messenger brought forward Oberfeldwebel Albers' platoon. With
a brave matter-of-factness it went into position next to Herold's.
Together, the two platoons shot up the next wave of French tanks.
Platoon leaders, gun commanders and Grenadiers all put their backs
to it. Most of the crews consisted of only three men. Many of the
Grenadiers were wounded. The battle was a duel. Once they had
opened fire, there was no question of concealment for the guns.
Moreover, flight was out of the question: either the tank was knocked
out or the gun was. Artillery shells burst all over the village, the fire
was really heavy. The platoon leaders were constantly in action.
When the situation became serious, the gun commanders could be
91
village abated. The infantry units were being worn down by the
determined French attack. Assault guns provided support. Obit, von
Egloffstein himself took command in Stonne. Four heavy infantry
guns went into position and fired 15 cm rounds at the water tower,
but it refused to fall. Losses mounted. Several of the anti-tank guns
had been hit and damaged, but they kept firing. Then I met Obit.
Fabich "Maxe' with elements of his 3rd Company. Obit.
Bohrmann was also there.
Hindelang was attacked by three 32-tonne tanks. Every shot
bounced off them and the tracing rounds disappeared somewhere.
They rolled on through the gardens. From one hundred metres one
of them scored a direct hit on an anti-tank gun and raked the
wreckage with machine gun fire. The gun's commander Uffz.
Kramer and his gunner were wounded and the other member of
the crew killed. Kramer crawled to the gunner and, under machine
gun fire, dragged him behind a house.
The fire from the three heavy tanks was threatening to wipe out
the platoon. Then one of the giants turned sideways. The commander of the gun on the left, Ogefr. Giesemann, spotted a small,
ribbed panel on its right side; apparently, it was the tank's cooling
system. The panel was no larger than an ammunition box.
Giesemann took aim at it and fired. A tongue of flame shot up from
the tank. The young Obergefreiter was a true sharpshooter with his
anti-tank gun!
Both gun commanders now opened fire at the small squares on
the flanks of the heavy tanks. Soon afterwards the left gun took a
direct hit and was put out of action. Hindelang pulled the surviving
gun back into the village. The three heavy tanks had been put out
of action. The other tanks sat disabled before the village. Hindelang's
decision, his holding out while under fire from all sides, even after
the destruction of his other two guns, saved the Stonne defensive
front on the decisive right flank. The Grenadiers of all platoons had
survived a great test.
On orders, in the afternoon the company left its positions in the
village. It was difficult. At that time the French were only a stone's
throw away in places. The men with machine guns could move out
faster than those with the anti-tank gun. The fire from close range
was alarming. The three of us Ogefr. Frauenknecht, Grenadier
Schmidt and I jumped up and pulled the gun into cover. We were
under steady rifle fire on the road to the hunting lodge, but we came
through smoothly."
The l4th(Pz.Jg.) Company had fought courageously. Its total
losses were:
Killed: 1 officer, 12 NCOs and men.
Wounded: 16 NCOs and men.
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94
evidence of how effective the French artillery fire had been here in
the rear: shell hole after shell hole, shot-up trucks and motorcycles.
In one of 14th Company's vehicles the driver still sat at the wheel,
half his skull ripped away a horrible sight. The wild drive continued.
Artaise was burning, a torch in the night sky. A short time later we
were there, driving through the streets. The heat from the burning
houses was terrific. We were through in minutes, still pursued by the
French artillery fire. Shells burst, tearing apart houses; sparks
showered down and smouldering beams flew through the air. Then,
all of a sudden, it was still. This quiet had an unsettling effect on us,
we simply weren't used to it. No bursting shells or rattling machine
guns; here and there a demolished house, a knocked-out tank,
freshly-dug graves.
We passed Bulson. Then we met the first infantry regiments. They
had covered a tremendous distance on foot. We halted. The vehicles
were parked and we climbed out. Deathly tired, we slumped to the
ground, wrapped ourselves in our blankets and went to sleep."
After days of tough combat and great stress, the company rested.
This peaceful period lasted until the late afternoon of 19 May. The
regimental order of 17 May had stated:
Regimental Order
1. The regiment will rest in its present location for 4 days, during
which it will remain under the command of the 10th Pz.Div. which
is continuing the advance toward the west.
2. The commanding general has ordered that, in these four days,
the regiment must be brought back up to full operational effectiveness.
Following a complete recovery from his illness, the former
regimental commander, Oberst von Stockhausen, returned to the
regiment and assumed command. (18. 5. 1940) The battalion
commanders at that time were:
I Battalion:
II Battalion:
III Battalion:
IV Battalion:
On 18 May the companies were called from their rest for their first
parade, where they were read the following regimental order:
"After seven days of an unprecedentedly triumphant advance through
Luxembourg and Belgium into France, the regiment stands at the end of
its first test in combat. At this moment I feel the deep inner need to thank
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every officer, NCO and man for his extreme devotion and true performance
of duty, with which each and every one contributed to the victory. The
regiment is proud of every one of its men.
Committed at decisive points, the regiment has achieved every objective
set for it by the high command, even when the exhaustion and over-exertion
of the restless pursuit stretched physical endurance to the breaking point!
Pursuit of the enemy through Luxembourg! Destructive attacking blows on
the move through Belgium! Relentless pursuit to the last breath of man and
horse south of Sedan!
Resolute defence against counterattacks!
These are the milestones of our triumphant advance!
"The unprecedented forward momentum of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment opened the way across the Meuse for the Panzer units.
If this major operation brings us victory in this war, then the regiment can
know that it made the first decisive contribution!' These are the words of
the commander of the 10th Panzer Division.
I am proud and grateful that it was my soldier's fate to be allowed to lead
this regiment in these days of victory. I thank you all! Onward with God!"
signed Graf von Schwerin
Oberstleutnant
The period of quiet allowed time for leisure. Everywhere one saw
soldiers walking across the meadows in bathing suits and sitting by
fires; a piano was fetched from a nearby village and was played by
Obit. "Maxe" Fabich of 3rd Company. Peace and quiet reigned,
undisturbed even by the few aircraft which flew overhead.
In the meantime, the regimental command took stock; the painful
losses revealed the bloody toll of the past few days:
In the period from 10 May to 17 May, 1940:
Killed:
9
15
79
103
Wounded:
30
84
328
442
Missing:
Non-commissioned officers
Men
Total
2
23
25
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Chapter Seven
Breakthrough to the Sea
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment received orders to transfer into the St. Quentin area and place itself at the disposal of
Panzergruppe Guderian. The battalions set out at 08.00. Marching
through Bulson, Mezires and Vervins, they reached St. Quentin,
where they bivouacked west of the city. The advance roads were
choked with columns of refugees fleeing to the east and south,
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infantry columns marching toward the west, and the supply columns
of the panzer units which were rushing forward with the vital supplies
of fuel.
Regimental orders reached the marching columns late in the
evening: following a brief rest for rations, the unit was to reach the
area of Combles, where it was to place itself at the disposal of
Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps. On 21 May the regiment drove
through St. Albert into the area south of Doullens where, late on the
morning of the same day, it occupied a defensive position in the line
MarieuxThievesOrville. Its assignment was to secure the right
flank of the 1st Panzer Division against an attack from the north.
The threat was expected to be enemy tanks from the direction of
Arras; without a doubt the enemy units encircled to the north would
attempt to break out. The regimental command post was located in
Marieux Castle the same building in which the British King George
V and French President Poincar had met in 1915.
It was in this sector that the regiment encountered British and
Canadian prisoners of war for the first time. Bordering the roads
were large military cemeteries from the First World War. In contrast
to the previous area of operations near Sedan, the country here was
wide and open. There were fields and magnificent beech woods,
clean pleasant villages and excellent roads.
The motorcycle platoon which had been formed in Neuruppin
arrived under the command of Lt. Gnzel and was incorporated into
the Regimental Headquarters Company. On 22 May the regiment
prepared for a new mission, details of which were contained in the
following regimental order:
Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Btl. Ia
1.
2.
3.
1st Pz.Div. is to secure the flank and rear of 2nd Pz.Div. which is
moving on Boulogne; front to the north and east.
To this end the division will deploy:
Left:
Gef.Gruppe Balck
Centre: Gef.Gruppe Krger
Right: I.R. GD in the sector north edge Haute Foret Zoteux
Deployed in the regiment's sector (beginning from left)
I Btl.
II Btl. each with an attached light infantry gun and
III Btl. anti-tank gun platoon. In addition, one company of SturmPionier Battalion 43 will be attached to each battalion.
Boundaries for reconnaissance and security:
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100
Feldw. Blanke and Gefr. Letmoden were killed. It was all for no
purpose; orders came to go around the village to the south. Then
new orders came from regiment: change direction toward the north,
force the crossings near St. PierreBrouck.
It was already dark; the burning houses luridly illuminated the
countryside. Dunkirk appeared as a torch against the night sky.
There was the objective!
With 5th and 6th Companies in the lead and 7th and 8th
Companies providing security to the sides, II Battalion marched
toward the bridge positions near Pont St. Pierre and St. Marie-Kerque. There was confusion in the darkness. Ill Battalion advanced
toward Hennuin. In the lead was an assault gun of the 16th SturmBattery, followed by three sections of 11th Company, the rest of the
attached platoon from the 16th Company, an anti-tank gun and then
the main body of the battalion. The first elements of the battalion
reached Hennuin near midnight and the last at roughly 05.00. Some
of the vehicles lost their way in the darkness and became stuck.
II Battalion also arrived in Hennuin in the dark of night. It received
orders to continue the advance immediately in the direction of St.
Nicolas and take possession of the bridge site. The 7th Company
moved forward but was fired on. It went into position on the west
bank of the Aa and dug in there for the rest of the night. A member
of 7th Company, Grenadier Wolfgang Mller, recalled:
"When it became dark we were split up into platoons. What would
be awaiting us now? All around everything was dark. A fine Flemish
drizzle sprinkled our helmets, dripping onto the tent squares we had
draped about us and leaking into our tunics. Even our wool pullovers
were no barrier to it, and we shivered from the cold. 'Dig in deep',
advised our platoon leader, 'we'll likely be getting artillery fire.' And
so we spent half the night digging our foxholes, hoping that the rain
would cease and smelling the characteristic odour of meadow earth,
which combined the odours of freshly-turned sod and rotting subsoil.
One spade-cut, two, three, then four spade-cuts down and we could
go no farther as we had reached ground water. A somewhat higher
shelf was cut out on the short side for a seat and a step and then the
foxhole was ready. We hunched down in our holes, lost in thought.
Then, in front of me, I heard the muffled rattling of equipment and
hushed voices. 'Hans, man, they're coming!' Hans said to take it
easy. We both stared into the darkness. We couldn't see a thing. .
But Hans had heard the noise too. Should we fire? Don't drive the
whole front crazy! If we see something, we'll fire. But as hard as we
strained, we couldn't see anything in the rain- blackened darkness.
The noises slowly died away. All was quiet."
At that time I Battalion was on the west bank of the Aa canal facing
enemy positions on the opposite side outside St.Pierre- Brouck. At
the canal the Grenadiers secured both sides of the HennuinAa
-i
no
103
were drawn up in preparation for the capture of the bridge site. The
resumption of the attack was set for the afternoon.
Gefr. Johann Neumann described the attack and the crossing by
6th Company:
"The new day dawned. Everything was still, until behind us we
heard the sound of a motor growing louder. One of our assault guns
was rolling forwards along the road beside us. The wide, heavy tank
moved past slowly towards the canal on our left and stopped several
metres from the bank. We described the target to our comrades. It
was a single tree, at the foot of which was the enemy outpost.
Turning its steel body slightly to align its gun on the target, the assault
gun seemed to crouch like a beast of prey. Then there was a flash
and a roar like thunder and a fountain of earth erupted at the tree.
The assault gun fired shot after shot. The ground over there was torn
up and clods of earth whirled through the air. It seemed impossible
that anyone could be left alive. Then, suddenly, all was quiet; the
target had been eliminated. The tank's motor roared to life. It rolled
forwards on its broad tracks to the crossroads a few metres away
and turned a bit to the left. Once again shells thundered from its
short gun barrel. The target now was the nearest houses in the village
on the other side of the canal.
In the meantime, our first sections had raced across the road. The
crossing now began using inflatable boats. The boats smacked onto
the water and we leapt in. A mighty heave and we were away from
the bank. It was twenty metres to the other side. Everything now
depended on speed. We had to get to the other side before enemy
machine gun fire could foil our plan. All the while our remaining
comrades of the platoon lay along the road, their weapons directed
at the enemy, fingers on their triggers.
The boats bumped against the high bank of the canal. The platoon
leader jumped out with his messenger, the section leader and several
infantrymen. The first men dropped to the ground near the tree. The
machine gun went into position farther out to the right. All of this
happened in a few seconds. As we came nearer, we could see the
completely bewildered French to one side of the tree. They were
simply unable to fire. One of them tried to escape to the village, but
he was shot down. In the meantime the remaining sections crossed
the canal. The platoon leader deployed his platoon toward the village
on a wide front. However, the enemy was well-entrenched there.
The first shots whizzed toward us, but we kept advancing. Houseto-house fighting broke out. It was the beginning of a very hot day!"
A small bridgehead had been established, approximately 1,000
metres deep. It was secured and set up for defence. The main body
of II Battalion remained quietly on the west side of the canal.
Pioniers forced a crossing over the canal for I Battalion near La
Bistade. The bridge had been blown and the Grenadiers fought their
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107
"We were outside Bergues. The light field positions near and in
the town were quickly taken by surprise. On the right the 2nd Platoon
went into position behind a poultry farm outside Soex. The 1st
Platoon remained in the centre behind a farm. The company
headquarters personnel pushed on across the railway embankment
and took up position in a house. Small hedgerows, bushes and
gardens provided some cover, but we were unable to escape the
sharp eyes of the enemy observers in the towers and churches
opposite us. We were very soon conscious of that fact. A hail of
shells showered down on us. Even our assault guns took cover. The
1st Platoon engaged truck columns with great success. 2nd Platoon
aligned its gun on a very narrow church steeple. The fifth and sixth
shells scored direct hits. Gradually, it became dark and we began to
dig foxholes."
In the afternoon approach routes were reconnoitred for a possible
attack on Bergues.
A patrol from 6th Company under Lt. Prachowski was the first to
enter the town of Bergues. Once there, the men hoisted the flag.
They had gone over so as to reach the town ahead of a Silesian
division which was approaching from the southeast. The patrol
returned with several prisoners.
The attack on Bergues planned for 29 May was called off;
conditions were unfavourable as much of the surrounding terrain was
flooded. It appeared, however, that the approach of Reichenau's
divisions would obviate the need for the attack in any case.
The battalions remained in position, widely separated. Enemy
artillery, including naval guns, kept up a steady fire. The light infantry
gun platoon of 13th Company received a direct hit, which killed
Ogefr. David Grossthe smallest man in the companyand
wounded Grenadiers Riermeyer, Brehm and Grn. A member of 8th
Company described the positional warfare outside Bergues:
"We were outside Bergues. We broke out the entrenching tools
and began to dig into the clay. Let the shells come! Only a direct hit
could impress us now.
On both sides clay. At the head and foot of the trench, clay.
Beneath us clay. Over us a tent square, with the rain spattering
against it. After the first hour the clay on the sides had become
damned soft. Several litres of water had collected on the tent square.
Bits of clay swam around in the water like goldfish. They came from
the fresh shell-holes all around us, and there were more and more
of them by the minute. We lay stretched out in our holes and stared
up into the clouds.
After the second hour there were bits of clay on our cheeks. We
had moved for a moment; now there was no water on the tent square,
instead there was a pool in the bottom of the hole. We propped
ourselves up on our elbows and stared into the clouds.
108
After the third hour again a pool of water on the tent square. Shell
fragments hissed close by. We must stay down. It was no longer wise
to stay propped up on our elbows. We lay flat and stared into the
clouds.
After the fourth hour we moved again. The water had risen to ten
centimetres, running over the tent square. Earth from a nearby shell
crater ran into our bath water. We lay outstretched and stared into
the clouds.
After the fifth hour the first wounded. . . we didn't know how much
longer we'd be staying outside Bergues."
At about 18.00, III Battalion was taken from the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment and XIV Army Corps and placed under
the command of the 11th Rifle Brigade. The battalion travelled on
foot over poor roads towards West-Cappel. At roughly 24.00 it
arrived there and received orders to attack and take the chateau at
West-Cappel, which was being stubbornly defended by English
troops. So far the 11th Rifle-Brigade had been unable to take the
chateau.
Also on 30 May, heavy, well-directed artillery fire fell on the
positions of GROSSDEUTSCHLAND's I and II Battalions. A
platoon from I Battalion extended the regiment's front to the right
to a total of 12 kilometres. Persistent British air attacks forced the
troops to keep their heads down. Again and again the supply trains
and heavy weapons were forced to change positions.
An 8.8 cm Flak was towed into position in 13th (Lgt.Inf.Gun)
Company's sector. From there it shot up the steeples in Bergues one
after the other, as it was suspected that the enemy artillery fire was
being directed from them. Patrols sent out by II Battalion confirmed
that the town was still occupied by the enemy. II Battalion had to
extend its front to the right. The battalion's 5th Company took over
a sector from I Battalion after it moved farther to the right. The
enemy artillery continued to fire after dark, and the Allied air forces
continued their low- level attacks on the German positions.
Meanwhile, III Battalion was in position near West-Cappel. A
strong patrol reconnoitred the chateau in the early morning. It
discovered that the enemy had abandoned the chateau during the
night.
In the afternoon an attack was ordered on the channel coast
between the Belgian border and Dunkirk. Ill Battalion's combat
report stated:
"On the right the 110th and 111th Rifle Regiments, on the left on the flank as usual III Battalion, which was to break through
near Feteghem and thus secure the way to the sea for the motorcycle
battalion. As there were no reconnaissance results available, Lt. von
Blankenburg was ordered to take a motorcycle patrol as far as the
Canal de la Colme. Ill Battalion was lined up along the West-Cap109
pelcanal road. Part of the patrol returned along the same road. It
had been fired on by enemy troops holding the canal crossing. Lt.
von Blankenburg had been wounded and Feldw. Gther killed.
Afterward III Battalion moved forward and, in bitter fighting, fought
its way through the first houses of Benty-Meulen. In the midst of the
heaviest fighting came the order from division: In the event that the
bridge over the canal has been blown, halt the attack immediately.
Under heavy artillery fire, the battalion remained in its positions
for the night."
On 31 May nothing new happened in the regiment's sector, which
now ran along the Canal de la Colme between SoexBergues
Steene to the channel near Pitgam. The battalions secured the area.
The ring around Dunkirk was drawing ever tighter. Prisoners
reported that the defenders were being worn down by Stuka bombs
and shells from the German heavy artillery.
Ill Battalion reported nothing out of the ordinary during the
morning other than harassing fire. Gefr. Herbert Gnthersberg, the
son of the commander, was fatally wounded on a patrol to the canal;
Gefr. Jakob Kreusch was killed by artillery fire. Reconnaissance
carried out at midday revealed that the enemy forces on the other
side of the canal had been reinforced.
The first elements of the relieving infantry of Reichenau's army
began reaching the regiment's positions during the afternoon. The
first patrols reached III Battalion which briefed the new arrivals on
the situation. Ill Battalion remained in its positions, however. Members and liaison agents of the 484th Infantry Regiment reported to
the Garski Battalion, which was slated for relief. It was rumoured
that the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment was to be withdrawn
and assembled in the Boulogne area for new duties. Preparations
and briefings for relief and withdrawal were carried out. Warning
orders were issued for this eventuality.
The battle in Flanders was nearing its end. Resistance in the
Dunkirk bridgehead slowly waned; the lessening of enemy artillery
fire was especially noticeable. Clouds of black smoke still hung over
the port. Enemy warships were anchored at sea and smaller craft
could be seen shuttling back and forth to the beaches: the British
Expeditionary Force was embarking, evacuating the bridgehead.
On 1 June I.R. GD was still in its positions outside Bergues. The
enemy artillery fire had lost some of its intensity. The impression was
that the Allied artillery positions had shifted to the rear. While nothing
special took place with I Battalion, two infantry regiments, the 51st
and 54th, arrived at II Battalion outside Bergues. The 51st Regiment
was slated to attack the town, but the planned participation by II
Battalion in the operation was cancelled. Then the attack by the 51st
Regiment was also put on hold.
110
Prior to the arrival of the relief forces, III Battalion, under the
command of Obstlt. Garski, had been idle. By 05.00 it had handed
over its positions to the relieving units and all elements of the
battalion had assembled in the eastern quarter of Zeggers- Cappel.
Unfortunately, the continuous enemy air attacksmostly by the
R.A.F.resulted in casualties to 12th Company of four wounded,
one of whom later died. During one attack a vehicle was struck by
a bomb, killing the driver and wounding the other occupants.
The scene on 2 June for the GD Regiment was almost a peaceful
one. The only enemy activity was scattered artillery fire, although a
chance hit on II Battalion's command post claimed the lives of two
men, one of whom was the well-liked Gefr. Lorenz, who had earned
a reputation as a stalwart messenger. German forces were now able
to occupy Bergues as the enemy forces had left their positions in the
town during the night. Meanwhile, the Sturm-Pionier Battalion 43,
which was still attached to GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, together with
elements of a rifle brigade and supported by an assault gun, launched
an attack on the Canal de la Colme west of Bergues near Mille
Brugghe. This attack was carried out in order to gain complete
control of the canal in this sector. The advance was a success; it was
also the last act of the German offensive on this front.
During the course of the day and night the regiment was relieved
by other units without incident. The only attempt to interrupt the
relief was a night raid by British bombers. At 09.00 on 3 June, 1940,
II Battalion, which had been relieved by the 14th Reconnaissance
Battalion, moved to the rear into the area of Bellezeele, where it set
up camp. Ill Battalion continued to rest in Zeggers-Cappel, taking
on supplies and regrouping. Meanwhile, it had been learned that the
regiment was not moving to the area east of Boulogne, but to
Pommier, between Dollens and Arras. Preparations were begun for
departure.
Stu.Pi.Btl. 43 had been attached to the GD Regiment since before
the start of the attack in the west and the men of the two units had
become true comrades in arms. However, the battalion was now
released temporarily by the regiment. Now seen as an experienced
breakthrough battalion, it was transferred into the Zweibrcken area.
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment was withdrawn and sent
to the south. Its initial destination was the Biensvillers area. It was 4
June, 1940.
111
Chapter Eight
To the Seine
The second phase of the German attack, the piercing of the
Weygand Line on the lower Somme, was to begin on 5 June. The
German bridgeheads at Abbville and Amiens were to be of great
significance to the attack.
Panzer Corps Hoth was the first to penetrate the prepared
positions of the Weygand Line south of Abbville, driving 15
kilometres into the enemy's rear. However, in the assault launched
from the bridgehead at Amiens, only the panzers were able to push
into the fortified enemy positions. The rifle regiments, on the other
hand, bogged down in the well-prepared positions, and it became a
battle for each fortified town against mines and barricades of every
description. The battle raged bitterly until the ring of hastily-erected,
but well-prepared, positions was pierced. The German regiments
streamed south through the gaps which had been smashed in the
French line toward St.Fuscien, then Sains and further in the direction
of Estres.
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment waited north of Amiens
ready to march. Its task would be to follow up and exploit a
breakthrough by pushing ahead into the enemy's rear. The regiment
was moved farther forward and on the night of 5 / 6 June was on the
road south of Amiens waiting to go into action. The mood was tense.
The regimental commander sat nervously in his staff car, repeatedly
scanning his maps. . . and waited. The noise of battle could be heard
in the distance with the booming of the artillery and the dull thunder
of the Stuka attacks. From this distance the troops could clearly
follow the dive bombers as they plunged toward their targets. Lt.
Stockmann of 6th Company reported:
"The advance led us through Amiens. Whole blocks of houses had
been completely destroyed. The air was poisoned by the decaying
bodies of horses and men. Tangled power and telephone lines hung
from their poles. The few remaining French inhabitants crowded
around the hastily set up food centres which were under German
control and supervision. It was a horrible picture, but rising out of
the field of rubble, like a vigilant guardian, was the undamaged
cathedral.
South of the city we drove past the former German field positions
from which the attack had been launched. To the left of the road
were the sad remains of a French air base, with burned-out hangars
112
113
5.
the north. At about 17.00 the battalion, which was deployed at the
head of the regiment (II Btl. on the left), went to the attack west of
the St.FuscienCains road, through the Bois de Camon and south
of Cains toward Hill 127, which was the initial objective.
Because of heavy machine gun fire from the direction of Estres,
the battalion went around the hill to the west. Working closely with
the attached I Btl./7th Pz.Rgt., the battalion reached the southern
tip of the Bois du Domont at roughly 21.15. There the battalion
came under enemy fire from the Bois de Berny. Decision: continue
the advance as far as Hill 161, south of Flers. As a result of the
greater distance involved and not least because of poor signals and
road communications, we were out of contact with the regiment,
which had meanwhile changed its intentions.
On this day (and also on 7. 6.) the battalion formed the spearhead
of the entire force attacking Amiens.
As the attack continued, enemy resistance stiffened. Following his
initial surprise, the enemy noticed that the attack was not being
carried forward on the flanks of III Battalion, which now suffered its
first casualties from flanking fire from the Bois de Berny.
Continuing the advance, III Battalion also received fire from the
right rear from the vicinity of Rossignol (near Essertaux). Taking into
consideration the approaching nightfall, the battalion commander
reached the following decision: call off any further attack, dig in on
Hill 161 due north of the road which runs from the north exit from
Flers to the Bois de Berny. Barrage fire lay behind this line. II
Battalion followed gradually and, linking up with 11th Company,
secured the battalion's left flank. Tank noises were heard from 03.00
to 03.30, otherwise the night was comparatively quiet."
II Battalion:
"Assembly was carried out in spite of heavy artillery fire which cost
II Battalion alone 22 casualties. The assembly area was moved
forward about 800 metres in the direction of Estres. A patrol
determined that Estres was heavily occupied. Decision of the
battalion commander: advance past Estres to the west and take Hill
127! II Battalion moved forward in the protection of a gully, won
Hill 127 and held. Ill Battalion could be seen from the hill as it
continued its advance. Estres was screened by tanks. II Battalion's
commander decided on his own initiative to carry on the attack
against the Bois du Domont, the division's objective. Heavy enemy
fire was suppressed by the panzers. As it advanced, II Battalion ran
into heavy machine gun fire from the Bois de Bemy. Initially the
battalion evaded the enemy fire and was then given covering fire by
the Panzers. Since III Battalion was far ahead in the direction of Flers
and could not be left on its own, the commander of II Battalion
decided to continue the advance in order to cover III Battalion's flank
116
to the south and southeast. The advance went smoothly and succeeded in establishing contact with III Battalion's 11th Company.
Neither II or III Battalion noticed that their positions lay across the
Weygand Line. The French, too, seemed unaware of this. The
escorting Panzers helped secure the territory that had been won;
however, the noise of their motors brought down enemy artillery fire.
This led to casualties in the battalion headquarters, as well as 8th
and 5th Companies."
The enemy forces facing the regiment consisted mostly of negro
soldiers. They fought like wild animals, firing from trees, bushes and
hedgerows. It was an uncomfortable, bitter battle.
Following up behind II Battalion, I Battalion succeeded in entering
and taking the strongly-fortified town of Estres. Lt. Pierson was
killed as the fighting was coming to an endit was his birthday. The
French had done much to improve the town as a defensive position.
Holes in cellar walls served as gun ports and ridges of roofs provided
high firing platforms for the negro soldiers.
Lt. Stockmann of the 6th Company reported on the course of the
battle west of Estres:
"At about 15.00 we were sent to the attack against Hill 127,
southwest of Estres. The objective was to widen and deepen the
wedge which had been driven to the southwest. In long rows we
crossed the meadows south of St.Fuscien. In the afternoon heat the
infantry's line of skirmishers, several kilometres wide, moved toward
Hill 127, the day's objective. It was as if a great manoeuvre was
unfolding. The French had done an outstanding job of extending
their defences; every village and farm had been turned into a fortress.
The cellar windows of the houses at the edge of the village had
become gun ports, the hedgerows were studded with artillery pieces
and anti-tank guns, and behind every bit of cover was a machine
gun. Riflemen in trees and on rooftops rounded out the French
defences.
However, too late the French artillery opened fire on the advancing
lines of infantry on the left wing. We lost only two killed and several
wounded. When the shells came too close we threw ourselves to the
ground. As soon as the smoke cleared we were up and moving before
the next shell landed.
We took our first rest in a small wood. The thick undergrowth
concealed dugouts armed with machine guns. It was incomprehensible to us that these excellent defensive positions had been abandoned so quickly. However, at the same time we realised something
else: nothing could stand in the way of an attack carried out with
sufficient force.
We set out again after a brief rest. The sun burned down on us
mercilessly and the equipment became a crushing burden as we
marched through cornfields and woods and across meadows. There
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118
The two of us lay in our hole. It had become cold and the dew fell
on us in thick drops. The enemy artillery thundered at regular
intervals and shells burst pitilessly among us. Cries for help rang out
through the moonlit night. As morning dawned it seemed somewhat
quieter, but this was just the calm before the storm."
Indeed, as the moon rose in the clear sky and the Grenadiers sought
protection in their holes from the enemy artillery fire, medical
personnel moved onto the battlefield and searched for the wounded
and the dead. . . searched for their comrades. And the battalions
recorded a high cost in human life, which in the end was reflected
in the sober numbers. Losses during the attack and the night of 6 / 7
June amounted to:
III Btl. 28 killed and nearly 100 wounded.
II Btl. 21 killed and close to 80 wounded.
This was a high toll in young men who bled and died, but the two
battalions were the first to succeed in piercing the fortified and
bitterly-defended Weygand Line south of Amiens. A stream of fresh
units stood ready to pour through the gaps they had created. Victory
was in sight!
Even as dawn broke on 7 June, shells began to fall on the
battalions' exposed positions. Soon there were more dead and
wounded; the holes in the chalky ground were simply not deep
enough. As the sun rose in the east the regiment was disposed as
follows: elements of Stu.Pi.Btl. 43 (2nd Company) south of Oresmaux, ready for the attack against Rossignol and Essertaux III
Battalion on the hills west of the Bois de Berny (east of Flers), far to
the fore due to its success of the previous eveningII Battalion north
of the EssertauxJumel road, about 600 metres directly in front of
the Bois de Berny, and I Battalion south of Estres following the
capture of the town.
During the night the enemy, which consisted mostly of negro units,
rushed forward everything still at their disposal. French resistance
especially in Rossignol, but also on the northern and western borders
of the Bois de Berny stiffened significantly. They were staking
everything on one card and defended desperately.
For the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND it was the
most difficult day and at the same time the high point of the
campaign, as was recorded in the regimental report.
Orders for the continuation of the attack came out at about 08.00.
The direction of attack had now been changed. In addition, following
units had arrived in the meantime, and the 69th Inf.Rgt. prepared
to attack in the sector held by III Battalion. Ill Battalion was to be
moved more to the left, toward II Battalion. The objective for the
two battalions was the Bois de Berny, the enemy's key defensive
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Chauny, 12 June
The division has broken through the Weygand Line south of Amiens
against an enemy markedly superior in artillery, and in the subsequent
pursuit has forced strong enemy forces to retreat to the south and
southwest.
50 tanks and numerous anti-tank guns have been destroyed, 20,000
prisoners, more than 100 guns and other materiel have fallen into our
hands on the battlefield.
We are proud of this success and now, after short days of rest, we set
off for our next action, reinvigorated and determined to triumph.
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Chapter Nine
Pursuit until the Cease-fire
The 15th of June saw Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND resume its drive to the south, moving through Nogent sur
Seine, Trainel La Postolle and Cerisiers as far as Joigny, where a
short rest had been scheduled before resuming the advance. Afterwards the advance was continued in the direction of Aillant, as far
as the Toucy area. There the troops rested in the ditches at the sides
of the road. Local security measures were taken. The units were
again nearing a front-line area once more, caution became the
watchword.
It was on this drive that the posting of signs along the advance
roads for following vehicles proved its worth. This practice simplified
matters for the following supply vehicles, especially the vital fuel
trucks. This was a method which was later used to even greater effect
in Russia.
On 16 June the regiment continued the advance towards the south.
The appropriate sections of road were marked out by the simple
expedient of placards left by motorcyclists, allowing the advance to
126
maintain its rapid pace. The pursuit of the fleeing enemy continued
through Toucy, which had been heavily bombed the day before. As
III Battalion drove into the city, it was able to intercept a French
leave-train, taking more than 400 prisoners. As a result of the speed
of the German advance, the French no longer had any idea where
friend or foe was.
III Battalion formed the regiment's spearhead, with only the 90th
Reconnaissance Battalion ahead of it. The latter regularly encountered enemy forces but was always able to put them to flight.
The advance continued through Leugny, Druyes, Clamecy, Tanney,
Corbigny and Vandaise to Chateau-Chinon. It was anticipated that
the troops would remain there for the night, but orders to resume
the march arrived after a short rest. Driving through hilly terrain, the
units passed through Arleuf in the direction of Mt.Prenely, and rested
for the night in roadside ditches outside the town.
The objective for 17 June was the city of Le Creusot, which was
to be reached via St.Prix, St.Lger, Etang and Moncenis. The units
were to arrive there in the afternoon. Obstlt. Khler, Obit. Gerbener,
Feldw. Semper and several grenadiers were the first to drive into Le
Creusot, with the intention of capturing the Schneider-Creusot
Works undamaged:
"The Schneider Works were surrendered undamaged and without
resistance. Incalculably important and valuable material thus fell into
German hands. We furnished ourselves with fuel and new trucks.
Rumours of a ceasefire buzzed through our ranks. The inhabitants
ventured back into the streets and watched us nervously. We were
very curious and made inquiries about French troops and units, but
the people merely shrugged their shoulders.
Following a quick breakfast we resumed the chase."
The pursuit continued through St.Martin to Buxy, where enemy
fire and fierce resistance were met. Obstlt. Garski and Obstlt. Khler
calmly organised the attack on the town. Resistance was quickly
overcome and the town captured. More than 500 prisoners were
taken and a German patrol (led by Lt. Peters of the motorcycle
battalion), which had been captured while scouting the advance
route, was freed. The brief, but intense bombardment by mortars
and infantry guns had ended, and the civilian population fearfully left
their cellars. The following report was made by 15th Company:
"Three hours later the company ran into enemy resistance. We
whisked past the densely-packed vehicle column, aligned the guns
and opened fire. From 500 metres the 2nd Platoon shot up some
houses, which our shells simply wiped from the canvas in a cloud of
dust. As a result of this action Obstlt. Khler promoted the gunner,
Gefr. Freitag, to Unteroffizier, while his tireless loader received the
Iron Cross, Second Class. Ogefr. Beeresthal and Ogefr.
Baumgrtner received leg injuries when they were struck by the gun
127
as it was driven back by the recoil on the hard road surface. We were
all in the front line and played a major role in overcoming this French
battalion which included negroes and Chinese as well as emigrants."
The regiment bivouacked in the ManceyTournus area and rested.
On orders from higher up, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND advanced no
farther on 18 June. Ill Battalion took up quarters in Toumus, while
II Battalion, which had in the meantime moved through Valliere to
the front of the regimental march group, moved into Louhans, where
it was to establish a bridgehead. Both battalion commanders organised appropriate security measures, but it was now extremely rare
to encounter armed Frenchmen.
At 03.00 on the 19th advance orders from regiment arrived at the
battalions: Resume the advance in the morning! At 07.00 the
regiment set off in the direction of Lyon on two advance roads.
Obstlt. Khler of IV Battalion greeted his companies at the departure
point at the south exit from Tournus with the words: "Today you
have the honour of capturing the second-largest city in France
Lyon!" The vehicles rolled southwards with I Battalion in the lead,
followed by IV Battalion and III Battalion in the rear.
Morale was at its highest. Talk of a ceasefire had begun in Le
Cruesot, and now it was again overheard in all circles that soon the
fighting would end. The vehicles rolled southwards in what was more
of a sight-seeing trip through the magnificent Sane Valley than a
military operation. The unit commanders warned their men to
remain vigilant, especially because of the large numbers of enemy
stragglers but who still took the threat seriously?
Macon was reached quickly. Individual fleeing French battalions
were sighted, but there was no more firing. Instead the roads were
lined with the local population, some waving, some looking on
bitterly. In many instances white flags were in evidence as the vehicles
rolled through the villages.
Up front, an assault gun platoon under Lt. Franz rolled along with
the lead company 3rd Company under Obit. Fabisch as a
symbol of power. The superstructures of the assault guns were
adorned with white flags. Two interpreters stood next to the commander of the assault gun platoon; they had been brought along to
handle negotiations for the surrender of the city. Then, suddenly, fire
from the area between the villages of Anse and Les Chres. Amid
the crack of anti-tank guns was heard the familiar slow rattle of
French machine guns. The company soon suffered its first wounded.
The troops jumped down from their vehicles and returned the French
fire. Enemy fire from the houses intensified. The enemy anti-tank
guns were silenced by the assault guns following a brief firefight. Then
the first enemy soldiers were spotted; they were black troops, skilfully
returning the German fire.
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In the meantime, the rifle companies had deployed to the left and
right of the road but made only slow progress. The terrain was
unfavourable, with vineyards on a steep slope, and this crowned by
a monastery with thick walls. This was where the main enemy
resistance was coming from, and it included artillery. The heavy
weapons were sent into action. Company after company climbed
the hill, exchanging fire with the unseen enemy who was dug-in in
the vineyards. One enemy hole after another was smoked out until
the Germans stood before the walls of the monastery. The enemy
fire abated and then ceased. In the monastery grounds the soldiers
discovered shattered artillery pieces and dead crews. The French
troops were all Moroccans. This last combat in the war in the west
cost the companies, especially those of III Battalion. Total casualties
were 10 dead and over 30 wounded.
The advance continued on foot, with enemy fire still coming from
the vineyards. The area was cleared by Feldw. Stadler of 2nd
Company and his platoon.
In the early hours of the afternoon the regiment rolled on towards
Lyon. At the same time, II Battalion left its positions in Louhans and
set off in the direction of Lyon. The officer in charge of the battalion's
departure, Lt. Blumenthal, organised the advance party with the
assignment of advancing through Romenay, Pont-de-Vaux, past
Macon, through Pont-de-Veyle, Thoissey, Montmerle, Trevoux and
Neuville. Lt. Blumenthal reported:
"I was to drive towards Lyon with a section in trucks and an assault
gun. I drove ahead in a motorcycle combination as the assault gun
was too slow. Ahead of me were only a few guides, with whom we
soon caught up. We drove through the bushy terrain at high speed.
Then, suddenly, 5 blacks! We braked and pulled our pistols. I
shouted, 'A bas les armes!' They didn't want to at first, but after
several obviously threatening gestures they dropped their weapons.
Their guns were smashed. I told them to wait as the rest of our forces
would soon arrive. We then went on, a machine gun in the front of
the side car that way at least we could open fire right away.
We drove on to the next village. A pair of blacks came around a
corner and these, too, were disarmed. More were in the forest above
and we went after them. They also came in, hands raised high.
We pulled up at a filling station, but there was no gas and we were
soon on reserve.
Soon we encountered more French cavalry; they, too, were taken
prisoner. Suddenly, another road barricade. Behind it men were
running around like ants in an anthill. We drove up. 'La guerre est
finie!' We rounded them up and smashed their rifles. They were
foreign legionnaires. I yelled, 'Vite, vite!' Someone said, 'take it easy'.
They were about 40 men with 3 heavy and several light machine
guns; we were only a rifle section. Not until our assault guns arrived
129
did they realise how few of us there were. They grumbled and swore
at each other. We moved on. Then, behind the next barricade, they
were smiling at us when, suddenly, one of them opened fire. Then
they all began to fire. My driver fell. We jumped into the ditches, but
there was no proper cover. Damn! Now they really opened up; the
air was filled with the whistle of bullets. Then the Oberleutnant and
the rest of the company arrived. The assault gun poured fire into the
barricade until it made an opening. We immediately lined up behind
it and moved forward. The 'Sixth' was now in the lead. Major Krger,
the battalion commander, drove with the company past shot-up
anti-tank guns. Onwards, onwards!"
The following report is interesting as it describes the same combat
as seen by II Battalion:
"Pont-de-Veyle was reached at 10.45 and at approximately 11.25
a barricade was taken by surprise attack in Trevoux. Captured behind
the barricade were its commander, a French captain, and his 45
men, some drunk and some asleep, as well as 2 heavy machine guns.
The advance continued with an assault gun from Lt. von Werlhoff's
platoon leading the way. The first serious enemy resistance was met
near Neuville sur Seine. The enemy had built strong machine gun
positions which commanded the road to Lyon, as well as flanking
positions in the front gardens, especially in that of the Chateau
Bellevue. There was a barricade in front of the village which had a
heavy machine gun, two light machine guns and a 4.7 cm anti-tank
gun. This barricade was taken. The second barricade, which was
located in the village itself, defended itself energetically. We suffered
one dead and two wounded. At first, some of the men behind the
barricade raised their hands in surrender. When our men approached
the barricade, machine gun and rifle fire suddenly erupted from every
house and the park. The assault gun immediately went into position
and blasted the barricade. Several of the crew manning the barricade
were taken prisoner; the rest were killed."
The 6th and 8th Companies were now moved up and the advance
was continued forthwith. It was now midday. Several more barricades had to be overcome and again the assault guns went into
action. The attackers had the impression throughout that the French
had thoroughly prepared the defence of the advance road. It was
14.45 and the advance guard of II Battalion was outside Neuville sur
Seine, when the mayor of the city approached under a flag of truce.
He informed the Germans that the members of the Prefecture of
Lyon and the French officers in command in the city were prepared
to come out for the purpose of negotiating surrender. He left it to
the discretion of II Battalion's commander, Hptm. Grosser, as to
whether he wished to accompany him back to the city. Grosser
declined. II battalion moved slowly into the first suburbs of Lyon.
Hptm. Grosser reported:
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132
All of the vital points in the city were immediately occupied. Ill
Battalion's 9th and 10th Companies guarded the exits from the city
at Vaise (west exits), 11th Company the village of Oullins (southwest
exit), while 10th Company watched the approximately 200 Moroccan prisoners. The remainder of the regiment's troops received strict
orders to remain with their vehicles. Entry into the surrounding
houses was forbidden.
An amusing incident occurred when 11th Company moved into
Oullins. As the first of the "Eleventh's" vehicles drove into the village,
a woman watched from her window and called, "Oh, the English,
have you finally come?" At this the Grenadiers of the "Eleventh"
shouted back, "No we're Germans!" The woman shut the window
again with a bang. Nevertheless, relations between the population
and the occupying soldiers soon improved. The residents heaved a
sigh of relief that their city had been spared the fury of war.
Arriving with the main body of the regiment was Major Greim who,
having recovered from his illness, relieved Hptm. Grosser and again
took command of II Battalion. The next day the German radio
network reported the capture of Lyon by II Battalion. Obit. Khler
was appointed city commandant and issued the appropriate instructions to the civilian population. During the next few days the
battalions moved into more permanent accommodations after the
regiment let it be known that they would be remaining in the city for
the time being.
The regimental command post was set up in the "Grand Hotel"
of Lyon, which offered magnificent accommodations. There the
headquarters staff made the acquaintance of a retired French general
who repeatedly expressed his admiration for the regiment's discipline.
Only III Battalion saw any action at this time. Orders came from
regiment on the evening of 20 June for the battalion to relieve the
1st SS-Regiment which was billeted in L'Arbresle, northwest of
Lyon. Lt. Peters was sent there at about 24.00 to establish contact
with the SS unit. The men of III Battalion were not at all happy over
this assignment, which meant that theirs would be the only battalion
still on the move.
When Lt. Peters returned at around 03.00, his report was not very
rosy. The SS-Regiment in L'Arbresle had lost several men killed in
ambushes by black troops scattered through the mountainous terrain. Ill Battalion set off while it was still dark and arrived in L'Arbresle
at 09.00. The town itself was magnificently situated among the
mountains. A small, picturesque town, it came to be much liked by
everyone. Security detachments were quickly moved into place,
being particularly watchful of the hilly, bush- covered terrain where
the black troops had been making trouble. To close this day which
had begun unhappily, the commander assembled his officers in the
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135
Chapter Ten
Armistice
Deeply moved, the regiment's Grenadiers listened in their quarters
to the news of the cease-fire and the provisional end of combat
operations. They were also moved by the words of their Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst von Brauchitsch, in his order of the
day in which he spoke of the comrades who had not lived to see the
end of the fighting. Among other things, that order of the day from
25 June said:
"At this moment we thank the almighty, who has so visibly blessed our
difficult struggle.
In proud sorrow we think of our fallen and wounded comrades who gave
their blood and lives for Germany's greatness."
For the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment the sacrifices in
blood and lives had been great. The magnitude of the sacrifice is
reflected in the following list of losses in France suffered from a total
strength of 3,900 men:
Up to Stonne:
Officers
NCOs
Men
Up to Flanders:
Officers
NCOs
Men
Up to Lyon:
Officers
NCOs
Men
Wounded:
21
64
250
335
Killed:
5
12
64
81
Missing:
1
3
20
24
=
440
1
8
50
59
10
27
197
234
2
17
19
2
21
58
81
221
9
37
215
261
830
3
11
14
57
=
356
= 1,108
312
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From the 2nd Platoon of 8th Company: Rudi Endlich, Paul Heyn, Hubert
Grumme.
From the headquarters of III Btl.: Wentges, Friedland, Gnthersberg,
Beise, Snoek.
And there were many more their names remain, rank now means little.
Ill Battalion ended the war with a parade in the marketplace of
Lyon. In his address following the reading of the regimental order of
the day, Obstlt. Garski once again touched on the memorable days
which had passed. Ill Battalion's success had been great. It had
fought from the extreme north to deep in the south of France.
Members of the Garski Battalion had been the first troops of the
Greater German Reich to fight on enemy soil when they were air
landed in Belgium on 10 May 1940. Then there was the crossing of
the Meuse in which the battalion was the first across, and the days
of the heaviest fighting, the 6th and 7th of June, with the battles near
Flanders and the Bois de Berny. In honour of those who had not
survived to see this proud day, the order was given: "Helmets off!"
The battalion's thoughts were of their fallen comrades as they
listened to the strains of the " Lied vom guten Kameraden". The
parade ended with a marchpast in front of the battalion commander.
Hundreds of Frenchmen watched this military drama.
In the evening there took place a gathering of the battalion's officer
corps in which Leutnant Baldur von Schirach, recently decorated for
bravery in the face of the enemy, took part for the first time. At this
point in the war there were few German battalions which could boast
more than 400 decorations, from the Knight's Cross to the Iron
Cross, IInd Class. Representative of those decorated were Lt.
Schreiber, Feldw. Czichi, Uffz. Kppke, Ogefr. Steinberg, Schilling,
Borgmann, Werner, Zilizinski, Heldt and Gefr. Zippel of 8th Company. From the headquarters of III Battalion were Uffz. Dost,
Assistant Medical Officers Dr. Imhof and Preu with the Iron Cross,
1st Class.
The regimental order of the day from 27 June specified that the
regiment was to take part in a parade which was to take place in
Paris at the beginning of July. From then on all of the units efforts
were directed at preparing for this event. Drill practice was carried
out as it had been in the days of the old Wachregiment. Rifle drills
and marching practice were carried out, just as on the barrack
grounds. The troops did plenty of grumbling but, on the other hand,
none of the Grenadiers wanted to miss this spectacle in Paris and so
they gave their best. Hauptmann Grosser and an advance party were
sent to the French capital to make the necessary preparations.
A new regimental order on 30 June altered the regiment's participation in the planned parade in Paris. The new order specified
that the unit would not participate on foot but seated in vehicles. All
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138
DURING HOSTILITIES
AFTER ARMISTICE
139
140
9.
With the arrival of the battalions a new unit joined the regiment.
It was the newly-formed Reconnaissance Company. The new unit
was a mixed company with motorcycles and armoured cars, which
had been formed by the Aufklrungs Lehr- und Ersatz- Abteilung
(Reconnaissance Training and Replacement Battalion) in Krampnitz,
near Potsdam. The company was organised as follows:
Company commander with Kfz. 18, a first-aid motorcycle-sidecar combination and a standard motorcycle.
An armoured car platoon, 4 cars armed with machine guns and 1 with
a 2 cm cannon.
3 sections, each with 3 motorcycle-sidecar combinations (BMW 750 cc.),
the first machine of each section mounted a machine gun.
1 mortar team (5 cm) on motorcycle-sidecar combinations.
1 heavy machine gun platoon on motorcycle-sidecar combinations.
Train
The new company met up with the regiment in Laye les Rose,
near Paris, and was incorporated into IV Battalion as 17th (Reconnaissance) Company.
The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Regiment moved into quarters in
the southern section of Paris. The units continued to drill in preparation for the parade, but in general the soldiers had plenty of
opportunities to see the sights in the city and its environs. Ogefr.
Rose of 6th Company reported:
"We moved into our quarters, which were in a school in Villejuif
on the southern edge of the city. We made an excursion to Versailles,
where we viewed the historic hall of mirrors in the splendid palace
built by Louis the Fourteenth.
Naturally, we also got to know Paris. We stood in awe before the
grave of the unknown soldier, which lay beneath the Arc de Triomphe, and then at the sarcophagus of Napoleon the First in the Church
of the Dome. We drove farther along the Champs Elyses, past the
monument to Clmenceau, to the Place de la Concorde. The Reich
war flag waved from the naval ministry. Our attention was then
drawn to the Egyptian obelisk. Later we inspected the Louvre and
Notre Dame. We got an impressive view from the Trocadero of the
Eiffel Tower, the highest in the world. Afterwards, we drove past the
Quai d'Orsay the government quarter, crossed a splendid bridge
over the Seine and had a quick look at the city's entertainment
quarter. The Avenue Madelaine with its elegant restaurants glided by
141
142
143
training was in full swing. The men took full advantage of the
opportunity to take some home leave.
The arrival of replacements to bring the regiment up to strength
resulted in many changes in the units; some officers were promoted
and moved. The changes in III Battalion were as follows:
Obit, von Usadel was transferred back to Germany as a result of
complaints. Obit, von Mackensen arrived from the Army NCO School as
Battalion Adjutant, while Obit. Richter moved over from I Btl. to become
Executive Officer. Dr. Richards joined III Btl. as Surgeon-Major, while Dr.
Imhoff had become Assistant-Surgeon. Obit. Harder again took over 10th
Company after Obit. Lucke, who had led the company throughout the
campaign, returned to 12th Company as a platoon leader. After having led
I and II Battalions in action on several occasions, Major Krger again
became commander of 11th Company. Lt. Obermeier (Iron Cross, 1st
Class) again became a platoon leader in the same company (12th Company), which was commanded by Hptm. Grosser. Lt. Peters (Iron Cross,
1st Class) was again a platoon leader with 9th Company, while Hptm. Gru
was posted to the Fhrer-Begleit- Bataillon.
At this time a further, heavy battalion was formed under the
command of Obstlt. Garski. Designated IV Battalion, its composition
was:
17th
18th
19th
20th
(Reconnaissance) Company
(Pionier) Company
(Signals) Company
(Flak) Company
With this addition the regiment had reached a size which already
looked like the framework for the future formation of a division.
On 24 August the long-awaited cuff titles bearing the name
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND were handed out. However, the shoulder
boards with the initials GD had still not yet arrived. The cuff title,
which was worn on the right forearm, was made of green fabric with
white script.
Chapter Eleven
Preparations for "Sea Lion" and "Felix"
A new operation was on the horizon. On 16 July 1940, following
the cessation of hostilities against France, Hitler issued Directive No.
16 which concerned itself with the preparations for a landing in
England:
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145
Volume 22
Issue 59
Hauptmann Rdiger
Leutnant Krger
Leutnant Gansor
Feldwebel Weienborn
Feldwebel Rser
The company was fully motorised, including a platoon with Bridging Equipment K.
On 27 and 28 October 1940 the I.R. GD left its well-liked quarters
in the Colmar-Schlettstadt area and drove to Le Valdahon and the
troop training grounds there. Accommodations were in wooden and
stone barracks. In addition to the usual duties there now also began
preparations for Operation "Felix", the surprise occupation of the
fortress of Gibraltar. The basis for these preparations was Directive
No. 18 of 12 November 1940:
"The preliminary measures by the high commands for the conduct of
the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:
2.
146
Political moves are under way to ensure a speedy entry into the
war by Spain. The objective of German intervention on the Iberian
Peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English from the
western Mediterranean.
To this end
(a) Gibraltar is to be taken and the straights closed,
(b) the English are to be prevented from gaining a foothold at
another location on the Iberian Peninsula or the Atlantic
Islands.
Obit. Rssert of 2nd Company/I.R. GD described the exercises
which were carried out by the regiment at that time:
"Preparations for the surprise capture of Gibraltar began under the
direction of General of Mountain Troops Kbler. The Infantry
Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND and the 1st Mountain Division,
which was stationed in the Pontalier area, were to form the core of
the forces which were to undertake this venture.
Photographs, maps and other sources were used to explain the
assignments to the officers and men and their roles in carrying out
the operation. Sand table models of the Gibraltar area were constructed (in Besancon, for example) and every participant was
familiarised with local landmarks.
The terrain around Le Valdahon, Pontalier and Besancon and to
the east as far as the Swiss border was ideal for conducting exercises
in the style of combat which would be necessary at Gibraltar.
A narrow north-south neck of land led from the Spanish mainland
to the Gibraltar peninsula and was crowned by a motorway. Ocean
waves lapped at both sides. I Battalion's 1st and 3rd Companies
were to attack the peninsula across this neck of land, while 2nd
Company would have to cross the bay to the right in assault boats.
On the eastern part of the peninsula the steep, almost unscalable
wall of its famous limestone rock faces the Spanish mainland. The
Jger of the 1st Mountain Division planned to climb the north face
of the rock in a daring, almost impossible operation and bypass the
English casemates and rock positions. Batteries of artillery were to
be positioned around the bay west of Gibraltar. Guns of this size and
in such concentration had not yet been used at that point in the war.
Together with the Stukas they were to support the surprise attack
by bringing the English harbour and field positions under fire at the
decisive moment.
It became apparent from the description of the plan that we were
being assigned tasks with which we were unfamiliar and for which
we were simply not prepared. The use of assault boats by 2nd
Company meant that it would have to cross the wide bay between
Spain and the quay-wall in Gibraltar harbour completely in the open
as quickly as possible. The company could not, therefore, take along
its light and heavy weapons and would have to leave fire support to
147
the Stukas and the heavy weapons arrayed around the bay. In order
to fill the gaps in the fire plan somewhat, it was decided to send
anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns along with the mass of
assault boats. These were to be placed on rafts, each of which would
be pushed along by two assault boats. As protection against infantry
fire the rafts were to carry a sand bag barricade and a smoke-generator. On reaching its objective 2nd Company would be faced by a
4-5 metre-high, completely smooth quay-wall. The troops would
have to scramble out of the heaving boats and climb the wall under
enemy fire. Grappling hooks and climbing poles would be taken
along. The most agile climber would go up the climbing poles,
hauling up rope ladders over which the others would follow.
Naturally, we practised the laying of smoke-screens and fighting in
the dark rock casemates and fortress installations with much enthusiasm. I remember well that for some time we didn't leave our
two-storey company building in Valdahon through the door as usual,
but instead leapt from the second-floor window. Even following
strenuous field exercises we were not permitted to re enter our
quarters using the entrance, but had to climb to the second-storey
window using climbing poles, grappling hooks and rope ladders. We
practised every aspect of the operation to the smallest detail. The
wording and sequence of every order were laid down to section level.
Through the intensive preparations and training the men achieved
a level of proficiency in climbing and scaling they would never have
thought possible. When we returned from our exercises we no longer
looked like military units. The men wore no belts, instead each had
a tool in his hands, such as long bamboo poles, rope, rope ladders,
grappling hooks, home-made smoke generators, wire cutters,
demolition charges, and so on.
Naturally, we enjoyed the entire operation. It was a welcome
change and gave us the opportunity to practice a style of warfare
which we had never been called upon to use before, but one which
thoroughly appealed to our sense of sportsmanship."
The meeting between Hitler and Franco on 23 October 1940 in
Hendaye was undoubtedly connected with Operation Felix. However, Franco succeeded in delaying his decision on bringing Spain
into the war until he later rejected the idea completely.
Despite the war games and assault team practices in the companies, there was still plenty of time for enjoyment. The transfer of
Obstlt. Graf von Schwerin from the regiment to other duties on 2
November resulted in a tremendous party. He was presented with
an Opel-Admiral which the Assault Gun Company had brought in
on a flat-bed trailer. With von Schwerin seated in the Admiral and
the regimental bugler in front, a procession of vehicles drove through
Le Valdahon and finally to Besancon where the next highest commander was just having lunch. The racket almost resulted in the alarm
148
being sounded, until it was discovered that it was only the GD acting
up again!
Arriving on 29 November was the Flak company which had been
formed for V Battalion. It was incorporated into the regiment as the
20th Company. Formed from the 103rd Flak Replacement Battalion
in Dberitz, it possessed three platoons each with three 3.7 cm Flak
mounted on 5-tonne tractors, as well as a signals section with a small
radio station, three radio sections and a telephone section. Its first
commander was Hptm. Weidemann.
In about mid-December 1940, Major "Kiki" Gehrke took over the
command of I Battalion in place of the departed Graf von Schwerin.
The Christmas service, the second of the war, took place in the large
church in Omens and was an extremely impressive affair.
The year 1940 drew to an end with the regiment on the Le
Valdahon troop training groundsapparently at peace, but still far
from home. Many thoughts went back to the events which were
engraved deeply in everyone's memory. It was through these events
that the regiment, a collection of men from all over Germany, had
become a fighting team. Proven in action and ready for new
deeds-that was how the men of the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Regiment faced the new year of 1941, although none of them
suspected what that year was to bring.
Chapter Twelve
Wachbataillon
Berlin
and
Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon
As the bearer of the traditions of its predecessors, the Wachregiment Berlin and the Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
which emerged from it, the Wachbataillon Berlin continued to
represent the interests of the regiment fighting at the front. In the
shadow of events, it carried out its necessary duties in the Reich
capital.
With the announcement of the cease-fire on 25 June 1940, waves
of joy swept over the German capital. This placed no special
demands on the battalion, although 2 officers and about 50 NCOs
and men were detached to Belgium to take over the guarding of the
Belgian King in Laeken Castle. Their duties there guarding the
Belgian royal family differed little from those of a normal guard
detachment.
For the remaining companies in Berlin, November 1940 brought
one of the high points of their existence when Marshall Antonescu
of Rumania paid a visit to the capital. The companies formed the
149
Hitler tried to interest Spain in joining the war. Of this, however, the
guards knew nothing; their only duty was to provide security for the
meeting. On the following day the vehicles of the Fhrer-BegleitBataillon headed north again, arriving back at the Adlerhorst
Installation near Ziegenberg on 28 October.
The 2nd Guard Company, nick-named the 2nd "Fast (it was a
motorcycle company), moved to Paris, where it was stationed in the
Cit Universitaire for several months as a standing unit. Together
with a grey column it remained there at the disposal of the F H Q u to
guard important personalities visiting Paris.
In the meantime, the 99th Infantry Replacement Battalion (mot.),
the unit in Neuruppin which furnished replacements for the I.R G D ,
had taken over the training of young recruits. On 21 July it sent a
large transport of replacements to the regiment in the West. The
group was under the command of Hauptmann von Meyer, with Lt.
Ulrich as platoon leader. Following a four day stop in Krefeld, it
passed through Arras to Colmar and Schlettstadt providing the new
formations there with necessary personnel. The 30th of November
1940 saw a change in the unit's designation. The corresponding
74th Issue
AHA/Ag/H
(Id)
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Chapter Thirteen
The Balkan War
Despite the months of peace for the German troops at the end of
1940 and early 1941, the great game of world politics went on
unabated. In September 1940 there was little activity along the line
of strongpoint-style positions in North Africa held by the Axis partner
Italy. However, as a prelude to a more active conduct of the war,
the English were assembling an attack force on the Egyptian-Libyan
border. These preparations were not yet complete when Mussolini
launched a new adventure which would threaten to completely
destroy him and his entire army: on 28 October 1940 several Italian
divisions launched an attack on Greece from Albania. This action by
the Italians, which ran contrary to all of Hitler's plans, demonstrated
to a shocking degree the weakness of Italy's military striking power.
Without the help promised by England, the Greeks succeeded not
153
only in bringing the Italian offensive to a halt, but forced them onto
the defensive and even occupied parts of Albania.
The British Expeditionary Corps, which was standing ready to
attack in North Africa, soon realised that the Greeks would initially
be able to contain the invasion without outside help. Therefore, on
the night of 7 / 8 December 1940, it went to the attack with
comparatively weak forces but with tank support. The first assault
by the British broke through the Italian positions south of Sidi Barani.
The weeks that followed brought defeat after defeat for the Italian
forces under General Graziani. On 22 January 1941 the Italian
garrison of Tobruk laid down its arms.
These Italian setbacks in North Africa also came as a complete
surprise to Hitler. The precarious Italian situation in Greece and
North Africa finally forced him to take measures which had not been
foreseen. On 22 February 1941 a German holding force under
General Rommel was moved to North Africa to halt the British
advance. For the time being this took care of the trouble-spot on the
Italian-German front, especially since the British laid on a several
week pause in their offensive.
To Hitler the situation in the Balkans seemed more uncomfortable
and much more dangerous. The necessity of securing the Balkan
region had led him to send a German instructional unit to Rumania
in October 1940. Hungary and Bulgaria were pacified by including
them in the Axis partnership. Yugoslavia, whose strategic position
had been made extremely unfavourable by the German entry into
Bulgaria, now likewise found itself under pressure to join the Tripartite Pact. However, internal political opposition and external political
influences delayed the decision in Belgrade. Not until 20 March 1941
did the Yugoslavian government, with only the barest majority in its
parliament, decide in favour of entry, signing the pact in Vienna on
25 March 1941.
However, while the German Twelfth Army under Generalfeldmarschall List was moving up in Bulgaria for the attack on Greece
to provide the Italians with promised assistance, a coup d'tat took
place in Belgrade on the night of 2 6 / 2 7 March. The government
fell, the Prince Regent Paul was driven from the country and there
was an obvious swing towards the side of the Allies. Riots in the
streets of Belgrade underlined this action and made obvious the
country's hostile intentions towards Germany.
Hitler therefore decided to expand the attack on Greece at the
beginning of April 1941 to include Yugoslavia, while at the same
time postponing Operation Barbarossa (the attack on the Soviet
Union) by at least five weeks.
Directive Number 25 laid down the guidelines for the offensive:
154
155
Chapter Fourteen
Entry into Yugoslavia But no Fighting!
5. 4. 10. 4. 41
156
waved cloths and passed out wine and cigarettes, happy to see
German soldiers.
The march route led through Deutsch-Haslau, Raab and Tokod to
Budapest, which the units passed through in the afternoon hours of
8 April 1941. Following a brief rest the vehicles were again rolling,
now over poor roads, towards the southeast. They drove through
the Hungarian towns of Kecskemet and Szegedin to Mako where
they crossed the Romanian border. The troops were quartered in
German-inhabited villages, where the citizens welcomed them enthusiastically. In the past years they had suffered a great deal because
of the fact that they were of German origin.
Haste was necessary. The German Twelfth Army was already on
the attack to the south and west and it was vital for the regiment to
link up with it as quickly as possible. The 10th of April finally brought
clear operational orders. In addition to the la Order, which the
regiment passed on to its battalions during the day, the order for the
rear services provided details of the difficult task of providing supplies
to the fighting units:
I.R. GD
lb
10. 4. 41.
20.30
157
5.
6.
on. The troops rested at the far side of the town, waiting for their
vehicles. This was too boring for the regiment's commander, however, and he ordered the advance to resume. The tanks which had
arrived in the meantime picked up 2nd Company and the pursuit
went on in the direction of the Danube and Belgrade.
In the villages along the way the mayors and the local population
stood waiting to greet the liberators in their own fashion. Quite often
it turned out that whole units of Serbian troops were still hiding in
the villages, waiting to allow the leading German elements to pass.
They were soon discovered, however, and unhesitatingly laid down
their weapons. The march went on until evening when the leading
company the 2nd under Obit. Rssert marched into another
purely German village. The soldiers had earned a rest; the march
through the clinging mud had been exhausting. The prosperity of
these German villages was astounding, each surpassing the last in
its hospitality. The German soldiers felt quite at home.
Meanwhile, the motorcycles, assault guns and armoured cars of
the 17th (Reconnaissance) Company moved on, hoping to take the
bridges over the Danube near Pancevo in a coup de main. Crossing
blown road and foot bridges, which proved little hindrance to the
motorcycles, soldiers of the company reached the Danube where
they stopped before the new bridge, which had been blown the day
before. What were they to do now? Messengers were sent back and
the company waited for the Pioniers. In the meantime a search was
organised for boats or ferries. The remaining elements of the
regiment arrived on the afternoon of 12 April and began preparations to cross the Danube. Obit. Rssert, commander of 2nd
Company, reported:
"Early in the afternoon we reached Pancevo, the last stop before
Belgrade. But there we were held up by a blown bridge over the
Tamis (also Temes) which we were unable to repair as the train was
still too far behind. It was then that the fantastic plan was born to
man the small steamers which were tied up along the river bank and
sail upstream to Belgrade. There was much enthusiasm for this
scheme and we immediately set about making the ships ready for
action. A wall of sandbags was erected on the deck, behind which
machine guns were set up. The belly of the ships were filled with
landlubbers, as we termed the infantry, who were quite looking
forward to the trip. We found some stokers and soon the stacks of
our improvised fleet were smoking merrily.
Perhaps it was just as well that the regiment ordered us to call off
our marine operation. The enemy situation on the Danube and in
Belgrade was completely unknown and one anti-tank gun would have
been sufficient to sink one proud ship after the other.
159
14.00
14.15 15.00
15.10 16.00
16.00
Opening message
German News Service followed by the news in
the Serbian language.
German News
Soldier-Comrade, fall into step, Comrade Songs
for soldiers, old and new
"This and That Something for Everyone"
Report of the Wehrmacht High Command,
repeated slowly, followed by the news in the
Serbian language.
163
18.00 - 18.30
18.30 - 19.40
19.45 20.00
20.00
20.15 22.00
22.00
"Volksdeutsche Hour"
"Olle Kamellen"
Political news and radio show from the German
Broadcasting Service.
German News, followed by the report from the
Wehrmacht High Command in Serbian.
"Learn to Laugh instead of Complaining"
German News.
Lilli Marleen
Words which travelled around the world. . .
Music: Norbert Schulze
Text: Hans Leip
Vor der Kaserne,
vor dem groen Tor,
stand eine Laterne,
und steht sie noch davor,
so woll'n wir uns da wiedersehn,
bei der Laterne woll'n wir stehn,
wie einst, Lilli Marleen.
Unsre beiden Schatten
sahn wie einer aus,
Da wir so Lieb uns hatten,
164
Hptm. Gruss
Hptm. Frhr. von Blomberg
Hptm. Nehring
equipment (tents, etc.)
At that time the unit's commanding officer, who was under the
command of the Fhrer Headquarters, was Obstlt. Thomas.
While the 1st (Guard) Company was roughly comparable to a rifle
company, with a machine gun platoon as its only heavy weapons,
the 2nd (Fast) Company was more similar to a small reconnaissance
battalion. It had BMW motorcycles, both solo machines and sidecar
combinations of the heaviest class at that time, as well as armoured
cars, which were under the command of Lt. Guderian, son of
Generaloberst Guderian. The 3rd (Heavy) Company possessed
anti-aircraft guns, 5-cm. anti-tank guns and infantry guns.
In the course of time the men of the battalion achieved a special
status. As a result of the ongoing exchange of personnel those
leaving the battalion were able to select the unit in which they wished
to continue their service. This was one of the peculiarities of the
battalion: other than a certain core of personnel, part of the unit was
always detached for service at the front, while those men were
replaced by combat-experienced soldiers. This exchange of personnel was deemed necessary due to the monotony of the duty and,
167
moreover, the FHQu. attached great importance to including distinguished combat soldiers in its ranks.
In order to visibly acknowledge the special nature of the unit, on
15 January 1941 it was decreed that its members would wear a
further cuff title in addition to the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
issue. To be worn on the lower left sleeve, the cuff band bore the
title Fhrerhauptquartier. Wearing of the new title was only permitted away from the Headquarters, especially while on leave, in
order to prevent giving away the location of the command centre.
Arriving in the period January-March 1941 as part of the unit's
expansion to a reinforced battalion was the "Hermann Goring Mixed
Flak Battery" under Hauptmann Gasda. The battery was to provide
the battalion's anti-aircraft defence on all of its operations. It was
equipped with one platoon each of heavy, medium and light antiaircraft guns. Formed in Dberitz in March/April 1941 as the future
basis for the 4th Company of the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon was a
"reinforced Panzer Platoon." Equipped with Skoda (Czech) tanks,
the platoon was under the command of Obit. Peiper. Also appearing
but not under the command of the Escort Battalion was a Fhrer
Aircraft Squadron, which was to be employed mainly on courier
missions and which included the Fhrer's own aircraft. A Fhrer
Signals Company was also formed, whose primary function was to
prepare signals communications while away from the FHQu. The
men of this company later manned the telephone exchanges within
the various command installations, ensuring trouble-free communications.
On 9 April 1941 the main body of the Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon
occupied and secured the Frhlinssturm (Spring Storm) installation
near Mnichkirchen, Steiermark. Although designated as headquarters during the Yugoslavian campaign the installation saw little
use. Used instead were Hitler's special train Amerika and the train
of the Wehrmacht High Command which were parked at the
Aspang Tunnel. Two locomotives were always kept under steam; in
case of air attack they were to pull the two trains to safety within the
tunnel.
The headquarters was set up at the Aspang Tunnel which was in
a deep valley surrounded on all sides by wooded mountains. Crews
working day and night had built a special platform along the tracks.
The railway line appeared to be a branch line over which few trains
travelled. Now it was idle and on it sat the two trains. They didn't
look much different than the familiar express trains, consisting of
about eight cars. One car featured a conference room, another was
a sleeping-car, another contained showers and bathing facilities, one
a kitchen, and another telephone and radio installations. In this train
lived and worked the command central, while the neighbouring train
which was similarly equipped housed the O K W .
168
169
Obit. Lucke
Lt. Blumenthal
Lt. Letz
Company Commander
Training Officer
1st Platoon
2nd Platoon
3rd Platoon
4th Platoon
Senior NCO
Hauptfeldwebel Tenter
Uffz. Tner
Gefr. Kanthack, then Obgefr.
Claus
The Pionier Platoon was then under the command of Lt. Jacquot,
while the Signals Platoon was under Lt. Kosella. Everyone, however
including the many not named here gave their best. The success
of the I.R. GD rested mainly on this training, which was constantly
improved and refined based on the lessons of experience. The means
available to the instructors were initially limited and most had to be
improvised. It was thanks to the awareness of the units on the outside
that there would be no success without well-trained replacements
that experienced people were sent back to pass on what they had
learned.
The unit commands of the replacement unit and the regiment in
the field had to wage a constant battle against a certain laziness in
the administration of this vital exchange. During every pause in
action, therefore, the Regimental Adjutant came back to meet with
the commander of the training unit to establish requirements. In the
years to come this practice proved extremely beneficial to the units
involved.
170
Part III
THE WAR IN THE EAST
Chapter One
The Soviet Union as a Power and Opponent of the
German Wehrmacht
When, some years after the events of 1941, one examines the
situation and position of the German Wehrmacht before the attack
in the East it is apparent that three factors were underestimated by
Hitler not the General Staff: the endless expanse of the Russian
land, the military strength of the enemy and the potential weakness
of the German Wehrmacht. In addition, there were the differences
of opinion between Hitler and the Army High Command over the
actual plan of operations which could not be resolved by the outbreak
of war.
The Soviet Union has an east-west length of more than 8,000
kilometres and a maximum width of approximately 4,000
kilometres, making it the largest political state in the world. The
USSR accounts for one-seventh of the earth's land mass, including
in its scope eastern Europe, all of northern Asia, the island groups
of the Arctic Ocean, the western part of Asia and the Caucasus,
which pushes deep into the Middle East. Despite a shoreline of
40,000 kilometres, most of which was accounted for by the arctic
and far eastern coasts, the Soviet Union was virtually a landlocked
nation with only a few ice-free seas: the Baltic, where, excluding the
Baltic States, Russia's share of the coastline was barely 150
kilometres, the Black Sea and the harbours of Murmansk on the
Arctic Ocean and Vladivostok in the Far East.
Containing more than 180 different ethnic groups, at that time this
tremendous land mass was not united geographically, culturally or
racially. There were also great differences in the density of population
among the various regions: the thickly- settled lands of the Ukraine,
171
173
This OKH's assessment, that the smashing of the Red Army was
a pre-condition for the winning of large areas of territory and the
occupation of the raw materials district, was contrary to Hitler's.
Hitler sought a military decision on both wings, while the O K H was
aiming at the central front.
The focal point of the attack by a further army group committed
south of the Pripet Marshes was to be the Lublin area in the general
direction of Kiev. Its powerful armoured forces were to advance
quickly into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces and roll
them back to the Dniepr.
Hitler agreed to the distribution of forces suggested by the OKH,
which would see the main body of the army committed in two army
groups in the area north of the Pripet marshes and only one in the
south. However, the tug-of-war over the operational objectives to
follow lasted throughout the campaign and overshadowed planning
on the German side.
The Russian war council issued a state of alert for all units on the
Western Front on 10 April 1941, and further urgent measures and
preparations for war were taken "to protect the western frontier" on
1 May 1941. It can be said that the Soviet Union as much as was
within its power was prepared for an armed conflict with Germany.
Whether attack preparations were included at this time can not be
stated with certainty. Nevertheless, in his speech in Nuremburg in
1941, Gen.-Oberst Haider described the Russian build-up as typical
of one prior to an attack.
That the Soviets, in the course of their plans for world domination,
would sooner or later attempt to conquer Western Europe, has not
only been proved by present day events, but is, when all is said and
done, an element of their doctrine.
Chapter Two
The Reinforced Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in the Attack in the East
15. 6.21. 6. 41
I . Basis o f S u p p l y :
(a) Panzergruppe 2 will be in charge of supply for the units under its
command with the beginning of the operation.
Requests for all supplies to go through XXXXVI Army Corps
which, after release of these supplies to supply districts or supply
support bases respectively, and after delivery into the corps
transport area, will allocate them to units under its command.
(b) Panzergruppe 2 is based on the installations of Supply District
Centre (Commander of the supply district in Warsaw)
Panzergruppe 2 is concerned with the following dumps in the
supply district:
1. Ammunition dumps "Marie": forest 12 km northeast of
Parczew, on the road from Parczew to Wisziec.
177
178
TROOP CONCENTRATIONS
AND THE GERMAN ATTACK
ROUTES ON EASTERN FRONT
22 JUNE 1941
Regimental HQ/I.R. GD
HQ IV Battalion/I.R. GD
14th (Panzeijger) Company
15th (Heavy Infantry Gun) Company
one Flak platoon of 20th (Flak) Company
400th Artillery Battalion
II Battalion/I.R. GD
III Battalion/I.R. GD
Remaining units
Supply.
The Polish advance roads were deep, sandy tracks. The route (R
2) led the spearhead through Mordy and Lonice to the vicinity of
Konstantynow. The regiment's assignment was finally made known
and at first may have seemed almost laughable to many: secure the
advance road for the panzer divisions which were passing through
and later take part in surrounding Russian forces southwest of Minsk.
That was why the regiment was so far to the rear and why it was
committed late and was moving only slowly toward the east. The
landscape gradually changed after crossing the Russian frontier. The
regiment now entered an area of dense forest, untended and barely
passable. On the sides of the roads were the first knocked out enemy
tanks, twisted and shattered guns and smoking collective farms.
Scattered among the debris were twisted brown forms: the bodies
of fallen Russian soldiers. The trees on the sides of the road had been
shattered, their leaves charred black. The air smelled of smoke and
smouldering wood, of sweat and bad tobacco. And always there were
more dead Russians, small heaps along the road covered in dust from
the passing columns. It was a picture of a battlefield of a type never
before seen by the Grenadiers. The regiment continued to move
forward, through Prushany and Roshany towards Slonim. The
advance was interrupted by a sudden outburst of rifle fire from a
wood close by the advance road. Snipers? Quickly the company
nearest the firing got down from its vehicles, deployed and moved
toward the suspected enemy position. The fire soon died down,
however, and the column continued on toward the northeast. The
companies passed through the village of Polonka and it was already
night when they reached the area around Stolowici, north of
Baranowici. It had begun to rain, which kept the dust down and
improved visibility, making it easier for the drivers. Everywhere were
columns from other units. All along advance road "R 2" could be
seen Luftwaffe signals men hurriedly laying their lines, the vital links
between the command centres and the fighting units. Artillery fire
rumbled in the distance; the front was not far away.
The regiment suddenly found itself in the midst of a battle as it
moved on from Stolowici towards the northeast on the morning of
30 June. The commanding general, far to the front with the
spearhead, had been ambushed in a village. He managed to escape
181
with great difficulty, but his driver was wounded and his executive
officer killed. The regiment made its first solid contact with the enemy
in the wooded country north of Goroditsche. The regiment was
surprised by the ferocity of the fighting, which included an attack by
tanks. The enemy attack was beaten off with the help of the anti-tank
guns, but the encounter cost a large number of dead and wounded,
especially among 6th Company, which suffered a total of ten
casualties. The day ended with patrol activity, necessary to clarify the
enemy's situation. The following account was taken from a press
clipping which described the day's events:
"Our slit trenches were already finished when the platoon leader
called the section leaders together. We were to reconnoitre a village
which lay 7 kilometres away and determine if it was held by the
enemy.
We set out at approximately four in the morning and headed off
through some rye fields toward a wood. Then we neared the edge
of the village. There a hundred metres ahead was a Soviet machine
gun sentry. We took him prisoner before he could make a sound.
Passing through the weakly-held village, we reached the exit on the
far side, where five more Russians appeared who were also overcome. But then more emerged from a nearby cornfield and the
shoot-up began. We eventually counted over 130 enemy soldiers;
however, we were able to pin them down and even captured 23
Russians and a commissar. The prisoners were delivered to the
company command post. We suffered no losses, our only casualty
was the platoon leader who received a grazing wound. These were
our first Russian prisoners."
That same night the advance was resumed with a stronger spearhead; an area approximately 40 kilometres northeast of Baranowici
was to be occupied in order to secure the flank of Gruppe Guderian.
Generaloberst Guderian's Panzergruppe 2 had meanwhile pushed
on through Slonim and Baranowici in the direction of Minsk with the
objective of encircling the enemy forces which had escaped the
Bialystok pocket. Guderian's forces formed the southern wing of the
encirclement, while Generaloberst Hoth's Panzergruppe 3, which
was advancing through Wilna towards Minsk, formed the northern
flank. By 26 June Panzergruppe 3 had won the northern edge of
Minsk, and on the 27th the armoured spearhead of Guderian's forces
likewise reached the city and linked up there with Hoth. This closed
the ring around Russian forces which totalled approximately 40
divisions with more than 400,000 men. Following in a forced march
were the German Fourth and Ninth Armies. Their role was to prevent
a breakout from the pocket, especially to the south and southeast.
While awaiting the arrival of the two armies, Panzergruppe 2
rushed forward Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND to
contain the enemy's initial attempts to break out of the pocket. The
182
regiment's thinly-held front faced north and northeast. When the two
German armies arrived, the regiment was to move on and join
Gruppe Guderian.
Details of the assignment were contained in a regimental order
issued at 21.00 on 30 June 1941:
R e g i m e n t a l O r d e r for S e c u r i n g t h e F l a n k o f G r u p p e
Guderian
1. The enemy is attempting to break out of the area Novogrodek
Puszeza forest regionZaniemonska and these efforts will intensify
in the next days. Organized large-scale breakout attempts are not
expected. Most will be local efforts by dispersed units, supported
by tanks.
70-80 divisions are thought to be holding out in the abovementioned area.
2. The security role ordered for I.R. GD remains the same. The
security sectors for I and II Battalions are also unchanged; II
Battalion's forces are to be concentrated near Poloneoska and I
Battalion's near Berodysscze. A combat-capable reserve is to be
formed which can be employed at threatened points.
The designated sectors are to be actively patrolled day and night.
II Battalion will reconnoitre the front to the wooded areas and,
employing motorized patrols, establish contact with its neighbour
to its right, the 5th MG. Btl., in Mir. The 5th MG. Btl. will arrive
in Mir this evening.
I Battalion will reconnoitre the west flank across the Myssanka as
far as Pelonka and make contact with its neighbour on the left
there. Further reconnaissance will be carried out to the wooded
areas lying directly in front of its security sector.
3. The line of security is to be held in the event of an enemy attack!
4. Password from 30. 6. to 1. 7. : "Moltke", in accordance with the
password list. It must be known by every soldier.
5. Ill Battalion will secure Stolowicze with one company and hold its
remaining elements in readiness so that the units can move
immediately if alerted.
6. Heavy weapons: I and II Battalions will each retain a heavy infantry
gun platoon under its command. heavy infantry gun company
will remain in its positions in II Battalion's sector under the
battalion's command.
IV Battalion's 14th (Pz.Jg.) Company will remain at the
regiment's disposal in Stolowicze. The 5 cm Pak platoon, which
until now has been attached to the battalions, is to be sent back
immediately to 14th Company. 14th Company is to be held in
readiness so that it can be employed with the battalions in the
shortest time in the event of enemy tank attack. Approach routes
to I and II Battalions are to be reconnoitred.
183
184
186
instrument. The first tracers reached for the emptying field-path and
after a few chords each clip contained 6 rounds the terrain as
far as the forest's edge had been swept clear. Only those left behind,
the silent victims of our premiere, offered us an impression of the
effects of our weapon against ground targets.
After this show, which lasted but a few minutes, the scene had
cleared to such a degree that we were filled with a thirst for action
and the proud feeling of a total victory on the battlefield. It only
remained for us to round out our victory with an impressive number
of prisoners. Under the sure protection of our 3.7 cm Flak we were
going to round them up, believing that we had smashed the enemy
attack in the wink of an eye with the effects of our weapon.
Everything appeared to be going smoothly as we flushed the first
5 or 6 Russians from a drainage ditch scarcely 50 metres in front of
our gun position. Guns carelessly at our sides, we thought the four
of us could collect hundreds of prisoners. Inexperienced and unconcerned, we neared the wheat field into which the front of the enemy
column had fled. It was all quite simple until the moment when
we were met by Russian rifle fire! Uffz. Stoffels lay on the field-path
with a serious shoulder wound, while the rest of us lay small and
plain in the grass, no longer so certain of victory. How the three of
us managed to bring the seriously wounded man back to the gun
position without further casualties is still a mystery to us today.
We began to sense that the enemy had not been beaten back for
long. Mixed in with the uninterrupted banging of our 3.7 cm, which
was soon joined by the other two guns of the platoon, was the vicious
chirping of enemy rifle fire, which whistled around our ears. Many
hits were clearly audible as they smacked against the armour plate
which, unfortunately, was only in front and not on the sides. More
and more we hid behind the armour plate, which we had not
appreciated until now, while a barn standing next to the gun position
shielded us from fragments from a mortar barrage. Small wooded
shingles rained down like roll shutters. The falling shingles were a
nuisance, but we much preferred that to the effects of the whirring
mortar fragments.
Our cannon had to be fed continually; flying hands refilled empty
ammunition clips. A barrel change, a job that had to be done outside
the protection of the armour plate, was carried out in no time. The
hot cannon barrel raised blisters on the hands of those involved.
Hands were in motion here and there, calls for full clips of ammunition, half deaf from the ceaseless pounding of the gun. . . there was
no time to feed hidden fears by looking beyond one's own task. The
Russians were unmistakably gaining ground. They stuck to their guns
although we kept up a continuous fire on the edge of the wood and
any groups of Russians that sprung up. Our supply of ammunition
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was also running low; had minutes or hours passed? Finally, ammunition arrived, and with it I Battalion.
For the infantry, finishing the job was just routine work, which we
could not imitate. All around us lay shell casings, ammunition clips
and crates, barrel keys, oil cans and everywhere the bothersome gas
masks. A change of position ended this premiere, and soon afterward we left the nameless village."
The regiment was ordered to departure readiness at approximately
15.00 on 3 July 1941. That evening the vehicles rolled off towards
a new objective.
Chapter Three
Across the Beresina to the Dniepr
The road assigned to the regiment, R 2, which lay south of the
two roads over which Panzergruppe 2 was advancing on Minsk, was
also the southern boundary of the pocket which had formed in the
meantime. Also streaming eastward along the road were the march
groups and columns of the artillery and infantry of the Fourth Army
which were trying to reach the front, and the columns of motor
vehicles carrying vital fuel and ammunition to the Panzer units. In
the midst of this was GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, laboriously pushing
its way past the columns. Everyone kept an eye trained to the north,
weapons were armed and directed to the left towards the forest and
across the open plain, because danger threatened from there. The
surrounded Russians were attempting to escape from the pocket,
which resulted in many firefights, ambushes and breakthrough
attempts towards the south. The reinforced I.R. GD moved on along
the dusty road, but was frequently held up by congestion along the
route. The march order had changed: II Battalion was now driving
behind V Battalion. It was dark when the regiment passed through
Nieswicz, an indifferent village like so many others. Again it was other
columns, as well as damaged bridges and crossings, that considerably
slowed the unit's progress. During one such halt while passing
through Baranowici, brute force had to be employed in order to get
traffic moving again. All this strained the nerves of the men, especially
the drivers, who had to bear the brunt of this difficult type of driving.
Movement was restored and finally, roughly at midday on 4 July, the
regiment reached Stolpce and Swerzen, about 3 kilometres to the
south. Tschweren was named as the regiment's objective.
Once again, however, the regiment's progress was interrupted by
a Russian breakout attempt. In the afternoon it may have been
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The 7th of July saw the regiment again on the march with the
objective of Beresino on the Beresina River. The old Polish- Russian
border was crossed. The drive went smoothly over the endless sandy
tracks which were interrupted only once by a 17 km stretch of paved
road. The drivers and passengers breathed a little easier. After
covering the stretch KodjanowMinsk SmilawiczeTscherwen,
the regiment reached the rest area in the wooded area about 6 km
west of Beresino. Everywhere, and especially in Minsk, there were
destroyed houses, some of which were still burning. For the first time,
too, there was the striking scene of multi-story buildings beside the
farm cottages. Thousands of prisoners streamed to the rear. At the
sides of the roads were groups of wooden crosses as well as single
ones: the graves of comrades who had paid for this victorious and
quick advance with their lives.
And then came the Beresina: the river was crossed under bright
moonlight. The columns rolled slowly across the wooden military
bridge. On the far side was only wasteland, sand and swamp.
Mosquitoes were everywhere.
The German armoured spearheads had reached the Dniepr.
Generaloberst Guderian's Panzergruppe 2 had pushed recklessly
ahead. All eyes were on one objective: Smolensk. Still marching
behind, carrying out its security duties, was the I.R. GD. But orders
were coming for the regiment to join up with the leading elements
of the armoured spearhead as quickly as possible. The regiment was
to take part in the breakthrough across the Dniepr!
Chapter Four
The Battle near Smolensk
The reinforced Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was
placed under the command of 10th Pz.Div. for the attack to create
a bridgehead across the Dniepr. An order from the Panzer Division,
which described the plan for the crossing, reached the regiment in
the late evening hours of 10 July:
10th Panzer Division: Div. Command Post, 10. 7. 41 - 20.00
la/op. Nr. 7
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Accuracy verified
Seele
Lt. and Adjutant
signed Schaal
A few kilometres from the Dniepr the men of the regiment climbed
down from their vehicles and shouldered their weapons and equipment. The battalions, led by I and III Battalions, deployed and moved
forward on both sides of the road. Tightly-packed columns stood
everywhere. The Russians could easily observe the concentration of
German forces taking place here. The terrain was open and the view
from the far side of the Dniepr was good. The companies moved at
a steady pace towards the river. Heavy enemy artillery fire began to
fall to the left and right of the road, forcing the advancing troops to
take cover. This ceased as they approached the steep slope which
ran along the Dniepr as the last bastion before the river. Assembly
points were occupied and observation posts set up. Through their
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field glasses the Stuka liaison officers scanned the far bank, picking
out worthwhile targets.
The morning of 11 July dawned after a cold night. 18th (Pionier)
Company readied its assault boats and inflatable rafts, while Bridging
Column K broke out its equipment. Everything would depend on
them and their joint effort with the other Pioniers. If they were able
to throw a bridge across the river quickly, then the heavy weapons,
above all the tanks, would be able to go into action across the river
in time and begin a successful pursuit of the enemy deep into the
rear. The men of the Pionier company knew this well.
A member of I Battalion described the Dniepr crossing:
"We sat freezing in the grey of dawn. There was no hot coffee.
Everyone was dirty and unshaven. Hands in our pockets, we shivered
from the cold. Pipes took the place of breakfast, but the smoke
parched our throats. Some of the men had their helmets on, others
the plain forage-caps. Some men's hair hung down across their dirty
faces. This then was the picture before the battle: cold, dirt, thirst
and fear. We formed a great jumble of men on our slope, because
we didn't know where else we should disperse to. It is always better
to squat in groups in an area which is not being fired on than to run
around in artillery fire. Many had bought it doing that already. The
enemy shells had been going over our heads since the afternoon of
the day before. Now and then there was also firing on the famous
planted field in front of us, which we would later have to cross. Our
own artillery had fired several times since 04.30; only light calibre
and very few. We consoled ourselves: they were just ranging in.
Stukas came at 05.00, beautiful music that raised our spirits. But
the bombs fell far in the enemy rear; they were of no direct use to
the little man on the battlefield today.
We climbed up the steep slope. The decision to do so was not
easy, but also not difficult, because to the left and right everyone else
was doing the same. The German attack began. Everyone was wide
awake and on their guard. We reached the ploughed field and then
the crest. With a crash there was smoke, dirt and fragments
everywhere this was the Russian barrage fire. The shells screamed
bestially; everyone stretched out flat, scratching into the hard earth.
Cover, cover! We were pinned down.
After perhaps another minute it died down. 'Move out now! Go!
Go! We hollered with relief; we were still alive! We began to run.
Already the enemy artillery could be heard again. We ran and ran.
Others were running to the left and right. We crouched as the shells
burst behind us. We were through!
The ploughed field came to an end. Before us was a steep slope.
Down there was the river. We laughed; it was wonderful. We waded
up to our knees in the water. We sat pressed together in the inflatable
boats, men from the 'Second', the machine gun company and
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Pioniers. It didn't matter. All that counted was getting to the other
side. Bullets splashed in the water around us and whistled past.
We reached the far shore out! Soaked with sweat, I stumbled
out of the boat. Out forward; there was nothing else we could do.
I threw myself down behind a bush. The Leutnant was not there and
Gefr. Binger was missing as was the wireless section.
Then Lt. Erdmannsdorf of 1st Company came towards me from
the left. His uniform was torn and bloody. He had been wounded in
a hand grenade duel. 'I'm just going to pull on another shirt, I'll be
back.' He said it as if he were just dressing for lunch.
Russian machine guns kept up a continuous fire from the left.
Muzzle smoke was visible from several bushes. Bullets whistled
overhead. The company was pinned down. Oberleutnant Hnert,
commander of I Battalion's machine gun company, crouched in a
shell-hole a few steps farther to the left. I leapt over to him. He was
smoking a cigarette with casual elegance. It seemed as if he could
care less about the battle, even though not a man of the battalion
could move in this fire.
All at once four heavy machine guns of his company opened up a
steady fire. This was sweet music for the Grenadiers. Clouds of dust
rose from the enemy positions. The battalion got up and the attack
went on. There was nothing to be seen of Hnert's company, but
they fired wonderfully and always at the right time. We continued on
and it became ever hotter, the sun burning down from the bright
sky."
For a time I Battalion was faced by the 'Stalin Students', a Soviet
elite unit. They were fanatical, unyielding and could take a lot of
punishment. The only way past them was to go straight at them.
The Soviets employed a human bridge in order to bring over planks,
weapons and equipment. They even dragged their guns across.
Unbelievable.
Ill Battalion's advance was also not without cost. 11th Company
lost its commander, Obit. Teubert, as he was about to cross the river
in an inflatable boat. Lt. Kiene, the leader of III Battalion's Pionier
platoon, as well as Lt. Maliszewski, a platoon leader in 2nd Company, also came to grief during the crossing. Many others, whose
names are not mentioned here, gave their lives in order to keep the
attack going.
The Russians defended desperately. Heavy artillery fire fell on the
bank of the Dniepr. Its target was the crossing point. Bullets whistled
about and Russian aircraft dropped their bombloads there. Nevertheless, the crossing went on without pause. More boats were
crossing the river and pulling up onto the other bank. On the far
shore the bridgehead was enlarged slowly, initially by infantry alone.
At first the heavy weapons were able to give only limited support.
The Pioniers worked feverishly; they were already preparing for the
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construction of the bridge. Until the bridge was ready, ferries had to
be employed to ship anti-tank guns, tanks and guns to the far side.
Late in the morning II Btl./69th Rifle Rgt. of the 10th Pz.Div. was
temporarily placed under the regiment's command. Its job was to
protect the northern flank against attacks from Schkloff and the
northeast. Enemy resistance lessened gradually; the bridgehead was
expanded. Soon the companies disappeared into a brush-filled
wood, moving forward towards their objectives. The men were
exhausted and plagued by thirst. Their backs, which had become
sweat-soaked under the hot sun, now became cold. Here there was
time to look around at the men ahead and to the sides. Who was
missing? Who had bought it? Names such as Feldw. Rdiger, Lt.
Beck, Gefr. Binger, Thomann and Dahlhoff were missing they
had been wounded and left behind. All were from I Battalion. Once
again the companies' strengths had been reduced, but the assignments remained the same.
The Pioniers completed their bridge-building in record time. The
first vehicles rolled across the bridge, also much-needed reinforcements. Meanwhile, the I.R. GD held on in the bridgehead against
desperate Russian counterattacks. Ill Battalion was only able to beat
off an enemy attack thanks to the timely arrival of anti-tank guns,
and I Battalion was even surrounded for a short time. Augustowo
fell to II Battalion, but was then lost again. Bely also changed hands
several times. It was 12 July, one day after the river crossing. There
was no rest, no pause the advance must continue. All resistance
had to be broken and the pursuit begun as soon as possible after the
breakthrough on foot, as long as the motorized forces remained
in the rear. Once across the river, they would soon overtake the
infantry.
The following is another eye-witness report from a member of I
Battalion:
"Our legs were heavy; tired and exhausted the mass of men set
itself in motion. There lay the village. Not a shot fell.
The 'Second' and 'Third' deployed for the attack. Suddenly the
place was full of Russians. They ran about between the houses like
startled chickens. We fired on them with machine guns and submachine guns. Ricochets buzzed past us. Once again the urge to
advance came over us; everywhere sections from our company leapt
forward, charged through the fields of sunflowers, shouting to each
other and laughing. Several houses were burning.
The village was taken in half an hour. Hundreds of prisoners stood
along the road. We had taken them completely by surprise, as they
had either been sleeping or were expecting us to come from the
other side. Our mood was excellent. The old man had been right;
he had a good nose for battle.
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bitter fighting. The Grenadiers saw their fallen comrades, one of whom had
been tied to a fence and shot. This time there were no prisoners.
The village with the bridge was stormed! "
It was I Battalion which set out toward the east after the river
crossing. In spite of Russian resistance which continually flared up,
it continued to advance, storming many villages, such as
Tschomodani. The other battalions, on the other hand, soon encountered heavy resistance, marked by Russian counterattacks. Ill
Battalion dug in, in and on both sides of Dubrovka and defended its
positions there. Prisoners there stated that at least a division was
attempting to break through the ring to the south. II Battalion had
stormed the village of Bely on the north- south road, but had been
thrown out again. Elements of the Russian division pushed past the
village, seeking a breakthrough. The first Russians appeared before
the positions of 1st Battery/4OOth Art.Btl. and were only beaten of
by direct fire. Terrible losses were inflicted on the Russians but still
they did not give up. A determined counter-attack from the west
across the north-south road by the reinforced 6th Company soon
returned the village to German hands. The company lost one man,
Ogefr. Schulze-Tertilt, who was killed by a sniper while going for
ammunition on the motorcycle. The desperate Russian attacks
abated by the evening of 15 July and peace settled over the
battlefield. The enemy's attacking strength at this position had
apparently been broken. The numbers were impressive: over 17,288
Russian prisoners were brought in and 167 light machine guns, 2
heavy machine guns, 21 light artillery pieces, 7 anti-tank guns, 13
mortars and 227 trucks were captured.
On 16 July 1941 the 29th Inf.Div.(mot.) captured the northeast
quarter of Smolensk and occupied the motorway crossing north of
the city. The most important city in western Russia was in German
hands. For the first time the Soviets sensed the direct threat to their
capital, which now lay barely 400 kilometres ahead of the German
armoured spearhead. This rapid and for the Soviets surprising
advance, with which the neighbouring German forces on the left and
right had been unable to keep pace, resulted in a dangerous situation
for the German command: Smolensk formed the extreme tip of a
salient pointing toward the east, which began approximately at Novy
Bychov on the lower Dniepr in the south, ran through Smolensk and
then bent back towards the northwest again, roughly as far as Rudnja
(approx. 100 km north of Vitebsk). Smolensk was the scene of the
heaviest fighting, especially along the MinskMoscow highway, or
roughly along the upper Dniepr, since the Russians had been able
to hold onto a narrow corridor there to the west. This corridor was
stuffed full of Soviet troops, which still had freedom of movement
thanks to the highway and the railway line which ran there. All
German efforts to close the gap failed.
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202
Distributor:
It was the regiment's I Battalion which had gone ahead and was
securing the heights near Mstislawl. The remaining battalions
remained in their previous positions, where they continued to guard
the road. Not until the night of 19/20 July did the regiment transfer
into the area of Kasskowka. Its route to the new area was Diwnowo
Faschtschewkacrossroads 16 km east of SchkloffLjubistroad
fork 12 km south of GorkiDribin RjasmaMstislawl. Security
was posted on the road during the night while the remainder of the
unit rested. The following day saw the regiment move on through
Choslawitschi, Tscherjepowo and Kisseljewka. The regiment's assignment was to keep open the advance road of 10th Pz.Div., which
was fighting farther ahead, and at the same time hold the major
SmolenskRoslavl road. The assignment also included guarding the
airfield near Motschuly. With its front facing east and south, the
regiment occupied positions along the Stomjati, a small, deeplyeroded and swampy stream. II Battalion went into position in and
on both sides of Woroschilowo, with 7th Company on the left and
6th Company on the right. 5th Company initially remained in the
rear as reserve. It was known that the enemy was holding out in
roughly battalion strength in Sacharowka, approximately 6 km south
of this position. I Battalion was located about 20 km farther to the
right, right at the SmolenskRoslavl road and railway crossing,
which formed the battalion's defensive strongpoint. Further right
there were no German forces, a ticklish situation for the regiment's
right battalion. The situation near the village of Kruglowka was
reflected in a report by I Battalion:
"There is a level crossing on the major road from Smolensk to
Roslavl about 7 km southeast of the Waskowo station, which can
also be found on the largest scale maps. The road is paved, which
is not often seen in this country.
The level crossing, which means the crossing of the road and
railway line on level ground, is the middle point of our position. Here
we are screening the large-scale movement of troops through
Smolensk against enemy attack from the south.
We took over the position earlier today the 21st of July from
the Waffen-SS
The fields are fallow, the villages gloomy. The landscape is wide,
9i^ey and ugly, the sky appears larger than at home. In the terrain in
front of us flows a small brook. Over in the direction of the enemy
lay a series of interconnected woods.
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On our right there are none of our own troops for 50 kilometres.
On the left it is 20 kilometres to II Battalion. We are entirely on our
own. The unit is no longer fresh.
The morning was quiet, except for one of our reconnaissance
aircraft which was fired on by a surprisingly large number of Russian
anti-aircraft guns. Otherwise all that is seen of the other side is
individual infantrymen.
Heavy artillery fire of all calibres has been falling on our position
since midday. One dares not raise a hand. The prime target is the
railway embankment where it crosses the road. Naturally, it is an
easy target. The linesman's shack is still standing, but is continually
shrouded in dirty smoke. Generally, one cannot see 50 metres. The
crashes of the exploding shells merge into one. The shrieking and
crashing is continuous and everywhere. We count at least 100
impacts in one minute. These are concentrated in an area of
approximately 100 square metres.
The command post is hidden in a drainage pipe beneath the road.
One can squat there with his knees pulled up. In doing so one must
keep his head bent low and endure the torment of the large stones
lying on the bottom of the pipe. A dead dog is lying in front of the
opening. It stinks terribly. We would gladly bury him, but we dare
not move. The barrage keeps up. The pipe shakes. Stinking powder
smoke drifts in. A troubleshooter has to go outside. The General's
coming!, he shouts. General von Stockhausen is pushed into the
pipe by the force of a new blast and, in falling, drops a handful of
Iron Crosses. He remains completely calm, but this is no place to be
awarding crosses!
Most of the men are sitting in a slit trench. It is narrow and deep.
While under artillery fire there are only three possibilities: either one
is not hit at all, or one is temporarily buried alive, or there is a direct
hit. Then it's all over in any case. In artillery fire one must remain in
one place. Many have died while searching for a better place."
Marshall Timoshenko's first reserve units were approaching
Smolensk, part from the east and part from the south, in order to
relieve the city. The I.R. GD was now facing these divisions, not
suspecting what the next few days were to bring. In their sectors the
companies spent the 21st and 22nd of July in peace, allowing them
time to set up their defences, but the 23rd brought enemy artillery
fire which forced them underground.
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Chapter Five
The Defensive battle near Jelnja and Smolensk
The 23rd of July was the first of five days which were so confusing,
and at the same time so eventful, that they must be recounted as
one. There was no difference between day and night, the battle raged
on. No one counted the minutes any longer. Looking back, we think
of the village of Kruglowka for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Companies of
I Battalion, and Voroshilovo for the 5th, 6th and 7th Companies of
II Battalion and the 10th Company of III Battalion as well as the 18th
Pionier Company. It was here that the men of Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND stood and fought desperately and held
their positions against Timoshenko's attacking divisions. The attempt by the Soviets to break through failed. The attackers were bled
white against the defence put up by the men of GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. The following is a description of the situation as it developed
with I Battalion:
"From 01.00 to 03.00 the fire was weaker. Then it thundered
down with renewed vigour on the level crossing. Right at the
beginning they brought in my old Ofeldw. Herold; he had lost his
hearing and his wide eyes stared into space.
Obit. Hnert's slit trench was between his machine guns. Communications from there were poor. Troubleshooters and messengers
could not get out and he could barely move himself. Stuck there up
front he could scarcely look after ammunition and rations. The
Oberleutnant had been crouching at his scissors telescope since
dawn. Now and then between the shell bursts, one could see the
forest beyond. Then, for a moment, we had a clear view the field
before us.
They're coming!!
Great masses of men were climbing down into the bottom land.
Mounted officers circled round them. Everything ahead of us was
brown with Russians. Now and then a head raised up from one of
our slit trenches. I wanted to speak, but I had become quite hoarse.
Most of them were now in the bottom land. The Russian artillery
fire ceased. Our ears were ringing. The only fire from our side was
from two infantry guns. Their rounds landed precisely in the bottom
land but it was simply far too little. Then several mortars joined in.
The brown mass was before us. Our fire into the brook had not
weakened them. They're coming! More and more of them! The
air was suffocating. Obit. Hnert, commander of the machine gun
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The events of 23 July appeared to have been only the prelude for
the coming day. The Russian forces facing the two battalions of the
Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND were steadily reinforced. Enemy preparations could be heard throughout the night of
2 3 / 2 4 July. Loud shouts rang through the clear night, and the
rumble and rattle of vehicles gave an indication of what was to come.
Both battalions improved their positions, reorganized their defences and supplied their companies with ammunition and replacement
weapons. The greatest problem remained the shortage of ammunition for the heavy infantry weapons and artillery. The supply lines
were already so far from the supply bases, and the supply roads so
often interrupted by enemy incursions, that the ammunition simply
could not be delivered. Once again it would be the Grenadiers who
would bear the weight of the fighting with their light weapons. The
3rd Company under Lt. Fabich was sent forward to reinforce I
Battalion where it was to be employed on the left wing.
The following report from I Battalion's sector at the level crossing
near Kruglowka was made by Obit. Rssert's 2nd Company, which
was employed at the scene of the heaviest fighting:
"The situation on 24. 7. had become especially threatening, as the
Russians had now become accustomed to advancing in skirmishing
lines and taking advantage of their artillery support. The enemy
reached the stream which flowed into the valley in front of our
positions. In the brush-covered terrain on the far side he began to
construct rafts and watercraft for a crossing. Thanks to the outstanding support from our Stukas, which had meanwhile appeared on the
scene and with which we had very good communications through
visual signals, the crossing attempt was, in the main, frustrated. The
Stukas rained destruction on the Russians barely fifty metres ahead
of our positions. Often, rafts with 30 to 40 Russians were hit and
sunk. The Russians apparently had no anti-aircraft guns, so that there
was little they could do to disrupt the Stuka attacks. The only reply
from the other side was furious machine gun fire which met the
Stukas as they approached. Our own artillery could scarcely fire, as
it had no ammunition.
One of the regiment's assault guns, which was temporarily at our
disposal, had meanwhile found work with II Battalion, but it was
often bogged down for long periods in the marshy terrain, so that
we saw it only seldom.
A major danger for our defence arose when it turned out that most
of our heavy weapons had been rendered unusable by enemy artillery
fire, and the wireless equipment as well. Most of the machine guns
and submachine guns no longer fired, having been temporarily
rendered useless by sand. All that we had left were the rifles. As a
result of this, in the long run we could not prevent individual Russians
from slipping across the stream and settling into the wheat fields.
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Then dust clouds to the north: the promised tanks. But too late!
Only two hours earlier and everything would have gone well. From
18.30 they rolled forward and 6th Company assembled its men.
There weren't many left. Killed in addition to the Leutnant were Uffz.
Juds, Bergmann and Diebler, and with them seven brave Grenadiers.
From among the many wounded, Uffz. Wedel, Ogefr. Stolp and
Grenadier Zoller died at the main dressing station. An initial examination of 6th Company revealed that of 1st Platoon only Gefr. Bergner
and 6 men were left, from 2nd Platoon Lt. Doege with about 20
men and from the Company Headquarters personnel the company
commander and 6 men. There was still no news on 3rd Platoon.
The battalion was ordered to regroup for the night.
On the right, extending to the church hill at Voroshilovo, was 18th
(Pionier) Company, next to it the 7th Company, then the 5th; the
10th Company of III Battalion and 6th Company remained behind
the church hill on the north slope in reserve. Darkness descended
over the events of the day and the mantel of peace spread over the
earth."
The official designation for this desperate struggle was "the Defensive Battle near Jelnja and Smolensk." The Russian divisions arriving
to relieve the situation, mostly from the Far East of that huge country,
had joined in the battle. The German regiments had gone over to
the defensive and held onto the captured territory. The fighting was
bitter. There were still insufficient numbers of German infantry and
the artillery still lacked ammunition.
The next days saw no lessening of the enemy attacks in I Battalion's
sector. The difficulty of those days and hours was once again
reflected in the reports:
"Everywhere in the position we were under rifle fire from ahead
and from both sides. The fire coming from the flank grew steadily
heavier.
Suddenly, Obit. Hnert climbed from his hole. He was wearing his
peaked cap with the bright officer's cord and was smoking a
cigarette. He walked slowly right across the front to the observation
post of the infantry guns. He appeared to us like an apparition: this
big man was walking across the battlefield where no one else dared
even raise a hand. Now and then he looked to the side when
someone fired. Then he, too, ducked down. The infantry guns
desperately needed an order, fire directions or a target assignment,
but the walk by the Oberleutnant was just as important to holding
the position. Obit. Hnert was trusted by his men of his company,
but on this day he also earned their love. Later I asked him why he
had done it. All that he said was: I could no longer justify sending a
messenger.
On the right, the Grenadiers of the Second (2nd Company) had
been lying within a stone's throw of the enemy for days. There the
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fighting was dominated by rifle fire and hand grenades. The dead
and living Russians in the bushes at the edge of the stream were often
indistinguishable. Many Grenadiers suffered head wounds inflicted
by fire from the right. Anyone who fired to the front had to expect
to be shot at from the cornfield to the right. For days no one knew
if he would still be alive the next minute.
The commander of 2nd Company was the soul of the resistance
there. He was always calm. He listened to the sound of shots and
reports, considered a while and then issued his orders clearly. He
then repeated the orders himself in the midst of the heaviest fire.
The position's survival depended on him. His men loved him. He
needed only stand calmly in his hole, that Obit. Rssert of the
Second. That was enough.
The companies had become too small. The Second could no
longer fight off a determined assault by the enemy. It would be shot
to pieces from the cornfield. Also, despite the heavy fire, some of
the men had fallen asleep in their holes.
We were to be relieved in the evening! We had to hold on until
then. The Second could scarcely move. More and more Russians
were crawling forward through the cornfield and the bushes. The
concentric assault must begin any minute! Then it would be all over.
It began to get dark and the Russians hadn't come. The snow
fences were mostly used up. There were muzzle flashes from the
enemy positions at the forest's edge. The shells fell to the left near
Hnert's 4th (MG.) Company. Our name for these guns was simply
the 'Ratsch-Bum'.
A messenger arrived during the night: relief not possible, continue
to hold the position. The infantry of the relieving units were needed
elsewhere. Now what were we going to do? Several Grenadiers
overheard the message. Their reaction was: Man, that's totally
impossible!
Everyone was determined to hold out until night. The tension
mounted. It spread through the position like poison. Several men
wept, others immediately fell asleep. Most sat still in their holes. Our
eyes were red from the heat, smoke and lack of sleep. The faces of
the men were gaunt, but marked, as if the finest shapes were only
chiselled by the greatest danger.
Another day of the heaviest fighting went by until, finally, the
Russians achieved penetrations in every company's sector. Following
the assault the Russians shared holes with the dead Grenadiers.
Germans and Russians were often only 20 metres apart. Here a slit
trench with Grenadiers, next to it one with Russians and, as always,
Russians in the bushes ahead. For hours the battle raged with rifles,
hand grenades and pistols. In the long run our position was hopeless.
In the evening we began to take fire from directly behind. Not a single
board remained from the linesman's shack.
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the German positions in 8 to 10 waves, driven on by their commissars. Nevertheless, the positions held.
The style of fighting changed little on 4 August:
"At 06.30 in the morning artillery fire directly on our position. The
dug-outs shook. How long before we took a direct hit? It was a
murderous hail of steel. We were completely blanketed. Then there
was a droning overhead: Soviet aircraft! Nine Russian planes attacked our positions. Finally, at about midday, the fire abated, only to
resume as darkness fell. The calibre of the enemy guns was 21 cm.
The earth shook as the shells impacted; it was a nerve-straining wait.
If only this bombardment would end! We nervously smoked one
cigarette after another. No one would forget Uschakowa."
The Pioniers of 18th (Pionier) Company were repeatedly sent to
the attack against the Russian positions between Gridina and Ustinowa, finally with success. It was the company's 3rd Platoon which
broke into the enemy positions. The cost was high: over 40 dead
and wounded were counted approximately one fifth of the entire
company.
Every man in this sector was conscious of the necessity of these
sacrifices: a Russian breakthrough toward the west and south had to
be prevented and all resources committed to hold the territory which
had been won. It was to be from this piece of territory that the new
German offensive would one day be launched.
The regiment's days near Uschakowa came to an end. A period
of rest was planned. The 15th Infantry Division one of the infantry
divisions which was hurrying to catch up with the spearhead of the
advance relieved the Grenadiers of Infantry Regiment GROSSDEUTSCHLAND in their positions.
The regiment's period of rest in the DankowoWaskowo (station)
area was a brief one. All hopes of time to recover from the strain of
the previous days of combat and the inner desire for a longer time
away from the danger of the front vanished when orders arrived on
9 August placing the regiment on alert. I.R. GD was to go into action
to the west of its previous area of operations. I Battalion was to move
into the wooded terrain around and west of Klimjatino. The other
two battalions were to go into position farther to the left, therefore
to the west, with their front facing north. In order to take advantage
of more favourable defensive possibilities, the regiment's positions
were moved back to two villages. Ill Battalion moved into Ssuborowka, while I Battalion occupied Jerdezy. The regiment's positions
formed an arc open to the north whose left wing joined up with the
90th Inf.Rgt. at the Dniepr. The regimental command post was
located in Dubassischtsche, south of the JelnjaSmolensk railway
line. This security sector was quieter, with few enemy attacks and
repeated, but not so heavy, artillery barrages. The terrain in this area
was impenetrable and jungle-like, very unfavourable for the defence.
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The field of fire was often only a few metres. German patrols combed
the area, always expecting an ambush from behind the next bush.
The river lowlands was a tricky area. Patrols suffered casualties, but
knowledge of the enemy's intentions was vital. The following account
is typical:
"A clearing. Machine gun and rifle fire crackled from half- right,
not more than fifty metres away. We immediately threw ourselves to
the ground. I took cover behind a small embankment with the
Unteroffizier section leader. Bullets hissed just overhead. Right
beside me lay a Gefreiter who had no cover. I called to him to crawl
over to us, but he didn't move. We rolled him over onto his back. A
small trickle of blood ran from his lips. His red cheeks became pale
in a few minutes and then turned a yellowish shade. His eyes were
still, his face relaxed and well-proportioned. The Gefreiter had been
walking only a few centimetres behind me. The step to death is only
a small one."
The I.R. GD was withdrawn from these positions on the night of
18/19 August. Brought up in the regiment's empty vehicles, men
of the 463rd Inf.Rgt. occupied the positions which, all in all, had
been quieter than the first sector in the bend of the Jelnja.
Once again a rest was scheduled for all the units of the regiment
and this time it actually came about. There were, perhaps, some who
half expected that their hopes for a period of quiet would come to
nothing because of a critical situation at the front. This had happened
before and no one could be certain; only rarely did the tension of the
next operation leave the soldiers.
The regiment's soldiers took up quarters in the Waskowo
ChochlowkaRudnaja Polyana area and the period of rest began.
Weapons and equipment were cleaned and overhauled, and the
soldiers found time to indulge in leisure activities:
"Mornings we all jumped into the lake. There was much splashing
and shouting and impromptu racing. Then followed a monumental
breakfast; the field kitchen even treated us to real coffee. Someone
managed to organize some honey.
We lay in the meadow and dozed in the sunshine, relishing every
breath. This was the life of the warrior, full of contrasts and always
on the edge of existence. In eight days we would again be in a hole
in combat, and in fourteen days perhaps already dead. But no one
was crippled by such thoughts. Instead we lived life more consciously,
also more simply. We just lived. In contrast, in peacetime one merely
passed the days."
Oberst Walter Hoernlein, commander of the Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND since 10 August 1941, a tall, lean figure
who spoke a north German dialect, visited the companies in their
quarters in turn. Such commander-to-soldier and soldier-to- soldier
contact produced the teamwork that influenced a unit's success in
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the field. Often a look, a gesture or a movement was enough for the
other to tell: here is someone I can depend on, or, he will never
amount to anything.
25 August 1941 was a day of honour for the entire regiment: Obit.
Hnert, commander of I Battalion's machine gun company, was
decorated with the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. It was the first
high decoration for the regiment since the beginning of the war
against the Soviet Union:
"The battalion stood drawn up in a square formation at the lake.
The machine gun company was not there yet. Obit. Hnert was
avoiding a lot of standing around. As they marched in, he was not
pleased with his company's order. Annoyed, he turned them around
and marched them in again. The rest of the battalion waited.
Completely annoyed at his company, Hnert positioned himself on
its right wing.
The Oberst reported to the Major. The Oberst spoke a brief word
in recognition of our difficult defensive battles not forced, but quite
naturally. It was just the type of address we wanted to hear. We felt
at one with the Oberst.
Obit. Hnert was ordered to step forward. He had no idea what
was going on.
The Oberst hung the Knight's Cross on Obit. Hnert and shook
his hand. The old man with the Knight's Cross at his throat like
one of Old Fritz' colonels congratulated the young, tough officer.
The magic of the Order of the Pour le Mrite was in the air.
The two officers reviewed the troops. Actually, to say it was a
review is an overstatement. The Oberst had no love for this sort of
thing and simply walked off with Hnert at his side. After the machine
gun company had been dismissed, the men crowded around to
congratulate their commander. Everyone wanted to shake his hand
and see him and his decoration up close, but they didn't dare to raise
him on their shoulders. Hnert was extremely pleased. He said very
little: 'Actually, I have a feeling that I ought to hang this Knight's
cross on one of you!' And on this great day every man of the battalion
really felt as if he had been decorated himself."
The sunny days became fewer; rain and cold nights signalled a
change in the weather. In Russia winter began much earlier at these
latitudes than in the west, in Germany.
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Chapter Six
The Battle of Kiev
Departure orders came on the evening of 30 August. The regiment
faced a new assignment. The days of rest were over, duty called the
Grenadiers to the site of new action. This time it was the Ukraine,
that wide, rich and abundant land which was known as the granary
of Russia.
The march southward progressed quickly over paved roads. The
regiment passed through Roslavl, Lukawiza and Starodub, where it
crossed the border into the Ukraine. The landscapes which met the
Grenadiers were different than before. Not only were dense forests
now a rarity, but the land as such, and especially the inhabitants,
made a better impression; everything was clean and orderly. The
houses had front gardens, the people were better clothed, neater
and friendlier.
The situation farther south at this time was as follows: seven
Russian armies were occupying a westwards-facing salient which
extended west from Trubtschewsk on the Desna as far as the
confluence of the Sosch (Sosa) and Dniepr rivers, thence south along
the Dniepr through Cherkassy, near Kiev, joining up with the general
front line near Kremenchug. The Russians were committing everything they had to hold this projecting position, although they knew
that this presented the Germans with an opportunity to pinch off the
salient.
On 22 August 1941 orders were issued for the destruction of the
Soviet forces in the Kiev area. On 25 August the German Second
Army, together with Panzergruppe 2, launched an attack to the
south. The first objective of the Panzergruppe was Konotop, which
lay far in the enemy rear. Its capture was part of the plan to create
a pocket at Kiev.
I.R. GD was one of the units called upon to protect Panzergruppe
2's unprotected 200 kilometre-long eastern flank against expected
enemy attacks. The regiment crossed the Desna river, which had
been forced by the panzers days before, near NovgorodSeversk.
The bridge was about 600 metres long. Enemy bombers made
repeated attempts to destroy the span. As soon as the regiment
arrived, the battalions were employed to secure the bridgehead and
relieve the 12th Rifle Regiment, which had distinguished itself during
the crossing.
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Ill Battalion's sector was about eight kilometres wide. Half of the
position ran through dense forest. The companies were positioned
accordingly: 9th and 10th Companies were stationed in the forest,
while 11th Company held a sector which was more than four
kilometres wide, but with a better field of fire. Initially, I Battalion
remained at the bridge in reserve.
In general it was quiet with scarcely any enemy contact. Positions
were selected and set up with great care the bridgehead had to be
held at all costs and the flanks of the two attacking panzer divisions
protected. Patrols determined that III Battalion was apparently faced
only by Russian reserve divisions, old men of the Soviet 468th
Infantry Division. There were no unusual occurrences or casualties
in the period up to the evening of 4 September, when the regiment
was relieved. Elements of the 29th Reconnaissance Battalion arrived
to relieve III Battalion during the night.
Withdrawn from the NovgorodSeversk bridgehead, I.R. GD
marched south through Pirogovka, Schostka and Voronezh into the
area west of Gluchow. Its assignment was to secure the road and
supply routes to the east. As part of the assignment the regiment
was to patrol as far as Gluchow. The regiment occupied its security
sector unhindered by the enemy. The regimental command post was
located in VoronezhGluchow. II Battalion was positioned in and
near Schostenskiy with the 6th, 7th and 8th Companies in and near
Polejewka and Ussok facing northeast and 5th Company near
Makow. Ill Battalion was south of VoroneshGluchow, while I
Battalion remained in its old positions. The 3rd Panzer Division
secured the area farther south in and near DolgalewkaKrolewez.
Only rarely did the patrols lead to minor clashes with the enemy.
However, all of the bridges had apparently been prepared for
demolition by the Russians. Following hurried preparations, II and
III Battalions attacked Gluchow and reached the edge of the town
without resistance. The town was taken at about 18.00, with II
Battalion moving in from the northwest and elements of III Battalion
from the west and south. Resistance in the town itself was weak.
The regiment's train followed, and soon the main body of the unit
was in quarters. It was 7 September 1941. Gluchow was burning in
several places and, as darkness fell, the companies moved out in long
columns to take up their security positions at the northern, eastern
and southern limits of the town.
In the meantime, I Battalion was involved in several defensive
actions. Gefr. Zimmermann was killed. On 8 September the battalion
joined the rest of the regiment in Gluchow, where it took over a share
of the security duties.
8 September saw elements of the regiment brought to departure
readiness. An advance detachment was formed, consisting of:
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225
finally thrown back after bitter fighting and the leading companies
reached the edge of the village. The Russians pulled back in panic.
The west exit from the village was soon taken and secured.
The assault guns continued the advance and succeeded in destroying or capturing a large part of the enemy's supply train. Trucks,
ammunition and documents fell into our hands. Among the Russians
killed and captured were a number of female soldiers. Orders to
continue the attack arrived at about 15.00. New objective: Bankowa.
We advanced along the road. Motorized reconnaissance revealed the
area to be free of the enemy. Afterwards we climbed aboard following
vehicles and drove to Konotop, where our billets were."
The city of Konotop offered one feature of modern civilization in
the form of electric lights. The Germans were also favourably
impressed by the city's neat appearance, orderly streets, stone
houses and good quarters. The men soon felt at home and took
advantage of the opportunity for a brief rest.
On 18 September the I.R. GD was again transferred into the
Sswetschkino area for security and mopping up duties. The regiment
was soon moved again, however, this time to Schilowka. In the early
morning of 20 September it assembled for an attack in the direction
of Belopolje, east of Schilowka. The first objective was Djakowka,
where the enemy had dug in and was putting up stubborn resistance.
Well-aimed rifle and machine gun fire and heavy anti-tank and mortar
fire showed the Bolsheviks' will to resist. Following several futile
attempts, including efforts to the left of the railway line by II Battalion
and to the right by III Battalion, the enemy resistance was broken.
The Russians withdrew during the night.
On 22 September the regiment reached the Klimowka rail junction
outside Belopolje. The withdrawing Russians had blown up the
station and track system. There was no enemy contact. The regiment
paused and made preparations to continue the advance.
The enemy soon regrouped, however, and stood ready to launch
a counterattack. It was even rumoured that stronger enemy forces
were nearing the GluchowPutivl supply road. The regiment initially
planned to take up a defensive line along the Wiry river. This was
not done, however, as it would have stretched the unit's resources
too thin. Instead, the regiment manned a defensive line which ran
from Putivl through Djakowka along the railway line to Babakoff
Station. I Battalion was located in Putivl, while II Battalion's positions
were east of Schilowka along the railway line facing northeast. Ill
Battalion's 9th and 10th Companies were at Babakoff Station. The
defenders could not allow the Russians to cross the Wiry, but they
possessed insufficient forces to extend their positions right up to the
river. This inconsistency would later prove disadvantageous for the
defence. The companies moved into their oversized sectors, some
of which were poorly chosen for defence. However, the enemy was
227
initially quiet; in fact, there was little contact at all. German patrols
which felt their way up to the river encountered only individual groups
of Russians, who were likewise carrying out patrols. A motorized
patrol from 6th Company was ambushed by the Russians. Uffz.
Bergner, Gefr. Ehm and Gefr. Ring were killed and three others listed
as missing. German patrols determined that the area was weakly
occupied, and it was concluded that the main body of the Russian
force was still east and northeast of the Wiry.
The regiment remained in these positions in the face of increasing
enemy activity until 3 October. During this time the Russians
succeeded in crossing the Wiry at several locations and occupied
individual villages. Patrols revealed that Nowyja Wiry and Sstaryja
Wiry as well as Hf. Woroshba were held by the enemy. Heavy
weapons were also being moved into the area. In particular, Russian
anti-tank guns were making their presence felt, forcing the
Grenadiers to ground, while the enemy infantry worked its way ever
closer to the German security positions. Casualties mounted. Lt.
Gnter was wounded seriously. The assault guns had to be called on
for help more frequently, and German artillery fire on recognized
enemy positions increased.
The situation was uncomfortable, especially for III Battalion near
Babakoff. It began to rain, and wet boots made any activity more
difficult. The soldiers recalled the battles in the Jelnja bend. The
nights became quite cold, and by the end of September water froze
overnight.
The Bolsheviks launched an attack from the village of
Tscherewatoj, but they were driven back by fire from the regiment's
artillery and heavy infantry guns. The terrain, which contained many
ravines, often allowed the Russians to approach unnoticed, which
was very disadvantageous for the defenders. What was more, the
Russian artillery with guns up to 15 cm calibre was now more
active. Under its protection Russian infantry moved up to within 30
metres of the German positions.
Meanwhile, I Battalion received orders to move by vehicle from
Putivl through Schilowka towards Nikolajewka-Nikolajenka and reinforce the regiment's right wing. The order illustrates the types of
demands made of the motorized units: the regiment was asked to
leave a defensive position, travel over 100 kilometres and occupy
two villages in a new area of operations without precise knowledge
of the terrain involved or the enemy's capabilities. In the beginning,
demands such as these were made only of good and homogeneous
units whose commanders had the situation well in hand. Later, in
other actions, this change in tactics became commonplace, a fact
which made command noticeably more difficult and constantly
increased the demands on the units. The Grenadier was forced to
bear this burden, but the overstrain was reflected in reduced results.
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Attrition among unit leaders, especially company and platoon commanders, increased to such a level that, in the end, their places had
to be taken by lance- corporals and corporals. This was the first sign
of the beginning of the unprecedented sacrifices which would eventually end in chaos.
The executive officer of I Battalion/I.R. GD described in detail the
assignment given the battalion:
"The 100 kilometres were difficult, and we didn't arrive until
evening. We had to assemble for the attack straightaway. The two
villages lay one behind the other. They were called Nikolajewka and
Nikolajenka. Nikolajenka was to be taken first, then we were to leave
the village and defend Nikolajewka, which lay behind it. We didn't
think much of that. Why first take a village and then give it up? To
what end the losses? We didn't understand and tried to have the
orders changed.
Nikolajewka was taken on the evening of 26. 9. in the face of weak
opposition. Several enemy guns fired from the next village,
Nikolajenka. The Major again demonstrated his fine nose for
battle: he refused to carry out the attack without first reassembling
his troops. He therefore called off the attack. It was his view that the
following day's battle would not be so easy.
It was 04.30. Patrols had reported Nikolajenka free of enemy
troops, but we didn't trust the quiet. Surely the enemy had been
sleeping; also, it was rather foggy. The terrain over which we would
attack was easy to describe:
Our village, in which we assembled for the attack 1,200 metres
of absolutely flat stubble-field then Nikolajena and to the right a
railway embankment where the Russians had dug in. This terrain
would not have been chosen for a peacetime attack exercise.
The plan of attack was not a simple one. We had to focus not on
the village, but on the railway embankment which lay to the right;
otherwise we would be running our heads against the wall at the
village. The 'Third' would therefore have to set out first and occupy
the embankment. On the left, the 'First' would attack the village once
the way was clear. The 'Second' was stationed far to the right with
the heavy weapons as security, and did not take part in this attack.
We thus had less than the full battalion available. In this attack our
spirit and training would have to win. On this day it was the only
advantage we had.
The 'Third' deployed and left our village, while the 'First' lay
well-camouflaged in readiness to the left. After 15 minutes the
Russians noticed something was up. Their artillery fire began to fall
on Nikolajewka, which we had just left. Soon afterward the Leutnant
commanding the 'First' also set out somewhat early, but it was
better than staying put under artillery fire.
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Things were not going well on the flat stubble-field. Rifle and
machine gun fire poured in from the railway embankment. There
were at least four Russian machine guns. The 'Third' lay flat and dug
itself in. There was firing from Nikolajenka; that was a job for our
infantry guns. They shrouded the whole village in smoke and dust.
Part of the machine gun company joined the 'Third' up front. There
was 400 metres left to cross. We realized that we could not silence
the Russians at the railway embankment. That was a job for the
machine gun company.
Things were going even worse for the 'First' farther to the left.
They came under steady mortar fire, moved out of range and then
came under Russian machine gun fire from the village. They advanced straight at the enemy, and many were brave against their will.
On the stubble-field there was nowhere to hide or take cover from
the bullets.
If Lt. Miede, the 1st Company's young Leutnant, had not acted,
his company would have been shot to pieces in half an hour. His
order was: 'Fire!' The company was magnificent. Although there
was no cover, every single man fired his rifle, machine gun or
submachine gun at every Russian that appeared. The Leutnant
watched through his field glasses and listened to the music of battle.
After twenty minutes the Russian fire had lessened noticeably. The
'First' had gained the upper hand. Miede sprang forward to the
company's foremost platoon and threw himself down in the front
line. 'Up move move!! Hurrah!!' The Leutnant led the charge.
The company stormed towards the enemy with all guns blazing.
At the same time the 'Third' took the railway embankment. There
it was not a charge, but a laborious effort which took the enemy
position. The machine gun company went into position up front,
where it could effectively cover the area to the left behind the village.
Its four machine guns raked groups of Russians fleeing past following
the assault by the 'First'.
Following their initial confusion, the Russians turned around to
escape the terrible machine gun fire. The 'First' ran headlong into
the fleeing Russians, resulting in a very confused situation. One
senior Obergefreiter suddenly came face to face with two Russians
in some bushes. Without a moment's hesitation he stuck his flare
pistol in the face of one of the Russians, as that was the only weapon
at hand. The company took about 70 prisoners, much to the
satisfaction of the Leutnant.
The battle for Nikolajenka was significant. What had turned the
tide was the heavy fire laid down by the individual Grenadiers. On a
completely level field, the companies had silenced the enemy with
accurate fire from 400 metres. Several factors made this success
possible: the Leutnant led his men forward under fire, and the
Grenadiers found the courage to raise their heads and fire accurately
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while themselves under fire, and then to get up and storm the enemy
position.
Dead Russians lay everywhere, at the railway embankment and in
their trenches. Many had been shot in the head or chest, torn apart
by hand grenades or killed with rifle butts or spades. We seldom used
the bayonet in storming an enemy position. Most fired their weapons
until at close quarters and then used a sharpened spade or dagger.
Unfortunately, the spade was not always readily at hand, as we kept
them stuck in our belts with the blade in front of our stomachs.
The battalion's losses in this assault were 6 dead and 20 wounded.
Our combat assignment had been carried out."
By the beginning of October, quiet had gradually settled over the
sector held by regiment. There was little direct contact with the
enemy other than artillery and mortar fire. Reserves relieved the
forward companies in rotation, providing the men with much-needed
rest.
The routine of these days was well-described in an order written
on a simple registration form by Major Krger of III Battalion:
Issuer:
Sent from:
Date:
III / I.R. GD
2. 10. 41.
To
9th Company, hvy. Company, lgt. and hvy. Inf. Gun. Platoons,
400th Art. Btl.
1. No offensive operations by enemy in battalion's sector on 2. 10.
41. Instead, the enemy is blanketing the battalion's positions
especially strongpoint 97.63 with heavy artillery fire.
2. On 2. 10. at 18.15, 11th Company will be relieved by 10th
Company and move back into the area 500 metres west of Point
97.63 (haystack) as battalion reserve. Preparations are to be made
to explore and exploit opportunities for action toward the heights
south of Babakoff and the reinforcement of Strongpoint 97.63.
3. Operational assignment and signals communications light and
heavy infantry guns as before.
4. One forward observer to remain with each company employed in
the front line. Barrage fire areas as before.
5. Anti-tank defence as in order 1. 10. 41. Tank warning = flare
signal: red-white.
signed Krger
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Chapter Seven
Forest Battle near Karachev
Relief for the regiment finally arrived on 3 October. Elements of
the 153rd Rifle regiment moved forward during the day and early
evening to take over the regiment's positions.
Twenty-four hours earlier, three panzer and infantry armies of
Army Group Centre had launched the attack on Moscow:
"On the southern wing the Second Panzer Army (formerly Panzergruppe 2) set out toward the northeast from the area around Putivl
on 30 September. It had the longest path to cover and, taking
advantage of powerful air support, was to reach the Orel area as
quickly as possible. Screening its open southeast flank, Second
Panzer Army achieved its objective by 3 October, while its left wing
had already veered towards Brjansk and now stood in the rear of the
enemy forces facing the German Second Army.
On 2 October 1941 the other armies of Army Group Centre,
supported by the Second and Fourth Air Fleets, abruptly went to the
attack, taking the Soviets by surprise.
The Second and Fourth Armies and the Fourth Panzer Army
(formerly Panzergruppe 4) smashed a wide, deep breach in the
enemy front which led to the formation of two large pockets, in the
south around Brjansk and in the north around Wjasma."
These movements led to the double battle of Vyazma and Bijansk,
in which the I.R. GD was not initially directly involved. Rather, it was
initially although only temporarily removed from the Second
Panzer Army and transferred north into the Roslavl area. The journey
was made over terrible roads (there were numerous cases of vehicles
suffering broken springs) through Sswetschkino, Konotop, Baturin,
Tschernikow, Gomel and Propoisk.
9 October 1941, in itself a quiet day like many others in the long
war, would not have been worthy of note had several events not
coincided: the regiment was ordered to departure readiness, the first
snowfall of the war in the east took place, and a religious service was
held in the field by I Battalion.
On 11 October the regiment was on the march from Roslavl
through Schukowka and Brjansk to Karachev. From there it veered
to the north into the Karachev Forest. The regiment's assignment
was to take up positions in the forest north of the city and prevent
Russian units from breaking out of the pocket to the east. In blowing
snow the regiment disappeared into the forest along the muddy
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roads. Often the men sank into the loose, muddy subsoil; boots
became stuck and had to be left behind. The troops encamped for
the night in and around Sholtowodje, north of Karachev. Attack
orders arrived during the night, which specified the capture of the
village and sawmill at Annino. Throughout the night the companies
moved laboriously towards the assembly area so as to be in position
for the attack at dawn.
By 01.00, I Battalion under Major Gehrke was already plodding
along the forest lane toward the north. Its objective was the Resseta
river. Its assignment was to win the river and to secure to the north
and west. The 2nd Company under Obit. Darjes and the heavy
company remained behind to secure several crossings and clearings
along the road. The forest lane was the regiment's route of advance
and had to be held to ensure supply of the advancing I Battalion. I
Battalion was followed by II Battalion and, farther to the rear, III
Battalion. The regimental command post was initially located in
Sholtowodje.
The forest north of Karachev was an impenetrable, jungle-like
thing. Only a few bumpy, rutted roads led through it, and most of
these were torn up and reinforced with field-stone. Slightly raised,
they ran like cords through the wooded terrain. The few side roads
that branched off soon turned into forest lanes which looked to all
appearances to be firm. However, when the heavy vehicles drove
over them they quickly turned out to be bottomless mud. Usually
they ran deep into the midst of the forest. There were only a few
clearings, and these were bordered by high grass which restricted
the view. Although it appeared normal, the subsoil was swampy.
The longer a man stood on the ever-wet grass, the farther he sank.
Any move off the path could lead the attackers into an ambush.
Both parties here were on the offensive; both wanted to get
through the forested area. The Bolsheviks, encircled west and
northwest of Karachev, were looking for a way out to the east with
their vehicles, heavy weapons and par>je wagons. They knew their
way around in the dense forest and felt at home in the treacherous
bushy terrain. But they were also driven by the fear of destruction
and were forced to try anything to get out of this swamp.
The German soldiers especially the I.R. GD had orders to
prevent this. They were to employ all means to stop the enemy
wherever they met him. They, too, must move through the forest
terrain, must advance and fight. Since a precondition for a successful
defence is favourable defensive positions, these first had to be won.
Therefore, the companies struggled northward, creating a barrier in
front of the Russian groups and columns streaming from the west,
and fighting to capture the best positions from which to prevent a
Russian breakout. The effectiveness of their weapons would have to
be as good as possible if success was to be on their side.
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236
he had to lie down, the runner helped him back up again. But he
kept going!
Concealed riflemen fired on us. We leapt several times and finally
reached cover again behind a tree stump. A man came and said that
Leutnant Ehrmann of the 'Seventh' had been killed. He had only
taken over the company four weeks before. Before that he had been
with the 'Fourteenth'. I thought of him often when I thought back
to the company. I later learned what had happened. The 'Seventh'
was farthest forward. Before the attack the Leutnant stood calmly
among his men, his helmet pushed back on his head. He was
probably aware of what was coming. He went forward, thirty paces
ahead of his company, the young idealist. Very calm and very sure.
He was killed by a bullet through the heart. I felt unqualified
admiration for my young comrade as a man. I couldn't grasp it all
yet, as was always the case when a friend was killed. (Lt. Ehrmann
had just taken over 7th Company from Obit. Blomberg.)
Men speak of waves of rifle fire; here it was true. From the enemy
side it roared and crackled up and down the forest. Obit. Hnert's
aide, a young, enthusiastic lad, came up to us, a terrified look in his
eyes: 'The Leutnant has been badly wounded shot in the stomach!'
Shortly afterward he came again: 'Obit. Hnert has been killed
he's dead!' He wept. No one spoke a word. We didn't look at each
other. Everyone had been struck down by the news. I am not sure
what happened in the next hour. The flank was once again
threatened. The sound of firing no longer frightened us. We referred
to this phenomenon as becoming numb.
Leutnant Forstbauer took over the company. The soldiers said not
a word. In his Wrttemberg accent he said quite calmly: whoever
gets out of this has a great obligation! A deep and heavy sadness
hung over the battlefield. As such I still feel it today. Remain pure
and become mature! Karl Hnert had practised and attained this.
On the other side the 'Second' and the 'Heavy' were forced to
defend themselves. The Russians, pressed by our attack, were trying
to escape there. Oberleutnant Darjes and his platoon leader, Lt.
Lemp, were killed. The leader of the Pionier Platoon, Lt. Baumann,
the picture of warlike, manly strength, also fell. It was difficult to
comprehend that they were gone. Surely at any minute they must
come up and say something to us!
The battle came to an end. We secured the area. Let come what
may. During the night (14/15 October) Leutnant Forstbauer of the
'Fourth' was seriously wounded by one of our sentries. The leader
of company headquarters personnel was killed in the same incident.
Around us stood hundreds of Russian trucks, guns and horses. A
column of 3,000 Bolsheviks moved past, a look of apathy on their
faces. At the head of the column were twenty women. The battlefield
237
Chapter Eight
The Advance on Moscow
The 17th and 18th of October brought relief for the regiment and
a transfer into the area east of Karatschew, on the road to Orel. The
regiment was allowed several days rest in the city of Orel, the high
point of which was an appearance by Generaloberst Guderian.
Guderian presented the German Cross in Gold to the commander
of II Battalion, Major Greim and to the commander of 6th Company,
238
a smooth flow of traffic. The Grenadiers cursed the roads. They were
forced to drive by night, unable to see a thing. They also had to
contend with vehicle breakdowns. These had to be avoided at all
costs, because they meant a loss in fighting strength. If only some
elements of the unit arrived they would be thrown into the battle on
their own, and if they possessed insufficient strength to force a
decision, failure would be the result.
Together with elements of the 3rd Panzer Division, which was
positioned to the right of the MzenskTula road, the battalions of
the I.R. GD launched an attack from the edge of the city of Mzensk
between the railroad and the highway against the well- fortified
Russian positions on the northeast heights. Nests of resistance had
to be stormed, and whole trench systems were softened up with hand
grenades and taken. The Russian defenders, who fought bitterly,
were cut down one by one. Ill Battalion, which was farthest to the
left, especially distinguished itself in the attack. When the 10th and
11th Companies, which were advancing on a wide front, were forced
to take cover by enemy fire, the 9th Company under Obit. Senger
swung out to the left to the railway embankment and attacked the
enemy's left flank. In this fashion the company was able to roll up
the Russian position from the left. Naked fear gripped the Bolsheviks
when, from the left and behind, they suddenly heard the loud
"Hurrah!" from the throats of the attacking German soldiers. At the
same time the soldiers of the pinned-down companies got up and
launched a frontal attack supported by assault guns which had
meanwhile arrived on the scene. There was no stopping the attack
now. The Russians fled their positions. The Grenadiers climbed
aboard the assault guns and charged after the fleeing Russians. The
most faithful friends of the Grenadiers in these battles were the
Stukas, whose bombs softened up the enemy positions. But uncomfortable situations could still arise, as a Grenadier of 6th Company/II
Battalion described:
"The Russians had fled, their positions were empty. The requested
Stukas approached and prepared to attack the Russian positions as
ordered. But now we were sitting in those positions! Using every
means available we tried to ward off the approaching disaster. Light
and smoke signals were fired; we jumped from the trenches, waving
flags and cloths nothing doing! The Stuka pilots were suspicious,
they continued their approach one by one.
We sat there, expecting the howling sirens and the whistling sound
of falling bombs any minute. The Stukas continued to circle above
us like a wild swarm of hornets. Had they recognized us after all?
No!! We held our breath; they were beginning their dives! In
desperation we waved like crazy, they must recognize us. And then
the miracle happened. At the last second the squadron leader pulled
his machine up and the others followed his example. They veered
240
off. Whew! That was close. Making an elegant turn, the Stukas
swooped down again, rocking their wings as they roared overhead.
They waved to us.
Thank God. We had been lucky.
And we carried on forward after the Russians!
We moved farther forward, climbed aboard the tanks and moved
off. The Stukas roared ahead of us. We could hear their howling
sirens and the explosions of their heavy bombs. Onward. Thick
mushroom clouds of smoke hung in the air, showing us the way."
The tanks carried the Grenadiers in the direction of Tschern, the
day's next objective. A description of the events that followed was
provided in an account by Lt. Kolewe, a platoon leader in 9th
Company/Ill Battalion:
"We had been assigned to establish contact with the elements of
3rd Panzer Division pushing through from the west, and we set off
at a brisk pace. We had climbed aboard the command tank. Effective
attacks by our Stukas cleared the way. For once this was an easy
assignment.
After 5 km we came to a breaching point, which was heavily mined.
9th Company was ordered to immediately occupy the heights in
front. The 2nd Platoon advanced to the left of the road and reached
the edge of the village without resistance. While clearing the houses
there was a brief exchange of fire, after which about 15 Russians
gave themselves up. The advance continued.
White flares shot up about 3 km away. There was great joy all
round when we reached our objective. A short halt. Generaloberst
Guderian came and greeted the men.
The advance continued to Tschern. Elements of a German panzer
division were still involved in fighting in the town. With our support
the town was soon free of the enemy so it appeared.
A new assignment for 9th Company: attack and take a village
about 3 km beyond Tschern. Once again the Stukas went to work.
Close to the village we got down from the vehicles. Bomb after bomb
crashed a short distance ahead. The Stukas strafed every building
with their machine guns. A column stood at the edge of the village.
We were taking fire from there. 2nd Platoon was to clear the village,
the tanks moved in. Every hole was full of Bolsheviks. We flushed
them out with hand grenades and pistols. Our booty included 20
trucks, 6 automobiles and 3 motorcycles. My platoon took 60
Bolsheviks prisoner.
It was soon dark. Orders came to go back to the road. The battalion
had meanwhile arrived. During the night we were to push through
to the railroad junction, about 20 km ahead. In the darkness we
heard the sinister, rumbling noise of tanks on the move. The advance
went on. In front of Popowka lights flared up and died away. It might
have been Russian tanks, but we couldn't make out anything in the
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withdrawing towards the east and north. The little resistance that
was met was quickly broken.
The regiment and battalion headquarters made preparations for
the attack on Tula. The appropriate orders were issued, laying down
the details of the operation. The following is the order issued by I
Battalion to its companies:
I/Inf.Rgt. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Abt. Ia
Rgt. H.Q.
Brig. H.Q.
2 light batteries
35th Pz.Rgt.
The remaining machine gun platoon will look for a place behind
the Battalion Headquarters, if possible mounted with the last
battalion of 6th Pz.Rgt.
The heavy company under the command of Feldw. Scholich must
remain close behind. The empty vehicles (Btl. Kbel) are placed
under Feldw. Scholich's command and under all circumstances are
to be brought forward with him. The heavy company must strive
to join up behind the last battalion of the 6th Pz.Rgt. Should
difficulties arise, then in or behind the 35th Pz.Rgt., then move
243
244
245
246
Chapter Nine
The Battles for Tula
The 30th of October, the day selected for the occupation of the
city of Tula, began well for the attackers as reflected in the account
by the same participant from I Battalion:
"We were to attack again at 05.30. The 2nd Company was to the
right of the road, the 3rd to the left and behind. The enemy made
no move. Once again our attack was delayed. Panzers, artillery
observers, heavy weapons all had to be assembled first. The
commander of the 5th Panzer Brigade, Oberst Eberbach, ran from
house to house in the front lines, conducting a personal reconnaissance.
The regiment's commander, Oberst Hoernlein, dismissed us confidently: I wish you the prettiest maidens of Tula! That was an irony
in this land.
The workers settlement consisted of house after house built along
the main street. The houses and several wooden apartment buildings
were the only cover. In rows the 2nd Company, led by Leutnant von
Oppen, scrambled through the gardens. With it was a platoon from
4th (MG.) Company as well as mortars. The Panzers growled along
the street on the left. Forward artillery observers went along with the
Grenadiers. Behind us in long lines followed III Battalion under Major
Krger. The great war machine was at work.
The first enemy machine gun began to fire. It was an uncomfortable
sound, hurried and irregular. Rifle fire also began to come from the
nearest houses. The battle had begun. The picture changed in no
time: groups of soldiers collected behind every house. The stone
houses were the most sought after. Then two or three men would
dash forward to cover behind the next house. Every time the machine
gun would open fire seconds later.
The run from one house to another required a decision and an act.
It was no easier after a dozen such dashes. The veteran troops
listened to the noise of battle before deciding to go. The young,
inexperienced soldiers had not yet learned this skill. They followed
the old hands. These older fellows led the way in the fight firing,
running and looking. The younger ones ran behind them carrying
hand grenades and ammunition. All were enthusiastic: the young
simply over combat, the old over a good shot, a daring dash, a brave
comrade.
247
The style of combat was unusual. Up front there were only a few
men. The company was very deep. The few up front were the
boldest: the Leutnant, a Feldwebel and several others who had
worked their way forward. They worked in a quick and businesslike
fashion. This phenomenon was a source of wonder during every
attack: the forward impetus of the volunteers. Every one of these
splendid fellows acted as if the capture of Tula hinged on him alone.
Wounded came back. They walked calmly, despite the firing. They
were no longer bothered by it. They joked among themselves: Hey
Emil! Say hello to home for me. Don't talk foolishness. I'll be back
tomorrow! They kept their spirits up. In general, the wounded didn't
lower our fighting spirit, rather they raised it.
Helmet back, long hair, unshaven, cigarette hanging from his
mouth, one arm in a sling, boots and pants covered with mud, a
hand grenade still in his jacket pocket this was the fighter of Tula.
Ill Battalion tried to move out to the right. The attack had to be
broadened. The attempt failed and the battalion suffered casualties.
The 'Third' had to fight its way through a brickyard to the left of the
road. It then found itself facing apartment blocks at the edge of the
city 500 metres away.
Progress was slow. Suddenly, there was an anti-tank ditch ahead
and then an area of open ground. The rows of houses curved away
to the left. A large, red apartment building stood several hundred
metres in front of us. The decision to make this dash was more
difficult. Several made it. Others made it only as far as the anti-tank
ditch. Wounded gathered in the ditch itself. The red apartment
building was visible from everywhere. The main enemy fire must be
coming from there.
Our Panzers were unable to help. The forward artillery observer,
a plucky Wachtmeister, was up ahead, but he had no communication
with the guns.
There was no actual battle noise, but rather a large number of rifle
shots. One needed only raise a hand and the firing started. And
always from the red apartment building.
Unteroffizier Wichmann of the 4th (MG.) Company attempted to
work his way farther forward. He moved in stages from house to
house. This blond dare-devil, who had earned the Iron Cross, First
Class in France, was known by the whole battalion. His gun crew
panted along behind him. From far ahead he called out targets. He
was an irrepressible fellow with a secret love for battle. The crew
assembled the machine gun. With all his strength, Wichmann ran
towards the anti-tank ditch. Out in the open he was knocked down
by enemy fire. His gun went into position and opened fire. The
'Second' moved up a few houses farther.
By the afternoon the attack had bogged down. The 2nd Company
was too weak. It was unable to take the red apartment building.
248
Russian anti-tank guns fired through the roofs, the anti-aircraft guns
fired senselessly into the air and the rifle fire kept up. The company
was unable to obtain a clear picture of the overall situation over the
radio.
As darkness fell we organized a thin line of security based on
houses, sheds, rubbish heaps and barbed wire. The red apartment
building was about 150 metres away. The Leutnant went from man
to man, organizing and seeing to their needs. He was fresh and
apparently unaffected by the battle. This instilled confidence in the
Grenadiers. They read the state of things from the face of their
leader."
The report that went back to the rear was momentous '. . . the
attack has bogged down. . .' This meant that the objective the
commanders wanted so badly could not be taken. It remained in sight
unattainable, yet so near. It also meant that all of the efforts to
take Tula had been in vain. Success had eluded the attackers.
The changeover to the defensive placed a great strain not only on
the troops, but also on their commanders and headquarters. The
shift from an offensive to a defensive mentality, from the optimistic
atmosphere of the attack to the desperate need to hold on to what
had been gained and persevere against an ever-growing weight of
enemy fire meant a moment of weakness for everyone. The hours
of the changeover were the hours of the commanders who, in order
to master the situation, had to be pillars of strength in the front lines.
It was they who had to do everything necessary for their men in order
to change their earlier spirit of attack into a determination to hold
on. While the attacking spearheads still lay forward, facing the enemy
in lonely isolation, the heavy weapons moved up and dug in close
to the future defensive position so as to be ready to meet the enemy
counterattacks expected in the early hours. Supporting fire from the
heavy machine guns, the infantry guns and artillery and its effects on
the attacking enemy were to ease the transition to this new phase
of the battle for the Grenadiers.
Outside Tula the transition from the offensive to the defensive, a
process which was repeated so often in this war, was completed on
the night of 30/31 October 1941. Soon after midnight the Russians
demonstrated to 2nd Company/I Battalion under Lt. von Oppen,
which was holding onto the first houses at the edge of the city, that
they were determined to defend Tula. At 03.00 the company came
under fire from a weapon it had not encountered before. This began
the first day of the defence in the Tula battle zone and many more
were to follow until 30 November. This day also showed what was
in store for I.R. GD in the days to follow:
"A barrage from a Russian multiple rocket launcher. We called it
'Firing Elias.' On other fronts it was also known as the 'Stalin Organ.'
Thirty to forty rockets struck a small area simultaneously. It
249
thundered and howled for half a minute and the houses shook.
Window panes fell into the rooms. The 'Firing Elias' was not for
weak nerves.
The weather changed abruptly. The ground became wet and
slippery. It was raining lightly.
In the morning dawn there was machine gun and rifle fire from all
sides. A new entrance was knocked through the rear wall of our
house and the old one blocked up. Several messengers ran toward
the old entrance, drawing machine gun fire on the house. We stood
battle-ready behind the thickest wall and smoked.
Enemy soldiers moved against 2nd Company in the semi-darkness.
We couldn't see them until they were quite near. Tracer fire came
from the red apartment building. The Grenadiers lay in the mud and
fired on every suspicious shape. Often their tired eyes saw ghosts.
The mental strain on the individual soldiers was great. The fighting
there was reduced to a basic, instinctive level: the man whose
vigilance was poor and fired too late, or who failed to hear the enemy
as he sneaked toward him, was overcome. The mud, the cold, the
heaps of rubble, the barbed wire entanglements, the red apartment
building these things weighed heavy on the minds of the defenders.
This battle was no heroic charge across a field of flowers.
It became lighter. The sound of engines was heard from behind
the red apartment building. Soon afterward the first shells from the
Russian tanks crashed into our houses, which collapsed or had their
roofs torn off. Wounded called for help and were moved to the rear.
Rifle fire crackled everywhere. The enemy leapt from house to house,
apparently without any plan. The number of men wounded by rifle
fire grew. Crawling and running, the Leutnant moved back and forth
among the Grenadiers. He and his Feldwebel were the heart of the
position and the soul of the defence.
In the cold and mud, and after many serious situations, the day
came to an end. The companies had been weakened, but in front of
every rifleman lay a heap of brown forms. The position had held.
There were no longer sufficient numbers to allow relief. Everyone
had to spend the night out of doors."
The positions of I Battalion if the few holes manned by the
weakened companies could be referred to as such lay with 2nd
Company on the right and 3rd Company on the left of the Jassnaja
PolyanaTula road. To the right, or east of 2nd Company, on the
other side of a significant gap, was III Battalion, to which 1st
Company under Obit. Derben had been attached. As the right hand
battalion of the I.R. GD, II Battalion had dug in on the heights on
both sides of the village of Gostewka after the Soviet positions on
the heights had been rolled up by 6th Company on 1 November.
The brick yard played a major role in the battalion's defensive system.
The heavy weapons, as well as the batteries of the 400th Artillery
250
Battalion, were located in the wide area behind these positions near
Kossaja Gora, near Ssudakowa and at the northern edges of the
forest near Kostowka. The regimental command post, formerly
hidden in this forest, was transferred south into the village of Trossna
after the situation firmed up.
In the beginning the Soviets launched repeated attacks with and
without tanks against the weakened companies in their unfinished
defensive positions. Things went too far for the defenders when, on
1 November, four to five Russian tanks attempted to break through
at the junction between III and I Battalions and even opened fire on
2nd Company from behind. Lt. von Oppen and a Feldwebel worked
their way up to the tanks from behind. While the Feldwebel provided
covering fire with his submachine gun, the Leutnant climbed up onto
one of the tanks, pulled the pins on several hand grenades and stuck
them into the tank's turret. Two members of the crew who tried to
escape were shot down by the Feldwebel. The tank was disabled.
Another was knocked out by German anti-tank gun fire and the rest
withdrew. This type of incident occurred daily along the defensive
line. Each man had to look out for himself to defend against the
enemy's superiority in numbers. The numbers bear witness to the
depleted condition of the companies. The following strength report
was sent back by I Battalion on 3 November: 8 officers, 56 NCOs,
303 men.
This sobering report indicated that individual combat companies
often had no more than 50 men on strength. A novel experience
and one that was almost amusing for the men up front was the first
use of loudspeakers by the Russians. Suddenly, the Grenadiers of
Tula heard: "Come over brothers, and bring your mess kits." Or:
"The Russian winter will destroy you!" Between messages the
Russians played German marching music. This went on for a while,
until the troops in the front line discovered the approximate location
of the loudspeaker. There was a burst of fire and then quiet. A little
later it reappeared in another location and resumed its broadcasts.
Although the Russian propaganda messages made no special impression on the Grenadiers, the appearance of the loudspeakers
introduced a certain amusing variation to the daily routine.
Forward in the positions a monotonous daily routine set in: fire
from rifles or machine guns interspersed by salvoes from Stalin
Organs or mortar barrages. One Russian weapon which was very
noticeable was the much-feared 7.62 cm anti-tank or tank cannon,
the so-called "Ratsch-Bum". Its hard crack was a very unpopular
sound. In several places the enemy was within 60-80 metres of the
German positions. These were very dangerous areas; the men could
move little during daylight but had to remain constantly vigilant.
The Soviet soldier was certainly tenacious, but less out of conviction than apathy. Death was not the worst for him, as his life was
251
raise the alarm. The company stumbled out, some men without belts
or coats, deployed, threw itself down in the snow and opened fire.
The 3rd Company was being issued rations when it was called away
to go to the assistance of 4th (MG.) Company. The Heavy Company
filled several gaps. After one night our rest quarters had become a
security position.
The bulk of I Battalion spent the night outside in the open. It
became colder. In the distance we could hear artillery shells exploding
from the direction of 1st Company."
The next day saw the entire battalion launch an attack against a
line of hills in order to improve its defensive positions. It could not
continue to hold out in the village in the valley below; it would have
to establish positions on the heights where it would have a wider
view. The leader of the Pionier platoon, Feldw. Krause, fell during
the attack just as he and his 14 men were about to storm 4 enemy
machine guns. The guns were taken, but the Feldwebel died. At the
same time as the hill was being taken, all the terrain for two
kilometres around was won back in order to shorten the German
position and strengthen their defences. This economizing of forces
allowed II Battalion which had been in the front lines without a
break to be transferred to the rear (to Worobjowka) for a rest. In
addition, Personnel Replacement Transfer Battalion 111/16 arrived
with 100 replacements. Following a short briefing and hasty preparations, they were assigned to the companies.
It was 9 November 1941. As has been said, the companies were
having it better resting in the rear. The following description was
provided by Grenadier Rehfeldt, who had been a member of Replacement Battalion 111/16 and was assigned to II Battalion's 8th
(MG.) Company:
"We travelled in 8th Company's trucks over snow-covered roads
to our sections and platoons. We reported to our company commander, Obit. Schneider, and our platoon leader, Ofw. Puis, who
greeted us and filled us in on the situation. He made an excellent
impression on me. He was quite the picture of calm itself.
I was assigned to mortar number one of the 1st Section/4th
Platoon. The other members of the section included:
Section leader
1st Mortar/1st Section:
Detachment leader
Mortar commander
Gunner I
Gunner II
Ammunition bearer
Uffz. Dittmann
Ogefr. Bunge
Ogefr. Wohner
MIA 16. 12. 41
Ogefr. Johne
Fatally wounded 16. 12. 41
Gefr. Leis
Gren. Keilhauer
KIA 16. 12.41
Gren. Schlobauer
Gren. Rehfeldt
253
Gefr. Monk
Runner
2nd Mortar/2nd Section:
Ogefr. Mochen
Detachment leader
Ogefr. Weidner
Mortar commander
Gefr. Banth
Gunner I
Gefr. Rieger
Gunner II
Gren. Postune
Ammunition bearer
Gren. Fritsch
Gren. Ladebeck
Gren. Fischer
MIA
KIA
MIA
MIA
KIA 1943
19. 12. 41
12. 09. 41
19. 12. 41
19. 12. 41
254
A sketch from a situation report showing the regiment's positions outside Tula.
two mortars into position. He laid down fire precisely in front of 2nd
Company. Kalinowski was the master of his weapon. Anti-aircraft
guns fired into the roofs. Heavy machine guns fired just over the
heads of the attackers, who could be seen only as shadows. Every
house that was taken was burning. Our medical officer, Dr. Alberts,
was up front with us. He assembled the wounded in several houses
that were still standing. They all had confidence in their doctor. His
task was more of an emotional one. Those who had been shot up
and were lying on the floor needed words of encouragement, not
empty phrases.
The commander of 2nd Company came back. He was being
supported by his batman. A stomach wound. He still walked upright.
He was an iron man, Obit. Grundmann.
We could get no farther than the centre of the village. The Russian
fire was too intense. Also, the enemy was sitting in the dark, while
we were in the light of the fires. What's more, there was also fire
coming from the heights on the left and right.
A runner approached. He was hit on the brightly-lit street. Next to
me the mortar N C O said to two boys: 'Fetch him in.' They looked
at each other. Then Uffz. Kalinowski leapt up himself. He picked up
the wounded man and brought him behind our house.
Our 1st Company under Obit. Derben had joined up. Derben
assembled his men behind the houses and calmly reorganized them
for the attack. Heavy machine guns and mortars were moved into
position. The machine gunners worked the bolts of their weapons
back and forth a few times. All was ready.
'1st Company forward!!!' A thunderous hurrah sounded
throughout the whole village. Pistols out and after them! We saw
the Russians running. Houses were burning everywhere. It smelled
of war. This assault could not be halted.
'Stalin Organs' opened fire on us unexpectedly. We threw ourselves to the ground. I lay on top of 5 or 6 Grenadiers. Next to me
Obit. Derben, the commander of 1st Company, took a large fragment in the thigh. We sat him up. Insisting on following procedure,
he handed the company over to his Leutnant. Then he gave notice
that he was leaving. Once again one could hear the familiar, 'the
company will obey my orders."
I Battalion's battle took place somewhere on the road to Tula
during the night of 4 / 5 December. It was on this same night that
tragedy struck a sister company, the 17th (Motorcycle), which was
located in and around Kolodesnaja. At the centre of events was the
company's commander, Leutnant Henke. A brave, but young,
officer, Henke was full of ideals, but lacked the vital experience which
only years of combat could produce.
Kolodesnaja was a small village in the midst of a great forest,
surrounded by a few fields and meadows which were now snow259
covered. Around the village, especially to the east, was the dark,
threatening forest, whose depths were unknown. The few panje huts
were the sole signs of a human presence. Some had been destroyed,
but the Grenadiers crouched in the few which were intact. These
offered some warmth and the soldiers were happy that they were
not exposed to the terrible minus 30 degree cold and the awful
snowstorms. The unspeakable harshness of the past days and weeks
was reflected in the faces of the Grenadiers. An overpowering
weariness caused them to sink into a half- sleeping state, forgetting
the danger concealed in the forests. The Leutnant, who had led the
company with great bravery, was also overwhelmed by exhaustion.
The few sentries and security outposts should be sufficient to warn
of approaching danger.
In another of the huts in the same village was the headquarters of
the Heavy Battalion (V Btl.), most of whose companies had been
assigned to other battalions. The battalion's commanding officer was
Major von Lentkze. He, too, had no idea of the events to come; he,
too, gave in to the vague feeling of security for which he was to pay
so dearly later.
Students from a Soviet officer school, on skis and clad in parkas,
sneaked cat-like through the forest towards the village. Moving out
of the darkness of the forest, they found a gap in the German line
of security, and suddenly burst into the village. The result was a
bloodbath. At the sounds of the first shots the Grenadiers raced from
the huts as they were, seized their weapons and attempted to defend
themselves. In sock feet, some partially clothed as if they had just
left from washing up, they tried to defend against an enemy who was
superior in numbers and had the advantage of surprise. The actual
battle was brief. Major von Lentzke was soon hit and killed, and Lt.
Gamier of 17th Company and many others were wounded. The
survivors scattered. Individually and in groups, scarcely armed, some
with no weapons at all, they reassembled several hours later.
The next morning the nightmare in Kolodesnaja was over; the
enemy had been driven away. But the scene in the village was a
terrible one: the wounded who had been left behind in the village
had been murdered. Those soldiers who had raced out of their huts
half- dressed and been captured by the Russians had been tied to
sleds and pushed into the village pond. They froze to death. Gefr.
Helmut Tuchscherer, a member of 2nd Battery/4OOth Art.Btl., had
stopped in the village for a rest with his comrades in their truck. He
was found by the door of one of the huts with a small hole in his
forehead. Beside him lay a dead Russian.
Almost half of the company's machines (BMW motorcycles) had
been left behind. Either there had not been time to start them or the
cold prevented them from doing so, and they had been burned or
destroyed by the Russians.
260
Chapter Ten
The Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon
As dawn was breaking on the morning of 22 June 1941, while
units of the German Army were setting out from their assembly areas
for the attack on Russia, motorised elements of the Fhrer BegleitBataillon were driving into the Wolfsschanze installation in East
Prussia. Without direction or large scale briefings the battalion
occupied the planned watches, strongpoints and outposts around
the installation in the forest. As the vehicles were still being
camouflaged beneath the trees, the men were already down from
the vehicles with their weapons and had begun building slit trenches
and foxholes. Fields of fire were laid down and sentry paths were
chosen and made passable. The importance of the installation was
explained to each guard. The most important structure in the
Wolfsschanze was House 11 the Fhrer's quarters. Hitler's house
was enclosed by Security Zone I. Within a larger radius was Security
Zone II, which included all the buildings belonging to the headquarters. The barriers consisted of wire screen fences topped with
barbed wire. Access was provided by gates at designated intervals.
It was there that the guards were posted. These were named for the
points of the compass, such as Guard West, etc. The sentry paths,
which led to the next sentry post, ran along the wire fences. Along
the paths at designated points were machine gun posts which,
initially, were constructed of logs. Later, these were replaced with
concrete dugouts.
The guards and companies were accommodated in wooden barracks, each of which was fitted out with beds and a lounge for a
section. For months one platoon of the 4th (Panzer) Company was
261
stationed on the east side of the installation while the rest of the
company was housed in the barracks. This company formed the local
reserve. In this period of German successes on the Eastern Front the
only possible threat was from parachute troops. The Flak Battery
was responsible for defence against such an attack as well as, of
course, the protection of the airspace over the installation. The only
other expected enemy activity was that of spies. From the very first
a large number of men was kept busy exposing and hunting down
Soviet spies. The company trains were stationed in the villages
around the installation and maintained a sort of forward control by
posting sentries and checkpoints on the access roads. In addition,
civilian defence officials were constantly active screening questionable elements in the immediate area as well as farther afield. The
closer one came to the installation, the denser became the net of
troops and security. Day and night, motorised patrols were on the
road as far as 100 kilometres away from the installation. Stationed
at the security zones, the sentries of the Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon
formed the last line of security before the installation. They themselves came under extremely close scrutiny. Every day and night officers
and NCOs in uniform and in civilian clothes tested the vigilance of
their soldiers. More than once, one of the officers or NCOs was fired
on by an alert sentry or even wounded after the first challenge.
At this time there was always a locomotive under steam at Grlitz
Station, the forest station within the installation, at the disposal of
the F H Q u . Its position was hidden from air observation by
camouflage nets hung between the trees.
The city of Rastenburg, about five kilometres west of the installation, served as supply base for the units in the headquarters. The city
was the express train station, which was common knowledge as the
Fhrer courier train left there daily for Berlin with great punctuality,
the return train also arrived daily. Incidentally, it was in Rastenburg
that the earlier Grenadier Regiment "King Frederick the Great" was
garrisoned. The "Royal Scots", the oldest British regiment,
originated from this regiment. Ironically, in 1945, towards the end
of the Second World War, this same British regiment fought against
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
units.
Rastenburg featured the Komtur Barracks (later artillery barracks)
and the Hindenburg barracks, which were to serve as quarters for
reinforcements for the Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon. For the amusement of the soldiers there was the Hotel Tuliweit, the Schtzenhaus
and the Bahnhof Hotel. Later, it was usually in the Bahnhof Hotel
that members were received and accommodated on arrival. The
Weigel'sche Bookshop took care of the men's intellectual needs,
while the Lyzeum was there for those who liked to dance.
The route travelled daily by the vehicles from the city through
Karlshof into the installation was over a good asphalt road. On the
262
left side beyond the level crossing there were several brick buildings
and white barracks which served as a hospital. Many members of
the Fhrer-Begleit-Bataillon spent time there recovering from
injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents.
Farther to the east lay the Mauerwald in which, near Angerburg,
was located Installation Anna. Installation Anna was the cover name
for the O K H (Army High Command), which kept its command centre
in a large number of barracks and buildings there. Mention of
Installation Anna may call to mind the Lake Zeisig Heights and the
Jger Heights with their lovely pubs and restaurants.
The headquarters of the highest ranking personalities in Hitler's
entourage such as Reichsfhrer SS Heinrich Himmler's headquarters in Grossgarten, about 12 km southeast of Angerburg, or
Hermann Gring's in a local castle contained further command
centres of the German Reich and the German Armed Forces.
The actual Installation Wolfsschanze was under the Commander
of Headquarters who was also commander of the Fhrer-BegleitBataillon. At this time the post was held by Obstlt. Thomas, whose
staff was organised as follows:
Adjutant
Executive Officer
la
lib
IVb (construction)
264
Battle Group Nehring was forced to join combat under these less
than favourable circumstances and saw no further action as a unit.
Prominent in these actions was the Panzer Company, which did a
splendid job with its small 9.6 tonne panzers on the log roads in the
Volkhov swamps. On numerous occasions it was the efforts of the
Panzer Company which permitted an orderly withdrawal by the
infantry. Under the most difficult conditions it fought open the
TichwinGrusino road (actually no better than a log road), as a result
of which the German forces were able to occupy winter positions on
the west bank of the Volkhov almost unhindered. Unfortunately, the
Panzer Company, under the command of Obit. Rohrbeck, lost all of
its operational tanks, which resulted in the employment of the highly
specialised Panzer crews as infantry.
Not until the end of March 1942, when the situation at the front
finally stabilised, were the remaining elements of the battle group
released to return to Germany.
Chapter Eleven
The I.R. GD in the Winter Retreat 1941-42
Defensive battles b e f o r e M o s c o w
6. 12.26. 12. 41
27. 12.-10. 4. 42
265
'Fourth' assembled his company; then he set out with a small band
of men. Orders were no longer given; command had reverted to its
original form. It was a battle for survival. Each of us took over a task
somewhere. We knew and trusted each other in such situations. This
gave one confidence.
Our strength had long been at an end. No one mentioned it. What
good would it do? Who would hear our complaints?
Several men fell in the persistent rifle fire. Oberleutnant Richter of
the 'Fourth' went on. He had on a bright cap. 'Just keep up! Come
on!' He was calm as always. His batman saw a Russian taking aim
behind a house. Just then the Oberleutnant was in the bright glare
of a fire. He collapsed and a few minutes later he was dead. No one
had ever noticed any inner emotion in him in combat. He did
everything matter-of-factly, including the sacrifice of his own life.
We fell back, our tired legs tramping through the knee-deep snow.
The Grenadiers of the 'Fourth' carried their dead chief with them.
It was especially cold that day; minus 36 degrees we learned later.
After an hour's march several men had frozen ears despite their wool
caps. The cold pricked our cheeks and the men had to rub their
noses to prevent freezing. Eyebrows and eyelashes had become
white with frost. Beard stubble froze fast to the wool.
The Leutnant and his Pioniers had been waiting in the village for
twelve hours. By much walking back and forth they simulated a larger
force. To do so, everyone had to remain outside, which resulted in
numerous cases of frostbite. Activities were carried out almost
mechanically: halt, leader forward, post security. Silently and
apathetically the platoons and sections spread out. Losses were
considerable: individuals had to do sentry duty more often and for
longer periods. Everything seemed to take longer because of exhaustion. Often, orders did not get through. The commanders were
always on their feet. Even thinking was difficult. Men simply fell
asleep.
The village looked desolate. An Obergefreiter of the 'Second' and
a Russian lay together where they had fought. The Obergefreiter was
clutching his rifle desperately. The Russian's bayonet was sticking in
his chest. The Russian's face had been shattered by a bullet, but he
had not let go of his rifle.
We had to make our ammunition last until evening; we couldn't
fetch any during the day. The exit from the village lay under accurate
rifle fire. We were also short of fuel and there was nothing to eat. In
the evening we realised it was Sunday, the second Sunday of Advent,
and at home two candles would be burning on the Advent wreath.
Back there they didn't know if we were still alive or not.
During the night the order arrived to disengage from the enemy.
Only grudgingly did we give up what we had conquered and held."
267
The tanks we had heard all night were Russian T-34s and 52 tonners
from Moscow earmarked for the relief of Tula. What was more, they
had brought in fresh troops Siberians!! And we had only the small
3.7 cm Pak up front.
I went back through the ravine with three men to fetch some food.
On the way back an icy wind blew in our faces and our breath froze
on our woollen caps. The pea soup in the mess kits had frozen into
solid lumps. Our hands were numb and the tent square holding the
cold rations weighed heavily on us.
At a bend where there were some bushes we thought we spotted
movement, but then we laughed at our unnecessary fright. Scarcely
had we reached the village street in Dedilowo, when we heard several
cries and a few shots behind us from the ravine we had passed
through not ten minutes before. Startled, we stopped for a moment
and then went into our quarters. Our comrades were pleased that
we had finally arrived. The mess kits were thawed over the open fire.
A little later a messenger came in and we asked him about the cries
from the ravine earlier. He said that a pair of Russians had bayonetted
and killed two signals men sent out to lay a new line.
In the evening orders came to move; we evacuated our positions
and fell back."
Once begun, the movement of the German troops forced to
withdraw from the threatened areas by the weight of the Soviet
attacks accelerated. This was especially true of those units which had
been located in the most threatened areas of the German Eastern
Front. These were the units whose elan had carried them the farthest
into Russian territory: the units east and northeast of Tula. Among
them was the I.R. GD. The destruction of these units was undoubtedly one of the first objectives of the Soviets, going hand in hand
with the forcing-back of the German spearheads north and south of
Tula. The German commanders near Tula had to call on all of their
command skills in order to extricate the threatened units quickly, so
that they could restore the front again as soon as possible.
The result, however, was a retreat marked by the abandonment of
daily positions. The units fell back during the night on foot, in
vehicles or on sleighs. When dawn came they moved into positions,
waited for the enemy and held on through the day. When darkness
fell they set out once again to continue the retreat to the rear, to
the west.
The battle raged over villages, over the warmth of fires, over the
few still intact peasant huts. These were the driving forces behind
the daily exertions in the biting cold as low as minus 45 degrees.
These prizes provided a few hours of rest and sleep until it was time
to move on. They permitted the men to gather their strength for the
events of the morning. The common soldier, the Grenadier, suffered
heavily from this fate, but he bore the hardships which every hour
269
272
soldier said, 'Leave me here!' 'It's no use!' The assault guns and their
brave Leutnant Frantz prevented the worst from happening. Bullets
smacked against the armour plate. Frantz climbed out and hoisted
the wounded up onto the assault gun. The Leutnant was wounded
in the shoulder. Twelve men fell dead or wounded into enemy hands.
It was a black hour.
This, too, young soldiers should know. This was what an unlucky
battle was like for a Grenadier. Those who survived it no longer
scared so easily.
Very formally, the Leutnant handed over command. He had seen
the same thing happen to his Oberleutnant a few days before. The
commander placed the black-white-red ribbon of the Iron Cross
through the button hole of his field jacket. Then the Feldwebel took
over the small, hard company."
More than anything else, it is the names of the villages and towns
that recall the events of the retreat. It was for the possession of these
that the men shed their blood and tears. Most lay on either side of
the TulaPlavskMzensk road, over which the German forces had
first advanced and now retreated. The often nameless villages had
to be protected, had to be held to the end as bases for supply and
care of the wounded. It was around them that the battles were fought
and, as they were given up one at a time, the gains of the previous
months vanished. Also along the road were the graves of those who
had fallen, the wreckage of vehicles, the ruins and ashes of burneddown houses evidence of the ferocity of this war for survival.
The following report was made from the village of Laminzewo
which, on 15 December 1941, was being defended by the 8th (MG.)
Company and other units of II Battalion. It was made by a young,
perhaps eighteen-year-old Grenadier who was assigned as an ammunition carrier with the company's heavy mortar. He had left
Germany only eight weeks earlier as a young replacement:
"We had completely lost our way, and it took us more than three
hours to cover two kilometres. After a brief rest we had to go out
again on relief. We took along a Russian pot and some dry wood so
that we would have something warm in the snow bunker.
This time at least the weather was clear, and after an hour we
reached the outpost and relieved the sentries. The four of us sat in
the snow bunker, for which we had made a roof from all the available
cover in the section. Outside we erected a wall of snow blocks to
break the icy wind. With our bayonets we cut shavings, which we
burned in the pot. Naturally, this produced more smoke than fire
and our eyes ran continuously.
At noon we saw a troop of Bolsheviks leave the forest about 1,000
metres in front of us and move into the village. A little later they were
followed by another group of about battalion strength.
273
274
(16. 12.). All were from 8th Company. There were so many who
never returned.
On 21 December 1941 the regimental headquarters moved its
command post to Tschern. The enemy's pursuit was not so vigorous
now, the pace of the retreat slowed. The companies still faced bitter
fighting but the pauses became longer, finally allowing an opportunity to regroup and rest. Gradually the regimental headquarters
was able to obtain a general view of the losses of the past weeks,
determine the strength of the units and assess their combat value.
The results of the tally were shocking. No better impression could
be conveyed of the scale of the unit's losses than the following
account of the reunion of the remains of a company with its motor
transport:
"After a seemingly endless night march, word came through that
trucks were waiting to collect us. Only two kilometres more. We
moved through burning villages with only one thought in mind our
trucks are there! Our field kitchen will be there! For days all we had
to eat was raw or cooked potatoes, pickles and doughy ch\eb.
Finally, the first trucks. Our company was in the lead, we almost
ran for joy. Finally, we reached them.
Our drivers shook our hands. They asked, where are the others?
We looked at one another in silence: killed, missing, wounded!! Of
the 17 men in our platoon, 3 had been killed, 4 were missing and 6
had been wounded.
Ogefr. Banth, Ogefr. Rieger and I (Gren. Rehfeldt). Climb in!
We jumped into the truck and soon we were wheeling our way toward
the rear. My God, it was such a feeling not to have to walk on frozen
feet any longer, not to have to carry the heavy equipment.
Following a quick night journey we moved into quarters north of
Mzensk."
The situation at the front had eased somewhat. Motor transport
came not just for this company, but for all of the other companies
as well. Travelling by night, the entire regiment was driven through
Orel into the Bolchow area, where it was to rest. However, the
strength of the infantry divisions along the Oka, which were to stop
the Soviet advance once and for all, was too weak and, despite the
trials of the past few weeks and its weakened condition, on 22 and
23 December the I.R. GD had to be sent back into action. The three
now-reinforced infantry battalions were sent to bolster three infantry
divisions in position along the Oka. Their fighting morale and ability
to hold on were judged far superior to the infantry there and they
were inserted as corset-stays at the likely focal points of the expected
Soviet attack mostly in the bridgehead facing the Oka.
With strengths of 10 to 25 men each (excluding the heavy
companies) the companies moved across the frozen Oka into
completely unprepared positions. At first there were only snow
275
wireless traffic in the ' Rote Kapee" net, which worked for the
Soviets in Europe and even in Germany, revealed their shameless
game. The following transmission was sent to Moscow on Christmas
Night:
"Dora to Director (Moscow)
From Salter (cover name): From prominent Germans staying here in
government service, who were previously close to the Nazis:
German people war weary and resigned! Masses still believe in final
victory, however intellectuals and senior military circle sceptical concerning outcome of eastern war. Hitler's death or defeat at the front
would mean end of Nazi regime by military dictatorship. Victory on
Eastern front costing the elite of the German Army. Russian tanks far
superior. Latvians and Estonians convinced that Soviets will return;
Germans on leave from baltic states strongly impressed!"
Even if the soldiers on the Eastern Front suspected nothing of this
treachery, the retreat before the forces of nature and the strength of
the enemy was eating away at their fighting morale and their will to
resist. Their m u c h loved Panzer leader, the courageous
Generaloberst Guderian, was held responsible for the setbacks on
the Eastern Front. He bade farewell to his troops in an order of the
day:
The Commander in Chief
of the Second Panzer Army
277
The 27th of December 1941 was a glorious day for the regiment.
The 17th (Motorcycle) Company under Oberleutnant Prachowsky
held its positions near Petrovka against far superior enemy forces.
The defence was marked by the heroic death of Leutnant Henke. A
member of the company described the day's events:
"The 17th (Motorcycle) Company was deployed along the Oka
river among the units of III Battalion. The company's positions
consisted merely of holes dug in the snow atop unprotected and
treeless heights. Attacking with massive forces, the Soviets attempted to press into these improvised defensive positions. They
achieved several local penetrations and partially outflanked the
company. Then Lt. Henke rose, rallied a few brave men around him
and, with a loud roar that was intended to conceal their true strength,
counterattacked the Bolsheviks with great elan, throwing them back
out of the positions. As the Russians fled across the frozen Oka, Lt.
Henke set out after them and put them completely to flight. It was
a terrific sight.
The Bolsheviks launched no more attacks in this sector during the
entire winter. The company received the special praise of the
regiment's commanding officer.
Lt. Henke, who had been somewhat unfairly held responsible for
the failure at Kolodesnaya, and on whom this blame had laid heavily,
was killed in the counterattack."
As a result of this action 17th Company was given back its cuff
titles. Lt. Henke's actions and his hero's death were acknowledged
by the regiment's commanding officer, Oberst Hoernlein, in a letter
to Henke's parents:
. . . he fell leading an especially daring counterattack which he
launched on his own initiative, and which put far superior enemy
forces to flight. . .
A captured Russian order showed clearly the superiority in forces
that the battalions had to contend with. II Battalion alone was facing
two enemy divisions, which so far had failed to gain more than a few
metres of ground in the Voronets bridgehead. Russian losses were
frightful.
At the turn of the year, when the situation in this sector on the
Oka had stabilised and the corps felt the position secure, II and III
Battalions were sent directly back to the regiment, leaving only I
Battalion still attached to a foreign division. Everywhere they went,
the Grenadiers with the black and silver cuff titles received thanks
and recognition for their outstanding achievements while with the
infantry divisions. An example of this recognition was an incident
involving I Battalion:
I Battalion under Major Gehrke was placed under the command
of one of the regiments of an infantry division. The regiment wanted
to send out a patrol to establish contact with the GD troops. A
278
Officers:
KIA Wounded MIA
11
20
15
7
8
23
2
6
6
13
2
10
36
2
89
NCOs:
KIA Wounded MIA
18
49
33 116
4
53 124
32
10
11
33
4
22
129
1
377
Men:
KIA Wounded MIA
174
617
19
226
723
35
208
756
28
43
121
2
24
65
266
14
1
93
4
11
1
1
735 :2,590
110
German positions on the Oka to the south and get their offensive
moving again. But with the successful Soviet breakthrough on both
sides of Belev the attacks on the Oka positions lessened noticeably.
The quiet period allowed some units to be pulled out of the line for
a rest.
As the first unit to be withdrawn from the front lines in this fashion,
II Battalion was transferred into the Subkowo area on 17 January
1942. The soldiers spent their time sleeping, washing and cleaning
weapons. Thoughts of seeing action again were far from their minds.
And yet, because of the threatening situation in the rear of the Oka
positions, their next action was not far off. Enemy patrols and even
sleigh columns had been spotted in the wooded areas northwest of
Bolkhov. German rear echelon services found themselves confronted
by enemy columns. Ambushes were the order of the day; supply was
threatened.
At about 07.00 on 20 January 1942, II Battalion moved out. Its
assignment was to clarify the situation in the JagodnayaTschuchlowoAlfonasowo area and establish contact with elements
of the 4th Panzer Division attacking from the west. It had to be
determined which villages were no longer in German hands. II
Battalion therefore drove through to Gorodok, about 20 km west
northwest of Bolkhov, where it left its vehicles and continued on foot
to Jagodnaya. That evening the battalion occupied positions which,
possessing a field of fire of scarcely more than 50-80 metres, had to
be characterised as particularly poor. Scarcely had the Grenadiers
occupied the positions when the enemy put in an appearance. Heavy
fire from behind snowbanks and bushes whipped into the German
lines. The situation was becoming increasingly difficult.
As expected, patrols revealed a serious picture. The 17th (Motorcycle) Company, which had transferred to Gorodok on 21 January
to secure the supply road for II Battalion, which had passed through
twenty-four hours earlier, was ambushed in the town. The company
put up a heroic defence but lost its commander, Obit. Prachowsky.
Prachowsky, who was held in high esteem by his soldiers, was one
of the few officers left who had served with the regiment since its
formation.
The regiment's units were sent into action as reports of the enemy's
appearance on the battlefield came in. Withdrawal of the units from
the line did not always go according to plan. This and other factors
resulted in their being thrown hastily into the new areas of operations
without rest in conditions of biting cold and deep snow. As the next
available companies, the 20th (Flak) and 18th (Pionier) marched as
quickly as possible to Gorodok to clarify the situation and help firm
up the defences. The threat to II Battalion, which was fighting hard
in Jagodnaya, of being cut off had to be overcome. Elements of the
400th Artillery Battalion also moved to Gorodok and went into firing
280
positions there. Gorodok, through which passed the road from the
northwest in the direction of Bolkhov, appeared to be the focal point
of the Soviet attack. Severing the road remained their main objective.
The thermometer registered as low as minus 40 degrees, and the
inadequately-clothed Grenadiers suffered pitifully in the bitter cold.
The difficulty of fighting in such sub-zero temperatures is illustrated
by the following incident described by a wireless operator of 2
Battery/4OOth Artillery battalion:
"Before us in a valley lay the village the name is not important;
it was apparently not occupied by the enemy. The battery ranged in
on it. Soon afterward the Ivans came storming out of the forest across
the open field in front of the village. Alarm!!! I came out of the bunker
and set up the field telephone behind a log fence in front of a shack.
Obit. Wackernagel ran about issuing orders to Oberwachtmeister
'Ossi' Oswald, whose battery was to open fire.
Next to me stood a Grenadier. His hands were in his pockets and
his rifle was leaned against the fence as he watched the approaching
Ivans. I asked him why he didn't shoot, and all he said was, 'No, you
go ahead!' So, I took off my headset, stood up, snatched up the rifle,
took off my old mittens they were little more than tatters anyway
adjusted the sight from 500 to 300 metres, poked the rifle through
the fence and fired three shots. I doubt that I hit anything. Then it
was all over for me; I was simply unable to insert another clip of
ammunition; my hands were white and stiff. Now I was just as
powerless in the face of the attacking Russians as my chum from the
infantry. I felt what it was like to be unable to do anything when I
knew that I should and must do something."
The main body of the regiment was now assembled in the area
around Gorodok. The focal point was obvious from the transfer of
the regiment's command post from Jamskaya (near Bolkhov) to
Koljukina on 22 January 1942, especially since the overall situation
demanded a centralised command. The Russians attacked
everywhere. II Battalion's 6th Company, still in positions at the edge
of Jagodnaya, faced repeated enemy attacks under increasingly
heavy fire from heavy mortars. Nevertheless, the company held.
On the same day, III Battalion launched an attack against the
well-camouflaged bunkers and field positions in Ivanovski, supported
by 20th (Flak) Company. Despite heavy losses (all three company
commanders were casualties), the enemy positions were taken in
difficult close-quarters fighting.
I Battalion was still fighting near Dolbino, but expected to be
transferred soon due to the worsening situation. Everywhere the
situation was unclear. Russian sleigh columns were appearing
everywhere seeking to break through to the south. Wherever they
met resistance they withdrew after a brief exchange of fire and
attempted to go around the German positions. Near Gorodok the
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Major Gehrke
Obit. Mller
Lt. Schaller (formerly of 20th Comp.)
Lt. Keiner
Obit, von Gamier
Obit. Senger
Where this had not already been done, the former companies were
reduced to platoons retaining their company supply trains and
parcelled out. Only IV and V Battalions, which had not suffered such
heavy casualties, remained as before. Another attempt was made to
take Tschuchlowo. All preparations were made to ensure the success
of this difficult attack. Reconnaissance of the terrain over which the
attack was to be made revealed the difficulties that lay ahead. The
attack was to be made across an open, sloping, snow-covered field
which provided no cover and offered no opportunities for
285
camouflage. What was more, the Soviets had a good view of the
entire area. Before reaching this open field, the attackers first had to
cross a ravine in darkness. The ravine was no more than 10 metres
wide and about 250 metres long and might prove a formidable
obstacle. On the positive side, elements of the 20th Inf.Rgt. were to
attack from the east at the same time, while elements of the 171st
Inf.Rgt. moved in from the west. The artillery of all units in the
immediate area were going to lay down a preparatory barrage on
the objectives of Kosowka and Tschuchlowo to ease the way for the
attackers.
Lt. Schaller, who had been detached from the 20th (Flak) Company
to serve as executive officer in the rifle battalion, provided an
eyewitness report:
The attack on Kosowka and Tschuchlowo on 20 February 1942.
"Everyone was on his feet at 04.00. The hard-frozen snow
crunched underfoot with every step. The Rifle Battalion GD prepared
itself for the planned attack. In the lead was Leutnant Keiner,
commander of 1st Company, followed by the 2nd and 3rd Companies. The commanding officer, the adjutant Obit. Mller, and I
followed with several soldiers from the battalion staff. Behind us
walked the signals men with their spools of cable.
It was 05.00: the beginning of the attack. Suddenly, to the south,
red-grey flashes. First one, then four, then too many to count: our
artillery battalions had opened the attack with a combined barrage.
The first shells were already roaring overhead. For five minutes,
mushrooms of smoke and flame rose from the enemy-held village.
It looked like all hell had broken loose. But several shells burst
damned close. Then the cry rang out through the grey morning for
medics: the first casualties from our own fire.
Lt. Keiner had meanwhile reached the edge of the village. A
murderous, well-aimed fire greeted the attackers. Dead and wounded
lay on the ground. In the light of dawn anything that moved
immediately drew heavy machine gun fire. It was fortunate that we
were all able to find cover in a ravine.
Our attack had bogged down. There was nothing to be seen of the
171st Inf.Rgt. and the 20th Inf.Rgt., which were supposed to be
attacking from the west and east respectively, and no battle noise
could be heard.
The enemy fire abated, but as soon as one of us raised his head
above the edge of the ravine he immediately drew machine gun fire.
During the course of the late morning the commander of the 2nd
Battery of the 400th Artillery Battalion suddenly appeared. He
crossed the open slope in great leaps and was lucky not to be hit.
We discussed the situation with him. He decided to screen the
dangerous areas with smoke so that we could recover the dead and
wounded from the entrance to the village. Our telephone lines were
286
still intact. He made contact with his battery and, after several ranging
shots, ordered smoke shells. Under cover of the smoke we were able
to bring all of the wounded and most of the dead back to the ravine.
Our battle group was spread along the roughly 200 metre length
of the ravine. The machine guns stood ready to fire; the Russians,
too, could attack at any time.
Following another discussion of the situation with the battalion
commander, Major Gehrke, Lt. Keiner left to return to his men in
the forward part of the ravine. Not five minutes after he left, a
messenger came running up and said that Lt. Keiner had been shot
in the head and killed!
Obit. Mller took over 1st Company. Soon he, too, lay gasping
among the wounded with a chest wound. Anyone who moved in the
visible part of the ravine fell victim to snipers. Otherwise, the Russians
were comparatively quiet.
About midday a shell suddenly exploded in the middle of the ravine.
A number of men fell dead or wounded in the snow. Obit. Gamier,
who was standing only two metres from me, collapsed. Both of his
legs had been blown off. A few moments later he breathed his last
he was dead.
I immediately reported this blow to the regimental command post
by telephone. The regimental commander, Oberst Hoernlein, was
always on the phone. He, too, was deeply shaken. Moved, he said
to me: 'You and your men are all I have left. See that you get out
safely when dusk falls. And be especially careful of my last commander!'
Finally, the sun disappeared in the west, and it quickly began to
get dark. The first men moved out, carrying and supporting the
wounded, dragging the dead behind them in tent squares. It was truly
a sad procession. Few words were spoken. Undisturbed, we disengaged from the enemy and left the ravine. Before we joined the
last group our glance fell once again on the blood-flecked snow, on
the helmets and the shreds of cloth which lay about.
The pitiful group that returned to Rschewka numbered 3 officers
and about 30 men. It was the remains of the once so proud I.R. GD
without heavy weapons and without a supply train."
The attack on Tschuchlowo was the last that winter by the battle
group of the I.R. GD. With a last desperate effort it managed to set
up and hold a defensive line at the edge of Melechewo with standing
patrol in Rschewka. The Grenadiers sought out their positions under
fire from Soviet light and heavy weapons. These consisted merely
of holes dug in the snow and depressions in the earth. All available
weapons were quickly emplaced in an effort to compensate for the
Weakness of the regiment's forces. The artillery moved their firing
positions to Fedorowka so as to be able to cover all sectors held by
the Rifle Battalion GD. Contact was established with the 171st
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Inf.Rgt. on the left and a continuous defensive position was established. Everything was set up for defence; there were no more
thoughts of attack. It was simply no longer possible. It was just
fortunate that the Soviets failed to recognise the weakness of the
German position and pursue. The result could have been a
catastrophe. But the days passed relatively quietly, broken only by
artillery barrages which, unfortunately, inflicted more casualties.
Among these was Oberfeldwebel Puis, long-time platoon leader of
the heavy mortars of the 8th (MG.) Company. Wounded by shell
fragments in Melechewo, he died soon afterwards. Many others were
killed or wounded, further reducing the already limited strength of
the defenders.
Finally, on 28 February 1942, a bright spot: replacements arrived
from Neuruppin. Thanks to the quiet situation there was time to
incorporate them into the front-line units. The arrival of the replacements resulted in an increased feeling of strength and raised hopes
for relief and rest. In fact, it was now possible to send individual
sections to the rear by day to rest and regroup. The Rifle Battalion
GD was disbanded and I and II Battalions reformed. Once again there
were two infantry battalions and, therefore, an Infantry Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. Optimism increased visibly, they were
back.
The regimental command post had been located in Jagodnaya for
several days. A normal routine for a defensive position set in. Only
seldom did the enemy mount an attack, such as the one against an
outpost position in Rschewka. It was 29 February a day like any
other. A pound of chocolate had just been given to each man as a
morale booster for those at the front. Several hours later a Russian
loudspeaker blared out: "The chocolate you have just been given is
to take with you to heaven, which is where all GD men will be going
tomorrow!" The Soviets underlined their threat with artillery fire
followed by attacks on the German positions. The regiment's last
assault gun was knocked out while repelling one of the attacks. The
gun's commander was seriously wounded while abandoning his
vehicle; he lost both legs.
Until March 1942 the situation in front of the main line of
resistance changed little. On 5 March, advanced outposts manned
by 2nd Company secured the main line of resistance, which consisted
in part of bunkers blasted out of the frozen earth. During this time
they were able to relieve the forward platoons for six to twelve hours,
allowing them sufficient time to rest and get warm. The bitterest
enemy now was the deep snow and fierce storms which made relief
difficult. Improved defensive positions and changes among the units
resulted in new defensive lines for some elements of the I.R. GD,
especially for II Battalion which was employed farther to the west.
The battalion was inserted north of Podkopajewskij on 23 March,
288
where the men took over a quiet position. The battalion command
post was in the village of Podkopajewskij itself. The regiment moved
to Bobrowka for the purpose of taking over the entire sector.
Signs of stabilisation of the front were the regular relief of the units
at the front and the rest periods in the rear, which were already being
used for training again. The de-lousing station in Afonasewo was
kept busy around the clock ridding the soldiers of vermin. What was
more, the rapid onset of Spring was apparent from the rising
temperatures, melting snow and break-up of the ice on lakes and
streams.
Senior officers turned up for inspections; quarters were polished
and uniforms and equipment were brought up to parade standard.
All that was still missing was the entertainment section, which could
have raised the men's spirits further with stage shows and films.
Finally, on 8 April 1942, the long-awaited message arrived: relief
and transfer on 9 April 1942!
Advance parties and horse-drawn infantry columns arrived, officers
from the relieving units familiarised themselves with the positions
and everything was made ready for departure. The heavy weapons
were loaded on trucks, while the men carried their own weapons
and marched off in the direction of Jagodnaja to the east. The rest
of the vehicles were waiting there and in Afonasewo to take the men
to Bolkhov. Once again the foot march was an ordeal: foot-deep
mud had transformed the roads and paths into swamps. The first
elements of the regiment finally arrived in Bolkhov on the night of
11/12 April. Following a brief rest the men boarded the vehicles and
continued on through Tschern and Mzensk to Orel. There the men
were quartered in schools and other buildings where they had a
chance to dry their wet clothing. They were once again in a large
city and wanted their uniforms and appearance to be appropriate.
Preparations were meanwhile made to load the regiment aboard
trains. The necessary cables and blocks for securing the vehicles were
organised. At the same time, word came through that the majority
of the regiment's members with the exception of a small core of
personnel were to receive home leave in Germany immediately,
for which purpose a special train had been laid on. On 15 April the
first elements of the I.R. GD were unloaded in Gomel, from where
they travelled by truck to Rjetschiza on the Dniepr. This medium size
city was to be the regiment's temporary home. It lay south of the
confluence of the Dniepr with the Beresina, where the river was quite
wide. The companies were quickly quartered in the city and soon felt
quite at home. Larger buildings were occupied and fitted out barracks-style. Paint and brushes brightened the quarters and cleanliness
and order brought a bit of Germany to this Russian city. Contact
with the local population resulted in a friendly atmosphere which, in
the time that followed, enabled the two groups to live in peaceful co
289
Chapter Twelve
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291
292
Part IV
BATTLES IN THE EAST 1942
Chapter One
The Infantry Division (mot.) GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1 April 1942 is the formation date of the Infantry Division (mot.)
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
So declared the Supreme Commander of the German Armed
Forces, Adolf Hitler. This most modem division of the German Army
was organised according to the latest experience and outfitted with
the best weapons and equipment. The basis for this was a Table of
Organisation (KSTN) and a Table of Basic Allowances (KAN); these
were not finalised until 20 June 1942. They foresaw a division
consisting of:
2 Infantry Regiments each with 3 battalions of 5 companies (originally
4), and a heavy battalion. The allotment of heavy weapons was
especially high.
1 Reconnaissance Battalion with 5 companies
1 Panzer Battalion with 3 companies (30 Panzer IV)
1 Assault Gun Battalion with 3 batteries (21 assault guns Type III long)
Artillery regiment with 11 batteries 4 batteries of light field guns, 4
of heavy field guns, 1-10 cm cannon battery, 1 rocket launcher battery,
and 1 observation battery. Initially, a rocket launcher battalion was
planned instead of a battery.
1 Army Flak Battalion with 5 batteries
1 Anti-Tank Battalion with 3 companies
1 Pionier Battalion with 3 companies and 2 columns
1 Signals Battalion with 2 companies and 1 column
Supply Service with 18 truck columns, 3 field workshop companies
and a supply company
Administrative and Supply Services
Medical Service
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Oberst Khler
Oberst Garski
Both had served with the former I.R. GD and had been successful
battalion commanders in France. They were two contrasting personalities whose personal rivalry, originating from their days in the
regiment, was carried over to the regiments commanded by them.
In contrast to the homogenous nature of the experienced and
battle-tested I.R. GD 1, the new I.R. GD 2 was made up of men from
every military district and province of Germany and was inexperienced.
The commanding officer of the division was Generalmajor Walter
Hoernlein, of whom his first la, General Staff Major von Hobe, said
following their first meeting: "My commander is a fine, tough soldier
with plenty of drive and full of ideas." It should be noted that for the
General, as well as for his la, the command and tactical operation
of a fully motorised unit such as the I.D. GD was new ground.
Consequently, the commanders of the division and both infantry
regiments faced problems which could only be solved through
experience gained on the battlefield. Since they could select from the
entire Wehrmacht, the division commanders chose the remaining
regimental commanders and those of the independent battalions
based on their technical qualifications and the particular type of unit
they were to command. They, too, would have to face their test of
fire with the new units they had formed.
Among the infantry regiments it must be recognised that one
shortcoming was the fact that, apart from a few men and officers or
small units (such as the 17th Motorcycle Company), not one complete unit or battalion was released by the I.R. GD to form the basis
of the new I.R. GD 2. If this had happened, perhaps the tension
which appeared between the regiments on occasion, even as late as
February 1945, would not have had such negative consequences.
Special directions were issued by the O K W and BdE (Commander
of the Replacement Army) relating solely to the formation of the new
division. Among other requirements, men enlisting in the unit had
to be young, at least 1.70 metres tall, possess good vision (no eye
glasses) and have no criminal record. They should, as stated in an
annex to the order, "conform to the ideal picture of the German
soldier." The formation headquarters had permission to select the
unit's officers from every military district and unit. The latest
294
weapons, provided they had been developed and were fully tested,
were available to the division.
In is undeniable that the new division owed its preferential treatment in personnel and equipment to the personal efforts of Hitler's
Wehrmacht Adjutant, Oberst Schmundt. Assisting him in pushing
through these special provisions was Hitler's Army Adjutant, Major
Engel. Engel worked with the Ha and adjutant of the forming I.D.
GD, Hauptmann Bethge, in tying down the details. It was thanks to
the efforts of these two men in the highest headquarters in the Reich
that, in early 1942, the unit was the ideal picture of a motorised
infantry division.
Of course, the division's preferential status also had its drawbacks.
Such a situation could easily lead to unrealistic demands being placed
on the unit or an overestimation of its potential in action. There was
a great difference between sending a so-called "field-, forest- and
meadow division" consisting of thrown-together units to attack a
commanding hill and ordering a full-strength, 18,000-man division
equipped with the most modern weapons to accomplish the same
task. Every success had to be evaluated based on the unit's armament, personnel strength and command, while also taking into
account its fighting spirit. It is a fact that in the battles which took
place in the years up to 1945 it was normal for excessive demands
to be placed on the I.D. GD and that it justifiably earned the
reputation as a "fire brigade". Its operations, successes and failures
must therefore be evaluated in this light.
The new division's formation period lasted about seven weeks,
from 1 April to 23 May 1942. The process took place at the new
troop training grounds in Wandern, which are fondly-remembered
by many ex-Grenadiers. The advance parties watched the units of
the new Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND march in. It was
spring and nature was awakening. The training grounds were large
and expansive, with newly-constructed quarters in the Narvik and
Grokirschbaum Camps. There were many lovely villages in the area
surrounding the camps, such as Lagow am See, for one. All of the
new division's units were there except I.R. GD 1, which remained
in Rjetschiza in Russia. This first regiment was never sent back to
the homeland as a complete unit. As per directions, its reorganisation
was carried out in Russia.
The headquarters personnel assembled in Dberitz, where the
following took place:
About 12 men gathered there on 23 March 1942, knowing only
that they were to join the staff of the I.D. GD which was then being
formed. Thus, it was not unjustified when they asked the commander
in Dberitz, "What are we supposed to do?", especially since the
new division's la, General Staff Major von Hobe, did not arrive until
1 April. Once there, Von Hobe took the lost men under his wing
299
1 for fuel
1 for weapons and ammunition, tool boxes and so on.
2 field kitchen vehicles with fixed superstructure
Three of these trucksnamely those of the repair echelon, the first
field kitchen and the fuel truckhad four-wheel-drive, as did the Steyr
and Horch Kfz.7O. The company also had three heavy motorcyclesidecar combinations (BMW 700) and a number of solo machines,
likewise BMWs. In total the company possessed over 43 vehicles.
The equipment of the two other rifle companies was identical or
at least similarespecially in regard to vehicles. At that time the 2nd
Company was commanded by Obit. Dr. Gnther. The 4th (MG.)
Company, which was equipped with 12 heavy and 6 light machine
guns, was commanded by Obit. Gruss.
The 5th (Heavy) Company, commanded by Hptm. Bethge, had a
varied complement of weapons. It possessed three light infantry
guns, a Pionier platoon with three light machine guns, an anti-tank
platoon with three 5-cm anti-tank guns and an anti-tank rifle section
with three anti-tank rifles. The complement of vehicles assigned to
the company, which had to take its infantry support weapons with
it, was different than the rifle companies, but appropriate for its
needs.
The regiment had three such rifle battalions, of which II Battalion
was commanded by Major Feucker and III Battalion by Major
Kohlhaas. In addition to the regimental units and the Headquarters
Company there was IV (Heavy) Battalion under Hptm. Lehnhoff.
The battalion included the 16th (Flak) Company, the 17th (Infantry
Gun) Company and the 18th (Panzerjger) Company. The latter
unit's 1st Platoon was equipped with anti tank guns mounted on
armoured, self-propelled vehicles.
This concludes the general survey of the equipment and composition of the new second regiment when it formed in Wandern.
Wehrkreis (Military District) III (Berlin and Brandenburg) provided
the men for the future I Battalion/I.R. GD 2, while those intended
for III Battalion came from Wehrkreis IX, thereby ensuring a diversity
of personnel. It was thus possible to hear Bavarian accents in one
company, Silesian in another and Berlin in another; all of this led to
a special esprit de corps. There was also a certain similarity to the
composition of the former Wachregiment Berlin, each of whose
companies originated from a different military district. The military
districts had issued orders to the replacement units under their
command to each set up a unit for GD according to the specifications
which had been laid down. As soon as these units were assembled
they were to be sent to Wandern. It is understandable that the
replacement units were reluctant to give up their best men to a unit
which was a stranger to them. In some cases it happened that the
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II Btl.
305
suffer heavy losses during the next year of fighting, being virtually
wiped out on several occasions. It would become obvious that
anti-tank weapons had not kept pace with developments in tank
design. However, no one suspected this in April 1942.
T h e R e c o n n a i s s a n c e Battalion G D was f o r m e d a t the
Grokisrchbaum C a m p on the Wandern troop training grounds
under the command of Major von Usedom. It assembled five
companies, each equipped to fill a different role:
1st Company was an armoured car company equipped with four- and
eight-wheeled vehicles.
2nd Company was an armoured personnel carrier company equipped
with one-tonne half-track APCs.
3rd Company was a Volkswagen company.
4th Company was a machine gun company mounted on Kbels and
Volkswagens.
5th Company was the unit's heavy company. Equipped with Kbels
and trucks, it had an anti-tank gun platoon, an infantry gun platoon
and a Pionier platoon.
Most of the battalion's men came from a variety of army units, with
armoured car and Panzer units p r e d o m i n a t i n g . The unit
demonstrated a special elan based on the cavalry tradition. The unit's
efforts to be regarded as cavalry were reflected in its use of cavalry
terms such as squadron and Wachtmeister (Cavalry Sergeant) and
the use of the service colour yellow. The unit was very conscious of
its reconnaissance role and emphasised this in its training.
Playing an important role perhaps not so much in the beginning,
but more so in the next year's fighting were the men of the Panzer
Battalion GD under their Viennese commander, Hptm. Pssel.
Emerging from I Battalion of the 100th Panzer Regiment which was
equipped with flame-thrower tanks, the battalion was reformed in
February 1942 with standard Panzer III and IV tanks. The Panzer
Ills, which were in the minority, were armed with a 5-cm cannon,
while the more numerous Panzer IVs featured a long or short 7.5-cm
gun. Each combat company fielded about twelve tanks at that time,
as well as three with the battalion headquarters. The unit's formation
was completed in Erfurt, the home of its former replacement
battalion. Not until the second half of May 1942 did it move to
Wandern to join its new parent division. The battalion's personnel
at that time were as follows:
Commanding Officer
Adjutant
Executive Officer
Supply Officer
IVa
Hauptmann Pssel
Obit. Bergstrsser, Obit, von Brockhusen
Obit. Kramer
Lt. Mller, Ofeldw. Stephanski
Ozm. Petznick
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IVb
Vk.
Headquarters Company
Commanding Officer
Signals Platoon
Pionier Platoon
Recon. Platoon
Senior NCO
Accountant & Pay
Maintenance Sergeant
Hptm. Heimke
Obit. Hoppe
Lt. Ringe
Lt. Bornscheuer
Held
Ofeldw. Linke
Light Column
Commander
Acting Senior NCO
Accountant & Pay
Obit. Schulte-Gnne
Ofeldw. Schindler
Uffz. Mai
Obit. Frantz
Obit. Adam
Obit. Lemme
308
battalions. Thus the unit went into action with the title Sturm-Pionier
Battalion GD under the command of Major Lorenz.
Wehrkreis VI in Mnster, Westphalia was instructed by the Chief
of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training
Army to set up the new Signals Battalion GD to consist of a radio
company and a telephone company. The unit was formed in Frechen
near Cologne. Former adjutant to the Commander of Signals,
Wehrkreis VI, Lt. Heydenreich carried out the necessary preparations and then joined the new unit as adjutant to its Bavarian
commanding officer, Major "Wastl" Binder. The Signals Company
of the former I.R. GD formed the basis of the new Signals Company
of the I.D. GD as well as elements of the 309th Signals Battalion
which had last been in action in Odessa.
The supply services were an essential part of a motorised division
and were commanded by a General Staff Officer. Such a unit could
not function without the replenishment of weapons, equipment,
clothing, fuel, medicine, vehicles, replacement parts, mail, rations
and so on. It was the supply services, which had earlier been
nick-named "baggage", that ensured that the fighting units received
the means necessary to continue fighting. The supply services were
vital for the existence and operation of every unit in the army. The
Administrative and Supply Services of the I.D. GD were extensive
as befitted a unit of its size and consisted of the following elements:
Division Chief of Supply Services with its elements, which included 18
columns, three field workshop companies, a replacement parts company which included na Armour-Artificer Platoon;
Administrative Services with a bakery and butchery company, as well
as the Division Ration Office and Field Post Office.
The division's Supply Service originated from the few supply
columns of the I.R. GD's 400th Chief of Supply Services. Under the
command of the veteran and experienced merchant and now Major
Gericke, the division's supply services included:
1st 10th
11th 14th
15th 18th
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311
von Weichs with the Fourth Panzer Army and the Sixth and Twelfth
Armies.
The German plan was for powerful armoured forces to break
through the Soviet front from the area around Isjum (First Panzer
Army) and southeast of Charkov (Fourth Panzer Army) and push
into the area between the Donets and the Don. At the same time
the Sixth and Second Armies were to advance toward the Don line
which ran from Kalitwa to Voronezh. Not until later, when the Panzer
Armies were advancing smoothly, was the Seventeenth Army to join
the attack from west of Rostov. Following objectives would be laid
down after the success of the breakthrough operations was assured.
In principle, however, it was intended that Army Group A veer
toward the lower Don while Army Group B would win the Volga on
both sides of Stalingrad on as wide a front as possible.
Standing ready in the Kursk area for offensive operations within
the Fourth Panzer Army under Generaloberst Hoth (Chief of Staff,
General von Bernuth) was XXXXVIII Panzer Corps under General
Kempf (Chief of Staff, Oberst i.G. Friebe). Under the Panzer Corps'
command were the 9th and 24 Panzer Divisions and the motorised
Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND. Positioned on the left
wing of Army Group B at the boundary with Army Group Centre,
the objective of these armoured divisions was to break through the
Soviet positions in the initial assault and win the crossings over the
Don near Voronezh. The bridges road as well as rail were to
be taken undamaged so as to provide the following infantry with
bridgeheads for the pursuit of the shattered enemy.
All elements of the I.D. GD were to assemble in the Fatesh area
northwest of Kursk and stand ready to move into the assembly area
due east of Schtschigry which still remained to be reconnoitred. Code
word for the attack by XXXXVIII Panzer Corps: Siegfried. Time of
attack: X + 2.15 hours.
Chapter Two
Preparations for the Summer Offensive
1. 06. 27. 6. 42
28. 6. 20. 7. 42
21. 7. 3. 8. 42
3. 8. - 17. 8. 42
313
When the main body of the I.D. GD left the site of its formation in
Wandern near Frankfurt/Oder on 23 May 1942, it was unlikely that
anyone knew its destination; it was in the east, that was all that was
certain. An intermediate stop in Mielau, Poland on 25 May was a
brief one. Forty-eight hours later the first units left the training area
there direction due east. The vehicles rolled off in long columns,
one behind the other. Travelling many hours per day the columns
passed through Lomscha, Bialystok, Slutsk, Rogatchev, Roslavl,
Bryansk and Orel before arriving in the area northwest of Fatesch,
where the units encamped. Here there was a longer stop, lasting
from 6 to 24 June, which was used mainly to carry out repairs to
the vehicles and for training. The troops spent an intensive period
in camp, sleeping in tents and lean-tos, becoming accustomed to the
Russian countryside. Meanwhile, the tracked vehicles and tanks
arrived by rail in their assembly area, where they were unloaded and
made ready.
The deadline for the great summer offensive was not far off. On
24 June, marching by night, the units moved farther east, quite near
the former main line of resistance where the German infantry had
been sitting out an almost peaceful positional war since the winter
battles. On the other side the Soviets had been especially quiet the
last weeks and months. Their artillery was virtually silent and they
mounted only occasional patrols. The German infantry had the
feeling that the positions opposite them were weakly manned, as if
the enemy suspected something of the coming attack.
When the attack order for the following day arrived at the I.D. GD's
divisional command post in Wjasowoje, northeast of Schtschigry, on
27 June 1942, all that was left to do was to issue instructions
directing the units to move into their planned jumping-off positions.
These final movements prior to the attack took place in the ghostly
darkness of the night of 27/28 June, occasionally lit by the light of
a descending parachute flare. The Russian air force was active,
especially the night harassment aircraft. The German soldiers had
dubbed these "Nhmaschirte" (sewing machines) because of their
low speed, almost noiseless approach and style of bombing. The
flashes of exploding bombs were everywhere; many houses and
vehicles went up in flames. One stick of bombs hit the GD Panzer
Battalion's fuel dump, which went up with a tremendous explosion.
In a desperate effort the vehicles were pulled away from the danger
zone, but all of the fuel was lost. The bomb hits on the train of 7th
Company/ II Battalion/I.R. GD 1, which was in waiting positions
farther to the rear, had far sadder consequences: the company's
well-liked senior NCO, Hauptfeldwebel Lange, was killed as were
Uffz. Riechert, Ogefr. Frohne, the company tailor and three other
men. Nine soldiers were wounded. It was a serious loss, of which the
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combat units found out only several hours later. Twenty-one vehicles
were more or less seriously damaged and initially out of action.
In the meantime, the individual companies moved forward on foot
into the attack positions one after another, assembled there and
prepared themselves for the morning attack.
Led by its I and III Battalions, I.R. GD 1 reached the positions on
the west bank of the stream that flowed through the village of
Polewoje. The regiment's forward command post was set up in
Polewoje itself. Pressed close together, the individual companies
assembled, occupied the existing positions and brought up sufficient
ammunition so as to be ready for the opening barrage planned for
dawn. The first objective was Dubrowka. Thought to be heavily
fortified, it lay on the road if it could be called such to
Tschermissinowo on the Tim River. Patrols by the infantry units
which had manned the positions earlier revealed the following picture
of the enemy fortifications in Dubrowka: images typical of a positional war, little different from those of the First World War, but
unfamiliar to the soldiers of this war. To all appearances the Russian
defences appeared to consist of strong bunkers and field fortifications
with wide areas rendered impassable by belts of mines. The reality
would later prove somewhat different, but who could know that at
the time? In any case, mines, which were a commonly used defensive
weapon in positional warfare, appeared to play a large role in this
sector. As a result, the Pioniers of the heavy companies and the
regiment's Pionier Company were placed in the front lines with their
mine detectors so they could begin the job of clearing the mines
straight away.
To the left of the attacking battalions of I.R. GD 1, near and north
of Polewoje, the men of I.R. GD 2 were also preparing for the attack.
The objective of III Battalion under Major Kohlhaas was to attack
along the SchtschigryTimVoronezh road and railroad and take
the bridges over the Tim in a surprise attack. Immediately behind,
the men of I Battalion assembled in order to immediately exploit and
enlarge the planned penetration into the enemy positions and also
protect the rear of III Battalion. Command of I Btl./I.R. GD 2 lay in
the hands of the former commander of 5th Company, Hptm.
Bethge.
The Artillery Regiment GD moved into the battery positions which
it had selected several days before and occupied firing positions.
Forward observers were sent to those companies which would be
employed at the points of main effort, in order to provide the
necessary covering fire. Telephone lines were laid, wireless communications established and the Armoured Observation Battery,
which had played such a major role in scouting enemy firing
positions, was moved in for other duties. The artillery regiment's
command post was in Nikoljewka, from where the necessary
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villages farther forward. It was here that the wounded were brought
first and where they received their initial treatment. Elements of the
medical services were with the infantry companies at the front. Men
of the medical service administered first aid in the front lines; the
lives of the wounded frequently depended on their skill and bravery.
Also involved in the preparations for the attack were the columns
of the GD Supply Service, which set up the necessary ammunition,
supply and fuel dumps. It was there that the materiel was issued, and
from there that the company supply trains picked up everything
needed by the fighting units to carry out their assignments. The heavy
trucks of the supply columns were under way every night fetching
the necessary supplies from the large supply bases in the rear.
18,000 men were crammed into a relatively small area, ready to
carry out the orders of the headquarters. The companies of both
regiments stood poised like a spearpoint at the enemy's main line
of resistance. Spread out behind them were the reserves, backed up
by tanks and artillery. In their midst were the vehicles of the combat
units, assembled and waiting to pick up the men after a successful
break into the enemy positions, waiting until they were finally on the
advance again with the enemy put to flight. Behind the main body
were the headquarters, the columns, the reconnaissance troops, the
flak artillery, the helpers in battle. With them too were the first units
of the Reich Labour Service (RAD). Once the military colossus had
been set in motion, it was the job of the RAD to repair and reinforce
roadways and bridges to create the highways over which to supply
the fighting units. Everything had been thought of. A gigantic
apparatus stood ready to begin the attack at 02.15 on 28 June 1942.
It was past midnight. The men were enjoying their last hours of
rest in their foxholes, but lights still burned in the headquarters of the
regiments and the division. The Commander-in Chief of Army Group
B, Generaloberst Freiherr von Weichs, as well as the commander of
the Fourth Panzer Army, Generaloberst Hoth, were at the division
headquarters. They had gone over the division's attack plan
thoroughly and had familiarised themselves with the condition of the
units. The Generals were prepared to experience the beginning of
the attack with the I.R. GD. But they had not come just to visit the
division's headquarters, but to see the men as well. Gen.Oberst Hoth
and his Executive Officer, Obit, von Papen, roved among the
companies of I.R. GD 2, making contact with the men. Obit. Kuehn
of 1st Company, I.R. GD 2 recalled:
"I had just finished a conference with my platoon leaders in a hut
when a man came in with the report that the Gen.Oberst was there!
I ran outside and reported, while the men some sleeping, some
lying near their foxholes and weapons, busy amongst themselves
passed the word from section to section, 'the Herr Generaloberst is
coming!', and jumped up to report. The little General and his
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Executive Officer, who was almost two heads taller, came through
our assembly area on foot, motioning vigorously to the men not to
get up: 'Remain sitting children, remain as you are!!'
He recognised me when I reported and asked most cordially if we
had completed our march into the assembly area without loss to air
attack. During the brief discussion I noticed that the General's glance
kept shifting to the soldiers standing around us. Thoughts of the
imminent attack and the unavoidable losses obviously weighed
heavily upon him.
Then, somewhat abruptly, he asked, 'Do you think all will go well
in the morning?' I answered, 'As far as we are concerned, it should
go well and everyone will certainly do his best.'
At the same time the thought struck me that from this question by
the Gen.Oberst I had learned for the first time for certain that the
attack was going to take place the next morning.
Finally, Gen.Oberst Hoth suggested that it was not going to be
easy and once again said, 'Hopefully, all will go well.' Again he gave
me his hand and wished me and my men well."
Another event that took place that night demonstrated the level of
morale among the young soldiers and their leaders. It took place in
the 4th Platoon of the same 1st Company/I.R. GD 2:
"During a meeting of platoon leaders Oberfeldwebel Kozak of 4th
Platoon reported that one of his men, a soldier since 1941 and
member of a machine gun team, was the last of four brothers left
alive. The others had fallen in the latest battles. Schtze Eggerth had
nevertheless implored not to be sent back to the vehicles during the
coming attack. He wanted to be there, even though he had a boil
on his arm which made movement extremely difficult. He insisted
that he wanted to go along anyway.
I already knew Schtze Eggerth. He had always struck me as a
bright, enthusiastic lad. I decided that he could stay with his gun for
the time being. However, if the boil didn't get better he would have
to be sent to the rear. Schtze Eggerth survived the attack and the
subsequent movements of the company and proved himself to be a
brave fellow. He died a hero's death in the later battles of 1942
the last of four brothers."
Chapter Three
Breakthrough to the Don
As the first light of the approaching day dawned shortly before
02.00 on the morning of 28 June 1942, with a thin mist rising from
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wreckage and ruins not a house was left standing, not a fence,
only smoking timbers and smouldering rubble. The companies of
I.R. GD 1 assembled in the remains of the village and prepared to
initiate the pursuit of the enemy in the direction of the Tim.
III Battalion/I.R. GD 2 had the most important assignment of the
day. The men of the 12th and 13th Companies, backed up by
infantry Pioniers and anti-tank guns of 15th Company, prepared to
move out, while 11th Company, reinforced by a battery of assault
guns from the Assault Gun Battalion GD and mounted in trucks,
waited in the bottom land north of Polewoje. Once a breakthrough
had been achieved, these motorised units would initiate the pursuit.
The objective of the attacking companies was to push past the north
side of Dubrowka to the left to the railway line and clear the terrain
on both sides of the tracks. As soon as they had broken through the
enemy positions, the mounted infantry of 11th Company was to
drive through the gap and capture the Tim bridges in a coup de
main. Despite the enemy's quick reaction with rifle and mortar fire
the attacking companies broke into the enemy positions with surprising ease.
I Battalion/I.R. GD 2's assignment was to follow close behind III
Battalion and clear the remaining enemy positions. Assembled in
depth, the battalion moved out of its assembly area into a narrow
ravine which ran across the southern part of the regiment's lane of
attack to within about 400 metres of the enemy's main line of
resistance. 1st Company led the way, with 1st Platoon (Lt. von Kleist)
on the right, 2nd Platoon (Lt. Jobski) on the left and 4th (MG.)
Company and the other rifle companies close behind in reserve. The
enemy defensive fire there was noticeably weak and uncoordinated.
A few shells burst on either side of the ravine without inflicting any
damage. The attackers gained the impression that the Soviets were
not expecting an attack at the ravine.
Following a preparatory artillery barrage, 1st Company moved into
the weakly defended enemy position and occupied the bunkers.
Knee-deep field positions between the bunkers presented no
obstacle. The only evidence of the enemy's presence was a few dead,
victims of the German artillery fire.
I.R. GD 2's alignment had III Battalion on the left, with I Battalion
on its right. Ill Battalion had smashed into and through the first
enemy field positions and was now rapidly advancing in the direction
of the Tim, disregarding the remaining enemy positions. The first
vehicles of the mounted 11th Company became visible as they slowly
assembled behind III Battalion and set out for the railway line. I
Battalion, echeloned to the right rear, followed. It moved across
terrain which consisted of fields divided by hedgerows, in which
enemy mortar and anti-tank positions were still visible. These had to
be cleared as quickly as possible. Everywhere lay items of equipment,
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first the attempts met with no success. When one assault gun finally
did reach the bridge, it slipped over the side of the embankment and
became stuck crosswise, completely blocking the entrance to the
span. The other vehicles were lined up behind it and could move
neither forwards nor backwards.
While the other rifle companies set about crossing the bridge on
foot, tragedy struck 11th Company. Lt. Kersting, leader of 15th
Company's infantry gun platoon, which had accompanied 11th
Company on its successful advance, described what happened:
"After crossing the Tim we advanced about 2,000 metres farther
east to a ridge near Swoboda-Poshidajewka. There the Russians had
dug trenches, which we occupied, as we were expecting an enemy
counterattack at any minute. Meanwhile, the Russians assembled in
a forward-projecting ravine farther to the left.
I was just about to bring the guns into position and set up the
observation post, when nine horizontal and dive bombers approached. We immediately spread out our orange-coloured air
identification panels as well as swastika flags and set off smoke
signals. In spite of this we were hit by a stick of bombs. After the
smoke and dust cleared an initial count revealed that the infantry gun
(light) platoon was left with a strength of one officer, an N C O and
eight men. Moreover, there was only one gun ready for action, a
Kbelwagen and a damaged motorcycle; everything else was
smashed. The human losses were not insignificant, especially since
the other companies also suffered dead and wounded.
In a later discussion with the flying control officer involved, I was
told that the bomber group had been assigned to bomb the hill at a
designated time in support of Kampfgruppe Kohlhaas. At the time
the aircraft approached the target, it was considered impossible that
the high ground was already in our hands.
The pilots thought the laying out of cloth panels to be a Russian
ruse, because vehicles had been seen standing at the bridge (likely
tanks or assault guns) which were still showing the sign for 'front
line'. In addition to the panels and flags, the pilot of the last aircraft
saw white signal flares being fired as the bombs were being dropped.
He pulled up from his dive and did not release his bombs."
These losses, inflicted by supporting weapons and caused by
human error, and therefore especially painful for those involved,
were very heavy: sixteen dead, frightfully mutilated, and a large
number of wounded. The first medical officer to arrive was Dr.
Kleine. Among the wounded he treated were Gefreiter Wilger,
Gefreiter Eul and Oberschtzen Kppen, Jungkurth and Gerlich.
Some were so badly wounded that they died hours or days later.
Among them were Oberfeldwebel Weischede, wearer of the German
Cross in Gold, who died on 29 June and Gefr. Lorenz, who
succumbed to his wounds on 30 June. The battalion commander,
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Major Kohlhaas, was not quite so seriously wounded, but he was still
forced to turn over command of the unit to Hptm. Prss.
The major success of capturing the bridge over the Tim River and
the associated tactical, even strategic, gains were overshadowed by
these events. It would be a long time before 11th Company and the
attached elements of 15th Company recovered from this shock.
For the outstanding action at the Tim bridge, which was soon
named Obstlt. Kohlhaas Bridge, the commander of III Battalion/I.R.
GD 2 was awarded the Knight's Cross.
While the forward units of 11th Company temporarily went over
to the defensive in anticipation of a Soviet counterattack, elements
of 12th and 13th Companies moved in to reinforce the bridgehead.
Meanwhile, with the taking of the Tim bridge, the signal was given
for the waiting reconnaissance battalion to move across the river and
reconnoitre the territory beyond. Its assignment was to move quickly
to establish bridgeheads across the Kschen and open the way to the
east for the division. The battalion's vehicles moved past the columns
at high speed and reached the bridge over the Tim at 08.30. There
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD found dense columns of vehicles
stalled in front of the bridge. Traffic was backed up because of the
steep approach to the bridge. Also, vehicles could cross only slowly
because of the railroad tracks. Hours later, at approximately 11.45,
the 2nd Squadron was able to get its armoured cars across the river.
The battalion's commander, Major von Usedom, decided not to wait
for the rest of the battalion, but to push on to the Kschen near
Nikolajewka (Point 221.3) with the armoured cars and establish a
bridgehead there. Kampfgruppe von Usedom drove cross-country
in the burning heat and reached Nikolajewka at about 13.00. The
bridge there had been destroyed, but a small bridgehead was
established. Later, at about 16.00, tanks and assault guns arrived to
expand and consolidate the bridgehead. Meanwhile, the Pioniers of
5th Squadron's Pionier Platoon built a new bridge for the vehicles
to cross.
From the command standpoint, the most desirable situation following the penetration of a fortified position had been achieved: the
division's motorised and armoured elements were advancing and
pursuing the fleeing enemy forces.
Meanwhile, after a long march the infantry had halted to regroup
and wait for the arrival of its vehicles. The battalions of I.R. GD 1
rested on the battlefield for three hours after reaching the Tim near
Serenowka. Then, since the vehicles were delayed because of the
blown bridge, the troops set out on foot in long columns towards
their next objective, the Kschen. The pace of the march was slow in
the parching midday heat. After the exertions of the morning, the
tempo of the advance was reduced. By the time the first elements
of I.R. GD 1 reached the Kschen in the early evening, they had
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For the following day's operations it was vital that the division
reinforce the von Usedom advance detachment, which was farthest
east, with tanks and send it towards the southeast at dawn. That
night, at approximately 23.45, orders were radioed to the reinforced
Reconnaissance Battalion GD to link up with the tanks and next
morning advance through Jekaterinowka, Alexandrowka, Werch.
Graiworonka and Gologulowka towards Babanino as far as Hill
249.4 and interdict the Staryj OskolKastornojeJelez railway line.
The advance detachment was to make the necessary preparations
during the night.
That night, however, it rained heavily, transforming the
countryside, and especially the roads, into a bottomless morass. The
muddy conditions made motor transport extremely difficult and
delayed significantly the movement of vehicles to the regiments. The
situation was aggravated by the large numbers of damaged or
destroyed bridges which had to be repaired or replaced.
While the two infantry regiments waited for their vehicles until
08.00 and 09.00, the von Usedom advance detachment set out at
02.30 to link up with 2nd Squadron which was farther to the east.
The von Usedom group set out again at 08.00, after waiting for the
roads to dry out somewhat, and reached the Grjasnaja near
Alexandrowka without meeting any resistance. The bridge there had
been destroyed, however, and the advance halted. The Pioniers
immediately went to work. Elements of the Reconnaissance Battalion
GD secured the hills to the east. While waiting for completion of the
Alexandrowka bridge, a radio message came in from division. The
battalion was to form a reinforced battle group led by the commanding officer, which was to set out immediately for the city of Kschen
on the Kschen river in order to take the rail bridge there intact in
cooperation with the 9th Panzer Division.
The 2nd Squadron, reinforced by a tank platoon from Panzer
Battalion GD, a 2 cm flak platoon and an eight-wheeled armoured
car patrol this in the lead set out towards the northeast at noon
under the command of Major von Usedom. It was roughly 13.00;
the route led across completely open terrain. Far ahead was the
heavy patrol under the command of Wachtmeister Schmarbeck, who
described his assignment:
"At roughly 12.15 on 29 June I was given an assignment which
read as follows:
1. You will drive ten minutes ahead of the battle group and reconnoitre as far as Kschen.
2. A net of field fortifications is to be expected before Kschen.
3. Are the bridges in Kschen still intact? Are they occupied by the
enemy?
4. You will secure the bridge reached until the battle group arrives.
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deliver it to the front. The drivers were given no rest. Too often the
individual columns encountered groups of enemy stragglers on their
nocturnal journeys. These bands of Russian soldiers, separated from
their units, roamed the countryside and on occasion ambushed the
supply columns. More than once the men of the supply units had to
use their weapons and defend themselves against these bands at
some lonely, isolated spot and fight their way through. It was thanks
to their largely unrecognised efforts that the division command was
able to plan ahead without worrying about supply.
When the infantry went into positions on the heights on the far
side of the Olym for a brief rest on 30 June, the division was able to
report to XXXXVIII Panzer Corps that it had crossed the Staryj
OskolKastornjeJelez railway line and had established a
bridgehead across the Olym with a reinforced company. The leading
elements of the division units of I.R. GD 1, together with elements
of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD and the Panzer Battalion GD
extended like a spearpoint deep into enemy territory. Its flanks
were open on both sides, because the neighbouring divisions had
not kept up. On the right, the 24th Panzer Division had been held
up near Gorschetschnoje. On the left, the spearheads of the 9th
Panzer Division were in and due east of the city of Kschen. The
Soviet forces held up the division's advance until evening when they
abandoned the city and fled towards the east.
The most forward positions at the railway embankment were
clearly visible in the rising morning heat of 1 July 1942. Riflemen
occupied holes and hollows on the east side of the tracks, while
anti-tank guns had been set up at strategic points to protect against
the sudden appearance of enemy tanks. Between the bushes were
the Kbels and trucks, the infantry's transport. The men stretched
in the morning sun and, looking around, saw nothing. All was quiet,
with only a few smouldering wrecks of Soviet tanks to foul the air
and recall the battle of the day before. The tanks of the Panzer
Battalion GD were still taking on fuel and ammunition. Most of the
crews were washing, putting away their bedding or beginning their
breakfast. But like so many others, this day, too, was to begin with
a surprise. Feldwebel Rapp of the 2nd Company/Panzer Battalion
GD described what took place:
"Following a cool night, during which we had secured the railroad
crossing taken the evening before, the first rays of the sun began to
warm us. Between and around us lay the wrecks of the enemy tanks
which had fallen victim to our guns yesterday. They had burned out
during the night and a few were still smouldering.
Beyond the railway embankment were the positions of our antitank guns. We were just about to eat breakfast when, suddenly, a
cry rang out: 'Enemy tanks from the right and ahead!' We leapt into
our tanks and fired up the engines. In seconds we were ready to
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the village and was not about to enter as there was still fire coming
in from enemy tanks in the village.
Gefr. Schindler's car came under fire from the left side of the
village, but he was able to avoid being hit by aggressive zigzagging.
Without a moment's hesitation he drove towards the source of the
trouble. My car and that of Gefr. Hoffmann sought another position
and raced towards the village's main entrance. Then, suddenly,
ahead of us on the road was an anti-tank barrier fashioned from
every sort of farm implement. Our infantry now arrived, however,
and we pushed the pile of junk to the side. My driver stepped on the
gas as an enemy tank appeared directly ahead of us. We swung our
weapon around and made for the tank. The enemy was so surprised
that he failed to take any action. This tank too was knocked out.
Immediately afterwards another appeared: two shots were enough
and it, too, was dispatched.
This rapid success gave me full confidence in my weapon and,
once at work, I didn't want to halt, but continued on into the village.
It was rather comic the way we bellowed at each other because, of
course, our hearing had suffered from the crash of the guns. But
everything went like clockwork; the drivers reacted to the slightest
gesture.
In any case, there was little time for reflection as another Russian
tank now appeared with another in tow. I quickly moved the car into
a favourable position and opened fire. This shot, too, was on target.
It was the fourth tank we had put out of action.
My ammunition supply was running low. I therefore sought out the
other cars and was just approaching when Gefr. Hoffmann's car was
threatened by a 44-tonne Russian tank from a range of 50 metres.
I pressed the trigger. Damn! The gun had jammed! Realising the
situation, my driver immediately brought the car out of the tank's
field of fire. The steering must have failed on Hoffmann's car,
because it blew up in front of our eyes. The crew was lucky; the men
were able to bail out just in time and escaped uninjured. I picked up
my comrades as well as three wounded infantry and drove to the
rear for more ammunition.
On the way I came upon Gefr. Schindler's car in some bushes. He
had just knocked out his second tank. I also saw that the infantry
had entered the village and occupied it without resistance.
On my return the battalion commander, Major von Usedom,
expressed his appreciation when we reported the destruction of
seven enemy tanks. Further recognition came in the award of the
Iron Cross, First Class."
I.R. GD 1 gathered in its assembly area in the ravines and valleys
north of the road to Jassenki, while the artillery batteries and rocket
launchers moved into their firing positions. These laid down effective
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fire on recognised targets and soon there was a great deal of fire and
smoke coming from the village.
Meanwhile, II and III Battalions and IV (Heavy) Battalion of I.R.
GD 2 had advanced as far as the area between Gologulowka and
the railway line near Knjasnaja Olym and had set up a defensive line
there, guarding the division's southern flank. The regiment's job
there was to prevent enemy forces, especially tanks, from breaking
into I.R. GD 1's attack preparations near Kulewka.
I Battalion/I.R. GD 2 was operating independently of the other
battalions. Its assignment remained to cover the northern flank of
the division. In the meantime, supported by Hptm. Adam's assault
gun battery, it had reached the broad valley of the Olym near
Ivanovka. After crossing the marshy bottomland, the reinforced
battalion went into position on the heights to the east. The 3rd
Company established a bridgehead and occupied the high ground
south of Schirokij. Its right wing followed the course of the Olym,
while its left lay along the stream which flowed into the Olym near
Ivanovka. The area around this stream was very marshy and therefore impassable. Attached to the company was a heavy machine gun
platoon and a heavy mortar section from the 4th (MG.) Company,
as well as a light infantry gun platoon of the 5th (Hvy.) Company.
Due north of Ivanovka, the 2nd Company under Obit. Dr. Gnther
went into positions on both sides of the railway line and the road
which ran parallel to it with its front facing north. On its left was 1st
Company with its front facing north and west. With its remaining
machine guns and mortars, 4th (MG.) Company occupied positions
on and behind the heights west of Ivanovka as did the howitzers and
an 8.8 cm flak battery. The assault gun battery was held back in a
valley near Ivanovka in case of an attack by enemy tanks.
In the course of the late morning a single Soviet tank appeared on
the heights east of the Olym on the road to Kutschugry. Fired on by
the flak artillery, it quickly disappeared to the east. A short time later
three 42-tonne KV-I tanks appeared on the road west of the railway
line, rolling towards the positions of 2nd Company. The anti-tank
rifles of the 5th (Hvy.) Squadron were able to score hits on the
intruders but these could not penetrate the thick armour of the
Russian tanks. Meanwhile, a platoon of the 2nd Assault Gun Battery
under Hptm. Adam arrived. The commander of 2nd Company, Obit.
Dr. Gnther, jumped onto the command vehicle to go along.
Company messenger Gefr. Mebes described what then took place:
"Tanks have been reported! I crawled forward to the chief who
was staring straight ahead. Barely 200 metres in front of us in a
cornfield stood a T-34, turret hatch open and on the look-out. Obit.
Gnther turned quickly and shouted, 'Mebes, run quickly to the heavy
anti-tank rifle at the railway embankment and report: tank ahead,
2nd Company requests support.' The chief gave me the order with
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shown, in the early morning. Orders from division for 2 July assigned
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD to secure Hill 242.4 in the eastern
section of Jassenki.
No significant combat operations were reported by I.R. GD 2 on
the division's south flank; however, considerable enemy concentrations, especially tanks, were observed near and in Gorschetschnoje.
Patrols also reported field positions and bunkers. The 24th Panzer
Division, which had run up against stiff opposition near this village,
had bypassed Gorschetschnoje and resumed its advance towards the
east. A divisional order which was issued during the night of 1/2
July ordered I.R. GD 2 to eliminate this dangerous flanking threat to
the I.D. GD and the 24th Panzer Division. Battle Group Garski
consisting of I.R. GD 2 (less I Battalion), Assault Gun Battalion GD
(less one battery), Artillery Battalion GD with support from Panzer
Battalion GD, which was to attack from the northeast, as well as
elements of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1, which were to screen the
assembly area in the north assembled for the attack due west of
the railway line.
Early on the sunny morning of 2 July the infantry of Battle Group
Garski moved towards Gorschetschnoje from the north. They were
met by fire, especially from tanks, from the forward positions and
the village itself. One of the first shells killed the commander of II
Battalion/I.R. GD 2, Major Feucker. Hauptmann von Ltzau, the
CO of 10th Company, took over command of the battalion.
The escorting assault guns were soon involved in a tank battle
which resulted in a considerable success for the attackers. However,
the battle proved more difficult than expected; artillery and repeated
Stuka attacks gave the attackers relief from time to time. An
Oberschtze of 13th Company/I.R. GD 2 reported his experiences
of the beginning of the battle, the most difficult of the offensive so
far:
'It was a hot day; we attacked the Russians early in the morning.
We ran into a major tank battle in which a T-34 came towards our
section 1st Section/2nd Platoon/I3th Company under the command of Uffz. Klavun to make us all into apple sauce. First, I
knocked all the mounted Russian infantry off the tank with my light
machine gun; then Uffz. Klavun disposed of the tank with a concentrated charge. The T-34 began to burn. As we advanced towards
the railway embankment we succeeded in eliminating three enemy
anti-tank gun crews, partly in close-in fighting. To the left in front of
the embankment was another enemy nest with a light machine gun.
I said to Uffz. Klavun: 'I'll take care of it!' But the Bolsheviks defended
themselves desperately. There were five Russians altogether, of
which four were killed and one taken prisoner. He was a Caucasian,
a student.
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We then moved against the level crossing, which was very difficult
and caused us to see red. A number of Russian tanks and anti-aircraft
guns were positioned there. We ran about like hares. The Klavun
Section succeeded in putting three more enemy tanks out of action
in close-in fighting; then we were through.
Uffz. Hans Klavun was our section leader. Following the action at
the railway embankment on 28 June 1942, he was promoted to
Feldwebel for bravery, but he remained our section leader. He was
a foundry worker from the Bochum mining district. Hans Klavun
wore the German Cross in Gold. Today he is in a hospital as a result
of a serious head wound he suffered later. For him there are only
memories of his comrades and the battles in the vastness of the East."
As a result of a flanking thrust from the northeast by Panzer
Battalion GD, an attempt by the Russians to leave the village of
Gorschetschnoje to the east failed. A total of 51 Soviet tanks were
destroyed, a proud success for the heavy weapons in which the heavy
infantry weapons and artillery played a significant role. Elements of
four Soviet tank brigades, brought in to the area fresh from Stalingrad
and the Urals, went down to destruction there.
In the meantime, it was not exactly quiet for the men of I.R. GD
1 securing the hills east of Kulewka. They could not fail to notice
that enemy tanks with infantry were assembling in the ravines and
valleys, especially north of the village, apparently for an attack. Was
it their intention to recover the village lost the day before? Whatever
the Soviet intentions, the men of I.R. GD 1 felt safe, especially since
the bulk of the heavy weapons were in position.
It was apparent that the tank units of the Soviet relief force had
not been completely destroyed and therefore might yet pose a threat
to the division's advance. Therefore, I.R. GD 2 was allowed only a
brief rest following the capture of Gorschetschnoje. By noon the
regiment's units were already on their way by vehicle into the area
due west of Jassenki. Also, I Battalion, which until now had been
protecting the northern flank, was returned to the regiment. Only
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD was still active from its security
positions, mounting numerous patrols to the east and northeast
throughout 2 July in an effort to determine the enemy's strength and
movements. The results of the reconnaissance were as follows:
"Stronger enemy tank forces are still in the area east of Jassenki,
primarily in the forests near DubratnojeNowosselowka -Rasbrod
Gussewka and northeast, as well as dug-in infantry in the Kutschugry
area."
Notwithstanding this discovery, the division decided to resume the
advance to the east early the next morning. The fact that the
division's neighbour, the 24th Panzer Division, had already resumed
its advance to the east may have played a role in the decision, as
there was a friendly competition to be the first to reach the Don.
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could again be expected the next day before Voronezh. For the
enemy, too, it was vital to hold onto a bridgehead on the Don for
later operations. It was the aim of the German forces to force a
crossing over the Don and ensure the successful continuation of the
offensive.
For the Soviets the wide river and its marshy bottomland offered
a perfect opportunity to throw up a firm barricade in front of the
German attack. But did they have enough troops left to accomplish
this? Would they be able to move their reserves, which had been
partially used up in front of the Don, into positions along the river
in time? Were the powers of resistance and morale of these Soviet
units adequate to hold on in the face of a determined attack? These
were questions that would soon be answered.
The Germans had to stake everything on preventing the battered
Soviet units from settling down and regrouping. Their spearheads
must force the crossing against the last Soviet units; they must strive
at any cost to capture the crossing points a road and a rail bridge
- undamaged. The GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division's objective
was clear: capture the rail bridge over the Don west of Voronezh.
Once again the fast mobile elements of the division took the lead,
with the Reconnaissance Battalion and Major Pssel's tanks forming
the advance detachment. This set out around 04.00 with the initial
objective of Chertkova.
With the Panzer Battalion GD in the lead, followed by the Reconnaissance Battalion's 2nd (SPW) Squadron, the force reached its
objective of Chertkova at approximately 07.00 without meeting any
resistance. Almost parallel to the advance guard, but farther south,
could be seen the spearheads of the 24th Panzer Division. Several
units of the I.D. GD had crossed that division's advance road during
the night. The 24th Panzer was also striving with all haste towards
the Don in the general area of the village of Gremjatsches and north.
It appeared that it would be the first to reach the river.
Low-hanging clouds filled the sky and light rain fell, transforming
the dust on the roads and paths into clinging, slippery mud. The
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division's advance detachment pushed
on past Ustje, which appeared to be free of the enemy, in the
direction of Petino. The German artillery, which had meanwhile
driven up into position, opened fire on fleeing Russian columns on
the far steep bank of the Don, which was now visible. The bridge
which the maps indicated in this general area was not to be found;
it must lay farther to the north. Therefore, following a brief halt, the
advance detachment drove northwards in its previous formation.
Rain continued to fall and road conditions continued to deteriorate.
Now and again a vehicle slid off into the ditch and had to be pushed
back onto the road by the prime movers.
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The next objective, the village of Dewiza on the Dewiza River, was
reached in the late morning. The bridge there had already been
blown. There was a temporary halt while the Pioniers went to work
to repair the span. In the meantime the sun broke through and slowly
began to dry up the roads.
Immediately after the departure of the advance detachment, the
spearhead of I.R. GD 2 had set off to follow in its vehicles. 2nd
Company took the lead in I Battalion and set off inasmuch as the
roads allowed at a high pace. When the leading vehicles arrived
outside Ustje there were no enemy troops to be seen. The advancing
Germans discovered, however, that some Soviet forces had halted
in the forest north of Petino and that there was a brisk flow of ferry
traffic moving troops from the west to the east bank of the river. This
action by the Soviets gave notice that they had no intention of holding
a bridgehead on the west bank of the Don. The 3rd Company under
Obit. Mehrens received orders to drive to the ferry landing as quickly
as possible and establish a bridgehead across the river there. The
regimental commander, who was under orders to capture the
railroad bridge, realised that the steep approaches to the ferries made
the site unsuitable for bridge building. He therefore turned 1st and
3rd Companies further north and gave them the task of capturing
the railroad bridge.
Initially, I.R. GD 1, led by II Battalion under Hptm. von Courbire,
followed its sister regiment along the road. Then, advancing towards
Dewiza, it moved up on the left. It was essential to the division
command that the movements of the advance regiment (I.R. GD 2),
which had the decisive task of capturing the bridge, be screened to
the north and northwest. Under the pressure of the southwards-advancing German motorised and tank units, the bulk of the Soviet
forces had been displaced northwards. As a result, the 3rd Infantry
Division (mot.) had run into determined resistance and overcoming
it was to be no easy task. On 4 July 1942 the division was located
near Latnaya, east of Werch. Turowo and on the hills north of Now.
Olschanka, its front facing north. Staggered to the left rear to the
I.D. G D , it fought its way slowly towards the Don.
Naturally, the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division was striving to
be the first to reach the Don and hoped to capture one of the two
bridges over the river. At noon its attack deployment was as follows:
on the right and nearest to the Don was I.R. GD 2. Leading the
regiment was I Battalion, which was engaged in clearing the wooded
ridge over which the Russians were fleeing to the ferries. Farther to
the right, the 24th Panzer Division had succeeded in getting several
patrols across the Don in inflatable boats at approximately 10.00.
On the left was II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 as well as the main body of
the regiment in the area of the Dewiza. In Dewiza itself were Major
Pssel's tanks and the Reconnaissance Battalion G D , which were
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Company and its crew fled. Despite the heavy fire, several men
succeeded in reaching the mined approach to the bridge and set foot
on the bridge itself. There, however, they were met by extremely
heavy rifle fire which made all movement impossible. Several men
on the bridge were wounded or killed. Snipers on the far bank kept
the bridge under fire. The German infantry on the bridge were forced
to withdraw to cover. Platoon leader Lt. von Kleist carried a
severely-wounded messenger to safety on his back. All subsequent
attempts to approach the bridge failed in the face of the considerable
sniper fire.
I Battalion/I.R. GD 2 halted and moved all of its heavy weapons
forward, which went into position around the approach to the bridge.
Assault guns were sent forward to pin down the enemy in bunkers
which had been spotted on the far side of the river. The situation
took an unexpected turn for the worse late in the afternoon while
preparations for a new attack were still under way. Steered by an
unseen hand, the heavily-damaged armoured train, which was still
burning, began to move towards the bridge and drove slowly onto
the span. The bridge's wooden planking, which had been dried by
the sun, was immediately set on fire by the glowing coals and burning
pieces of wood which fell from the blazing rail cars. Soon the bridge's
iron girders began to glow. The bridge became an inferno and, as it
was certain that the girders would soon lose their load-bearing
capacity in the heat, any further sacrifices in an effort to capture the
bridge were senseless. The regimental commander, who was on the
spot in a sand pit, ordered a temporary halt while the possibilities of
another way across this time using inflatable boats was explored.
In any case, the approach to the bridge was secured for the time
being.
Meanwhile, the reinforced Reconnaissance Battalion GD had
succeeded in crossing the Dewiza. It set out to the north in the
direction of Ssemiluki but, together with the tanks, was stopped by
an anti-tank ditch in front of the village and became involved in heavy
fighting with enemy forces. After learning of the unsuccessful attempts to take the railroad bridge the battalion advanced northwards.
Not until evening did it succeed in penetrating the southern section
of Ssemiluki. At approximately 18.00 the battalion halted and
secured in front of the village, as II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 had
meanwhile arrived and was assembling for an attack on the village.
Unaware of the situation, groups of Soviet troops repeatedly tried
to reach the road and rail bridges across the Don from the west.
Some dug in and put up determined resistance, while others resigned
themselves to their fate and surrendered. For the German units the
situation was extremely uncertain, as they might come under fire
from any side at any time. The greatest disturbance was caused by
several T-34s which were driving about the countryside. Apparently
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seeking a way across the river, they had stumbled into German forces
in the process. All of these enemy movements on the west bank of
the Don were caused by the pressure being exerted by the 3rd
Infantry Division (mot.), which was pushing slowly but steadily
towards the river, driving the Soviet forces before it.
A typical example of the mix-up between friend and foe, which
also affected the artillery units, was the experience of the Freyschlag
gun of 2nd Battery/ I Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD:
"Scarcely had a bombing attack by several enemy IL-2s ended,
when we heard the shout: Tanks from behind! Damn! there they
were, rolling towards us!
There were one two three four, scarcely 500 meters behind
us. All T-34s. They appeared not to have spotted us, but rather they
turned their turrets to the right and sprayed shells on the surrounding
terrain where some of the vehicles of the regiment's supply train
were parked.
Thank God we had placed one gun in position facing west. We
had done so because we were aware of the unclear situation to our
left, but also to secure the level crossing.
The tanks must soon be close to the gun, but there was no
movement there, none at all. Were those fellows asleep over there?
Hadn't they noticed anything? The battery officer considered briefly
and ordered: right gun about 180 degrees! Target first enemy tank
armour-piercing ammunition fire! A direct hit but it was on
a telephone pole that was standing only 50 metres in front of us.
Ha, ha! We grinned at one another. The gunner had completely
failed to notice it.
Then, finally, there was movement around the single gun at the
railway embankment. We could see two men. There: it fired!! The
second enemy tank burst into flames. Another shot and the third
tank was finished; it was smoking! The turret hatch flipped open and
the crew scrambled out. Then more shots at the fourth tank, which
had just started to roll backwards and it, too, was done for.
Our gun continued to fire, now with impact-fused shells, on the
fleeing Russians who had been seeking a breakthrough behind their
tanks. In a few moments they were destroyed by a single l.FH 18
with a two-man crew gunner Obgefr. Freyschlag and 2nd Cannoneer Gefr. Willi Mller! Hours later four rings were painted on the
gun barrel as symbols of the successful destruction of four enemy
tanks.
A note: After the first three shots, the rest of the gun crew
Cannoneers 3, 4, 5 and the gun commander, Uffz. Mller had
scrambled forwards from the rail embankment, so that at the end of
the interlude the complete crew was there. The joy over the four
tank kills was great. Gun commander Mller, known as 'Communist
Mller' on account of his political views, made his report and was
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awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, while the rest of the crew
received the Iron Cross, Second Class. Only gunner Freyschlag
received nothing; he had already been awarded the Iron Cross,
Second Class for an action at Jelnja in 1941.
A few months later, however, it got around that 'Communist
Mller' had ordered his crew to take cover behind the embankment.
His crew had obeyed with the exception of Freyschlag and Gefr.
Mller. In spite of the order to stay put they ran to their gun and
acted without their commander. Obgefr. Freyschlag was later
awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class and promoted to gun commander.
'Communist Mller' was transferred out and became ammunition
supply officer! He stopped wearing his Iron Cross, but put it on again
later in Cottbus and Guben with the replacement unit! (Today he
is an officer with the Volkspolizei in Leipzig, East Germany.) That
brave lad Gefr. Mller was killed near Guben in March 1945."
Situations such as this occurred often in the sector at the railway
embankment before JanowischtscheSsemiluki and it demanded
total alertness from all involved in order to meet the challenge. In the
same area were the artillery batteries which were to support the
attack preparations by II/I.R. GD 1. The objectives of the attack:
Ssemiluki and perhaps the road bridge, as the rail bridge could not
be taken.
Leutnant von Prittwitz, a platoon leader in 7th Company/I.R. GD
1, described the development of the attack and the capture of the
road bridge over the Don. His account was written some time after
the events and fails to mention the other companies of the battalion,
all of which made a contribution to II Battalion's success:
'Time: 18.00.
After 7th Company, fighting ahead of the units of II Battalion, had
taken Hill 166.2 by storm, it was given a new objective of the school
and church in Ssemiluki. In spite of bunkers and heavy enemy sniper
fire, the company, fighting ahead of and to the right of the battalion
with no communications, made good progress and reached its
objective.
Within sight of the Don the company took a short break. It was
organised as follows:
Forward on the right the Infantry Pionier Platoon from 10th
Company under Feldw. Wrede, a section from 1st Platoon, then 2nd
and 3rd Platoons; behind 2nd Platoon was the 4th (Hvy.) Platoon.
To 7th Company's left rear was 8th Company.
After the assault guns came forward and engaged the recognised
enemy targets, 1st Platoon was given the following assignment:
1st Platoon is to carry out a patrol as far as the bridge in the valley in
front of us. Distance about 6 kilometres.
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While the company continued its attack to the north, the 1st
Platoon which consisted only of a single section moved down
into the enemy's rear in the Don valley and engaged fleeing Russian
troops in hand-to-hand combat.
Time: about 19.30
It had meanwhile become quite dark. 7th Company had reached
the far side of Ssemiluki; 1st Platoon was in positions along the bend
of the Don. Obit. Blumenthal, commander of 7th Company, now
gathered all of his men together and with these few (roughly three
rifle sections and a heavy machine gun section) charged towards the
bridge under covering fire from the heavy machine section, driving
the enemy before them. Under the covering fire Blumenthal's men
pushed forward as far as the approach to the bridge to screen it
immediately to all sides. For their part the Bolsheviks kept up a lively
fire from their bunkers on the other side of the river while individual
groups attempted to recover the bridge site.
Time: roughly 20.00
The first action was to save the road bridge.
Standing almost up to his neck in the water, Uffz. Hempel removed
the demolition charges which were located on the bridge supports,
and which were already burning, with his bare hands. In the same
breath Obit. Blumenthal and a few men raced across the bridge and
reached the other side unharmed behind the fleeing Russians. Once
there he immediately deployed his men to secure the approach to
the bridge. In the meantime, using steel helmets and ammunition
canisters, the soldiers extinguished the few small fires on the bridge.
Still unaware of the situation, Russians repeatedly tried to cross
the bridge. They were taken prisoner and after an hour over 70 were
in our hands.
In the meantime further elements of the company had reached the
west bank; however, no more troops were sent across to the east
bank. Rather, the soldiers already there were pulled back under cover
of darkness. A light machine gun was placed on the west approach
to the bridge to cover the east approach.
8th Company finally arrived at approximately 24.00 and it, too,
took up covering positions on the west bank. The bridge had
meanwhile caught fire again and its eastern end was now under
water. As a result, 7th Company prepared to make another crossing
attempt the next morning using an old boat."
This act by 7th Company under its commander Obit. Blumenthal
was of great significance to the division and the following units. It
was thanks to the quick independent action of the men of the
company that the major part of the road bridge fell into German
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352
they dropped a cluster of tiny bombs, startling the men on the ground
from their sleep.
At approximately 21.15 the Pioniers of the heavy company
brought up the inflatable boats. The soldiers quietly climbed in and
the first boats set off with light paddle strokes towards the other side.
2nd Company/1 Battalion/I.R. GD 2 and the battalion headquarters
were the first across and they immediately secured a small bridgehead
at the crossing site. Next the Pioniers took across the 5th (Hvy.) and
3rd (Rifle) Companies, which extended the position. Machine gun
platoons of the 4th Company followed. The enemy was quiet,
nothing stirred. It almost seemed as if the Soviets hadn't noticed.
This assumption was strengthened by the fact that the Soviets had
placed their positions farther to the east because of the higher west
bank, which provided the attackers with a good view of the other
side. Increasing resistance was expected at the heights southeast of
Podkletnoje. The crossing manoeuvre took most of the night and as
dawn broke on 6 July both battalions of I.R. GD 2 were assembled
on the east bank for the attack to the East.
At the road bridge the 6th and 8th Companies of I.R. 1 began
their attack just before dawn. Return fire from Podkletnoje, which
the battalion was to attack from the west-northwest while I Battalion/I.R. GD 1 attacked from the southeast, was initially weak. Just
outside the village itself, however, the advance was hampered by a
wide band of swamp. Elements of 6th Company were able to cross
over a small bridge but were forced to take cover on the other side
by well-aimed sniper fire. Elements of 7th Company, which had been
held in reserve, were now brought up and succeeded in advancing
some distance toward the first houses. However, a completely
flooded anti-tank ditch once again brought the advance to a halt.
Snipers forced the Grenadiers to take cover. Several men had already
been wounded and no one dared move. The ROA, Uffz. Groswindhager of the Art.Rgt. GD, was hit and fatally wounded.
In the meantime the road bridge over the Don had been repaired
by the Pioniers and was again passable. Assault guns were the first
vehicles to cross, followed by the battalions' heavy weapons and
anti-tank guns of the Panzerjger Battalion GD. The assault guns
joined up with the infantry outside Podkletnoje at roughly 09.00.
The village was taken from both sides late that morning, with
elements of I Battalion driving into Podkletnoje from the southeast.
The companies lost over seven men killed in the battle against
determined Soviet forces which defended desperately from bunkers
and foxholes. Completely worn out, the men were unable to go on.
They fell to the ground and lay there exhausted in the burning heat.
It required a great deal of effort to get some of the units moving again
to clear the Soviets from the wooded terrain to the east. Here the
Grenadiers found many bunkers and a great deal of equipment and
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358
II Btl./Inf.Rgt. GD 1
M a r c h i n g Orders for 1 3 J u l y 1 9 4 2
(on 1 : 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 m a p )
1. The enemy is in retreat towards and across the Don. Straggling
enemy units and air attacks are to be expected in the area of the
advance.
2. I.D. GD will continue the advance on 13 July 1942 and reach the
Djogtewo-Meschkow road between Sssetrakowskij and Lasowskij
and there prevent a withdrawal by the enemy to the north.
3. II Battalion, advancing as the first march group of I.R. 1, will leave
the departure point Kolchos, southeast of Babyschef, at 02.45 in
the following order, which will also be the order of march:
6th Company
Staff
10th Company
8th Company
9th Company
7th Company
4. March Route: Marked by I.R. GD 1 road signs.
Oljchowatkaroad fork 9 km east JeremenkowPjakodonoff
Kosinkaroad fork east KosinkaMichailowkaSsmaglejewka
KolessnikowkaAnnowoRebrikowoSherebzowskijSchapil
off.
5. Departure Officer: a Feldwebel from 6th Company.
Trail Officer: Lt. von Carlowitz, 8th Company. It is his responsibility to see to it that no vehicle or column passes the march
group during the entire march. In addition, I make the company
commanders responsible to see to it that no vehicle passes, joins
up with or drives alongside their march column. Companies are
to appoint trail officers for this purpose. Vehicles which are left
behind are to drive along at the rear of the battalion and rejoin
their companies at the first rest stop.
6. On 13 July 1942 the I.D. GD has the right of way over all infantry
divisions and Hungarian units. The only vehicles with the right of
way over the division's units are all operational as well as courier
vehicles and echelons of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and its units the
23rd and 24th Panzer Divisions.
7. Air Attack Protection greater enemy air activity is to be expected
in the area southeast of the present cantonment area. Companies
are to take all measures necessary for immediate defence against
air attack. (Machine guns clear!!)
8. Medical Collecting Station: during the march, Oljchowatka.
9. Hptm. Peiler is designated departure officer for I.R. GD 1.
F. d. R.
von Mitzlaff
Signed in draft:
von Courbire
Lt. and Adjutant
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Chapter Four
Pursuit to the Manych
On 20 July 1942 the first elements of the regiment crossed the
Donets near a village named Michailowskij, which was a very
common name in this area. At the same time the first elements of
the von Usedom advance detachment set out in the direction of
Mokri Log with the objective of capturing the small city of Kertschik.
This did not happen so quickly, however, since the enemy forces
which were being pushed from west to east by an attacking panzer
division now found themselves caught between two German forces
and were seeking escape in all directions. Once again the war diary
of the Reconnaissance Battalion:
" O n 20 July 1942 the battalion received orders from division to
set out for Kertschik. The vehicles were ready and the tents were
just being taken down when the air was filled with a howling noise.
With a crash, rockets from a Stalin Organ smashed into the
bridgehead security positions of 2nd and 4th Squadrons, resulting in
the first casualties of the day.
At approximately 08.00 the reinforced battalion set out from the
former bridgehead to begin the advance on Kertschik.
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In the burning heat the 3rd and 4th Squadrons advanced along
both sides of the road through fields and meadows and across hills
and valleys while the 2nd (SPW) Squadron covered the right flank.
The 1st (Armoured Car) Squadron, as well as the battery of light field
howitzers which was attached to the battalion and a battery of 8.8
cm Flak followed along the road. The Stalin Organs continued to
fire, and shrapnel from the exploding rockets tore gaps in the infantry
of both squadrons as they advanced widely dispersed. An 8.8 cm
gun was also heavily damaged. Individual tanks appeared to harass
the German advance, but most of these were put out of action. The
withdrawing enemy was difficult to pin down; he fired on the
spearhead as it moved into a valley, but by the time the flak was
moved forward into position he had long since disappeared over the
next hill.
All of this slowed the pace of the advance. The men were at the
limits of their strength; they were plagued by thirst and the heat had
brought them almost to the point of collapse under their heavy load
of equipment.
In the meantime the 2nd (SPW) Squadron under Obit. Klemme
and the 8.8 cm Flak were moved forwards as a special battle group
and now drove off after the withdrawing enemy direction
Kertschik. Near Mokri Log, however, the leading vehicles were met
by a hail of anti-tank shells. Here the road sloped gently towards the
village. To the left the terrain beside the road sloped steeply upwards,
while to the right of us a swamp hindered evasive manoeuvres or
withdrawal. As it had meanwhile become dark, and loud tank noises
could be heard from the village, the commander decided to dig in
here for the night. Strong security positions were set up in the
direction of the village and the Flak was moved forward."
Meanwhile, elements of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1, following on the
heels of the Reconnaissance Battalion, had succeeded in crossing
the river and had dug in on the other side. Under its protection, the
remainder of the regiment prepared for the crossing on the following
day.
I.R. GD 2, which had been held up for days farther to the rear
through lack of fuel, now advanced into the Tazinskaja- Skassyrskaja
area and followed slowly with the units of the division which had
been left behind.
The new objective for the Reconnaissance Battalion and for I.R.
GD 1 farther south was Kertschik and the industrial city of Schachty.
The Soviets had evacuated their positions in Mokri Log during the
night, and when the Stukas finally arrived their bombs struck only
houses and threshing machines. Meanwhile, giant columns of Soviet
tanks and vehicles moved across the next hill towards the northwest
in the direction of the attacking German panzer divisions. Individual
Soviet tanks still appeared, seeking a way out of the closing ring of
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The companies had just moved into their security zones when an
order came in from division to evacuate the city of Schachty and
assemble in Kertschik for employment by the division."
The I.D. GD had received orders to turn off the highway to the
south, reach the lower Don near Melichowskaja and Rasdorskaja,
cross the river and advance southwards. Meanwhile, the 14th Panzer
Division, a part of III Panzer Corps, was to pursue the fleeing enemy
southwards through Koslik.
Gruppe Khler was formed from the following elements:
I.R. GD 1
Reconnaissance Battalion GD
1st and 2nd Batteries, Flak Artillery Battalion GD
a company of Anti-tank Battalion GD
It received orders to carry out the new plan, in which it was essential
to prevent the enemy forces from withdrawing and escaping across
the river.
In the course of the new action the division turned left while still
on the move and sent ahead three attack groups which reached the
bank of the Don during the night of 21/22 July.
Early on the morning of 22 July the infantry of II Battalion, I.R.
GD 1 moved into an assembly area outside Melichowskaja in
preparation for an attack on the village to be launched at 04.00.
Despite considerable enemy mortar fire the village was taken at
approximately 06.00. More than a thousand Russian soldiers were
flushed out of the bushes along the river and taken prisoner. There
was so much equipment stored and abandoned there that it was
difficult to accurately estimate its numbers or worth. The first soldiers
of the battalion immediately set about crossing the Don, which was
approximately 800 metres wide at this point, in inflatable boats in
order to establish a small bridgehead on the other side.
The action was described by Lt. Konopka, platoon leader in the
Regimental Pioniers:
"We had taken the village of Melichowskaja on the Don early in
the morning. A considerable amount of booty was taken on that side
of the river. The village had a ferry crossing, which interested me,
as responsible Pionier, the most. The ferry itself had been in use by
the enemy a short time before, but now it had disappeared, the rope
and cable cut and the approach partially destroyed.
The way I saw it, if there had once been ferry traffic here, then it
was highly probable that this was the crossing place sought by the
regiment. We immediately built ferries from inflatable boats and sent
across several reconnaissance vehicles. I myself went across with the
first. On the other side we caught a couple of riderless horses and
set off downstream to look for the ferry. We found it several hundred
368
metres farther down where it had been driven onto the bank by the
current. We went into the water and started to tow the thing
upstream with the horses. Then there was a sudden exchange of fire
with some Cossacks who appeared unexpectedly out of the willows.
We captured several, who were immediately put to work as oarsmen.
While the ferry traffic steadily increased, a Soviet seaplane landed
on the river about 200 metres away, apparently misled by the
Russian uniforms of the prisoners pressed into service as oarsmen.
The aircraft's crew was getting ready to make contact with them.
We grabbed our weapons, however, and were able to render the
crew harmless. Attempts to make the aircraft flyable for our own use
failed at first. Nevertheless, the aircraft was a considerable addition
to the strength of the Regimental Pionier Platoon/I.R. GD 1."
With the capture of Melichowskaja by II Battalion, the other
elements of I.R. GD 1, namely I and III Battalions supported by IV
Battalion, anti-tank units and heavy Flak, advanced along the ridge
towards Puchljakowskij and Rasdorskaja, where they became
embroiled in heavy fighting with Soviet units still holding out there.
In addition to preventing additional Soviet forces from escaping
across the river, it was also the regiment's task to find and capture
a suitable crossing over the Don.
After landing on the other side of the Don near Melichowskaja the
leading elements of II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 found that a wide band
of swampy, moor-like terrain ran along the river and was simply too
wide to bridge, especially for motor and armoured vehicles. Countless backwaters and tributaries led deep into the hinterland, posing
a virtually impenetrable obstruction.
In the stifling heat of the day each breath was an ordeal. The men
of II Battalion fought their way forwards against swarms of
mosquitoes and other pests in an attempt to reach a position where
they could see and shoot. Instead, however, they became more
entangled in the jungle of vegetation along the riverbank. Exhausted,
they sank to the ground and waited for what was to come.
Things were going much better for the reinforced Reconnaissance
Battalion GD and the I.R. GD 2 in the breadbasket of the Ukraine.
Positioned on the heights west of Kertschik, the Reconnaissance
Battalion's assignment was to guard the right flank and rear of I.R.
GD 1's battle group against enemy attack. This was all the more
important as surrounded Russians sought a way out of the pocket
which had closed around elements of several Soviet divisions to the
northeast. Patrols were sent out towards the KoslikNovocherkassk
road heavy fighting was still raging around the latter to
determine the enemy's movements. I.R. GD 2 was given similar
assignments; it secured to the north along the highway which ran
from east to west.
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370
brief rest, however, and then it was on to the river. The Pionier
platoons of I and III Battalions' heavy companies dragged the first
inflatable boats up to the river while others searched the riverbank
for boats and any other means of getting across. It was midday and
extremely hot when the first inflatable boats began the crossing under
the protection of the heavy weapons. Heavy machine guns and
mortars laid down supporting fire to keep the enemy pinned down
on the other side.
The actual crossing was described by Hauptfeldwebel W. Kaufmann of 11th Company who, as senior NCO, was directly involved
in the preparations:
"The Ivans were sitting fast in the low pines on the far bank, feeling
rather secure because of the width of the river in front of them. And
with good reason, because it was impossible to reach the riverbank
undetected, much less cross the river. On our side was a steep bank;
behind stretched giant grain fields with a single machine station
consisting of only four buildings. From there we had a wide view into
the deep plain on the far side of the Don. There was brush and
scrawny pines growing along the edge of the river.
We the 11th Company were to be the first to cross and attack
the enemy in order to clear the way for the bridging of the river
planned for the following day. A discussion was held on the spot with
the company and section leaders concerning landmarks and stop
lines; at the same time boundaries for the automatic weapons fire
were laid down. As senior N C O and a former platoon leader, I was
to lead the crossing.
In the meantime the company cook, Feldw. Willi Becker, served
the sections a hot meal. Everyone was restless and there was a great
deal of tension.
The company's commanding officer, Obit. Kottkamp, and his
company headquarters personnel intended to cross in the first boats.
Just then a squadron of German aircraft passed overhead, returning
from a mission; at the same instant a mighty rain of fire crashed
down on a wide front precisely in our assembly area along the
riverbank. At first we suspected the aircraft above; but that could not
be, as we had clearly identified ourselves as German. It must therefore
have been a Stalin Organ. Two men were fatally injured; the medics
attended to the wounded.
But there was no time to lose and Obit. Kottkamp ordered the
crossing to begin at once. Kottkamp and his company headquarters
personnel jumped into the Pioniers' inflatable boat which had been
put into the water at the river's edge. At the same time our heavy
machine guns and other heavy weapons opened up a murderous
sustained fire on the other bank to keep the enemy's head down.
The first sections ran to the bank and into the boats. Soon there was
a brisk flow of traffic back and forth across the river with inflatable
372
rafts and more and more men, including those from other companies, came up to the crossing site, some even with their vehicles.
Giant dust clouds hung over the steep riverbank.
In the meantime I assembled all of the company's drivers, as well
as Schirrmeister Hans Strbling, for another briefing. Then, suddenly, I saw a flash and at the same time recognised the firing position
of the feared Stalin Organ. Its rockets were soon whistling in. I
shouted, 'split up and take cover!' Other than the minor wounds
suffered by the Schirrmeister and the 2nd Field Cook, B. Kalkum,
there was no damage, although two vehicles of the 2nd and 10th
Companies went up in flames. Immediately afterwards all of the
vehicles hastily drove back across the open field to the machine
station.
Feldw. Willi Becker and the company tailor, Gefr. Fritz Dinnert,
remained there with the converted rations truck. My driver Ogefr.
Erhard Bhme, who was nicknamed Junior, also remained there. In
the meantime our pay sergeant, Uffz. Alfons Piitz, saw to it that the
fallen received a proper burial above, on the slope at the entrance
to the village.
Our Sturm-Pioniers had meanwhile constructed a raft to ship the
first guns and vehicles across. And that's how it was done."
It was the division's Pioniers who had to bear the brunt of the
action over the next few hours. Driven by the commanders, they
dragged their inflatable boats, ferries, pontoons and bridging equipment up to the bank in preparation for the bridging of the river.
Officers and NCOs surveyed the bridge site and staked it out, while
the equipment was laid out under cover farther to the rear. While a
portion of the Pioniers were busy with that, others were bringing
assault boats to the water to establish an orderly flow of traffic across
the river. Still others, assisted by the regimental and company
Pioniers, manned other assault boats in order to get the infantry
across to the south bank as quickly as possible. A small bridgehead,
approximately 200 x 400 metres, had been established there and
desperately needed reinforcement before the enemy could take
countermeasures.
It was mostly the riflemen of I and III Battalions, I.R. 1 who
streamed forwards and across the river. They streamed in the truest
sense of the word, because the men on the north bank were from
all companies and everyone was seeking a spot in the next boat.
Stripped to the waist, the Pioniers under Lt. Konopka piloted their
inflatable boats back and forth across the river. A number of Russian
prisoners, still in full uniform, were also put to work steering the
boats.
Meanwhile, on the south bank enemy resistance had begun to
stiffen. There was heavy fighting in the woods along the riverbank,
which resulted in casualties. Often the persistent Soviet counterat373
tacks, which were supported by mortars and anti tank guns, had to
be turned back in close-in fighting. The situation soon improved as
more companies arrived, gradually building up the German forces in
the bridgehead. Local attacks, mainly for reconnaissance purposes,
were carried out successfully.
Farther to the rear at the Rasdorskaja bridge site, the division's
Pioniers, together with recently-arrived army Pioniers, had begun the
job of throwing a bridge across the river. O n e hundred and ten
pontoons were brought in. The Pioniers stayed with their equipment
in the punishing heat of 25 July. They worked throughout the day
and night to complete the job. The bridge and crossing sites
repeatedly came under fire from Soviet heavy artillery, mortars,
Stalin Organs and even infantry weapons. The German flak artillery,
which had gone into position on the north bank and the steep slope,
had more than one opportunity to engage attacking Soviet bombers
and was able to shoot down several.
Without a doubt, the bridge-building operation under way near
Rasdorskaja was very uncomfortable for the Soviets. They made
numerous attempts to do away with it, but in vain. Further reinforcements were sent in by the division. II Battalion/I.R. GD 1 was
relieved in its bridgehead near Melichowskaja by 11th Company and
elements of the 15th Company/I.R. GD 2 and sent to Rasdorskaja.
Meanwhile, other elements of I.R. GD 2 (II Btl.) relieved the Reconnaissance Battalion near Bessergenewskaja. It was moved forward
to Kertschik-South in preparation for its next action deep in the
bridgehead. The battalion's commanding officer, Major von
Usedom, left the unit due to illness after first transferring command
to Rittmeister Wtjen, the former A O K 4.
The battalions of the Artillery Regiment GD went into position
north of and along the south bank in order to take over the fire
support role for the planned attack by I.R. GD 1 against Ssussatskij.
Approaching from the rear was the 16th Infantry Division under
Generalmajor Henrici, which was likewise to continue the advance
to the south from the bridgehead.
Reinforcement of the bridgehead near Rasdorskaja by the I.D. GD
continued, easing the battle of the men in the front lines. After the
village of Ssussatskij had been softened up by repeated Luftwaffe
bombing attacks and the enemy fire silenced, the Grenadiers of III
Battalion/I.R. GD 1, supported by the 2 cm Flak of the heavy
company under Obit. Walle, together with other elements of the
division, launched their attack across the completely open terrain. In
the face of increasing enemy resistance the village was not taken until
that evening. I Battalion was moved in immediately, with the first
tanks to cross the river right on its heels. Heavy weapons and
anti-tank guns were brought into position and the village prepared
for defence.
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375
376
Waldheinis' And more came out from holes in the ground, from
cellars always more.
We took hundreds of Russians prisoner without loss to ourselves.
It was quite a day!"
Ill Battalion's battle group was not always so fortunate as to capture
an entire Russian regiment without loss. Another report on the battle
for the grain silo near Elista shows the other, more difficult side to
these battles:
"Our drive continued in the burning heat through the salt marshes
along the Manych canal. We had only one wish: water! But on the
parched steppe with temperatures in the sun of 45-50 degrees
centigrade it was impossible to obtain the precious liquid. We then
began a raid on the Elista grain silo. We first drove our vehicles quite
close to the objective and then dismounted. During the attack which
now began, we succeeded in destroying several enemy anti-tank gun
and artillery crews. Neither side employed tanks in the battle.
During this attack I was shot by an enemy sniper. He hit me right
in the corner of my left eye. The bullet passed through and out again
at my right eye. Suddenly I could no longer see because everything
was covered in blood. Five or six other men were also wounded,
some seriously. We wounded were assembled in a hollow. Also there
was my friend Ogefr. A. Kelle, whose leg had been almost shot off.
Our medic applied a dressing so that he wouldn't bleed to death. We
lay the whole night alone, waiting. Far and wide there was not a
living soul. Russian cavalry was all around us. It was not until
twenty-four hours later that we were picked up. Our August Kelle
kept trying to loosen his bandage, but we took turns watching him
to ensure nothing happened. When we were finally freed there was
a doctor on hand who immediately set to work to save August. But
it was already too late. We all stood around with tears in our eyes as
he lay dying from the great loss of blood."
On 1 August 1942, while the I.D. GD's battle groups namely
the reinforced III Btl./I.R. GD 2 and the reinforced Reconnaissance
Battalion GD were still in action, orders arrived to transfer
elements of the division back to the north across the Don. A new
mission was planned for the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Division; all
of its units were to be pulled out of the line. Sunday, the 2nd of
August 1942; GD journey day, as it was known in the jargon of the
common soldier, because most Sundays were travel days, and this
Sunday saw the first unit, II Btl./I.R. 1, set out across the Don to the
north. The regimental headquarters of I.R. 1 followed, moving
initially into Melichowskaja on the north bank of the river. I Battalion/I.R. 2 under Major Grosser passed through Rasdorskaja to
Schachty where it took up quarters. The Art.Rgt. GD and its
command post moved into the same city.
378
over the dusty Ukrainian roads towards their loading station. The
rumours that the unit's destination was France and that a longer
period of rest was to follow had become so persistent that everyone
was convinced that they were true.
Inf.Rgt. GD 1 II Btl.
O r d e r for L o a d i n g a b o a r d R a i l Transport
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
381
10. The entraining units are to establish contact with the loading
stations as early as possible. The trains are usually ready several
hours before the times given in the loading summary. It is therefore
possible that units which are to entrain by night might be able to
get aboard during daylight.
11. All orders for assembly, movement to the loading station, order of
loading and air defence during loading, en route and during
unloading are to be issued independently by the transport officers
for their trains.
12. The entraining units will find all further orders at the railheads.
13. Lt. Willert, 6th Company, has been designated commander of the
battalion's advance party. He will entrain with a car and crew one
day before the loading of the first battalion unit. Because it is
travelling by rail the advance party may become mixed in with the
regimental headquarters, which is entraining on 14. 8. 1942, and
an exchange of vehicles may be necessary.
The advance party will report to the regimental command post in
the unloading area.
Materials for posting the new billets and the route from the railhead
are to be received from battalion.
14. The regimental commander has once again pointed out the need
for iron discipline during loading, while on the trains and during
unloading. Violations against discipline and military obedience will
be severely punished. I am making the unit leaders responsible for
the carrying out of the regimental commander's order.
signed Hnes
This loading order, which was based on the complete divisional
order, was a masterpiece. The loading distribution itself was determined by the rail cars assigned, their specified size and capacity and
their mass and weight. The loading as such demanded a certain time
allotment, meaning that a unit had a specified period of time in which
to entrain. This received a fixed designation, for example, Tempo
24. This meant that a unit must be loaded aboard 24 trains in 24
hours. This meant that every hour a transport train was loaded and
ready to depart. This, however, was the maximum rate.
Even if the I.D. GD didn't have to entrain at such speed, it was
ostensibly bound for France, the promised land of peace, wine and
beautiful women. At many of the loading stations there was a certain
unconscious haste to get the units aboard the trains.
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383
Chapter Five
The Replacement Units
With the formation of the motorised Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND, the resources of the former replacement unit in
Neuruppin were no longer sufficient for the division's many elements
and its special units. Therefore, on 9 April 1942, a discussion took
place between the Division's la and the BdE (Commander of the
Replacement and Training Army), Generaloberst Fromm and
General Olbricht, with the aim of increasing the size of the existing
replacement battalion. After much deliberation directions were issued as an interim measure for the formation of a replacement
regiment and later a replacement brigade. Neuruppin, the former
home of the replacement battalion, was too small to take the new
unit. Cottbus was suggested and accepted as a replacement. Cottbus
was a city east of Berlin on the GrlitzBerlin railway line. It
possessed a fully developed airport and several barracks which
housed infantry replacement units. These received orders to vacate
and hand over the barracks.
At that time Cottbus was a district town which, in addition to the
single track railway line, regional theatre and town hall, could boast
of pleasant surroundings which gradually gave way to the Spree
Forest. Large wooded areas surrounded the city, which possessed a
good reputation in Germany and abroad for the hats which were
made there. Otherwise it was like any other wartime city, where the
citizens went about their daily business and the cityscape was
dominated by the grey of uniforms. During the month of May 1942
Cottbus was to become home to the new replacement unit.
At about the same time the framework of the Grenadier Replacement Regiment (mot.) GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was created, from
which, in June 1942, the Replacement Brigade (mot.) GD was to
emerge. The unit's first commanding officer was Oberst von Wartenburg, who represented the unit's interests in dealings with the city
until about October 1942. Then, at the request of the division
commander, General Hoernlein, von Wartenburg was replaced by
Oberst Bandelow, a former battalion commander in the Infantry
Regiment
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND.
The unit's initial composition more a formation cadre than a
complete unit was as follows:
Replacement
Regiment
(mot.)
384
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Quarters:
Commanding Officer
Rgt. Adjutant
Executive Officer
Abt. Ib
Propaganda Section
Ordnance and Materiel
385
Replacement
Brigade
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
GROSSDEUTSCHU\ND
Brigade Commander:
Oberst
von
Wartenburg
(Gen.Maj. as of 1. 10. 42)
Hptm. (Res.) Niehoff
Lt. (Res.) Graf Yorck Wartenburg
Hptm. (Res.) Nebel
Obit. Beck (from Oct. 1942 Hptm. Rssert)
Technical Inspector Funk
Brigade Adjutant:
Executive Officer:
Abt. Ib:
Propaganda Section:
Weapons and Equipment:
Obstlt./Oberst Bandelow
Oberst H. Schulte-Heuthaus
Oberst Langkeit
Oberst Schwarzrock
Oberst Glaesemer
Oberst Volker (until May 1945)
386
Hptm. Schwarzrock
Major von Senft zu Pilsach
387
the men and officers of the old I.R. GD who kept returning to the
unit in spite of illness and wounds.
Chapter Six
In the Wolfsschanze
At the Wolfsschanze Installation, the Fhrer Headquarters near
Rastenburg in East Prussia, life in the command centre was running
smoothly. The Fhrer-Begleit Bataillon had taken over external
and internal security, while the personal protection of Hitler was the
responsibility of a small group of SS men under Obersturmbannfhrer Rattenhuber of the Sicherheitsdienst. The installation lay well
camouflaged in the forest and the activity that went on there was
scarcely noticeable to the uninitiated.
One of the installation's technical wonders was the communications centre of the FHQu, one of the most modern of its kind. It was
housed in a very large bunker and was manned by the best technicians, radio operators and switchboard operators available. These
men, whose duties were carried out beyond public scrutiny, were
former members of the post office, the marine radio service, well
known industrial operations, and so on. They were true specialists.
Their reputation was very high and their abilities were well known.
The Fhrer communications network extended like a spider's web
over all of Europe and beyond.
Responsible for the entire signals service was the FHQu's signals
company, which was under the direct command of the O K W and
led by Obit, (later Major) Lohse. Lohse was the Supreme
Commander's Wehrmacht Signals Officer. Teletype Central was
installed in the Kurhaus Warlimont. It carried on its teletype traffic
under the designator (V)WNOL, while the Fhrer Teletype Station
used W N O F . These agencies could always be reached using these
codes. Meanwhile, the telephone agencies used the call-signs
"Wolfsschanze Exchange" and "Warlimont Exchange". All of the
Fhrer lines were checked every night between 02.00 and 05.00 to
ensure serviceability and trouble-free operation.
One of the long distance telephone lines led to the city of Vinnitsa
in the Ukraine. It was near there that Hitler maintained a forward
headquarters at that time. An advance detachment of the FhrerBegleit-Bataillon went there in June 1942. Under the command of
Oberstabsarzt Dr. Walker, the detachment consisted of the 1st
Platoon of the 1st Company/FBB. It watched over the construction
and outfitting of blockhouses and two bunkers. The installation was
388
389
390
Part V
WITH
ARMY
18. 8. 42--25. 8. 42
26.
10.
9.
25.
8. 42-- 9. 9. 42
9. 42-- 8. 10. 42
10. 42--26. 10. 42
11. 42--10. 1. 43
GROUP
CENTRE
Chapter One
The Defensive Battle for Rzhev
The winter offensive begun by the Soviets on 5 December 1941
had set the entire German front in motion, but had been unable to
bring about its collapse in the south. Extending from Rostov through
Orel Juchnow-Gshatsk to Rzhev, the southern section of the front
stood firm. The city of Rzhev held out against all attacks and, in the
period which followed, formed the corner stone of the German
defences which the Soviets were unable to pass. Farther north,
however, the Soviets penetrated deep into German-occupied territory, advancing as far as Bely (still in German hands) Demidow
Welish and Veliki Luki. In the forests of the central sector they
linked up with the partisan bands active in the area but were then
forced to halt operations temporarily by the onset of the spring
muddy period. The Germans meanwhile were able to establish a
makeshift, weakly-manned defensive line.
The projection deep into the Soviet lines held by the courageous
divisions of the Ninth Army under Generaloberst Model remained
the number one danger point. Following the failure of the German
attempt to close the gap in the front near Bely and establish a
cohesive line, the Ninth Army faced the threat of being cut off. The
objective of the approximately 10 Soviet divisions and 4 cavalry
391
divisions which had infiltrated the area remained Rzhev. Its capture
would mean the envelopment of the entire German Ninth Army as
well as parts of the Fourth Panzer Army.
When the focus of the German summer offensive was directed at
the southern sector of the front, the armies in the north and centre
were given the assignment of launching local attacks to tie down
large numbers of Soviet units and diversionary attacks with limited
objectives to improve their own defensive positions. In addition, the
Ninth Army was to withdraw strong forces from its otherwise quiet
front to first close the gap in the front near Bely and then eliminate
the threat from the groups of enemy forces in its rear by creating a
series of small pockets around them. Both plans succeeded. By the
end of July the Soviet Thirty Ninth Army and the Eleventh Cavalry
Corps were completely destroyed along with those elements of the
Twenty-Second and Forty-First Armies which had been unable to
escape.
In an effort to relieve the forces fighting in the Ninth Army's rear,
the Soviets launched an almost uninterrupted series of attacks against
Ninth Army's outer front, especially in the area of Rzhev. The Soviets
may have thought that the majority of the Ninth Army's units were
committed elsewhere and that their attacks there would bring relief
to their hard-pressed units in the south.
A major crisis developed near and south of Rzhev at the beginning
of August 1942 which held the threat of a Soviet breakthrough. The
first objective of the Soviet operation, which had grown into a major
offensive, appeared to be the city of Rzhev itself. The Soviets threw
two powerful shock armies into the attack: the Thirtieth Army from
the north against the city itself, and the Thirty-First Army from the
east against the SsytschewkaRzhev railway line, which constituted
the lifeline of the German forces fighting there. Between the two was
the somewhat weaker Russian Twenty-Ninth Army, which was also
assigned to the attack.
Under pressure from the attack by the massed Soviet armies, the
German defensive line was pulled back behind the Volga, and the
city of Subzow, which lay at the confluence of the Volga and the
Wasuga rivers, was abandoned. As the Germans withdrew under
heavy pressure from the numerically-superior enemy forces, the
Soviets were able to cross the Wasuga and Ossuga rivers southeast
of Rzhev and south of Subzow; there they established a bridgehead
which was fifteen kilometres wide and eight kilometres deep. The
Soviet forces were now dangerously close to the Ssytschewka- Rzhev
railway line. This as yet unchecked enemy assault caused the German
command to detain three panzer divisions and several infantry
divisions which had already been pulled out of the line for transfer
to the southern front, and send them by fast train to the central
sector. One of these units was the Infantry Division GROSS392
arrived with the first of the headquarters personnel and begun to dig
foxholes in a small area overgrown with bushes when a pair of
armoured Soviet IL-2 ground attack aircraft carried out an attack on
the position. Bombs fell all around the foxholes, a field policeman
was blown to bits, wounded screamed and the others trembled in
fear. It was a small foretaste of what was to come. It was in this
inferno that the soldiers were to halt the repeatedly attacking enemy,
throw him back to his starting positions and destroy him. It became
a battle of the unknown front-soldier against superior strength, a
confrontation between the individual and the machine, became a
sacrifice of the nameless German soldier in the hell of a war of
attrition. Only from this view can one fully appreciate the forty-eight
hour attack and the weeks-long defensive battle in the shell-torn earth
before and in Tschermassowo, at the church hill and the box-shaped
wood.
It was the 10th of September 1942. Early that day it may have
been 06.30 the two infantry regiments in the front line set out.
On the left was I.R. GD 1 under the command of Obstlt. Greim. In
the lead were III Battalion and the Assault Gun Battalion GD; to the
left and behind was II Battalion (less 7th Comp.), supported by the
heavy infantry weapons of IV Battalion. I Battalion was in reserve
and was approaching from the area south of Rzhev. The 1st
Regiment set out from the east edge of the wood north of
Tschuprowo in a skirmishing line as the shells from the batteries of
the Artillery Regiment GD whistled overhead on the way to their
targets to the east. To the right was I.R. GD 2, with II and III
Battalions in front and I Battalion, which had not yet arrived, in
reserve. Squadrons of Stukas roared overhead on their way to attack
targets in the enemy's rear. The Panzer Battalion GD stood to the
side in a narrow forest clearing awaiting orders to move out.
The advancing regiments were met at once by heavy artillery and
mortar fire, as well as repeated attacks by Soviet bombers and ground
attack aircraft on a scale not previously encountered. The attack
moved forwards, but only slowly and with heavy casualties. Repeated
Soviet counterattacks, preceded by heavy bombardments from Stalin
Organs and accompanied by tanks, had to be beaten off. The Russian
infantry forces were weak and of little significance, but the Soviets
possessed an abundance of heavy weapons which they employed
cleverly and to good effect. The Panzer Battalion GD was caught in
a surprise barrage and suffered heavy losses in men and equipment.
Mines inflicted further damage, while marshy ground forced the
panzers to bunch up, resulting in additional losses.
As a result of these difficulties, the Grenadiers of I.R. GD 1 failed
to penetrate the village of Tschermassowo on the first day of fighting.
That evening the battalions were forced to dig in on the hills west of
the village. Progress by I.R. GD 2 was also slow. Its objective lay
396
Flak immediately opened fire; the Flak guns roared, our machine
guns hammered away. The black flak bursts appeared in the midst
of the bombers and the tracing rounds snaked upwards like a string
of pearls. Then our fighters appeared on the scene!
Expectantly, I followed the bombs, which hung in the air like an
iron chain and appeared to be falling directly toward us. They must
hit any second; I cowered against the cold earth wall of my hole and
noticed for the first time that there was a 15 cm layer of mud on the
ground. Now!! The earth shook, there was a crash and I was thrown
about my hole. It felt as if I was being lifted. Dirt flew down on me,
and I made myself yet smaller. With my head pressed close to the
earth I found myself looking into the staring eyes of a frog.
I was quite calm. I clung to the damp earth as if I wanted to hang
on and waited. Then it was over; our fighters had brought down one
of the bombers. Again we moved forward. Running in spurts, we
raced singly through the enemy mortar fire. Only too often the shells
exploded damned close, their fragments whizzing viciously through
the air.
We reached a hollow and breathed a little easier. Here at least we
were protected from direct fire. But the shells were soon roaring in
again and exploding on the far slope. Shells now started to strike
near us as well. I looked for a hole and took cover. The fire intensified.
Move to the other side! Pick up your gear and get across the hollow!
By chance my crew was running in a line, quite close together. I was
just about to shout for them to spread out when it happened. Five
metres ahead and to our right there was a flash and a crack. Struck
by the shock wave, I was spun around a full turn. Fragments whizzed
past me with a brief, sickening swish; I buckled over and fell biting
powder smoke burned my eyes and lungs. I had felt a short, hard
blow on my upper arm and my right knee burned terribly. After a
quick survey I realised that I had been hit by several shell fragments.
Holes had been torn in my service blouse and the knee of my pants
was shredded.
But what had become of my comrades who had been nearby? They
were all lying on the ground, some in cover. My gunner, a Berliner,
shouted, 'I'm wounded, get me out of here!' The mortar commander
cried out and the youngest ammunition bearer, a cheerful lad from
Vienna, lay with fragments in his back and face. I heard him say,
'I've been hit in both cheeks.' Of the six men in my crew, three lay
wounded on the ground.
We other three dragged them to nearby foxholes and shell holes.
I opened Fritz' uniform and noticed a shrapnel wound in his upper
thigh; he must have been in considerable pain, because he groaned
and swore, 'Damn it, why did I have to get it now?' Two infantrymen
were going back for ammunition. A brief handshake: 'Take care of
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yourself; be glad that you're out of the shit; and write from home!'
Then they carried him off, and the other two wounded men as well.
I squatted in the shell hole. I couldn't kneel, it hurt too much. My
arm was still burning. There were little holes all through my uniform.
Then there was another rush of shells. My section leader decided to
move ahead to a thicket which lay in front of us. As soon as we got
there we began digging foxholes, especially up front in a small
hollow, so we could keep our heads down. Shell after shell impacted
around and between us. An infantry gun drove up into our midst and
opened up a rapid fire. The Russians replied, but their fire was short
and fell on us.
Now and then I called, 'Akteris, Fritsch?' 'Yes, what's up?'
'Everything still OK?' 'Yes, everything's all right.' After another
barrage I saw Akteris running back during a pause in the shelling;
his hand was bandaged and blood-red. It had been ripped up by a
shell fragment and he had to go back to the main dressing station.
Now there was one more gone. It was different here than in the
south. Then the order came: Get ready, we're moving out! We stood
up and, bent low, moved forward in the cover of the bushes.
Someone was missing. Who then? Gerdes wasn't with us. Two men
went back and found him sitting in his foxhole, bent over with his
head on his knees. They called to him and shook him, but suddenly
they realised that he would wake no more Gerdes was dead. A
shell fragment had hit him as he sat in his hole and killed him. When
the two returned we stood silently for a moment. Then we moved
on.
Tank shells howled in direct fire straight over the bushes. Instinctively everyone stopped and ducked down. The shells crashed
through the branches and landed beyond us. Forwards! We hurried
through a thicket and suddenly ran directly into a swamp. We cursed,
but what was the good of it? The shells were now coming down as
thick as hail. I wasn't going to lie down here! My boots squeaked,
they were full of water. Once again, all that we could do was dig in.
Before beginning to dig we took a quick look around to see if there
were any holes close by. There was a Russian bomb crater as well
as a pair of foxholes. I jumped straight into one of the holes and fell
asleep.
I couldn't have slept long; the sun was already low on the horizon.
It was becoming cold and darkness was falling slowly. Tracers flitted
here and there; there were shots from both sides. The heavy artillery
fire slowly died away, and the infantry fire ebbed and then stopped.
We were able to stand up again and walk about freely. Now we could
see those comrades who had survived the day's fighting. New
positions were sought and the section leaders briefed. There was no
sense in digging a hole; after three spadefuls water was already
running in.
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We were ready to move but our stomachs now made their presence
felt. During the day there had been no time to think of food.
Fortunately, they were now able to get some food up to us. It was
cold, but even cold noodles tasted good.
I heard the word being passed through 6th Company, which was
in position on our left: 'II Battalion prepare to change positions.'
That's always the way it happened; just when we were ready to get
some sleep they ordered a change of positions. Cursing softly we
gathered up our things and shuffled off. The company, which was
marching in file, was to move into new positions 300 metres ahead.
Suddenly, flares climbed high into the sky and hung motionless
above us. We froze; any movement could give away our position.
Then we moved on.
Quickly we were directed into our new positions. We had to be
cautious; above us buzzed a sewing machine, a slow, four-motor
bomber. From a great height it dropped one parachute flare after
another. If it recognised something on the ground it would immediately drop its bombs. It was always an awkward feeling when the
crate flew directly overhead. One always felt that it was staying right
there overhead. Then there was a brief crash, the earth shook and
there was an infernal flashing and cracking.
I wrapped myself in my tent-square and, deathly tired, fell fast
asleep."
At the same time all along the front line men fell into the nearest
hole, where they were overcome by exhaustion and fell into a
dreamless sleep. It was not yet time to rest for the panzers, the assault
guns, the artillery and the heavy infantry weapons, however; they
still had to take on fuel and ammunition, make guns and equipment
ready for action, load ammunition belts, and oil and grease the
equipment. First the machines, then the men; that was the first order
of business at the end of a day of fighting. That was the way it had
to be.
The night passed quietly, except for scattered harassing fire from
the enemy artillery. The Soviets had felt the effect of the thrust into
their attack; they, too, had suffered casualties and were forced to
regroup.
On the morning of 11 September, the second day of the attack,
the counterattack by the I.R. GD was to be resumed on both sides
of the Gostischka Valley towards Jurewo. However, as soon as dawn
broke the Soviets again opened up with heavy artillery, mortar and
multiple rocket launcher fire. On the division's left, in the 72nd
Infantry Division's sector, the Soviets, attacking from the bottomland
around the brook, succeeded in penetrating into the village of
Michojewo. While I Battalion/I.R. GD 1, which was in reserve, was
sent there at once to support the 72nd Division, II Battalion/I.R. GD
1 attempted to take the village of Tschermassowo and the graveyard
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opened fire. The man from 14th Company was killed instantly and
I got it in the thigh. The Russians beat it, and I had to lay there for
five hours in the cold; I couldn't move. After a while I called for help
and. . .' The wounded man had made his report in a halting voice,
but his strength now left him and he fell asleep.
The other two told me that they had heard moaning and, finally,
calls for help. They crawled forward and found him. The messenger
was already dead.
The wounded man was immediately evacuated to the rear in a half
track which had brought up some ammunition. All of the newly
delivered munitions rifle bullets, hand grenades, concentrated
charges, crates of mortar ammunition, boxes of anti-tank and
anti-aircraft rounds were concealed in holes in the ground to keep
them from being spotted from the air.
Otherwise, my two-hour watch passed uneventfully. I was glad to
be able to get a few hours of sleep in my hole. When I awoke I
couldn't believe my eyes, the sun was shining brightly. I asked for
the time: 'Nine o'clock, man, you slept well!'
We were to attack; orders arrived to get ready. Our machine gun
platoon broke down its weapons and moved into its jumping-off
position it must start soon. We were to advance 800 metres, as
that's where the Russian positions were thought to be. Events were
to prove quite different.
Our artillery opened fire with every gun; the hour of the attack had
arrived. We jumped from our holes; the heavy shells roared overhead. The 2l'ers exploded in the enemy positions. The rifle companies charged forwards we followed and reached the hill where
we were met by scattered rifle fire. With a shout of 'Hurray!' we
stormed ahead. Then a roaring and howling in the air. The sound
of heavy guns firing boomed over from the Russian lines. A black
curtain rose in front of us, a wall of exploding shells. We froze in our
tracks.
None of us had ever encountered such barrage fire before. The
earth rumbled and shook from the detonations of the bursting shells.
There was no way we could get through that! A few daredevils leapt
forward in an attempt to get through the wall of fire they soon lay
dead or wounded. It was useless.
We threw ourselves to the ground. Beside me lay body upon body.
One of them was my section leader, a young N C O of twenty-one
years. During the winter, while he was still a Gefreiter, he had been
with me in the same crew. We lay flat, as only one under such heavy
artillery fire could. The focus of the enemy fire lay in front of us
surely there could be nothing left alive there.
I looked into the face of my NCO; he was staring fixedly ahead,
then suddenly he fell backwards. I felt a pain in my leg. Clumps of
earth and shell fragments whizzed overhead and smacked into the
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ground in front of us. Slowly I felt along my leg with my hand and
turned my head to look; no hole, nothing it had probably been
nothing more than a lump of earth.
Once again there was a roar and shells howled our way, crashing
into the earth just in front of us; again earth and dirt rained down on
us, bouncing off our helmets. The terrific noise left our ears ringing.
When we looked up during a pause in the firing smoke was drifting
overhead. My N C O said that it was impossible for us to stay here.
We had to get back to our holes and await the counterattack there.
Then we heard a familiar roar in the air; 'Stalin Organ', someone
shouted. Everyone knew what that meant: death, a multitude of
death, accompanied by an ear-splitting crashing and bursting. I
looked up and saw the rockets falling, apparently directly towards
us. We lay pressed tight against the earth, our fingers clutching the
grass and waited.
There was a whistle followed by a series of explosions again
fragments whizzed overhead. The explosions came faster. Forty-two
shells hammered down in rapid succession on an area no larger than
a soccer field. The rockets fell close together like barrage fire. Powder
smoke and dust mixed together, hanging before us like a black wall.
The wind drove the cloud toward us. It burned the eyes and irritated
the throat and lungs. Then, all at once, there was a whistling howl,
approaching unbelievably fast. Seconds later shells were exploding
in our midst. Fragments whizzed and whistled around us, mixed with
dirt and clumps of earth and grass. The next salvo was already on
its way. And now there began an almost uninterrupted howling,
crashing and bursting, a whizzing and whistling that seemed to have
no end. Spent shell fragments and clumps of earth showered down
harmlessly on us.
Speechless, I stared at a glowing fragment which had just missed
me and was sticking out of the ground barely 50 cm in front of my
face. Wouldn't the damned Russians ever stop?
Finally, the enemy fire shifted further to our rear, and we could
again raise our heads. The barrage had rolled over us like a
steamroller. Some of our men were already going back. Soon we,
too, would have to move back to our old positions. There was only
sporadic artillery fire; the main weight of the enemy's fire now lay to
our left.
The command came: 'Move out!' I picked up my ammunition
canisters, jumped up and raced down the slope towards my old
foxhole, pursued all the way by shells. I got to my hole and with a
leap I was in. I had made it!
Scattered rifle bullets were still whistling from behind me, hissing
past over my hole. I finally recovered my breath, stood up and
prepared myself for defence. I laid hand grenades at the rim of the
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hole and released the safety on my rifle. Then I crouched in the safety
of my hole, watching for the Russians but they didn't come.
Observation revealed that the Russian infantry was pulling back;
our fire was probably too punishing for them. The Russian infantry
alone couldn't have stopped us if their artillery hadn't laid down
barrage fire. We moved forward again in pursuit of the retreating
enemy infantry. As dusk fell we occupied the hill and dug in deep.
It had certainly been a hot day!
The word came down from the right: '9th Company pick up
hot food and rations.' Each section was to send two men, one with
mess dishes and the other with a tent-square. I picked up my
tent-square and we set out. All we had to do was follow the deep
tracks left by the assault guns and soon we came to a ravine which
had been the scene of heavy fighting the day before.
The way to the battalion command post had been heavily-travelled.
All around lay equipment, empty ammunition canisters, wicker shell
baskets and shot-up trucks. Flares shot upwards every few moments.
The heavy shells from our long-range guns roared overhead; we
could scarcely hear the guns firing or the impact of the shells.
Darkness lay over the battlefield.
We reached the rations truck. Quickly and efficiently we were
issued food, coffee and cold rations. Soon we were ready and began
the trip back to our unit.
When we got back our boys were waiting expectantly in their
foxholes. The food was soon distributed and everyone spooned up
the cold barley soup. Their pleasure was increased further by the
cigarettes we had been able to buy."
Another day had come to an end, another advance at the cost of
much sweat and many casualties. On the left the former main line
of resistance was again in German hands; in the centre and on the
right it still remained to be recovered. There was not much farther
to go, only a few hundred metres. The corps to which the division
was attached issued orders calling off the attack in the division's
sector. The cost that had to be paid for every metre of ground was
too high. Although the Soviet infantry forces in this sector were weak,
they had amassed a tremendous artillery force. The day's objective,
to prevent an enemy breakthrough, had been achieved. The division
was to consolidate its positions and hold. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
was going over to the defensive.
Beginning at 02.00, the 16th of September saw the Soviets launch
one attack after another. Heavy artillery fire, backed up by fire from
Stalin Organs, fell on the German positions, forcing the defenders
deeper underground. It was clear that the enemy wanted to break
through north of the Gostischka by any means necessary. But on
this day the German artillery in the sector, under the direction of the
Artillery Regiment GD's C O , concentrated its fire so quickly and
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escaped unhurt. Also killed there was Lt. Schlenga, platoon leader
in 14th Company/I.R. 1.
It was lucky for the defenders that the Soviet tanks attacked in
waves of only about thirty instead of massing them for one, concentrated assault. As a result of the Soviet tactics, the defenders had
time to knock out the tanks before they penetrated the infantry's
positions. On 15 September the Soviets lost a total of 102 tanks.
On that day the Artillery Regiment GD was able to raise the number
of enemy tanks destroyed by its guns since 28 June 1942 from 298
to 304.
The days between 15 and 21 September 1942 were marked by
repeated Soviet attacks and probes, all of which were beaten off.
The period between the 17th and 21st was a little quieter because
of poor weather, which brought steady rain. The resulting mud
severely hampered movement on both sides of the front.
One loss worthy of note was the death on 19 September of
Obermusikmeister Grosch, who was serving as executive officer with
the I.R. GD 1. He was killed by a direct hit. Grosch had formerly
been the second band leader with the Wach Regiment in Berlin.
Even the days of relative quiet were full of danger. Positional
warfare demanded daily sacrifices through artillery fire, mines and
snipers. The following is a description of the defensive battles
somewhere near Tschermassowo:
"Russian bombers approaching! Two machines flew directly over
our positions at low level. They sprayed out a grey-green liquid, which
settled to earth in dense clouds. Gas? If it was, then it was adieu. We
had no gas masks at the front. We had never needed them before.
Soon a thick wall of smoke stood between the fronts; now the
Russians must come any minute.
Then there was a roar behind us. The air above was filled with a
howling and whistling as our artillery laid down a barrage. Over there
mushroom clouds shot up into the air the fire was on target! The
Bolsheviks didn't even leave their holes. The attack which they had
likely been planning never took place. The day ended with heavy
artillery fire from both sides.
The call went out: four volunteers to the platoon leader! I buckled
up and ran to the command post. The platoon leader showed us
there were four soldiers including me two dead from our company
about 30 metres in front of our lines. Moving individually, we ran
forward and laid the first soldier on a tent-square. He still had an iron
grip on his rifle and we had to carry him back together with his
weapon.
Ready, go! and we ran back. We took a breather in a trench,
then hauled our sad cargo to the battalion command post. That
evening there were six to eight dead from the day's fighting laid out
there. They lay in a row, silent and cold. We laid our burden next to
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the others and looked silently into the faces of the dead, recognising
many good friends with whom we had exchanged friendly words only
the day before.
There was always the uncertainty: would the next shot be meant
for me? or would it pass harmlessly by? We had long ago grown
sick of this damned, punishing war in the swamps and bushes, wild
forests and wide, seemingly endless plains of this damned Russia!
But every man knew that we had to fight on to the end until we had
achieved the complete destruction of bolshevism. Otherwise there
would never be any peace!" 21 September passed much like any
other day in the last few weeks without anything special taking place
at least as far as the senior command authorities were concerned.
Lt. von Carlowitz, a platoon leader in 9th Company/I.R. GD 1, was
killed on this day.
Things were livelier farther north near Rzhev. There, perhaps as
a diversion, or a change in the focus of their attack following their
lack of success at the Gostischka Valley, the bolsheviks charged the
positions of the German 6th Infantry Division. They achieved several
local penetrations and began to wear down the few defenders in the
positions at the edge of the city with their heavy fire. How long could
the defenders hold out? Was the city in direct danger? Was the
bastion of the German defences to fall after all? Once again it was
the I.D. GD which was called in to help save the city of Rzhev. The
Reconnaissance Battalion GD, under the command of Rittmeister
Wtjen, which until now had been standing idly by as corps reserve,
was alerted by the Chief of-Staff of XXVII Army Corps and instructed
to find a way to Rzhev-South and establish contact with the 6th
Infantry Division fighting there. Combat was to be expected. It was
learned from Generalmajor Gromann, the division's commander,
that the Russians had attacked on both sides of the railway line with
powerful tank and infantry forces and had pushed in the German
main line of resistance.
While it was still dark, the battalion less the armoured car
squadron set out in the direction of Rzhev for employment by VI
Army Corps which was in overall command there. The commander
of the 6th Infantry Division was considering three possible uses for
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD:
1. Participation in a counterattack to restore the old main line of
resistance;
2. Occupy the position at the northern edge of Rzhev;
3. Occupy the south bank of the Volga.
The Reconnaissance Battalion GD moved into the southern part
of Rzhev, the so-called lower section, and prepared for its next action.
The unit was kept on alert, but its only activity on 22 September was
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Stuka support had been requested and the entire artillery force
stood ready to fire. The description of the attack begins with a factual
report by the I.R. GD 1 and is followed by an account of the
experiences of a Gefreiter Sturmpionier.
The following is the daily report by the I.R. GD 1, from whose
positions the operation began:
"Through Operation 'Max and Moritz' the southeast part of
Tschermassowo, the cemetery hill and the Gostischka valley were to
be taken from the enemy and incorporated into our own main
defensive position. Ill Battalion moved into its assembly area at
15.45. At 17.00 followed a sudden Stuka attack on the cemetery
hill and the Gostischka valley, as well as a barrage by all of our
artillery. Surprisingly, enemy resistance was comparatively weak.
The 2nd and 3rd Companies of the Stu.Pi.Btl. GD, which had moved
up into III Battalion's sector, were able to cross the enemy's barrage
fire zone very quickly and began clearing out the bunkers in the
Gostischka valley and at the southern edge of the small wood with
satchel charges and flamethrowers. Support by the attached Assault
Gun Battalion GD was very good, and by 17.00 our troops had
already taken the cemetery hill. The hill was cleared as was the gully
to the south.
7th Company cleared the ravine east of the cemetery hill which
had been named 'Prittwitz hollow'. The attack was carried forward
so forcefully that the enemy gave up 'panzer hill' (a neighbouring hill
on which there were several knocked-out tanks) and fled. At approximately 17.30 it was reported free of the enemy and the
neighbouring unit on the left should have occupied it. Unfortunately,
this was not done, and during the course of the evening the enemy
once again took possession of the hill.
By 18.00 it could be reported that the attack's objectives had been
reached. Ill Battalion/I.R. GD 1 set out to relieve the two Pionier
companies which had carried out the assault and, at 18.45, took
over the positions at the eastern edge of Tschermassowo and on the
cemetery hill. The situation that evening was as follows:
In the bottom land 150 metres south of the cemetery hill, the right
wing of III/I.R. 1 had contact on the right with units of I.R. GD 2. The
bulk of I.R. GD 2 was still lagging behind. The cemetery hill itself was
firmly in our hands. Contact existed there between the inner wing of
II and III Battalions/I.R. GD 1 and their neighbour on the left, III
Battalion/lO5th Inf.Rgt. When darkness fell the units regrouped for
defence and consolidated their new positions.
The Pionier company under Lt. Hckel set out against the small
wood which it reached in twelve minutes after storming eighty
bunkers. The company under Lt. Warschnauer was even more
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In long rows we passed through the gap. We were a third of the way
to our objective and not a shot had been fired. The nerve-racking
howling of the Stukas and our artillery seemed to have confused the
Russians somewhat.
Then, we spotted movement ahead. A commissar was chasing his
people around and the earth-brown figures were running about in
confusion. Then the whistling and buzzing began. So now it was
becoming serious. But we were already too close. Hand grenades
out, throw, take cover and up again. Soon we were in among the
Russian foxholes. The bolsheviks that hadn't run away raised their
hands. We stormed on into the wood, or better between the shattered
tree trunks. Ahead of us was the wall, but our momentum was so
great that we wanted to keep going. But the order came: Halt
advance no farther!
But why? Why now? But orders were orders. The word came
through to assemble. The whole thing had taken scarcely half an
hour. Then infantry came and occupied the position.
From this hill with its small wood we had a terrific view. We could
look down into three valleys, and to the northeast we could see the
Russians still running.
Then the first shells came in; the Russian artillery was making its
presence felt again. The word came down: Pioniers pull back. We
were to move back to our jumping-off positions.
Groups of three, assemble the wounded! We worked our way back
and soon we were again at the mine-belt. An N C O came towards
us with two Russian prisoners. We called to him, 'Watch out, mines!',
but one of the Russians stepped on one of the green boxes and the
second man right behind him. There was a loud crash and I couldn't
see anything for the smoke and dust. I couldn't hear a thing for at
least an hour.
We moved back to the old infantry position and for us it was time
to rest."
The infantry battalions quickly set about consolidating the newlywon positions and preparing them for defence. It was certain that it
wouldn't be long before the Russians tried to win back their former
main line of resistance. The important thing now was to hold on to
the vital hill with its excellent view into the enemy's rear.
On the following day, 23 September 1942, the enemy began his
desperate effort to regain the lost territory. If that were not enough,
a period of bad weather now set in. The continuous rain made it
difficult to walk along the trenches. The water stood 30 to 50
centimetres deep in the foxholes in which the men had to hold out
day and night under heavy artillery and mortar fire.
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and fired blindly. They were swept away by our machine guns which
we fired on the run.
Then the first rounds from a Russian mortar landed in our ranks.
150 metres lungs burning, we headed straight for the Russian
trench line. Just as I was about to leap into the trench, I fell and found
myself looking into the asiatic face of a Russian sniper who was lying
there. Amid the roar of battle I shouted at him: Rukki wjerch\
hands up! But he didn't want to. I summoned my courage and poked
him with my bayonet. Then he left the trench and crawled to the
rear into captivity.
As a precaution I threw a hand grenade into the section of trench
to my left. Following the explosion I continued along the trench.
Other men from my company hastened along beside and behind me.
Suddenly, stop! We had advanced 250 metres when the trench was
interrupted by a barricade. Out! There was no way forward here.
Hand grenades flew to and fro; the bolsheviks were behind the
barricade, only 5-8 metres away and determined to resist. Then a
machine gun appeared among the Ivans. Machine gun forward! In
a flash our machine gun was in position. It was all or nothing now
us or them. It was a matter of seconds, one of us, the Russian or
the German, would be too slow in this life or death duel. Then our
machine gun spit out its deadly burst of fire, a tenth of a second
faster. On the Russian side an abandoned and shot-up machine gun
swayed in the air. Around us all hell broke loose; the Russians were
laying down barrage fire. Shell bursts danced around us. We pressed
into the trench. The hell of Ssuchtino raged. Death thundered down
from the cemetery hill, where the grenadiers were fighting, to the
hills before Ssuchtino. We could see the shells from a Stalin Organ
exploding over where the Grenadiers were.
Our tanks had not arrived. We were facing 144 Soviet batteries,
that was 432 guns. If things continued like that, we would never
reach the bank of the Volga which we could see shimmering on the
horizon. Behind me a man stood up, lifted his rifle and fired. . . and
collapsed, covered in blood. He had been shot through the head by
a sniper. I took the ammunition from his bullet pouch as our supply
was almost exhausted. Every bullet was precious. What would have
happened if the Russians had counterattacked? To make matters
worse, there was a 200 metre gap in the front. Lt. Leo Graf von
Schwerin, leader of 2nd Platoon, ordered Kotelka to reestablish
contact with our neighbouring platoon. Under constant fire, I crawled
from the trench and helped our medic tend to the severely wounded.
Five men were left standing in the trench no one had given up
yet.
The fighting slowly ebbed, and the day slowly came to an end.
Ignaz Kotelka had not returned. As darkness fell I crawled to the rear.
Through rolls of barbed wire, past dead and wounded, through shell
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holes and trenches; then I ran to the battalion command post with
the report.
I stepped into the bunker. Light surrounded me. Major Grosser sat
before me. Thank God, a report from 2nd Company! Here, have
a smoke; what's new up front?' I made my report and sucked the
smoke deep into my lungs. The cigarette made me forget all the
excitement of the day. I learned that Gefr. Willy Bhme, our battalion
messenger, had been wounded then I ran back.
I ran into Uffz. Hoffmann, former driver for our company commander, his head almost completely swathed in bandages. I shook
his hand, a gesture that said more than a thousand words. When I
reported back, tting said to me, 'Kotelka is not here, he's missing!
Jupp Greifenstein has been killed.' I heard many other names.
The seriously wounded man was still lying in the trench, moaning
in pain. tting and I ran back to the old German trench in the
blackness and fetched a stretcher. As we carried it forward we met
some regimental Pioniers who were to plug the gap between our
platoons. No one knew the exact way to the front; in the Egyptian
blackness we had lost our way. One of the Pioniers suggested that
we just keep going.
We stumbled on, how many metres and for how long I no longer
know. Suddenly there was a call from ahead: '2nd Company
Grodeutschland??' I listened we heard Russian voices and then
a command in Russian, shots were fired.
We dropped the empty stretcher it would only slow us down
and ran back in the direction from which we had come. I stumbled
and fell right into a water-filled hole. I was soaking wet and my
boots were full of water.
When we finally reached Lt. von Schwerin's platoon, Lt. Hensel,
our company commander, was also there. Our severely wounded
comrade no longer needed the stretcher; while we were gone he had
died from loss of blood."
The losses suffered on this one day were such that individual units
had to be merged within the battalions. The fighting strength of the
division had fallen to that of a weak regiment. Nevertheless, the
attack had been a considerable success. For Uffz. Klemm of 2nd
Company/I.R. GD 1, 30 September 1942 was a day of glory. After
his company commander and all of the unit's senior NCOs were
knocked out of action he took command of 2nd Company and,
risking his own life, not only reached the assigned objective but, on
his own initiative, led the attack far beyond it. For this outstanding
action the Supreme Commander awarded Klemm the Knight's
Cross.
The award recommendation submitted by the regiment described
the action this way:
425
426
through the ranks; the morale of the men, who had endured this
battle for three weeks, improved greatly. Even though the enemy
resumed his sudden, surprise barrages, the repeated enemy assaults
collapsed under the fire of the Grenadiers and Fusiliers the
positions remained firmly in German hands.
The increasing numbers of orders of the day which were reaching
the troops in the front lines were a sign that relief was at hand. They
provided a brief review of the past period of fighting and were the
official thanks from the commanders for the sacrifices and accomplishments of the troops.
Special recognition for the division's accomplishments came in an
order of the day from XXVII Corps:
The Commanding General
XXVII Corps
427
428
They also knew, however, that it had cost great sacrifices in action
to earn their reputation. Again and again the thoughts of the men
turned to the machine gunner or tank driver, the forward observer
or motorcyclist, who had given his life on some battlefield.
At the conclusion of the battle the I.R. GD 1 reported the following
casualties:
10 officers, 157 NCOs and men killed,
1,230 officers, NCOs and men wounded
The Reconnaissance Battalion GD alone suffered 141 casualties,
including 36 dead, during its action in the positions at the edge of
Rzhev in the period 23. 9. - 3. 10. 1942:
The 2nd Company/I.R. GD 1 went into battle on 10 September
with 141 men and returned on 5 October with only 47. The
company's commander, Obit. Grundmann, was killed on 30 September and with him Feldwebel Gratz and an Oberfeldwebel who
had just been transferred in from 17th Company. Among the NCOs
wounded were Ofeldw. Stadler, the first member of the division to
be awarded the German Cross in Gold (Feb. 1942), Feldw. Gehr and
Feldw. Arndt. The only Feldwebel who was unscathed was Ofeldw.
Wiesjahn who, by chance, was on a course in Germany at this time.
With the company train at that time were Hptfeldw. Pflug, Feldw.
Flsser and Feldw. Pabich.
The Artillery Regiment GD, which had fired more than 30,000
shells in the period 10. 9. - 1. 10. 1942, buried 6 officers and 29
NCOs and men in the military cemetery at Botscharewo. Another
13 officers and 102 NCOs and men were recovering from wounds
in military hospitals.
Between 6 and 9 October the individual units were relieved in their
positions near Tschermassowo and Ssuchtino by the 95th Infantry
Division and pulled out of the line. The men did not have long to
forget the inferno of the battle, however. The individual sections and
companies moved back across a landscape torn by the war of
attrition, while the prime movers drove to the rear through the
protective ravines, towing the anti-tank guns and heavy infantry
guns. They assembled behind stands of trees and clumps of bushes
and waited. The trucks arrived, were loaded with soldiers and drove
away to the northwest towards the main road. The units were
transferred into the division's rest area in the area north and
northeast of Olenin. The troops were quartered in villages and
peasant cottages, the vehicles were dispersed and camouflaged and
the unit stood down. Quiet lay over the villages as the men recovered
from the trials of the past few weeks. The following days saw them
engaged in servicing vehicles and weapons and improving their
quarters as they prepared for a longer period of rest. The hastily set
429
were the padded snow-suits and felt-lined boots. Horses and sleighs
were also supplied.
A training demonstration by the Sturm-Pionier Battalion took place
in the presence of the commander-in-chief, likewise an exercise by
the Fusiliers of the reinforced II Battalion. Map exercises were also
included in the agenda. The units took all measures necessary to
defend against a Soviet winter offensive.
The Soviet Position:
"At the beginning of the winter the Russians resumed their attack
at the same points on which they had been focusing for months. It
was their intention to tie down German forces on all fronts, prevent
movement of reinforcements to threatened sectors and improve
conditions at tactically favourable positions for later operations. Their
greatest efforts were directed at the front between Rzhev and Velikiye
Luki where, during the summer months, the Germans had only been
able to close the gaps in a makeshift fashion. The bulge at Rzhev,
which jutted deep into Soviet-held territory, offered an especially
favourable starting point for an envelopment followed by a thrust
deep into the German front, especially as the Russian forces near
Toropets were already threatening the salient's deep northern flank.
German air reconnaissance had spotted a Soviet build-up between
Toropets and Kalinin in mid-October. Although air attacks could
probably delay and harass the Soviet build-up, they could not prevent
it in the long run."
R a d i o Message:
432
the previous winter. Only a few panzer divisions, such as the 5th
Pz.Div. near Rzhev and the I.D. GD near Olenin, were available as
a mobile reserve. For the numerous points of effort expected in the
coming Soviet attack it was far too few.
In detail:
In the I.D. GD's area of operations were
(from north to south):
the 253rd Inf.Div., the 206th Inf.Div. and
the 110th Inf.Div. (XXIII Army Corps).
near Bely:
the 246th Inf.Div. and the 2nd Luftwaffe
Field Division (XXXXI Panzer Corps).
The strengths of these infantry divisions gave rise to fears that they
would not be able to prevent a breakthrough by the enemy in the
event of major attacks by the enemy."
In the first half of November the main body of the Infantry Division
GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was still widely spread out across the area
east and northeast of Olenin. The division headquarters was in
Mjassniza.
The reinforced Kampfgruppe Kassnitz, which was in readiness
northeast of Bely, about 35 km south of Olenin, was expecting to
see action with XXXXI Panzer Corps (General Harpe), under whose
direct command it was. Reconnaissance in the northwest corner of
Ninth Army's combat zone indicated that further units of the I.D. GD
would most likely have to be sent there. It was already obvious that
the danger existed of the division being frittered away in small groups.
As far as weapons and personnel were concerned the division had
recovered relatively well despite the brief time it had been given to
recuperate, even though combat strengths had not yet reached their
former levels. The men were rested; exchanges and transfers had
closed the most important gaps in the ranks of the commanders.
Oberst Kassnitz had taken command of the Fusilier Regiment; Major
Grosser, former commander of I Battalion/Fusilier Regiment, had
been transferred and replaced by Hptm. Bethge. Major Kohlhaas,
who had been wounded at the Tim bridge, returned and took
command of the Fusilier Regiment's III Battalion. On 24 November
1942 Kohlhaas received the Knight's Cross which had been awarded
him by the Supreme Commander.
The Grenadier Regiment remained under the command of Oberst
Khler; his battalion commanders were Major Heesemann, Major
Gehrke and Hauptmann Petereit. Further officers arrived from
Germany to fill the open company and platoon commander positions
within the companies.
The 11th Armoured Observation Battery of the Artillery Regiment
GD was probably the first of the division's units to see action. From
17 November, on orders from XXIII Army Corps, it began monitor-
433
ing both sides of the Beresa River near Artemenki in the 110th
Infantry Division's sector using a sound-ranging system in preparation for the occupation of the area several days later. The 11th
Battery's Meteorological Section was sent into Demidow with the
ARKO 122 to take weather observations for the entire corps sector.
A flash-ranging system was subsequently set up in the same sector,
as it was determined that the Soviets had reinforced their artillery
forces in a sector opposite the 86th Infantry Division in the Luchesa
Valley.
The German High Command calculated that the Soviet offensive
would begin on 25 or 26 November 1942. All of the division's units
therefore found themselves at a high state of readiness. As reported
in the Wehrmacht communique, the Russians launched their attack
on the central sector on a wide front between Kalinin and Toropets,
preceded by heavy artillery fire. At the same time there began the
process of splitting up the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND into various battle groups which reached its peak on 30
November when elements of the division were scattered over 110
kilometres of front.
The A s s i g n m e n t o f t h e I . D . G D t o Sectors o f O t h e r
Divisions between O l e n i n a n d Bely
Grenadier Rgt. GD
I Btl.
II Btl.
III Btl.
IV Btl.
to
to
to
to
Fusilier Rgt. GD
entire regiment
Reconnaissance Btl. GD
entire battalion
Panzer Battalion GD
1st Company
2nd Company
3rd Company
disbanded
to 206th Inf.Div.
to 14th (mot) Inf.Div.
Artillery Rgt. GD
I Battalion
II Battalion
III Battalion
Armoured Observation
to
to
to
to
434
GD
GD
253rd Inf.Div.
GD
Battery
Army Flak Battalion GD
1st Battery
2nd Battery
3rd Battery
4th Battery
5th Battery
to
to
to
to
to
Pz.Jg. Battalion GD
1st Company
2nd Company
3rd Company
disbanded
to XXXXI Pz.Corps - Bely area
to GD
Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD
1st Company
2nd Company
3rd Company
Bridging Column
Signals Battalion GD
GD
206th Inf.Div.
XXIII Army Corps
GD
GD
to GD
to GD
to 14th (mot) Inf.Div.
Vyazma dispersal area
to GD
Supply Service GD
4th, 6th, 12th, 13th, 9th, 10th, 17th Columns to 592nd
Supply Battalion
Administrative and Supply Services GD
Bakery Company, Butchery Company in Vyazma dispersal
area.
Medical Services GD
1st Medical Company
2nd Medical Company
to GD
to XXXXI Pz.Corps - Bely area
Field Hospital
1st Ambulance Platoon
2nd Ambulance Platoon
3rd Ambulance Platoon
to GD
Kosino
Smolensk
435
Division Headquarters GD, Signals Battalion GD, Grenadier Regiment GD (I, II and IV Battalions), Panzerjger Battalion GD (3rd
Company), III Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD, Flak Battalion GD
(1st, 4th and 5th Batteries), Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD (Battalion
Staff, 1st and 2nd Companies).
At the same time, the following units were placed under the
command of the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND:
from the 86th Inf.Div. - 216th Grenadier Rgt. (I and reinf. Ill
Battalions); 3rd Company/I86th Pionier Battalion; 12th Battery/
186th Artillery Rgt. (Czech cannons); 2nd Company/I86th Pionier
Battalion.
from the 110th Inf.Div. reinf. 7th Company/252nd Grenadier
Rgt.; II Battalion/120th Artillery Regiment; Kampfgruppe Hptm.
Schmittborn (two rifle companies).
These were the units available to the division when action began.
Chapter Two
With the Ninth Army in the Winter Battle 1942-43
The Russian offensive began on 24 November 1942 as expected,
without immediately revealing its points of main effort, however.
Instead, the Soviets applied pressure all along the Ninth Army's front,
hoping to find the weakest spots in the German main line of
resistance. These were revealed in the afternoon, when alarming
reports of significant breakthroughs came in from the area south of
Bely, in the Luchesa valley, north of Cholmez (253rd Inf.Div.) and
near Wanino Motorino (boundary of the 253rd and 206th Inf.Div.).
The situation at these locations was unclear, and the commanding
corps XXIII Army Corps in Tatewo - had only a partial picture of
what was going on as the telephone lines and other forms of
communication had been partially severed. To make matters worse,
a severe winter storm was raging.
The result of the large number of reports coming in from all sectors
of XXIII Army Corps was the hasty alerting of the I.D. GD and an
order to send individual battle groups to the threatened points. They
were assigned to throw back the enemy forces through local
counterattacks and return the infantry which had fallen back in
the face of the Soviet attack to its former positions.
This order was a mistake, as the German command was soon to
find out, because a counterattack launched without knowledge of the
enemy's strength and with limited forces usually results in failure. An
even greater mistake was the splitting up into small groups of a
436
situation in the area defended by the 206th Infantry Division and the
253rd Infantry Division the right wing appeared especially
threatening. Increasing cold and persistent snow storms forced the
motorised units to take extraordinary measures. The tanks had to be
fired up every twenty minutes to prevent their engines from freezing.
Lack of, or insufficient supplies of camouflage paint made operations
by the tanks very difficult.
Meanwhile, heavy fighting was raging to the south (in the DubrowkaJemeljanowaDemechi area) where the Soviets had attacked
with two tank corps and had completely overrun the south wing of
the 246th Infantry Division and the entire 2nd Luftwaffe Field
Division. A dangerous breakthrough of the Ninth Army's front was
at hand. The Fusilier Regiment, which was still to the northeast, was
alerted and readied for action south of Bely. It was to depart early
on 26 November, without III Battalion, however, which had a special
assignment and would follow the regiment two days later.
The Soviets had also gone to the attack in the Luchesa valley in
the 86th Infantry Division's sector and had likewise achieved local
penetrations. As a result of pressure from the division command of
the 206th Infantry Division, the last available combat unit of the I.D.
GD, II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment, was also sent into action. The
battalion was placed on alert on the evening of 25 November.
The Soviets had made numerous local penetrations in Ninth
Army's main line of resistance on the northern and western fronts,
each of which had the potential to become a full-fledged
breakthrough. The last reserves, namely the units of the I.D. GD,
had been committed. The High Command advised its superiors of
this dangerous situation and requested further units. Two battle
groups from the 1st Panzer Division were despatched to danger area
number one: the area south of Bely. Kampfgruppe von Wietersheim
was on a forced march in the area due south of Bely, while
Kampfgruppe von der Meden was hurrying towards the Natscha,
southeast of Bely, in order to halt the advancing enemy at that section
of the river. But these measures were still under way, while the enemy
forces continued to march eastward through the snow. Moving
towards them from the other side of the pocket was a powerful Soviet
battle group with tanks which, by the evening of 25 November, had
reached the SsytschewkaRzhev railway line, severing the supply
route to the German divisions fighting to the north.
For the I.D. GD this brought about another weakening of its
fighting strength, because the Division Supply Units, which had just
arrived in Vyazma, were forced to release seven of their columns for
the supply of other units. With the limited number of supply columns
left to it, the division was only able to supply its widely-separated
units in a makeshift fashion and then only with great difficulty. This
placed a tremendous burden on the men of the supply services.
438
Darkness fell over the battlefield on this first night of the winter
battle on the central sector of the Russian Front, but there was no
quiet. The Soviets took advantage of their initial success and attempted to continue their eastward advance by moonlight. The
defenders clung to their individual strongpoints, regrouped and
occupied new positions. They were exhausted. Guns failed to fire in
the freezing cold and deliveries of ammunition by the overloaded
supply system were slow and inadequate. Another factor was their
own weakness compared to the numerical strength of the enemy,
which had been exacerbated by the considerable numbers of casualties, weakening their fighting strength. At the division headquarters
of the I.D. GD still in Mjassniza a certain desperation was
apparent. As it had scarcely any of its own units left under its
command, all the division command could do was register the reports
from the individual units; it had no influence over events. The
battalions, and even individual companies, were spread out from
right to left among the 206th Inf.Div., the 253rd Inf.Div., the 86th
Inf.Div., the 246th Inf.Div. and the XXXXI Pz.Corps. The division
command sought the return of its units, reminding its superiors of
the old lesson that the secondment of units to foreign commands
meant only disadvantages, exploitation and improper utilisation
but in vain.
Thus passed the night of 25/26 November. Reinforced by tanks
of the Panzer Battalion GD (1st and 3rd Companies), I and III
Battalions of the Grenadier Regiment, supported by III Battalion/
Artillery Regiment GD, resumed their attacks against Scharki (I Btl.)
and Wanino Motorino (III Btl.) in the face of heavy enemy fire.
Scharki was taken at the cost of heavy casualties; Motorino also fell
into German hands, but had to be given up again in the afternoon
when a shortage of ammunition forced a withdrawal in the face of a
Soviet counterattack.
Obit. Ringe, commander of one of the tank companies, was killed
as he attempted to recover a wounded grenadier. Also killed were
Obit. Henke, commander of 14th Company/Grenadier Regiment
and Lt. Dck, commander of 8th Company. Many NCOs and men
were also killed.
Exhausted, the men of III Battalion dug into the snow outside
Motorino, while the Grenadiers of I Battalion clung to the ruins of
Scharki, determined to hold on to the village.
Farther west the squadrons of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD
were in positions outside Cholmez and Makarowo as the reserve for
the 473rd Infantry Regiment of the 253rd Infantry Division. So far
the infantry had been able to hold onto its positions.
Farther south, the Soviet penetration south of Bely was threatening
to become a catastrophe. Finding no opposition, the Soviet armoured groups were pushing eastward, seeking to expand their
439
West of Bely the main line of resistance, which ran towards the
southwest, was firmly in the hands of the defending divisions as far
as Popowo. From Popowo the blocking position, which was occupied by the remnants of the 246th Infantry Division, bent back
towards Budino and ended with its left wing on Wishenka brook.
The positions of the 246th Infantry Division and the 2nd Luftwaffe
Field Division which extended from Popowo to the southwest around
Ssimonowka and Klemjatin had, as already mentioned, been overrun
by the Russian tank units. Most of the soldiers of both divisions had
been scattered or taken prisoner.
Hastily thrown together alert units and newly brought in reserves
tried desperately to dam up the breakthrough. On the German side
no one knew for sure exactly how far the Russians had penetrated.
The reinforced Kampfgruppe Kassnitz was placed under the
command of the 1st Panzer Division. On the afternoon of 26
November both rifle battalions were to attack southwest from Budino
towards Ssimonowka and Klemjatin, occupy both villages and win
back the former main line of resistance.
The bulk of the Soviet artillery was spotted in positions in the forest
about 5,000 metres west of Ssimonowka and Klemjatin. Their
observation posts were located in and on both sides of the two
villages. From there they must have had an excellent view of the
terrain over which Kampfgruppe Kassnitz was to launch its attack.
If the attack had gone ahead across this open terrain, it would
certainly have been smashed by Soviet artillery fire, especially since
the German artillery was still moving into position in the bottom land
on both sides of Borissowka and was temporarily unable to fire. As
a result of the objections raised by Oberst Kassnitz, the attack was
postponed until the following day at 10.00.
While the Oberst and his commanders were brought up to date by
the commander of the battalion from the 246th Infantry Division on
the present situation and the locations of the earlier positions, enemy
infantry suddenly attacked the blocking position due west of Budino.
Elements of I Battalion joined the action and threw back the enemy
forces which had managed to penetrate the German lines at one
point.The remnants of the 246th Division which were employed
there were rather battered and no longer stable.
The high ground on which the village of Budino once stood was
studded with massive bunkers which had been quite comfortably
fitted out. The regimental headquarters which had been quartered
there until the attack could probably have spent the winter there quite
nicely if the Russians hadn't been so unfriendly as to attack at that
exact spot. Also still standing were the bunkers in the bottom land
near Turowo, in which the division's supply train and horses had
apparently spent the winter.
441
and passed on to the higher authorities. But help with what? There
were no more German units available. The supply trains were
combed for men and scratch units sent to the front. Every available
fighting man was to be sent immediately to the threatened position
in the Luchesa Valley. Time was of the essence!
At about 07.30 on 27 November, following a thorough pre-attack
bombardment by the German artillery, I and III Battalions/ Grenadier
Regiment GD once again went to the attack against Wanino and
Motorino. Deep snow, drifts and cold hampered the attack, which
was so important to the recovery of the former main line of
resistance. The attack failed. After hours of bitter fighting the
Grenadiers could go no farther; it could simply not be done with the
available forces. The accompanying tanks suffered heavy losses; four
were knocked out during the battle.
Pleas by the commanders of the attacking battalions led XXIII
Army Corps to call off the attack in the 206th Division's sector and
issue orders to hold the line which had been reached as the new main
line of resistance. This freed forces which were immediately
employed elsewhere along the front. Ill Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD remained in the new front line, reinforcing the infantry
units there, while I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD, III Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD, the 2nd Pionier Company, a Flak
battery and the rest of Panzerjger Battalion GD were thrown
together as Kampfgruppe Khler. The units assembled during the
night in their old billeting area in preparation for a move early the
next morning into the Luchesa Valley, where it was to bring much
needed relief for II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment which was
engaged in hard fighting there.
The Reconnaissance Battalion GD was still in its positions near
Cholmez and Samoschje. It could see enemy troop concentrations
but nothing out of the ordinary took place and the battalion continued
extending and improving its positions.
Meanwhile, south of Bely where the Russians had broken through,
all hell had broken loose. Russian columns streamed endlessly
through the gap in the front and, together with the tanks, poured
eastward. Repeated attempts by the Russians to enlarge the
breakthrough to the north in the direction of Bely failed in the face
of the resistance put up by Kampfgruppe Kassnitz, which was itself
preparing for an attack from the north in the direction of Ssimonowka intended to take the enemy in his flank. The following is another
account by Hauptmann Bethge, commander of I Battalion/Fusilier
Regiment GD:
"It had meanwhile turned out that the enemy had occupied the
heights south and southwest of Morosowo and Nossowo after the
makeshift unit employed there abandoned its positions the night
before without any contact with the enemy. The result was a gap in
443
the front through which the enemy could have pushed northward
toward Bely. In order to remove this threat, III Battalion/Fusilier
Regiment GD under Oberstleutnant Kohlhaas, which had arrived
early on 27 November, was sent to take the heights south of
Morosowo.
Thick fog and blowing snow reduced visibility, but also prevented
the battalion from being spotted too soon by the enemy artillery and
fired upon.
The battle southwest of Morosowo raged back and forth for hours.
The enemy repeatedly sent in tanks and attempted to throw the
attacking III Battalion back down the hill. The Panzerjger of 18th
Company destroyed several T-34s.
Through gaps in the fog the men could see the enemy tanks clearly
as they drove around on the hills between Ogibalowo and Morosowo.
Eventually, however, III Battalion was able to gain a foothold at the
edge of a horseshoe-shaped gully southwest of Morosowo and held
this position against all enemy attacks.
During the afternoon enemy activity in front of the positions held
by Kampfgruppe Kassnitz died down. The planned attack by the
battle group was put off until the following day."
The breakthrough at this position had brought the enemy's spearheads to Skerino, about 12 kilometres southeast of Bely, or almost
20 kilometres past the former German defensive line. Meeting little
resistance, the Soviets prepared to cross the Natscha. But
Kampfgruppe von der Meden of the 1st Panzer Division arrived after
a forced march and occupied the east bank of the river between
Koweltschina and Komary in order to prevent the crossing. However, the battle group simply did not have the forces necessary to do
so, especially as the marshy areas along the river had frozen over
and were no longer an obstacle to tanks. A catastrophe now seemed
unavoidable and the destruction of the Ninth Army and with it the
Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND seemed certain.
On the other side, the Soviet elite units committed at the crucial
points, motorised and mechanised units with many tanks and rocket
launchers, fought especially well. The strength of the Soviet forces
in the Luchesa Valley alone was estimated at more than 21,000 men.
The German defenders were proven positional infantry divisions.
They had spent the previous winter of 1941/42 quietly in their
well-equipped bunkers, but had lost some of their defensive strength
in the months of inactivity. All of their preparations for the Soviet
attack they knew must come were smashed and destroyed by the
Soviet artillery barrage and following attack on the night of 24 and
25 November 1942.
In the face of the enemy assault the units of the I.D. GD were
employed as "fire brigades" at hot spots along the front. Dispersed
along the entire northern and western front of the Ninth Army, they
444
Inf.Div.) and the remnants of the Panzerjger Battalion (one company was near Bely and one motorized company had been disbanded) had to first seize their positions and then hold them against
the tremendous numerical superiority of the Soviets. These units,
which were once more under the direct command of the division,
were outdoors day and night in the snow and cold with practically
no cover, had no effective anti-tank weapons which could operate
in the cold, and had to fight without tank or assault gun support.
Their only support came from a weakened battalion from a foreign
unit on their left wing. The combat strengths of the units were
extremely low, and there were no reserves available. Soviet tanks
repeatedly overran the German strongpoints and then fired on the
positions from behind.
As it became more apparent that the main Soviet effort was in the
Luchesa Valley, the medical services moved to be nearer the fighting:
1st Medical Company and the 1st Ambulance Platoon to the road
leading to Ssidorowo where they immediately set up the main
dressing station. The ambulances drove the wounded from the
battalion aid stations in Gussewo to the main dressing station.
Further south the reinforced Kampfgruppe Kassnitz stood ready
for the planned attack in the direction of Ssimonowka. It was about
midday when the attack began. The following description of the
attack is taken from the personal papers of the commander of I
Battalion/Fusilier Regiment GD:
'II Battalion had scarcely left its blocking positions and stepped into
the open when it was struck by a firestorm. Within twenty minutes
the battalion had been shattered by artillery fire whose intensity was
unlike anything we had imagined before. The very leading elements
of II Battalion did succeed in reaching the first bunkers in Ssimonowka, but they were met there by Soviet infantry and badly shot up.
Only a few of the men made it back to their starting position. The
commanding officer, adjutant and all of the company commanders
and company officers were killed or wounded. The battalion executive officer was the only officer to return unhurt. Losses in men and
NCOs were correspondingly high.
Things went better for I Battalion which attacked from farther back
on the right. It was able to take the first part of the old main line of
resistance fairly quickly, but the attack then bogged down as a result
of II Battalion's lack of progress and the extremely heavy Soviet
artillery fire. Moreover, the enemy infantry had settled into the
bunkers and trenches and were defending tenaciously. Meanwhile,
Oberst Kassnitz arrived and gave orders for I Battalion to return to
its former positions.
The battalion was subsequently inserted on the left wing of the
battalion from the 246th Infantry Division in the blocking position
southwest of Budino where it closed the gap to III Battalion near
446
overrun. There was nothing left but for the Grenadiers to jump onto
the steel monsters and destroy them with concentrated charges.
Fifteen of the Soviet tanks were put out of action by these means or
by direct fire from the 8.8 cm Flak, artillery or anti-tank guns.
At midday, however, the situation threatened to become even
more critical: the Karskaja strongpoint, which was being held by the
86th Infantry Division, was overrun by Soviet tanks. Finding no more
opposition, the tanks roared towards the east and north to attack
the other strongpoints from the side or rear, trailing sprays of snow
in their wakes. The only solution for the strongpoints was to form
hedgehog positions and hold on at any cost.
Soviet pressure also increased again near Staruchi. The German
infantry was in retreat towards Bogorodizkoje, the southern flank
had been ripped open. Then Kampfgruppe Warschnauer, which
consisted of 1st and 2nd Companies of Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD,
threw itself against the far superior enemy force which included at
least 40 tanks in an effort to prevent the Soviets from achieving a
breakthrough. Obit. Frsterling was killed and his NCOs fell one after
another, but the Pioniers held on in spite of the loss of their section
and platoon leaders and continued to fight. The attack was brought
to a halt, but only a small number of defenders survived those hellish
hours.
The elements of II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment deployed at the
Luchesa bridge north of Staruchi were also involved in bitter, close-in
fighting. The few men committed there fought with unparalleled
courage. The 7th Company and its commander Obit. Rupp were
likewise engaged in a battle man against men and tanks. That evening
7th Companyformerly the famous 'Sixth'counted a combat
strength of five men. Obit. Rupp, Ofeldw. Sonnenburg (leader of the
company headquarters personnel) and many others were listed as
missing in action. Every man held his ground and fought on against
the Soviet tide to his last breath. During the night II Battalion's
fighting strength was that of a reinforced platoon: that was all that
was left after the frightful 29 November 1942.
Alongside the infantry were the forward observers and radio
operators of the artillery. They took part in the battles in the front
lines, directing the fire of their batteries which provided fire support
for the Grenadiers. They were also the eyes of the division command.
Their continuous radio reports from every sector gave the artillery
and division commanders an accurate picture of their own and the
enemy's situation.
Lt. Busch of 7th Battery/III Battalion/Artillery Regiment GD,
which was supporting Kampfgruppe Khler, described his experiences that day as a forward observer near Staruchi:
"We occupied an observation post at 03.00; reported to Major
Lorenz, commander of a battle group. . . nothing to be seen, only
450
the uncomfortable sound of tank tracks rumbling through the impenetrable snowstorm. At about 09.00 the first crossed our lines,
rammed our Paks; one rolled straight over our trenches. Unfortunately, we had no hand grenades or demolition charges at hand.
When it cleared for a moment we could see our infantry crawling
about and heard the 'hurray' of the bolsheviks. I tried every means
to range in the guns, but when I actually did see an impact, by the
time the next shot was fired there was such a thick wall of snow in
front of us that we could see nothing more.
Suddenly, at about 10.00, ten more T-34s appeared in front of us
and rolled over our holes. A hundred paces behind them followed
the Russian infantry. We wondered why our Grenadiers weren't firing
and then saw them pulling back in a group behind us. What to do?
If we pulled back too the Russians would soon be on our hill and
would simply shoot us down as we climbed down into the gully. So
we decided to try to hold.
We collected all the machine guns and submachine guns.
Hauptmann Fromm, who had come forward a short time before,
took command of the last defendersabout 45 menincluding two
Pak crews, several Grenadiers and our radio operator.
We allowed the bolsheviks to approach to about 80 metres and
then we opened fire with our limited supply of ammunition. But there
always seemed to be more, charging at us with horrible cries of
'Urrah!'. There was nothing else to do we would have to make a
run for it. Hptm. Fromm ordered an orderly withdrawal along the
road, but there wasn't much chance of that.
I was able to take a brief, sad look at my forward observer car. It
was stuck in the ditch. It wouldn't be long until the Russians poured
over it. Nevertheless, we remained in cover behind it until we
suddenly came under fire from the side. The Russians had outflanked
us on the right.
The last hope for escape lay in flight across the snow-covered field
to the left. One man after another toppled over into the snow, fatally
hit. Hptm. Fromm was hit in the groin, but was able to keep going
with my help. Then there was a cry behind me; Wachtmeister
Budecke had been hit in the head.
I was able to drag myself slowly through the snow. I had already
lost my boots; I was able to get along much better without them.
There were splashes in the snow all around me; I don't remember
anything else, except that once, when I turned around, I saw a
number of dark forms standing behind me shooting at me.
The snow became deeper and deeper. I wasn't going to get much
farther; I was all in. Forty metres ahead of me was a small bush and
I trudged off towards it. A deep snowdrift lay before me; I couldn't
get through standing up. I tried to crawl through on all fours, tried
to roll over my strength was simply at an end.
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452
457
been repaired during the night. Numerous tanks, some with mounted
infantry, streamed into the woods north of Merkuschi. Kampfgruppe
Lorenz (elements of I Battalion /Grenadier Regiment GD and the
Sturm-Pioniers) which was positioned there held out in the northern
part of the narrow wood. For the German troops it was a battle for
survival.
The way to the main road, the lifeline not only of the division, but
of the entire Ninth Army, again appeared to be open before the
enemy. The elements of II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD and
2nd Company/Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD which were still holding
at the bridge near Bogorodizkoje were in constant danger of being
surrounded, as the Soviets had pushed farther to the north in the
direction of Bojewka. Snowstorms and drifting snow restricted the
view for the remaining anti-tank weapons as well as the Stukas which
had been called in. Losses among the personnel of Kampfgruppe
Lorenz (Major Lorenz, CO Sturm-Pionier Battalion) were considerable. The division attempted to fill the gaps with alert units. The
Soviets, too, suffered enormous losses, but they could always send
in fresh troops.
XXIII Army Corps sent in some new forces. II Battalion/473rd
Grenadier Regiment arrived with a total strength of 5 officers and
127 NCOs and men exactly company strength. Also arriving was
the 10th Battery of the 4th Flak Regiment with several guns. Farther
south the Soviets continued their heavy attacks. Their points of main
effort there were near Gorowatka and Now. Bojarschtschina, where
they employed greater numbers of tanks in an effort to force a
success.
At about 15.00 the attackers threw new forces into the battle near
the Bogorodizkoje bridge (at least 20 tanks and 1,100 men) and
forced II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment back into a prepared position in the rear near Lapkowo, due east of Bojewka. Assault gun
support was urgently requested. Help was promised and the Assault
Gun Battalion GD set out from the area of Bely. Hptm. Adam,
commander of the battalion, drove ahead to scout the area. However, several Soviet tanks which had broken through were on the
road to Olenin north of Bely and these opened fire on the
Hauptmann's Kbel from a range of 2,000 metres. The first shell
shattered the car, killing Hptm. Adam and his driver. Adam's deputy,
Hptm. Lemme, took command of the battalion.
Meanwhile, the Soviet pressure north and northeast of Bogorodizkoje had become so great that II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment was
forced to pull back its left wing and dig in again along a line
BogorodizkojeBojewka, with its front facing east and southeast.
The remaining elements of Kampfgruppe Lorenz (parts of I
Btl./Gren.Rgt. and the Sturm-Pioniers) were able to hold on in the
woods south of Lapkowo. As darkness fell the Soviet pressure
458
decreased; the principal danger had been averted for the next few
hours.
The division, which had its headquarters in Tatewo, followed the
movements of the enemy, the disposition and strength of its own
units as well as the manoeuvres of its forces with mounting anxiety.
The division headquarters maintained a steady flow of factual situation reports to XXIII Army Corps in an effort to convince it of the
seriousness of the situation. The corps did not share the division's
concern; in several cases it even tried to play down the threat. A
growing controversy resulted from the discrepancies in the assessment of the situation. This could be attributed to the false optimism
of the Ninth Army which, in order to give a positive picture of the
situation to those above, made unrealistic demands which failed to
take into account the actual condition of the fighting units.
Where the Infantry Division GROSSDEUTSCHLAND was concerned, the picture was further complicated by the fact that Hitler
himself was following its progress in great detail, unaware that the
division had been committed at the focal point of the battle with only
the smallest part of its own units. Out of this grew an increasing
alienation between the I.D. GD and XXIII Army Corps as well as
Ninth Army. It was thanks to the Division la, General Staff Major
von Hobe, that no word of the numerous reproaches from superior
command authorities reached the ears of the troops.
The battle being fought by the Grenadier Regiment GD (less II
Battalion) in the SsmolkowoGorowatkaSnernossekowo area was
kept under close scrutiny by the division command. It was in constant
direct telephone communication with the regimental command
posts, resulting in a factual picture of the division's overall situation
on its situation maps.
During the afternoon hours of 1 December the commander of the
Grenadier Regiment GD was again on the phone, describing the
precarious situation of his troops. The commander, whose
weakened battle group possessed virtually no anti-tank weapons,
was speaking from a bunker on the south slope northwest of
Gorowatka. He described the numerous local penetrations by the
Soviets and the breakthroughs by individual enemy tanks, some with
mounted infantry. He described the bravery of his few men holding
out in holes dug in the snow and the high losses among his officers
and NCOs. He gave a pitiless description of the situation in his sector
which now consisted solely of a few strongpoints and machine gun
nests. Major von Hobe tried to cheer him up, but this seemed poor
consolation as he could hear the noise of rattling tank tracks and
bursts of machine gun fire over the line.
At that moment several T-34s with escorting infantry attacked the
village and the high ground to the northwest from the wood
southwest of Gorowatka. The defenders made out 10 enemy tanks.
459
A single 8.8-cm Flak tried to hold them off, but it was hit and put
out of action after destroying one of the T-34s. The gun's crew fled.
The Soviets pushed into the village and the T-34s fired point-blank
into cellars and bunkers in an effort to destroy the few Grenadiers
still desperately holding on. The scene was a terrible one and few
escaped the bloodbath.
Several of the tanks then turned toward the bunker on the side of
the hill in which were located Oberst Khler, some members of the
regiment's Pionier Platoon and a few signals men. Over the phone
the Oberst described the details of the enemy attack forcefully and
accurately. "I can now see the first T-34 driving over the slope; a
regimental Pionier trying to get close enough to use a demolition
charge has been hit and has gone down. The first Russians are
approaching, firing their submachine guns from the hip. The surviving Pioniers that are still able are firing back at them. There are only
a few men holding out with me: Uffz. Krger, my loyal la Clerk, a
Feldwebel from the Pioniers and a few men, no more. My executive
officer is outside trying to scrape together enough men for a
counterattack to win us some breathing space." A pause. Major von
Hobe listened; the sound of tank tracks was now clearer and louder
and between bursts of submachine gun fire he could hear the hacking
sound of an MG 42 and then the crash of tank cannon. Was Oberst
Khler about to leave the bunker and abandon the position? No, he
continued to speak, quite calmly, but also somewhat sadly. Did he
recognise the inescapable situation he and his men were in? Did he
suspect what was coming?
"Look at GD, Hobe, our old regiment and now our young division
it was a great time. And the Grenadier Regiment to which I feel
so closely bound. . . Now here we a r e , - - m y men are fighting like
lions. But soon it will be all over. We're ready. Please stay on the
line, I'd like to keep t a l k i n g , - - t a n k s are coming now. . ." Then
the connection was broken.
Major von Hobe hung his head in his hands. He wept. Deep quiet
reigned in the la room in Tatewo. The 01 still held the receiver in
his hand, but the set was silent. A few minutes passed. Then the la
suddenly raised his head. He called the leader of the signals service
and ordered: "Troubleshooter out at once! Communications with the
Grenadiers have been cut; restore them at once!" He rummaged
aimlessly through the maps and seemed to be looking for something.
Survivors later described what had happened after the line was cut:
Behind the village of Gorowatka lay a small hill on which were the
timber-reinforced foxholes and bunkers of the Regimental Pionier
Platoon under the command of Feldwebel Sperling. From there the
Pioniers pinned down the infantry escorting the Soviet tanks. It was
there that the Oberst and a few, mostly wounded, men went after
the village was abandoned in an effort to reorganise the defence and
460
hold the position. But the Soviets pressed towards the hill as well.
Nevertheless, the Oberst never thought of retreating despite the
hopelessness of his situation. Not until there was no other choice left
to him did he order the evacuation of the bunker hill. The last Pioniers
tried to leave the position under mutual covering fire. Finally, the
Oberst, too, left his bunker. When he was about twenty metres away
he and Feldwebel Sperling were killed by a mortar round. With him
fell some of the members of the Pionier Platoon which had held out
with him: Gefreiten Jger, Schulz, Kuschela, Meermann and Kubitz.
Others died heroically: Uffz. Krger, the regiment's Ia Clerk, and
Feldwebel Wrede of the Regimental Signals Platoon. Only a few men,
most of them wounded, succeeded in escaping this witches' cauldron
at the last minute. They survived to describe the death of their Oberst
and Regimental Commander.
But back to the division headquarters. About an hour after the last
conversation was cut off the door suddenly burst open; a white,
blood-smeared figure staggered inside. His left arm hung limply at
his side, tied up below the shoulder with a length of red telephone
wire. A Russian fur cap sat lop-sided on his head. It was Oberst Palm!
He threw himself down on the nearest bench and groaned. The
medical officer, Dr. Pflugmacher, came in, examined the arm and
tried to loosen the wire.
Almost shouting, Oberst Palm blurted out: "It's all over! The
Russians are through! Oberst Khler is dead! The men are retreating,
we can't hold any longer!!"
Then there was silence again. Major von Hobe stared at the Oberst.
Although he was dying to ask him many questions he refrained from
doing so. Minutes passed while the doctor and the leader of the
signals section tended to the wounded officer and arranged for his
evacuation to a hospital.
Major von Hobe regained his composure. He tried to contact the
artillery in order to ascertain the Grenadiers' situation through their
forward observer. He learned that, as a result of a lack of anti-tank
weapons, I Battalion and the remaining elements of III Battalion had
withdrawn towards Waskowo. There were now no more German
soldiers in the Luchesa Valley other than the Meurer Battalion which
was somewhat farther to the south, and the Soviets had a clear path
to the vital road. The situation in the area east of KorenewkaShernossekowo was initially unclear.
That evening the supply trains were again combed for men. The
resulting alert units were sent to reinforce I Battalion. The battalion
received orders to move from the Waskowo area and use all means
at its disposal to immediately create a new blocking position near
Kusowlewo. The new position was to be reinforced with mines.
Major Lorenz, former commander of the Sturm-Pionier Battalion
GD, was given command of the Grenadier Regiment GD. As a result
461
of his exemplary readiness for action, clarity of purpose, circumspection and above all calm, he soon became the soul of the defence in
the Luchesa Valley. He quickly succeeded in rousing the exhausted
and depressed Grenadiers, who had lost two regimental commanders in the past few days, from their lethargy and reinstilled their
will to resist. The first four assault guns under Obit. Frantz arrived
during the night, providing the Grenadiers with the support they
needed to face the heavy fighting expected on the following day.
The situation for the German defenders on the evening of 1
December 1942 was very bad; the front had been torn open in many
places. The units had been so scattered that the defences now
consisted only of isolated strongpoints; there was no longer a
coherent front. The division therefore shortened its front which now
ran as follows:
Wetka (to 110th Inf.Div.)-Point 234.7-Griwa (Gruppe Lindemann) -north of Woronino (II Btl./Gren.Rgt.)Bojewka (II
Btl./Gren.Rgt.)Missjulkino cheese dairy (I Btl./Gren.Rgt.)Chudulicha (Kgr. Lorenz)Now. Bojarschtschina (I Btl./252nd
Rgt.)Bogdaschkino (I Btl./252nd Rgt.)-to 86th Inf.Div.-reinforcements promised by XXIII Army Corps.
The fighting on this day, which again cost the division heavy
casualties, was very significant for the defence of the Ninth Army's
western front. As a result of the delaying tactics and the heroic
defence by the Grenadiers, the Soviets did not succeed in completing
their breakthrough to the east. Suffering enormous losses, they were
able to win ground but were never able to break through. Considerable Soviet forces were tied down by the division, gaining time which
allowed other forces to be moved into the Luchesa Valley from
quieter sections of the front. It is likely that a complete defensive
success would have been achieved if the GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
Division had been committed as a homogenous unit. It had been
learned long before that a man performed much better when he was
with his comrades as part of a coherent unit than when he was alone
among strangers.
The morning of 2 December dawned misty grey over the battlefield
in the Luchesa Valley. The Grenadiers, Pioniers, artillerymen and
members of the alert units stared from their dirty-white holes in the
snow and once again made ready their weapons. At 07.00 the
Soviets resumed their attack, sending tanks from the area of Bojewka
in the direction of Belikowo. The main burden of the fighting was
borne by the few Grenadiers of II Battalion.
Farther south the Soviets launched an attack with tank support
from the woods north of Merkuschi on both sides of the road to the
northeast and towards Wereista. The German forces in the path of
the attack (the Pioniers of the Sturm-Pionier Battalion GD and the
right wing of I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment G D , part of
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O r d e r of the D a y
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464
severe cold and blowing snow had weakened the troops considerably. It was only the self-sacrificial conduct of individual officers and
NCOs that enabled the positions to be held.
The medical units remained in action as before. The ambulance
drivers were active day and night without relief, bringing the wounded
back to the main dressing stations over the snow-covered roads. In
two days 2 and 3 December 1942 the 1st Medical Company's
overloaded main dressing station cared for 448 wounded. The
surgeons were exhausted, but they carried on, often kept going only
by coffee and stimulants. From time to time the field hospitals were
bombed and strafed by Soviet aircraft which spotted the traffic and
the inevitable concentrations of vehicles nearby.
Slowly, very slowly, the situation in the Luchesa Valley began to
stabilise. Assisting the Grenadiers in their defensive battles were the
Stukas, which bombed enemy assembly areas with considerable
success. Contributing to the accuracy of the bombing was the
outstanding work of the Close-Range Reconnaissance Platoon of the
A.O.K.9 which interpreted Soviet radio traffic, which was transmitted uncoded, and passed the intercepts on to the division command. During the course of the defensive battles in the Luchesa
Valley the Ic of the Division GD, Obit, of the Reserve Otto Ritter,
specialised in such activities, employing all available means to
determine the enemy's intentions. It was thanks to his initiative that,
following the first attempts at intelligence gathering using the
Armoured Observation Battery GD, forward observers and individual
listening posts set up in front of the lines the A.O.K.9's highlyspecialised Close Range Reconnaissance Platoon was employed in
the Division GD's sector. The platoon soon met with success. During
combat the Russians transmitted in the clear, even though they did
use code names. German intelligence soon discovered the meanings
of the code names.
Additional units were now sent to the defensive front in the Luchesa
Valley, which had stabilised on 4 and 5 December. The Kautz
Artillery Battalion of the 110th Infantry Division (GD's neighbour on
the right) was incorporated into the division's artillery system and
achieved great success as a result of excellent cooperation. The
Pioniers, who were fighting a courageous delaying action on the
LapkowoWaskowo road, were reinforced by elements of the Huch
Regiment of the 110th Infantry Division, the GD Military Police and
further alert units from Division Headquarters. Killed in the fighting
were Feldw. Germann and Ogefr. Richter, the executive officer of
Major von Hobe of the Division Staff.
5 December began with heavy fire from Soviet artillery and Stalin
Organs but, contrary to expectations, the rest of the day passed
quietly. Small-scale attacks were beaten back easily and the defenders
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467
468
penetrated into the town but soon afterwards turned about and went
over to the defensive in a line Novaya ZizinaPloskaya with fronts
facing east and west.
I Battalion soon entered Dubrovka and cleared the area of the
enemy before pushing on to the western edge of the town. As soon
as the fog lifted heavy artillery fire began to fall on the town. This
inflicted little damage on the battalion, however, as the bunkers on
the western edge of Dubrovka offered adequate protection. The area
had apparently once been used by the supply train of the 246th
Infantry Division. I Battalion located its command post at the western
edge of the town where there was an excellent view of the country
to the west. About 200 metres west of Dubrovka ran a ravine in
which the 246th Infantry Division had placed a heavy field howitzer
position. The guns were still there, but they now faced east. Apparently the Soviets had tried to put them to use against their former
owners. Along the ravine ran another line of bunkers which were
occupied immediately by the rifle companies. The main line of
resistance therefore ran along the reverse slope, but because of the
heavy enemy artillery fire this was advantageous.
The enemy was sitting in bunkers about 400 metres from the MLR
on the heights on both sides of Point 236. The 1st Company under
Obit. Wei was sent to the attack against the position and was able
to reach the high ground. Losses were so high in the bitter fighting
for the individual bunkers that the company had to be pulled back.
The company commander and five men were all of 1st Company
that made it back from the operation.
While I Battalion prepared for defence forward of the western edge
of Dubrovka, II Battalion launched an attack with assault gun support
in the direction of a wood in which enemy forces were sitting in the
bunkers of the former command post of the 246th Infantry Division's
artillery regiment. The operation was a success and resulted in
contact being established with III Battalion which was near Budino.
The encirclement of the two enemy tank corps was complete.
A security battalion made up of older men was placed under the
command of I Battalion and employed at the southern edge of
Dubrovka where it was to maintain contact with 19th Panzer
Division.
The 12th Panzer Division made good progress towards the
northwest along the Natscha and was able to significantly reinforce
the defensive front held by Kampfgruppe von der Meden. The enemy
was showing strong tendencies to withdraw westwards. In the next
few days pressure against the western side of the German ring
between Dubrovka and Ploskaje was to increase considerably. Heavy
fighting was expected there with Soviet battle groups attempting to
break out.
470
Bunkers were laid down in the new positions with great haste, most
of the construction work being done at night. In the forest Pioniers
felled trees which the Grenadiers moved forward into their positions.
The fortunate ones were those whose positions were located at the
edge of the forest as were those of 2nd Company/I Battalion/Fusilier
Regiment GD.
The once again whole division was now situated north of the
Luchesa Valley in fortified positions. There it awaited the approaching Christmas season. All possible preparations were made for the
holiday without reducing vigilance at the front. On Christmas Eve
the division's commanding officer sent officers from his staff to all
the units, conveying his greetings and best wishes. General Hoernlein
himself could not be prevented from visiting the most forward
outposts and handing out some of his own cigars.
A general barrage from all of the division's heavy weapons was
planned for 24.00 in order to spoil any plans the Russians might
have made to interrupt the holiday. It was a time for reflection for
the men in the bunkers and holes in the snow, in the unit trains and
the main dressing stations. The following poem by Gefreiter Hans
Roger was probably written at that time:
The icy east wind sweeps through the house
around Russian farmers' cottages.
A lonely sentry stands outside,
watching over his comrades' rest.
Snowflakes swirl, night falls;
we sit in the circle together.
Someone lights the candles
our thoughts are elsewhere.
We see home beneath the lit tree,
we see our parents, our loved ones;
But alas it is only a beautiful dream,
from which only homesickness remains.
Then rings out the song of the "Holy Night",
at home in every room,
in the East we stand on guard for you,
we, your men and boys.
The soft notes of the harmonica
wake us from our dreams;
and with you at home together with you,
we sing the songs of Christmas.
Outside the sentry makes his rounds,
he doesn't hear the melancholy singing.
He hears the East wind howl and whine,
and the raucous voices of the snow geese!
Christmas Day passed without interruption by the enemy. The
front was completely still, scarcely ever interrupted by the whistle
474
and impact of a shell. The last days of the waning year passed much
the same way. Harassing artillery fire by both sides and occasional
patrols were the only events of those days. Not until 29 December
were orders issued by division for a limited attack on 30 December
north of the Luchesa. Oberstleutnant i.G. von Natzmer had become
the new Division la on Christmas Eve. Farther south the 12th Panzer
Division was to launch an attack from its sector to improve its main
line of resistance. The Grenadier Regiment GD under its commander
Oberst Moehring was to take part in these movements. Once again
the Reconnaissance Battalion GD was to simulate an attack from its
positions on both sides of the main road west of Waskowo and at
the same time carry out a reconnaissance in force toward the narrow
wood. The artillery was directed to support the attack.
The Grenadiers of I Battalion went to the attack at 06.30 under
the command of Obit. Zybon. Enemy resistance was stubborn but
the Grenadiers pushed into Missjulkino after intense close quarters
fighting. However, the battle group was pinned down by heavy fire
in front of the Missjulkino cheese dairy. The heaviest fire seemed to
be coming from the southern tip of the narrow wood. It was thanks
to the efforts of the Pionier platoon, which was able to roll up the
enemy positions from the left, that the attackers were able to capture
the objectives of Mai. and Bol (north of Gorowatka).
Despite heavy enemy fire and a counterattack from the southern
tip of the narrow wood, the German forces were able to hang onto
the territory they had won. Early on 31 December they resumed their
attack, shifting the focal point of the assault further north. Following
thorough artillery preparation and supported by tanks and assault
guns, II and III Battalions of the Grenadier Regiment GD and
elements of the Reconnaissance Battalion GD launched an attack
aimed at capturing the narrow wood. This resulted in heavy, close
quarters fighting against a determined enemy which was not brought
to a successful conclusion until evening. Several more hours passed
before the wood was cleared of stragglers. Contact was then established with the elements of the 12th Panzer Division attacking south
of the Luchesa. A defensive position was immediately set up at the
western edge of the wood and a new main line of resistance
established. With this a cohesive line had been achieved which could
be held in the future. Activity slowly died down along the front which,
at the end of the year, ran as follows in the division's sector:
Forest east of PysinoLomow in the hands of the Fusilier Regiment GD the fir wood and Lapkovo as well as the northern tip of
the narrow wood held by the Recon. Battalion. In the narrow wood
elements of II and III Battalion/Grenadier Regiment GD, to the south
I Battalion/Grenadier Regiment near Merkuschi and Mai. to the
Luchesa. Contact there with the 12th Panzer Division.
475
It was in these positions that the men of the I.D. GD awaited the
new year, the fourth of the Second World War. As 31 December
1942 came to an end, when the clocks showed 24.00, every heavy
gun in the division's sector opened fire as if by a ghost hand. The
howitzers lobbed their shells toward the enemy, the cannon of the
9th Battery crashed and the light flak fired their pearls of tracing
ammunition into the sky as if trying to shoot down a horde of unseen
enemy aircraft. The flak searchlights probed the snow-veiled sky with
their milky-white fingers, joining their beams to form a dome of light
over the division's sector. The men got up out of their holes. In the
bunkers and foxholes the Grenadiers, the artillerymen, the stretcher
bearers and the members of the supply train raised their canteens
and wished one another luck and health for the coming year. In many
bunkers there was stillness when someone or other brought up
names such as Khler, Richter, Henke, Kster and others. Contrary
to expectations, the bolsheviks remained quiet that New Year's Eve,
although from time to time the sound of the drunken Soviets drifted
over from the other side.
During the late morning of 1 January the Bartsch Company of I
Btl./Grenadier Rgt., reinforced by several assault guns, cleared the
southwestern tip of the narrow wood of the enemy forces which had
been holding out there since the day before. The operation was a
success. There was tough, close quarters fighting, and once the forest
had been cleared the company captured the village of Merkuschi.
The village had to be taken as it was to form the bulwark of the future
main line of resistance. Immediate Soviet counterattacks were beaten
off with bloody losses to the enemy.
The capture of Merkuschi was the last major offensive operation
in this sector by a unit of the I.D. GD. The fortification of the line
which had been was pushed ahead rapidly, especially by the
Grenadier Regiment. The division now received more details of its
withdrawal from this sector which was to lead to a longer period of
rest.
New Year's greetings arrived from Fhrer Headquarters on 2
January which were received with much satisfaction all round. The
division commander, Gen.Lt. Hoernlein, marked his fiftieth birthday
on the same day, which was celebrated in an appropriate fashion.
The artillery had played a major role in the defensive success in
the Luchesa Valley thanks to the outstanding leadership of Oberst
Reinke and his adjutant, Hptm. Kuhlmann as well as his executive
officer, Obit. Wollenhaupt.
While the situation at the front continued to stabilise, the period
of quiet provided an opportunity to assign replacements to the
companies in an effort to raise their combat strengths. There were
also adjustments within the command ranks made necessary by the
overexertion of some individuals. In rare cases replacement was
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possible. The newly created division was never given the opportunity
to conduct division-level exercises on the training grounds. Even the
sub-unit exercises were limited to march movements and so-called
"command post exercises" once again because of time constraints.
The homogeneity, the interaction of command and units, familiarity
with the weapons of other units - all of this was missing completely.
The continual comings and goings of personnel right up until the
division's departure made it almost impossible for company commanders to learn the names of the men under their command. Even
the frequent company social evenings were of no help.
During the advance in July 1942 the actions at Schtschigry,
Voronezh and at the Manych saw only a few days of heavy fighting;
at no time did they approach the severity of the later battles near
Rzhev or in the Luchesa Valley. The feeling of being victors and
masters of the battlefield which had been fostered by the successes
in the Ukraine was lost on that morning in September when the bulk
of the division drove into the front lines south of Rzhev. The
thunderclap of the incoming artillery salvoes brought a painful
awakening. The course of events during the first days of the attack
near Rzhev led to a disillusionment which in many cases very soon
threatened to become desperation.
A deep depression gained the upper hand for a time. This
condition, which reigned after the first attack on 10 September 1942
and which reached its deepest point as a result of the enormous
losses of those few hours, could only be overcome, and had to be
overcome, by the strength of individuals, and these were not limited
to the officer corps. These few succeeded in holding the unit
together, even though a high price in blood was exacted.
Contributing to the unit's survival in purely military terms were the
absolutely vital changes in the methods of command and the battle
tactics of individuals. There was no comparison between the attack
and advance on the one hand and defensive fighting in foxholes and
bunkers on the other.
The change from joint action to individual fighting, from striving
forward to digging into the ground, from superior attack to fighting
for one's own life in addition to mastering this new style of fighting,
very high morale and unequalled staying power.
At first the troops were ill-prepared for a defensive struggle. They
had to make up for their lack of training in defence, which had been
neglected during the years preceding the war, on their own, in the
midst of a terrible battle of attrition.
Only a few survived the fighting south of Rzhev in early 1942.
Those that did survive, however, were first-rate fighters, the foundation of the later units and their will to resist.
The battles which took place in the Luchesa Valley and farther
south near Italy in November/December 1942 cost further heavy
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