Constitutional Law II Reviewer For Finals

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Constitutional Law II| | JDAndalecio| Arellano University School of Law| Year 2016
I. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
A. Rule 113, Sec. 5
Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
Decision: Subversion and Rebellion are continuing offense

for they are anchored on ideological base which compels
the repetition of same sets of lawlessness and violence
until the overriding objective of overthrowing the
government is attained.
NOTE: In this case, the SC justifies the warrantless arrest
as falling under paragraph (a) of Rule 113, Section 5.
Since Rebellion is a continuing offence, accused was
actually committing an offense while he is under
medical treatment in the hospital.
D. Committed in the Presence of Police Officers
1. People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 (1991)
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Facts: Accused was observed 2 meters away by a police

officer for several hours as he sells some goods beside a
chapel. Officers intercepted a buyer and found a marijuana
with him. Accused was later arrested and sticks of
marijuana were recovered from him.
B. Art. 125, Revised Penal Code
Decision: An offense was committed in the presence or

within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceed at once to the
scenes thereof, Within the distance of 2 meters, Fulgencio
saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. When Macabante
was intercepted by police and was caught throwing the
marijuana stick, and when confronted readily admitted that
he bought the same from accused clearly indicates that
Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and
therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the
police officers had personal knowledge being members of
the team which monitored Sucros nefarious activity.
Delay in the delivery of detained persons in the proper

judicial authoritiesThe penalties provided in the next
preceding articles shall be imposed upon the public officer
or employee who shall detain any person for legal ground
and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of 12 hours, for crimes
punishable by light penalties or their equivalent; 18 hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties,
or their equivalent; and 36 hours for crimes or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the
cause of his and shall be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel.
C. Rebellion as Continuing Offense
1. Umil vs. Ramos, G.R. 81567, July 9, 1990
Facts: Man, alleged member of NPA was arrested while
undergoing treatment in a hospital for gunshot wounds;
accused for murder of police officers and charged with
rebellion.
2. People v. Luisito Go, G.R. No. 116001, March 14, 2001

Facts: Accused went to a night club with his gun tucked in
his waist, He was asked if he has a license to carry it,
being unable to show any, he was arrested.
Decision: While he was in the possession of a gun and
could not show a license for the same, he was committing
a crime. Hence, the arrest is valid and the subsequent
search valid.
3. People v Racho, G.R. No. 186529 (2010)
2. People v. Sinoc, 275 SCRA 357 (1997)
Facts: Accused was arrested after going down from the

bus, his effects confiscated on ground of information from
an unnamed source that he is going to engage in a drug
deal that day.
A company car was car napped and its driver and

passenger shot leaving the driver dead. A civilian reported
the location of the car and the police officers were told that
the person who parked the car will be getting it again.
Accused was caught as he is about to ride on it, the keys
having found in his possession, he was arrested and was
charged with car napping complex with murder.
Decision: We refused to validate the warrantless search

precisely because there was no adequate probable cause.
We required the showing of some overt act indicative of
the criminal design. As in the above cases, appellant herein
was not committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
had committed, was committing, or about to commit an
offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just
alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a
tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
police officers to suspect and conclude that he was
committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for
the information given by the informant, appellant would
not have been apprehended and no search would have been
made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not
have been confiscated.
Decision: The Police officers were aware that an offense

had just been committed, that some 12 hours earlier, a
Pajero had been stolen and its driver and passenger shot,
the former having died and the latter being on the verge of
death. An informer had reported that the stolen Pajero was
at the Bliss housing Project ar Moncayo. It was precisely
to recover the Pajero that a team went to the place. When
they reached the place where the Pajero was parked, they
were told by the owner of the apartment behind which the
Pajero was Parked that the man who had brought the
Pajero would be back by 12 nn; that the person thus
described did in fact show up and was immediately
identified as the one who rode on that car Pajero. Sinoc
had the key to the stolen Pajero and was in the act of
moving towards it, admittedly to take possession of it.
E. Personal Knowledge of the Offense
3. People v. Baula, G.R. No. 132671, November 15, 2000
1. People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993)
Facts: A victim was killed by one of the drunkards. Police

officers were shown his house which they did enter. Inside
the house was a blood stained clothing and a blood stained
bolo. Accused was arrested and charged with murder.
Accused was charged with murder of one Blache by

dropping a hallow blocks in his head. A witness pinpointed
him and upon his arrest, a marijuana was recovered in his
possession.
Decision: Search and Seizure of Marijuana was incidental
to a lawful warrantless arrest: (1) Police saw Blache dead
and when they inspected the crime scene, (2) they saw the
instrument of death; (3) witness reported the happening to
the policemen and pinpointed her neighbour Gerente as
one of the killer. Under these circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
Blache and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others
had killed him. Hence, they could lawfully arrest Gerente
without warrant. If they postponed his arrest until they
could obtain a warrant, he couldve fled the law as his two
companions did.
Decision: Police officers lack personal knowledge of the

incident to warrant a probable cause to arrest the accused.
Mere suspicion is not personal knowledge of facts.
4. People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001
Facts: A victim was killed after getting out of a restaurant.
When police officers asked a waitress, she identified the
accused as the companion of the witness before the latter
died. Police officers arrested him and searched his house.
Decision: Information from alleged witnesses is not
personal knowledge. Thus, the arrest of the accused is
illegal and the search of his house illegal.
F. Time of Arrest
G. Marked Money
1. People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992)
1. People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 (1993)
Facts: Accused was arrested without warrant in a buy bust

operation conducted by police officers because of a
confidential information of transactions dealing with
illegal drugs.
Facts: A buy bust operation was conducted. When officers

looked for the mark money, they could not find it (as it
was given to the wife of accused who was able to escape).
Accused was arrested without warrant.
Decision: Since the place was under surveillance, the

police officers could have secured a warrant before
arresting the accused.
Decision: Even if the marked money was found in him,

this cannot and will not validate the illegal search. The
same (marked money) shouldve been used to apply for a
warrant.
2. Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 586 (1992)

Facts: Go went against one way road and had a quarrel
with another driver named Eldon where the former
resolved into killing the latter by shooting him in the head
in the middle of the day. Police officers identified the
accused because of the credit card he used in a restaurant,
they called a presconference and publicly announced that
Go is a wanted person for murder. Go went to police
station where he was arrested.
Decision: Information from a witness is not a personal
knowledge. Six days after a crime was committed cannot
fall under the description has just been committed. Go
was illegally arrested.
3. People v. Calimlim, G.R. No. 123980, August 30, 2001
H. Lack of Urgency
1. People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001
Facts: A police officer was alleged to have peed on the
gate of accused house. As he was peeing, he saw
marijuana being grown in the backyard, a search was
conducted and the accused was arrested.
Decision: There was probable cause and a time to secure a
warrant, instead the officers uprooted and confiscated the
marijuana plants. Consequently, the search was illegally,
hence the evidence inadmissible as evidence against him.
2. People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
Facts: Victim was raped many times in different parts of

the house. Accused was arrested one day after the incident.
Facts: An intelligence report indicates that accused will be

coming carrying illegal drugs with him. Police officers
decided to arrest him and seized the effects.
Decision: One day after the crime has been committed

does not fall under the description has just been
committed; nevertheless, when the accused pleaded
during arraignment, he is deemed to have waived his right
to question the legality of his arrest.
Decision: The head of a team cannot for himself decide

that no warrant was necessary. They had at least 2 days to
get a warrant: teh accused was known, the vessel he was in
was known and the date of his arrival was likewise known.
They shouldve obtained a warrant.
NOTE: Effects of an Illegal warrantless arrest:

1. Court does not acquire jurisdiction
2. All evidence obtained became inadmissible as evidence
against him for any purpose, in any proceeding.
HOWEVER, when one pleas during the arraignment, the
court acquires jurisdiction over his case.
I. Effect of Bail
Rule 114, Section 26
Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or
irregular preliminary investigation.An application for or
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of
the charge against him, provided that he raises them before

entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as
early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of
the case, (n)
Decision: The prohibition against wire tapping extends to

all persons, including those involved in the conversation.
J. Effect of Entry of Plea
Facts: Police officers opened and inspected the letter of a

detained person being held by his counsel. Counsel claims
privilege communication as it is a confidential letter
between him and his client.
1. People v. Plana G.R. No. 128285, November 27, 2001

Facts: Accused was arrested after being identified by
victim as the person to have raped her. He was arraigned
and later on question the legality of his arrest.
Decision: Right to question the legality of arrest is waived
upon entering a plea.
3. Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005
Decision: Detained persons right to privacy is less than

that of the ordinary person. Letters from such prisoners
may be inspected and that confidential letters to counsel (if
marked as such) may only be inspected but not read.
B. Privileged Communications
K Validity of Conviction
1. People v. Conde, G.R. No. 113269, April 10, 2001
Facts: Respondent was accused to have hold-up a Bumbay
Decision: Arrest after 5 days upon the commission of
crime cannot render void all other proceedings including
those hearing to the conviction of the accused.
II. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
A. R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) (1965)
Mere listening does not constitute a violation of this act
1. Katz vs. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Facts: A recording was installed in telephone booths
Decision: A person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies ti,
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the
words he utters into the mouth piece will not be broadcast
to the world.
2. Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
Facts: A fight transpired involving the petitioner,
conversations were recorded and the recording was
presented as evidence.
1. In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)

Facts: a lawyer who assured his client of a favorable
decision lose the decision of the SC. He wrote letters to
justices labeling them as corrupt and threatening them of
suit. SC sent him letter asking him to show-cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court.
Decision: Letter addressed to Justices in connection with
their official duty is not a private communication. Right to
privacy cannot be invoked in this instance.
2. People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)
Facts: A letter was sent to a witness telling the same not to
testify as it will prejudice the accused. The letter was
presented as evidence, accused invoked privacy of
communication.
Decision: Letter sent to a person belongs to that person.
The letter writer cannot invoke his right to privacy of
communication.
NOTE: If a letter is sent and received by the recipient, the
ownership is transferred to the person receiving it. Hence,
the privacy of communication can only be invoked by the
recipient.
3. Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
Facts: Petitioner suspects his husband, a medical doctor of
having affairs with another woman. She went to her office
and searched his drawers finding diaries, photos, passport
and bills which prove the affair. She used the documents
as evidence in a proceeding for legal separation and
disqualification for her husbands practice of medicine.
Husband invoked privacy of communication.
Decision: The Constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. A person, by contracting
marriage does not shed his right to privacy as an individual
and the Constitutional protection is ever available to him.
4. Deano v. Godinez, 12 SCRA 483 (1964)
Facts: respondent wrote a letter to his superior informing
her that some teachers and school official may be a
potential grafter and swindlers of medical-dental funds. An
action for damages for filed against her, she invoked
privilege communication.
C. Exclusionary Rule
1. Art. III, Sec. 3(2)
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
2. Silverthorne Lumber vs. US, 251 US 385 (1920)
Facts: A document was illegally obtained. It was
photocopied and presented as evidence.
Decision: The essence of the provision forbidding the
acquisitionone cannot do indirectly what has forbidden
directly.
Decision: Herein, the communication denounced as

defamatory is one sent by Godinez to his immediate
superior in the performance of legal duty, or in the nature
of report, submitted in the exercise of an official function.
He sent it as an explanation of a matter contained in an
endorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a
report submitted in obedience to a lawful duty. Though in
doing so, Godinez employed language somewhat harsh
and uncalled for, such is excusable in the interest of public
policy.
3. People v. Aruta, G.R. 120915, April 3, 1998
5. Waterhouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.

113271. October 16, 1997
III. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION
Facts: Employee was charged with estafa as her cheats on

changing the price of items were discovered in a letter
addressed to her which was opened by accident. She
invoked privacy of communication.
1. Art. III, Sec. 12
Decision: The protection against intrusion into private

communication cannot be invoked when the intruder is a
private person and not the State.
Waiver to jurisdiction does not include a waiver of

objection to the inadmissibility of evidence.
D. Liability for damages
1. Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)
Damages can be recovered due to illegal arrest, illegal
search and detention.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of

an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
2. Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)
Facts: Miranda was arrested at his home and was identified
by the complaining witness. He was brought into an
interrogation room where he was interrogated without a
counsel. Police officers was able to obtain his confession
which states that in particularly that his confession was
made voluntarily.
Decision: It is clear that Miranda was not apprised of his
right to consult with an attorney and to have one present
during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be
compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in
any manner. Without these warnings, the statements were
inadmissible. The mere fact that the signed statement
which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had full
knowledge of his legal rights does not approach the
knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish
constitutional rights.
A. Custodial Investigation
1. People v. Lugod, G.R. 136253, February 21, 2001
Facts: Accused was charged with rape and murder of an 8
year old girl after allegedly admitting to officers and to the
vice mayor the commission of an offence and after
allegedly pointing to the location of the body of the victim.
Decision: Records reveal that accused-appellant was not
informed of his rig ht to remain silent and to counsel, and
that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he
would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no
evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights.
Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be
valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the
assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accusedappellant's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he
raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel
cannot be used against him for having transgressed

accused-appellant's rights under the Bill of Rights. This is
a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be
disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime
committed may be
2. People v. Del Rosario G.R. 127755, April 14, 1999
Facts: A woman was shot after being robbed by armed
men who boarded a tricycle owned and driven by the
accused. He was charged with murder in conspiracy with
others.
Decision: Any public officer or employee, or anyone
acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains
or investigates any person for the commission of an
offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and
understood by him, of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating
officer
3. People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 (1992)
Facts: Accused was picked up by police officers as
suspect. While inside the jeep, he admitted the crimes
upon questions by the officers.
Decision: Accused was already in custodial investigation
at the time he was made to board a jeep, he was already
entitled to a counsel. Hence, admission in the jeep is
inadmissible.
4. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)
Facts: Accused was arrested, taken into a cage wagon.
Police officers were talking to each other about the
missing shotgun and how some children might find it and
hurt themselves. Reacting to the conversation, accused
pinpointed the location of shotgun which was used as
evidence against him.
Decision: Turning to the facts of the present case, we
conclude that the respondent was not "interrogated" within
the meaning of Miranda. It is undisputed that the first

prong of the definition of "interrogation" was not satisfied,
for the conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and
McKenna included no express questioning of the
respondent. Rather, that conversation was, at least in form,
nothing more than a dialogue between the two officers to
which no response from the respondent was invited. There
is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were
aware that the respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an
appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of
handicapped children. Given the fact that the entire
conversation appears to have consisted of no more than a
few off-hand remarks, we cannot say that the officers
should have known that it was reasonably likely that Innis
would so respond.
5. People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)
Facts: Accused was taken into a police station. He was
interrogated in the presence of a PAO lawyer and later on
confessed of committing the offense.
Decision: The interrogation and the confession were made
before a counsel and the latter informed him of his rights.
The confession taken therefore should be admissible as
B. Administrative Investigations
1. People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Facts: In an administrative proceeding, the person charged
admits the commission of the offense in a statement and
later on in a letter sent to his boss offering to settle the
dispute between them. He later on contested the validity of
his admissions.
Decision: Accused was not under custodial investigation
when he submitted to administrative investigation. Hence
the rights during custodial investigation do not apply here.
2. Office of the Court Administrator v. Sumilang, 271
SCRA 316 (1997)
Facts: An audit was conducted which reveals anomalous
transactions involving the former OIC of MTC Laguna
(Malla). 240, 000 was discovered to have used in her
personal expense as evidence of her affidavit admitting the
same. She later on challenged the admissibility of this

admission.
Decision: The aforementioned constitutional provision
may be invoked only during custodial investigation or as
in custody investigation which has been defined as
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way. The
investigation is defined as an investigation conducted by
police authorities which will include investigation
conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and
the NBI and such other police agencies in our government.
Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be
deemed to be the law enforcement authority contemplated
in the constitutional provision
3. People v. Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005
Facts: A confession was made in a sworn statement (while
in hospital) for an administrative proceeding involving the
respondent. He contested his statement as he was not
informed of his rights under investigation
Decision: The Sworn Statement was signed during NPC
interrogation not under custodial interrogation. Statement
is admissible as evidence against
NOTE: You will notice that the Miranda rights are
available only when one is in custodial investigation and
does not apply when one is in an administrative
investigation/proceeding.
C. Police Lineup
1. Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without
warrant. Detained with several others, he was set to a line
up with other detainees where a complainant pointed at
him as one of the robbers. He filed a motion to acquit.
Decision: Since petitioner in the course of his
identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to
answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not
deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the
accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not
have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process
as the confrontation between the State and him had not

begun. In fact, when he was identified in the police line-up
by complainant he did not give any statement to the police.
He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not
facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the
police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used
against him. For it was not he but the complainant who
was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit
down in front of the complainant while the latter was being
investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to
counsel had not accrued
2. United States v. Wade, 388 U.A. 218 (1967)
Facts: A bank in Eustace was robbed by a man wearing
strips of tape on his face. 15 days later accused was
indicted for robbery and was set in a line up wearing strips
of tape on his face and uttering a line which was allegedly
spoken by the robber before the bank officials. They
pointed to the accused as the robber even during trial.
Decision: Since it appears that there is grave potential for
prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which
may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since
presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and
assure a meaningful confrontation at trial,] there can be
little doubt that, for Wade, the post-indictment lineup was
a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was "as
much entitled to such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial
itself. Thus, both Wade and his counsel should have been
notified of the impending lineup, and counsel's presence
should have been a requisite to conduct of the lineup,
absent an "intelligent waiver
3. People v. Escordial, G.R. 138934, January 16, 2002
Facts: Accused was invited for questioning. He was asked
to take off his shirt and the witness identified him because
of the keloid at the back of his neck, more witness later on
identified him.
Decision: Uncounseled show and line up were done at the
time the accused was already being held supposedly for
the crime committed. His constitutional right should have
already applied to him.
4. People vs. Piedad, et al., G.R. No. 131923, December 5,

2002
Facts: Accused was charged with murder of one Mateo
Lactawan. The wife of the victim identified him as soon as
he was brought to be identified.
Decision: The claim by the defense that Neils pre trial
identification was suggestive due to the absence of a police
line up is more theoretical than real. The witnesses are not
identifying persons whom they are unfamiliar with. When
the accused was presented before the witnesses, they were
asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible
for the crime perpetrated.
The lack of the counsel during the pre-trial identification
process of the accused is not fatal as they did not make any
extra judicial confession with regards to the crime charged.
Moreover, the right accorded on the accused under section
12 applies only against testimonial compulsion and not
when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined
as was done in this casethey were presented to be
identified.
D. Cases before January 17, 1973 not applicable
1. Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 (1975)
Facts: Respondent Judge declared admissible the
confessions made by accused without a counsel and
without being informed of their right to remain silent. The
same confessions were given before the 1973 Constitution
where no such rights existed.
Decision: The right to counsel and the right to be informed
of such right should be given effect only when the right
already existed and had been violated. Consequently,
because the confessions were taken before the effectivity
of 1973 Constitution in accordance with the rules then in
force, no right had been violated as to render them
inadmissible.
E. Rule under the 1973 Constitution (Voluntary,

knowing & intelligent waiver)
1. People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
Facts: Accused was from Samar, he was interrogated in
tagalong and was asked to sign a statement of waiver
without counsel.
Decision: The so called waiver, not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently given is inadmissible as
2. People vs. Tampus, 90 SCRA 624 (1980)
Facts: Accused killed a co-prisoner named Celso
Saminado by stabbing him with their knives. They
voluntarily surrendered and admitted that they only took
revenge. They gave an extra-judicial confession and
pleaded guilty at arraignment which was later on
questioned in this case.
Decision: Accused had already admitted the guilt after
coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they
surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered and
they revealed to him that they committed an at of revenge.
The admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial
confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. They
didnt even appeal for judgment of conviction.
NOTE: what is a RES GETAE?
It is the exemption to the hearsay rule and refers to the
spontaneous utterance of victim/witness on a startling
incident. The person therefore is not a personal witness to
the event but a personal witness to the utterance.
3. People v. Sayaboc, G.R. 147201, January 15, 2004
F. The Galit Rule

1. People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985):
Facts: Galit was taken by NBI for murder of an old
woman. He claimed to have been tortured, his face put into
a toilet bowl and physical maltreated while in custody. He
later on confess of the crime suspected of him.
Decision: Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into
the circumstances surrounding the taking of any
confession, especially where the prisoner claims having
been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt
as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
G. Rule under the 1987 Constitution
Requirement of Competent and Independent Counsel
1. People vs. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 (1994)
Facts: Accused was alleged to have been tortured and later
on signed a confession before the municipal counsel.
Decision: Constitution requires an independent counsel to
stand before the accused. The legal officer of a
municipality does not qualify to this.
2. People v. Quidato, G.R. 117401, October 1, 1998
Facts: Accused was first interrogated, a day after, a PAO
lawyer came to sign his confessions.
Decision: A lawyer must be there when the accused is
making the Confession.
3. People v. Januario, 267 SCRA 608 (1997)
Facts: Accused asked for a lawyer during an interrogation.

He was given a PAO lawyer who sat there without saying
a word. He confessed and the lawyer signed the same.
Facts: Accused was arrested and interrogated in Bicol, he

was brought to manila where his sworn statement was
taken. A lawyer, who was an applicant of NBI was taken
to sign his sworn statement.
Decision: The manner of informing his rights was not

enough. Counsels silence showed that he was not vigilant
and competent.
Decision: The Law required that the counsel be competent

and independent. A lawyer applying for a position in NBI
is not an independent lawyer.
10
4. People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 12793, December 8, 1999
2. People vs. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450 (1994)
Facts: Accused was interviewed before a counsel who was

usually engaged by the police to assist arrested people.
Counsel notarized his sworn statement.
Facts: Accused was charged with murder (of a judge) and

illegal possession of firearm. He was caught on his escape
and was taken into custody. He admitted the charges
against him before Atty Torres, a lawyer which he did not
expressly chose as the counsel to assist him.
Decision: The law requires an independent and vigilant

counsel. A counsel who notarizes the sworn statement
attests to the regularity of the confession.
5. People vs. Samus, G.R. 135957-58, September 17, 2002
Facts: Accused was arrested and brought to the media
where he supposedly admitted the commission of the
crime.
Decision: The confession, although not objected is
inadmissible as it was given without a counsel.
6. People v. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133138, July 23, 2004
Facts: Respondent was accused of murder. HE confessed
and asked a lawyer to aid him in his confession. The Brgy.
Captain, who was also a lawyer, aided him in his
confession.
Decision: The Brgy Captain has a duty to enforce the law
and cannot be a lawyer of a private person.
7. People v. Bagnate, G.R. No. 133685-68 May 20, 2004
Facts: Accused confessed to a lawyer and with him went to
a judge to attest to the confession. He later on claimed that
he was just forced to give confession.
Decision: The word preferably under the Article III,

Setion12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution does not convey a
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
custodial investigation is exclusive as to prelude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then the
tempo of the custodial investigation will be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer
who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect
his interest.
I. Counsels presence required in entire proceedings
1. People v. Morial, G.R. 129295, August 15, 2001
Facts: A lawyer was brought before the accused during an
interrogation. Counsel left in the middle of the
interrogation but the same continued. A confession was
made and the counsel, upon returned signed the
confession.
Decision: The right to a Counsel requires that the Counsel
must remain with accused throughout the interrogation.
J. Seized Articles
Decision: What is required is a counsel who will advise

him of his right, not a counsel who will advise him of
penalties.
H. Counsel of Choice
1. People vs. Gallardo, G.R. No. 113684, January 25, 2000
Facts: Accused was assisted by the lawyer who was given
by the police. They confess before a judge but later on
contest on the admissibility of the confession as they were
assisted by a counsel not of their choice.
Decision: When one accepts the services of a lawyer, the
later is deemed to be the formers choice.
1. People v. Castro, 274 SCRA 115 (1997)

Facts: Accused was charged for violation of RA 6425 by
virtue of a buy-bust operation conducted in Pangasinan.
He was arrested and was asked to sign on the Receipt of
Property Seized.
Decision: Castros signature on the receipt of property
seized is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing
that he was assisted by counsel when he signed the same.
Since this is a document tacitly admitting the offense
charged, the constitutional safeguard must be observed.
11
2. People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)

Facts: A group of tourist checked in the airport. Each of
them has a box of cereal in their baggage, when opened all
contained crystalline substance. Boxes were marked and
they were asked to sign.
Decision: The act of making them sign the boxes
containing shabu amounts to confession, the same must be
assisted by a counsel.
3. Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 102 (1999)
Facts: Accused were employees of Makati Post Office who
were caught in flagrante delicto opening envelops that they
are about to send. They were made to sign on the envelop
they were opening and was used as evidence against them.
Decision: Signature on letters is an admission of crime.
Since it was done without counsel, the same is
inadmissible. The letters however are admissible as they
were seized during a lawful arrest.
publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession

does not form part of a custodial investigation as it was not
given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. However,
because of the inherent danger in using TV as a medium
for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of the
phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts
are to be reminded that extreme caution must be taken in
further admitting similar confessions.
3. People vs. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000
Facts: body of a rape victim was found. Accused were
interrogated but later on was allowed to go but they
voluntarily went back to confess. There was no lawyer, so
a priest was instead called together with the relatives of the
accused and the media. The admission was later on
contested.
Decision: If no lawyer is available, law enforcers should
desist from interrogation.
K. Confession to Newsmen
L. Other Confessions
1. People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997)
1. People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26,

2006
Facts: A rape and a homicide took place. A certain family

nearby started to leave as the police investigates the crime.
Accused was suspected and arrested. He later on made a
confession to the mayor which was video taped and
witnessed by the media. In a subsequent media interview,
he admits to the commission of the crime.
Facts: a house was burned down and the maid was arrested
and interrogated by the Brgy. She was detained and her
neighbor visited her where she confessed of starting the
fire as she is being maltreated by her employers.
Decision: The confession to the mayor was not a result of

custodial investigation; hence, can be made without a
counsel and therefore admissible as evidence against him
2. People v. Endino, G.R. 133026, February 20, 2001
Facts: Accused were charged with murder of one Dennis
Aquino. They fled after the crime but Galgarin was
arrested later on. He was taken into custody and the media
made an interview with him where he admits to the offense
and named Endino as the gunman. This admission was
later on assailed by the accused.
Decision: The interview was recorded and it showed
Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
Decision: The interrogation of the Brgy was custodial but

the confession to the neighbor was a voluntary admission
and is not part of custodial investigation.
2. Evangelista vs People
Facts: Accused was caught in Dubai having a gun in his
luggage. Dubai allowed him to go on the conditioned that
the gun will be surrendered to the Pilot. In the Philippines,
he filed up a custom declaration form and declared therein
that he has a gun in custody of the pilot. He was
investigated, charged and convicted.
Decision: Custom Declaration Form was not a custodial
interrogation as it was filed before the actual investigation
took place.
12
3. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)

Facts: Accused was made to voluntarily confess because of
strategic deception employed by police officers disguised
as inmates who in no way informed him of his Miranda
rights.
confessed. On this note, the police came to kniw ad

reovered from accuseds house the victims green slippers,
pair of golden earring, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt. The same items were used as evidence to
his conviction.
1. People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 (1992)
Decision: P03 Tan didnt even have the simple sense to

reduce the all important confession of Alicando in writing.
Neither did he present any writing showing the Alicando
waived his tight to silence and to have a competent and
independent lawyer. It is not only the uncounseled
confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also
evidence derived therefrom. The Pillow and the T-shirt
with the alleged blood stains were evidence derived from
uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police
from Alicando.
Facts: Accused was charged with crime of rape with

murder of one Rowena Capcap (18), he was asked to reenact the event while a photographer is taking pictures to
be used later on as evidence against him.
Fruit of Poisonous Tree- once the primary source (the tree)

is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary
or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also
inadmissible.
Decision: The decision of the trial court states that the reenactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the
police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that
before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had
been informed of his constitutional rights including,
specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived his
right before proceeding with the demonstration. Under
these circumstances, the court must decline to uphold
admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.
2. Harris vs. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
Decision: Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic

deception by taking advantage of a suspectss misplaced
trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. Miranda
was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about
their criminal activities in front of persons whom they
believed to be their cellmates.
J. Re-enactment
K. Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
L. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
1. People v. Alicando 251 SCRA 293 (1995)
Facts: Accused was charged with rape with homicide of a
4 year old child. An eye-witness testified to have seen the
accused committing the crime. On the basis of this
testimony,P03 Tan interrogated the accused where he
Facts: Accused was charged for twice selling a heroin to

an undercover police officer. He took the witness stand as
his own witness and denied the allegations against him.
The prosecution however presented Harris Testimony after
his arrest which contradicts his testimony in court. On this
basis, he was impeached from standing as witness and was
later on convicted.
Decision: Harris testimony on his own behalf concerning
the events of January 7 contrasted sharply with what he
told the police shortly after his arrest. The impeachment
process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury
in assessing Harris credibility, and the benefits of this
process should not be lost because of the speculative
possibility that impermissible police conduct will be
encouraged thereby.
3. New York vs. Quaries, 104 U.S. 2626 (1984)
Facts: A woman reported to officers that she was raped by
a black man who entered an A & P Supermarket wearing a
black Jacket with the name big Ben printed in yellow
letters on the Back. Identifying the person, who upon
seeing the officers ran, the police officers pursued him, he
13
was frisked and was asked where the gun was. He nodded
on the direction where the gun was placed, was formally
arrested and read his Miranda rights. He was charged with
criminal possession of a weapon.
Decision: Undoubtedly, most police officers would act out
of host of different, instinctive and largely unverifiable
motivestheir own safety, the safety of others, and
perhaps the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from
the suspect. Whatever the motivation of the officer in a
given situation, the court does not believe that the doctrinal
underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all
its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety.
Property bond, how posted.A property bond is an

undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given
as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days
after the approval of the bond, the accused shall cause the
annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with
the Registry of Deeds if the land is registered, or if
unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space
provided therefor, in the Registry of Deeds for the
province or city where the land lies, and on the
corresponding tax declaration in the office of the
provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the
court his compliance and his failure to do so shall be
sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond
and his re-arrest and detention. (11a)
IV. RIGHT TO BAIL

Art. III, Sec. 13
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
A. Bail Defined
Deposit of cash as bail.The accused or any person

acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest
collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or
municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court,
or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or
filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of
deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance
with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused
shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited
shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of
fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to
the accused or to whoever made the deposit. (14a)
Rule 114, Section 1, ROC

Bail defined.Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail
may be given in the form of corporate surety, property
bond, cash deposit, or recognizance, (1a)
B. Kinds of Bail
Rule 114, Sections 10, 11, 14 & 15
Corporate surety.Any domestic or foreign corporation,
licensed as a surety in accordance with law and currently
authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond
subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the
corporation duly authorized by its board of directors. (10a)
Recognizance.whenever allowed by law or these Rules,

the court may release a person in custody on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person.
C. When right may be invoked
1. Govt of the US vs Judge Purungganan, GR 148571
(2002)
Facts: Mark Jimenez will be subjected to extradition
proceedings pursuant to RP-US extradition treaty. His
immediate arrest was demanded so he filed a motion for
provisional liberty.
Decision: Extradition is different from ordinary criminal
proceedings. There is no provision in the Philippine
Constitution granting a right to bail to person who is the
subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. As
14
suggested by the se of the word conviction, the

Constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of
Rule 114 of the ROC, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of the Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings
because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Moreover the constitutional right
to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. It
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition where the presumption of
innocence is not an issue
2. Govt of Hongkong vs Olalia, GR 153675 (2007)
Facts: Munoz was charged with conspiracy to defraud
punishable by Hongkong Law. He was subjected to
extradition and was detained for two years. He asked to
bail.
Decision: The time-honored principle
of pactasuntservanda demands that the Philippines honor
its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our
foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.
However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with
its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a
potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not
only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to
apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant
is satisfactorily met
3. Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)
Facts: Petitioners wife is a political detainee handed to
Commonwealth and is detained in the Correctional
Institution for women. He filed a petition for her
immediate release or for her to bail.
Decision: All person shall before conviction be bailable
except those charged with capital offense when the
evidence of guilt is strong. From the moment he is placed
under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of law,

he can claim his guarantee of the Bill of Rights and the
right retains unless he is charged with a capital offense and
the evidence of guilt is strong. If there is presumption of
innocence of one already formally charged with criminal
offense, this presumption should be indulged in favour of
one not yet so charged, although already arrested or
detained.
4. People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968)
Facts: Accused were charged with murder with qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. The motion to bail was
considered in a regular trial and was resolve despite the
objection of the prosecution on the ground that there are
still witnesses that they should present.
Decision: The prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it
may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such
an opportunity, there would be a violation of due process,
and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground.
5. Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387,
September 10, 1997
Facts: Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance
of the law when he granted bail in a murder case without
hearing and the accused without having been taken into
custody of the law yet
Decision: The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even
in ases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. The right to bail can only
be availed of ny person who is in custody of law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be
premature, not to say incongruous to file a petition for bail
for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
6. Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000
Facts: Accused was charged with several information for
child abuse having successfully committed carnal
15
knowledge with a 16 year old and 12 others of age below

18. Respondent Judge granted motion to bail with
condition of arraignment should takes place first.
Decision: Bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a
motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the
arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial
court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. To condition the grant of bail to an accused
on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot
be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash
so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be
released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the
accused constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge
him with a crime and his right to bail.
D. Procedure for bail
1. Paderanga v. Drilon, 247 SCRA 741, (1995)
Facts: Paderanga was charged as conspirator in a crime of
multiple murder for killing members of Bucag Family. His
counsel filed an application for bail even before a warrant
of arrest is served on him.
Decision: Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically
placed under arrest. He may, at that point and in the factual
ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively
and legally under custody. Thus in a likewise peculiar
circumstances which attended the filling of his bail
application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing
thereof, he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which
thereafter granted bail as prayed for.
2. Go v. Bongolan, A.M. 99-1464, July 26, 1999

Facts: Go was kidnapped by herein accused. They were
charged with kidnapping with ransom, a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. They filed an application to
bail and respondent judge ordered the grant of bail.
Decision: A bail hearing is mandatory to give the
prosecution reasonable opportunity to oppose the
application by showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.
If the prosecution is denied that opportunity, there would
be a violation of procedural due process. A bail application
does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary
liberty but likewise the right of the state to protect the
people and the peace of community from dangerous
elements. These two rights must be balanced by the
magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for
hearing to guide his exercise of discretion.
3. People v. Gako, G.R. 135045, December 15, 2000
Facts: An extra-judicial confession implicated the accused
to a crime of murder. He filed a motion to bail on account
of his medical condition which the respondent judge
granted without a hearing.
Decision: The reliance of Judge Gako on voluminous
record of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he
was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail
of accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that
carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing,
the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. Further,
the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako merely made
a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a
substantive and formal defect that voids that grant of bail.
E. Bail and Habeas Corpus
1. Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 (1990)
Facts: Enrile was arrested by virtue of a warrant and was
charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple murder. He filed a petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Supreme Court assailing the charges against
him.
Decision: The criminal case before Judge Jaime Salazar
(RTC Quezon City Branch 103) was the normal venue for
16
invoking Senator Enriles right to have a provisional

liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said Judge.
The correct course was for Enrile to invoke that
jurisdiction by filling a petition to be admitted to bail,
claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of
the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was
denied by trial court should the review jurisdiction of this
court have been invoked and even then, not without first
applying to the CA if appropriate relief was also available
there.
2. People vs. Judge Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
Facts: Accused was commander of NPA charged with
rebellion, a crime which became punishable by prision
mayor. He filed a petition to bail.
Decision: Crime of rebellion is a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus is suspendedThe 1987 Constitution strengthens
further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
Habeas Corpus is suspended
Note in Garcia-Padilla vs Enrile, the rule in Marcos time is
to suspend the right to bail when the privilege of habeas
corpus is suspended
Bail as a matter of right- Bail is either a matter of right or a
matter of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. The prosecution does not have the right to
present evidence for the denial of bail in instances where
bail is a matter of right.
F. Bail on appeal
1. People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1993)
Facts: Accused was charged with rape of a 13 year old. He
was duly convicted by the trial court but filed an
application for bail on appeal.
Decision: If an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial
court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither
a matter of right on the part of the accused nor a matter of
discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the
court would not have only determined that the evidence of
guilt is strongwhich would be sufficient to deny bail
even before convictionit would have likewise ruled that
the accuseds guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during
the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
2. Maguddatu v. CA, G.R. No. 139599, February 23, 2000
Facts: Accused were charged with murder and was
convicted of homicide by the trial court, sentenced to
suffer the penalty of 8- 14 years of imprisonment. While
on appeal, they filed an application to bail while remaining
at large.
Decision: Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused
may be admitted to bail upon the courts discretion after
conviction by RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Herein accused
however is not entitled to bail because: (1) they violated
the conditions of their bail. Their non appearance during
the promulgation of the decision despite due notice and
without justifiable reason, and their continued nonsubmission to the proper authorities as ordered by the CA,
constitutes violations of their bail. (2) They failed to renew
their expired bail bond and (3) they had no cause to expect
that their application for bail would be granted as a matter
of course precisely because it is a matter of discretion.
17
3. Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 114350, January 16,

1997
considering that the accused is a government employee

earning a monthly salary of P 210.
Facts: Accused was serving a sentenced for conviction on

robbery when he was involved in an ambush-slaying of a
govt official and his driver. He convicted for two counts of
homicide. While pending appeal, he filed an application to
bail.
Decision: Expressions in varying language spell out in a

general way the principles governing bail fixing. One is,
the amount should be enough to assure the presence of
defendant when required but not higher than what is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Another is the
good of the public as well as the rights of the accused, and
the need of a tie for jurisdiction and the right of freedom
from unnecessary restraint before conviction under the
circumstances surrounding each particular accused should
all be balanced in one equation. The inability of the
defendant to secure bail in a certain amount, by itself, does
not make the amount excessive. For, where an accused has
no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or none to
turn to for premium payments, any amount fixed no matter
how small would fall into the category of excessive bail;
and he would be entitled to be discharge at his own
recognizance.
Decision: Obosas conviction for two counts of homicide

disqualifies him from being admitted to bail as a matter of
right and subject his bail application to the sound
discretion of the court. While the accused, after conviction,
may upon application be bail at the discretion of the court,
that discretionparticularly with respect to extending the
bailshould be exercised not with laxity, but with caution
and only for string reasons, with the end in view of
upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of
justice.
G. Standards for fixing bail
1. Rule 114, Sec. 9
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines.The judge who
issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a
reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not
limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
2. Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967)
Facts: Accused was charged with murder of a police
officer. He was admitted to bail with the bail bond of P 40,
000 but later on was raised to P 60, 000. The issue raised
in this case is whether the bail bond is excessive
3. De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971)

Facts: Accused was charged with murder and frustrated
murder. He applied to bail but was granted in an excessive
amount of P 1, 195, 200. In spite of the recommendation of
Secretary of Justice to fix the same at P 40, 000, the judge
maintained the former bail bond. Accused escaped
confinement during pendency of his petition for certiorari.
Decision: There is a grim irony in an accused being told
that he has the right to bail but at the same time being
required to post such exorbitant sum. The amount fixed by
the trial court is excessive and is violative of the accuseds
constitutional rights. However, because of his subsequent
escape, he is no longer entitled to the relief prayed for.
4. Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975)
Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of qualified
theft. His provisional release was cost P 15, 000. In lieu of
the cash, accused asked the trial court to allow him to post
a surety bond instead. Judge however insisted on an entire
cash bond.
Decision: The condition that the accused may have
provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is
abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on
18
the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the

attendance of the accused when required by the court, and
there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the
accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The
allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in
this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide
for it. Were this is not the case, the posting of bail by
depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced
because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail
presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body
of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where the cash
bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a
surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. Thus, the
trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and
insists that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only
thru cash bond.
5. Yap v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6,
2001
Facts: Petitioner was convicted of estafa for
misappropriating amounts equivalent to P 5.5M. He filed a
notice of appeal and moved to have provisional liberty.
The CA set the amount of bail to P 5.5M, equivalent to the
civil liability of which the petitioner is charged.
Decision: Although an increase in the amount of bail while
the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the setting of the
amount to P 5.5M is unreasonable, excessive and
constitutes an effective denial of Yaps right to bail. The
purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court.
The amount should be high enough to assure the presence
of the accused when required but no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at
an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which Yap is
charged is to permit the impression that the amount paid is
an exaction of the civil liability that the accused is charged
of; this the court cannot allow because bail is not intended
as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability
which should necessarily await the judgment of the
appellate court.
6. Cabaero v. Caon, A.M. No. MTJ-01-369, September

20, 2001
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for allegedly covering up for
her sons commission of theft amounting to P 3, 191. She
was detained and posted bail of P 30, 000 and later another
bail with the same amount for the provisional liberty of her
son. She filed this complaint alleging that considering the
value of the property allegedly stolen, the bail required
was excessive.
Decision: Judge Canon erred in ordering t he arrest of
Guillerma D. Cabanero. She was not included as one of the
respondents in the criminal case filed. The judge also
imposed excessive bail. The monetary value of the falcate
trees cut into logs is P 3, 191. The bail of P 30, 000 is not
proportionate to the amount stolen. When the law
transgressed is elementary, the failure to know or observe
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law
G. Bail and the Right to Travel Abroad
1. Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 (1980)
Facts: Accused was charged with estafa and was allowed
to bail in the amount of P105, 000. While at provisional
liberty he filed a motion for permission to leave the
country on the ground of business transactions.
Decision: A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon Manotoc to make
himself available at all times whenever the court required
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. If the Accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the court.
V. RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED
Art. III, Sec. 14
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
19
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against

him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
A. Presumption of Innocence and Proof beyond
reasonable doubt
People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 (1971)
Facts: Accused were primary suspects in a robbery case.
They allegedly contemplated and performed the killing of
one Estelito Nogaliza that the latter will not able to testify
against them. Victim was hit by the wood and repeatedly
stabbed to death. Dramayo informed the wifes victim that
he saw the dead body of her husband, but noticing a blood
stain in her trousers, he was interrogated.
Decision: Presumption of Innocence: It is incumbent on
the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be
laid the responsibility for the offence charged; not only did
he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required is a moral certainty; that is to the end that
courts mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the
innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escaped
unpunished. The requisite quantum of proof to show guilt
beyond reasonable was met on two accused as they were
duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as the
offended party.
B. Order of Trial
1. Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1988) (modified by
Rule 119 Sec. 3 (e)
Facts: Petitioner, during his arraignment pleaded not guilty
to the crime of Homicide. He however, admitted killing
the deceased but that he acted in self-defense. The Judge
required the defense counsel to FIRST prove evidence in
self defense AND the prosecution to present its evidence
to disprove the same. Accused opposed contending that
such is violative of the sequence in the presentation by the
parties in criminal cases (FIRST by the prosecution THEN

by the defense, not vice-versa)
Decision: Enshrined in the Constitution as a protection to
accused persons in criminal cases is the requirement that
no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law. The requirement simply
requires that the procedure established by law shall be
followed. Section 3 of Rule 119 prescribes the order of
trial in criminal cases provides that the plea of guilty
having been entered, the trial must proceed in the
following order (a) the fiscal, on behalf of the People of
the Philippines, must offer evidences in support of the
charges (b) the defendant or his attorney may offer
evidence in support of the defense, (c) Parties may then
respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, in furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question. (d) the introduction of the evidence shall have
been concluded, unless the case is submitted to the court
without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the
attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal may
conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may
either be oral or written, but only the written arguments, or
such portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be
preserved in the record of the case. The procedure outlines
safeguards and protects the fundamental right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. That right is founded on the principle of justice
and ins intended not to protect the guilty but to prevent as
far as human agencies can, the conviction of an innocent
person.
C. Presumption of Guilt
1. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
Facts: Petitioner asserts the validity of BP 52 Section 4
which disqualifies elective candidates who have been
charged in Civil and/or military tribunals.
Decision: Explicit is the Constitutional provision that, in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation,
according to the fundamental law is not synonymous to
guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
20
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is

disqualified from running from public office on the ground
alone that charged have been filed against him before a
civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully
heard. In ultimate effect, except as to degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been files
for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run
for public office. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination.
2. People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 857 (1953)
Facts: Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malvrsation
of public funds as he was not able to produce the missing
fund amounting to P 3, 938 upon demand of provincial
auditor. He assert that Article 217 of RPC violates the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved as it treats the inability of the
public officer to produce funds demanded of him as a
prima facie evidence that he has put the funds in his
personal use.
Decision: The statute in the present case creates a
presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It
makes the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming, upon a proper demand, any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use. The ultimate act presumed is that the officer has
malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody,
and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he
has received them and yet he has failed to have them
forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact
presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved,
so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection
between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only
a prima facie presumption, this giving the accused an
opportunity to present evidence to rebut it.
D. Applicability to Juridical Persons
1. Feeder Intl Line vs. Ca CR 942 62, May 31, 1991
Facts: M/T ULU WAI a foreign vessel owned by
petitioner (Singapore) carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil
and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil anchored in the vicinity of

Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo
customs authority. The ship does not have required
shipping documents which lead to the decision of District
Collector that it violated the Tariff and Custom Code. The
products where forfeited in favor of the Philippines.
Petitioner opposed contending that such forfeiture is
violative of the right to be presumed innocent.
Decision: Seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the
Tariff and Customs Law are not criminal in nature as they
do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the
imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of
the Code. Seizure proceedings are purely civil and
administrative in character, the main purpose of which is
to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to
unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate
possession. The penalty is seizure cases is distinct and
separate from the criminal liability that may be imposed
against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds
of penalties may be imposed. Considering, therefore, that
proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported
are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the
conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon
him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required in order to justify the forfeiture of goods. Further,
a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to
be presumed innocent which right is available only to an
individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
E. Official Duty
1. People vs. Martos, 211 SCRA 805 (1992)
Facts: Accused was charged with violation of RA 6425 by
virtue of his arrest by police officers (one of which acted
as poseur buyer). HE was found guilty and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Decision: If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. The accused is not even called to offer
evidence in his behalf. His freedom is forfeited only when
the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be
21
in existence. An Assiduous and thorough analysis of the

record disclosed that Martos conviction has no basis. The
prosecutions evidence in support of its theory is not
convincing. If there was any evidence presented, it was so
slender and shaky, not presented with care and
thoroughness which the gravity of the offense demanded
and, taken in its entirety, is utterly insufficient to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
F. Equipoise Rule
1. Corpuz vs. People, 194 SCRA 73 (1991)
reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can

arise from the established fact of her possession of the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This
presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence
enshrined in the fundamental law. Dizon Pamintuan was
unable to rebut the presumption under PD 1612. She relied
solely on the testimony of her brother which was
insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the
contrary, even disclosed that Dizon-Pamintuan was
engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she
used to buy from a certain Fredo.
Facts: Corpuz was charged with malversation of public

funds and was duly convicted. He invoked the equipoise
rule in his appeal.
G. Right to be heard personally or by counsel:

Importance of Counsel
Decision: The equipoise rule invoked by Corpuz is

applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly
balanced, in which case, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome
by Corpuz with his nebulous claim of persecution and
conspiracy
Facts: Accused, a private individual was charged with

slight illegal detention of one Artmia Fabreag. He pleaded
guilty without the benefit of a lawyer and was sentenced.
2. Dizon Paminatuan v. People, July 11, 1994

Facts: Accused was charged with violation of anti-fencing
Law when jewelries, which were products of a recent
robbery, were found in her actual possession of, and is
being sold by her in Chinatown. She was convicted, and on
her appeal she contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that she had knowledge that the item she was selling
was a product of robbery.
Decision: Fencing, is the act of any person who, with
intent to gains for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item
object, or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, have been derived from proceeds of the
crime of robbery of theft. PD 1612 expressly provides that
mere possession of items which are subject of robbery or
theft shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. It follows
that Dizon-Pamintuan is presumed to have knowledge of
the fact that the items found in her possession were the
proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is
1. People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752 (1950)
Decision: The record discloses that said court did not

inform the accused of his right to have an attorney not did
it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed
to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an
attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or to
assign an attorney de oficio. One of the great principles of
justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law, and that all accused shall enjoy the right
to be heard f himself and counsel. In criminal cases, there
can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by a counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and, without a counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It
is for this reason that the right to be assisted by a counsel
is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under our rules of
procedures, it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to
ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him
22
if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable

time to procure an attorney of his own.
2. Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357 (1986)
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted of estafa. On
her appeal she requested for a new trial as she was
represented by a counsel who was not a member of IBP.
Decision: Accused person is entitled to be represented by a
member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her
before the RTC. Unless she is represented by a lawyer,
there is great danger that any defense presented in her
behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites
and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would
certainly be a denial of due process.
G1. Improvident Plea of guilt
1. People vs. Baluyot, 75 SCRA 148 (1977)
Facts: Accused were charged with crime of robbery and
homicide. They were represented by different counsels
during arraignment and trial. In the continuation of the
trial, a new de oficio was assigned to them who was given
20 minutes to convene with the accused. Thereafter, the
new de oficio informed the court that the accused change
their plea from not guilty to guilty. They later on affirmed
before the judge the truthfulness and correctness of their
counsels manifestation and were sentenced to death.
Decision: It is not unreasonable to assume that said
counsel de oficio proceeded to trial without first fully
investigating the facts of the case and that his interview
with the accused, even if it lasted for 20 minutes as the
record insinuates, was not, and could not have been
sufficient to enable him to acquire a fairly good grasp,
much less a comprehensive knowledge, of the relevant
facts of the case. The trial court cannot plead ignorance of
the prevailing injunction directed towards trial judges to
exercise patience and circumspection in explaining to the
accused not only the nature and meaning of the accusation
and the full import of their plea of guilty but also the
meaningin laymans languageof the aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
2. People vs. Magsi, 124 SCRA 69 (1983)

Facts: Accused were charged with murder with several
aggravating circumstances. Six hearings were set where in
two instances the accused entered the plea of guilty under
the representation of 2 de oficio appointed by the court in
different stages of trial. Del Rosario was convicted and
was sentenced to death.
Decision: The court has consistently enjoined strict and
substantial adherence to its ruling in cases where
defendants are charged with capital offenses. Mere proforma appointment of de oficio counsel, who fails to
genuinely protect the interests if the accused, resetting of
hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence
when in fact bone was conducted, perfunctory queries
addressed to tea used whether he understands the charges
and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient
compliance with the Courts injunctions. The conduct of
the trial court clearly established the fact that it had been
remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on
an improvident plea of guilty.
G2. Right to Lawyer of Choice
1. People vs. Malunsing, 63 SCRA 493 (1975)
Facts: Manuel Villegas was charged with murder. A de
oficio counsel was appointed to him in spite of his claim
that he has and would want his own lawyer to represent
him. No evidence was presented in his behalf and was
convicted of murder.
Decision: It is not enough that a onsel de oficio was
appointed, especially where the accused had indicated that
he wanted a lawyer of his hoice, a decision prompted
moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the
member of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest
respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named,
instead of conferring with the accused, would just blithely
inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his
exacting responsibility. It was unintended of course, but
the result could not rightly be distinguished from pure
travesty. Villegas could then rightfully invoke this
constitutional guarantee. In as much as it is intended to
assure a just and fair proceeding, he is entitled at the most
to a new trial where he can be duly represented either by a
23
counsel of his choice or by one appointed de oficio who

would discharge his task in a much more diligent and
conscientious manner and would readily assume that he
need not bother himself unduly with familiarizing himself
with all aspects of the case. For only in such a way may
there be an intelligent defense.
H. Deprivation of Right to be Heard
Moslares v. CA, 291 SCRA 440 (1998)
Facts: Accused was charged with estafa and violation of
BP 22. During the representation of evidence, accused did
not appear only his counsel who claimed that he cannot yet
proceed as he is not yet familiar with the case. The court
then promulgated its decision convicting him of the
offense charged.
Decision: The rights of the accused during trial are given
paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal
procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Verily this
right is even guaranteed by the constitution itself. This
right has been recognized and established in order to make
sure that justice is done to the accused. Further, the
constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his
defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system
of government has the power to deprive him of that right.
Granting that Mosrales had sought a number of
postponement, the requirement of substantial justice
mandate that he should have been given his day in court.
The grant of a reasonable continuance would have been
sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to
have a speedy disposition of the case but at the expense of
a fundamental right.
H. Right to be informed of nature and cause of
accusation
H1 Lack of Arraignment
1. Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
Facts: Accused was charge with slight physical injury.
There was no arraignment but the judge continued with the
trial in absentia and convicted him. Without due notice, the
decision on the appealed case was also promulgated.
Decision: Arraignment is the stage where in the mode and

manner required by the Rules, an accused for the first time,
is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully
aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending in the nature of the crime imputed to him. At
the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the
prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An
arraignment serves that purpose.
2. People v. Alcalde, G.R. 139225, May 29, 2002
Facts: Accused was charged with parricide and frustrated
parricide. HE was arraigned while he is out of touched of
the world and was later on convicted of all offenses
charged to him.
Decision: Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed
or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present
condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his
discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by
reason of such affliction, the accused could not, with the
aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the
court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused
to a proper place of detention until his faculties are
recovered.
3. People v. Dy, G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
Facts: Accused were charged with rape and acts of
lasciviousness filed by 2 american nationals whom they
drugged, molested and robbed in Baguio. They refuse to
enter a plea, hence the court entered a plea of not guilty for
them They were later on convicted of the offenses charged.
In appeal, they contend that the lack of arraignment
nullifies the proceedings against them.
Decision: Concededly, the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived.
Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter plea and
let the court enter a plea of not guilty in their behalf.
However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the
accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them. The defense cannot
hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the
complaint or information. Further, it cannot be said that
the defense does not know the nature and the cause of the
24
accusation against them. The conduct of the defense,

particularly their participation in the trial, clearly indicates
that they were fully aware of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. By actively participating in the
trial of the case, they have effectively waived whatever
procedural error there was in their arraignment.
cannot be punished for a graver offense than that with

which he was charged. The requirement for the complete
allegation on the particulars of the indictment is based on
the right of the accused to be fully informed of the nature
of the charge against him, so that he may adequately
prepare for this defense pursuant to the due process clause
of the Constitution.
H2 Sufficiency of the Information

3. People v. Lozano, G.R. 125080, September 25, 1998
1. People v. Sadiosa, 290 SCRA 82 (1998)
Facts: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment of
large scale after inducing several people to apply as
domestic worker in Kuwait without having legal authority
for recruitment. She challenged the information filed
against her contending that it is confusing and might be
mistaken with estafa by the facts stated therein.
Decision: The information is sufficient where it clearly
states the designation of the offense by the statute and the
acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense.
However, there is no need to specify or refer to the
particular section or subsection of the statute that was
violated by the accused. No law requires that in order that
an accused may be convicted, the specific provision
penalizing the act charged should be mentioned in the
information. What identifies he charge is the actual recital
of the facts and not that designated by the fiscal in the
preamble thereof. It is not even necessary for the
protection of the substantial right of the accused, nor the
effective preparation of his defense, that the accused be
informed of the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged.
2. People v. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 24, 1998
Facts: Accused was charged with simple rape in an
information filed by his step daughter. He was convicted
and was sentenced the supreme penalty of death.
Decision: A reading of the information discloses that,
contrary to the findings d the said court, only the crime of
simple rape was charge against Ernesto and no attendant
special circumstances which would in effect qualify the
crime was alleged as such in the information. Procedurally
then, while the minority of Maribel and the relationship of
Ernesto and his victim were established during the trial,
Ernesto can only be convicted of simple rape because he
Facts: Accused was charged with rape of one Lilia

Montederamos with whom he had carnal knowledge by
means of force and intimidation. The prosecution tended to
prove that Lozano had carnal knowledge of the victim at
least twice but the trial court convicted him of one count of
rape.
Decision: Although the prosecutions evidence tended to
prove that Lozano had carnal knowledge with the victim at
least twice, he cannot be held liable for two counts of rape,
because the information charged him with only one count.
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict
him of offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be a violation of this constitutional
right.
4. People v. Ladrillo, G.R. No. 124342, December 8, 1999
Facts: Accused was charged with rape of a 5 year old who
is his cousin. The information filed against him describes
that he committed the crime on or about the year 1992.
Accused maintains that he has not known the complainant
on the year 1992 as evidenced in the record of his
residence having moved near the complainants only on
1993. Trial court nevertheless convicted him.
Decision: The peculiar designation of time in the
information violates Section 11, Rule 110 of ROC which
requires that the time of the commission of the offense
must be alleged as near to the actual date as the
information or complaint will permit it. More importantly,
it runs afoul of the constitutional protected right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The information is not sufficiently
25
explicitly and certain as to time to inform accusedappellant of the date on which the criminal at is alleged to
have been committed. Certainly, time is not an essential
ingredient or element of the crime of rape. However, it
assumes importance in the instant case since it creates
serious doubt on the commission of rape or the sufficiency
of the evidence for purposes of conviction.
7. People vs. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804. February 26, 2003

Facts: Accused was charged with rape with homicide of a
14 year old girl. He was arraigned and plead guilty on
murder. In the presence of aggravating circumstances, trial
court convicted him and sentenced him to death. The issue
set forth in this case is whether or not the accused was
properly informed of the nature of the charges against him.
5. People v. Valdesancho, G.R. 137051, May 30, 2001

Facts: Accused was charged with rape of a 14 year old
sister of his wife. The information filed against him
describes that he committed the offense on August 15, 16,
1994 but the trial court convicted him of offenses
committed on August 15, 16, 1993.
Decision: Article III, section 14 of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal
offense without due process of law. It further provides that
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and a counsel.
Similarly, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides that in all criminal prosecution, it is the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. To convict an accused for an
offense not alleged in the complaint or information
violates such right.
6. People v. Alcalde, G.R. Nos. 139225-28, May 29, 2002
Facts: Accused (who doesnt know to read and write) was
charged with parricide and frustrated parricide. HE was
arraigned while he is out of touched of the world and
was later on convicted of all offenses charged to him.
Decision: The Constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him under the Bill
of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to
effectively convey to the accused the information to enable
him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is
the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the
mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the
accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the
proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the
accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law
secures or gives.
Decision: The trial court is required to probe thoroughly

into the reasons as well as the facts and circumstances for
the change of plea of the accused and his comprehension
of his plea; explain to him the elements of crime for which
he is charged as well as the nature and effect of qualifying
circumstances, generic aggravating circumstances and
mitigating circumstances in the commission thereof; and
inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil
liabilities for the crime for which he would plead guilty to.
Herein, the information was merely read and translated to
Ostia in the waray dialect which he understood. The trial
court failed to comply with its duties as Ostia did not even
know how to read and write.
8. People vs. Flores Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December
27, 2002
Facts: Accused was convicted of rape of his 11 years old
daughter. In the information filed against him, it was
described that he sexually abused the victim. The issue
set forth in this instance is whether or not the information
filed against him violated his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him.
Decision: The recital of facts in the criminal complaints
simply does not properly charge rape, sexual abuse not
being an essential element or ingredient thereof. Neither
can Pedro be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness or of any
offense for that matter under our penal laws. It is settled
that what characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information. The complaint must
contain a specific allegation of fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused
being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
26
I. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial Speedy

trial
1. Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970)
Facts: Accused was charged with damage to property
through reckless imprudence. For 6 years, the case was
pending before the trial court. The complainant later on
testified on direct examination but the cross examination
no longer continue as complainant did not appear on trial.
On another schedule of trial, witnesses did not appear,
hence petitioners counsel move for dismissal of the case
base on accused right to speedy trial.
Decision: The right of the accused to have speedy trial is
violated not only when unjustified postponement of the
trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without
good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without having his case tried.
2. People vs. Judge Laya, 161 SCRA 327 (1988)
Facts: Soledad Castro and Crisologo Abines were charged
with the crime of grave coercion. The trial on their case
was delayed for two months being forwarded from one
fiscal to another. The case was dismissed for failure to
prosecute.
Decision: Whether or not one has been denied speedy trial
is not susceptible to precise quantification. At best,
constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent
with reasonable delays, taking into account the
circumstances of each case. The case at bar is a simple
one. It did not need lengthy and tedious preparation. The
two months delay of the trial if requested for sound
reasons may not be unreasonable. However, wing to the
nature of the case, the reasons of postponements, and the
fact that one of the accused is a municipal mayor, who had
to leave his work every time he was hauled to court only to
be told to return another day, the delay becomes
vexatiousthe delay is not only prejudicial to him but also
to the people of Santader, Cebu.
3. Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 (1924)
Facts: petitioner has been forced to respond to no less than
five information for various crimes and misdemeanours,
has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no
less than on 8 different occasions only to see the cause

postponed, has twice been required to come to the SC for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than 1 year,
her case has not been heard.
Decision: Dismissed from her humble position, and
compelled to dance on courts while investigations and
trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is
palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the
public.
4. Dacanay vs. People, 240 SCRA 490 (1995)
Facts: Dacanay was charged with a criminal complaint of
economic sabotage through smuggling with the president
of NASUTRA who was abroad and as a consequence, 8
years has lapsed and the case has not been heard. He
prayed that he be given a separate trial.
Decision: The resulting inconvenience and expense on the
part of the Government cannot be given preference over
the right to speedy trial and the protection to a persons
life, liberty or property accorded by the Constitution. The
prosecutors opposition to the request for separate trial was
based on the ground that the principal accused cannot be
placed under arrest because he remains outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more reason
should his co-accused, who are under arrest, be entitled to
a separate trial. A separate trial is in consonance with the
right of an accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him
by the 1987 Constitution. Herein, it has been 8 years since
the information against Dacanay was filed, but the case
against him has yet to be tried. The lng delay has clearly
prejudiced Dacanay, who is now 73 years of age.
5. People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001
Facts: Accused was charged with rape of his 13 year old
daughter. One day immediately after the filing of
memorandum, the court disposed of the case by sentencing
him to death by lethal injection. The issue posed in this
case is whether or not the speedy disposition of the case
denied the accused due process.
Decision: Public policy requires that trial continue as
scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately
represented by counsels who were not shown to be
negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent
27
him. Rolando was not denied due process considering the

speed with which the trial court rendered judgment against
him, which judgment was promulgated one day after he
filed his memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial
court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on
which it is based. It discusses in full the courts findings on
the credibility of both the prosecution and the defense
witnesses and the evaluation of the evidence of both
parties.
6. Solar Team Entertainment v. How, G.R. No. 140863,
August 22, 2000
Facts: Information for estafa was filed against Berreiro
before RTC. She moved that her arraignment be deferred
as she is a pending appeal on the secretary of justice which
the trial court granted. The issue set forth in this case is
whether or not arraignment may be suspended by virtue of
a pending appeal on SOJ.
Decision: Review as an act of supervision and control by
the SOJ over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
holds that mistaes, abuses or negligence committed in the
initial setps on an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency should be corrected by higher
administrative authorities and not directly by the courts.
As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted
may judicial recourse be allowed. The decision to suspend
arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the
SOJ is an exercise of such discretion.
NOTE: Speedy Trial means one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective
being to assure that an innocent person may be free from
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible
time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatever legitimate defense he may interpose.
J. Public trial
1. Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970)
Facts: A criminal information was charged against accused
for slight physical injuries. The trial was conducted by the
judge inside his air conditioned chambers rather than on
the usual open court.
Decision: Trial should be public to offset any danger of

conducting t in an illegal and unjust manner and thus
serves as deterrence to arbitrariness. There is no ambiguity
in the words employed. The trial must be public. It
possesses that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the proceeding
may do so. There is to be no ban in such attendance.
Herein, when trial was held on Saturdays and in the airconditioned chambers of the city judge for the convenience
of the parties and of the judge, the proceedings were not
violative of the right to public trial. There is no showing
that the public is thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that
the size of the room allotted he judge would reduce the
number of those who could be present. Such a fact though
is not indicative of any transgression of this right. It
suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if
the accused could have his friends, relatives and counsel
present, no matter with what the offense he may be
charged.
2. Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001
Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Boadcaster ng Pilipinas
requested the SC to allow a live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder case of President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada.
Decision: A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that
his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the courts doors must be open to
those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
K. Impartial trial
1. Tumey vs. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
Facts: Accused was arrested and charged with unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor. He questions the
qualification of the Mayor to try his case as the latter has
pecuniary interest in the case, having to receive $ 12 in
each conviction of the case.
Decision: The mayor has a direct pecuniary interest in
convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in
the $ 12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would
28
not have received if the defendant had been acquitted. It is

certainly not fair for each defendant brought before the
mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt
or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss
by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal.
2. Soriano vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, August 31, 2000
Facts: Petitioner in this case filed an information of direct
ssault against one Garcia for allegedly pointing a gun at
him and injuring him. Respodent judge acquitted Garcia
and herein petitioner claims that respondent judge is biased
and partial.
Decision: It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is
partial to one of the parties is not enough evidence to
prove the charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed,
especially weighed against a judges sacred allegation
under oath of office to administer justice without respect to
any person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.
There must be showing of bias and prejudice stemming
from an extra-judicial source resulting in an opinion in the
merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case.
L. Right to confront witnesses
1. U.S. v. Javier, 37 Phil. 449 (1918)
Facts: Accused was charged for stealing a carabao found
in his possession. A sworn statement of one of the
constabulary who arrested him was admitted as evidence
although the person who had given it is already dead.
Decision: With reference to the Bill of Rights, it intends to
secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as fact
provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such
witnesses has meet him face to face at trial, who gave their
testimony in their presence, and give to the accused an
opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to
prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions of
ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of
the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the
exercise of the right of cross-examination. In other words,
confrontation is essential because cross-examination is
essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a
tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance
of the witness while testifying.
M. Right to secure attendance of witnesses

1. U.S. vs. Garcia, 10 Phil. 384 (1908)
Facts: Accused were charged of robbery. They were
convicted and on appeal, they postulate that they should be
given a new trial as their counsel became ill before the trial
and they were not able to secure the presence of their
witnesses.
Decision: Record discloses that it appearing that the
original counsel assigned to defend the accused was sick at
the time of the trial, new counsel was assigned for their
defense by the court, and it does not appear that any effort
was made to secure the presence of witnesses nor was any
motion made to the court for a continuance of that
purpose. The appellants in criminal case cannot be heard
for the first time on appeal to complain that they could
secure the presence of witnesses at trial, when it does not
appear that they made any effort to do so before or during
the progress of the trial, or that they sought the aid of the
court to compel the attendance of their witnesses, or
objected to proceeding without them.
2. People vs. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1938)
Facts: Accused, together with others, was charged with
murder and was convicted by the trial court. On his appeal,
he claims that the witnesses during the preliminary
investigation should also be presented as witnesses during
trial, an event which the trial court failed to do.
Decision: The only effect of this failure (to present the
witnesses during the preliminary investigation as witnesses
in trial) was to entitle the defense to adduce secondary
evidence touching the testimony of said witnesses, for the
purpose of attacking their veracity, should they have been
presented as witnesses during trial.
3. People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204 (1989)
Facts: Accused was charged with murder. During
arraignment, he pleaded guilty with qualifying statement
(hindi ko po sinasadya) and waived the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution. He was later on convicted.
The issue posed in this case is whether or not an accused
who pleaded guilty may waive the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution.
29
Decision: The essence of the plea of guilty is that the

accused admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full
knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and
with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the
crime charged in the complaint or information. While it is
true that the plea of guilt admits all the allegations in the
information including the aggravating and qualifying
circumstances, the repeated and emphatic qualification of
de Luna as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn
the attention of the trial court that the plea was made
without full knowledge of its consequences. Apparently,
counsel failed to advise him as to the meaning and effect
of the technical language used in the information
qualifying the acts constituting the offense. In order to be
valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt.
When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry to the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability
N. Right to be present during trial
N1. Trial in absentia
Rule 115, Sec. 1 (c)
To be present and defend in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however,
waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations
set forth in his tail, unless his presence is specifically
ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The
absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial
of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his
right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody
escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be
present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him
is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to
the court that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel.
O. When presence of the accused is a duty:

O1. Arraignment and plea
Rule 116, Sec. 1 (b)
The accused must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall
be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the
validity of the proceedings.
O2. During trial for identification
1. Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 63 SCRA 546
(1975)
Facts: Aquino was arrested and was charged for complicity
in a conspiracy to seize political and state power in the
country. He was detained and was tried by Military
Commission. He waived his right to be present during the
hearings before it.
Decision: The rights of the accused to defend himself in
person and by attorney, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to
meet the witnesses face to face, as well as the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, are rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. They are necessary either because of
the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and
impartial trial, or of the need of protecting the individual
from exercise of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no
question that all of these rights may be waived.. No logical
reason, why Aquino, although he is charged with capital
offense, should be precluded from waiving his right to be
present in the proceedings for the perpetration of
testimony, since this right was conferred upon him for his
protection and benefit.
2. People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986)
Facts: Accused was charged with homicide, after being
admitted to bail, he escaped. His bail bond was cancelled
and his immediate arrest was ordered. Prosecution
nevertheless moved that the trial must proceed even in his
absence.
Decision: The prisoner cannot, by simply escaping thwart
his continued prosecution and possibly eventually
conviction provided only that (a) he has been arraigned;
30
(b) he has been duly notified of the trial and (c) his failure
to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to be present at
ones trial may now be waived except only at the stage
where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who
will identify the accused. Under section 19, defendants
escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the
inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial.
He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same
fact of his escape will make his failure to appear
unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself
beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
O3. Promulgation of sentence
Rule 120, Sec. 6
Promulgation of judgment.The judgment is promulgated
by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge
of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province
or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive
judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the place of confinement or detention upon request of the
court which rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept
the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending
appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused
personally or through his bondsman or warden and
counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because
he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him
shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal

docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment,
however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and
if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he
shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice. (6a)
Exception: Light offenses
VI. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Art. III, Sec. 17
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
A. Scope covers compulsory testimonial incrimination
1. People v Gallarde; GR 133025 (2000)
Facts: Accused was the primary suspect of a rape case. His
photos were taken while the body of the victim was being
unearthed. He later on posts the defense against selfincrimination because of those pictures.
Decision: The taking of pictures of an accused even
without the assistance of counsel, being purely mechanical
act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused
against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt , hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. The essence of the right against
self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion , that is, the
giving of evidence gainst himself through a testimonial
act.
31
2. United States vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)

Facts: Accused allegedly placed his penis on a 7 year old
girls private part. The latter later on contracted gonorrhea.
Victim identified accused in an investigation and was
brought to a police station where he was stripped and a
substance emitting from his body was taken. It was later
on discovered that the same is suffering from gonorrhea.
The admissibility of the substance taken from him was
questioned as it would constitute testifying against himself.
Decision: The prohibition that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against ones self is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendants own lips, against his will, ad admission of his
guilt. The purpose is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the
purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations
implicating them from the commission of the crime. Such
inspection of the body does not violate the privilege
granted under the Bill, because it does not call upon the
accused as a witnessit does not call upon the defendant
for his testimonial responsibility.
3. United States vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917)
Facts: Accused was forced to discharge a morphine from
his mouth. It was later on used as evidence to his
conviction. He claimed that this is a violation of his right
against self-incrimination.
Decision: It would be a forced construction of the
paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to
hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from the
person of the accused could not be given in evidence. The
main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit
testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to
extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating
them from the commission of the crime.
4. People vs. Otadura, 86 Phil. 244 (1950)
Facts: Accused was charged with murder of spouses Leon
Castro and Apolonia Carreon. He alleged that Hilaria
Carreon induced him to kill the spouses so that they wont
be able to pursue on a civil case to prejudice her. The
prosecution, in proving her part on the murder, asked her
husband to wear the pants that Otadura used in the

commission of the offense at it was alleged to be his.
Decision: There was no timely objection on the specific
ground. It is to be doubted whether the accused could
benefit from the error, if any. Furthermore, and this is
conclusive, measuring is photographing the party is not
within the privilege (against self incrimination). Nor is the
removal or replacement of his garment or shoes. Nor is the
requirement that the party move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done.
5. Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of adultery.
The court ordered her to submit herself to an examination
to determine whether or not she is pregnant. She refused
and as a result, she was held in contempt of court and was
detained.
Decision: Once again, the court lays down the rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is
limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that,
on a proper showing and under an order of trial court, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
6. Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
Facts Petitioner was under administrative investigation.
Six letters were claimed to be her writing. She was
required to copy them in the presence of the investigator.
She refused contending that it is a violation of her right
against self incrimination.
Decision: Petitioner opportunely invoked the privilege
when it was desired to subject her to trial by copying six
letters in action. The purpose is positively to avoid and
prohibit the repetition and recurrence of the certainly
inhuman procedure compelling a person in a criminal or
any other case, to furnish the missing evidence.
7. Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929)
Facts: Petitioner was ordered to appear before provincial
fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the
latter. It is for the purpose of comparing the petitioners
32
handwriting and determine whether or not it is he who

wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
Decision: Privilege is not limited to testimony but extends
to all giving or furnishing of evidence. Writing is
something more than moving the body, it is not purely a
mechanical act because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention. Writing in this case means that
petitioner is to furnish a means to determine whether or not
he is the falsifier.
NOTE: If petitioner stood as a witness and denied the
allegation, he may be compelled to write.
8. People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 (1994)
Facts: Tranca was charged with violation of RA 6425 after
the police officers conducted a buy bust operation where
he was arrested. A marked money dusted with fluorescent
power was found in his possession. He was later on
exposed to ultraviolet and found to have fluorescent
powder on his hands and some parts of the body indicating
that he indeed took the marked money as payment for the
drug confiscated. The same was admitted as evidence
against him to his conviction.
10. Schemerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)

Facts: Petitioner was arrested while being treated in a
hospital. He was charged with driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. A chemist conducted a
test on a blood extracted from him and shows positive in
the presence of alcohol. It was later on used as evidence
against him.
Decision: As the passage in Miranda implicitly recognizes,
privilege has never been given the full scope which the
values it helps to protect suggests. The privilege is fulfilled
only when the person is guaranteed the right to remain
silent unless he chose to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will. It is clear that the protection of the privilege
reaches an accuseds communications, whatever form they
might take, and the compulsions of responses which are
also communications.
11. People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, December 9,
1999
Facts: Accused was identified as the rapist because of the
hair obtained from him by the victim during the process
of rape.
Decision: What is prohibited by the constitutional

guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it
may be material.
Decision: The provision contemplates on a physical or

moral compulsion to extort communication; it does not
include a persons body.
9. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983)
1. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344

(1969)
Facts: After failing a field sobriety test, accused was

arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The
police officers consistently urged him to undergo a bloodalcohol test. Accused expressly opposed the same. His
refusal was later on counted against him in trial.
Facts: Petitioner was under administrative proceeding for

immorality. Herein respondent would want him to take the
witness stand but the petitioner refused invoking his right
against self incrimination.
Decision: The court held that the privilege bars the State
only from compeeling communications or testimony.
Since a blood test is physical or real evidence rather than
testimonial evidence, it is unprotected by the privilege.
Given then, that the offer of taking blood-alcohol test is
clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate
when the State offers a second option of refusing the test,
with the attendant penalties for making that choice.
Decision: The Constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination is not limited to allowing witness to object to
questions the answer to which could lead to a penal
liability being subsequently incurred. It is also a protection
against ANY disclosures which the witness may
reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal
prosecution o which could lead to other evidence that may
be so used.
B. In what proceedings available
33
2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)

Facts: Following the death of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr,, A
fact finding board was created by virtue of PD 1886 to
determine the person or persons liable for the incident. The
board was also given power to hold those who will not
cooperate in contempt. Herein accused were charged for
the murder of Aquino and their testimony before the board
is used as evidence against them.
Decision: PD 1886 denied them of their right to remain
silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves. They have to take the witness stand,
testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they
failed or refuse to do so. The jeopardy of being placed
behind bars even before conviction dangled before their
eyes. The constitutional rights to remain silent and not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself were away
totally foreclosed by PD 1886. Hence unconstitutional.
C. Use Immunity v. Transactional Immunity.
1. Art. XIII, Sec. 18 (8)
railway or its officers from answering a charge of having

violated its provision. To say that, notwithstanding his
immunity from punishment, he would incur personal
odium and disgrace from answering this questions seems
too much an abuse of language to be worthy of serious
consideration but, even if this were true, he would still be
compelled to answer if the facts sought to be elucidated
were materials to the issue. If the witnesses standing in
Browns position were at liberty to set up immunity from
testifying the enforcement of the inter-state commerce
Law or any other analogous act wherein it is for the
interest of both parties to conceal their misdoings would
become impossible sine it is only from the mouth of those
having knowledge of inhibited contracts that the facts can
be ascertained. While the Constitutional provision is justly
regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the
citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory
immunity that the witness is compellable to answer.
D. Exclusionary rule
1. Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose

testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth
in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of

this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
1. Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Use immunity: Prohibit the use of witness compelled

testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with
the criminal prosecution of the witnesses.
Facts: Chavez stood as an ordinary witness (as he was

among those who planned the scheme) in a criminal case
of theft of motor vehicle. The accused however were
acquitted and he was implicated to the commission and
later on conviction on the crime charged. He filed an
application for Habeas Corpus
Transactional Immunity- grants immunity to the witness

from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates.
3. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
Facts: Brown was a witness on the case of alleged
violation of Interstate Commence Act. He refused to
answer some questions as it will incriminate him to the
crime being prosecuted.
Decision: It is entirely clear that he was not the chief or
even a substantial offender under the law and that his
privilege was claimed for the purpose of shielding the
E. Effect of denial of privilege by court
Decision: The course which Chavez took is correct.

Habeas Corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accuseds constitutional rights are disregarded. Such
defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent
conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
violated. The void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
34
function of Habeas Corpus. The writ may be granted upon

a judgment already final. For the writ of Habeas Corpus as
an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so
as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake
VII. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
2. Art. VIII, Sec. 15
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twentyfour months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or
by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and
served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued
within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory
period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility
as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall
decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay.
4. Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)
Facts: A complaint was charged against Davao City Mayor
Duterte for allegedly entering into a computerization
project which is grossly advantageous to the government.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and lasted for
four years.
Decision: Duterte et al could not have urged the speedy

resolution of their case because they were completely
unaware that the investigation against them was still
ongoing. Peculiar to this cast is the fact that Duterte et al
were merely asked to comment and not file counter
affidavit which is the proper procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation,
and after four long years of being in dark, they naturally
have the reason to assume that the charges against them
had already been dismissed. On the other hand, the office
of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible special
or even novel reason which could justify the four year
delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the
delay, the many layers of review that the case have to
undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail has
lost its novelty and is no longer appealing
5. Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)
Facts: Tatad was charged under RA 3019, the preliminary
investigation of which lasted for years. He moved to quash
information on the ground of speedy disposition of case.
Decision: The long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by Tanod Bayan is violative of
the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation
including substantial adherence to the requirements of the
law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation
including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor is a part of the procedural due process
Constitutional guaranteed by the fundamental law not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause but
under the institutional guarantee of the speedy disposition
of cases as embodied in Sec 16 of the Bill of Rights. The
inordinate delay is violative of Tatads Constitutional
rights. A delay of close to 3 years cannot be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of circumstances in the
light of the present case. The court is not impressed by the
attempt of Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in speculative assumption that the delay may be
due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanod
Bayan. AS to whether the evidence presented during the
35
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former

high ranking government official
6. Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 145851, November 22,
2001
the accused. In as much as one violation would mean

others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial
system of price controls
2. People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Facts: Accused was charged with criminal offense before

Sanfiganbayan. Ten years after the cases submission, the
Sandiganbayan is yet to render decision.
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted under RA

4670, a law which does not provide a determinable term of
imprisonment.
Decision: Clearly, the decision in this case is long overdue

and the period to decide the case under the law has long
expired. Even more important than the above period within
which the decision should have been rendered, is the right
against unreasonable delay in the disposition of ones case
before any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body.
This Constitutional guaranteed rights find greater
significance in a criminal case before a court of justice
where any delay in disposition may result in a denial of
justice for the accused altogether. Indeed the aphorism
justice delayed, is justice denied is by no means
achieved trivial or meaningless concept that can be taken
for granted by those who are tasked with the dispensation
of justice.
Decision: Sec 32 of RA 4670 provides for an

indeterminable period of imprisonment with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration, having been set by the
legislative authority. The courts are, thus, given wide
latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard such
that the duration thereof may range from 1 minute to the
life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed.
VIII. PUNISHMENTS
A. Excessive fines and cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishments
1. People vs. Dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 906 (1953)
Facts: Accused was sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years
and to pay fine of P 5, 000 for charging 30 centavos for a
10 Centavos worth of product to a customer (who is not in
good terms with him).
Decision: To justify a courts declaration of conflict with
Constitution, the prison term must be so disproportionate
to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the
circumstances. The court does not such punishment
unusual and cruel remembering the national policy against
the profiteering in the matter of foodstuffs affecting the
Peoples health. The need of stopping speculation in such
essential and of safeguarding public welfare in times of
food scarcity or similar stress, the damage cause to the
state is not measure exclusively by the gains obtained by
3. Loiusiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1974)

Facts: Willie Francis was about to be electrocuted, he sat
on the electric chair but because of some failure and
mechanical difficulty, the sentenced was not
consummated. His execution was reset on another date and
he protested on the ground that subjecting him again
amounts to cruelty.
Decision: The cruelty against which the constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method
of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved
employed to extinguish life humanly. The fact that
unforeseeable incident prevented the prompt consumption
of sentence cannot add an element of cruelty to a
subsequent execution.
4. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
Facts: Ford is a criminal convicted of a crime punishable
by death. After his conviction, Ford began to exhibit
unusual behaviors. Psychiatrist declared him to be insane
but the state seems to be insistent in his execution.
Decision: Eight Amendment prohibits the state from
inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is
insane. Whether its aim be to protect the condemn from
fear and pain without comfort of understanding or to
36
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of

exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds
enforcement in the eight amendment. Fords allegation of
insanity in his Habeas Corpus petition if proved, therefore,
would bar his execution. A related flaw in Florida
procedure is the denial of any opportunity to challenge or
impeach the state appointed psychiatrists opinion. Perhaps
the most striking defect in the procedure is the state
emplacement of the decision wholly within the executive
branch. Under this procedure, the person who appoints the
expert and ultimately decides whether the state will be able
to carry out the sentence that it has long sought is the
governor whose subordinates have been responsible for
initiating the very stage of prosecution of the condemned
from arrest to sentencing
Decision: The traditional made of exercising the courts

coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent
stenographer in contempt f court if he does not comply
with the order for the transcription of his notes and
transfer, promotion, resignation, clearance of stenographer
until he completes the transcription of his notes.
Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another or the condition of
one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment
and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is
paid or not.
D. Imprisonment for debt
B. The death penalty
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of

a poll tax.
1. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601

January 19, 1999
2. Sura vs. Martin, 26 SCRA 286 (1969)
Facts: Echegaray was charged and convicted of rape and

was sentenced to death by lethal injection. He filed a
supplemental motion alleging that the death sentence by
lethal injection is cruel and inhuman.
Decision: Punishment is cruel when they involved torture
or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word used in the
Constitution. It implies there is something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than mere extinguishment of
life.
C. Involuntary servitude
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except
as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.
2. Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1979)
Facts: Petitioner is a temporary stenographer who was later
on incarcerated and compelled by the court to transcribe
his notes
Facts: Respondent was ordered by the court to give

support to his child in a judgment rendered on a civil case.
Failing to comply, he was declared in contempt and was
imprisoned.
Decision: The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of
Martin, Sr. for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the
judgment were illegal in view of the following
consideration: (1) the judgment ordering Martin, Sr. to pay
pass and future support at 100/month was final disposition
of the case and was declaratory of the obligation of Martin,
Sr. The writ of execution issued on the judgment with
respect to past support in the amount of about 6,000
required the sheriff or another proper officer to whom it is
directed to satisfy the amount of all property, real and
personal, of the judgment debtor in manner specified in
Rule 39 Section 15 of ROC, the writ of execution
therefore, a direct order to sheriff or other officer to whom
it is directed and not order to the judgment debtor. In view
thereof the judgment therefore cannot in the very nature of
things have committed disobedience to the writ. (2) the
Sheriffs return shows that the judgment debtor is
insolvent. Hence, the orders of January 9 and February 1,
1965, in effect authorize his imprisonment for debt in
violation of the Constitution
37
3. People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726 (1992)
2. Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970)
Facts: Lim was charged for violation of BP 22, when the

check he issued was dishonored and failed to pay such
amount as owned
Facts: Kay Villegas, who claims to be a duly recognized

and existing non-profit corporation which impugns Section
8 of RA 6132 on the ground that it is an ex post facto law.
Decision: Although memorandum check may carry with it

the understanding that it is not to be presented at the bank
but will be redeemed by the maker itself when the loan
falls due, with the promulgation of BP 22, such
understanding or private arrangement may no longer
prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the
law. To require that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of check be first look and thereafter exempt such
issuance from punitive provision of BP 22 on the basis of
such agreement and understanding will frustrate the very
purpose for which the law was enacted to stem the
proliferation of an unfunded check.
Decision: An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes

criminal an at done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was,
when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, that
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of right for something
which when done is lawful; (6) deprives a person accused
of a crime of some lawful protection to which has become
entitled such as the protection of former conviction or
acquittal or proclamation of amnesty. Form the aforesaid
definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws,
the constitutional prohibition refers only to criminal laws
which are given retroactive effect. While it is true that sec
18 penalizes a violation of any provision of RA 6132
including Sec 8 (a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for
acts committed after the approval of the law and not those
perpetrated prior thereto
4. In Re: Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No.

154037, April 30, 2003
Facts: Petitioners (tenants) were arrested and imprisoned
by virtue of a warrant which stemmed from motion to
declare them guilty of indirect contempt for not complying
on a court order directing them to pay monthly rentals.
Decision: Constitution expressly prohibits that no person
shall be imprisoned for non-payment of debt. Debt refers
to civil or one not arising from criminal offense. Until and
unless all the means have been resorted to and failed,
imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for
civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts.
E. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder
Ex Post Facto Law- a statute which makes an act an
offense when it was not punishable when committed or
aggravates the seriousness of a crime, prescribes a greater
punishment and alters the rules of evidence to easily
convict an accused.
Bill of Attainder- is essentially a bill which convicts a
person without a trial
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
3. People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)

Facts: Accused was charged with subversion under RA
1700 which is being assailed as in a form of bill of
attainder,
Decision: A bill of attainder is legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. History in
perspective, bills of attainder which employs to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against
this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The
singling out of a definite class, the imposition of burden on
it, a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a
bill of attainder. Herein, when the anti-subversion act is
view in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not
specify the communist party of the Philippines or the
members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it
38
does is simply to declare a party to be an organize

conspiracy for the overthrow of the government for the
purpose of prohibition, stated in sec 4 against membership
in the outlaw organization. The term communist party of
the Philippines is use solely for definitional purposes, in
fact, the act applies not only to the communist party of the
Philippines but also to any other organization having the
same purpose and their successors. Its focus is not on
individuals but on conducts.
wanted for the prosecution of an offense or a crime which

was already committed or consummated at the time the
Treaty was ratified.
4. People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241 (1992)
REQUISITES:
Facts: Paredes is being charged under BP 195 for offenses

done by him when he was still the provincial attorney.
Decision: BP 195 which was approved on 16 March 1982,
amending sec 11 of RA 3019 by increasing from 10 to 15
years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of
violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices, may not be
given retroactive application the crime which was
committed by Paredes in January 1976, for it would be
prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of
substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive
period under section 11, RA 3019 which was an essential
element of the crime at the time he committed it. To apply
BP 195 to Paredes will make it an ex post facto law for it
would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making
him criminally liable for a crime that had already been
extinguished under the law existing when it was
committed.
5. Wright vs. CA, 235 SCRA 341 (1994)
Facts: Wright was subjected to an extradition by virtue of
the Treaty entered into by the Philippines.
Decision: Applying the constitutional principle, the court
has held that the prohibition applies only to the criminal
legislation which affects the substantial right of the
accused. This being so, there is absolutely no merit in
petitioners contention that the ruling of the lower court
sustaining the Treatys retroactive application with respect
to offenses committed prior to the Treatys coming in
force and in effect violates the constitutions prohibition
against ex post facto laws. Here, the Treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons
F. Double Jeopardy
Is a right which prohibits a person from being put twice in
danger of conviction. It suggests that the state or a private
person has only one chance to put a person in danger of
conviction.
(1) There must be a valid complaint or information

(2) Filed before a competent court
(3) Defendant had pleaded to the charge (arraignment)
(4) The defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
2. Rule 117, Sec. 7
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double
jeopardy.When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar
to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following instances:
39
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts

arising from the same act or omission constituting the
former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known
or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the
former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended
party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies
or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be
credited with the same in the event of conviction for the
graver offense. (7a)
3. Rule 120, Sec. 5
When an offense includes or is included in another.An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter. (5a)
G. Elements
1. People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 (1968)
Facts: Accused was charged with rape of one Erlinda
Dollente in the rice field. He was arraigned and his counsel
filed a motion to quash the information. It was granted but
the State later on revived the case. Accused invoke double
jeopardy.
Decision: The Dismissal was upon the instance of the
accused, and bars him from subsequently interposing the
defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new
prosecution for the same offense.
NOTE: In this case the doctrine of Waiver and Estoppel
applies, the sine quanon conditions are: (1) The dismissal
must be sought or induced by defendant personally or
through his counsel, (2) such dismissal must not be on the
merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
H. Subsequent prosecution barred; Exceptions

1. Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1959)
Facts: accused was charged with frustrated homicide. He
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Later on, the victim
died and the prosecution sought to amend the information
to homicide. Accused invoked double jeopardy.
Decision: The rule of Identity does not apply. The second
(homicide) did not exist yet at the time of first prosecution
for the simple reason that in such a case there is no
possibility for the accused during the first prosecution to
be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
2. People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
Facts: Yorac was charged with slight physical injury. He
was convicted and was already serving his sentence when
new information was filed against him as there is a new
medical findings (on the victim) leading him to a more
serious commission of an offense.
Decision: A defendant in a criminal case should be
adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left
alone in peace, in a latter case, the state being precluded
from taking an appeal. It is in that sense that the right
against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as
possessing many features in common with rules of finality
in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that the
matter is closed, enabling him to plan his future
accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to
mention saving him both he and the state from the
expenses incident to redundant litigation.
3. Heirs of Rillorta vs. Firme, 157 SCRA 518 (1988)
Facts: Accused inflicted skin-deep wound in victim. The
Doctors performed exploratory surgery on the victim, as a
result, the latter developed pneumonia and died. The
accused was convicted of slight physical injury with civil
indemnity of P 500.00. Heirs appealed for more indemnity.
Decision: There is no double jeopardy as the appeal is not
for conviction but on damages. However civil indemnity
must be limited to the amount of the crime found by the
trial court to have been committed.
40
4. People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586 (1982)

Facts: Accused was charged with murder (by bombing an
apartment), he pleaded not guilty and was convicted.
Another victim filed a criminal case against him, he
invoked double jeopardy.
Decision: But the more untenable aspect of the postion of
Milflores is that when he invoked the defense of double
jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy had not
yet been completed or even begun. It is settled
jurisprudence in the court that the mere filling of two
information or complains charging the same offense does
not yet afford the accuse, in those cases the occasion to
complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the
same offense, for the simple reason that the primary
defense of double jeopardy is that the accused had already
been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the
same has been terminated without his consent.
5. People vs. Judge Vergara, 221 SCRA 560 (1993)
jeopardy if he is again tried for the same offense for which

he has been convicted, acquitted, or in any manner in
which the indictment against him was dismissed without
his consent. Herein, there was a valid complaint filed
against her to which she pleaded not guilty. The court
dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution
without Tupaz consent. This consent cannot be implied or
presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no
doubt as to the accuseds conformity. As Petronilias
consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case
must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the refilling
of the case.
I. Jurisdiction of Courts
1. People v. Bocar , 138 SCRA 166 (1985)
Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of theft. He
pleaded not guilty and the judge dismissed the case on the
ground that it was more civil than criminal
Decision: The conditions for a valid defense of double

jeopardy were present in this case: (1) first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first.
Decision: To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three

requisites must be present: (1) A first jeopardy must have
attached prior to a second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be
for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. The lower court was not competent as it was,
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of
prosecution to due process, in effect the first jeopardy was
never terminated, and the remand of criminal case for
further hearing and or trial before the lower courts
amounts to merely a continuation of a first jeopardy and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
6. Tupaz v. Ulep, G.R. No. 127777, October 1, 1999
2. Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)
Facts: Petitioner was charged for non payment of

deficiency corporate income tax. She pleaded not guilty
and later on, at the instance of the prosecution, the judge
dismissed the case. It was however being revived so she
invoked her right against double jeopardy.
Facts: All 26 accused for the assassination of Aquino were

acquitted. The question posed in this case is whether or not
even after their acquittal, they can still be prosecuted on
account of new evidence that the proceedings leading to
such acquittal was rigged.
Decision: The reinstatement of information would expose

Tupaz to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double
Decision: The unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26

accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang
Facts: Frustrated murder was filed against accused. They

were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Prosecuting fiscal
however suspended the hearing and a reinvestigation was
resolved in their favor. Later on, fiscal moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of the result of the
reinvestigation. Sec of Justice however refiled the
information of frustrated murder where accused pleaded
not guilty. He moved to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy.
41
conference would accomplished the two principal

objectives of the satisfaction of the public clamor for the
suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them
true trial acquittal, the legal shield of double jeopardy. The
Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict
and travesty of justice to stand unrectified, and declared a
sham trial a mock trial and that a predetermined judgment
of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. It is settled
doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this court setting aside the trial courts judgment of
dismissal of acquittal were the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. The cardinal precept is that, where there is a
violation of a basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
of their jurisdiction.
3. People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 (1988)
Facts: Accused was charged with estafa, he peladed not
guilty. Later, the judge dismissed trhe case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
Decision: A dismissal of subject criminal cases by a judge,
predicated on his lack of jurisdiction is correctible by
certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and
not an error judgment on the merits. Well settled is the rule
that questions covering jurisdictional matter may be
averred in a petition of certiorari, exclusive of whatever
order of the trial court null and void. The present petition
for certiorari seeking to set aside the void decision of the
judge does not place the accused in double jeopardy for the
same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned
judgment was not adjudication on the merits. It was
dismissal upon the judges erroneous conclusion that his
court had no territorial jurisdiction over the cases. Where
an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the
merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case
based on the same offense. The dismissal being null and
void, the proceedings before the trial court may not be said
to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no
second proceeding which will subject the accused to a
double jeopardy.
4. People vs. Judge Santiago, 174 SCRA 143 (1989)
Facts: Accused was charged with violation PD 772. Upon
arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. At preconference was
held, Rosario informed the court that she has the title for
the land and a building permit, the judge immediately
acquitted her.
Decision: No doubt, the acquittal of accused is nullity for
want of due process. The prosecution was not given the
opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the
representation of the accused. The prosecution is as much
entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case.
Hence, double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to
another prosecution in this case. There is double jeopardy
only when: (1) there is a valid complaint or information;
(2) Filed before a competent court; (3) to which defendant
had pleaded; (4) of which he been previously been
convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed or
terminated without his express consent. In fine,
prosecution was deprived of opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case. The decision that was rendered in disregard
of such imperative is void for lack of jurisdiction. It was
not a court of competent jurisdiction when it precipitately
rendered a jurisdiction of acquittal after a pre-trial.
J. Identity of Acts
1. People vs . Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
Facts: accused was found in possession of devices and
contraptions being installed to decrease the reading of
electric current. He was charged under a municiap
ordinance and was acquitted. Another case was filed
against him for violation of RPC constituting the same act;
he invoked double jeopardy
Decision: Thus, where the offenses charged are penalized
either by different sections of the same statute, or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the
identity of offense charged: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only when an identity
is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged. In contrast where one offense is charged
under a municipal or ordinance while the other is
penalized by statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of
the acts which the accused is said to have committed and
which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available so long as the acts which constitute or have given
rights to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are
42
the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the

offense charged under a statute.
identity of element in two offenses, otherwise stated,

prosecution for the same act is not prohibited, what is
forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.
K. Identity of Offenses
1. People vs. City Court, 154 SCRA 175 (1987)
Facts: Gonzales was charged under RA 3060 and similar
prosecution under Article 201 of the RPC. He invoked
right against double jeopardy
Decision: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of
double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3)
the first jeopardy must be for the second offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or a frustration thereof. All these
requisites do not exist in this case. The two information
with which the accused was charged, do not make out only
one offense. In other words, the offense defined in section
7 of RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion features
not duly passed by the Board of censors for motion
features does not include or is not included in the offense
defined in article 201 (3) of the revised penal code
punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion
features.
2. Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 (1990)
Facts: Petitioner was charged with 9 criminal ases for
violation of BP 22 and separately, for the crime if estafa
under RPC. He invoked the right against double jeopardy.
Decision: Nierras is charged with two distinct and separate
offenses, first under section 1 of BP 22 and second under
article 315 2-d (of the revised penal code). Deceit and
damage are essential element in article 315 2-d RPC but
are not required in BP 22. While the filing of two sets of
information under the provision od BP 22 and under the
provision of RPC, on estafa may refer to indentical acts
committed by Neirras. The prosecution thereof cannot be
limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may
give rise to multiplicity of offense and variance of
difference between the elements of an offense in one law
and another law, there will be no double jeopardy because
what the law on double jeopardy prohibits refers to
L. Military Court Proceedings

1. Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988)
Facts: Accused was charged under martial law and was
under the jurisdiction of military courts. Martial law
ceased and a new information was filed against him
involving the same case.
Decision: No breach of constitutional prohibition against
twice putting an accused in jeopardy or punishment for the
same offense would result from retrial of the petitioners
cases, for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction
of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners
prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous
proceedings are required in order that the defense of
double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second
prosecution. In fine, the court holds that the merits of
indictment against all these civilians are solely for the civil
courts to way and decide upon after due proceedings.
Otherwise stated, they are entitled to the retrial they have
explicitly requested of their respected cases in the civil
courts.
2. Tan v. Barrios, October 18, 1990
Facts: Tan was charged and convicted of murder. Upon
abolition of military tribunal, a new case was set before
him involving the same offense.
Decision: The doctrine of operative facts applies to the
proceedings against et al and their co-accused before the
military commission. The principle of absolute invalidty of
the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians would
not be allowed to obliterate the operative fact that in the
right particular case of Tan et al, the proceedings were fail,
that there were no serious violation of their constitutional
right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of military
commission that heard and decided the charges against
them during the period of martial law had been affirmed
by SC years before the Olaguers case arose and came
before the SC. Because of this established operative facts,
refilling of information against Tan will place them in
double jeopardy in hard fact, if not constitutional logic.
43
M. Right to Speedy Trial
N. Administrative & Criminal Proceedings
1. Que vs. Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 (1989)
1. Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377 (1992)
Facts: Accused was charged with estafa. Because of

continuous scheduling of the trial on her case, her counsel
moved to dismissed on the ground of seedy trial. It was
granted. Later, the case was revived; she invoked the right
against double jeopardy.
Facts: Upon dismissal of his administrative case before

SC, another complaint for graft was instituted against him
before Sandiganbayan. He invoked double jeopardy.
Decision: The requisites that must concur for legal

jeopardy to attached are: (1) there is a valid complaint or
information; (2) Filed before a competent court; (3) to
which defendant had pleaded; (4) of which he been
previously been convicted or acquitted or which was
dismissed or terminated without his express consent of the
accused. The Fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case.
The case was dismissed upon motion and with the express
consent of the accused. The accused invoked their
constitutional right to a speedy trial when the prosecution
refused to present evidence until the court had ruled on the
motion for inhibition. It was on their oral motion that the
lower court ordered the case to be dismissed. For double
jeopardy to attached, the general rule is that the dismissal
of the case should be without the express consent of the
accused.
2. Caes vs. IAC, 179 SCRA 54 (1989)
Facts: Accused was charged with illegal possession of
marijuana. The witnesses, not appearing on trial, the judge
provisionally dismissed the cases. Later, it is being
revived.
Decision: The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases
against Caes was described by the trial judge as
provision did not change the nature of the dismissal. AS
it was based on the lack of interest of the prosecutor and
the consequent delay on the trials of the cases, it was final
and operates as an acquittal of the accused on the merits.
No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes expressly
concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent is
not enough, neither may it be lightly inferred from the
presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the
allege waiver of Constitutional right
Decision: After a closer look at the records of the case, the

court is of the view that the view that the distinction
between administrative and criminal proceeding must be
upheld and that the prosecution in one is not a bar to the
other. It is therefore, for the Sandiganbayan to hold that
double jeopardy does not apply to present controversy
because the SC case was administrative in character while
the Sandiganbayan case is criminal in nature.
O. Plea of Guilt to Lesser Offense
1. People vs. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246 (1992)
Facts: Accused was charged for violation of RA 6425.
Accused plead not guilty and trial ensued. Later, accused
would want to change his plea from not guilty to guilty to
lesser offense. Judge approved such motion while the
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration
Decision: The accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to lesser offense, regardless of whether or not
it is necessarily included in the rim charged, o is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the information pr complaint is
necessary. A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent
to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of
double jeopardy. However, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty to a lesser offense under the rule is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a
matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of
a trial court. Herein, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a
lesser offense after the prosecution has already rested its
case.
44
IX. PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus.
1. Art. II, Sec. 15
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected
with, invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it.
2. Art. VII, Sec. 18
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
3. Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919)

Facts: City mayor of Manila detained several prostitutes to
stop evil vices in the city. Without their consent, they were
sent to Davao where they were given work as laborers. A
Writ of Habeas Corpus was applied for their immediate
return.
Decision: The forcible taking of these women from Manila
by officials of that city, who handed them over to the other
parties, who deposited them in distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively
as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they
pleased. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded. Both on reason and authority, than not one of the
defenses offered by the respondents constituted a
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
4. Moncupa vs. Ponce Enrile, 141 SCRA 223 (1986)
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four

hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The
Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
Facts: Moncupa was arrested and detained in suspicion of

being a member of NDF. The prosecution however found
out his non involvement to such group hence he was not
charged with Subversion but only illegal possession of
firearms. He filed an application for Habeas Corpus but he
was temporarily release subject to some conditions
imposed to him by the government.
Decision: The essential objet and purpose of the writ of
Habeas Corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraints as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
the person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will prelude freedom of action is sufficient.
Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present
45
denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely

involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of
subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail
themselves of the privilege of the writ
5. Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971)
Facts: Because of the bombing incident in plaza Miranda
which cost the lives of many LP candidates, President
Marcos suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus for the
persons presently detained including petitioner.
Decision: For the valid suspension of the writ: (a) the must
be invasion, insurrection and rebellion; and (b) public
safety require the suspension. There are no doubts about
the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly
risen arms to overthrow the government and thus have
been and still are engaged in rebellion against the
government of the Philippines. NPA is a proof of the
existence of rebellion of which establishment is in the
nature of public challenge to the duly constituted
authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war. The
suspension then is required by public safety
6. Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 420 (1971)
Facts: Chavez stood as an ordinary witness in a criminal
case of theft of motor vehicle. The accused however were
acquitted and he was implicated to the commission and
later on conviction on the crime charged. He filed an
application for Habeas Corpus
Decision: The course which Chavez took is correct.
Habeas Corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accuseds constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. The void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of Habeas Corpus.
The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final.
For the writ of Habeas Corpus as an extraordinary remedy
must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person

whose liberty is at stake
7. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 663 (1968)
Facts: Accused was charged with complex crime of
rebellion with murder. Upon his plea of guilty, he was
convicted. He already served 13 years of imprisonment
when the SC declared that he cannot be convicted of
complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., as there is no
such crime. A Habeas Corpus was applied for his release
Decision: The writ of Habeas Corpus latitudinarian scope
to assure the illegality of restraint and detention be avoided
is one of the truism of the law. It is not known as the writ
of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on Judges the
grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any
legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom.
Unless there be such showing, the confinement must
thereby cease. Once deprivation of Constitutional right is
shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and Habeas Corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.
8. In re Abadilla, 156 SCRA 92 (1987)
Facts: Accused was suspected as one o the leaders of the
group who took over GMA television and broadcasting
facilities. He was arrested, detained and was dropped out
of the official roll of AFP. He was charged with mutiny
and an application for Habeas Corpus was filed in his
behalf.
Decision: The record of the case discloses that Colonel
Abadilla has been charged by the military authorities for
violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition) which
is a serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets
have been prepared against him. The important issue in
this Petition has been resolved - the detention of Colonel
Abadilla under the circumstances obtaining in this case is
not illegal
9. Norberto Feria vs. CA, et al. G.R. 122954, Feb. 15,
2000
Facts: Losing the records of his case because of fire, Feria
filed a petition for Habeas Corpus questioning his
continuous confinement
46
Decision: Herein, based on the records and the hearing

conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on
record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which
serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made
judicial admissions; both verbal and written that he was
charged. Since the public officials have sufficiently shown
good grounds for the detention, Ferias release from
confinement is not warranted.
10. Illusorio v. Bildner, G.R. 139789, May 12, 2000
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is

the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had
transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for
such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief
as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner
Facts: This case is an application for Habeas Corpus to

compel the husband to live with the wife in a conjugal
bliss
XI. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Decision: To justify the grant of petition, the restraint of

liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be
actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. Herein,
there was no actual effective detention or deprivation of
Illusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the
writ
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of

expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.
NOTE: Why is the Writ of Habeas Corpus considered the

great writ of liberty? Because it can be directed even
against a private person.
X. WRIT OF AMPARO
1. Roxas v GMA, G.R. 189155
Facts: Petitoner was abducted by several heavily armed
men. She was confined and tortured in a detention. She
filed writ of Habeas data and writ of Amparo
Decision: The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.
The writ operates to protect a persons right to control
information regarding himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by
the court, in order to address specific violations or threats
of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
1. Art. III, Sec. 4
2. I d., Sec. 18 (1)

No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
A. Purpose
1. United States vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918)
Facts: An allegation of malfeasance in office was charged
against Justice Punsalan in a written affidavit executed by
herein respondent. AS a result, they were charged with
libel.
Decision: The interest of society and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of public affair.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men
is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of
its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuage with the bond of a
clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thinskinned with reference to comment upon his official acts;
only thus, can the intelligence and dignity of individual be
exalted. Of course, criticism, does not authorize
defamation, nevertheless, as the individual is less than the
state, so mush expected criticism be borne for the common
good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials to
47
the chief executive, to the legislature, to the judiciary, to

any or all agencies of the governmentpublic opinion
should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.
The guarantees of free speech and free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct.
would-be critics of official conduct ,ay be deterred from

voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true
and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether
it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having
to do so.
2. Burgos vs. Chief Of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
B. Restrictions
Facts: A warrant was issued to search and seized WE

Forum Newspaper Publication on the ground of PD 885
which authorizes the sequestration of the property of
person engaged in subversive activities against the govt.
Printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles in printing and publication and
distribution of said newspaper were seized
1. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969)
Decision: The premises searched were the business and

printing offices of the Metropolitan mail and We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises of the metropolitan mail and WE Forum
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of Burgos et als freedom to
express themselves in print. Thus state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free alert
and eve n militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
3. New York Times vs. Sulliven, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
Facts: Respondent in this case filed a complaint against the
four individual petitioners herein for an alleged libelous
article printed against him and his honor as Commissioner
of Alabama. The issue presented in this case is whether or
not an allegation against official conduct should be
supported by actual facts to free persons from liabilities of
libel.
Decision: Allowance of the defense of truth, with the
burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that
only false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting
this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the
difficulties af adducing legal proofs that the elleged libel
was true in all its factual particulars. Under such-a rule,
Facts: RA 4880 prohibits too early nomination of

candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity.
Decision: The scope of the curtailment to which freedom
of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed b the
recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil, the debasement of electoral process.
The majority of the court is of the belief that the ban of the
solicitation of undertaking or any campaign propaganda,
whether irectly or indirectly, by an individual, the making
speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding
interview for or against the election for any part or
candidate for public office.
2. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989)
Facts: Gonzales allegedly made contumacious acts or
statements in a pleading filed before the court and in his
statements given to the media.
Decision: Balancing of Interest Test- requires a court to
take a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay
of interest observable in a given situation or type of
situation. The Court believes that the statements made by
Gonzales are of such nature and were made in such a
manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is
the authority of the SC to confront and prevent a
substantive evil consisting not only of the obstruction of a
free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of a broader evil of the degradation of the
judicial system of a country and the destruction of
standards of professional conduct required from members
of the bar and officers of the courts.
48
3. Sanidad vs. COMELEC, G.R. 90878, January 29, 1990

Facts: RA 6766 was enacted which prohibits columnist to
use a column or TV/radio to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues. This was assailed by the petitioner
invoking the right to expression.
Decision: Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern
and importance. The right of the people to be informed and
to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would
be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of
the issue, including the forum. The people affected by the
issues presented in the plebiscite should not be unduly
burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. No reason advanced by
COMELEC to justify such abridgement.
4. Reno v. ACLU, D-96-511, June 26, 1997
Facts: Communications Decency Act protects minors from
harmful material on the internet and penalizes knowing
transmission of obscene and indecent messages to any
recipient under 18 years of age. It was questioned for
being vague.
Decision: The vagueness of the Communications Decency
Act is a matter of special concern for two reasons: (1) the
CDA is content based regulation of speech. The vagueness
of such regulation raises special First Amendment concern
because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. (2)
CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium
and stigma of criminal conviction, the CDA threatens
violators with penalties including up to two years in prison
for each act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions
may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than
communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas and
images.
5. Miriam College v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127930,
December 15, 2000
Facts: Students were disciplined for a publication of an
article which attracted a complaint from a grade 5 Ateneo
Student.
Decision: The right of the student to free speech in school
premises, however, is not absolute. The right to free
speech must always be applied in light of the special
characteristic of school environment. Consistent with

jurisprudence, section 7 of the Campus Journalism act, if
read to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a
student solely on the basis of article he or she has written,
except such article materially disrupt class work or involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
Further the power of school to investigate is an adjunct of
its power to suspend or expel. It is necessary, corollary to
the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning.
C. Freedom of Expression, Libel and National Security
1. Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
Facts: Accused was charged with libel after putting
pictures of one Cruz in his publication.
Decision: A libel was defined as a malicious defamation
expressd either in writing, printing or by signs or features
or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is
dead, or to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or
publish the alleged natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby exposing him to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule. No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in
the guise of punitive action visited in what otherwise could
be characterized as libel whatever in the form of printed
words, or defamatory imputation, resulting from the
publication of Cruz feature with the offensive caption as
in complain.
2. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
Facts: Johnson burned the American flag while doing his
protest on the government. He was charged with
desecration of venerated object,
Decision: Johnsons expressive conduct does not fall
within that small class of fighting words that are likely to
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby
cause a breach of the peace. No reasonable on looker
would have regarded Johnsons generalized expression of
dissatisfaction with the policies of federal government as a
direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fistic
acts. Forbidding criminal punishment for conduct such as
Johnsons will not endanger the special role played by our
flag or the feelings it inspires. Nobody can suppose that
49
this gesture of an unknown man will change our nations

attitude towards its flag.
3. Borjal v. CA., 301 SCRA 1 (1999)
measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires

which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a
likely threat to the administration of justice.
2. People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265 (1939)
Facts: Petitioners were charged with libel after publishing

an article alleging an anomalous activity involving one
Wenceslao, Director of FNCLT
Decision: Fair commentaries on matter of public interest
are privilege and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that
while in general, every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
until his guilt is judicially prove, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when a
discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person, in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that the discreditable imputation to a
public official must be actionable, it must a false allegation
of fact and comment based on false presupposition. If
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably inferred from the
facts. There is no denying that the question article dealt
with matters of public interest. Reading of the imputation
of Borjal against Wenseslao shows that all these
necessarily bore upon the latters conduct and his moral
and mental fitness as executive director of FNCLT
D. Freedom of Expression and the Administration of
Justice
1. Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152
Facts: Herein petitioner was a party an ejectment case. He
wrote a letter to the office of the President of which
language undermines the reputation and independence of
the courts.
Decision: The freedom of speech and Press should not be
impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the
utterance in question is serious and imminent to the
administration of justice. A judge may not hold in
contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends
to make him unpopular or to belittle him. The vehemence
of language concerning a judge decision is not alone a
Facts: A letter involving a pending case of robbery-in-band

was sent to the office of the president and was published in
a column which appears to be derogatory to the reputation
of the court.
Decision: Newspaper publication tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding
constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the court. The rule is otherwise after the
cause is ended. It must, however, clearly appear that such
publication do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
administration of justice before the author of publication
should be held for contempt. What is this sought to be
shielded against the influence o newspaper comments is
the all important duty of the court to administer justice in
the decision of a pending case.
3. Nestle Phils. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987)
Facts: Respondents kept on picketing at the SCs premises
for a redress of the case pending before it.
Decision: The right to petition is conceded to be an
inherent right of the citizen under all fee government.
However, such right, natural and inherent though it may
be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of
propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. The acts of
the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of the court, but equally a violation of the right of
the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Still, the
individual cited, who are non lawyers are not
knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive and
adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the right of
free speech and assembly are protected by the constitution,
any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice
constitutes contempt of court.
50
E. Freedom of Expression, Movie Censorship,

Obscenity and the Right to Privacy
3. Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong, 160 SCRA 861

(1988)
1. Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katikbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)
Facts: Petitioner would film the event on 1986 EDSA.

Enrile however, refused his character to be presented in the
film as it violates his right to privacy.
Facts: Board of Review for Motion Pictures and TV

classified the movie, Kapit sa Patalim For adults Only
and impose the conditions to edit the material to allow it a
General Patronage.
Decision: The test to determine whether freedom of
expression may be limited is the clear and present danger
of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a
right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but
also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared
may be traced to the expression complained of. There is a
requirement of it being well-nigh inevitable. The basic
postulate therefore, is that where the movies, theatrical
productions, radio scripts, TV programs, and other such
media of expression are concerned,--included as they are
in clear proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest.
2. Lagunzad vs. Sotto, Vda. De Gonzales 92 SCRA 476
(1979)
Facts: Newspaperman Lagunzad began the production of
the movie The Moises Padilla Story under the name of
his own business outfit.
Decision: Herein, the interests observable are the right to
privacy asserted by Sotto vda Gonzales and the right of
Freedom of Expression invoked by Lagunzad. Taking into
account the interplay between those interests, the court
holds that under the particular circumstances presented,
and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
Agreement entered into by Lagunzad, the validity of such
agreement needs to be upheld particularly because the
limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon the matters of essentially private
concern.
Decision: The subject matter of The Four Day

Revolution relates to the non-bloody change of
government that took place at EDSA, and the train of
events which led to that denouement. Clearly, such subject
matter is one of public interest and concern, and also of
international interest. The subject relates to a highly
critical stage in this history of this country and as such,
must be regarded as having passed into the public domain
and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression
and coverage by any form of mass media. The four day
Revolution is not principally about, nor is it focused upon
the man, Juan Ponce Enrile; but it is compelled, if it is to
be historical, to refer to the role played by Enrile in the
precipitating and the constituent events of the change
environment in February 1986
4. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
Facts: Petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor for selling
brochures displaying sexual organs and other materials
which convey the message of sexual intercourse.
Decision: The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and (c) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
F. Radio Broadcasts
1. Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Dans, 137
SCRA 247 (1985)
Facts: Radio Station DYRE was closed on the ground that
it is used to incite people to sedition.
Decision: Radio broadcasting, more than other forms of
communications, receives the most limited protection from
51
the free expression clause, because: First. Broadcast media

have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives
of all citizens. Material presented over the airwaves
confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy
of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible
to children. Bookstores and motion pictures may be
prohibited from making certain materials available to
children, but the same effectivity cannot be done I radio
television, where the listener or viewer is constantly
turning in and out,
XI. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
1. Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948)
Facts: An ordinance was issued by Municipality of Manila
that before a rally can be conducted in Plaza Miranda; a
permit first must be sought and be approved by the Mayor.
Decision: The provision of said ordinance is construed to
mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to
refuse or to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in
issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or
public places where the parade or procession may pass or
the meeting may be held.
2. Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
Facts: A request to conduct rally at Plaza Miranda was
sought. Instead, the mayor offered the Sunken Garden
Instead.
Decision: Experiences in connection with the present
assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the courts
believing that Mayors appraisal that a public rally at Plaza
Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Garden as he
suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of
public disorders and breaches of peace, criminal acts, and
even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies and
petitioner has manifested that it has no means of
preventing such disorder. Consequently, every time that
such assemblies are announced, the community is placed
in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed
early and employees dismissed, store fronts boarded up,
classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the
general detriment of the public.
3. Ignacio vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)

Facts: A request to conduct a rally was sent by Jehovahs
Witness group in Zambales. Respondent Mayor prevented
them from using the public plaza to conduct the same.
Decision: The power exercised by Mayor Ela cannot be
considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the
peculiar circumstances. It appears that the public plaza is
located at the short distance from RC Church. It cannot be
said that Ignacio et al were denied their constitutional right
to assemble for, as was said that the tenets of Ignacio et
als congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman
Catholic Church, a factor which Mayor Ela must have
considered in denying their request.
4. J.B.I. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
Facts: Petitioners sought permission to conduct a rally
before the US embassy.
Decision: The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right (expression and to peaceably
assemble) so fundamental to the maintenance of a
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public
interest. There can be no legal objection absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace
rally would start; neither can there be any valid objection
to the use of the streets to the gates of US Embassy, hardly
two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard
5. Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233 (1983)
Facts: A permit to conduct a prayer rally was sought by
petitioner. The case involves the jurisprudence on the duty
of the applicant to determine whether a permit has already
been issued before seeking a relief from the court.
Decision: A party desirous of exercising the right to
peaceably assemble should be the one most interested in
ascertaining the action taken on the request for a permit.
Necessarily, after a reasonable time, or, if the day and time
was designated for the decision on the request, such party
or his representative should be at the office of the public
official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the
52
decision reached, whether adverse or favorable should be

sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not
be waste if time and effort not only for the litigants but
likewise of a court from which redress is sought in case of
a denial r modification of a request for a permit
6. Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
Facts: A student concerted activity was conducted. Classes
were disruptive and as a consequence, petitioners were
suspended for one year.
Decision: Conduct of students, in class, or out of it, which
for any reasonwhether it stems from time, place, or type
of behaviormaterially disrupts classwork, or involves
substantial disorder, or invasion of the rights of others, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech. There was a violation of the terms of
the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that
specified. Moreover, it was continued longer than the
period allowed. The university could thus, take
disciplinary actions.
7. Arreza vs. GAUF, 137 SCRA 94 (1985)
Facts: Petitioners are student leaders who lead a
demonstration in their University. They were not allowed
to enroll.
Decision: If the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances
extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose,
that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the
timid diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and
dogmatic. They would be ineffective of during a rally they
speak in a guarded and judicious language of the academe.
At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take
into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity
of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They
may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but
with the activity taking place in the school premises and
during daytime, no clear and present danger of public
order is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking
of disciplinary action for conduct materially disrupts class
work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights
of others.
8. German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985)

Facts: Petitioners rally were interrupted and stopped by
respondents from proceeding to JP Laurel Street, Manila.
Decision: The restriction is reasonable as it is designated
to protect the life of the President, his family and other
government officials and is necessary to maintain the
smooth functioning of the Executive Branch of
Government.
9. Acosta v. CA and CSC GR 132088 Jun 28, 2000
Facts: Petitioners were charged with grave misconduct for
participating is mass action against the government and for
not complying with the order to return to work.
Decision: It is not the exercise by Acosta et al of their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such
right which resulted in the temporary stoppage pr
disruption of public service and classes in various public
schools in Manila. For indeed, there are efficient and nondisruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question,
whereby Acosta et al could petition the government for
redress of grievances. It bears stressing that suspension of
public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail
services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the
right to strike is denied to government employees
XII. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
1. Art. III, Sec. 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
2. Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Facts: The office of the city mayor requested to examine
criminal docket records of municipal court of Taal,
Batangas but respondent Judge refused.
53
Decision: There can be no realistic perception by the

public of the nations problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision-making if they are denied access of
information of general interest. Information is needed to
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of the time.
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied

only by persons who are eligible. Public officers are at all
times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities
for their respective positions
3. Tanada vs. Tuvera, supra
Facts: Cong Garcia requested to have access to the records

of the Board of Investment on original and amended
applications for registration, as petrochemical
manufacturer, of Bataan Petrochemical Corporation
Facts: Several PDs were challenged to be unconstitutional

as they were not published before they were given effect.
Decision: Non publication offends due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern them. They would be punished by the
law, no because of failure to comply to it but because they
did not know of its existence. Publication is required
because people are deemed to know the Law.
4. Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
Facts: Petitioner requested to have access to GSIS records
which pertain to behest loans secured by Imelda Marcos in
favor of certain members of opposition in Batasang
Pambansa.
Decision: The right to privacy is purely personal in nature
and may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is
claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, that
the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if
they choose to invoked their right to privacy, considering
the public officer they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that
because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those who
are holding responsible postions in the government, enjoy
a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny
5. Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Facts: Petitioner is requesting for the information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
Decision: Public Office, being a public trust, it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
6. Garcia vs. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
Decision: When BOI approved BPCs application to

establish its petrochemical plant in Bataan, the inhabitants
of the province, particularly the affected community in
Limay, and Garcia as the duly elected representative of the
2nd district of Bataan acquired interest in the project which
they have a right to protect. Garcias request for Xerox
copies of certain documents filed by BP together with its
original application, and its amended application for
registration with BOI, may not be denied as it is
constitutional right of a citizen to have access to
information on matters of public concern
XIII. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
1. Art. III, Sec. 8
The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
2. Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 2
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security
of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
3. Occena vs. COMELEC, 127 SCRA 404 (1985)
Facts: The Brgy Election Act of 1982 bans on the
intervention of political parties in the election of barangay
officials. Petitioner seeks that section 4 and 33 thereof be
54
declared unconstitutional as they are violative of the right

to form association and societies for purposes not contrary
to law.
Decision: The right to form associations and societies for
purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute nor
illimitable; it is always subject to pervasive and dominant
power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or
curtailed to serve appropriate and important public interest.
Examining Section 4 of Brgy Act of 1982, the right to
organize is intact. Political Parties may freely be formed,
although there is restriction on their activities, i.e., their
intervention in the election of Brgy officials. But the ban is
narrow and not total. It operates only on the concerted or
group action of political parties. Memebrs of political and
kindred organizations, acting individually may intervene in
Brgy election.
4. In re Edillon, 84 SCRA (1979)
Facts: Edillion is a licensed Attorney who refuses to pay
his membership dues to IBP alleging that doing such will
deprive him of his liberty and property as he is personally
antagonistic about IBP.
Decision: Bar integration does not compel lawyers to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend
the meetings of his integrated Bar chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The SC, in order to further the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost improving he profession in this
fashion be shared by the subject beneficiaries of the
regulatory programthe lawyers. Assuming that the
questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be
a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
5.Board of Directors of Rotary Intl v. Rotary Club, 481
U.S. 537 (1987)
Facts: A law was passed allowing the inclusion of women
as members Rotary Club. Respondent sought to enjoin
petitioner from enjoining it as it is alleged to be violative
of their right to association.
Decision: The evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting

women to Rotary Clubs will affect in significant way the
existing members ability to carry out their various
purposes. By opening membership to leading business and
professional women in the community, Rotary Clubs are
likely to obtain a more representative cross section of
community leaders with a broadened capacity for service.
XIV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art. III, Sec. 5
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
A. Non-establishment Clause: Operation of Sectarian
schools
Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2)
Educational institutions, other than those established by
religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely
by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may,
however, require increased Filipino equity participation in
all educational institutions.
B. Religions instruction in Public schools
1. Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3)
At the option expressed in writing by the parents or
guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their
children or wards in public elementary and high schools
within the regular class hours by instructors designated or
approved by the religious authorities of the religion to
which the children or wards belong, without additional
cost to the Government
55
C. Anti-evolution laws
Epperson vs. Arkansas, 33 U.S. 27 (1968)
Facts: The Arkansas Law prohibited the instruction that
man, by evolution, came from lower animals and that
allows the violator to be dismissed from work.
school day. Those who would not want to participate will

be excused upon written request of parents. This was
questioned by herein respondent.
D. Prayer and Bible reading in public schools
Decision: Applying the establishment clause principles in

case, the states are requiring the selection and reading the
opening the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and
recitation of the Lord s Prayer by the students in unison.
These exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular
activities of students who are required by law to attend to
school. They are held in the school building under the
supervision and with the participation of teachers
employed in those schools. Such an opening exercise is a
religious ceremony and was not intended by the state to be
so and thus, the exercises and the law requiring them are in
violation of the establishment clause. Nor are these
required exercises mitigated by the fact that individual
students may absent the services upon parental request.
For the fact furnishes no defense to claim of
unconstitutionality under the establishment clause.
1. Engel vs. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
3. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
Facts: The NY law adopted the practice of reciting the

Regents prayer in public schools to be said aloud in the
presence of the teacher.
Facts: Kentucky Statute requires the posting of Ten

Commandments in public schools.
Decision: The States undoubted right to prescribe the

curtticulum for its public schools does not carry with it the
right to prohibit on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching
of scientific theory or doctrine where the prohibition is
based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment.
Arkansas law cannot be defended for its neutrality.
Arkansas did not seek to exercise from the curricula of its
schools and universities all discussion of the origin of man.
The laws effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a
particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the
Biblical account, literally read.
Decision: There can be no doubt that NY program of daily

classroom invocation of Gods blessings as prescribed in
the Regents prayer is a religious activity. It is a solemn
avowal of the Divine faith and supplications for the
blessings of the almighty. The nature of such a prayer has
always been religious. There can be no doubt that NYs
state prayer program officially established the religious
belief embodied in the Regents prayer. The argument to
the contrary, which is largely based upon the contention
that the Regents prayer is non-denominational and the fact
that the program does not require all pupils to recite the
prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain silent
or be excused from the room, ignores the essential nature
of the programs constitutional defect.
2. Abington Schools Dist. vs. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1973)
Facts: A law passed which requires public schools to read
Holy Scriptures (without comment) at the opening of the
Decision: Kentucky statute requiring the posting if the Ten

Commandments in public school rooms has no secular
legislative purpose and is therefore unconstitutional. The
pre-eminent purpose for positing the Ten Commandments
on school room walls is plainly religious in nature. The
Ten Commandments are undeniably a cared text in the
Jewish and Christian Faiths, and no legislative recitation of
a supposed secular purpose and blind us to the fact. The
Ten Commandments do not confine themselves to
arguably secular matters, such as honoring ones parents,
killing or murder, adultery, stealing, false witness, and
covetousness. Rather, the first part of the Ten
Commandments concerns the religious duties of believers;
Worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not
using the Lords name in vain, and observing the Sabbath
day.
56
E. Tax exemption
Art. VI, Sec. 28 (3)
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
F. Pubic aid to religion
1. Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
2. Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937)
Facts: Director of Posts announced that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the city of manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church.
Decision: Herein the issuance of the postage stamps was
not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor particular
church or religious denomination. The stamps were not
issued and sold for the benefit of Roman Catholic nor were
money delivered from the sale of the stamps given to the
church. The purpose of issuing the stamps was to take
advantage of an event considered of international
importance, to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people and to attract more tourists to country. Thus,
instead of showing Catholic chalice the stamp contained a
map of the Philippines, the location of the city of Manila
and inscription that reads: Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, February 3-7, 1937. Thus, while the
issuance and sale of the stamp may be said to be
inseparable link with the event of religious character, the
resulting propaganda relieved by the Roman Catholic
Church was not the aim and purpose of government. The

government should not embarrass in each activities simply
because of incidental result. More or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could
legitimately be undertake by appropriate legislation, the
main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination
to mere incidental results not contemplated.
3. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
Facts: A law in Minnesota permits state tax payers to claim
a deduction from gross income for certain expenses
incurred in educating their children. The law was
questioned as it would apply to 95% of students who are in
sectarian schools.
Decision: The deduction is available for educational
expenses incurred by all parents including those whose
children attend public schools, and those whose children
attend non-sectarian public school or sectarian public
school. The states provision of a forum neutrally available
to a broad class of non-religiosu as well as religious
speakers does not confer any imprimatur of state approval .
So here the provision of benefit so broad a spectrum of
groups is an important index of secular effect. Although
the establishment clause extends beyond prohibition of
state church or payment of state funds to one or more
churches, its prohibition does not extend to the type of tax
deduction established by Minnesota. The historic purposes
of the clause simply do not encompass the sort of
attenuated financial benefit ultimately controlled by the
private churches of individual parents. That eventually
flows to parochial from the neutrally available tax benefit
at issue.
4. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Facts: A law was pass which authorizes state officials to
supplement the salaries of teachers of secular subjects. It
further allows reimbursement on materials used for secular
instruction but excluding those who teach religious
subjects in its scope.
Decision: Three such tests may be gleaned from cases.
First, the statute must have secular legislative purpose,
second, its principal or primary effect must be one which
neither advances no inhibits religion; finally, the statute
57
must not foster an excessive government entanglement

with religion. Inquiry into legislative purposes of the
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statute afford no basis for
conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance
religion. On the contrary, the statutes themselves clearly
state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the
secular education in all school covered by the compulsory
attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the
legislature meant anything else. A state always has
legitimate concern for maintaining minimum standard in
all schools it allows to operate. As there is nothing here
which undermines the stated legislative intent, it must
therefore be accorded appropriate deference. Still, it
should be determined whether the government
entanglement with religion is excessive. The state provides
a resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority. Herein, both statutes foster an
impermissible degree of entanglement.
5. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
Facts: Respondents children were required in school to
attend regular prayer services and meditations. He filed a
complaint to restrain the schools from indoctrinating his
children.
Decision: Three tests must be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have secular legislative purpose.
Second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. Finally, the statute
must not foster an excessive government, entanglement
with religion. It is the first of the three criteria that is most
plainly implicated by this case. No consideration of the
second and third criteria is necessary of the statute does
not have a clearly secular purpose. For even though a
statute which is motivated in part by religious purpose may
satisfy the first criterion, the First Amendment requires
that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated
by a purpose to advance a religion. In applying the purpose
test, it is appropriate to us whether governments actual
purpose is to enforce or disapprove of religion. Herein, the
answer to the question is dispositive for the record not only
provides us with an unambiguous affirmative answer but it
also reveals that the enactment of 16-1-20.1 was not
motivated by any clearly secular purpose.
6. Islamic Da wah Counsil v. Executive Secretary, G.R.

No. 153888, July 9, 2003
Facts: Office of Muslim Affairs was created under an
Executive Order and was given authority to issue
certificates halal certificates. It warned consumers on
buying foods designated to be halal by NGOs like that of
Petitioner.
Decision: By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify
food products as halal, the Executive order encroached
upon the religious freedom of Muslim Organizations like
IDCP to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products
are fit for Muslim consumption. Aslo, by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing hala certifications, the state has in
effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of
the Quran and Sunnah on halal Food. There is no
compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslims of their religious right to classify food products
as halal, even on the premise the health of the Muslim
Filipino can be effectively protected by assigning the
OMA the exclusive power to issue hala certificate
G. Intramural religious disputes
Fonacier vs. CA, 96 Phil. 417 (1955)
Facts: IFI was divided into faction as a result of
petitioners dismissal as Obispo Maximo. The church
required him to surrender all documents and properties
under his custody while he was yet in office.
Decision: Where a decision of an ecclesiastical court
plainly violates the law, it professes to administer, or is in
conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed
by the civil courts, in some instances, not only have the
civil t courts assumed the right to inquire on the decisions
of religious tribunal and the regularity of their procedure
but they have subjected their decisions to the test of
fairness or to the test furnished by the constitution and
laws of the church. Thus it has been held that expulsion of
member without notice and without opportunity to be
heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a
property right is involved. Where there is Schism which
leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies,
the right of such bodies to use of the property must be
determined by ordinary principles which govern voluntary
58
association. If the principle of the government in such

cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority
of members must control the right to use of the property. If
there be within the congregation officers in whom are
vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere
in the acknowledged organism by which the body is
governed is entitled to use of the property. The minority, in
choosing to separate themselves into distinct body and
refusing to recognize the authority of the government
body, can claim no right in the property from the fact that
they had been once members of the church or
congregation.
H. Free Exercise Clause
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006
Facts: Escritor is a stenographer of a court whose moral
standing as a court official is questioned due to her act of
living together with a man not her husband. She claimed
that such setting is condoned in her church and that
because of the pledge of faithfulness which she sworn, she
cannot be living an immoral life as far as her religion is
concerned.
Decision: The government should be given opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold
in opposing Escritors s stance that her conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes
within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the
court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected
by the Free Exercise Clause, the courts action would be
an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. The court cannot therefore simply take a passing
look at Escritors claim of religious freedom, but must
instead apply the compelling state interests test.
I. Flag salute
1. West Virginia Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943)
Facts: West Virginia Legislature required all schools to
conduct flag ceremonies saluting the flag and refusing to
do such is deemed insubordination. Respondent and other
citizens who are members of the religious sect called
Jehovahs Witness filed a complaint against said Act.
Decision: The power of compulsion is invoked without

any allegation that remaining passive during the flag salute
ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify
an effort, even to muffle expression. To sustain the
compulsory flag salute, the court is required to say that a
Bill of Rights which guards the individuals right to speak
his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel
him to utter what is not his mind. If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exemption, they do not now occur to the court. The action
of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control
2. Ebralinag v. Division Superintended (March 1, 1993)
Facts: Several students who are members of the religious
set, Jehovahs witness were expelled from school for not
saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting
the patriotic pledge because of their religious conviction
that doing such is an act of idolatry.
Decision: The sole justification for a prior restraint or
limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
exercise of a grave and present danger of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the state has a right and duty to prevent.
Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the
students from the schools is justified. By exempting JW
from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and
reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious which
admittedly comprises a small portion of the school
population will not shake up our part of the globe and
suddenly produce a nation untaught and inculcated in and
unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of
country and admiration for national heroes
59
J. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines

1. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 181 Phil.
386 (1957)
Facts: City of Manila wanting to impose tax upon ABS for
selling bibles and religious paraphernalia as the latter is
being alleged to have been earning in such endeavor.
Decision: To impose tax upon ABS is to impair religious
freedom and the freedom to propagate religious ideas as
imposing tax will result to raising the prices of religious
materials and make difficult the means for the people to
acquire the same.
2. Swaggart Ministries v. Cal Bd. Of Equalization, 493
U.S. 378 (1990)
Facts: Petitioner is a religious organization incorporated as
a non profit corporation. It engages in selling religious
books, tapes and records and other religious merchandise.
A tax was demanded from them under the California Sales
and Use Tax Law.
religious faith to associate with work union. He later on

received a notice of dismissal.
Decision: What the exemption provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or
coerced to join labor unions even when said labor unions
have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in
spite any close shop agreement, members of said religious
sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from
their jobs on sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the
said act, far from infringing the constitutional provision of
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does
not prohibit said members of religious sects from
affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members
the liberty and the power to affilliate , or not to affiliate,
with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious faith,
they refuse to sign up, they can do so, the law does not
coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit the, from
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union
compel them to join.
L. Disqualification for local government officials
Decision: The Free-Exercise clause withdraws from

legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any
restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to
secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any
invasions thereof by civil authority. Indeed a regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless
offend the constitutional requirement for government
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.
The free exercise inquiry asks whether the government has
placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief o practice and, if so, whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies the burden. (In this case, the
tax imposed is not a precondition in disseminating
religious message)
Pamil vs. Teleron 367 U.S. 488 (1961)

Facts: Father Margarito Gonzaga was elected to the
position of municipal mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. He
was duly proclaimed but a quo warranto was filed by
petitioner to challenged his eligibility as the
Administrative Code prohibits an ecclesiastic to be elected
as municipal officer.
Decision: The challenged Administrative code Provision,
certainly insofar as it declares ineligible to any elective or
appointive office, is on its face, inconsistent with the
religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so
exclude them is to impose religious test.
K. Exemption from Union shop
M. Religious Test
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54

(1974)
Torcaso vs. Watkins 367 U.S. 488 (1961)
Facts: Petitioner is a member of INC. He is a member of a

Labor Union which has a closed shop provision that
membership in union is a condition for employment. He
resigned from being a member as it is prohibit in his
Facts: Tocaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public

by the governor of Maryland but was refused a omission to
serve because he would not declare his belief in God,
60
Decision: The fact that a person is not compelled to hold

public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him
from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the
Constitution. This Maryland religious test for public office
unconstitutional invades Torcasos freedom of belief and
religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed

beyond the reach of the court.
XV. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
Contentions: 1. to bar former President Marcos and his

family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them
not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their
country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution
and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the
Constitution; 2. The President has no power to bar a
Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily; and 3. There is no basis for barring
the return of the family of former President Marcos
1. Art. III, Sec. 6

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
2. Salonga vs. Hermosa, 97 SCRA 121 (1989)
Facts: Petitioner for the second time seeks relief from the
SC to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of
eligibility to travel.
Decision: The travel processing center should exercise the
utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens
desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel
could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. It goes
without saying that petition for such certificate of
eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to
facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer
as to person desiring to travel being in any way responsible
for any delay.
3. Manotoc vs. CA. 142 SCRA 149 (1986)
Facts: Accused was charged with estafa and was allowed
to bail in the amount of P105, 000. While at provisional
liberty he filed a motion for permission to leave the
country on the ground of business transactions.
Decision: A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon Manotoc to make
himself available at all times whenever the court required
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. If the Accused were allowed to leave the
4. Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

Facts: President Aquino bans the return of Marcoses as it
claimed to be a threat to public security.
Decision: President has residual power to ban the return of

Marcos as it post threat to national security.
5. Silverio vs. CA, G.R . no. 94284 April 8, 1991
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20
of the Revised Securities Act, a criminal charge. A hold
departure was ordered against him and cancellation of
passport.
Decision: Article III. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
should by in mo means be construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the courts to use all means necessary to
carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending
before them. When by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court officer. Herein Silverio is facing
criminal charge, He has posted bail but has violated the
conditions thereof by failing to appear before the court
when required. Warrants of his arrest have been issued.
Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if
an accused were allowed to leave or to remain, at his
pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country.
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of
the courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines
must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.
61
6. Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 end.

Facts: Petitioner filed an application for Habeas Corpus
questioning the validity of his confinement to San Lazaro
Hospital because of his leprosy disease.
Decision: The methods provided for the control of leprosy
plainly constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will
be taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to
be an infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted
with it to be shunned and excluded from society, and that
compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing
the spread of disease is supported by high scientific
authority. Upon this view, laws for the segregation of
lepers have been provided a world over. Similarly, a local
legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease
and has authorized measures to control the dread scourge.

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1

Decision: Subversion and Rebellion are continuing offense

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

Facts: Accused was observed 2 meters away by a police

B. Art. 125, Revised Penal Code

Decision: An offense was committed in the presence or

Delay in the delivery of detained persons in the proper

2. People v. Luisito Go, G.R. No. 116001, March 14, 2001

3. People v Racho, G.R. No. 186529 (2010)

2. People v. Sinoc, 275 SCRA 357 (1997)

Facts: Accused was arrested after going down from the

A company car was car napped and its driver and

Decision: We refused to validate the warrantless search

Decision: The Police officers were aware that an offense

E. Personal Knowledge of the Offense

3. People v. Baula, G.R. No. 132671, November 15, 2000

1. People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993)

Facts: A victim was killed by one of the drunkards. Police

Accused was charged with murder of one Blache by

Decision: Police officers lack personal knowledge of the

1. People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992)

1. People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 (1993)

Facts: Accused was arrested without warrant in a buy bust

Facts: A buy bust operation was conducted. When officers

Decision: Since the place was under surveillance, the

Decision: Even if the marked money was found in him,

2. Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 586 (1992)

Facts: Victim was raped many times in different parts of

Facts: An intelligence report indicates that accused will be

Decision: One day after the crime has been committed

Decision: The head of a team cannot for himself decide

NOTE: Effects of an Illegal warrantless arrest:

the charge against him, provided that he raises them before

Decision: The prohibition against wire tapping extends to

J. Effect of Entry of Plea

Facts: Police officers opened and inspected the letter of a

1. People v. Plana G.R. No. 128285, November 27, 2001

3. Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005

Decision: Detained persons right to privacy is less than

1. In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)

Decision: Herein, the communication denounced as

3. People v. Aruta, G.R. 120915, April 3, 1998

5. Waterhouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.

III. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL

Facts: Employee was charged with estafa as her cheats on

1. Art. III, Sec. 12

Decision: The protection against intrusion into private

Waiver to jurisdiction does not include a waiver of

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of

cannot be used against him for having transgressed

the meaning of Miranda. It is undisputed that the first

same. She later on challenged the admissibility of this

as the confrontation between the State and him had not

4. People vs. Piedad, et al., G.R. No. 131923, December 5,

E. Rule under the 1973 Constitution (Voluntary,

F. The Galit Rule

Facts: Accused asked for a lawyer during an interrogation.

Facts: Accused was arrested and interrogated in Bicol, he

Decision: The manner of informing his rights was not

Decision: The Law required that the counsel be competent

4. People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 12793, December 8, 1999

2. People vs. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450 (1994)

Facts: Accused was interviewed before a counsel who was