Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
No. 14-1027
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:08-cv-01157-JFM)
Argued:
Decided:
Affirmed
in
part,
vacated
in
part,
and
remanded
with
instructions by unpublished opinion.
Judge Duncan wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Agee joined.
Judge Harris wrote a
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
KARPINSKI, COLARESI
Appellants.
&
KARP,
P.A.,
Baltimore,
Maryland,
for
the
reasons
that
follow,
we
vacate
the
portion
of
the
of
$250,000
and
remand
for
an
entry
of
an
award
of
I.
We
take
many
of
the
facts
and
much
of
the
procedural
Kane
v.
(unpublished).
Lewis,
483
F.
Appx
816
(4th
Cir.
2012)
are in dispute.
A.
On May 6, 2005, the Officers set out to execute warrants at
408 High Street in Cambridge, Maryland, a residence consisting
of an upstairs apartment and a downstairs apartment.
3
Andrew
Cornish
and
apartment,
Bradrick
Apartment
Cornish
B.
(Brad)
The
occupied
Officers
the
wore
upstairs
clothing
J.A. 534.
The four
J.A.
828-29;
see
also
J.A.
553.
The
downstairs
residents testified that they did not hear the police announce
themselves at Cornishs door.
A door on
the left side of the kitchen led to the living room and master
bedroom.
The door between the kitchen and living room was 16.5
J.A. 243.
A second
entry
into
the
apartment,
Officer
Shorter
headed
left
of
Shorter
apartment
and
towards
Detective
Lewis
the
second
testified
bedroom.
that
they
Officer
shouted
been
in
Cornishs
apartment
for
about
seconds,
the
J.A. 856-57.
J.A. 859.
J.A. 858-59.
kitchen
and
was
unable
to
retreat
further.
At
this
point,
halfway through the doorway between the kitchen and the living
room--in
other
words,
distance
from
his
knife,
still
in
its
sheath,
master
bedroom
was
recovered
from
As relevant here,
the
to
Fourth
knock
Amendment
and
by
announce
using
their
excessive
presence.
force
Kane
and
sought
damages for wrongful death and physical and emotional pain and
suffering.
The Officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that their
actions
were
protected
by
qualified
immunity.
The
Officers
door, thus failing to alert Cornish to the fact that the men
forcefully entering his apartment were police officers.
The district court granted the Officers summary judgment
motion in part and denied it in part.
With
respect to the issues before us, the district court held that
Detective
Lewis
was
entitled
to
qualified
immunity
on
the
could
have
believed
Cornish
presented
denied
summary
judgment
on
Kanes
deadly
The court,
knock-and-announce
rule.
By
order
dated
July
9,
2010,
the
wrongful
death
for
Cornishs
death
itself
otherwise.
conduct
J.A.
79.
constituted
The
court
determined
superseding
cause
of
that
his
Cornishs
death
that
to
resolve
two
questions:
First,
whether
the
Officers
If
the jury determined that they did not, Kane would be entitled to
nominal damages for the violation of Cornishs rights.
Then,
actual
damages
to
Kane
to
compensate
for
Cornishs
April
4,
2011,
the
day
of
trial,
Kane
voluntarily
dismissed with prejudice his 1983 claims for damages for pain,
suffering, and emotional distress.
See
We held that
Id. at 822.
Indeed, we
1983
for
the
violation
of
Cornishs
constitutional
and announce.
precluded
Id.
review
Defendants
the
qualified
Officers
immunity
cross-appeal
defense
would
because
require
the
denying
wrongful
death
damages
or
to
enter
summary
denied
determine
the
whether
request
a
and
set
the
knock-and-announce
case
for
violation
trial
The
to
occurred.
J.A. 83.
On December 7, 2012, the case was reassigned to a different
district court judge 1 and Kane made the same request that the
previous court had denied.
instead of allowing trial to proceed solely on the knock-andannounce issue, the second district court also permitted the
jury to consider the excessive force claim and the claim for
wrongful damages arising from the alleged unlawful entry. 2
J.A.
84.
violation
and
the
district
court
entered
It
held that the excessive force verdict did not conflict with the
knock-and-announce
verdict
because
the
Officers
created
an
district
court
J.A. 1110.
also
denied
the
Officers
qualified
II.
On appeal, the Officers claim that they are liable only for
nominal damages arising out of their failure to properly knock
and announce and that they are entitled to qualified immunity on
by the second district court, nor could it have been at that
point in the case.
10
and
were
focus
the
primary
qualified
of
this
immunity
appeal,
issues
and
because
they
consider
each
argument in turn. 3
As a threshold issue, however, we must first determine the
governing standard of review.
amend the judgment, the denial of which they appeal here, cites
both Rule 50 and Rule 59 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the district court did not identify either authority in its
ruling.
See J.A.
J.A.
763,
contemplated
by
908.
Rule
the
jurys
Officers
verdict--and
filed
this
as
post-
judgment
motion
raising
the
same
arguments.
See
Mem.
Supp.
Defs. Mot. Alter Am. J., Kane, No. 08-cv-01157 (D. Md. Nov. 7,
2013), ECF No. 199-1.
v.
Bartolotta,
150
F.3d
729,
732
(7th
Cir.
See
1998)
district
considering
the
evidence,
that
See
credibility
id. at 173.
of
court
the
determines,
witnesses
or
without
weighing
the
evidence
sufficient
to
favoring
overcome
the
the
[plaintiff]
defense,
is
id.
[not]
legally
(alterations
in
that
were
[Detective]
Cornish
realized
police
Lewis
with
officers
a
and
appreciated
prior
knife.
to
Appellants
that
advancing
Br.
at
the
upon
33-34.
jury
had
sufficient
evidence
to
conclude
that
in
the
take
action
in
supposed
self-defense
and
that
police
officer may view that action as threatening and shoot and kill
him.
awarded
under
1983
for
violations
of
U.S.
247,
asserting
254
(1978)
constitutional
(emphasis
tort
Carey v. Piphus,
added).
under
1983
plaintiff
must
therefore
See Murray
v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2005) (Section 1983 . . .
require[s] a showing of proximate causation, which is evaluated
under the common law standard.); see also Shaw v. Stroud, 13
F.3d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1994) ([T]he causal link in 1983
cases is analogous to proximate cause.).
defendants
are
certainly
responsible
the
natural
335, 344 n.7 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187
(1961))
(internal
quotation
[will]
mark
omitted).
break[]
the
However,
chain
of
[a]
superseding
cause
proximate
causation.
2011); see also Warner v. Orange Cnty. Dept of Prob., 115 F.3d
1068, 1071 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that in cases brought under
1983 a superseding cause, as traditionally understood in common
law
tort
doctrine,
Specifically,
the
will
relieve
subsequent
acts
defendant
of
of
liability).
independent
decision-
liability.
Evans
v.
Chalmers,
703
F.3d
636,
647
(4th
Cir.
2012).
In similar circumstances, the Third Circuit has held that
officers
are
liable
only
for
the
harm
proximately
or
(Alito,
entered
home
are
As
not
such,
officers
liable
for
who
harm
have
unlawfully
produced
by
superseding cause or the harm caused by the officers nontortious, as opposed to . . . tortious, conduct, such as the
use of reasonable force.
Id.
if
disarm
him]
on
the
theory
that
the
illegal
entry
without
Id.
courts
have
also
addressed
1983
causation
in
the
superseding
cause
of
harm
when
it
precipitated
See James
police
deliberate
officer,
attack
on
it
the
was
the
SWAT
suspects
team
[that]
unlawful
and
constitute[d]
125
F.
Appx
(holding
that
the
officers
with
[a]
31,
41
suspects
handgun
(6th
Cir.
actions
are
what
in
led
2005)
(unpublished)
threatening
to
his
injuries
and
death).
Turning to the record, we conclude that no reasonable jury
could have found that the Officers knock-and-announce violation
proximately caused Cornishs death. 6
The
evidence
Kane
presented
at
trial
was
insufficient
to
establish that Cornish did not recognize that the men in his
apartment were police officers, and therefore that the Officers
illegal entry was the legal cause of Cornishs death.
Kane
photo
indicated
confrontation.
J.A.
that
neither
205-06.
Dr.
item
Adams
toppled
during
testified
the
that
he
J.A.
failed
to
show
proximate
17
J.A.
684,
and
that
he
could
not
definitely
conclude
J.A. 697.
as
recognize
he
advanced
them
as
on
the
police. 8
Officers
or
his
Accordingly,
opportunity
Kanes
evidence
to
is
344 n.7.
Moreover, the undisputed evidence establishes that Cornish
must have recognized that the men in his apartment were police
officers.
It
is
undisputed
that
Cornish
was
found
in
the
To reach that
police
officers
in
SWAT
gear
who
were
shouting
their
18
identity. 9
recognized,
Cornish
must
have
known
that
the
men
in
his
J.A.
79.
Unfortunately for Kane, the strategic decision to abandon
his claim for damages for emotional distress Cornish suffered
during
the
period
of
time
between
the
Officers
entry
and
pursue
recovery
for
that
critical
jury,
it
evidentiary
would
basis
which
the
claim
have
for
interval,
been
easier
monetary
for
award
us
other
to
than
find
an
nominal
damages.
Because Cornish must have known that the men were police
officers, yet advanced toward them with a knife, his unlawful
and
deliberate
attack
on
the
[police]
constitute[d]
In other words, the Officers illegal entry was not the legal
cause of Cornishs death; rather, he was killed as a direct
result of trying to stab a police officer.
Id.
Kane
to
is
entitled
only
to
nominal
damages
Accordingly,
vindicate
the
Officers
immunity
next
on
contend
Kanes
that
they
are
knock-and-announce
10
entitled
to
claim.
We
20
disagree. 11
The Officers argue that the jury found that the Officers
knocked and announced their presence at Andrew Cornishs door,
but . . . also determined that the Officers did not properly
wait long enough before entering. 12
clearly
after
established
knocking
and
how
long
announcing
police
their
officers
presence
must
before
wait
forcibly
11
entering
dwelling
to
execute
narcotics
search
warrant,
for
1983
substantiate
claims
unless
violation
(1)
of
the
allegations,
federal
statutory
if
or
that
reasonable
person
would
503,
506
(4th
Cir.
2011)
have
known
his
acts
or
Ridpath
v.
Bd.
of
Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006)).
The
knock-and-announce
rule,
in
the
absence
of
unusual
Therefore,
residents
testified
J.A. 1091.
that
they
not
hear
the
they
used
presented
battering
evidence
that
unbroken.
J.A. 547.
[b]ecause
the
[apartments],
ram
the
breach
glass
the
outside
portion
of
door,
the
door
Kane
was
officers
and
to
synchronized
because
the
walls
their
were
entry
thin,
into
the
both
silence
there
was
sufficient
J.A. 53.
evidence
that
the
Officers
is
clearly
established,
we
reject
the
Officers
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
23
(Cornish)
investigate,
the
lived
in
Cambridge
the
police
upstairs
inspected
apartment.
To
the
of
contents
What
trace
amounts
paraphernalia.
of
marijuana
and
associated
drug
In Cornishs apartment,
their
presence
before
breaking
down
the
than
followed
minute
their
later,
unannounced
in
the
4:30
confusion
a.m.
entry
that
on
door
to
And no
immediately
suspicion
of
24
no
reasonable
jury
could
have
found
that
the
Officers
I.
The tort-law principles that govern this case are a matter
of common ground.
it
was
proximately
caused
by
the
Officers
knock-and-
announce violation.
district
the
court,
and
courts
proximate
cause
instructions
harm
produced
unforeseeable
between
entry
by
intervening
and
superseding
event
ultimate
that
injury.
breaks
See,
cause,
the
e.g.,
or
causal
some
link
Massey
v.
Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 355 (4th Cir. 2014) (analyzing proximate
causation in the Section 1983 context).
Finally and this is the crux of the matter there is
agreement that an attack on the Officers by Cornish, if it were
knowing and deliberate, would constitute just such a superseding
cause
and
thus
Cornishs death.
insulate
the
Officers
from
liability
for
review the case endorsed that premise, and for good reason.
As
this
case
explained:
If
Cornish
knew
that
the
J.A. 53.
Citations
opinion.
to
Maj.
Op.
26
refer
to
the
majority
slip
compelled
such
finding.
The
majority
answers
that
Cornish
must
have
known
that
the
men
were
police
was ample evidence from which a jury could conclude that in the
minute that elapsed after the officers unlawfully broke down his
door and before he was shot, Cornish never realized that he was
confronting the police.
II.
A.
Because we accord the utmost respect to jury verdicts and
tread
gingerly
in
reviewing
them,
party
challenging
the
Bldg.
Corp.
v.
Nat'l
Union
Fire
Ins.
Co.
of
And we cannot
reject
the
jurys
conclusions
simply
because
we
would
have
its
existence.
See
In
re
Neurontin
Mktg.
&
Sales
It
Cornishs
was
up
advance
to
on
the
them
Officers,
was
that
knowing
and
is,
to
prove
that
intentional,
thus
jury
that
could
have
found
28
the
Officers
evidence
was
inconclusive, and that they had failed to prove that Cornish was
aware of their identity before he died. 3
B.
Drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the jurys
verdict, as we must, I can find no reason to second-guess the
jurys judgment on this score.
a.m.
were
police
officers,
and
could
have
died
while
29
the police.
and
announcing,
it
must
be
someone
other
than
the
police.
Certainly there is nothing about the facts of this case
that would have deprived Cornish of the right to rest on that
presumption.
On
decision
to
execute
search
warrant
based
on
All
that matters for this case is that Cornish could have had no
reason to expect such a raid, and that the jury understood as
much.
in
cases
involving
warrants at all.
marijuana
use,
J.A. 81213.
typically
does
not
seek
the jury verdict rests that the Officers failed to knock and
announce their presence before breaking down Cornishs door, as
they were required to do by law and the jury very reasonably
could have concluded that Cornish would have presumed that the
intruders in his home were not the police.
Second, the events in question unfolded so quickly, and
under conditions so conducive to confusion and mistake, that a
jury
readily
could
find
that
Cornish
never
had
chance
to
This
the
cases
cited
by
the
majority. 4
According
to
Officer
J.A. 884.
and presumably asleep, had one minute to wake up, register and
describes,
find
sheathed
knife
and
cross
the
approximately 16 feet between his bedroom and the area near the
front
door,
where
he
was
shot.
Even
under
the
best
of
It
Though the
enough
opportunity
that
to
at
turn
least
on
one
of
flashlight
the
after
Officers
the
took
the
shooting,
and
another testified that he may have been using the light attached
to his gun.
moving
rapidly
and
shouting
loudly,
making
the
situation
of
the
doubt
when
it
comes
to
their
perceptions.
In evaluating
that such situations can be exceptionally confusing and fastmoving, with officers required to make split-second judgments
under suboptimal conditions.
F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2005); Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d
125, 13031 (4th Cir. 2001); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640,
642 (4th Cir. 1996).
According
There is no
reason I can think of that the same jury could not apply the
same standard to Cornish who, unlike the Officers, had the
benefit of neither training nor advance warning when he found
himself caught up in the tumult of a military-style nighttime
raid and assume that Cornish, too, would be unable to exercise
33
But
we
are
not
talking,
of
course,
about
the
These
Officers were clad all in black, for stealth rather than ease of
identification.
testified
that
he,
too,
was
without
helmet,
and
J.A. 554.
The majority also points out that the first district court
to consider this case on the pleadings concluded that Cornish
must have known that the men in his apartment were police
officers.
But surely it is at least as significant that the
second district court the one that presided over the four-day
trial in this case and heard all of the evidence and testimony
came to the opposite conclusion.
See Kane v. Lewis, 989 F.
Supp. 2d 468, 46970 (D. Md. 2013).
34
the
jury
could
patch.
And
infer
the
that
single
he
had
Officer
in
who
mind
the
same
police
testified
that
he
was
by
his
own
entire encounter.
account,
out
J.A. 646.
of
Cornishs
sight
during
the
jury could have concluded that the Officers had not met their
burden of proving that, in the heat of the moment and by the
light of a television, their patches or badges or any other
identifying features would have been visible and recognizable to
Cornish.
Nor, it bears noting, should it be at all surprising that
police officers might find it difficult to convey their identity
in the confusion that inevitably follows an unannounced home
entry.
There is a reason
and
finally,
there
is
the
credibility
of
the
the Officers.
credibility was very much at issue during the trial, given that
the
Officers
never
conceded
the
knock-and-announce
violation
On the
heard
any
noise
at
that
door.
The
district
court
J.A.
1062,
and
we
should
assume,
drawing
all
that
imputing
awareness
of
the
jury
knew
that
Cornish
had
cooperative
and
Officers
J.A. 972.
friendly
J.A. 996.
that
because
the
Officers
failed
to
knock
and
by
law,
Cornish
died
before
he
could
identify
the
exactly
prevent.
what
the
knock-and-announce
rule
is
intended
to
my
mind,
the
jurys
verdict
in
this
case
represents
Amendment
obligation
to
37
announce
themselves
before
would not disturb the jurys verdict in this case, and would
affirm the district courts judgment in full.
38