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No. 97-1967
COUNSEL
ARGUED: H. Brewton Hagood, ROSEN, ROSEN & HAGOOD,
P.A., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Stephen Lynwood
Brown, YOUNG, CLEMENT, RIVERS & TISDALE, L.L.P.,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel F.
Blanchard, III, ROSEN, ROSEN & HAGOOD, P.A., Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Stephen P. Groves, Sr., Edward D.
Buckley, Jr., Duke R. Highfield, YOUNG, CLEMENT, RIVERS &
TISDALE, L.L.P., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
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OPINION
WIDENER, Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2),1 Beaumont Townhomes, Limited Partnership (Beaumont) moved to intervene as of right in a
declaratory judgment action brought in district court by Houston General Insurance Company (Houston General) against Pro-Tech Termite
& Pest Control Company (Pro-Tech), the Estate of Clifford Moore,
Sr., and Clifford Thomas Moore, Jr. Beaumont also sought to set
aside the underlying default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
60(b). The district court denied Beaumont's motion to intervene, thus
rendering the motion to vacate the underlying judgment moot. Denial
of these motions is the sole issue on appeal, and we affirm.
I.
On August 10, 1993, Houston General issued a commercial liabil_________________________________________________________________
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall
be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
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days after the entry of final judgment, there was no pending litigation
in which Beaumont could intervene. Therefore, the motion was
untimely under this circuit's decision in Black . 500 F.2d at 408 (holding that intervention is untimely when the time for appeal has run).
Because we conclude that Beaumont failed to make a timely application to intervene, we need not address whether it meets the other
requirements of Rule 24(a)(2).
III.
Based on our review of the record, we are of opinion that Beaumont's motion to intervene was untimely. Therefore, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Beaumont's motions to intervene and to set aside a final judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of
the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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