CASE 56: Osmena v Pendatun

1. In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to Garcia. In the
said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmea
during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected
to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea avers that
the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman
Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the
matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic
world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
2. Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K.
Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity;
he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his
charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show
cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio Osmea, Jr.,
made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have been hearing of ugly
reports that the government has been selling free things at premium prices. He also claimed that even
pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth,
would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would expose it to
contempt and disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the charges
against the President of the Philippines made by Osmea, Jr. It was authorized to summon him to appear
before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the
production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its
findings before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmea alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other
business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has
intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to
answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without
issuing any preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to
defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such report, the House
approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension and then invited
attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to suspend
one of its members.
Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." The
provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil

actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the
resentment of every one it may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does
not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured, committed to
prison, and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This was the traditional power of legislative
assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. For instance, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices
of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against him, because
after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was
unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules,
which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or
renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are subject to
revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body
when the required number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power
of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly
con duct of business, and as security against hasty action. (Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was censured by the House,
despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct
for which Osmea may be disciplined, the court believed that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows
best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by
the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct
constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. This was
due to the theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this. Each department, it has been said,
had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara
vs. Electoral Commission.)
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member,
the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision.
Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having
taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them
no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of
California declined to interfere:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, due to the Constitution. Every legislative body in which is
vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause
which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to
the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state; That it is a
power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency
which may justify and require its exercise. Given the exercise of the power committed to it, the senate is
supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house, in the exercise of the
power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty
to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found the House of Representatives of the United States
taking the position upon at least two occasions.
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In
1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he
had assaulted another member of that Body. The Senator challenged the validity of the resolution.

Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the
Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the
resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law gave the
Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law
specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member. The Jones Law empowered the Governor
General to appoint Senators. Alejandrino was one.
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without
that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood
to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as
restricted by the Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law
did not give the Senate the power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Now. the
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's Constitution. So that
any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to
jail.
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had
been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the
suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It
would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most probable outcome
of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction.
3. G.R. No. L-17144

28 October 1960

Ponente: Bengzon, J.
FACTS:
Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A Message to
Garcia wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President. Being unable
to produce evidence thereof, Osmea was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the
House of Representatives. Osmea argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned.
ISSUE:
Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING:
Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative shall not be questioned in any other place. Although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself. Observe that they shall not be questioned in any other place in Congress.
4. Nature: Petition for declaratory relief and/or certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Facts:
In a privilege speech before the House of Representatives, Congressman Sergio Osmena from the 2
nd
District of Cebu made
serious imputations of bribery
1
against then President Garcia. A resolution (#59) was then passed that a special committee of 15
members to be appointed by the Speaker shall be tasked to investigate the truth of the charges against
Garcia and for Osmena to
substantiate his charges with evidence (i.e. papers and witnesses) and if he fails to do so, he show cause
why he should not be
punished by the House. However, Osmena refused to comply. He was then suspended for 15 months for
disorderly behavior
. Osmena
then filed this petition to the Supreme Court.
Issue:W/N the House had the power to discipline Osmena with suspension?

Held:
Whether the courts can determine whether personal attack upon the President constitutes disorderly
behavior:
The House is the judge
of what constitutes disorderly behavior not only because the Constitution delegates it but also because
this matter depends on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best and cannot be presented to and adjudicated by the Courts.
The courts will not assume
an appellate jurisdiction, which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the
legislature. The theory of separation
of powers demands a prudent refusal to interfere.
Parliamentary immunity invoked by Osmena:
Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in
Congress, Senators and Members of the House shall not be questioned in any other place. This is
understood to mean that although
members of Congress are exempt from prosecution or civil action for their words uttered in Congress, they
can nevertheless be
questioned in Congress itself. Furthermore, Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House recognizes the
Houses power to hold a
member responsible for words spoken in debate. Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal and civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside the Congressional
hall, however, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress may be
censured committed to prison,
suspended even expelled by the voted of their colleagues.
Whether the House has lost power to question and discipline Osmena as it had taken up other business
before approving Resolution
No. 59:
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and may be waived or disregarded by the legislature. The courts
have no concern
with their observance.
Ruling: The Petition is DISMISSED
CASE 57: Mabanag v Vito
1. Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate
opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23
April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session
of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in
the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution
had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a
consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional
resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made
defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular
Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on
the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation
of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question.
The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the

political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect
to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill
rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to
achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article
XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is
no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of
the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity
of a proposal then into that of ratification.
2. FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower
House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were
not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At
the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the
Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of
the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot
take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of
a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy
in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the
copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case
of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
4. Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23
April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session
of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in
the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution
had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a
consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional
resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made

defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular
Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court ma yinquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on
the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation
of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question.
The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect
to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill
rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to
achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article
XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is
no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of
the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity
of a proposal then into that of a ratification.
2. Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due
to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House
except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not
considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing
amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same
time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution
was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the
furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take
cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of
a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy
in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the
copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the
journals.
CASE 58: Casco v Jimenez
1. 7 SCRA 347 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used
primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the
required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it
maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it

issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General,
who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct
components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin
formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic
Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not
be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed
as urea and formaldehyde. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing
in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill
before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea formaldehyde
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which
is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not
represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive
upon the courts. The enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
2. Facts of the Case:
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber
and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42
in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the
refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank,
dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt
from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said
refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of
section 2 of RA 2609.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.
Held:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product
which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the conjunction and between the terms urea and formaldehyde separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of urea formaldehyde and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the
view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.
3.
by: Rebecca Jordan
Constitutional Law 1
G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC.,
petitioner,
v.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank,

respondents.
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner
Casco Philippine
Chemical Co., Inc.
FACTS:
Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of
synthetic
resin
glues used primarily in the
production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are "urea
and
formaldehyde" which are both being imported
abroad.
Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, The Central Bank issued Circulars fixing a uniform
margin fee of
25% on foreign exchange transactions. The bank also issued memorandum establishing the procedure for
the applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by
R
.A. 2609
.
Petitioners paid the required margin fee with their 2 import transactions. In both of their transactions
through R.A. 2609
they wanted to avail the exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by RA. 2609. Petitioners filed
a refund request
to the Central Bank and the Central Bank issued the vouchers but was not accepted by the Auditor of the
Bank. The refusal
was also affirmed by the Auditor General. The refusal was based on the fact that the separate importation
of "urea
and
formaldehyde" is not in accord with the provisions of R.A. 2609. Becuase section 2 of R.A. 2609 clearly
provides Urea
formaldehyde and not urea and formaldehyde
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as
"urea
and
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction
"and"
between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt
"urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea" formaldehyde",
not the latter as a finished product.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners contentions that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction
"and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde"
RULING:
No, because what is allowed in RA. 2809 is urea formaldehyde, not "urea
and
formaldehyde" , both are different
from each other.
The National Institute of Science and Technology defines urea formaldehyde is the synthetic resin formed
as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature,
acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive
fillers constitutes a
fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished
product, which is
patently distinct and different from urea
and
formaldehyde,
What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled
bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon

the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by
the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers
and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial
decree
5. Casco Philippine Chemicals v. Gimenez
7 SCRA 347
FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the
Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner had bought
foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, raw materials for resin glues, and was
thus paying for the margin fees at that time. Relying on Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the
said bank declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee,
the petitioner sought for a refund of the margin fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee
HELD:
Urea and formaldehyde are not exempt from fees by law. RA 2609 only exempts urea formaldehyde and
not the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde as they are different, the former being a finished
product. The enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts. The
courts cannot speculate that there had been an error I printing of the bill as this shall violate the principle
of separation of powers. Shall there have been any error in the printing, the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by a judicial decree.
6. G.R. No. L-17931

28 February 1963

Ponente: Concepcion, J.
FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2609 (Foreign Exchange margin Fee Law), the Central Bank
of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., a manufacturer of resin glues, had bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde raw materials for the said glues and were thus paying for the
margin fees required.
Relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said bank declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee, the petitioner sought for a refund of the
margin fees that had been paid. This was denied by the Auditor of the said Bank stating that the claim
was not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of R.A. 2609.
ISSUE: Whether urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin
fee
HELD/RULING:
Urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from law.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users. (Emphasis provided.)
Urea formaldehyde is different from urea and formaldehyde, the former being a finished product. It is well
settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President. The courts cannot speculate that there had been an error in the printing of

the bill as this shall violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall there have been any error in the
printing, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
7. Facts: The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise
known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959,
its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No.
1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these
products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts,
the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde
is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069.
Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid
margin fee.
Held: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.
Ratio: It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea
and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
8. Facts: RA 2609 known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. On November and December 1959 Casco Philippine Chemical purchased
urea and formaldehyde, the main ingredients in manufacturing glues, and paid corresponding margin fees.
Casco sought a refund pursuant to Section 2 RA 2609, shall not be imposed urea formaldehyde The
Bank Auditor of Central Bank did not honur the vouchers for refund and was affirmed by the Auditor
General. Respondent contend that urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product and distinctly different
from urea and formaldehyde.
Issue: Whether or not there was error in printing of bill?
Decision: Decision appealed from is affirmed. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation not by judicial decree.
CASE 59: Sampayan v Daza
1. MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al
G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992
Facts:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent
RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the
ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since
October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as permanent
resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by
respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?
Held:
No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for the
reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully
pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against
respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as a de facto public officer, respondent

cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid as
those of a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered.
2. HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests and qualifications of members of Congress
Remedies against a disqualified House of Representative candidate: (1) cancellation of certificate of
candidacy filed with COMELEC before election; (2) quo warranto case filed with HRET after proclamation
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of their
congressional district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that
the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. They also alleged
that Mr. Daza has not by any act or declaration renounced his status as permanent resident thereby
violating the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution (section 18, Article III).
Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the
United States as evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles,
U.S.A, he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is moot and academic for it is
evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the
respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30,
1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral
Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of its members.
The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas
certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House of Electoral Tribunal
within ten days after Dazas proclamation
CASE 60: Abbas v Senate Electoral Tribunal
1. 166 SCRA 651 Political Law The Legislative Department Electoral Tribunals Inhibition in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the
COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the
resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution
of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not
to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is
that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
2. Facts:

This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET
Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal
senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary.
Issue:
WON the SET can function without the Senator members.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the
Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would
stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
3.
Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal 166 SCRA 651 (1988) GR L-33767
ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Facts:
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an electioncontest docketed
as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition whowere proclaimed senators-elect
in the
May 11, 1987 congressional elections by theCommission on Elections.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada butincluding Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunalreplacing Senator Estrada, the latter
having
affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned asthe Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with
the
respondent Tribunal a Motionfor Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the
hearing
andresolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties tosaid case, as
respondents therein.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself fromparticipating in the
hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET CaseNo. 00287 and SET Case No. 00187, the
latter being another contest filed by Augusto'sSanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as
alternative
respondents, citing hispersonal involvement as a party in the two cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the normsof fair play and due
process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and thatthe doctrine of necessity which they
perceive to be the foundation petition of the questionedResolutions does not rule out a solution both
practicable
and constitutionallyunobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of
procedureso
as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring theconcurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is aproviso that where more than four (4)
members
are disqualified, the remaining membersshall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one
(1)
Justice, and mayadopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situationcreated by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leavethe
resolution
of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices ofthis Court, whose disqualification
is not
sought.
Issue:
Whether the proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) is neither unfeasible nor repugnant
to the
Constitution.
Held:
No. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in theplain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, createsthe Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its

composition and defines its jurisdiction andpowers.It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a
Tribunal
to be staffed by both
Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended thatboth those
"judicial' and
'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority ofdeciding all contests relating to the
election,
returns and qualifications of Senators. Therespondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition
when it
held that saidprovision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolvedby a
panel or
body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented."
1
The other part, of course, is that the
constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court
4. Facts: On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest against
22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the exemption of Senator Estrada,
the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing and resolution on the ground
that all of them are interested parties to said case.
Issue: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in the
tribunal?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations of for the substitution of senators designated to the Tribunal. Litigants must simply place their
trust and hopes for the vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Tribunal.
CASE 61: Pimentel v HRET
1. Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal
GR 141489
29 November 2002;
also Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments [GR 141490]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 11 concur, 2 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List
System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular
vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House.
Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe,
Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list
groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka,
Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send
2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also
elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House
constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies.
In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to
occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on
Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the
party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date
of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives
belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two
letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate
President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include
party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its
meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator
Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET
Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this
Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and
Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that
the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of

Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR
141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their
petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted
the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect,
defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was
joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as copetitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement
of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who
may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members
those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the
power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are
reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on
what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the
HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it
appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in
the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list
representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the
predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or
the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives,
the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their
internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
2.
Digest Author: Margreth Rizzini A. Montejo
Pimentel vs House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
GR NO. 141489-90
Petitioner:
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., et. al.
Respondent:
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et. al.
Petition:
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
assailing composition of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Commission of
Appointments
Ponente:
J. Carpio
Date:
November 29, 2002
Facts:
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. This sought to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of

Representatives through a party-list system in pursuant of section2 of the Republic Act

7941.
On 11 May 1998, national elections were held, which included for the first time
the election of party-list group through popular vote. Fourteen representatives were
elected coming from thirteen party-list groups namely APEC, ABA, COOP-NATCO,
AKBAYAN, and ABANSE. Subsequently, the House constituted its
House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Commission of Appointments
contingent by electing representatives to these bodies. It appears that no one from the
party-list group was nominated.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Pimentel wrote two letters to Senate President Ople
as Chairman of
Commission of Appointments
and Justice Melo as chairman of the
House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
to reorganize both bodies in order to include partylist representative in accordance to Sec. 17 and 18 Art. VI of the Constitution.
On 2 February 2000, Petitioners filed a petition in the Supreme Court assailing
that party-list representatives should have at least 1.2 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in
CA. They
assert that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act
positively on Senator Pimentels letter. Hence, they invoked section 11 of Republic Act
7941.
The Solicitor Generals consolidated comment shows that the party-list group only
constitutes 6.36% of the House.
Issues:
!"#$
the composition of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and
&"''($$(") "* +,,"()-'#)-$
violate the Constitutional Requirement of proportional
representation on the ground of the absence of party-list representatives in the said
Constitutional bodies?
Ruling:
No.
The composition of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and
Commission of Appointments is within the prerogative of the House of Representative as
3. Pimentel vs House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal GR No 141489 29 November 2002
Facts: On 03 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect and election on 1998 was held in
accordance to this. Proclaimed winners were fourteen party-list representatives from thirteen
organizations. This was assailed by Senator Pimentel. He contend that party-list representatives should
conform with Article 6 Section 17 18 of the 1987 Constitiution.
Issue: Whether or not Party-list System Act should be null and void?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits to choose from among its members those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the House in Electoral Tribunal.
CASE 62: Sarmiento v Mison
1. 156 SCRA 549 Political Law Appointment of Head of Bureaus Officers Requiring Confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and
Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the
appointment of Mison because it appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus
require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Misons
appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are

vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by
the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison
as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be
confirmed by the COA.
2. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla v. Salvador Mison in his capacity as
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and Guillermo Carague in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987
Padilla, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by
then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is being
questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers,
members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment
is not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment
(COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau"
requires the confirmation from COA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from COA
is valid.
HELD:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that
needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups
whom the President shall appoint:
1

Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls, Officers
of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by the
President that requires approval from the COA and the following instances are those which
does not require approval from COA:
All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
3. Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from
disbursing payments for Misons salaries and emoluments on the ground that Misons appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the constitutionality of
Misons appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the
Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint.
(1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in the Constitution,
(2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and
(4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups are the present

bone of contention.
Issue: Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by the president with or without
the consent/confirmation of the CA
Held: The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers
of the organic law and the people adopting it. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide. The 1935 Constitution requires confirmation by the CA of all
presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar malpractices. Under the 1973
Constitution, the president has the absolute power of appointment with hardly any check on the
legislature. Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution struck a middle-ground by requiring the
consent of the CA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President without such confirmation
the appointments of the other officers. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation on the CA except appointments to
offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, the confirmation on the
appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the CA is not required.
The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the constitutional authority of
the President.
5. Sarmiento v. Mison
156 SCRA 548
FACTS:
In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then President
Corazon Aquino. Petitioners questioned the appointment of Mison as it appears that Misons appointment
was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that under
the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmationd of COA. Sarmiento also seeks to enjoin
Guillermo Carague, then Secretary of the Department of Budget from disbursing salary payments for
Mison.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed the confirmation given by the Commission
on Appointments
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution framers removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers needing confirmation
by COA. There are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These groups are: 1) heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; 2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law; 3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and 4) officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group are the only public
officers appointed by the president which requires the confirmation of COA. The position of Mison does not
belong to the first group, hence, his appointment need not be confirmed by the COA.
6. Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549
F: Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law
professors, to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground
that his appointment, w/o confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional.
HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the Committe on Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com
read:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall
appoint the heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the provision. The first was to
delete the phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and
substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." The first amendment was
intended to exempt the appointment of bureau directors from the requirement of confirmation on the
ground that this position is low and to require confirmation would subject bureau directors to political
influence. On the other hand, the 2nd amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those

mentioned in the frist sentence, namely:

The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in the Consti, i.e.,
(1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]
(2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IX-B, Sec. 1 (2)];
(3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)];
(4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)];
(5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.)
The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all other
officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (2) those whom the Pres.
may be authorized by law to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by
law vest in the Pres. alone.
CASE 63: Guingona v Gonzales

1. Guingona v. Gonzales

G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993

Campos, Jr., J.
Facts:
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators,
3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must
have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDPLABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded
off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the
CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member
of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional
representation.
Issue:
whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the Commission
on Appointments
Held:
It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership
on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal
interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP
majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by
adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership
was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to
less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it
is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD
or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to
come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other
party.
2. Facts: As a result of national elections on May 1992, the Senate was composed by the following by
parties: LDP IS, NPC 5, Lakas 3. Applying the mathematical formula agreed by parties they are
entitled to twelve seats. On the organization of the Senate, Majority Floor Leader Romulo nominated eight
senators for Commission on Appointments. Senator Guingona objected on the nomination of Osmea.
Issue: Whether or not the Constitution requires the election and presence of 12 senators in the
Commission?
Decision: Constitution does not require the election and presence of 12 Senators for the Commission to
function. Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their
functions even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constittion.

3. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Antonio Martin, and Teresita Santos vs. The City Fiscal of Manila, Hon. Jose
Flaminiano, Asst. City Fiscal Felizardo Lota and
Facts:
From March 1979 to March 1981, Clement David made several investments with the National Savings and
Loan Association. On March 21, 1981, the bank was placed under receivership by the Bangko Sentral. Upon
Davids request, petitioners Guingona and Martin issued a joint promissory note, absorbing the obligations
of the bank. On July 17, 1981, they divided the indebtedness. David filed a complaint for estafa and
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations regarding foreign exchange transactions
before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Petitioners filed the herein petition for prohibition and
injunction with a prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the public respondents to proceed with the preliminary investigation on the ground that the
petitioners obligation is civil in nature.
Issue:
(1) Whether the contract between NSLA and David is a contract of depositor a contract of loan, which
answer determines whether the City Fiscal has the jurisdiction to file a case for estafa
(2) Whether there was a violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364
Held:
(1) When private respondent David invested his money on nine. and savings deposits with the aforesaid
bank, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of
deposit. Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan
Association is that of creditor and debtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was
transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited
for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While the Bank has
the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to return or deliver the same
money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited will not constitute
estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it
will only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no jurisdiction.
But even granting that the failure of the bank to pay the time and savings deposits of private respondent
David would constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, nevertheless
any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided, because when the aforesaid bank was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank, petitioners Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation of the bank to
private respondent David, thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual obligation arising
from deposit into a contract of loan and converting the original trust relation between the bank and private
respondent David into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners and private respondent.
Consequently, the failure of the bank or petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the deposits of private
respondent would not constitute a breach of trust but would merely be a failure to pay the obligation as a
debtor. Moreover, while it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may however,
prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in
court. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioners Guingona and Martin executed a promissory
note on June 17, 1981 assuming the obligation of the bank to private respondent David; while the criminal
complaint for estafa was filed on December 23, 1981 with the Office of the City Fiscal. Hence, it is clear
that novation occurred long before the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal.
Consequently, as aforestated, any incipient criminal liability would be avoided but there will still be a civil
liability on the part of petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the assumed obligation.
(2) Petitioner Guingona merely accommodated the request of the Nation Savings and loan Association in
order to clear the bank draft through his dollar account because the bank did not have a dollar account.
Immediately after the bank draft was cleared, petitioner Guingona authorized Nation Savings and Loan
Association to withdraw the same in order to be utilized by the bank for its operations. It is safe to assume
that the U.S. dollars were converted first into Philippine pesos before they were accepted and deposited in
Nation Savings and Loan Association, because the bank is presumed to have followed the ordinary course
of the business which is to accept deposits in Philippine currency only, and that the transaction was regular
and fair, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely civil in nature and that there is no
clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, We hold that the public respondents
acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently, public
respondents should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case to
continue, even if the petitioners could have appealed to the Ministry of Justice, would work great injustice
to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper administration of justice.
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the
House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in
that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the

HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in
the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come
from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version
rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere
matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his
over what has been done.
CASE 64: DELEZ VS COA
See link here - http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/sep1989/gr_83216_1989.html
CASE 65: ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
1. Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so
that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll
call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo
was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House
2. Facts: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing socalled sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were challenged by Representative

Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee after submitting its report to the House, the chairman of the
committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to
move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and put to a vote. The interpellation of the
sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third reading.
Issue: Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum?
Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department of the
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its
own rules of procedure or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when the petitioners can find their remedy in their own department.
3. Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek
a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court
has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body.
In view of what is essential
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.
First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the
act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of
a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the

Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If,
then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present
a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as
this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a
viva voce or nominal voting.
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the
matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has
been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate,
then the voting comes in.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House
has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.
In view of grave abuse
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled
meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned
democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should
turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the
Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves
with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to
reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor
do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case
at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
CASE 66: TOLENTINO VS. SEC. OF FINANCE
1. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on
the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by

Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H.
No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required
by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill
which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that
a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment
of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only
to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means
is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill
in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this
was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed
with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.
2. G.R. No. 115455
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a
mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days
on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient
that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes
in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of
printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
3. Tolentino v Sec. of Finance
Facts:
House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base
and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes)
Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill

Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of the Bill on the same day
Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which eventually
became the EVAT law.
Procedural Issue:
(1) WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti
(2) WoN the Senate bill violated the three readings on separate days requirement of the Consti
(3) WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule.
NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes. After the
passage of EVAT, they were already included. PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided
for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL and that it was inly made after the meeting of the
Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166
Held:
(1) YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the House of Rep, but the revenue
bill which was required to originate from the House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from the Lower
House because they are elected in the district level meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to
the needs of the locality.
Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate. Senate
can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House proposed. The Constitution
does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, so
long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill.
(2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the
requirement not only of printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the Senate accepted
the Pres. certification
(3) No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system and
one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also
in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public utility when the
common good so requires.
One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of pending
legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect in title but
because they might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its existence.
4.
CASE 67: ABAKADA VS. EXEC
1. G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
Facts: Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits these are the
reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted.
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and
Senate Bill No. 1950.
Because of the conflicting provisions of the proposed bills the Senate agreed to the request of the House of
Representatives for a committee conference. The Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate and the House of the Representatives
did.
The President signed into law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act 9337. Before
the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
Among others, Petitioners contend that Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution;
Issue: W/N there is an undue delegation of legislative power
Held: In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5
and 6 which reads as follows: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or(ii) National government
deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %)
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate;41 and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of

authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no
valid objection can be made.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent
upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President.
Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The
use of the word shall connote a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and
is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power
when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
2. Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before
the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the
law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the
new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President,
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of
value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an
abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28
(2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services
which cant be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the
conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding
standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.
Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate,
especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power? NO
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently
and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make
a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable,
and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its
use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one
which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature
has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or

condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of
the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of
any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a
clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether
by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or
the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If
either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit
such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as
the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will
is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and
collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by
Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law.
3. G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA;
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
FACTS:
RA 9337, an act amending certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, is questioned by
petitioners for being unconstitutional. Procedural issues raised by petitioners are the legality of the
bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate
concomitant thereto. Also, an issue was raised with regard to the undue delegation of legislative power to
the President to increase the rate of value-added tax to 12%.
Petitioners also argue that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax,
the 60- month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods exceeding P1,000,000.00, and
the 5% final withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory, and that it
violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 9337 is constitutional
RULING:
Yes. Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits ... these are the
reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court
even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe.
It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an enema, a first-aid
measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor is it turning a deaf ear on the
plight of the masses. But it does not have the panacea for the malady that the law seeks to remedy. As in
other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.
4. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]
[endif]

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition
on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes
a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned
provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been
satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the
Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives,
the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and
franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power
when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has
long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be
levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the States
power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
CASE 68: LIDASAN VS COMELEC
1. Lidasan vs COMELEC GR No L-28089 25 Ocotber 1967
Facts: Republic Act 4790, being disputed, reorganized the barrios in different municipalities of Province of
Lanao del Sur. It came to light later that 2 barrios in the statute are within the boundaries of other
municipalities and that other 10 barrios are parts and parcel of another municipality, all in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. As the statute stood, 12 barrios are transferred to the province of Lanao
del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of
the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation. Comelec, by resolution of September
20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
This triggered the petition for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Petitioner requested
that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelecs resolutions implementing the
same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement that [n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
Decision: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the
bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss
the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details
set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to
or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
Since the petitioner is a qualified voter from the affected barrio, he has every right to become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
2. Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:
[if !supportLists]1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's
resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought
about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan
are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. [endif]Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

unless declared

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
[if !supportLists]1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The
title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The
subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes
the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of
House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in
the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.
[if !supportLists]2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the
bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislators.
[if !supportLists]3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is
bad.
[if !supportLists]4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of
Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without
subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has
a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly

from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and
(2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
[if !supportLists]5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law.
One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to
the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill.
2. Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered
that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law,
COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan
then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not
clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios
from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.
CASE 69: NLU VS SVOC
CASE 70: ARNAULT VS LEON NAZARENO
1. Arnault v. Nazareno
Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid prison.
Denied.
FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and
P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to
Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by
Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the
estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust
company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his
payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate
to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000.
The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National
Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter
part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to
investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution
called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An
intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and
irregularity of the Governments paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only
P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H.
Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and
that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to
the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000
payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave
rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved
a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being
contested in this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the

person to whom he gave the P440,000.

2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to
that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within
the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in
it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is,
that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself
are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not
by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish
for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will
not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness
in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might
thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of
that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of
the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he
knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as
contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since according to the witness
himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance
with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the
name of that person might incriminate him.
2. Facts: On February 27, 1950, the senate adopted a resolution creating a special committee to
investigate on the purchase by the government of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates owned by
Ernest Burt as represented by Jean Arnault.
The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at
the expense of the government.
The special committee called and examined among other witness, Jean Arnault. However, for the latters
refusal to answer some questions propounded on him, the names of the person to whom he gave the
money as well as answer to the pertinent questions in connection therewith, the Senate resolved to
imprison him until such time as he decided to answer relevant questions put to him in connection with the
investigation of a government transaction.
Issue: Whether or not the Senate has the authority to punish petitioner for contempt.
Held: The supreme court affirmed, considering that the questions were pertinent to the pursuance of the
Senate Resolution.
The supreme court also held that the offender could be imprisoned indefinitely by the state, it being a
continuing body, provided that the punishment did not become so long as to violate due process.
3. Arnault v Nazareno digest
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
Ozaeta, J.:
Topic: Legislative inquiry
Facts:
1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact
of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the
Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was
P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity
of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation,
petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused
to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered
his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the

new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who
received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto.
2. It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it
was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue
of the recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. An intriguing
question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the
Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two
estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to
determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
Government.
3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and
that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to
the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which
he himself cashed.
4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:
[if !supportLists]a)
[endif]Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt
for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is
immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the
question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
c) Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person
ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a member for
contempt
YES.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the
power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in
the exercise of that power.
It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material
to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional
right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent
authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his
right under the Constitution.
The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. That power subsists as long as the
Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved.
See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/09/arnault-v-nazareno-gr-no-l-3820digest.html#sthash.UBdx6MuK.dpuf
4. This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of
the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to
reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms
and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional
hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry
in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention
should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.
CASE 71: UNKNOWN
CASE 72: MIGUEL VS. GORDON
1.
CASE 73: JOSE BENGZON JR. VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON
1. G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
[if !supportLists]1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to
the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
[if !supportLists]2.
[endif]By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look
into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners
and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know"
regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
[if !supportLists]3.
[endif]At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony
may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
[if !supportLists]4.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was
beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required
the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO.
[if !supportLists]1.
There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry
to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out
whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection
with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa
Group.
2.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be
"in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to
be compelled to testify against one's self.
3.
The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and inquire
into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been preempted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.
[if !supportLists]4.
Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action including the relevant limitations of the Bill
of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain
silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a
criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled
by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not
in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.
See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/bengzon-v-senate-blue-ribboncommittee.html#sthash.hIVVcBPN.dpuf
2. JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

Facts:
Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the
properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing
probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5.
The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this
petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue
Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them.
Issues:
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or
disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in
aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and
that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed.
Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is
not absolute or without limitation.
3. Bengzon Jr vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee GR No 89914 20 November 1991
Facts: A petition for prohibition was filed to enjoin Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the
petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin
Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group in several corporations. Earlier, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile had
delivered a speech asking the Senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act because of the said purchase.
Issue: Whether or not Senate has authority to conduct inquiry?
Decision: Petition granted. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
4. It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the
Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the
biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet
Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various
government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained
in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to
testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise
refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his
allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an
inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance
and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in
clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,
prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA
No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of
the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of
Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.
CASE 74: PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS
1. PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
110 PHIL 331
GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from such
expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction,
upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction
and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as
contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta,
situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any
important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose
because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and
the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by
its owner to the government.
ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an
expenditure of the government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which
must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of
private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use
public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
2. FACTS: Pascual, in his official capacity as the Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioned for a writ of
certiorari against the dismissal of the case and dissolving of the preliminary injunction held by the Court of
the First Instance. Petitioner prayed for that RA #920 be declared null and void, that the alleged Deed of
Donation made by Zulueta be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner also prayed for an injunction enjoining
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Director of Public Works and Highways and the disbursing
officers of the latter department from making and securing any further release of funds for the said road
project. RA# 920 contained an item appropriating P85,000.00 which the petitioner alleged that it was for
the construction of roads improving the private property of Jose Zuleta, a member of the Senate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA # 920 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not Pascual has the legal capacity or to sue.
HELD:
1. RA #920 is unconstitutional because the Congress is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but public purpose.
2. Pascual has the personality to sue as a taxpayer recognizing the right of the taxpayer to assail the
constitutionality of a legislation appropriating public funds.
3. In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then
governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to
be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The
said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and
approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns
those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the
said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be
restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought,
donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent
donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional
defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be

ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only,
money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged
then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and
void.
CASE 75: GARCIA VS. MATA
1. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works GR No. L-10405,December 29,1960
FACTS:
Ra 920 (An act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an item for the
construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension of Pasig feeder road terminals currently projected and planned
subdivision roads, which were not yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C.
Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal, Pascual, questioned the constitutionality of the item in RA 920, it
being not for a public purpose. The lower court dismissed the petition upon the ground that petitioner may
not contest the legality because the same does not affect him directly. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does petitioner have legal standing to sue?
RULING:
Yes.
It is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury
in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are as many decisions nullifying, at the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds.
Thus, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.
Thus, the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Where the land on which feeder
roads were to be constructed belongs to a private person, an appropriation made by congress for that
purpose is null and void, and a donation to the government made five months after the approval of the Act
does not cure the basic defect of the law.
2. G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960 Ponente: Concepcion, J. Legal Standing Facts: 1. Petitioner was the
governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item providing for an
appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder road in Pasig. The said law was
passed in Congress and approved by the President. 2. The property over which the feeder road will be
constructed is however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The property was to be donated to the local government,
though the donation was made a few months after the appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition
alleged that the said planned feeder road would relieve Zulueta the responsibility of improving the road
which is inside a private subdivision. 3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to
assail the validity of RA 920, due to the public interest involved in the appropriation. However, he does not
have a standing with respect to the donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by said
donation, hence it dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the
petition YES. 1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor of the province of
Rizal which is considered one of the most populated biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers bear
a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the country. 2. Public funds can only be appropriated for a
public purpose. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether it
is used to promote public interest. Moreover, the validity of a stature depends on the powers of the
Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed subsequent
thereto, unless it is an amendment of the organic law. - See more at:
http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/pascual-v-secretary-of-publicworks.html#sthash.BbUkTFaN.dpuf
CASE 76: DEMETRIA VS ALBA
1. Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel
Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the
Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the
said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the

general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the
Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the
GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one
department to another here.
2. G.R. No. 71977 | February 27, 1987 | J. Fernan
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree
of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common
to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon
the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of
legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving
appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held
that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of
duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic
after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which
was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that No law
shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations.
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any
program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether
or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes
the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void,
as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior
in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only
the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.
3. Almario vs Alba case digest (Consti-1 case)
[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:WordDocument> <w:View>Normal</w:View> <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables/> <w:SnapToGridInCell/> <w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/> </w:Compatibility>
<w:BrowserLevel>MicrosoftInternetExplorer4</w:BrowserLevel> </w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif][if
gte mso 10]> <style> /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; msotstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-paddingalt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widoworphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} </style> <![endif]
Amendment to the Constitution
As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984
to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110,
111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4)
separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the
submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (grant as an additional mode of acquiring lands
belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a
social reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection

on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in
Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for
more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the
nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.
HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the
courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or
improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the
people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination. Assuming that a member or some
members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban
land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion
to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes
or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their
desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of
the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that
the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban land reform."
4.
Demetria v Alba
G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with
general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose
vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for. The petitioners
assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec. 44 of PD 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977 with a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The contents of PD 1177 particularly that of the first paragraph of section 44 extends the
privilege of the president to discriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department of any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi and fulfill the requisites for suing as
taxpayers and concerned citizens.
HELD:
The petitioners comply with the legal standing both as concerned citizens and taxpayers.
As concerned citizens, the petitioners bring the suit in quest of law and justice. The issue
cries out to be solved as justice demands not only for the vindication of the outraged
right but also for the guidance of the bench and bar, and as a restraint upon the future.
Furthermore, the petitioner has standing to sue as taxpayer. In the determination of the
degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of
a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers. They have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys.
The Supreme Court granted the instant petition. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177 was also declared null and void for being unconstitutional
CASE 77: GARCES VS. ESTENSO
1. ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San
Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash,
duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of
the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church
during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After
the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to return custody of
the image to the council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were
used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and
posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment
of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the
barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not
allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and
state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.

ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private funds in
connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socioreligious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint
of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the
construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the
"selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular
matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring
the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the
image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image)
cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its
celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery
of the lives of the masses.
2. Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc Citywere passed:a. Resolution No. 5Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of
the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be
obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano
mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would
remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made
available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.These resolutions have been
ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar
of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to
return the image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in
its acquisition.Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case
against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec
18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the image,
therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided
to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
3. GARCES VS. ESTENZO
104 SCRA 510
Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed. These resolutions
have been ratified by 272 voters, and projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in
the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea
refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds
were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the
replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain
Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said
resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article
IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.Issue: Was any freedom of religion clause
in the Constitution violated.Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of
the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal.

Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any
family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that
were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their
right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution , since
private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and
which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church
and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
CASE 78: AGLIPAY VS RUIZ
1. AGLIPAY Vs. RUIZ
G.R. No. L-45459

March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks
the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for
printing
ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
constitutional
HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were
money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter
of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this
country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people
2. Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz,
the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance
and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist and the government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Emphasizing
that, when the Filipino people implored the aid of Divine Providence, they thereby manifested reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded
to religious sects and denominations.
3. Facts of the Case:
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the
City of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay,
the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is
a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were
actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

Held:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage
stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view,
giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would
be advantageous to the Government. Of course, the phrase advantageous to the Government does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not
intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman
Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of
issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great
opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In
evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a
Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that
reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937. In considering these, it is evident
that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
4. Aglipay v. Ruiz - A case digest
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head
of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested
Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced
having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was
sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held / Ruling:
There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage
stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in
issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in
weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap
exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to
costs.
5. G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Laurel, J.:
Facts:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the
fulfilment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member of the Philippine Bar,
to denounce the matter to the President. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of
Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said
stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part remained unsold.
3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section
23, Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in the issuance and selling of the
commemorative postage stamps. It was provided therein that, No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,

denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the principle of separation of
church and state
NO.
1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds
and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. In so far as it instils into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to
religious sects and denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new
designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
the postage stamps in question, still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the
exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be
filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The court resolved to deny the petition for a writ of prohibition.
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/aglipay-v-ruiz-digest.html#sthash.nzK7FyIq.dpuf
CASE 79: ARAULLO VS AQUINO III
1. Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015
POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL REVIEW. We have already said that the
Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but
not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution,
which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law
means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and
instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a
case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled
by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental,
principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of
powers.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; STRICT CONSTRUCTION ON THE ACCUMULATION AND UTILIZATION OF SAVINGS. The
decision of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed
by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the
amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will
also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict
interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits
of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress
power of the purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of
whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices
under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and
unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from
savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to
augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best
intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable
purposes must be carried out through legal methods.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWER TO AUGMENT; CANNOT BE USED TO FUND NON-EXISTENT PROVISION IN
THE GAA. Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity,
purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the
purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set
aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes.

This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of
flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.
CASE 80: Lladoc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue
1. Lladoc vs Commisioner of Internal Revenue (1965)
February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law
.entry-meta

.entry-header
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias,
Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality,m as
intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an
assessment for donees gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and
requested the withdrawal thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as
contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed
on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise
upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The
imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.
2. Lladoc v CIR (1965)
Lladoc v CIR
GR No L-19201, June 16, 1965
FACTS:
In 1957, MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to Reverend Father Ruiz, then parish priest
of Victorias, Negros Occidental for the construction of a new Catholic Church. Under date of April 29, 1960,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment amounting to P 1,370 for donees gift tax
against the Catholic Parish of Victorias. Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment. CIR denied the
protest which was substantially affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
2
3

(1) Whether petitioner should be liable for the assessed donees gift tax on the P10,000 donation;
(2) Who should be called upon to pay the tax?
RULING:
(1) The petitioner is liable. What the Collector assessed was a donees gift tax; the assessment was not on
the properties themselves and is thus, not subject to the exemption in the Constitution. It did not rest upon
general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the
privilege of receiving the properties.
(2) The Head of the Diocese, to which the parish Victorias pertains is liable for the payment thereof.
3. LLadoc v. CIR (14 SCRA 292)
A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter
vivos.
Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin
Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of
a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish
of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax is valid despite the fact that the Constitution provides an
exemptions and that Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation.
Held: Yes, the imposition of the gift tax was valid. Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates
exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished
from Excise taxes. The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a
violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which
on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the
Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being

no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein
must be denied.
4.
JJMO
Case: REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC v. CIR and CTA (14 SCRA 202)
Date: June 16, 1965
Ponente: J. Paredes
Facts:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. in Bacolod City donated P10,000 in case to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the then
parish
priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and the predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the construction
of a new
Catholic Church. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.
On March 1958, M.B. Estate filed a donors gift tax return. Subsequently, on April 1960, the CIR issued an
assessment for donees gift tax in the amount of P1,370 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from
May 1958 to
June 1960 and the compromise for the late filing of the return against the Catholic Parish of Victorias,
Negros Occidental
of which Lladoc was a priest.
Lladoc protested and moved to reconsider but it was denied. He then appealed to the CTA, in his petition
for
review, he claimed that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest, thus, he is not liable.
Moreover, he
asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid,
for such would
be a clear violation of the Constitution. The CTA ruled in favor of the CIR. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
WON donees gift tax should be paid
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation
cemeteries,
churches
and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all
lands
,
buildings
, and
improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes
assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes.
In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the
properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the
properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. Manifestly, gift tax is not within
the
exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax
imposed on
the transfer of property by way of gift
inter vivos
, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for
religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in
the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no
clear,
positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of Lladoc, the exemption herein must be denied.
However, the Court noted the merit of Lladocs claim, and held as liable the Head of Deocese for being the
real
party in interest instead of Lladoc who was held to be not personally liable; the former manifested that it
was submitting
himself to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court and he presented Lladocs brief, by reference, as his
own and for all
purposes
5.
LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA
292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels:

Case Digests
,
Political Law
Facts:
Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City,
donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor
of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in
the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's
gift
tax return
. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue issued an
assessment
for the donee's
gift tax
against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was
the parish priest.
I
ssue:
W
hether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the
fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of
donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have
juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for
religious purpose is valid.
H
eld:
Y
es, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section
22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption
only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as
Property taxes
contra distinguished from Excise taxes The
imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious
purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not
a property by way of gift inter vivos.
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real
party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the
property donated to the church for religious purpose.
LLADOC V CIR & CTA
GR 19201 June 16, 1965 14 SCRA 293
Paredes, J.:
FACTS:
MB Estate of Bacolod City donated Php 10,000 in cash to Fr.
Ruiz, then the Parish Priest of Victorias, who was the
predecessor of petitioner. MB Estate filed their donors gift tax
but petitioner is on protest regarding donees tax claiming
that assessment of gift tax against the Catholic Church is
against the law; that when the donation was made. He was
not yet the parish priest.
ISSUE:
W
hether or not petitioner should be liable for assessed
donees gift tax dontated.
RULING:
A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on
the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the
imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious
purposes, does not constitute an impairment of Constitution
exempt from taxation as employed in the Constitution
should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of

taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of

such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption
herein must be denied
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels:
Case Digests
,
Political Law
Facts:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No.
25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will
be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the
Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the
permanent
settlement
of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further,
Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation
providing that said
homestead
applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of
Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River
including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site
of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall
refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were
claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have
not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and
are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived
of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi
and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation.
I
ssue:
W
hether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus,
W
ON
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
H
eld:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative

Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and

does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in
reservations
in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and
(2) the only successfully method for
educating
the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General
adds
the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing
civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by
law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No
man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by
due process of law.