Art 38 FC Full Text Cases Compiled

1
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him.
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein
private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant
in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an
eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia
lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City.
On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's
parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would
also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the
couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever
Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as
a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit
the United States, where he underwent a training program under the
auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch

with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of
marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it
was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report
to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set,
albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation,
stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of
the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its
lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import
of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
2
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not
lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He
added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient
use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and
the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7)
be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity,
there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used
a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable
marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean
Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for
void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack
or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation
of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the
marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a
ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and
to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is
a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they
do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they
are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that
it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration
and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different
from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen
years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno,
however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent
and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there
is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children
3
and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been
cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of
the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that
the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of
marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among
the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision
is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after
the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he
is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this
case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On
the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity.

Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue
on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities,
which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the
Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law
and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to
the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer
to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were
concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten
4
years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should
be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected,
has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application.
Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has
been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis
(G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive
for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law
prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation
or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then

the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect
to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some
kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be
able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal
effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is
due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not
only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect
did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability
to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of

Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of
a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem)
are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon,
novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf.
SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and

most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
5
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue
to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code,
and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of
our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still
hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I
cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no
ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not
deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the
intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the
grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the
doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their
marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency,
among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor,
to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
6
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to
my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up
her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989,
but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her
husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to
do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a
basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of
a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be
instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have
to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains.
Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the
latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or
maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does
not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest
after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the
transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain
illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his
wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her
and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction
for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to nonrecognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital
obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage
between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have
his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of
private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of
the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April
15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and
Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes CojuangcoTeodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law
Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of
a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family
Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft
of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."
7
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for
an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds
available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by
the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare
a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage.
Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found
in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void
marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion
of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in
the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today
may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus
rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting
with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been
declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who

refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical
violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to
those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-tocase basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing
at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other
provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in
interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of
Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at
all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of
one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained
to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision
since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner
by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision.
These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the
other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I
cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no
ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
8
private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not
deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the
intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the
grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the
doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their
marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency,
among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor,
to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to
my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up
her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989,
but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her
husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to
do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a
basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of
a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be
instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have
to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains.
Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the
latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or

maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does
not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest
after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the
transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain
illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his
wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and
to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction
for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to nonrecognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital
obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage
between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have
his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of
private respondent.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of
the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April
15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and
Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes CojuangcoTeodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code.
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
9
this matter.
marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
within the limits provided by law."
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for
an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds
available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by
the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare
a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage.
Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found
in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void
marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion
of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in
the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without

prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting
with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been
declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical
violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to
those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-tocase basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing
at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other
provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in
interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of
10
Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at
all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of
one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained
to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision
since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner
by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision.
These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the
other.
Footnotes
1 Per Judge Enrique Garovillo.
2 Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justice Pedro Ramirez and Ramon
Mabutas, Jr.
3 Rollo, 37-42.
4 Rollo, 13-18.
5 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.
6 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2, 1986.
7 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.
8 In her "Handbook on the Family Code."
9 Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986, 129-130.
C 1095 Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi:
1. qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;
2. qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et official matrimonialia
essentialia mutuo tradenda et acceptanda;
3. qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales assumere non
valent.
10 Ibid., 131-132.
11 Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
1 Written pursuant to the request of Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
during the March 23, 1985 joint meeting of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee at the UP Law Center for comments on P.B. 3149 (Pacificador Bill) on Divorce,
P.B. No. 1986 (Monfort and Collantes Bill) on Recognition of Church Annulments of
Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on Additional Grounds for Annulment of Marriage and
Legal Separation and P.B. 1350 (Kalaw Bill) on Equal Rights of Filipino Women which
were pending before her Sub-Committee.
2 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48.
3 J.A. v. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 37 (1988).
4 As quoted in the majority opinion.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190
January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time,
much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89)
which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's
decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract.
(Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
11
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio
City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed
since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was
no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did
not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January
20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as
he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime
he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him
and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once
but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So
he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed
this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be
forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are
still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he
is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency
(Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size
of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him,
if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will
not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by
the intervention of medical technology or science.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion

between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at
the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by
the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion
between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141,
private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the
court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended
to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal

separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The
assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When
private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was crossexamined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After
such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the
petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage
shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
(Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between
the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva GonzagaReyes, viz:
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based
on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife
after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Section 1.
Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as
13
error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders,
such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in
a short span of 10 months.
of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal
of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show

that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner
also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that

the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that
he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her
feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering
from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife
whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard
to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and
fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with

private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and
avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He
never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to
prove such a claim.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is
the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom
he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity
to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code. 7
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or

her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say
"I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to
have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has
never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other
becomes immaterial.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness
14
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely
not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated
marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo G.
Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.
2
Rollo, pp. 20-24.
3
Ibid.
4
Rollo, p. 34.
5
Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C".
6
Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.
7
Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our
courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this
Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court
of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel
and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and
a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in
February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
15
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to
be an incompatible marriage from the start.
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5

heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties
broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it
added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1.
That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2.
That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3.
That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4.
That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5.
That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6.
That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that
of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of
Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made
an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as

a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to selfdestruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
16
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of
the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder
but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q
It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
There is no hope for the marriage?
There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q
Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other
parties?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality

traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a
failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the
facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many
trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici
curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family
Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these
friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during
the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"
by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
17
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the
foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo
Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima,
Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
18
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but
only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained,
and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the
wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion.
Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position
that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband,
did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
"It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness.
For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of
insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature
of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in
the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
(7)
Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7)
That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated."
It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's
marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should
be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers
to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9,
1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
19
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of
the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that
this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility
that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest
after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the
afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1.
lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2.
reasons of public policy;
3.
special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases

and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family
Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites,
some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable
of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails
a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into
another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to
contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and
classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or
totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it
did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the
same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the
major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due
competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the
ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the
union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was
20
incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first
time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of
marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing
short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came
after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during
the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that
of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no
longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal

decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a selfgiving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill
the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2)
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty
to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability
21
to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume
or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup
of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4

1
concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains
valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses

were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos
v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the
wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for
more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render
the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages
remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring
the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said
petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had
coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the
physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by
the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital
obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the
marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch
I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban

in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared
for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term
"psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family
Code. Thus
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law
Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those)
1.
who lack sufficient use of reason;
2.
who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
We declared:
3.
who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
22
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one
must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help
and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only
thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned
Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute
divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce;
however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry
out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid
down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should
regard marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
indicia of psychological
Sec. 12.
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . .
.
total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
23
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not
so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The
Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered
mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest
such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by
disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on
marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but
only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained,
and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the
wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion.
Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate
of the trial court.
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position
that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband,
did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
"It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness.
For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of
insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature
of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in
the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
(7)
Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
(7)
That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated."
It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should
be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers
to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
24
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9,
1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
another.
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility
marriages, viz:
1.
lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2.
reasons of public policy;
3.
special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases

and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family

of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to
relationships.
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and
25
totally in existent from the beginning.
did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the
same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due
competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the
ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
ceremony.
opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
matrimonial consent. 2
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a selfgiving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill
the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
other spouse. 3
26
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch
I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
We declared:

discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume
or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup
of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses
were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos
v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the
wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for
more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render
the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages
remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring
the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said
petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had
coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the
physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by
the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital
obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the
marriage null.
1
concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains
valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared
for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term
"psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family
Code. Thus
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law
Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
27
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those)
1.
who lack sufficient use of reason;
2.
who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3.
who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one
must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to

have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help
and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only
thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned
Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute
divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce;
however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry
out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid
down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should
regard marriage and the family, thus
28
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12.
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . ...
total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not
so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The
Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered
mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest
such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by
disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on
marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1
Rollo pp. 25-33.
2
Sixteenth Division composed of J., Segundino G. Chua, ponente and
chairman JJ., Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3
Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.
4
Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas.
5
The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the
RTC Decision is follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible,
dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics
of respondent are based on petitioner's testimony that the former failed to be gainfully
employed after he was relieved from the office of the Government Corporate Counsel
sometime in February, 1986. leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family.
Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both
petitioner-mother and son except during the first few months of separation when
respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00
for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for
financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his
friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he
bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then
transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were
actually renting the house with the respondent's parents responsible for the
payment of the rentals. Aside from this. respondent would also lie about his salary
and ability. And that at present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child.
which fact he does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if
we look at the background of their relationship. During their college days, when they
were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely,
and intelligent causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and
mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness
and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship
because of some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while
they were working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair.
They became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature
respondent. Believing that they know each other much better after two years of going
steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It would seem. therefore, that
petitioner and respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married
life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and
dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and
respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their
frequent arguments and fighting's. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their
parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to
terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because
of their opposing and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of them can accept and
understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each other
for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent
cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this
resulted because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which
is unique and requisite in marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman with
the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code).
The unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and
lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully
understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently)
united in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the
parties, among others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt
understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family
Code requires them to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental
roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage.
Such is the unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp.
70-73).
6
240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
29
7
Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First
Edition, 1988.
8
TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9
The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the
marriage tribunals of each archdiocese in the country. Aside from heading the
Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic
Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds
the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also
Secretary-General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines PCP II held
from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a
parliament or a constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and where the
ponente, who was a Council member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by his
keen mind and prayerful discernments.
10
Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister
of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and the law practitioner.
Article XV
THE FAMILY
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the state.
Sec. 3. The State shall defend:
(1)
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
connections and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2)
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty. exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3)
The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4)
The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may
also do so through just programs of social security.
Art. 1
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
13
Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
14
This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other
hand, the text used in Santos v. CA reads:
"Canon 1095.
They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx
xxx
xxx
3.
Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum is due
to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differentlyworded English translations.
1
Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.
2
Zwack , Joseph P. Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.
3
The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law Society
of America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.
4
Zwack, ibid., p. 47.
5
G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
6
G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
1
Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, In
Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.
2
In Santos vs. Court Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.
3
Supra.
4
At pages 34-35.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however,
that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the
parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her
Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
30
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent
Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if
any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in
relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties'
children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted
to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in
the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military
service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they
had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to
stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on
her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17,
1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh.
G, Records, 153).
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by
Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command
Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children
were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him
at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing
them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran
after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973.
Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang
during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa
Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street,
Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss
Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit
and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness.
He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
31
enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations
of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code
and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition,
established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee.
Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only
to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be
truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make
him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to
show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a
psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no
evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity
which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d]
preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following
issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity

of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family
Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the
foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the
CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
32
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however,
has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding
of psychological incapacity. No costs.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
SO ORDERED.
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
[1] Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A.
Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
[2] CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.
[5] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon
receipt by this Court of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio
V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had
been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
33
[6] Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
[7] Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
[8] 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
[9] "Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe
in ten years after its celebration."
[10] Supra, pp. 209-213.
[11] 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
[12] "Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or
political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years,
even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by
adoption."
THIRD DIVISION
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE,
Petitioner,
- versus ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Oppositor.
G.R. No. 161793
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity,
since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion
in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed,
totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and
devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of
the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas
close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man
34
decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another
and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March
1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila
and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find
a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to
her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad,
and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit
suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married.
He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at
her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not
allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns
and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able
to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at
their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who,
however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live
on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got
mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward
must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and
stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family
whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his
persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better
for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.
[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000,
ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate
whether there was collusion between the parties.[12] In the meantime, on
July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in
the scheduled hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it
could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it
recommended trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties
psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and
conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and
baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at
AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married
to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself
at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one
deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he
[considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to
be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to
be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield
International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as
being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest
lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is]
said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he
only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father
and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate
degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that
with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this
became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating,
35
petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had
insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because
petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously
brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going
to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to
Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled
to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any
so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help
from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner,
all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go
back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their
home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone
and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why
he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to
commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent
would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner
does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to
file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper.
Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point
in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of
frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same
day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge.
Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed
that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their
own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he
should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the
petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When
respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay,
petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He
told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a
job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does
not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and
informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after
arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived,
respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened
in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent
even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission
their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner
sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him
at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner
was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his
predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage
contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred
for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent.
Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and

recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them
was motivated by different notions on marriage.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly

in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[]
unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure
and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on
the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is
not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and
mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that
he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship
especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as
he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
36
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the
aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat
exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take
move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring
her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her
dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is
somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for
wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry
himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out
of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and
law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently
clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they
are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the
other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful,
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is
apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood
and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.[15]
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the
marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
[17] The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.
[18]
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It
ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent,
and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[21] needed
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without
the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons
for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.[23]
The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise

assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on
certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out
that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the
OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been
furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment
petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital
obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was
it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties
was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the
OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the
development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that
drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the
37
Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate
opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of
the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April
15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family
Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present
Article 36 in the Family Code.
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
this matter.
marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
within the limits provided by law.
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted
for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would
not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not
recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested
to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice
Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to
the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result
was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to
the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another
meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the
Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has
been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of lack of due
discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who,
because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a
38
family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly
normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo
among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly,
like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It
was explained that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties
marital obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be
a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
1984 session that this term is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
another.
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility
marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases
and special situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family


As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or

mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9,
39
of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a
marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from
the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to
relationships.
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand
totally inexistent from the beginning.
did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the
same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: Canon #1081
required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid

consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the
related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due
competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the
ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological

incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that
the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself
was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow
some resiliency in its application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant
to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article
68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The
40
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in
fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction
must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a
house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to
positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract,
viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the
conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to
both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of
the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process
of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have
such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their
consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the
object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid
because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both
valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an
object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction:
the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing
the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of
consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as
a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941
regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from
pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as
ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has
studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies
always and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which
affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are
there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from
certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the
sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these
persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical
sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature
which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal,
either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the

nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However,
these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an
adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though
is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot
fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis,
the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from
the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to
posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in
this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear
whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the
object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that
the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes
that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this
irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision,
made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It
would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question:
is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously
under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one
who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be
juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of
consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with
usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may
indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to
an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have
seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a
clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one
hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage,
and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no
difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons,
capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience
difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne,
another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of
41
consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view
of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating
intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the
selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain
progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent)
can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an
intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The
decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a
spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but
also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The
decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of
assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no
difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the
weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not
unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or
similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some
anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the
faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic,
obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment
dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject
incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the
anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations.
According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology:
nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of
the contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium.
One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so selfcentered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to
begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses
are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which
goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise
when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other
party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the
good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be
deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a
person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the
financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from
serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have
understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage,
he was not capable of assuming them because of his constitutional
immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards
the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of
decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision.
And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that
the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person
was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place.
When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the
obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially
at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential
obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on
the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards
the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common.
A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve
ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This
and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good
of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not
have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume
any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of
inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective
immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
42
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what
rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to
say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations.
Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as
incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground
of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the
object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in
corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095
[incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems
to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily
impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is
usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental
infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect
the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person
is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to
fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies,
not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the
source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological
nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to
the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the
psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his
capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to
the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in
this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something
rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these
obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not
seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference
being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the
incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,
that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the

trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was
not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45]
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-tocase basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set
of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
43
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are

unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on
evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining
independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership

concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another
threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts.
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
of the trial court.[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the Court has
applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear
44
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs
exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world.
[50] The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to
fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert
the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages
on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[51]
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the

normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person
with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in
their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina
in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O.
Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives
as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a caseto-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided
by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among
which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The
Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They
met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and
parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found
both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls
under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56]
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological

incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it
be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place,
as the same is void from the very beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.[57]
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose
too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of
its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
45
matrimonial consent.
incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole
of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions
since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as
meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other
oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is
held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
other spouse.
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity
to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry
out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered
into.[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
46
incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to
suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial
judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an
independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the
parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of
psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case.
The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present
their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we
consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted
with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.
We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality
disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a
persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking
are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained,
inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental
stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or
earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old
age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types.
Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive)
was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of
obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships. However,
later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or
fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor
involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders;
there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some
family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be
related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality,
researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic
acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past
history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with
low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit
eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have
been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most
widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent
in a control group.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders,

despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to
pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals
with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such
qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits
can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction
with life.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or
DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose

a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic
factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passiveaggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear anxious or fearful.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of

development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise
specified, that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.

Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric
habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly
emotional, erratic and dramatic.
47
mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals
who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[65]
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of
the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to
sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either
through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and,
quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that
masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to
control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may
befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits
of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden
prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as
moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality disorders, the
others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.[66]
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered,
the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made
by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null
and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further
consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder,
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on
his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this
case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around
him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent.
Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of
others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of
the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996
is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are
48
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170925
October 26, 2009
RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
AURORA A. ASPILLAGA, Respondent.
DECISION
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated September 9, 2005
and the Resolution2 dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68179, entitled Rodolfo A. Aspillaga v. Aurora A. Aspillaga.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively.
Rodolfo courted her and five months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter,
Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the
distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication.
In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They
begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was tumultuous. He
described Aurora as domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his
friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family
budget and made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that
Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the
latters filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an administrative case.
He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred
that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to
Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of
three months. In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while
she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose
A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation with her
cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May
1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with Besina. Aurora claimed
custody of the children.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained his psychiatric evaluation of
the parties as well as his recommendation that the petition be granted. In this report,
he stated,
x x x x
49
Psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, Rodolfo Aspillaga, showed that he is an intelligent
adult male, who is egoistic and harbors an inner sense of inadequacy, helplessness
and anxiety in losing agility. He, however, projects himself as dominant person, to
cover his deep-seated insecurity and inadequacy. He tends to be suspicious and
blames others for his mistakes. He claims for adulation, reassurance and attention
from other people. These can be traced from an unhealthy familial relationship during
the early maturational development specifically in the form of a domineering and
protective maternal image.
Self-esteem was fragile.
Psychiatric evaluation of respondent, Aurora Apon Aspillaga, showed history of
traumatic childhood experiences. Her parents separated when she was about one
month old and was made to believe that she was the youngest daughter of her
disciplinarian grandfather. Her surrogate sister maltreated her and imposed harsh
corporal punishment for her slightest mistakes. She felt devastated when she
accidentally discovered that shed been an orphan adopted by her grandfather.
Attempted incestuous desire by an uncle was reported.
Psychological test results collaborated the clinical findings of sensitivity to criticism.
Tendency for self dramatization and attention getting behavior. Lapses in judgment
and shallow heterosexual relationship was projected. Sign of immaturity and desire to
regress to a lower level of development were likewise projected. Self-esteem was
also low. Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness and emptiness hamper her
objectivity.
In summary, both petitioner and respondent harbor psychological handicaps which
could be traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict,
domineering, disciplinarian role models. However, respondents mistrust, shallow
heterosexual relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the
It is recommended that the petition to annul their marriage be granted, on the grounds
existing psychological incapacitation of both petitioner and respondent, which will
hamper their capacity to comply with their marital obligations. Dissolution of the
marital bond will offer both of them, peace of mind. 3
On May 31, 2000,4 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the parties psychologically
incapacitated to enter into marriage.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 9, 2005, reversed
and set aside the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora
Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also
denied in a Resolution dated December 20, 2005.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
[WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE DEFINITION
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF
THE PARTIES DURING THE CELEBRATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE.5
Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the ground of
the parties psychological incapacity.
The petition must fail.
As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 we categorically said that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, while the psychological examination conducted on respondent
found her to be mistrustful, to possess low self-esteem, given to having shallow
heterosexual relationships and immature, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that these
personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring
about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr.
Maaba was able to establish the parties personality disorder; however, he failed to
link the parties psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically
incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. We cannot see how
their personality disorder would render them unaware of the essential marital
obligations or to be incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to a marriage. The fact that these
psychological conditions will hamper (as Dr. Maaba puts it) their performance of their
marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous
to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that each partys condition is so
grave or is of such nature as to render said party incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed
incapacity is incurable and permanent.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent,8 but
failed to discharge it.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.9 The intention of
the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.10
Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially
had a blissful marital union for several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed
the ceremony in church rites in 1983, showing love and contentment with one another
after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to
respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued during their
marriage for about eight years from the time they married each other. From this, it can
50
be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to each other
and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and
remained faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities
to augment the family income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who
traveled a lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It was only when Rodolfos acts
of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail.
As to Rodolfos allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to
convince. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other
aspects of ones marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground
to declare a marriage null and void.11 In the present case, petitioners disagreement
with his wifes handling of the familys finances can hardly be considered as a
manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements
regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence between
husbands and wives.12
At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found
to have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing
that these disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to psychological
incapacity. We must emphasize that said disorders do not manifest that both parties
are truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is
nothing that shows incurability of these disorders. Even assuming their acts violate
the covenants of marriage, such acts do not show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which will prevent them from undertaking the basic
obligations of marriage in the future. At the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the
parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, which cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity as understood juristically.
As this Court has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof
manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13
As regards respondents claim for support, we find no basis to award the same as it
was not passed upon by the trial court in view of the agreement of the parties on the
issue presented for resolution, which agreement, however, was not put into writing.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated September 9, 2005 and Resolution dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68179 are AFFIRMED.
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA,
Petitioner,
- versus
EDWARD RUMBAUA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 166738
Present:
*CARPIO-MORALES, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
**CARPIO,
***CHICO-NAZARIO,
****LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 14, 2009
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
SO ORDERED.
Carpio*, Carpio Morales, Brion, Abad, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition for

review on certiorari,[1] the decision dated June 25, 2004[2] and the resolution dated
January 18, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095. The
challenged decision reversed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua
51
(respondent) null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The
assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioners complaint for the declaration of
nullity of marriage against the respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following
circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof
after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his
mothers death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he
pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as personal
service proved futile.[5] The RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to investigate if
collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no fabrication or suppression
of evidence would take place.[6] Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongsons report negated the
presence of collusion between the parties.[7]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the petition.[8] The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the
Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings of the case.[9]
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate her
charges.
The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors in
Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and became
sweethearts but the respondents family did not approve of their relationship. After
graduation from college in 1991, the respondent promised to marry the petitioner as
soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL)
accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent proposed to the
petitioner that they first have a secret marriage in order not to antagonize his
parents. The petitioner agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993.
The petitioner and the respondent, however, never lived together; the petitioner
stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his
parents in Novaliches.
The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six
months of their marriage. At that point, the respondent refused to live with the
petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application
for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couples daily meetings
became occasional visits to the petitioners house in Fairview; they would have sexual
trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent enrolled at FEATI University after he
lost his employment with PAL.[10]
In 1994, the parties respective families discovered their secret marriage. The
respondents mother tried to convince him to go to the United States, but he refused.
To appease his mother, he continued living separately from the petitioner. The
respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise
failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent indicated as
well in his visa application that he was single.
In April 1995, the respondents mother died. The respondent blamed the petitioner,
associating his mothers death to the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage
brought. Pained by the respondents action, the petitioner severed her relationship
with the respondent. They eventually reconciled through the help of the petitioners
father, although they still lived separately.
In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in Davao. A
year later, the petitioner and her mother went to the respondents house in Novaliches
and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia). When she
confronted the respondent about it, he denied having an affair with Cynthia.[11] The
petitioner apparently did not believe the respondents and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya
to recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery brought.[12]
The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication between
her and respondent had ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also
presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;[13] and the testimony,
curriculum vitae,[14] and psychological report[15] of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy
Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on
the petitioner: a Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a Sachs Sentence
Completion Test; and MMPI.[16] She thereafter prepared a psychological report with
the following findings:
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual level.
Logic and reasoning remained intact. She is seen to be the type of woman who
adjusts fairly well into most situations especially if it is within her interests. She is
pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had reservations from negative
criticisms such that she normally adheres to social norms, behavior-wise. Her age
speaks of maturity, both intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her
compliant attitude which makes her a subject for manipulation and deception such
that of respondent. In all the years of their relationship, she opted to endure his
irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that someday things will be much
better for them. But upon the advent of her husbands infidelity, she gradually lost
hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that she has finally taken her tool to be
assertive to the point of being aggressive and very cautious at times so as to fight
with the frustration and insecurity she had especially regarding her failed marriage.
52
SO ORDERED.[18]
Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he
believes that the world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him
to deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an extreme air of confidence
and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards
others especially to that of petitioner.
The CA Decision
REMARKS
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.[19]
The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and
denied the nullification of the parties marriage.[20]
Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the

expectations people tagged with it. In love, age does matter. People love in order to
be secure that one will share his/her life with another and that he/she will not die
alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die it is
a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she expected.
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayags psychiatric report did not mention
the cause of the respondents so-called narcissistic personality disorder; it did not
discuss the respondents childhood and thus failed to give the court an insight into the
respondents developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came
to the conclusion that the respondents incapacity was deep-seated and incurable.
In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really happened for
her towards the young respondent who used love as a disguise or deceptive tactic
for exploiting the confidence she extended towards him. He made her believe that he
is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful only to reveal himself contrary to what
was mentioned. He lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that he was
able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner look like an innocent
fool. His character traits reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder declared to be grave, severe and incurable.[17] [Emphasis supplied.]
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be
psychological, although its manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the evidence
presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so that
he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them,
could not have assumed them. In other words, the illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. In the present case, the petitioner suffered because
the respondent adamantly refused to live with her because of his parents objection to
their marriage.
The RTC Ruling
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion
in its resolution of January 18, 2005. [21]
The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The
trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and concluded
as follows:
xxxx
Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent
imposed limited or block [sic] out communication with his wife, forgetting special
occasions, like petitioners birthdays and Valentines Day; going out only on occasions
despite their living separately and to go to a motel to have sexual intercourse.
It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case which
show the psychological incapacity of respondent, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital
responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is declared
grave, severe and incurable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between petitioner Rowena
Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.
The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that
1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina[22] (the Molina case)
cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the
requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to
recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as well as to present
additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and
3.
Dr. Tayags testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.
The petitioner prays that the RTCs and the CAs decisions be reversed and set aside,
and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot
grant this prayer, that the CAs decision be set aside and the RTCs decision be
reinstated.
53
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was
applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the
trial courts decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not proper;
and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondents psychological incapacity.[23]
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages:
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Emphasis supplied.]
effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that
was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.
The petitioners argument lacks merit.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in
character; it does not create or remove any vested right, but only operates as a
remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,[25] as we held in De Los Santos v.
Vda. de Mangubat:[26]
Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an
OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the
measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to
its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28]
have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the
Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between
the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the
prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be
present. From this perspective, the petitioners objection regarding the Molina
guideline on certification lacks merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and
duly published -- is geared towards the relaxation of the OSG certification that Molina
required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:
SEC. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor,
in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated for
prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of the required OSG certification
specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took
The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts decisions and the
remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally
permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the
fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the
case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in
this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally
construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.
We do not find her arguments convincing.
A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant
of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37
provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or
final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an
appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded
against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved partys rights
54
have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial,
and that would probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence
presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however,
specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity
prima facie shows that the petitioners counsel had not been negligent in handling the
case. Granting arguendo that the petitioners counsel had been negligent, the
negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the
petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel
Corporation where we explained:[29]
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result
of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground
for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there
would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced
or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors
by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse
decision, as in the instant case.
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioners requested remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the
respondents psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on
Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In Santos v. Court of
Appeals,[30] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby

protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
respect by our courts
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
55
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To
reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] These requisites must be strictly complied with,
as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define psychological
incapacity, fleshing out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through
jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. VelezTing[33] when we explained:
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that
each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a caseto-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the
totality of the petitioners evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.
a. Petitioners testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of
respondents condition
The petitioners evidence merely showed that the respondent:
(a) reneged on
his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c)
forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during special
occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for
the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact he was
cohabiting with another woman in 1997.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that
the law requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize
some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was not enough that respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondent's
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some
psychological illness. As the petitioners testimony reveals, respondent merely
refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a
scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The respondents
failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special
occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mothers death and of
representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to
forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological
incapacity. Likewise, the respondents act of living with another woman four years into
the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that
respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after
their marriage; their problems only came in later.
To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws.
The presence of these imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant a
conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that
rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of
Navales v. Navales:[35]
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different
from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due
to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
b.
Dr. Tayags psychological report and court testimony
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side
the petitioner whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her
report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.[36] For, effectively, Dr.
Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did
not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted
and responded to the doctors probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioners narrations, and on
this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and
unremorseful person who believes that the world revolves around him; and who
used love as adeceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended
towards him. Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of love; made a
generalization that respondent was a person who lacked commitment, faithfulness,
56
and remorse, and who engaged in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look
like a fool; and finally concluded that the respondents character traits reveal him to
suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder
declared to be grave and incurable.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It
failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder
and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayags conclusion in
her Report i.e., that the respondent suffered Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization
and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner
could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this
same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondents psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayags subsequent testimony in court
cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed to establish
the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering
from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential
duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she
came to the conclusion that respondents condition was grave and incurable. To
directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:
Q:
I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked
as Exh. E-7, there is a statement to the effect that his character traits begin to suffer
narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial personality disorder. What do
you mean? Can you please explain in laymans word, Madam Witness?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A:
Actually, in a laymans term, narcissistic personality disorder
cannot accept that there is something wrong with his own behavioral manifestation.
[sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are eccentric; they are exemplary,
demanding financial and emotional support, and this is clearly manifested by the fact
that respondent abused and used petitioners love. Along the line, a narcissistic
person cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply because they love themselves
more than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person cannot support his own
personal need and gratification without the help of others and this is where the
petitioner set in.
Q:
Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?
A:
Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral
manifestation under personality disorder [sic] this is already considered grave,
serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of developmental
disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years and brought about by
one familiar relationship the way he was reared and cared by the family.
Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child disorder. [sic]
Q:
You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?
A:
Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long
before he entered marriage. [Un]fortunately, on the part of the petitioner, she never
realized that such behavioral manifestation of the respondent connotes pathology.
[sic]
xxxx
Q:
So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is
now lying [sic] with somebody else, how will you describe the character of this
respondent who is living with somebody else?
A:
This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent
[sic] because an antisocial person is one who indulge in philandering activities, who
do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of another person, and this [is] again a
buy-product of deep seated psychological incapacity.
Q:
And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep
seated [sic], how would you describe the psychological incapacity? [sic]
A:
As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I
would say incurable in nature and at this time and again [sic] the psychological
pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not being able to give
meaning to a relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.
Q:
And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of
the respondent and the petitioner, Madam Witness?
A:
Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early
formative years and so if it takes enough that such psychological incapacity of
57
respondent already existed long before he entered marriage, because if you analyze
how he was reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is already an
unhealthy symbiosis developed between the two, and this creates a major emotional
havoc when he reached adult age.
Q:
How about the gravity?
A:
This is already grave simply because from the very start
respondent never had an inkling that his behavioral manifestation connotes pathology
and second ground [sic], respondent will never admit again that such behavior of his
connotes again pathology simply because the disorder of the respondent is not
detrimental to himself but, more often than not, it is detrimental to other party
involved.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:
Q:
You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A:
Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the
respondent never appeared at my clinic.
Q:
On the basis of those examinations conducted with the
petitioning wife to annul their marriage with her husband in general, what can you say
about the respondent?
A:
That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to
give meaning to their relationship. If you analyze their marital relationship they never
lived under one room. From the very start of the [marriage], the respondent to have
petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their family knew of their
marriage [sic]. Respondent completely refused, completely relinquished his marital
obligation to the petitioner.
xxxx
COURT:
Q:
Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the
petitioner, can you really enumerate the specific traits of the respondent?
Q:
something specific?
You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you
A:
The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on
the part of the mother merely because respondent happened to be the only son. I
said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic] developed between the son
and the mother simply because the mother always pampered completely, pampered
to the point that respondent failed to develop his own sense of assertion or
responsibility particularly during that stage and there is also presence of the simple
lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of handling emotional imbalance and it
is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent refused to build a home together with
the petitioner when in fact they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never felt or
completely ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty hurting the
petitioner because on the part of the petitioner, knowing that respondent indulge with
another woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet respondent never had the
guts to feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their relationship, and clinically
this falls under antisocial personality. [37]
In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayags answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:
xxxx
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO
Q:
Can this personally be cured, madam witness?

DR. NEDY TAYAG
A:
Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable,
up to this very moment, no scientific could be upheld to alleviate their kind of
personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other person suffering from any
kind of disorder particularly narcissistic personality will never admit that they are
suffering from this kind of disorder, and then again curability will always be a question.
[sic][38]
DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A:
One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the
dependent attitude of the respondent.
Q:
Even if he is already eligible for employment?
A:
He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-golucky simply because he never had a set of responsibility. I think that he finished his
education but he never had a stable job because he completely relied on the support
of his mother.
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general
characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder, she did
not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these traits. She
mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage
namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage, psychological
incapacity relating to marriage and in her own limited way, related these to the
medical condition she generally described. The testimony, together with her report,
however, suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondents exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony
58
and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably
on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality
disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it
was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the
respondents awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioners
case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the
prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the
law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[39] If a
psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why
such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.[40] No such
independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this
case, particularly about the respondents early life and associations, and about events
on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony
and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the onesided and meager facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the
conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this
because only the baser qualities of the respondents life were examined and given
focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities,
such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through
studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others.
The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought
into her marriage, for example, why the respondents family opposed the marriage
and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his
mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not
a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both
of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments that
do not amount to psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses
likewise never appeared to have been factored in. Not a few married couples have
likewise permanently separated simply because they have fallen out of love, or have
outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their younger years.
Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a
remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of additional evidence; the
petitioners evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the
conclusion that the petitioners marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the
ground of the respondents psychological incapacity.
The Court commiserates with the petitioners marital predicament. The
respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations, particularly
the obligation to live with ones spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his
marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The

psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should
be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to
assume.[41]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and
AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and
January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the that the conclusions in the
59
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that
she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession
that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts so
that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother,
whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the
"assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by
petitioners counsel and not an averment of ultimate facts, as required by the Rules
of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding
the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding
its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we
referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.
G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994
On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition thus
JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br.
107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salitas alleged

psychological incapacity in his bill of particulars . . .
Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner.

Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic
Church in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour.
They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the
ground of Joselitas psychological incapacity.
The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the interpretation of Art. 36 of
the Family Code. 1 Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition
for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification
of the petition.
The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on
7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that "[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to
realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the
marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter." 2 Dissatisfied with the
allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court
granted. 3 Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that
In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the Rules requirement that
a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiffs cause of action. To
require more details thereof, to insist on a specification of Salitas particular conduct
or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person
indicating her alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on
evidentiary matters. To obtain evidentiary details, Salita may avail herself of the
different modes of discovery provided by the Rules of Court
(Rules 24 to 28).
Whether Espinosas averments in his bill of particulars constitute psychological
incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code is a question that may be resolved
in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the merits of the case, not in a motion for bill of
particulars. And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the present petition. 5
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita Salita questioning
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying due course to her petition.
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal
conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital
obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of
Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husbands cause of action. She
rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or
behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not
call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot
adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
60
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of
Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point.
He defines ultimate facts as
. . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary
right and duty, or which directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal,
determinate facts upon the existence of which the entire cause of action rests. 6
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or
allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural
reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the
issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of
action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which
will be required to prove the existence of those facts . . . 7
Private respondent further argues that "[c]onclusions of law and evidentiary matters
need not be stated in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of the
cause of action only to such operative facts as would give rise to the right of action of
the plaintiff to obtain relief against the wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or
particulars of evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be
stated." 8
In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by
herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein
petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or
causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the
expected evidence will support." 10 As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does
not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on
the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence
of those facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint,
while not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. 11 A
motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the
proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means.
12
We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by
private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details
from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters.
Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private respondents
cause of action against her thus
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the
demands made by his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine
upon petitioners time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of
attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose
his job.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already
prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged
that "she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To
demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts
facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. 13 For sure, the additional
facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be
evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of
particulars. 14
We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic 15 where we said
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification
purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in
the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order
that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the
end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling
involves alleged "misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nations
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,
betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power." The respondents therein pray for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. There, the alleged
illicit acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on the other hand, concerns
marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each and
every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have
to prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins.
Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of
the annulment proceeding which have already been delayed for more than two years
now, even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated should be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably
delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple
who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either
alone or in the company of each other.
A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. 16 We do not see the need to define or limit the
scope of the provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so,
the actual controversy being the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the
provision at this juncture would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides,
it appears that petitioner in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what
Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy, formerly of the
Court of Appeals and a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the
Family code, explains
61
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law. 17
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the
questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July 1992 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996]
EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L.
TUASON, respondents.
Seguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for private respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated
July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioners
appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case
No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged
that she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two
children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their
fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her to
file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used prohibited
drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended
penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984,
he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of
whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling,
petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition
fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept donations and doleouts from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and
abused his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their
assets and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies and other
financial institutions, without private respondents consent; that attempts at
reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioners refusal to reform. In
addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for
powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.[1]
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he
claimed that he and private respondent were a normal married couple during the first
ten years of their marriage and actually begot two children during this period; that it
was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his wife
did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a
persona non grata; that due to the extreme animosities between them, he temporarily
left the conjugal home for a cooling-off period in 1984; that it is private respondent
who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man; that
petitioners work as owner and operator of a radio and television station exposed him
to malicious gossip linking him to various women in media and the entertainment
world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses in his business and was
compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares
in exclusive golf and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to
return to the conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal
partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent
presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and
marriage counselor of both private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a
close friend of the spouses, and Any. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondents counsel.
Private respondent likewise submitted documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper articles of her husbands relationship with other women, his apprehension
by the authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior church
annulment decree.[2] The parties marriage was clerically annulled by the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which was affirmed by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.[3]
During presentation of private respondents evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990,
filed his Opposition to private respondents petition for appointment as administratrix
of the conjugal partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of
petitioners evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for petitioner
moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the
country and due to return on the first week of June.[4] The court granted the motion
and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.[5]
62
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the
court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the
case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
is taken, against a party in a court of first instance through fraud, accident,

mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same
cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private
respondents marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private
respondent. The court ruled:
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court
may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial
and meritorious defense or cause of action.[11] If the petition is granted, the court
shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein.[12]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L.

Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void oh initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of
the Family Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was contracted and in the registry of
Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is
hereby awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of
annulment as provided for under Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.[6]
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal
was taken from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties.[7]
Petitioner opposed the motion on October 17, 1990[8]
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with
the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.[9]
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his
petition for relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court.[10]
Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under
the circumstances of the case.
In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to private respondent
had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the
reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the decision of the trial court was
null and void for violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied due
process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court
deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on
the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the
hearings on the ground that he was then confined for medical and/or rehabilitation
reasons.[13] In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he attached a certification by
Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation
Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for treatment of
drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police.[14]
The records, however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the
trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same
counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and
executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.[15]
The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to
enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to
counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to
inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.[16]
Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of
petitioners confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance
at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former
counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led
the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the negligence of
petitioners counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for
reconsideration.
We rule in the negative.

A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides:
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other
proceedings thereof. - When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may
have lost his right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the
records show, petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings
below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private respondents
witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondents motion for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.[17]
63
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a
party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial
or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.[18] Indeed, relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the
loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for
relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.[19]
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family
Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the
prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor
upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He contends
that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason
for his non-appearance.[20]
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon
a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
xxxxxxxxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed.[21]
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the
danger of collusion.[22] Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear
on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties
and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default
but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists
between the parties.[23] The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.[24] Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution.[25] Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The state can
find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of
the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for
failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause
of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings
below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private
respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a
no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of
the proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondents witnesses, particularly
Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner
alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he could have testified that he
was not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the
fact that during their first ten years, he and private respondent lived together with their
children as one normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his family even
after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and operator of a radio
and television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject
for malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts, according to
petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence
of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding
on us.[26] Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-a-vis petitioners
defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous.[27]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave.
64
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that
no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to
present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between
herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987,
she gave birth to their child.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to
make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this
judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological
incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his
obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent
remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family.
Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and
lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person.
Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and
disability of entering into marital life.5
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of
the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with
his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see her and their child.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision
dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer

residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court
granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by
a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving
Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading
after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court
granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after
the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his
family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he
never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent
sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent,
on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and

jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered
denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically

incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual
65
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68
of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should
petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and
worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the
upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite
respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling
short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and
incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines
set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
66
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
respect by our courts. x x x
the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13
(emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require
that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.15
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person

from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in
the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with
respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated
August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios

psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support
his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent.
Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the
Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior
was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for
an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had
she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
G.R. No. 162368
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There
was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere
fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown
to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There
was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida PerezFerraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003
and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with
67
Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record
were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no
evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could
given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of
the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were
incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals
also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of
respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at
the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to
clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him
from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for
review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal
committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent
Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived
the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it
complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court
resolves to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the
facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court
to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a wellestablished principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the
case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when
there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks
and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality

disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies
heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality.
However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly
demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment
cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's
psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do
not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or
that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that
respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all
a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological
malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during
their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively
short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company
of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible
and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting
respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from
women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to
perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that
respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the
"dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from
such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr.
Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the
petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive.
She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated
that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship.
But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or
supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral
element" in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting,
68
and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner
likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady
existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against
petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the
marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the

Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure
of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"

attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the
sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more

time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on
his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope
of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not
a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of
marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must
be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22
38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage
void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article
55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.27
Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.28
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800
March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled
many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no
matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in
the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of
certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of
Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
(respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead
the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got
married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a
subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April
1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family
Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
69
essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at
the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed
that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and
kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever
witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor
and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.15
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents
persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondents
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there
was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was
no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head
to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her
as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the
letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract
with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She
claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her
payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money
from other people on false pretexts.20
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers
thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a
resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation
but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede),
a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
70
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist,
to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the
series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures
and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself
conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior,
gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from
respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted
by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted
respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument
called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such
test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that
respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established.
According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of
lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead
that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman
Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals.
Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that
respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient
to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case
to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish
respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled
principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such
evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative
facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented
by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid
down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the
Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in
reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there
was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy
afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration
of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances.
Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it
raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although
mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who
are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51
Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as
marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A
partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of
1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54
Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the
divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the
Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified
under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or
lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a
71
marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under
Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent.
Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision
committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a
vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on
the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by
the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to
comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which
makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and
thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same
time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack
of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was
further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates
from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically
incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee
was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding
specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that
no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as
intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and
even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate
ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in
providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not
set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this
case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74
It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is
hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the
concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family
Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the
72
trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are
binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently,
this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he
State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family
and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences
it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions
that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through
the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family
life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in
fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account
in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement
of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under
Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are
not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently
applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as
the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
73
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This
requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the
trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this
Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts,
and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such,
it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her
pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent
with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court

acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires
the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically
or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and
clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and
situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical
or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner
presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had
headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as
follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say
that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are
a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit.
One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent";
which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal
or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses
from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack
of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that
endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to
tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen
as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
74
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness
for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners
officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that
there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with
a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal.
We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no
basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman
and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically
incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He
concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she
loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case
record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the
supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal
examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be
declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly,
Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true
set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners
factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has
been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her
therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and
respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying
is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed
at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and
made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise,
she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible
that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the
exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate
a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which
according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature
of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her
best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her
marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological
condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates
her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to
even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to
the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded
much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that
a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and
75
Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45
(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied
to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her
marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations
as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins
the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The
appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference
was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring
the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina,
which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing
the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota
of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by
a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with
a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance
and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that
based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of
the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in
tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its

practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction
pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact
of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the
trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the
Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are
drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners
allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct,
and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church
on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents
condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant
behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite
grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable.
Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or
incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this
point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina
was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family
Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began
its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then
the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and
76
the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the
doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference
to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came
out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents psychological
incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the
incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration
of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this
case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a
medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time
when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital
bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent,
despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her
persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue
emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the
Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in
legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to
live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID
under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, 102 the Court countered an argument that
Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a
law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we
approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in
this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there
was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question
was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection,
there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective
petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as
such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article
36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to
mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the
time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of
the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to
the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court
of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Asscociate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
C E R T I F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Attestation by the
Divisions Chairman, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

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1

Republic of the Philippines

August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity.

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then

third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:

Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and

marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who

Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or

on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without

Republic of the Philippines

January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion

such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5

That the respondent is not asking for damages;

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as

Yes, Your Honor.

There is no hope for the marriage?

There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Yes, Your Honor.

Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality

reasons of public policy;

special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases

whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal

marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban

who lack sufficient use of reason;

reasons of public policy;

special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a

who lack sufficient use of reason;

clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to

240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.

They are incapable of contracting marriage:

on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity

The Court's Ruling

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly