WAITE VS.

PETERSON
1. WRONGFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY; SALE OR TRANSFER; ACTION BY THE TRANSFEREE. When the property of one person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has a
right of action against the latter for the recovery of the property or for damages for the taking or retention, and he is entitled to his choice of these two remedies. This is also a
right which may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain either action against the wrongdoer.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SHERIFF. When, however, the owner seeks to make the sheriff responsible for such wrongful act he must, in order to preserve his
right against the sheriff, comply with the provisions of section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. LEVY UPON PROPERTY; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CREDITOR. If a sheriff levies upon property at the instance of a creditor and is indemnified by the latter, the creditor is
thenceforward liable for the acts of the sheriff with respect to the property.
DECISION
The appellant (Kwong We Shing) has not caused the proof in this case to be brought here. The only question therefore is whether the facts admitted in the pleadings and those
found by the court below in its decision sustain the judgment appealed from. That court found among other things as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"From the evidence presented at the trial, the court finds that on December 8, 1905, one Henry Manheim delivered to L.K. Tiao Eng a diamond ring one consignment for 800
pesos, to be returned, if not sold, in sixty days; that on the 22d day of January, 1906, while the ring was in the possession of L.K. Tiao Eng, the defendant, as sheriff of Manila,
levied upon the said ring; that on the 23d day of January, 1906, the aforementioned Henry Manheim, for value received, assigned all his right to and interest in said ring to the
said plaintiff herein; that on the 25th day of January, 1906, the plaintiff made demand upon the sheriff of Manila, who had made the levy, as before said, for the said ring, and
alleged the value thereof to be 800 pesos; that the sheriff was indemnified by the judgment creditor, in whose favor the levy had been made, as provided by law, and retained
possession of the ring and sold the same at public sale; that the said Henry Manheim has never been paid for the said ring, in accordance with the terms of the contract
hereinbefore mentioned or any part thereof; that at the time of the levy by the sheriff upon the said ring, as before stated, the said Henry Manheim was the owner of and entitled
to possession of the said ring; that while the ring was in the possession of the sheriff the said Henry Manheim transferred his ownership and right to possession of said ring to
plaintiff herein and that the plaintiff thereupon became the owner and entitled to possession of said ring."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Judgment was rendered against both of the defendants for the return of the ring, and, if that could not be had, for the sum of 725 pesos, with interest, and costs.
I. The appellant claims that by the terms of section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure this action can not be maintained by the plaintiff because he was not the owner of the ring
at the time the levy was made. In other words, as we understand it, his claim is that no action for the value of the property taken can be maintained except by the person who
was the owner thereof at the time it was seized by the sheriff. We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Said section 451 is as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"Claims by third persons to property levied on. Property levied on can be claimed by a third person as his property, by a written claim, verified by the oath of such claimant,
setting out his title thereto, his right to possession thereof, stating the ground of such title, and served upon the governor, or his deputy, or officer making the levy. The officer in
such case is not bound to keep the property, unless the plaintiff, or the person in whose favor the writ of execution runs, on demand, indemnify the officer against such claim by
an obligation, signed by the plaintiff, with good and sufficient surety, and no claim to such property shall be valid against the officer, or shall be received or be notice of any rights
against him, unless made as herein provided; but nothing herein contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The vice in the argument of the appellant consist in the fact that he assumes that section 451 is the only law which gives the plaintiff a right of action against the sheriff, and that
if he is not included within that section, he can not maintain any action. This is manifestly erroneous. So far from being the origin of any rights on the part of the owner of
property wrongfully taken by the sheriff, it is rather a limitation upon his rights previously existing. If property of a person is taken by the sheriff upon an execution against
another person, the sheriff is liable thereof in the absence of statute, as any private person would be. When ones property is wrongfully taken by another, the former has a right
of action against the person who interfered with his property, whether for the recovery of the property itself or for damages for its taking, and he has his choice of these remedies.
If section 451 did not exist, by the general principles of the law the sheriff would always be responsible for wrongfully taking the property of another. For the purpose of limiting
the responsibility of the sheriff in such cases, and to provided that some notice should be given to him of the claims of third persons, this section requires such third persons to
make such claims in writing, so that the sheriff, after the notice is given to him, can decide for himself whether he will proceed with the levy or abandon the property.
The right of action given by the general principles of law to the person whose property has wrongfully been taken from him, either to recover damages or the possession of the
property, is a right which can be transferred by him, and his transferee can maintain either one of these actions against the wrongdoer. On this first claim of the appellant, then,

the only question is whether this section 451 has taken away from the assignee of the owner his right to maintain an action to recover the value of the property.
An examination of the section will show that there is no distinct statements therein, that the claim can only be made by a person who was the owner of the property at the time
the levy was made. As the section is written, we do not think that it should be so construed. Such a construction would, in case of the involuntary transfer of rights, deprive the
transferee of actions which might be absolutely necessary to him for the protection of his interest. If we so construed the section, we should have the levy his executor or
administrator would have no right to make a claim against the sheriff for the return of the property and would be deprived of an action against the sheriff for the recovery of
damages for such wrongful taking. The same rule would have to be made if an order in bankruptcy was passed against the owner of the property the day after the levy. We do not
think that the section requires any such construction.
II. It is further claimed by the appellant that in no event should judgment have been entered against him that is to say, against Kwong We Shing. It will be noticed that the
court found that the sheriff was indemnified by the judgment creditor. This statement is sufficient to make the judgment creditor liable for the acts of the sheriff. In the case of
Lovejoy v. Murray (3 Wall. U.S., 1) the court said, at page 9:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The demand for indemnity, and the giving of it by the defendants, proceeded upon the supposition that the sheriff would without it go no further in that direction, but would give
up the property to the claimant, the present plaintiff, and make his peace on the best terms he could. By the present statute of Iowa he had a right to do this, if the plaintiff in
attachment refused to assume the hazard of indemnifying him. And if there were no such statute, he had a right to deliver the property to the claimant, and risk a suit by the
plaintiff in attachment rather than a contest with a rightful claimant of the goods.
"The giving of the bond by the present defendants must, therefore, be held equivalent to a personal interference in the course of the proceeding, by directing or requesting of the
defendants in attachment. In doing this they assumed the direction and control of the sheriffs future action, so far as it might constitute a trespass, and they became to that
extent the principals, and he their agent in the transaction. This made them responsible for the continuance of the wrongful possession and for the sale and conversion of the
goods; in other words, for all the real damages which plaintiff sustained."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant, Kwong We Shing. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. ONATE

Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 17 September 2007:
G.R. No. 161758 (Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Division of Albay etc., et. al. v. Celso Oate)
On June 6, 2007, this Court issued a Resolution in this case which reads:
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY DUE COURSE to the petition for failure to
sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
On June 8, 2007, a Decision was then promulgated by this Court involving the same case, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the January 14, 2004 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 affirming the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi
City RTC is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Declaring the DepEd (formerly DECS), Division ofAlbay to have the rights of possession and usufruct over Lot 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T83946 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay, as a result of laches on the part of respondent Celso Oate and his predecessors-in-interest. Respondent Celso Oate, his heirs, assigns,
and successors-in-interest are prohibited from selling, mortgaging, or encumbering Lot 6849-A while the said lot is still being used and occupied by petitioner DECS. However, the
rights of possession and usufruct will be restored to respondent the moment petitioner DECS no longer needs the said lot. The Registry of Deeds of Albay is ordered to annotate
the aforementioned restrictions and conditions at the back of TCT No. T-83946-A in the name of respondent Celso Oate. Item No. 2 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the
Legaspi City RTC is modified accordingly;
2) Declaring Celso Oate as the true and legal owner in fee simple of the following lots:
a. Lot 6849-C with an area of 10,000 square meters under
TCT No. T-83948 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay;
b. Lot 6849-D with an area of 1,127 square meters under TCT No. T-83949 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; and
c. Lot 6849-E with an area of 608 square meters under TCT No. T-83950 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay.
3) Declaring Mariano M. Lim as true and legal owner of Lot 6849-B with an area of 3,100 square meters under TCT No. T-84049 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay;
4) Ordering petitioner DECS and all other persons claiming under said department to return the possession of Lots 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E to respondent Celso Oate and
Lot 6849-B to Mariano M. Lim; and
5) Deleting Item No. 4 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC, which ordered respondent Celso Oate to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 50,000) to defendant
Municipality of Daraga, Albay.
The November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No costs.
Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration [1] which was posted on July 24, 2007 and received by this Court on August 1, 2007. A Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Clarification[2] was posted by respondent on August 9, 2007, which was received by this Court on August 21, 2007.
Although this Court, as a rule, does not allow the filing of a Motion for Extension to file Motion for Reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading, nonetheless, this Court takes
into consideration the circumstances surrounding this case and deems it prudent to admit said motion. As was held in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson, the rule
shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts,

the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court.Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. [3]
In said Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification, respondent prays that a clarification be made regarding the June 6, 2007 Resolution of the Second Division and the June 8,
2007 Decision, and that DECS be ordered to pay rentals from 1960 up to the present or that DECS be ordered to buy said lot under TCT No. T-83946 through negotiated sale in
the highest interest of justice. Respondent submits that the June 6, 2007 Resolution of the Court is valid and binding; hence, the Decision promulgated on June 8, 2007 has no
legal force and effect.
A Motion for Reconsideration is a remedy in law which grants a party the opportunity to point out any mistakes which it believes the Court committed in its penned decision,
whereas for the latter, the opportunity to correct itself in order to avoid an injustice. Likewise, it will give said party chance to amplify its stand on the issues that it raised before
the Court.
The Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.
During the division session on June 6, 2007, the draft ponencia submitted by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was deliberated upon and approved. However, through human error
and inadvertence, the action taken in another case, which was the denial of the petition, was applied in the instant case. As a result, a Minute Resolution dated June 6, 2007,
denying due course to the petition for lack of reversible error, was erroneously prepared and released.
The Court therefore regrets the mistake committed and the confusion that resulted from it.
Anent the issue on the prayer of the respondent that DECS be ordered to pay rentals from 1960 up to the present or that DECS be ordered to buy said lot under TCT No. T-83946
through negotiated sale in the highest interest of justice, the Court reproduces its discussion in the June 8, 2007 Decision:
Laches has set in
A brief scrutiny of the records does show tell-tale signs of laches. The first element is undisputed: the then Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed in 1940 on
a portion of disputed Lot 6849, specifically Lot No. 6849-A containing 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946. Moreover, Mrs. Toribia Milleza, a retired government
employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga since 1955 pertinently testified, thus:

Q:
A:

How long have you been residing in this place, Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay?
Maybe I stayed there in 1955 until the present.
xxxx

Q:
A:

Now, can you further recall the kind of building that was constructed in this property?
Seva type, building.

Q:
A:

At present how many buildings were constructed in this property?

Plenty of school buildings.

Q:
A:

Now, how many buildings were first constructed in [sic] this property?
In 1955 only one, the Seva type, then there was constructed five (5) Marcos Type buildings during the Marcos time.

The devotion of Lot No. 6849-A to education started in 1940 and continued up to December 21, 1988 when said lot was donated to the DECS. From then on, DECS built various
buildings and introduced improvements on said lot. Lot No. 6849-A was continuously used for public education until March 18, 1993 when respondent Oate filed Civil Case No.
8715 and thereafter up to the present.
Thus, for a total period of more than fifty-two (52) years, Lot No. 6849-A was exclusively and completely utilized by DECS for public education. This fact was not successfully
challenged nor refuted by respondent.

The second element of laches was likewise proven. No evidence was presented to show that respondent or his predecessors-in-interest ever took any action, administrative or
judicial, nor either party questioned or protested the Municipality's adverse occupation of a portion of Lot 6849. As petitioner had demonstrated laches by persuasive and credible
evidence, it is incumbent upon respondent to show that his predecessors-in-interest indeed protected their rights of ownership over the lot. Thus, as early as 1940, when the first
Seva type school building was constructed over a portion of the disputed lot, now Lot 6849-A, respondent must prove that his predecessors-in-interest indeed undertook activities
to contest the occupation of the portion of the lot by the Municipality and subsequently by petitioner DECS. Unfortunately, respondent failed to substantiate such defense of
ownership and possession of the lot and even skirted this issue.
Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when he was 23 years old. He asserted that he took possession of said lot in the same year when his two (2)
uncles, the brothers of his late father, passed on to him the disputed lot as his father's share of the inheritance from the late Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Banos (his
grandparents). However, it is interesting to note that he testified that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary school was built on a portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849A. These assertions are irreconcilable. Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing
elementary school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the owner starts possessing a property.
Nonetheless, even granting that respondent indeed only came to know of such encroachment or occupation in 1991, his rights cannot be better than that of his predecessors-ininterest, that is, Claro Oate and his uncles, Antonio and Rafael, who died in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Since respondent's right over the lot originated from his predecessorsin-interest, then he cannot have better rights over Lot No. 6849-A than the latter. The spring cannot rise higher than its source. Besides, respondent has not proffered any
explanation why his predecessors-in-interest did not protest and challenge the Municipality's occupancy over a portion of their lot. Verily, with the span of around 52 years
afforded respondent and his predecessors-in-interest, their inaction and delay in protecting their rights were certainly excessive and unjustified.
In the third element, the records clearly bear out the fact that petitioner DECS did not know nor anticipate that their possession and occupancy of a portion of Lot 6849 would
later be questioned. In fact, petitioner built additional school buildings and facilities on the school site amounting to more than PhP 11 million. Mr. Jose Adra, School Principal of
the Daraga North Central Elementary School, testified on the donation of the disputed lot to petitioner and the cost of the improvements on it. After more than forty-eight (48)
years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession by petitioner DECS, it had no knowledge nor reason to believe that respondent would assert any right over the lot
after the lapse of such long occupation coupled with a tax declaration in the name of the Daraga Municipality.
Finally, the last element is likewise proven by the antecedent facts that clearly show grave prejudice to the government, in general, and to petitioner, in particular, if the instant
action is not barred without even considering the cost of the construction of the school buildings and facilities and the deleterious effect on the school children and affected school
teachers and personnel if Lot No. 6849-A would be returned to respondent.
Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations. In the instant case, with the foregoing
considerations, we are constrained from giving approbation to the trial and appellate courts' ruling that the application of the principle of laches would subvert the ends of justice.
Indeed, it is unjust for the State and the affected citizenry to suffer after respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had slept on their rights for 52 years.
Also, the inaction of respondent Oate and his predecessors-in-interest for over 50 years has reduced their right to regain possession of Lot 6849-A to a stale demand.
Based on the foregoing discussion, respondent's prayer that DECS be made to pay rentals cannot be granted as DECS has acquired the right of usufruct over the property based
on the equitable ground of laches. Anent the plea to require DECS to buy said lot, it is a matter to be negotiated by the parties and outside the ambit of the instant petition.
In light of these conflicting issuances, the Court RECALLS the June 6, 2007 Minute Resolution, andAFFIRMS the June 8, 2007 Decision.
SO ORDERED.

MWSS VS. ACT THEATER INC.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated
January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581, which affirmed the civil aspect of the Decision 2 dated May 5, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 77, directing the petitioner MWSS to pay the respondent Act Theater, Inc. damages and attorneys fees.
The present case stemmed from the consolidated cases of Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Tabian, et al., for violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 401, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 876, and Civil Case No. Q-88-768 entitled Act Theater, Inc. v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. The two cases
were jointly tried in the court a quo as they arose from the same factual circumstances, to wit:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were
apprehended by members of the Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. The respondents
employees were subsequently criminally charged (Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo. On account of the incident, the respondents water service
connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. Q-88-768) against the petitioner MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a quo that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondents
water service connection without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondents patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were
adversely affected. The respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay damages.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the four (4) above-named Accused are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.3
In Civil Case No. Q-88-768
...
1. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P25,000.00; and to return the sum of P200,000.00 deposited by the
plaintiff for the restoration of its water services after its disconnection on September 23, 1988;
2. Defendants counterclaim for undercollection of P530,759.96 is dismissed for lack of merit;
3. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay costs of suit;
4. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;

5. Making the mandatory injunction earlier issued to plaintiff Act Theater, Inc. permanent.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the aforesaid decision to the CA. The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. According to the CA, the court a quo
correctly found that the petitioners act of cutting off the respondents water service connection without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the latter justifying the
award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Undaunted, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] VALIDLY AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN RESOLVING THE
PETITIONERS APPEAL;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY UPHELD THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 429 OF THE SAME CODE.5
Preliminarily, the petitioner harps on the fact that, in quoting the decretal portion of the court a quos decision, the CA erroneously typed P500,000 as the attorneys fees awarded in
favor of the respondent when the same should only be P5,000. In any case, according to the petitioner, whether the amount is P500,000 or P5,000, the award of attorneys fees is
improper considering that there was no discussion or statement in the body of the assailed decision justifying such award. The petitioner insists that in cutting off the respondents
water service connection, the petitioner merely exercised its proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the petitioner in justifying its act of disconnecting the water supply of the respondent without prior notice, reads:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as
may be reasonable to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, 6 constitutive of a legally enforceable claim
of one person against the other.7

Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. 8
Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of ones rights:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. 9 In this case,
the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondents water service connection. As correctly
found by the appellate court:
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to the disconnection of the latters water services, this was done only a few hours
before the actual disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter, Act sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he
was treated badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act. Acts water services were cut at midnight of the day following the apprehension of the
employees. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it was deprived of the water services. As a consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to
provide water for a number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services.10
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a quo and the appellate court that the petitioners act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial
to the respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the amount of P500,000 as attorneys fees in that portion of the assailed decision which quoted the fallo of the court a quos decision was obviously a typographical error. As
attorneys fees, the court a quo awarded the amount of P5,000 only. It was this amount, as well as actual and compensatory damages of P25,000 and the reimbursement of P200,000
deposited by the respondent for the restoration of its water supply, that the CA affirmed, as it expressly stated in its dispositive portion that "finding no cogent reason to reverse the
appealed Decision which is in conformity with the law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED." 11
The award of P5,000 as attorneys fees is reasonable and warranted. Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by
reason of an unjustified act of the other party.12
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581 is AFFIRMED in toto.

PNB VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking a reversal of the Court of Appeals resolution in CA-G.R. SP
No. 48660 dated August 25, 1998, which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 60 in LRC Case No. M-2635.
Sometime during the late 70s, the spouses Godofredo and Wilma Monsod obtained a loan in the amount of P120,000.00 from petitioner
Philippine National Bank (PNB). To secure their loan, the Monsods mortgaged to PNB a parcel of land covered by TCT No. S-84843, located
within the Monte Villa de Monsod Subdivision in Paraaque, Rizal.
Due to Monsods failure to pay their loan obligation, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction sale of the subject real
property, PNB was declared the highest bidder. On December 21, 1981, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of PNB, and was registered
on July 11, 1984.1
Upon expiration of the redemption period on July 12, 1985, ownership of the property was consolidated in PNB. Thereafter, TCT No. S84843 was cancelled and TCT No. 99480 was issued in PNBs name.2
On June 23, 1992, PNB filed an "Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession" with Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as LRC Case No. M-2635. Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended, the trial court conducted an ex
parte hearing. PNBs representative testified that the foreclosed property is occupied by one Ernesto Austria. According to PNB, Mr. Austria
was invited by the bank to a conference to discuss the ownership of the foreclosed lot, however, he did not honor the banks invitation. 3
On August 28, 1992, the trial court granted PNBs petition and a writ of possession was issued on October 26, 1992.4
On December 11, 1992, respondents Ernesto and Loreto Quintana Austria filed a "Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
Enforcement of the Writ of Possession." The Austrias alleged that they are the actual occupants of the subject lot, which they purportedly
bought from the Monsods as early as 1974. They claimed that the foreclosed property was enclosed within a concrete fence and formed
part of their family compound. PNB allegedly knew of this fact even before it granted the loan to the Monsods, because the banks credit
investigators were advised of the same when they inspected the property in the summer of 1976. Consequently, the Austrias maintained
that the issuance of the possessory writ ex parte was improper, since it will deprive them of their property without due process.5
Due to the Austrias refusal to vacate the premises, the sheriff failed to enforce the challenged writ.
On July 27, 1993, on motion of PNB, the trial court issued an alias writ of possession. Again, the writ was not implemented.6
On September 17, 1993, the sheriff sought to enforce the first alias writ of possession for the second time. The Austrias filed a "Second
Motion for Intervention" seeking to restrain the enforcement of the writ of possession issued on October 26, 1992.7 PNB then filed an
"Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Break Open Order"8and, subsequently, an Opposition to the Austrias Second Motion for
Intervention.9

On January 31, 1994, the trial court denied the Austrias second motion and granted PNBs "Motion for Issuance of Break Open Order." The
trial court ruled that the Austrias can no longer be permitted to intervene in the case during said stage of the proceedings and that the
remedy of the Austrias was to file an ordinary civil action to assert their claim of ownership over the property.10
In the meantime, the first alias writ of possession lapsed. PNB thus filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Possession,"11 and on November 29, 1994, a second alias writ was issued.12
Unfazed, the Austrias filed an Omnibus Motion on January 25, 1995, seeking a recall of the second alias writ and a reconsideration of the
trial courts order denying their motion to intervene.13 Meanwhile, the second alias writ had likewise expired.
PNB filed a "Manifestation and Motion for Issuance of Third Alias Writ of Possession," which the trial court granted anew in an order dated
October 10, 1995.14
However, on December 12, 1995, the Austrias again filed a motion to set aside the trial courts order dated October 10, 1995 and to recall
the third alias writ.15
Consequent to the filing of this fourth motion, the sheriff again failed to implement the third alias writ, which also lapsed. Thus, on
February 15, 1996, PNB filed another "Motion for Issuance of a Fourth Alias Writ,"16 which was granted on March 26, 1996.
The trial court, after hearing the Austrias fourth motion, issued an order on October 4, 1996, denying the same, on the ground that the
issuance of a possessory writ for a property sold at public auction pursuant to an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding was a ministerial
duty on its part. The Austrias failed to establish any legal ground for recalling the writs, even as they claimed a superior right to the
subject property.17
On February 19, 1997, the fourth alias writ was issued by the trial court. The writ was partially implemented with the posting of PNB
security guards within the premises of the foreclosed lot.18
On April 17, 1997, the Austrias, for the fifth time, filed a motion to stop the enforcement of the fourth alias writ and to set aside all prior
writs issued by the trial court.19
In the meantime, the Austrias filed before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, an action for cancellation of PNBs title to the property,
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0184.20
On October 28, 1997, the trial court denied the Austrias fifth motion but ruled that: "any writ of possession that may be issued in this
case, is declared unenforceable against the MOVANTS ERNESTO AUSTRIA and the HEIRS OF LORETO AUSTRIA, until the Court declares
otherwise."21
PNB filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on May 20, 1998.22 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
was filed by PNB before the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, stating:
There is no prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in issuing his assailed Order which the Court
finds to be in accord with law, the pertinent rules and jurisprudence cited therein.

Hence, PNB filed the instant petition, contending that:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR BY SIMPLY ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT WRIT OF
POSSESSION CANNOT BE ENFORCED AGAINST RESPONDENT AUSTRIA. SAID FINDINGS ARE UNPROVEN AND UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN:
A) SUPPORTING THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE OCTOBER 28, 1997 ORDER. THE RULINGS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE
NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AGAINST RESPONDENTS. RESPONDENTS WERE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
BUT NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM;
B) NOT GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE FACT THAT PNB HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO POSSESS THE PROPERTY AS ITS REGISTERED
OWNER;
C) LOSING SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT BELATEDLY ISSUED THE OCTOBER 28, 1997 ORDER DIRECTING THAT THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION CANNOT BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS. THE TRIAL COURT HAD EARLIER ISSUED FOUR (4) POSSESSORY WRITS
ALL OF WHICH WERE DIRECTED AGAINST RESPONDENTS AUSTRIA & QUINTANA.23
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not an ex-parte writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended,
can be enforced against a third person who is in actual possession of the foreclosed property and who is not in privity with the
debtor/mortgagor.24
Petitioner PNB maintains that the trial courts order was based on the unproven allegation that respondents had purchased the property
from the Monsods before the latter mortgaged it to PNB. According to petitioner PNB, respondents did not adduce any proof to support
their claim of ownership, even as they were repeatedly given the opportunity to do so during the hearings on the numerous motions filed
by respondents themselves.
Petitioner PNB also submits that since it is the registered owner of the property, it is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right.
The bank insists that it could rely on the title of the registered land which does not have any annotation of respondents supposed rights.
Petitioner PNB likewise avers that the trial court could not now belatedly refuse to enforce the writ of possession against respondents. The
trial court had already issued a total of four possessory writs directing the ouster of all occupants of the lot, including respondents herein.
On the other hand, respondents assert that the trial court correctly held that the writ of possession can only be implemented against the
debtor/mortgagor and his successors-in-interest. Since respondents acquired their rights as owners of the property by virtue of a sale
made to them by the Monsods prior to the banks mortgage lien, respondents can not be dispossessed therefrom without due notice and
hearing, through the simple expedient of an ex-parte possessory writ.

We agree with respondents. Under applicable laws and jurisprudence, they can not be ejected from the property by means of an exparte writ of possession.
The operative provision under Act No. 3135, as amended,25 is Section 6, which states:
Sec. 6. Redemption. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his
successors in interest or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be
governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in
so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (Italics ours)
Despite the evolutionary development of our procedural laws throughout the years, the pertinent rule in the Code of Civil
Procedure26 remains practically unchanged. Particularly, Rule 39, Section 33, second paragraph, which relates to the right of possession of
a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale:
Sec. 33. x x x
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor. (Italics ours)
Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court,27 we held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex-parte writ of possession in favor of
the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the
property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The same principle was inversely applied in a more recent
case,28 where we ruled that a writ of possession may be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, only if the debtor is
in possession and no third party had intervened. Although the factual nuances of this case may slightly differ from the aforecited cases,
the availing circumstances are undeniably similar a party in possession of the foreclosed property is asserting a right adverse to the
debtor/mortgagor and is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of possession was applied for.
It should be stressed that the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements are not without support in substantive law. Notably, the Civil Code
protects the actual possessor of a property, to wit:
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property.
Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial
action for its physical recovery. The term "judicial process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which
the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process" as
contemplated above. Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession as

purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party "sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."29
It should be emphasized that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule
68 of the Rules of Court, any property brought within the ambit of the act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court of
justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.30
As such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty, who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor,
will have no opportunity to be heard on his claim in a proceeding of this nature. It stands to reason, therefore, that such third person may
not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex-parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in
violation of the basic tenets of due process.
Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of the Civil Code, cited above, requires nothing less than an action for ejectment to be brought
even by the true owner. After all, the actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal presumption of just title in his favor,31 which must be
overcome by the party claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, petitioner PNB admitted that as early as 1990, it was aware that the subject lot was occupied by the Austrias. Yet,
instead of bringing an action in court for the ejectment of respondents, it chose to simply file an ex-parte petition for a writ of possession
pursuant to its alleged right as purchaser in the extra-judicial foreclosure sale. We cannot sanction this procedural shortcut. To enforce the
writ against an unwitting third party possessor, who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would be tantamount to the taking of real
property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention.
Consequently, it was not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act No. 3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster of respondents
from the lot subject of this instant case. The trial court was without authority to grant theex-parte writ, since petitioner PNBs right of
possession under said Act could be rightfully recognized only against the Monsods and the latters successors-in-interest, but not against
respondents who assert a right adverse to the Monsods. Hence, the trial court cannot be precluded from correcting itself by refusing to
enforce the writs it had previously issued. Its lack of authority to direct issuance of the writs against respondents assured that its earlier
orders would never attain finality in the first place.
In the same vein, respondents are not obliged to prove their ownership of the foreclosed lot in the ex-parteproceedings conducted below.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to determine who between the parties is entitled to ownership and possession of the foreclosed lot.
Likewise, registration of the lot in petitioner PNBs name does not automatically entitle the latter to possession thereof. As discussed
earlier, petitioner PNB must resort to the appropriate judicial process for recovery of the property and cannot simply invoke its title in
an ex-parte proceeding to justify the ouster of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 48660 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CALUB VS. COURT OF APPEALS

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order
had denied petitioners' (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of replevin.2
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75,
being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced
lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. . . .3

Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4 Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts.5 Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in
Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code.6
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub
this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.7
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan
and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an
equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia,
and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.8
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court
ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao
and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and
ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.9
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery
of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court
granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992. 10 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which
was denied by the trial court. 11
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for
Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further
proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products
seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products
seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme
Court. 12 In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition. 13
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority
granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the
appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of
illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or
policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court
said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under
Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277. 14
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series
of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a
report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners' failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR

Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners' counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to
the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject
vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis. 15
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners' claim that private respondents' complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had
not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary
liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the
scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the
possession of the property of another. 16
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody
because they were contradicted by its own findings. 17 Their petition was found without merit. 18
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors: 19
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS
AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA
LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78
states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the
penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were
loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest

products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the
Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public
prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry
Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of
this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any
forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense.
. . [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. All conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally
whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in
favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. The Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural
resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR areauthorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto.
Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the
nearest DENR field offices, and turn oversaid forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made
by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is
most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of
said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners' failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.
Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following
the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when
one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR
Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin.
The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a
confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly
deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the
custody of the law, and not otherwise. 20

In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a Deputy
Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor
of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property
already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial
Sheriff's Return, and wait for the judge's instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we
elucidated further:
. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their
execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of
replevin. . . 21
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the
State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. 22 And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect,
a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. 23However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. 24 In the present case,
the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are
clearly official in nature. 25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their
part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General's line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. 26 If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived
and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it. 27
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE.1wphi1 Consequently,
the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are
ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate
number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable
Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INC. VS. PNCC

FACTS:
Superlines Transportation Company (Superlines) is engaged in the business of providing public transportation. On 13 December 1990,
one of its buses swerved and crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC). The incident
was initially investigated by PNCCs toll way patrol, Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic control and security
department of the South Luzon toll way. The bus was then towed by the PNCC patrol upon request of traffic investigator Cesar Lopera.
Superlines made several requests for PNCC to release the bus, but Balubal denied the same, despite Superlines undertaking to repair the
damaged radio room. Superlines thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages against PNCC and Balubal. The
claim for damages, however, failed to implead Lopera and any other police officer responsible for the seizure and distraint of the bus as
indispensable parties.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Superlines claim for damages against can be passed upon. Whether or not Superlines failure to implead indispensable
parties is fatal to its cause of action.
RULING:
Anent the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The reason is that a contract of deposit was perfected between the
police authorities, through Lopera, and PNCC, the former having turned over the bus to PNCC for safekeeping. Hence, for Superlines to
pursue its claim for damages, it or the trial court motu proprio must implead as defendants the indispensable parties. With respect to the
second issue, the Court ruled, again, in the negative. Accordingly, the failure of Superlines to implead indispensable parties is not fatal to
its cause of action, since misjoinder or non-joinder of parties is not a ground for its dismissal. In other words, the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. According to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the petition for its failure
to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

SUAREZ VS. SPOUSES EMBOY JR.

Facts:
Respondent spouses Felix and Marilou Emboy inherited a 222 sq.m. lot, Lot No. 1907-A-2 covered by TCT No. T-174880, from their
mother, Claudia. The lot was originally part of a bigger property, Lot No. 1907-A, which was partitioned into 5 different lots for Claudia and
her siblings as inheritance from their parents Carlos Padilla and Asuncion Pacres. In 2004, the respondents were asked by their cousins,
the heirs of Vicente (Claudia's brother) to vacate the subject lot and transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5 which was a landlocked portion without a
right of way. The respondents refused, insisting that Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2. Shortly thereafter, the
respondents received a demand letter from counsel of the petitioner, requiring them to vacate the said lot on the information that
petitioner had already purchased the said lot from the respondent's relatives on Feb. 12, 2004. Respondents refused and went on to file a
complaint for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heir's respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A after
examining the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovering possible anomalies like forged signatures and alterations in the
execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to the same lot.
The petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents on Dec. 8, 2004 before the MTCC alleging that she bought
the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia, the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the
respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance.
The MTCC upheld respondent's claims in its 2006 decision and ordered the respondents to vacate the subject lot and remove at
their expence all the improvements they had built thereon. The RTC in its 2008 decision affirmed the MTCC ruling. Through a petition for
review filed before the CA, respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades
while petitioner was buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the
subject lot's title. The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to petitioner, had never
physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for petitioner's claim that the respondents' possession of the subject lot
was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners. Respondents also discovered a duly notarized document showing that Vicente and his
spouse, Dionesoa, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A when he used the same as a collateral in obtaining a loan from
PNB. The loan was paid for by Carlos and Asuncion. Based on this discoveries, the Heirs of Vicente did not have the rights over the subject
lot to convey to petitioner. Respondents also averred that petitioner's complaint lacked a cause of action because the certification to file
an action was issued in the name of James Tan Suarez (petitioner's brother), who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot. Also,
no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after the execution of the deed of sale (April 1, 2004), which served as petitioner's
primary basis for her claim to the property. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date of its
service should be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit can be filed.

Issues:
Whether or not Carmencita's comlaint againts the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents' petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new
certificates of title can abate Carmencita's ejectment suit.

Ruling:
1. Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present in the case at bar. Without
a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof
from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
2. As an exception to the general rule, the respondents petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A can abate
Carmencitas suit for unlawful detainer. Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the
respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the
defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of
Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencitas complaint be
granted, the respondents house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing
circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.

ASIS VS. ASIS VDA. DE GUEVARRA

In an action for unlawful detainer, the municipal or metropolitan trial court has jurisdiction when the plaintiff really and primarily seeks the restoration of
possession; even if there is a need to resolve the ownership of the disputed property to determine who has prior possession. As long as the issue of
ownership is to be ascertained ONLY for the purpose of determining the issue of possession, then the court can make a declaration who among the
contending parties is the real owner of the property. Any such pronouncement is to be regarded merely as provisional, and will not bar nor prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the disputed property. 1
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated November 26, 2004 issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 76187, and the Resolution dated March 18, 2005 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are simple, and substantially culled from the CAs account. 2
Respondent Consuelo Asis Vda. De Guevarra, claiming to be the owner of the apartment units located at 1495, 1497 and 1499 7th Street, Fabie
Subdivision, Paco, Manila, filed separate ejectment cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) against her brothers Romeo, Oscar and
Eduardo, all surnamed Asis, the petitioners herein.3 In her complaint, respondent admits that the land on which the apartment units were built are
owned in common by her and her siblings, including petitioners,4 but alleges that she alone owns the apartment units, having paid for the construction
of the same, and that the name of petitioners had only been included in the title of the property at the instance and benevolence of respondent.5 She
then alleges that petitioners, as lessees of the apartment units, had been paying her for several years monthly rentals of P500.00, P1,000.00
and P2,000.00 respectively, for their occupation of the apartment units.6 All of a sudden, and she states that for no justifiable reason, petitioners
stopped paying rent. 7 Despite repeated demands, they failed and refused to pay.8 When the matter could not be settled by the Barangay Lupon,9 a
"Certification to File Action" was issued. The cases against petitioners were then consolidated, as they involved common issues and questions of fact and
law.
In their respective Answers, petitioners claim that they are co-owners not only of the lot but also of the apartment units, by virtue of inheritance,
because it was their parents the original owners of the land who had constructed the apartment units by way of loan and mortgage of the land with
the Philippine National Bank in 1964.10 They each claimed that they have never paid any rental for the occupation of the apartment units to
respondent.11 Petitioner Eduardo added that any money he may have given to respondent was in the form ofabuloy (alms), since respondent was their
eldest sister, and a widow without children.12 In their petition with this Court, they admit to having previously paid the exact amounts specified by
respondent monthly, but averred that these were not rentals but contributions for the upkeep and maintenance of the premises. 13
The records show that petitioners claim of co-ownership over the apartment units is solely based on the principle of accession. They argue that since
they can establish possession of the apartment units during the lifetime of their parentswho were then owners of the parcel of land and the

buildings/improvements situated thereon,14then their inheritance as compulsory heirs must necessarily include ownership not only of the land but also
of the improvements.
The MeTC ruled for respondent, finding sufficient basis for the valid ejectment of petitioners thus:
On the issue of whether or not [respondent] could validly eject the [petitioners] from the apartment [units], the Court find[s] basis to sustain the
[respondent].
[Petitioners] claim that they, together with the [respondent] are co-owners not only of the lot but also of the apartment [units]. They posit this claim by
their mere argument that the accessory follows the principal. But this issue should not be resolved by a blinded adherence to such legal principle when
evidence shows otherwise.
[Respondent] never denied that the lot upon which the apartment [units were] erected is owned in common by her and her siblings. She claims
ownership only on the apartment [units]. She support[s] this with the records of her real property loan with the [Social Security Systems] and the Tax
Declaration which are solely in her name. [Petitioners] have nothing to refute the authenticity of the said documents other than their naked claim and
stubborn insistence of co-ownership.
[Petitioners] could not also convince this Court that what they were paying to the [respondent] were not rents but contribution to the upkeep and
maintenance of the premises as well as aid to the [respondent] who is their elder sister. On the face of this gratuitous allegation[s], [respondent] has
presented several receipts to establish that defendants were paying rental but stopped doing so[,] prompting her to file the instant case for ejectment.
[Petitioners] submitted no evidence to disprove their authenticity. 15
The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent, as follows:
Civil Case No. 161644-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Romeo Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under him to vacate Apartment No. 1497 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision,
Paco, Manila;
2. Ordering [petitioner Romeo Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing his rental arrearages from July
1998 up to February, 2000 and the amount of P500.00 a month from March, 2000 and every month thereafter until he finally vacates the premises, as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises.
Civil Case No. 161645-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Oscar Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under him to vacate Apartment No. 1495 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision,
Paco, Manila;
2. Ordering [petitioner Oscar Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P22,000.00) representing his rental arrearages from
May, 1998 up to February 2000 and the amount ofP1,000.00 a month from March, 2000 and every month thereafter until he finally vacates the
premises, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises.
Civil Case No. 161646-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Eduardo Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under him to vacate Apartment No. 1499 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision,
Paco, Manila;

2. Ordering [petitioner Eduardo Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P38,000.00) representing his rental arrearage
from August, 1998 up to February, 2000 and the amount ofP2,000.00 a month from March, 2000 and every month thereafter until he finally vacates the
premises, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises.
Ordering all [petitioners] to pay [respondent], jointly and severally the sum of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the costs of suit.
[Petitioners] counterclaim[s] are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 16
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)17 reversed the Consolidated Decision of the MeTC on the ground that the latter had no jurisdiction over the
case since it involved not only possession of the lot but of the rights of the parties on the building constructed thereon. Relying heavily on the case
of Chua Peng Hian v. CA,18 the RTC ruled:
On hindsight, and yes, what escaped the attention of the [MeTC] was the averments of the initiatory pleading, the [petitioners] formal reaction thereto,
and papers subsequent to the preliminary conference of November 16, 1999, with respect to the controversy as to the matter of exclusive dominion
over the apartment units vis--vis the acknowledged co-ownership of the lot. Indeed, there was no unanimity of thought as to ownership of the lot and
building thereon which thus constrained this Court to equate thecasus belli at hand to the scenario portrayed by Mr. Justice Aquino in [Chua Peng Hian
vs. Court of Appeals] (133 SCRA 572, 575 [1984]; cited [in] 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 8th Revised Edition, 2002, at page 801) which may
well apply herein, thusly.
We hold that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case. Where the issues raised before the inferior court do not only involve possession of
the lot but also the rights of the parties to the building constructed thereon, the Court of First Instance and not the municipal or city court has
jurisdiction over the case. (citations and emphasis omitted)
Even then, and mindful of the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellate court can hardly render a
categorical disposition based on the entire record in accordance with Section 7 thereof, relative to the nagging query as to the rights of the parties over
the building, inasmuch as the proviso under Section 8 of the same Rule was conditional upon reception of evidence on which the judgment of the
lower court was based peculiar to a a trial on the merits by the lower court, which circumstances are anathema to a civil suit envisioned by the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. (citations omitted) 19
The RTC ruling was likewise reversed and set aside by the CA,20 and the decision of the MeTC was reinstated. The CA ruled that the Chua Peng
Hian case relied upon by the RTC was not applicable to the case at bar, since the action there was for specific performance of the stipulations in a lease
contract which was filed with the RTC, whereas the present case is for eviction of tenants through an unlawful detainer action. The CA thus explained:
x x x However, it must be stressed that the Chua Peng Hian case involves the recovery of possession of a leased lot where the lessee bound himself to
transfer to the lessor the building which he erected thereon. It was an action for specific performance. On the other hand, in the case at bar,
[respondent] sought the eviction of her tenants from her apartment units in an action for unlawful detainer. The Supreme Court further explained in the
case of Chua Peng Hian that, "the action was for specific performance of the stipulations of a lease contract. It was not capable of pecuniary estimation.
It was within the [exclusive original jurisdiction] of the Court of First Instance." Evidently, the ruling in that case is not applicable to the case at bar.21
Further, the CA sustained the jurisdiction of the MeTC to rule on the issue of ownership for the purpose of determining who had the right of possession,
based on the explicit grant in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus:
Furthermore, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
We should emphasize that the only issue involved in ejectment proceedings is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, that
is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.Moreover, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that in ejectment proceedings where the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts have the power to resolve the issue of ownership but only to
determine the issue of possession. This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Aznar Brothers Realty vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 359, where the
Supreme Court held that, "In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto. However, when the issue of possession cannot be
decided without resolving the issue, the court may receive evidence upon the question of title to property but solely for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession."
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that the [MeTC] has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case. Even if [petitioners] raised the issue
of ownership, the [MeTC] can still determine the validity of their claim on which they justify their right to possess. "The MeTC acts correctly if it receives
evidence on ownership where the question of possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership"Paz vs. Reyes, 327 SCRA 605. It
is now a well-settled rule that inferior courts are not divested of jurisdiction over ejectment cases just because the defendants assert ownership over the
litigated property (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 714).22
Petitioners now come before this Court arguing that a grave reversible error was committed by the CA in overturning the decision of the RTC, on the
grounds that (a) Chua Peng Hian23 applies to the instant case because the complaint filed by respondent at the MeTC did not make out an action of
ejectment; and (b) petitioners could not be ejected because they are co-owners of the apartment units.
The petition must fail.
Petitioners cannot negate the jurisdiction of the MeTC by invoking the Chua Peng Hian case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the RTC erred when it
was applied to the case at bar. What was filed therein was an action for specific performance [with the then Court of First Instance], and it was the
defendant there who raised the issue that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction, implying that the case was really an issue of possession. Thus,
it was in this context that this Court held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case, not only because the issues raised do not only
involve the possession of the land, but also the rights of the parties to the building constructed thereon.
This portion of the Chua Peng Hian decision therefore was taken out of context by the RTC when it quoted the same to justify its ruling that the MeTC had
no jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, the Chua Peng Hiandoctrine enunciated in the 1984 case should be taken in light of Section 16, Rule 70 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is categorical. The issue of ownership raised as a defense will not oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case, as the court can rule on the issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has right to possess the disputed property. "When the
defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession."24
Moreover, petitioners objections to the MeTC jurisdiction all rest on the supposed "exception" to the jurisdiction over ejectment cases, anchored on the
proposition that "when the issue of ownership is so necessarily involved with the issue of physical possession that it cannot be determined without
resolving the issue of ownership, the court loses its jurisdiction."25
Unfortunately for petitioners, the cases cited in support of this "exception" were all decided prior to Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129. And this "exception"
to the MeTC jurisdiction was removed, and the rule modified by B.P. Blg. 129, which provides that in ejectment proceedings where the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, all inferior courts have the power to resolve the issue of ownership but only to
determine the issue of possession (Sec. 33 [2], changing the rule in Sec. 3 [c], R.A. No. 5967, which was then applicable to City Courts).26 Even more so

after the promulgation of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, with its clear grant of power under Section 16, Rule 70. It is for this reason that
petitioners are unable to cite jurisprudence to support their cause after the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129.
Did the passage of these amendments mean that courts having jurisdiction over ejectment cases can never be ousted of such jurisdiction? This was
explained in Sps. Refugia v. CA,27 where this Court, speaking through J. Regalado, held:
x x x [I]t is clear that prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of
ownership in order to determine only the nature and extent of possession, by reason of which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became apparent
that the issue of possession was intricately interwoven with that of ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which
likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has
been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
where the issue of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership. It finds no proper application where it is otherwise, that is, where
ownership is not in issue, or where the principal and main issue raised in the allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for make out not a
case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.
To ensure that the above policy would be maintained, Refugia also laid down the following guidelines to be observed in relation to the exercise of
jurisdiction over issues of ownership in ejectment proceedings:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of
ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under
consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is
dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession.
Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not
merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such
claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to
real property.
3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the
ejectment case, unless it is sufficiently established that there has been a subsequent change in or termination of that relationship between the parties.
This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of his prior possession,
if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained in some other way, then the inferior
court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue of ownership.

5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve
the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the
issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of
possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in
an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land or building.28
From the foregoing, it is clear that unless petitioners are able to show that the real purpose of the action for ejectment is to recover title to the property,
or otherwise show that the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, then the municipal or metropolitan trial court retains jurisdiction.
This the petitioners failed to prove.
Finally, a careful evaluation of the records of this case also convinces us that the findings of the MeTC are in order, insofar as to the validity of the grant
of eviction. Again, we stress that the decision of the MeTC finding respondent as the owner of the apartment units is merely to determine the right of
possession. It will not bar any of the parties from filing a suit with the proper court to determine conclusively the title to the disputed property.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Consolidated Decision dated March 7, 2000, rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC VS. SUNVAR REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:

Petitioners Republic and NAPOCOR are registered co-owners of a parcel of land which they leased to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years
ending on December 31, 2002. The TRCFI was given the right to sublease this land, which it did, to Sunvar, through sublease agreements with the common provision that their sublease
agreements were going to expire on December 31, 2002, the date that the TRCFIs lease agreements with the petitioners would expire.
In 1987, when the government was reorganized, the TCFRI was replaced with the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF). Before the expiration date, Sunvar wrote to
PDAF and expressed its desire to renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25 years. PDAF forwarded the letter to
petitioners. By June 25, 2002, PDAF had informed Sunvar of petitioners decisions not to renew the lease.
When the lease contract and the sublease agreements expired, petitioners recovered all the rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the
property.
Six years after the expiry date, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to vacate the subject property. Although Sunvar duly
received the Notice, it did not vacate the property. Almost a year after the first notice, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days. When the
period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property.
Petitioners then filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Sunvar moved to dismiss the complaint, questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC
as the action was supposed to an accion publiciana rather than one for unlawful detainer. The MeTC denied respondents Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and
required Sunvar to submit their Answer.
Despite filing an Answer, Sunvar still filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss. To answer
this petition, petitioners questioned the RTCs jurisdiction and prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition. The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and granted the Rule 65 Petition,
directing the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the instant petition.