UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4942

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JASON WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00123-D-1)

Submitted:

May 27, 2014

Decided:

June 4, 2014

Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion.

David L. Neal, Hillsborough, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Christopher
sentence

following

Jason
his

Williams

guilty

plea

appeals
to

two

his

540-month

counts

of

sex

trafficking of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1),

(b)(2) (2012).

Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Williams
sentence is reasonable. *
supplemental

pro

se

Although advised of his right to file a

brief,

Williams

has

not

done

so.

The

Government seeks to dismiss the appeal based on the appellate

waiver provision in the plea agreement.
We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver.
United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013).

We generally will enforce a

waiver . . . if the record establishes that the waiver is valid

and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the
waiver.

United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

defendants waiver is valid if he agreed to it knowingly and

*

Specifically, counsel questions whether the district court

imposed an unreasonable sentence by treating the Guidelines
provisions for sexual exploitation as reasonable, by not giving
sufficient weight to the [18 U.S.C.] 3553(a) [2012] factors,
and by not downwardly departing given Williamss history of
traumatic sexual abuse as a four-year-old boy.
(Anders Brief
at 1).

intelligently.

United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627

(4th Cir. 2010).

Although the validity of an appeal waiver

often depends on the adequacy of the plea colloquy, the issue

ultimately

is

evaluated

by

reference

to

the

totality

of

the

circumstances, United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 355 (4th

Cir.

2012)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted),

such

as

the

experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the accuseds

educational background and familiarity with the terms of the
plea

agreement.

Thornsbury,

670

F.3d

at

537

(internal

quotation marks omitted).

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Williams knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal
his sentence.

Because the issues he seeks to raise on appeal

fall within the scope of the waiver, we grant the Governments

motion to dismiss Williams appeal of his sentence and dismiss
this portion of the appeal.
Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement
precludes

our

review

of

the

sentence,

the

waiver

does

not

preclude our review of any errors in Williams conviction that

may be revealed pursuant to the review required by Anders.

In

accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and

have found no meritorious issues that are outside the scope of
the appeal waiver.

We therefore affirm the district courts

judgment as to all issues not encompassed by Williams valid

waiver of his right to appeal.
This court requires that counsel inform Williams, in
writing,

of

his

right

to

petition

United States for further review.

the

Supreme

Court

of

the

If Williams requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation.

Counsels motion must

state that a copy thereof was served on Williams.

We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately

presented

in

the

materials

before

this

court

and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART