Marine Safety Forum Safety Flash 14-36

Issued: 6th October 2014

Subject: Breach of Platform Vessel Restricted Zone
While approaching the Platforms to conduct fuel hose work the vessels Chief Officer, driving from the aft conning
position, noted that the Joystick control while being operated from starboard to port made a clicking noise and
became slack. Control was immediately changed to manual and the approach was aborted. Whilst exiting the 500
metres zone the vessel inadvertently breached the vessel restriction zone at the East side of another platform.
Interviews were conducted with the Bridge Team at the time of the incident and the Master who was called
during the incident. A technical investigation was also instigated to ascertain the cause of the joystick issue and
any contributing technical factors.
The incident occurred at 10.30. Due to the restricted visibility at the time of arrival (250m) the vessel went on
standby outside the 500 meter zone. The Bridge Team started the pre-entry checklist at 1200 hrs but this was
not completed due to the restricted visibility preventing alongside work. It was decided to utilise the time on
standby on DP mode to gain some DP time for the Bridge Team.
The vessel set up on DP just over 1 mile from Platform.
After a period of just over 2 hours on DP the visibility had improved enough to meet the minimum visibility
criteria and thus allow the decision to commence the operation.
Weather conditions on location at the time were recorded as:
Wind Dir: ENE
Wind Force: 2
Sea height: 1 metre
Visibility: Poor
Temperature: 21C
Tide Dir; 207 True
Tide Rate; 0.7 knots.
The records of pre-entry checks completion was recorded in the Deck Logbook. The pre-entry checks confirmed
all equipment was operating correctly and the vessel entered the 500 metre zone at 1420 hrs.
At 1438 hrs the Chief Officer was driving the vessel from the aft consul and was going alongside the North Face
whilst the Crane was preparing to lower the hose.
This manoeuvre included thrusting to starboard, as they approached the required station the Chief Officer
moved the Joystick to port to check the starboard movement of the vessel and ease into position.
While moving the stick from starboard to port an unexpected clicking noise was heard and he immediately felt
the tension on the joystick slacken.
The Chief Officer immediately deselected the joystick control and operated the manual thruster controls on the
after consol whilst at the same time asking the 2nd Officer to contact the installation and inform them there was a
problem and they would be pulling off to investigate. The Second Officer informed the Installation and then
immediately called the Master to the bridge. Once the Chief Officer had thrusted off to approximately 40 metres
he decided to utilise the main propulsion to take a clear escape route straight ahead to exit the 500 metres safety
zone.
Prior to entry to the 500 metre zone the main engines and rudders had been set up for split rudder
configuration, with the port rudder set to 30 degrees to starboard and zero pitch on both main engines as per the
diagram on page 3, the Chief Officer applied forward thrust on both engines by moving the propeller pitch to
30% ahead and then prepared to pass control to the forward consol where the 2nd Officer was in a position to
accept control. Navigating from the forward console when going ahead is normal navigational practice and
transfer between the consuls was a routine task that was carried out regularly by all Navigational Officers. In
The information available on this Safety Flash and our associated web site is provided in good faith and only
for the purposes of enhancing safety and best practice. For the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall be
attached to any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.

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order to hand over the control to the ford consul both thruster and pitch controls were set to zero, control is
then passed over from the aft consul to the forrd consul where the 2nd Officer was stationed to accept control. At
this point the Chief Officer stated the vessel began to veer to starboard. The 2 nd Officer was of the opinion that
the vessel was veering to starboard prior to this point.
Both parties confirmed that the 2nd Officer had commented you cant go in there which would suggest the vessel
was already veering to starboard before control was passed.
The 2nd Officer on taking control on the forward consol noticed that the rudder indicator was over to starboard
although he could not confirm whether it was one rudder or both or exactly how may degrees to starboard it was
showing.
He realised that if he applied ahead propulsion before putting the rudder/s to port it would only aggravate the
situation and increase the rate of turn to starboard. The Second Officer therefore activated the forward thrusters
to port to swing the vessels head out of the starboard turn and the vessel exited the restricted zone and once well
clear recorded the time of exit at 1448 hrs.
The Master arrived on the bridge and witnessed the 2nd Officer applying the forward thrusters to correct the
vessels heading and counter the starboard turn.
When the vessel reached a safe distance from the installation, the issue with the joystick was investigated and it
was decided to replace the aft joystick with one from the Stbd Bridge Wing and test it fully. The test proved
successful and when the Master was satisfied with the operational integrity of the joystick the vessel went
alongside to accept the fuel hose.
Later investigation identified a spring in the joystick had broken
Findings

Bridge Team confirmed they were aware of the Restricted Access Zone and they had an installation data
card posted on the bridge. They also stated that they were aware that the Restricted Access Zone was to
protect the risers and they were aware of the location of the risers.

They did not intend to enter the restricted access zone.

The 2nd Officer confirmed at least one of the forward rudder indicators was to starboard.

The rudders had been selected in the joystick configuration.

The vessel confirmed that the after console has been selected prior to the joystick being selected,
therefore the default on disengaging the joystick was to return the control to the aft panel.

The failed joystick was only 5 months old.

The Chief Officer has stated that in hindsight that he should have continued to thrust to port and exit the
500 metre zone by that means before attempting to pass control.

Conclusions

The Chief Officer and all the bridge crew were well aware of the platforms restricted area. There was
never any deliberate intention to enter into it.

The Chief Officer thought when he experienced the slackening of the joystick it had undermined its
operational effectiveness; this was later proven not to be the case.

The Chief Officer had instinctively decided the most suitable course of action was to pull off the
installation immediately and vacate the 500m zone by the shortest route. On the premise that he
believed the joystick had failed completely this was the correct action.

The decision was made to pass over control from the aft consul to the forward consul, during the exit
from the 500 m safety zone. Whilst this was done with the best intention on retrospect it may have been
wiser for the Chief Officer to wait until he had confirmed the vessel was in a safe position prior to
transferring control.

The configuration of the rudders on this vessel is arranged so that when the vessel is on Joystick or DP
mode the rudders work independently of each other. In other words one may be aligned to starboard

The information available on this Safety Flash and our associated web site is provided in good faith and only
for the purposes of enhancing safety and best practice. For the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall be
attached to any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.

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whilst the other is aligned to port. This facility combined with ahead and astern thrust on the drive
gives extremely flexible manoeuvring characteristics for the vessel.
However, when in normal control mode on the aft consul the rudders act as master and slave whereby
the slave takes its signal from the master. This meant that when the joystick was deselected the slave
rudder (Stbd) had to align with the master
(Port) before both rudders could move to the position demanded by the controls. As the master was
aligned to starboard while on joystick the slave had to go to starboard to sync with the Master before
they would move to midships as set by the Chief Officer.
This was not defined clearly enough in the Operations Manual therefore the bridge crew were not fully
aware of this operating configuration.

Normally when changing over from joystick to manual the joystick is put to zero. This then zeros all the
propulsion equipment and also the rudders. In this case the joystick was still set to port and when he
changed over to manual all propulsions went to zero, because their individual follow up system caused
them to do this and the operating handles were at zero, but as we know the port rudder was over to
starboard and as this was the master rudder the starboard rudder had to align with the port rudder. The
lever control on the after consul will not centre the rudders, as there is no follow up system so the lever
has to be physically moved to centre both rudders. This did not happen.

Thrust direction

Thrust direction

Astern

Rudder angle 0

Ahead
Rudder angle 30 to Stbd

Direction of travel to port

Recommendations
1

2
3
4

Recommendations
Manufacturers to check system and modify where applicable, in particular to change the
system on the after consul so that we have a follow up system. Also an emergency system to be
integrated on the after consul
Vessels with similar systems to be checked and all information contained within this report to
be shared with them
Safety alert to be sent to the fleet and MSF
Information regarding the operational modes of the rudders to be amended in the bridge
operating manual (Depending on the results of manufacturers inspection/recommendations)

The information available on this Safety Flash and our associated web site is provided in good faith and only
for the purposes of enhancing safety and best practice. For the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall be
attached to any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.

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