Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws;

Constitutional Law: Intergenerational
Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors
Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR.
They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to:

1.
Cancel all existing Timber
Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2.
Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs

just and equitable under the premises. They
alleged that they have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property
he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds:

1.
Plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him;

2.
The issues raised by the plaintiffs
is a political question which properly pertains
to the legislative or executive branches of the
government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of
action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is

based on the concept of intergenerational

responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the rhythm and
harmony of nature which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas
and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development, and utilization
be equitably accessible to the present as well
as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of
a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083 July 30 1993
FACTS:
Forty-four children, through their
parents, sought to make the DENR
Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut
timber, invoking their right to a healthful
environment (Secs. 16, 15 Article II,

1987 Constitution). The petitioners

further asserted that they "represent
their generation as well as generations
yet unborn." They further claimed that
the Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements to cover more areas for
logging than what is available.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a
cause of action to file the case.
RULING:
Yes. the Court stated that even though
the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies of the
Constitution and not under the Bill of

Rights, it does not follow that it is less

important than any of the rights
enumerated in the latter: [it] concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation, the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. The
right is linked to the constitutional right
to health, is fundamental,
constitutionalised, self-executing and
judicially enforceable. It imposes the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.
The court stated that the petitioners
were able to file a class suit both for
others of their generation and for
succeeding generations as the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound

environment constitutes, at the same

time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.

Resident Marine Mammals of

the Protected Seascape Taon
Strait VS. Secretary Angelo
Reyes

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon

Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771 (April 21,
2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the
legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX).

The service contract

allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Taon Strait

during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well.
The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine
mammals in the Taon Strait by two individuals acting as legal
guardians and stewards of the marine mammals.
The

second

petition

was

filed

by

non-governmental

organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with

individual representatives from fishing communities impacted
by the oil exploration activities.
The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX
began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government
of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and
oil

exploration

activities

ceased.

The

Supreme

consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.

Court

In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important

procedural point of whether the case was moot because the
service contract had been terminated.
The Court declared that mootness is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Id., p. 12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations
and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the
fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the
Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even
though the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.
ISSUE: Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners,
the Supreme Court narrowed them down to two: 1) whether
marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing
to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract
violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. Id.,
p. 11.
As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of
standing beyond natural and juridical persons, even though it
recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence
moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating
court access in environmental cases. Id., p. 15. Instead, the
Court explained, the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring
a suit to enforce our environmental laws. Id., p. 16-17.

The

Court

then

held

that

while

SC-46

was

authorized

Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did

not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract
for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president
and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was
executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to
the

Philippine

congress,

the

Court

held

that

it

was

unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS
Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources
in protected areas.
protected

area,

the

In order to explore for resources in a

exploration

must

be

performed

in

accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA).

The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before
any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Id.,
pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and
exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be
authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress.
Because Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in
Taon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration
should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.

Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding

respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG
as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air
Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the above-declared
principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and
the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of
sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and
monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making
process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development
policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on
the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any
activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise
in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere
of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or
her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in
violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and
cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against
violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting
from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before
this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a
procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set
aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of
technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public,
especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ
of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will
not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

HENARES V. LTFRB

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ

of mandamus
commanding
respondents
LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative
fuel .Asserting their right to clean air,
petitioners contend that the bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the

LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an

alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,and Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8749otherwise known asthe
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
Issue: WON LTFRB CAN BE COMPELLED
TOREQUIREPUVs TO USE CNG THROUGH A
WRIT OFMANDAMUS?

Held: NO. Petitioners invoke the provisions of

the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their
prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs
to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although
both are general mandates that do not
specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel,
particularly the use of CNG, there is
an executive order implementing a program
on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
Executive
Order
No.
290,
entitled
implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle

Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT),

took effect on February 24, 2004. A thorough
reading of the executive order assures us that
implementation for a cleaner environment is
being addressed. To a certain extent, the
instant petition had been mooted by the
issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is

unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an acts pecifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no
law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and
the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG. Further, mandamus will not
generally lie from one branch of government
to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason
that neither is inferior to the other. The need
for future changes in both legislation and its
implementation cannot be pre-empted by
orders from this Court, especially when what
is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides,
comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch

dictate that we give sufficient time and

leeway for the coequal branches to address
by themselves the environmental problems
raised in this petition.

In the same manner that we have associated

the fundamental right to a balanced and
healthful ecology with the twin concepts
of "inter-generational
responsibility"
and
"inter-generational justice" in Oposa, where
we upheld the right of future Filipinos to
prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so
do we recognize, in this petition, the right
of petitioners and the future generation to
clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is now
explicitly found in the Constitution even if
the right is "assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers [of the
Constitution] that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the

Constitution
itself,
thereby
highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to
come.

"It is the firm belief of this Court that in this

case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we
have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa.
Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air
pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic
as they are to the environment, as fatal as
these pollutants are to the health of the
citizens, and urgently requiring resort to
drastic measures to reduce air pollutants
emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit
in particular that petitioners are unable to
pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable
legal duty on respondents that will justify a

grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the

use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It
appears to us that more properly, the
legislature should provide first the specific
statutory
remedy
to
the
complex
environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by
mandamus is taken