Leibnizs Universal Language: Empathy Stripped Down

I really believe that languages are the best mirror of the human mind, and that a precise
analysis of the significations of words would tell us more than anything else about the
operations of the understanding, writes Leibniz in New Essays in Human Understanding
(281; bk. 3; chap. 7; sec. 6). The human understanding, modeled through motor acts and
the psychology of their intentions, has been shown in studies of mirror neurons to be
developed through gestural communication. Gallagher and Zahavi would call learning
from gestural communication primary intersubjectivity, or identifying with and
understanding the direct body behavior of an individual (188). The evolution of language
from mimicry and the intersubjective bonding through mimicry has extended human
understanding to secondary intersubjectivity (Gallagher and Zahavi 189), or
understanding of the intentions behind situations, rather than the intentions of individual
people. This extension of intersubjectivity among humans necessitates the need for a
consistent definition of situations in order to maintain the communication of human
bonding that is necessary for learning. Universal emotions are among the consistent
definition of interactions that have evolved for survival reasons, and verbal and written
language have further developed from gestural communication to facilitate and extend
human communication. Leibnizs proposal for a universal language, or a minimalist
language system representative of human understanding and logical reasoning, however,
suggests that human language can be reduced to an unequivocal, universal mirror of the
human mind. I propose that intersubjectivity among humans can be likewise stripped
down to its bare essentials to reflect the human understanding through human empathy,
and that human empathy may form at least the basis for Leibnizs theoretical universal

language. That is, Leibnizs universal language may not only speak to the eyes
(Pannese 268) or to the ears but also to the very core of the human being. In 1992
(Ehrenfeld), during an implanted electrode brain study of macaque monkeys performing
certain motor actions, Italian researchers serendipitously discovered mirror neurons, or
brain cells that are activated both when an individual performs an action and when an
individual observes an action (Perry). When a monkey observed a researcher reach for
food, neurons in the premotor cortex were active (Perry). Neurons in the same area and in
the parietal cortex (Ricciardi 9719) also activate when the monkey itself reaches for food.
Until recently, studies relied on imaging to find only regions where mirror neurons could
be found in the human brain, resulting in discoveries of mirror systems (Ehrenfeld). A
neurological study on epileptic patients using implanted electrodes, however, has
provided evidence of individual mirror neuron cells in the human brain (Keysers and
Gazzola R353). Human mirror neurons, like the monkey mirror neurons, are localized in
the parieto-frontal region of the brain (Rizzolatti). Mirror neuron studies on monkeys
have shown that mirror neurons are activated in the monkeys involvement of motor acts
and in their imitation of motor acts, suggesting that mirror neurons are involved in their
capacity to learning to use tools (Rizzolatti). Neurological studies on humans, however,
show that mirror neurons are not only involved in understanding the motor acts
themselves but also in the mechanism and intention behind the motor acts, as well
(Rizzolatti). Rizzolatti infers that the capacity of understanding the tool use in terms of
tool mechanism [] appears to be unique to humans. To extend Rizzolattis argument,
the activation of human mirror neurons under not just actions but intentional actions
implies that humans understand motor acts in terms of their intention, as opposed to the

actions in themselves. Mirror neuron studies qualifying this argument suggest that we
understand the actions of others in part by transforming them into the motor vocabulary
of our own actions. (Schippers 9388).
Imitation is the capacity of an individual to replicate an act that belongs to his or
her motor repertoire after having seen it executed by others (Rizollatti). Mirror neurons,
according to Thagard, allow people to both understand and imitate motor actions (189).
Our mirror neurons may not only facilitate imitation and the understanding of actions and
their intentions, but also empathy and the development of language, according to
Ricciardi (9719). That is to show that mirror neurons allow for people to imitate on the
basis of something more abstract, rather than on the basis of pure physical mechanics. In
a study of a game of charades (Schippers et al), it was shown that mirror neuron systems
of two people, functioning as receiver and transmitter of a physical action, resonate
with each other (Ehrenfeld) or echo each other (Schippers et al 9391), reflecting similar
and corresponding changes in one other and mov[ing] neurologically in tandem (qtd. in
Ehrenfeld) to one another as gestures and their meanings changed.
Congenitally blind people can still learn and understand motor actions and
behaviors, even though they have no visual experience (Schippers et al 9719). A study on
the mirror neuron systems of congenitally blind people has shown that the mirror neuron
system can develop in the absence of visual experience and that actions translated to
audio representations, such as the sounds of an action or sentences containing actionrelated words, activate neurons in the same areas of the mirror neuron system in blind
individuals as in sighted individuals (Schippers et al 9722). The study also showed that
the mirror neuron system can discriminate between performed actions on the basis of

their sound representations, without access to visual imagery (Schippers et al 9719-9720).

Although the study revealed that mirror system is engaged by non-visual cues of actions
in addition to visual representations of actions, Schippers et al stressed that it [does] not
rule out that its recruitment may be the consequence of a sound-elicited mental
representation of actions through visually based motor imagery (9720). That is, that
blind people with no visual library stored in their minds can still experience an action
aurally does not mean that visually based motor imagery cannot be elicited in the
minds of blind people. The findings of this study, however, do suggest that motor actions
perceived through multiple sensory mechanisms, including visual and aural, do have
motor representation[s] stored in the mirror neuron system (Schippers et al 9722).
Thus, not only is the development of the mirror neuron system not dependent on visual
experience, but the activation of the mirror neurons also does not require visual sensory
experiences (Schippers et al 9722-9723). The mirror neuron system is therefore not just a
visuomotor system, but it is one that processes other sensory experiences to create an
abstract representation of object and spatial features (Schippers et al 9722), including
motor actions.
Evidence has shown that the mirror neuron system may also involve visceralmotor centers (Thagard 189). Empathy, according to Thagard, consists of imagining
yourself in someone elses situation and reasoning that persons emotional state based on
your experience with a similar situation and is important in enabling us to understand
other people and to make moral decisions about them (190). It was originally thought
that we understood actions and their intentions logically, but the discovery of mirror
neurons has shown that our understanding may also be based on feeling the actions

(Perry). That is, whereas the visuo-motor center of the mirror neuron system allows us to
imitate motor actions of others, the visceral-motor center of the mirror neuron system
allows us to empathize with peoples feelings. Our mirror neurons allow for a more
direct kind of empathy employing visual-motor representations (Thagard 190), firing not
only when we observe people perform motor acts, also when people express their
emotions (Thagard 191). Empathy is thus analogical mapping between someone elses
situation and your own. (Thagard 190). Empathy, whether entailing motor or emotional
analogical mapping, recruits the use of mirror neurons to this mapping.
Experiments have revealed regions of the brain that are activated in both the
subjects experience of emotions and sensations and observation of these experiences
(Keysers R972). The insula is among these brain regions, and, only recently reported to
contain mirror neurons (Ehrenfeld), it provides a connection between empathy and mirror
neurons (Ehrenfeld). Many other factors control how we act, but mirror neurons are how
we recognize an emotion in others neurally, says Rizollatti (qtd. in Ehrenfeld).
A neurological study focusing on two emotions, pain and disgust, out of a
collection of [emotions] that have been laid down during the course of evolution
(Rizollatti) has shown that neurons in the amygdale and insula of the brain activate when
a person directly smells or tastes something disgusting or directly experiences pain, and
that neurons in the insula activate when a person observes facial expressions of disgust or
pain (Rizollatti et al). This overlap suggests that the insula may be involved in the
recognition of experiences of disgust and pain. Not only does that suggest a common
definition between experience and observation of expressions, but it also suggests that
there is some common definition between disgust and pain themselves (Rizollatti).

Another study found that people with highly active mirror neuron systems in the
insula and amygdale tend to score higher on empathy scales (Thagard 190), further
evidencing the mirror neurons role in human empathy. The employment of empathy
among mirror neurons requires neither mimicry nor behavioral synchronization, but
only the perception of anothers situation (Thagard 192), which visceral-motor system
of the mirror neuron system generates. That is, the mirror neuron system decodes facial
expressions, and since humans communicate emotions physically through facial
expressions, mirror neurons play a key role in our ability to empathize and socialize
with others (Rizzolatti et al).
Gallese encapsulated the commonality among humans of emotional and
sensational experiences and perception of the human form into a concept called the
shared manifold of intersubjectivity (44). According to Gallese, this shared manifold
allows us to identify familiarly with other human beings and allows the possibility of
intersubjective communication (44-45), or a communication between separate minds.
Gallese stratifies the shared manifold into three levels, but he stresses the
phenomenological level as embodying the concept of visceral and sensorial empathy
among humans. The phenomenological or empathic level is one in which actions,
emotions and sensations experienced by others become meaningful to us because we can
share them with them. (Gallese 45). Philosophy has often interpreted mirror neuron
systems as central to establishing intersubjective relations (Kulstad et al). Empirical
evidence, such as findings from the aforementioned studies on pain and disgust, has
already begun to justify the phenomenological stratus of the shared manifold theory.

Gallese underlines that emotions were one of the earliest ways to acquire knowledge
about other human beings (46).
Before there was speech, linguistic meaning was conveyed through gestures
(Rizzolatti et al). This idea constituted the gestural theory of origin of speech. The
discovery of mirror neurons corroborated the gestural theory of speech (Rizzolatti et al).
In Schippers study on charades, that the mirror neuron systems of both the actor and the
guesser resonated neurologically in tandem to one another further showed that mirror
neurons play an important role in the evolution of speech and language (Ehrenfeld). The
mirror neuron system, according to Rizzollatti et al, acts as a direct link between
information sent by one individual and information received by another (Rizzollatti et al).
As demonstrated by Schippers charade study, motor acts by an individual activate a
similar motor copy in the observers, allowing them, in this way, to understand directly
the message (Rizzollatti et al).
One of Ricciardis conclusions made in his mirror neuron study of blind
individuals was that the mirror neuron system, given only audio representations of
actions performed, helped to discriminate between different actions performed (97199720). Both the charades and blind individuals studies provide evidence that mirror
neurons use abstract coding to make distinguish and interpret peoples actions
(Ehrenfeld). It was observed that while a third of all mirror neurons fire for exactly the
same action, either executed or observed, the larger number [] fire for actions that
achieve the same goal or those that are logically related (Ehrenfeld). As Pannese puts it,
based on evidence that mirror neurons not only respond to motor action but also to other
sensorial information, mirror neurons might be involved in any type of cross-domain

mapping (268). That is, mirror neurons integrate information from all the senses to make
fine distinctions (Ehrenfeld) between different actions and intentions.
The sound-shape interactions (Pannese 268) thus far evidenced seems to
demonstrate that the mirror neuron mechanism was instrumental to the leap from
imitative abilities of early human learning to this empathic communication system that
Galleses shared manifold theory postulates (Rizzolatti et. al). Imitation, or mimicry, has
been shown to be linked to mirror neurons and to human bonding (Ehrenfeld). German
philosopher Theodor Lipps originating idea that empathy was inner imitation has thus
been qualified with current empirical findings that mirror neurons help people distinguish
between emotional states and intentions of other people from their behavior (Steuber).
Leibniz had originated a philosophical approach to mapping out the human
understanding through language. He formulated a plan for an artificial language, what
he calls a universal symbolistic (Leibniz 654) or universal characteristic
(Philosophical Papers and Letters 654), in which the characters and the words
themselves would give directions to reason (Philosophical Papers and Letters 654). He
believed that all our meanings and ideas could be reduced to their primitives (qtd in
Kulstad and Carlin), a kind of calculus (Philosophical Papers and Letters 654) which
would map out the human reasoning system or pattern symbolically, much like a formal
logic system (Kulstad and Carlin). Individual symbols would represent the primitives
of ideas, and, representatively mirroring the operations of the [human] understanding
(New Essays on Human Understanding 281). The human reasoning itself would be
represented in the operative synthesis, or combinations, of these primitive symbols,
such that we can create derivative concepts (Kulstad and Carlin) from them. This

universal characteristic is more than just a formulation of logic; it should take on a

language-like structure and reflect the relations between concepts of human reasoning,
based on Leibnizs view that all of human understanding and learning uses symbols
(Kulstad and Carlin). Leibniz believed that human understanding was based on
determinable axioms of logic and so could be accurately represented by a symbolic
system. Therefore, the intention of his universal characteristic was to calculat[e], so
to speak, truths (Kulstad; Philosophical Papers and Lectures 654).
Pannese observes that Indeed, Leibniz saw an intimate connection between
language and the operations of the mind (267). She speculates that Leibnizs universal
characteristic would ideally consist of symbols that would directly represent things []
and not words (qtd. in Pannese 268), allowing for easy interpersonal communication
not dependent upon verbal processing, which would be more culturally biased (Pannese
268). She suggests that mirror neurons play an important role in the cognitive
processing of signs and symbolic language (268). .According to Pannese, the mirror
neuron system extracts the common denominator between multimodal perceptual
information, thereby enabling abstraction and reconceptualization, two of the most
distinctively human abilities. (268).
As stated earlier, Ehrenfeld reported that studies have shown that mirror neurons
used abstract coding to allow people to understand peoples behaviors. Synthesizing this
finding with Panneses argument as quoted above, this shows that there is some ground
for connection, or intersubjective relation, among logically related motor actions that
our brains can distinguish.

If mirror neurons are activated for both a third person action and a first person action,
neutral to the agent of the action but discriminate of its intention, then there must be
some kind of common denominator that humans instinctively pick up on and resonate
to with each other, thereby promoting a bonding to some degree that the situation allows,
ranging from the strong bond of love and affection to a momentary bond in groupwork or
teamwork. This common denominator must constitute the fundamental language of the
human reasoning in order to act to such varying degrees and situations, irrespective of the
biases instilled in each individual through his/her upbringing. Evidence of this can be
shown in the charades study, blind individual study, and the study on expressions of
disgust and pain. There must be some common denominator inherent between the word
and sound representations of the actions and the actions themselves in order for the blind
individuals to make the connection between them. The charades study demonstrates that
mirror neuron systems provide the intermediary through which these common
denominators are processed in the human mind. The study on disgust and pain showed
that the output of these common denominators from mirror neuron systems is a bond
through empathy, further substantiating Galleses manifold theory of intersubjectivity at
the phenomenological level.
I therefore object to Panneses speculation that the mirror neuron system enables
abstraction from extracted common denominators. She later concludes that the
communication of mirror neurons is a biological instantiation of Leibnizs universal
characteristic (Pannese 269). This seems to contradict her idea that mirror neurons
abstract common denominators, in that the input before extraction would be
representative of the material world, and then these concrete common denominators are

then abstracted in the process of mirrored communication. I propose that the

aforementioned neurological studies have collectively shown the opposite. The studies,
based on observations of physical outputs of the mirror neuron communication
processing, like facial expressions, gestural communication, and behavioral imitation and
mimicry, show that since the human body is incapable of explicitly communicating
abstract concepts, ideas, or meanings without resorting to physical output, the mirror
neuron system materializes abstract common denominators. The true biological
instantiation of Leibnizs universal characteristic is therefore not representative of things
or the material world itself, but of common feelings, the human body image, and
evolutionary or instinctual human motor actions. That is, the universal characteristic
would be based on the shared manifold at the phenomenological level and inherent to the
human body and human nature only.
Furthermore, I propose that because mirror neurons would act on the strings of the
human nature only and irrespective of the rest of the material world, they may be more
grounded to ultimate truth than any other system of cognition humans use. Further
philosophical insight as to how mirror neurons work, in relation to empirical evidence
from neuroscience, may justify that mirror neurons could be instrumental to
understanding ultimate, definite truth.
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