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AGRARIAN LAW

Calalang vs. Williams


Facts: The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and
to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal
Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of
Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila
Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer
challenges its constitutionality.
Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works
infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice
Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is
neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption
of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provision
s of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval fro
m the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations t
o regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animaldrawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the
said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the
greatest number.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of


Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742

July 14, 1989

Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines


Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O.
No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter
alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it

is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.

Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time
on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of


compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power
for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What
is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain

Facts:

Several petitions are the root of the case: a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD
No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5
hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228
as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino
usurped the legislatures power. b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in
Victorias Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation
131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. c. A petition
by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer. d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.
ISSUE
Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is
violative of the Constitution.
Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent
domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in
full of just compensation
HELD
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However,
objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is
judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in the provision as the
determination of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all
parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to review with finality the
said determination.
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no
other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and
eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere
millions of pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in
fact not even fully available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in
the nullification of the entire program.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full
owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just
compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

HOLY TRINITY

Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce


(OIC)Vs Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. Sutton
G.R. No.162070

livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O.
fixed the following retention limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of
1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall
likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19,
2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the
Constitution.

The case involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which


has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987,
pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government,
respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took
effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine.

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v.


Secretary of DAR, the Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultryraising are not included in the definition of agricultural land and declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included
livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of this, respondents
filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from
the coverage of the CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him
to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the
Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an


Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the
coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9,
petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes,
and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the
rest of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under
Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, contending that their entire


landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.
Said motion was denied. Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the Office
of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining
the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the
constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case
which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian
reform. The OP affirmed the impugned order. On appeal to CA, the CA ruled in
favor of respondents and declared A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993 as void.

Issue:

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy,


Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that it was devoted solely to
cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of


their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in
connection therewith. Petitioner ignored such request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which
provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of

Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which
prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock
raising is constitutional?

Held:

The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.


sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of
agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership.
However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a
clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that

livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within
the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock,
swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not

an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in


the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and
facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds

In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.

and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenance.

DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted


an ocular inspection on petitioners property and recommended the exemption of
petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP.

Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has
exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993,


setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for
livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.
Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.

DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation


The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug.
Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the


reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied
legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by
making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at

bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881
which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law
changed the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial
farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification,
Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the

intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from


the coverage of agrarian reform.

Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia


and company before the MCTC.

It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the


provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution.
To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In
case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the
Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was
properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of
agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from


the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA
as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR
conversion order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions
converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the
area of the property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373
hectares.

Milestone Farms vs Office of the President


FACTS:
Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage
in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and
3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of
said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect

MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone


RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
CA ruled in favor of Milestone
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776
hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and
declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.
Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug
but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President
reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.

With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary


Villas Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the
controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its
amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is
hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared
covered by the CARP.

ISSUE: Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of
CARP
HELD:

No. When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or
gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was
then subsisting and in full force and effect.

As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject
property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of
evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine,
and/or poultry raising.

Property
6. BOLLOZOS V. YU

Loida Maglinao (from the Bureau of Forest Development) testified that the
subject properties are within the alienable and disposable area of the public domain
and no forestry interest is adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest
Development.

RTC and CA granted the petition of Tabangao. Hence, this appeal by the
Republic.
Issue: WON Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over three (3) parcels of land
situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.
Held: NO. The ruling of the CA was erroneous.

7.
Republic vs. CA and Tabangao Realty
Tuesday, July 1, 2014
Facts:

On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original


Registration of Title over three parcels of land.

Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the
above-mentioned lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the
corresponding Deeds of Sale; that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been
in actual possession of the lots since the time it acquired the same from the previous
owners up to the present; and that its possession and occupation as owners
including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful, continuous,
adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner.

Tabangao Realty alleged that the plant of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Company is partly erected on the subject lots which improvements are owned by it
(applicant). {There is a lease contract between LPG and Tabangao}

Should the property registration decree invoked not be allowed, the applicant
in the alternative applied for the benefits under CA No. 141 as amended and thus
alleged that together with its predecessors-in-interest it had been in open,
continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject lots for more
than 30 years.

Geron (Tabangos witness) testified that the applicant-corporation was duly


organized and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is
authorized to acquire land by purchase and develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage,
exchange, lease and hold for investment or otherwise, real estate of all kinds.

He also testified that the subject properties in this case were purchased by
Tabangao Realty as evidenced by Deed of Sale and that the taxes of the properties
were properly paid by the corporation.

Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with regard to the


ownership, possession and the status of the lots subject of the application.

There is a presumption that all lands belong to the public domain of the State
An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is
the owner thereof in fee simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to
the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by
purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even
before the Spanish conquest.
The land in question is admittedly public
The applicant has no title at all. Its claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on
possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for were declared public land by decision
of the Cadastral Court. Such being the case, the application for voluntary registration
under P. D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) is barred by the prior judgment of
the Cadastral Court.
The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and
declared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary application
under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-judicata.
As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the
parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration."
There is no sufficient evidence that Tabangao Realty was in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the lands for 30 years
Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of
its predecessors in interest. "The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession." "Actual possession of land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property."
In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent
evidence.
Hence, the application for registration of the properties must be denied. (Ruled in favor
of the Republic.)

8. Rep. vs. CA, 236 SCRA 442


a.

Where the actual publication of the notice of initial hearing was


after the hearing itself. The publication is also defective where
the Official Gazette containing said notice, although for the month
prior to the scheduled hearing, was released for publication only
after said hearing, Rep. vs. CA, 236 SCRA 442, 449 (1994).

9. REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL


295 SCRA 359, September 10, 1998
FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in
Opol, Misamis Oriental. On 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the
said area but the Director of Forestry rejected the same.
Sometime in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a
resolution reserving a certain lot as a school site. This lot unfortunately included the lot
of Doldol.
Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion
possessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on schools power.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling that Doldol was
entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32 years (19591991).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?

HELD:

No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the
land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied
with the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of title/certificate of tile being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable in accordance with the District Foresters Certification. Doldol thus meets the
first requirement.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed land
since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than June 12, 1945.
Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol cannot be said to have
acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right superior to the school given that
then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.

The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no


contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to
withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public
use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough this may
defeat the imperfect right of settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to
entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Solicitor General)
In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the land in
dispute.

10. G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO, FLORENCIO T. CASTILLO, SOLEDAD LOTA
CASTILLO, CARLOS L. CASTILLO, NIEVES KATIGBAK CASTILLO, MARIANO L.
CASTILLO, HIPOLITA DYTIAPCO CASTILLO, AIDA CASTILLO HERRERA,
HERMITO HERRERA, JOSE L. CASTILLO, LILIA MACEDA CASTILLO, TERESITA L.
CASTILLO, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATANGAS and THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

of First Instance of Batangas.


Facts:
In 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land, Lots
1 and 2, located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, as the true and absolute owner of
the land with the improvements thereon, which was issued to him by the Register of
Deeds of Batangas. He was married to Amanda Lat.
By virtue of an instrument dated in March 1960, the two parcels of land with Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) were consolidated and divided into Lots 1 to 9 which was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). After the death of Modesto Castillo on
August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a deed of partition and
assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which
Original Certificate of Title was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of
title (TCT) were issued to the following appellants-defendants.
The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo,
et al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands
covered thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State.
It was alleged that said lands had always formed part of the Taal Lake and being of
public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as private property.
They alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred by the
decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the
government was estopped from questioning the ownership and possession of
appellants.
The then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, decided that the Register of
Deeds of Batangas to order the cancellation of the OCT in the name of Modesto Castillo
and the subsequent TCT issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots
Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-19166 are hereby declared public lands belonging to the
state. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Defendants appealed their case. The Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on
April 26,1984, reversed and set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the
complaint.
Issue:

EN BANC

The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the decision of the Land Registration
Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 26, 1984 Decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court reversing the February 6, 1976 Decision of the then Court

Held:

There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering
the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter (Ramos v. Pablo, 146
SCRA 24 [1986]; that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use
(Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable.

Appellate Court is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the February 6,1976
Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Batangas is hereby AFFIRMED and
REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters
and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not
convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant
(Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259 [1965], citing the cases of Dizon, et al. v.
Bayona, et al., 98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., 13 SCRA 704).
But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands involved in this case.
Petitioner contends "that "Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed part of the Taal
Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the same were not
subject to registration, being outside the commerce of men; and that since the lots in
litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the registration court (of
1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private property, hence, res
judicata does not apply. (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence.
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be
differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is
alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides (Castillo, Law on Natural
Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67).
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake,
like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added
(Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423) while accretion on a sea bank still belongs
to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by
the government to be no longer needed for public use (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108
Phil. 335 [1960]).
But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion
shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants
of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to
make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as
already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land does not by itself automatically
divest the land of its public character (Cuevas v. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1968]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the April 26,1984 Decision of the then Intermediate

11.

13.

12. Director of Lands v. Reyes (68 SCRA 177)


Facts:
In 1964, Alisunurin filed his application for the registration of a vast tract of
land, containing an area of 16,800 hectares, with the CFI of Nueva Ecija. The land was
admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay. During the
pendency of the case, PIDC substituted Alinsunurin since the former acquired the
ownership of the land. The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was
without sufficient title and that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the
military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No. 237, dated
December 10, 1955 of the President. To prove the claim, the applicants presented
blueprints of two survey plans but lack the approval of the Director of Lands.
After the trial, the CFI granted the application and ordered registration, which
the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
appealed to SC, where they claim that the plans presented by the applicants failed to
identify the parcel of land sought to be registered.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the plans presented by the applicants are sufficient to prove the
identity of the land in dispute.
Ruling:
No.
The Court held that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which
must be approved by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The
submission of such plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless a
plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same
are not of much value. The blueprints of two survey plans presented had no approval of
the Director of Lands, thus these did not suffice the requirement of the law.

immediately empowered the court to enforce the order/judgment/decree. This automatic


process is to avoid further delay and inconvenience to a successful land registration
litigant if he were compelled to commence another action to secure possession.
Furthermore, there is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession. The writ may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated
in a registration case, but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any
portion of the land. Even fraud shall not be a bar to the issuance of the writ of
possession, which necessarily implied the delivery of possession of the land.
As to the questions of fact raised by the Loots, the SC can do nothing. These must be
raised at the CA of appeals; otherwise, the parties contesting the facts are deemed to
have waived the opportunity to question the correctness of the findings.

15. NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE


14. Lucero v. Loot

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled


to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI.
He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those
covered by the title

The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to


explain.

Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge,
he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary
Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the
Supreme Court

Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES)

Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of
discretion.

25 SCRA 687
DOCTRINE: When a final decree has been issued in a land registration case, the
issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has
been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is no period of prescription as to the
issuance of writ of possession.
FACTS:

Julio Lucero filed and was granted a writ of possession of property


(based on a final decree in a land registration proceeding).
Although the other party (all surnamed Loot) filed a motion to quash the writ, this was
granted by CFI Iloilos Judge Fernan on September 21, 1959.
The Loots opposed the decision on the ground that there were
defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion was not under oath.
The court dismissed these as trivial arguments.
Two motions for reconsideration were also denied.
The writ of possession prayed for was issued in favour of Lucero.
The Loots were very adamant to their opposition.
They then went straight to the Supreme Court for an appeal for certiorari.
The Loots desperately tried to assert
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law. -YES
HELD:
The order granting the writ of possession was based on a decision promulgated on a
land registration case in 1938, which became a final decree on October 29, 1941.After
the final decree, the issuance of the writ of possession was only a ministerial duty of the
court if no writ has been issued to the registered owner yet. The final decree, in effect,

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by


the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?
SC: NO.
If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges
equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only
by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it
would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the
Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such
officials.

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with
administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial
duties.

house was extrajudicially foreclosed, pursuant to their contract. It was sold to Tumalad
and they instituted a Civil case in the Municipal Court of Manila to have Vicencio vacate
the house and pay rent.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with
the administration of judicial functions.

The MTC decided in favor of Tumalad ordering Vicencio to vacate the house and pay
rent until they have completely vacated the house. Vicencio is questioning the legality of
the chattel mortgage on the ground that 1) the signature on it was obtained thru fraud
and 2) the mortgage is a house of strong materials which is an immovable therefore can

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not
include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the
Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts
recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.

only be the subject of a REM. On appeal, the CFI found in favor of Tumalad, and since
the Vicencio failed to deposit the rent ordered, it issued a writ of execution, however the
house was already demolished pursuant to an order of the court in an ejectment suit
against Vicencio for non-payment of rentals. Thus the case at bar.

The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.


Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function,
but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of
Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not
automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the
consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.

ISSUE:

16. TUMALAD V. VICENCIO

HELD:

Whether or not the chattel mortgage is void since its subject is an immovable

NO.
Although a building is an immovable; the parties to a contract may by agreement

Although a building is by itself an immovable property, parties to a contract may treat as

treat as personal property that which by nature is a real property however they

personal property that which by nature would be real property and it would be valid and

are estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise.

good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. By principle of estoppel, the
owner declaring his house to be a chattel may no longer subsequently claim otherwise.

FACTS:

When Vicencio executed the Chattel Mortgage, it specifically provides that the
mortgagor cedes, sells and transfers by way of Chattel mortgage. They intended to treat

Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon received a loan of P4, 800 from Gavino and

it as chattel therefore are now estopped from claiming otherwise. Also the house stood

Generosa Tumalad. To guaranty said loan, Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in

on rented land which was held in previous jurisprudence to be personalty since it was

favor of Tumalad over their house of strong materials which stood on a land which was
rented from the Madrigal & Company, Inc. When Vicencio defaulted in paying, the

placed on the land by one who had only temporary right over the property thus it does
not become immobilized by attachment.

[Vicencio though was not made to pay rent since the action was instituted during the
period of redemption therefore Vicencio still had a right to remain in possession of the
property]

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights
of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources.
Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a
7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no
majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian
doctrine.

17.cruz v. sec of denr

18.
347 SCRA 128 (400 Phil 904) Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis
Regalian Doctrine
Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 228
Cruz, J.

that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law
basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which
may include natural resources.
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of private
landowners.

FACTS: An application for registration of a parcel of land was filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children. The
land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots. According to
the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by
Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. In support of the application,
both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of
prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the
Liberation. Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto. She
was corroborated by Felix Marcos, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by
Alberto's father. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of
James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14,
1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner. Atok alleged that a portion of Lots

1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by
Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the
office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these
locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lots. The Bureau of Forestry Development also
interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16,
1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove
their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The
applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and affirmed
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the
sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet
and Atok appealed to the Supreme Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic filed its own petition for review and reiterated its argument that neither the
private respondents nor the two mining companies had any valid claim to the land
because it was not alienable and registerable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Benguet and Atok have a better right over the property in
question.

land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as
already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so
and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were
perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath,
it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine. If a person is the owner of agricultural


land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the
right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which
such minerals belong.

Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could
not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. The decision is set aside and that of
the trial court is reinstated.

19. Republic of the Philippines vs. Alexander Lao


HELD: Yes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included
in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested
in Benguet and Atok at that time. The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public
domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even
the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the
obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to
the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as
the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. The Court of Appeals justified
this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of the surface rights
and the owners of the sub-surface rights. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. However, the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the

Facts:
Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land.
She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and
Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn,
inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto
Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under
Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-ininterests open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession
and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She

presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the

where she obtained her deed of sale. She further did not present any certification from

technical description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors

appropriate government agency to show that the property is re-classified as disposable

names. The court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the Solicitor

and alienable land of the public domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a land

General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision,

registration to provide these incontrovertible evidences to support her claim for her

hence this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no

application. In the absence of these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the

sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to

petition was granted and her application was denied.

comply with the required periods and acts of possession mandated by law and her
failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
20 Baranda vs. Gustillo
Issue:
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the

Facts:

qualifications required by law on the manner of possession (continuous, adverse,


notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a bonafide claim of
ownership under C.A. 141?

The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the names of
petitioners Baranda and Hitalia.

The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera
and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772
over the same Lot No. 4517.

The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently acquired by Perez,
Gotera and Susana.

Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was questioned by


Perez and others so a motion for reconsideration was filed.

Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042) for the
execution of judgement in the resolutions issued by the courts.

In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827) involving the
same properties. (NOTE: This time three cases na ang involve excluding the case at
bar.)

The petitioners prayed that an order be released to cancel No.T-25772.


Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to
each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to
cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.

In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito
Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same
and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.

However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a


notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title.

Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application
was disposable and alienable land of the public domain?

Ruling:
The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his title
over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years
and the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by
incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time
required by law. She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest
started occupying the property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property from its
previous owners was shown and she did not show any relationship between the parties

A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo
involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered
by OCT No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.

This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates.

Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion
for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds
Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.

No room for construction for the laws on functions of ROD


Issue: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a
notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute
concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.

Held:
21. Cheng vs. Genato & Sps. Da Jose
G.R. NO. 129760 December 29, 1998
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register
of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with
real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... If the
instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the
presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising
him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage
or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does
not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by
the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."

The function of ROD is ministerial in nature


The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting
Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of
the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.

In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of

Facts:
Genato is the owner of two parcels of land. He entered into an agreement with the Da
Jose Spouses over said land. The agreement culminated in the execution of a contract
to sell in a public instrument and contained the stipulation that: after 30 days, after
having satisfactorily verified and confirmed the truth and authenticity of documents
vendee shall pay the vendor the full payment of the purchase price. The Da Jose
Spouses asked for an extension of 30 days. Pending effectivity of said extension period,
and without due notice to Spouses Da Jose, Genato executed an affidavit to annul the
Contract to Sell. This was not annotated at the back of his titles.
Cheng expressed interest in buying the properties. Genato showed Cheng the copies of
his titles and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose
Spouses, and the affidavit to annul contract to sell. Cheng issued a check for P50,000
upon the assurance that the previous contract will be annulled.
Genato later continued with the contract for Da Jose spouses, and informed Cheng of
his decision and returned to the latter, the downpayment paid. Cheng however
contended that their contract to sell said property had already been perfected.
Lower Court There was a sale between Cheng and Genato, and there was a valid
rescission of the Contract to Sell (between Genato and Spouses Da Jose)
CA Reversed the lower court declaring that the Contract to Sell in favor of Spouses
Da Jose was not validly rescinded.
Issue:
Who has the better right to the land?
Held:
The Spouses Da Jose. The contention of the Da Jose spouses that no further condition
was agreed when they were granted the 30-day extension period from October 7, 1989

in connection with clause 3 of their contract to sell should be upheld. Also, Genato could
have sent at least a notice of such fact, and there being no stipulation authorizing him
for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance on his titles and make it
available to other would be buyers, it bolstered that there was no default on the part of
the Da Jose Spouses. Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal or
written, to the Da Jose spouses for his decision to rescind their contract.
The Court ruled that if it was assumed that the receipt is to be treated as a conditional
contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to suspensive
condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses
should first be cancelled or rescinded a condition never met.
Note: "Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any entry made in the
books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and
cancellation, annotation, and even marginal notes. In its strict acceptation, it is the entry
made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership
and other real rights.
Spouses Da Jose made annotation on the title of Genato. Since Cheng was fully aware,
or could have been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses
under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato,
Cheng was in bad faith when he registered his claim.
22. Danao Coal Mining Syndicate, Ltd. vs. Cenon Laurente

G.R. No. L-20075 [November 27, 1968] Reyes, J.


Facts:
Transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 7567) covered a parcel of land situated in
Camansi, Danao, Cebu. The same was issued in 1928 by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu in favor of H. M. H. Nemazee, the proprietor of the original applicant, Danao Coal
Mining Syndicate, Ltd.
In a quitclaim deed, the heirs of Nemazee transferred and quitclaimed in favor
of Southwestern University their rights, title, interest and participation in, including their
mining and leasehold rights over, subject land.
Southwestern University petitioned the lower court to order:

(1) the cancellation of the annotation of encumbrances on the ground that the
condition and agreement constituting the same were cancelled and rendered
inoperative by the outbreak of World War II as well as by the death of all the
listed beneficiaries thereof;
(2) the registration of the quitclaim deed; and
(3) the cancellation of TCT No. 7567 itself, and issuance of a new certificate of
title in its name.
The petition was immediately granted and a new certificate of title (TCT No.
RT-2164) was thereafter issued in favor of Southwestern University.
Cenon Laurente moved for reconsideration of the order of cancellation,
specifically of the second portion of the annotation of encumbrances in question. He
alleged that Southwestern University had filed an ejectment suit before another branch
of the same court against him and several other occupants of the land covered by TCT
No. 7567, over which land, he claimed, he might possibly have an interest as a
purchaser of a certain parcel of land situated also in Camansi, Danao, Cebu, from
Filomeno del Mar, one of the persons in whose favor "the use of occupancy of the
surface of the ... land" covered by said TCT No. 7567 was reserved. Laurente thus
argued that the cancellation of the annotation of the incumbrance in favor of Filomeno
del Mar and others should not have been ordered without giving notice, at least through
publication, to the parties who, like him, being a successor-in-interest of said Filomeno
del Mar, might thereby be adversely affected. Laurente's alleged interest was, however,
never registered.
The motion for reconsideration was denied reasoning that inasmuch as the law
specifically provides notice to parties in interest, such notice if any, should be limited to
the parties listed or annotated on the certificate of title. Hence, if such parties are
already dead, as had been alleged and substantiated by petitioner Southwestern
University, then notice to said parties would be superfluous or notice would not be
necessary. The Court acting within its limited jurisdiction as a Court of Land
Registration, can only act on what appears on the face of the certificate of title, and
cannot go beyond what appears therein as movant Cenon Laurente would now want
this Court to believe. Notice by Publication is not necessary in connection with the
petition which has been duly filed in accordance with Section 112 of Act 496.
Granting that the use and occupancy which was annotated in the certificate of title is a
real right which could be transferred or disposed of by the person named in the
certificate of title to a third person (Cenon Laurente), the latter should have taken the
precaution of having his right annotated on said (certificate of title). His failure to do so
is therefore fatal, in the sense that this Court cannot consider him as a party in interest
who is entitled to notice before the petition for cancellation of encumbrance could be
acted upon.

Issue:
Whether or not court erred in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by a
third person whose interest, purportedly, might have been prejudiced by the cancellation
Held:
No. Cancellation of registered interests that have terminated and ceased may
be ordered by the land registration court under the Land Registration Act. The new
owner, Southwestern University, of the land herein involved took the right step by
petitioning the court under said section to have the registered interests the deceased
persons' rights of use and occupancy of the surface of said land ordered cancelled
on the ground that the same had terminated and ceased. Notice was no longer
necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the petition insofar as the second
portion of the annotation of encumbrances was concerned. With the death of all the
registered adverse claimants thereof, there were no more parties in interest to be
notified.
Appellant Laurente was not and cannot now be considered a party in interest
entitled to notice. He was a stranger representing no adverse claim as to render the
petition for cancellation controversial and, thereby, divest the lower court of its
jurisdiction. The cancellation of the right of the persons recorded as entitled to use and
occupancy of the surface of the land is too vague and unsubstantial to give him
standing to claim right to notice or to contest the order of cancellation.
Before a claimant can be considered as possessing a genuine adverse interest
that would deprive the Registration Court of jurisdiction to proceed in the absence of
notice to him, there must be a showing of the prima facie truth and validity of such
adverse interest. Laurente has failed to make such a showing. His motion merely
speaks of a possibility of being prejudiced.

23. Apolinio Egao and Beatriz Egao vs. Court of Appeals, Severo Dignos and
Severo Bontilao
G.R. No. L-79787 [June 29, 1989] Padilla, J.
Facts:
Private respondents filed an action Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of
Possession and Ownership before the RTC of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, against
petitioners Apolonio and Beatriz Egao. They alleged that they are the legitimate owners
and possessors of two parcels of land situated at Lonocan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon,
per deed of absolute sale. Upon purchase of the lot from Roberto Marfori,

improvements were introduced and taxes paid by private respondents. Sometime in


June 1983, petitioners allegedly occupied illegally portions of the land.
In their answer, petitioner claims that Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of
the parcel of land evidenced by OCT No. P-3559 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Bukidnon pursuant to Free Patent No. 298112 dated 12 August 1965. He also claim that
the land has never been sold by reason of the prohibition against alienation under
Commonwealth Act No. 141
The Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondent Severo
Bontilao to immediately deliver to the Egaos the owner's duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3559.
Private respondents went to the Court of Appeals and the same set aside the
RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents has a right over the disputed land, they being
the transferees of Marfori
Held:
No. It clearly appears that all deeds were executed within the prohibited period
of five years. Respondents who are not innocent purchasers for value have no standing
to question petitioners' right to the land and to file an action for quieting of title.
An "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed, under the Torrens system, to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value. Where a
purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a
defect in his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor, purchases the property without making any further investigation, he
cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.
The rule of pari delicto non oritur actio (where two persons are equally at fault
neither party may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of exceptions and does not
apply to an inexistent contract, such as, a sale void ab initio under the Public Land Act,
when its enforcement or application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the
grantee's right to the land under the homestead law.
24.Pacifico Garcia vs. Benjamin Gozon, et al.
G.R. Nos. L-48971 & 49011 [January 22, 1980] Aquino, J.
Facts:

A deed of sale for two parcels of land of the Hacienda Maysilo, located in
Malabon, Rizal and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 983, was executed in
favor of Ismael Lapus a bona fide occupant thereof. The deed was executed pursuant to
an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 391, Negao vs. Vidal, a
partition proceeding involving the said hacienda.
The deed of sale was presented for registration and was recorded as Primary
Entry No. 7710. However, the deed of sale was not annotated on OCT No. 983 and that
title was apparently not cancelled.
As a result of the registration of that deed of sale, Transfer Certificate of 'Title
No. 4910 was issued to Lapus for the two parcels of land and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 4911 was issued for the remaining five lots covered by OCT No. 983.
Lapus on different occasions mortgaged the two parcels of land to secure his
obligations to the PNB, the Government and the Philippine Trust Company. He died in
1951. The two parcels of land were inherited by his daughter, Carolina Lapuz-Gozon.
She became the registered owner of the two lots. She subdivided them into 55 lots. She
sold some of the subdivision lots to her co-respondents-appellees herein. Lapus and his
successors-in-interest have been in possession of the two parcels even before 1910.
In 1962, the alleged heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a
motion in Land Registration alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the
Hacienda Maysilo covered by OCT No. 983 and for other titles and that, since only OCT
No. 983 was supposedly unencumbered, all the land covered by that title should be
adjudicated to them. The court granted the motion notwithstanding the fact that OCT
No. 983 appears to have remained uncancelled although the sale to Lapus of two
parcels covered by it and the fact that it had been replaced by TCT Nos. 4910 and 4911.
On June 7, 1963, OCT No. 983 was definitely cancelled and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112236 was issued to the Riveras. Later, Lots 5 and 7 of
the said title were assigned by Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia and
TCT Nos. 112743 and 112742 were issued to Cruz and Garcia, respectively. Thus, two
sets of transfer certificates of title for Lots E and G or 5 and 7, originally covered by
OCT No. 983, were issued, one to the heir of Ismael Lapus and another set to the
successors-in-interest of the Riveras.
On October 22, 1964, Garcia subdivided Lot 7 (G) into Lots A and B. As a
consequence of the assignment, TCT No. 112742 was cancelled and TCT No. 134957
was issued to Muoz. In 1965, he mortgaged Lot B to the Associated Banking
Corporation to secure a loan of P200,000.
On July 17, 1964 Cruz sold to Santiago Go Lot 5 (E). Go mortgaged Lot 6 to
PNB to secure a loan of P50,000 which was later increased to P60,000.

Muoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts. The two banks foreclosed the
mortgages. The PNB bought the mortgaged lot at the auction sale. The sheriff issued to
it a certificate of sale but at that time there was already a notice of lis
pendens annotated on the title of the mortgaged lot. TCT Nos. 212163 and 236881 for
the mortgaged lots were issued to the Associated Banking Corporation and PNB,
respectively.
Gozon later learned that the Riveras had acquired the land. Her lawyer and a
surveyor informed her that parcels E and G, which she inherited from her father, were
identical to Lots 5 and 7 which were conveyed to Cruz and Garcia. She registered
adverse claims on the titles covering Lots 5 and 7. On December 27, 1965 she and the
persons to whom she had transferred portions of parcels E and G filed with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City against the Riveras, Cruz, Muoz, Garcia,
Associated Banking Corporation, PNB and others an action to quiet title and for
damages.
The trial court in its decision declared valid TCT Nos. 141802 to 141855 and
143512 issued to Mrs. Gozon and her co-plaintiffs. It voided TCT No. 112235 issued to
the Riveras and all titles and transactions emanating therefrom insofar as those titles
covered the lots embraced in plaintiffs' titles.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1920 title issued to Lapus and the titles derived therefrom
should prevail over the 1963 title issued to the Riveras and the subsequent titles derived
from it
Held:
Yes. The title of Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should be given effect.
The title of the Riveras and the titles springing from it are void. Lapus was an innocent
purchaser for value. He validly transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible
title or ownership over the disputed lots. That title could not be nullified by the issuance
43 years later to other persons of another title over the same lots due to the failure of
the register of deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapuz. This must be
so considering that Lapus and his interest remained in possession of the disputed
successors in lots and the rival claimants never possessed the same.
It is settled that is this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he
who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land registration matters.
25. People of the Philippines vs. Mizpah Reyes
G. R. No. 74226-27 [July 27, 1989] Cortes, J.

Facts:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located
in Lipa City registered in their names under TCT No. T-7471. They were survived by the
following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R.
Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City that the said property had already been transferred in the
name of Mizpah Reyes under TCT No. T-9885 effected through a notarized deed of sale
executed and signed on by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo. The deed of
sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961.
Upon examination of the document, they found that the signatures of their
parents were falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was
single although she was married. The document was referred by the complainants to
the N.B.I. for examination of the signatures of their parents and a report was returned
with the finding that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo
was forged. Upon complaint, the fiscal filed with the RTC of Batangas, 2 Informations
both for falsification of public document, the first for allegedly making it appear in the
notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo, the mother of the accused, participated in
the sale of a parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the second for allegedly
making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale by stating that accused was
single.
Accused filed a motion to quash both informations on grounds that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished by prescription of the crime and the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of accused because of noncompliance with the pre-conciliation requirement of P.D. No. 1508. The trial court
granted the motion.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the discovery of the crime may be deemed to have taken place
from the time the document was registered with the Register of Deeds, consistent with
the rule on constructive notice
Held:
No. Registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record
is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains.

The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and
rules of interpretation used in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on
constructive notice, cannot be applied in criminal actions.
The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91
of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the
prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time
the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case,
the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations
for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or
more than ten years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged
has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of
prescription.

26. Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. L-40824 [February 23, 1989] Regalado, J.
Facts:
Private respondents, spouses Isabelo R. Racho, together with the spouses
Flaviano Lagasca, executed a deed of mortgage in favor of GSISand subsequently,
another deed of mortgage in connection with two loans granted by the latter in the sums
of P 11,500.00 and P 3,000.00, respectively. A parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 38989 of the Register of Deed of Quezon City, co-owned by said
mortgagor spouses, was given as security under the aforesaid two deeds.
On July 11, 1961, the Lagasca spouses executed an "Assumption of
Mortgage" where they obligated themselves to assume the aforesaid obligation to the
GSIS and to secure the release of the mortgage covering that portion of the land
belonging to herein private respondents and which was mortgaged to the GSIS. This
undertaking was not fulfilled.
Upon failure of the mortgagors to comply, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage and caused the mortgaged property to be sold at public auction.
More than two years thereafter, herein private respondents filed a complaint
against the petitioner and the Lagasca spouses in the former Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, praying that the extrajudicial foreclosure be declared null and void. It was
further prayed that they be allowed to recover said property, and/or the GSIS be ordered
to pay them the value thereof, and/or they be allowed to repurchase the land.

Private respondents alleged that they signed the mortgage contracts not as
sureties or guarantors for the Lagasca spouses but they merely gave their common
property to the said co-owners who were solely benefited by the loans from the GSIS.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to
establish a cause of action. However, such decision was reversed by the respondent
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are liable under the mortgage contract
Held:
Yes. Contrary to the holding of the respondent court, it cannot be said that
private respondents are without liability under the aforesaid mortgage contracts.
So long as valid consent was given, the fact that the loans were solely for the
benefit of the Lagasca spouses would not invalidate the mortgage with respect to
private respondents' share in the property. In consenting thereto, their share in the
property shall nevertheless secure and respond for the performance of the principal
obligation. The parties to the mortgage could not have intended that the same would
apply only to the aliquot portion of the Lagasca spouses in the property, otherwise the
consent of the private respondents would not have been required.
The supposed requirement of prior demand would not matter since the
mortgage contracts created obligations with specific terms for the compliance thereof.
The facts further show that the private respondents expressly bound themselves as
solidary debtors in the promissory note hereinbefore quoted.
On the extrajudicial foreclosure effected by GSIS, respondent court erred that
lack of notice to the private respondents of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale impairs the
validity thereof. There is no showing that the foregoing requirement on notice was not
complied with in the foreclosure sale complained of .
The respondent court erred in annulling the mortgage insofar as it affected the
share of private respondents or in directing reconveyance of their property or the
payment of the value thereof Indubitably, whether or not private respondents herein
benefited from the loan, the mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
were valid.
27. Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102377 [July 5, 1996] Torres, Jr., J.
Facts:

Spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of


residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the petitioners on installment basis as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell. The property was registered in the names of the
Uychocde spouses. Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based
on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was inscribed as
Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a
Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple. The deed
of absolute sale was registered almost a year after.
Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed a case for collection of sum of
money against Ernesto Uychocde. A Compromise Agreement was entered into by the
parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary
obligation to Domingo Pilares. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking,
Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to which the court granted.
Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the CFI of Quezon City where the civil
case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution, a notice of levy on execution was
issued on February 12, 1985 where defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City
presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and
the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
When the deed of absolute sale was registered, TCT No. N-79073 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas
couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over
to the new title. Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon city,
hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as scheduled.
Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution
upon Pilares. Despite said demand, Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said
annotation. In view thereof, petitioners filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal against Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered
the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
On appeal, appellate court reversed the lower court's decision, and upheld the
annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners has a better right over the property in question
Held:
Yes. The adverse claim provision in Section 110 of the Land Registration Act
(Act 496) does not provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse
claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now specifically provides for only 30 days. If the

intention of the law was for the adverse claim to remain effective until cancelled by
petition of the interested party, then said provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of
effectivity would not have been inserted in the law.
Since the adverse claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, it was effective
only until September 26, 1984. Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the notice
of levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was already ineffective.
It cannot be said that actual or prior knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim on
the Uychocdes' title is equivalent to registration inasmuch as the adverse claim was
already ineffective when the notice of levy on execution was annotated. Thus, the act of
defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of levy on execution was proper and justified.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without
qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides
for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim
is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land
Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and
serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming
an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.

28.Benita Salao, et al. vs. Juan Salao, et al.


G.R. No. L-26699 [March 16, 1976] Aquino, J.
Facts:
Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by
his only child. Valentin Salao. There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties
formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her
death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but
notarized on May 22, 1919. The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her
three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in
representation of his deceased father.
The documentary evidence proves that prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio
her two children, Juan and Ambrosia, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a 47 hectare fishpond. It is also
known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later
became a part of Bataan.
The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.

Juan and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Where
they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is
that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the
funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel
Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond.
There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond
consisted of lands purchased by Juan and Ambrosia in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908.
After Juan and Ambrosia secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in
1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin
Salao.
On December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the
Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In the
deed of sale Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were the dueos
proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro,
conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease.
After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco, Ambrosia and Juan sold it
under pacto de retro to Eligio Naval. The period of redemption was also one year. The
fishpond was later redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a
document.
The Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was
claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond
(subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square meters
(Exh. 22).
Ambrosia Salao bought from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of
swampland planted to bacawan and nipa.
The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No.
12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao
filed an application for the registration of that land in their names.
Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was
issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of
the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and
Ambrosia Salao.
The Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of
the Hermosa cadastre. It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond.
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his nephew, Valentin Salao, died. The intestate estate of
Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudiciallybetween his two daughters, Benita Salao-

Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza. His estate consisted of the two fishponds which
he had inherited in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.

Yes. Reconveyance had already prescribed. Plaintiffs action is clearly barred


by prescription or laches.

Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao. As donee


Benita Salao signed the deed of donation.

Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an
implied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year.

On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to
the children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held
in trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.

The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial


demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed
in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The
plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they
had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is watchful of
his rights.

But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's
death that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran
fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of
Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani).
During the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's
death, she donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to
her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family. He
was already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it
from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of
real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the said
properties during her lifetime.
The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950.
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter
informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds
and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and
Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to
P200,000.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not
have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli
and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that
he Juani was the donee of Ambrosias one-half share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the
donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran
fishpond as Valentin Salaos supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond
registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Issue:

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the
reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer to Pass upon the validity of the
donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two
fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any
successional rights to Ambrosias share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her
nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in
1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first
cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him
in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation
takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full
or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita
Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza.

29.Teodoro Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan


G.R. No. L-22486 [March 20, 1968] Castro, J.
Facts:

Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance had already prescribed


Held:

Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of


merit in the claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly
when they are threatened or invaded. Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a
plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may,
according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself.

Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land covered by


original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M.
Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of

Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer
certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following
grounds that Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is considered conjugal property; the
sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is
necessary that both spouses sign the document; but since, the wife has already died
when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property
without violating the existing law.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on
a petition for mandamus , to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale
and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. It is Almirol's assertion
that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and
that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In its resolution, the lower court, declaring that mandamus does not lie
because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151",
dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the
deed of sale in question
Held:
No. Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the
duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction.
The register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151
from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem
of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the
said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any
deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do
is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who
shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the
doubtful question.
The court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus. Section 4 of
Republic Act 1151 provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the
Register of Deeds, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of
Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can
have recourse to the courts.

meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,
among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the
law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary
treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as archipelagic
waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight),
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a
means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do
with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls
Natural resources
Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita

when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle


on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the

655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional

treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under

Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was

the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines

enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine

miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic

Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the

zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image

baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North

below for comparison)

Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as

rights.

our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over
these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of
international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage
that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a
regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the
baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime
zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main
archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we
will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of
UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where
we exercise treaty-based rights:

Anent their particular contentions:


a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section
2 of RA 9522:

sovereignty

b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).

likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that
vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic

c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the

obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among

right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone

jeepney drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised

Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by

pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly
due to the emissions of PUVs.

Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a
2. Henares v. LTFRB

writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative
May 23, 2016

fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. and
Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the Philippine Clean Air Act

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING

of 1999.

AND REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB devotions) et al.


Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government
G.R. No. 158290

October 23, 2006

FACTS

agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs,
and with the same agencies awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous
levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a writ of

respondents functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory


Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures
of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into
the air from various engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege that with
the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government agencies,
the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel. He explained that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing
the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far
as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG
as alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the petition should be addressed to

Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as

of CNG for public utility vehicles. The legislature should provide first the specific

alternative fuel.

statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners


before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

ISSUES
In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No. 290,
1.

Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested


alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas (cng)

2.

assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed.

Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to


use compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus

RULING

1.

which implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The court was

Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined


by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the
DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been
tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive
Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on
the results of the DOTC surveys.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN, JR.


224 SCRA 792
Date of Promulgation: July 30, 1993
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
Keywords: taxpayers class suit; intergenerational responsibility; right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; timber license agreements
QuickGuide: Petitioners personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful environment is concerned.
Facts:
-

The principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.

The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests."

In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission
standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor
vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose
mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

2.

No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal
duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use

The controversy begun as Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before the
RTC of Makati City Branch 66.

The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned
about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court."

The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."

It is prayed for that judgment be rendered


ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs.
and
(3) granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found.

These rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is


irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which
have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial.

Scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful


ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of
fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses.

The distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of


deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of


continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a


Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government.

In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1)
the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion
is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the


aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge
further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and asked the Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

Petitioners:
o Contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause
of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment, the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation.
o Rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
o It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
o Non-impairment clause does not apply in this case because TLAs are
not contracts.
o Even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is
well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the
public interest so requires.

Respondents:
o Aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do
not reveal a valid cause of action.
o They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging
should be permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is
not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
o As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit
that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time

usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.

Issue
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal
standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Their
right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment
for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on
behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of
contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of
public welfare.

Relevance
The case of Oposa vs. Factoran has been widely cited worldwide for its concept of
intergenerational responsibility, particularly in cases related to ecology and the
environment. For example:

Oposa vs. Factoran's concept of "intergenerational responsibility" was cited in


a case in Bangladesh.[1]

The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) considers Oposa vs.


Factoran a landmark case in judicial thinking for environmental governance.[2]

In the book Public Health Law and Ethics by Larry O. Gostin, Oposa vs.
Factoran is cited as a significant example of the justiciability of the right to
health. [3]

In the book The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development by the IUCN
Academy of Environmental Law Research Studies, a study cites Oposa vs.
Factoran as basis for asserting that the right to breathe is part of the right to
life as an acknowledged human right.[4]

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
18 October 1990

FACTS: This case dealt with the cancellation of a timber license and the
question whether a court could interfere in matters which were addressed to
the
discretion
of
government
agencies.
The petitioner sought the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which
was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration. He stated that
after the Government had made an order canceling his logging concession
pursuant to presidential instructions, a part of the area was allowed to be
logged by Filipino companies without a license; and, that the latter entities
were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos. The Ministry refused to reverse the order, ruling that a
timber license was only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public
interest or welfare so demanded.
Issue: Whether or not the refusal of the respondents to reverse the final
administrative orders did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Held: The court held that the refusal of the respondents to reverse the final
administrative orders did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. It was an
established doctrine in its jurisdiction that the orders of administrative agencies
had upon their finality, the force of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders were as conclusive upon
the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a
court
of
general
jurisdiction.
Besides that, the administrative actions were apparently in response to the
growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter
disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The
legitimacy of such concern could hardly be disputed. While there was a desire
to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the countrys
immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future
generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demanded
effective Government action to check further denudation of whatever remained
of the forest lands.There was a basic rule that the courts would not interfere in
matters which were addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge of such agencies. Timber licenses could be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests
so required. The petition was dismissed. Nevertheless, the Court expressed its
concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license
agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

CARINO V. INSULAR
Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution

FACTS:

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such

proceedings against him or his father ever was made.

Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

There must be a presumption against the government when a private

Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ
of error because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application

individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands

For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his

will be deemed private absent contrary proof.

ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather
maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for
pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were
registered to him but process only established possessory title

Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the
Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet
among others from its operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.


HELD: YES. Petition Granted.

Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public
land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds,
it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, 30.

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines


(G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962) (14 October 2008)
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP),
represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign
the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the
previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamorodefined
as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of
Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE
is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOAAD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as associative,
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its
provisions requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall take effect upon
signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel
the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOAAD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on
matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga
excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist
from formally signing the MOA-AD.

Issues and Ruling:


1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new
legislation and constitutional amendments.
YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary
changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as
unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the Presidents authority to
propose constitutional amendments. Because although the Presidents power to
conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly
consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, she
may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any
way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
2.

W/N there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of


public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution,
Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify
the exercise of the peoples right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the
peace agenda:
a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is
replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of
the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before
any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment;
c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).
3.

W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No.

8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.
NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way
to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions
thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in
the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The
President addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is
worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and
the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President
herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.
5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.
NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public
scrutiny.
Carpio-Morales, J.
The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of
the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands.
The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.
An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable
links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to
the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination
of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determinationa peoples pursuit of
its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes
the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most
extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend
the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision.
As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration
only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed
to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its
statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to
the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in
peculiar circumstances.
. Atienza

G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

Facts
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified
the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in
the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that
the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option. In the MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with
the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer and green
zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE
will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting
from joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.
Issue
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Ruling
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because
the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled
by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs.


HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on
the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all

cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon
them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
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Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian
reform.
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of
property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance..
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

AGRARIAN LAW
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share
of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other
natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession

suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. The State may resettle
landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be
distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

Section 7. Priorities. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in coordination with


the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) shall plan and program the acquisition
and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of ten (10) years from the
effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:

Section 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve
such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their
labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

Phase One: Rice and corn lands under Presidential Decree No. 27; all idle or
abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform;
all lands foreclosed by the government financial institutions; all lands acquired by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG); and all other lands owned by
the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and
distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be
completed within a period of not more than four (4) years;

Section 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of
the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and
privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for
their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the under-privileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Republic Act No. 6657

June 10, 1988

AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO


PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE
MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 5. Schedule of Implementation. The distribution of all lands covered by
this Act shall be implemented immediately and completed within ten (10) years from the
effectivity thereof.

Phase Two: All alienable and disposable public agricultural lands; all arable public
agricultural lands under agro-forest, pasture and agricultural leases already cultivated
and planted to crops in accordance with Section 6, Article XIII of the Constitution; all
public agricultural lands which are to be opened for new development and resettlement;
and all private agricultural lands in excess of fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess
hectarage is concerned, to implement principally the rights of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are the landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till,
which shall be distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the
implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years.
Phase Three: All other private agricultural lands commencing with large landholdings
and proceeding to medium and small landholdings under the following schedule:
(a) Landholdings above twenty-four (24) hectares up to fifty (50) hectares, to
begin on the fourth (4th) year from the effectivity of this Act and to be
completed within three (3) years; and
(b) Landholdings from the retention limit up to twenty-four (24) hectares, to
begin on the sixth (6th) year from the effectivity of this Act and to be completed
within four (4) years; to implement principally the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till.
The schedule of acquisition and redistribution of all agricultural lands covered by this
program shall be made in accordance with the above order of priority, which shall be
provided in the implementing rules to be prepared by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC), taking into consideration the following; the need to distribute land to
the tillers at the earliest practicable time; the need to enhance agricultural productivity;
and the availability of funds and resources to implement and support the program.
In any case, the PARC, upon recommendation by the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), may declare certain provinces or region as

priority land reform areas, in which the acquisition and distribution of private agricultural
lands therein may be implemented ahead of the above schedules.
In effecting the transfer within these guidelines, priority must be given to lands that are
tenanted.
The PARC shall establish guidelines to implement the above priorities and distribution
scheme, including the determination of who are qualified beneficiaries: provided, that an
owner-tiller may be a beneficiary of the land he does not own but is actually cultivating
to the extent of the difference between the area of the land he owns and the award
ceiling of three (3) hectares.
Section 11. Commercial Farming. Commercial farms, which are private agricultural
lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising, and aquaculture
including saltbeds, fishponds and prawn ponds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and cutflower farms, and cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate
compulsory acquisition and distribution after (10) years from the effectivity of the Act.n
the case of new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial
production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the
government shall initiate the steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon payment of
just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of
organized cooperatives or associations, which shall hereafter manage the said lands for
the worker-beneficiaries.
If the DAR determines that the purposes for which this deferment is granted no longer
exist, such areas shall automatically be subject to redistribution.
The provisions of Section 32 of the Act, with regard to production-and income-sharing,
shall apply to commercial farms.

Republic Act No. 9700

August 7, 2009

AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM


PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL
AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS
AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philip


Section 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the
beneficiaries shall commence from their receipt of a duly registered
emancipation patent or certificate of land ownership award and their actual
physical possession of the awarded land. Such award shall be completed in
not more than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of registration of
the title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines:Provided, That the
emancipation patents, the certificates of land ownership award, and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and
imprescriptible after one (1) year from its registration with the Office of the
Registry of Deeds, subject to the conditions, limitations and qualifications of
this Act, the property registration decree, and other pertinent laws. The
emancipation patents or the certificates of land ownership award being titles
brought under the operation of the torrens system, are conferred with the same
indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles under the said system, as
provided for by Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6732.
"It is the ministerial duty of the Registry of Deeds to register the title of the land
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, after the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) has certified that the necessary deposit in the name of the
landowner constituting full payment in cash or in bond with due notice to the
landowner and the registration of the certificate of land ownership award
issued to the beneficiaries, and to cancel previous titles pertaining thereto.
"Identified and qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, based on Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as, amended, shall have usufructuary rights over the
awarded land as soon as the DAR takes possession of such land, and such
right shall not be diminished even pending the awarding of the emancipation
patent or the certificate of land ownership award.
"All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents,
certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian
reform program are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of the DAR."

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