RULE 110 cases

People vs Ibanez
Facts: Ibanez was charged with three counts of raping his own daughter under three pieces of
information before the RTC of Cavite. When arraigned he plead not guilty. On the 1st charge, AAA
testified she was at their home in Cavite and did not inform anyone of the incident (June 1997). On
the 2nd charge, AAA testified being raped 8 times from January to December 1998. The 3rd rape
happened sometime in April 1999 while her mother was at work. After which, she told her cousin
who brought her to the NBI, where complaint affidavit was executed.
Ibanez denied having raped his daughter with an alibi of being always away from home.
Issue: Whether or not the precise dates of the commission of the rape be alleged in the information
Held: NO. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an
essential element of the crime charged. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or
circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the
information with ultimate precision.
The allegation in the pieces of information that the appellant committed the rape "sometime in June
1997 and "sometime in April 1999 was sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged of
qualified rape committed against his daughter. The allegation adequately afforded appellant an
opportunity to prepare his defense. Thus, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
It was also too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the criminal pieces of information
since he had himself arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of rape which is
equivalent to waiving his right to object to the pieces of information on the ground of an error as to
the time of the alleged rape.
Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment or a motion to
quash on the ground that the pieces of information alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of
plea.

MACASAET VS PEOPLE

FACTS: In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and
Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the
newspaper Abante were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime
of libel.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC OF QUEZON CITY has jurisdiction?
HELD: In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the
alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila whereAbante was first
published or in the province or city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article
was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations
contained therein are utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than
perfunctorily stating Quezon City at the beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who
prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was
invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said
city at the time the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue
of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one
of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face
of the information renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent, the information filed
before the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutors failure to properly
lay the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the
power to take cognizance of this case.

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation,
the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense
was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was
actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was
printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua
non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the
basis of the venue of the action.[40]

BANAL VS PANGANIBAN
Crime of Libel

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE OF CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS FOR LIBEL TO
ALLEGE THE PLACE WHERE THE OFFENDED PARTIES ACTUALLY RESIDE AT THE TIME
OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSES OR THE PLACE WHERE THE ALLEGEDLY
LIBELOUS PUBLICATIONS WERE PRINTED AND FIRST PUBLISHED, EITHER OF WHICH
ALLEGATION IS REQUIRED UNDER ART. 360 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO
CONFER JURISDICTION UPON THE COURT, IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR THE
QUASHAL OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS.

Whether the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the offense

HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Paragraph 3, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code states:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for
in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended
parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held

office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed
and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published

Thus, it was clearly stated in the information that the newspaper is published in Makati
City but circulated throughout the country, which allegation accordingly vests jurisdiction over
the offense charged in the RTC of Makati City.
Moreover, the amendment in the informations was one of form. Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. In the instant case, the
amendment was done after petitioners arraignment and with prior leave of court. The
amendment which states, That the libelous article above-quoted was printed and first published
in the City of Makati, more particularly at 3817 Mascardo street, Makati City and/or at 1098 Chino
Roces Avenue (formerly Pasong Tamo) corner Yague and Mascardo Streets, Makati City,[14] is
merely formal.
As laid down by this Court, an amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states
with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. [15] In the case of People v.
Casey,[16] we laid down the test in determining whether an amendment is a matter of form or
substance, thus:
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an
information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally
stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as
in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an
amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not
guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a
higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise
or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance not prejudicial to the
accused, and therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 (now Section 14) of the
Revised Rules of Court.[17]
We find that the original information is sufficient in form. Allowing the amendment does not alter
the defense of the accused. Indeed, it only states with precision that which is already contained
in the original information.

PEOPLE VS CASEY

ISSUE:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the amended information
without arraignment, and in finding him guilty after such illegal trial.
HELD:
We do not find merit in the first assignment of error. The lack of arraignment under the amended
information is objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that
there is a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him. There
can be a violation of such right, however, only when the amendment pertains to matters of
substance. In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the information refer to the inclusion
of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same charge of murder. They do not change the nature
of the crime against accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength are similarly alleged in both informations. No extenuating
circumstance is likewise alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information as far as
accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of form and not of substance as it is not
prejudicial to his rights.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to
be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other. 12 A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an
amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for

a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance not
prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court. 13