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G.R.No.156296

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.156296November12,2012
DENNISQ.MORTEL,Petitioner,
vs.
SALVADORE.KERR,Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN,J.:
Whentheincompetence,ignoranceorinexperienceofcounselissogreatandtheresultingerrorissoseriousthat
theclient,whootherwisehasagoodcause,isprejudicedanddeniedhisdayincourt,theclientdeservesanother
chancetopresenthiscase.Hence,thelitigationmaybereopenedforthatpurpose.
The client seeks the reversal of the resolution dated September 5, 2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
deniedhispetitionforreviewoncertiorarifromtheorderoftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch72,inOlongapoCity
(RTC)issuedinCivilCaseNo.27902000.Hepleadsthattherulesofprocedureshouldbeliberallyconstruedin
hiscase,andthatheshouldnotbeboundbythenegligenceanderrorsofhispreviouscounselsthatdeprivedhim
ofhispropertywithoutbeingaffordedhisdayincourt.
Antecedents
OnJuly19,2000,respondentSalvadorE.Kerr(Kerr)institutedacomplaintforforeclosureofmortgage,docketed
as Civil Case No. 27902000, against Dennis Q. Mortel (Mortel), who duly filed an answer on August 11, 2000
through Atty. Leonuel N. Mas (Atty. Mas) of the Public Attorneys Office. The pretrial was reset four times for
variousreasons,butonthefifthsettingonDecember7,2000,MortelandAtty.Maswerenotaroundwhenthecase
was called. On motion of Kerrs counsel, the RTC declared Mortel as in default and allowed Kerr to present
evidenceexparte.
OnDecember28,2000,Atty.EugenioS.Tumulak(Atty.Tumulak)filedanoticeofappearanceinbehalfofMortel,
buttheRTCdidnotactonthenoticeofappearance.
OnFebruary28,2001,theRTCrenderedjudgmentinfavorofKerr,2disposingasfollows:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedorderingthedefendantDennisQ.MorteltopaytheplaintiffSalvador
E.Kerrwithinaperiodofnotmorethanninety(90)daysfromreceiptofthisDecisionthesumofP130,000.00plus
interestofP6,000.00permonthfromNovember1999untilthewholeobligationhasbeenfullypaidandthefurther
sumofP20,000.00bywayofattorneysfeesandthecosts.
Indefaultofsuchpayment,letthehouseandlotdescribedintheDeedofRealEstateMortgage(Exhibits"A1"and
"A2") in the plaintiffs complaint be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the aforesaid
obligationandthecostsofthissuit.
SOORDERED.
OnMarch22,2001,Mortel,throughAtty.LeopoldoC.Lacambra,Jr.(Atty.Lacambra),filedamotionfornewtrial.3
OnMarch23,2001,Atty.Masfiledhiswithdrawalofappearance.4
OnApril5,2001,theRTCdeniedMortelsmotionfornewtrial,notingthatAtty.MaswithdrawalascounselofMortel
hadbeenfiledonlyonMarch23,2001andapprovedbytheRTConMarch26,2001.Itheldthatconsideringthat
therecordsofthecaseshowedthatAtty.MashadreceivedthedecisiononMarch1,2001,themotionfornewtrial
hadbeenfiledoutoftimeonMarch20,2001.5
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OnMay4,2001,Mortel,thistimethroughAtty.Tumulak,filedaverifiedpetitionforrelieffromjudgmentunderRule
38oftheRulesofCourt.6
OnAugust20,2001,theRTCdeniedtheverifiedpetitionforrelieffromjudgmentonthegroundthatthepetitionfor
reliefhadbeenfiledbeyondthereglementaryperiodof60daysbasedonareckoningofthestartoftheperiodfrom
March1,2001,thedatewhenAtty.MasreceivedthenoticeandcopyoftheOrder,7towit:
xxx.Now,thepetitionforreliefisagainfiledbyacounselwhoseNoticeofAppearancehasnotbeenactedupon.
DefendantscounselonrecordreceivedtheDecisiononMarch1,2001,whichisthereckoningpointtocountthe
mandatorysixty(60)daysinorderthataPetitionfor
Reliefcanbefiled.Itiselementarythatnoticetocounselisnoticetoparty(Peoplev.Midtomod,283SCRA395).
Hence,fromMarch1,2001uptoMay4,2001thefilingofthePetitionforReliefisalreadysixtyfour(64)days
which is four days beyond the period within which to file the same. The defendants Counsel now reckoned the
periodfromthetimetheclientreceivedthesaidDecision.8
OnNovember14,2001,Mortelmovedforthereconsiderationofthedenialofhispetitionforrelieffromjudgment.9
OnDecember6,2001,theRTCgrantedthewithdrawalofAtty.LacambraandAtty.MasascounselsforMortel,and
finallyrecognizedAtty.Tumulakastheonlycounsel.10
OnJanuary16,2002,theRTCtreatedMortelsmotionforreconsiderationasamerescrapofpaperandorderedit
strickenfromtherecordsforfailureofthecounseltoserveanoticeofhearingwiththemotionforreconsideration.11
MortelfiledanurgentmotionforreconsiderationvisvistheRTCsorderofJanuary16,2002.12
On June 17, 2002, the RTC denied the urgent motion for reconsideration for being a second motion for
reconsiderationandforbeingmootandacademicandgrantedKerrsexpartemotionfortheissuanceofawritof
possession.13
Subsequently,theRTCissuedawritofexecutiononJune20,2002,14andKerrwasthenplacedinpossessionof
theproperty.
OnAugust26,2002,Mortel,throughAtty.Tumulak,filedintheCAapetitionforreviewoncertiorariwithprayerfor
theissuanceofarestrainingorder.15
On September 5, 2002, the CA issued a resolution dismissing Mortels petition for review for failing to state the
specificmaterialdatesshowingthatthepetitionhadbeenfiledwithinthereglementaryperiod,inviolationofSection
6(d),Rule43oftheRulesofCourt.ItobservedthatMorteltherebyresortedtothewrongremedyconsideringthathe
was assailing the propriety of the RTCs order declaring him in default, against which the proper remedy was a
petitionforcertiorari.16
OnOctober14,2002,Mortelsoughtthereconsiderationofthedenialofhispetitionforreview.17
OnNovember18,2002,theCAdeniedMortelsmotionforreconsiderationforlackofmeritbecausethedefectsof
the petition for review were not corrected, and for availing himself of the remedy of petition for review when he
shouldhavefiledapetitionforcertiorariinstead.18
Atty.TumulakreceivedthedenialbytheCAonDecember5,2002.19
InsteadofappealingviapetitionforreviewoncertiorariintheSupremeCourt(SC),Mortel,throughAtty.Tumulak,
filedintheCAonDecember20,2002anurgentmotionforextensionoftimetoappealtotheSC.20
OnDecember23,2002,Mortel,byhimself,soughtanextensionoftimetofileapetitionforreviewoncertiorari.21
OnJanuary27,2003,theCourtgrantedMortelsmotionforextensionwithawarningthatnofurtherextensionwould
begiven.22
OnJanuary22,2003,Mortel,stillbyhimself,filedhispetitionforreviewoncertiorariassailingtheCAsdismissalof
hispetitionforreviewoncertiorari.
Issues
Mortelcontendsthat:
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WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 2002 FROM THE RESOLUTION DATED SEPTEMBER 5, 2002
DISMISSINGTHEPETITIONFORREVIEWFILEDBYTHEPETITIONER.23
MortelpraysthattheRulesofCourtbeliberallyinterpretedinhisfavortoallowhispetitionforreviewoncertiorari
despitethevariouslapsesofhiscounselsresultinginthelossofhisopportunitytoassailtheresolutionsoftheRTC.
On the other hand, Kerr insists that the CA correctly dismissed the petition because the errors of his former
counselsboundMortel.24
Accordingly,theissuestoberesolvedarethefollowing:
1.WhetherornotthenegligenceofMortelspreviouscounselsshouldbindhimand
2.WhetherornotMortelwasdeprivedofhispropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.
Ruling
Thepetition,beingmeritorious,isgranted.
TheCAfoundthatdespitetheopportunitygiventohimtodoso,Mortelscounselerredinfailingtostatethespecific
material dates required by Section 6(d) of Rule 43, Rules of Court to show that the petition for review was filed
withinthereglementaryperiodandthatMortelresortedtothewrongremedybyfilingapetitionforreviewinsteadof
apetitionforcertioraribecausehewasquestioningtheproprietyoftheRTCsorderdeclaringhimasindefault.25
Mortelscounselcommittedanothererrorwhenhefiledhisurgentmotionforextensionoftimetofileanappealin
theCA,insteadofintheSC,resultinginnotstoppingtherunningoftheperiodofappealandintherebyrendering
theResolutionoftheCAfinal.
Asarule,aclientisboundbyhiscounselsconduct,negligenceandmistakeinhandlingacase.26Toallowaclient
to disown his counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the
meresubterfugeofreplacingcounsel.27
But the rule admits of exceptions. In several rulings, the Court held the client not concluded by the negligence,
incompetence or mistake of the counsel. For instance, in Suarez v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court set aside the
judgment and mandated the trial court to reopen the case for the reception of the evidence for the defense after
findingthatthenegligenceofthethereinpetitionerscounselhaddeprivedheroftherighttopresentandproveher
defense.Also,inLegardav.CourtofAppeals,29theCourtorderedrestoredtothepetitionerherpropertythathad
beensoldatpublicauctioninsatisfactionofadefaultjudgmentresultingfromthefailureofhercounseltofilean
answer and from counsels lack of vigilance in protecting her interests in subsequent proceedings before the trial
courtandtheCA.Lastly,inAmilv.CourtofAppeals,30theCourtdeclaredthatanexceptiontotherulethataclient
is bound by the mistakes of his counsel is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross that the client was
deprivedofhisdayincourt,therebyalsodeprivingtheclientofhispropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.
Therelevantquestionbecomes,therefore,whetherthenegligenceofMortelscounselswassogrossandpalpable
astodeprivehimofhispropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.
Weholdthatitwas.
Morteldidnothavehisdayincourt,becausehewasunabletosubmithisevidencetocontroverttheclaimofKerr
abouthiscontractualdefaultaftertheRTCdeclaredMortelasindefaultduetohiscounselsfailuretoappearatthe
fifthsettingofthepretrial.Yet,heexplainedthathewasonlylatebecausehearrivedincourtafewminutesafter
thecasehadbeencalled.Hisexplanationappearsplausible,consideringthathehadunfailinglyappearedincourtin
thefourprevioussettingsofthepretrial.Inviewofthefactthatitwashisfirsttimenottobepresentwhenthecase
was called at the fifth setting of the pretrial, the RTC could have allowed a second or a third call instead of
immediately granting his adverse partys motion to declare him as in default. In Leyte v. Cusi,31 the Court has
admonished against precipitate orders of default because such orders have the effect of denying a litigant the
chancetobeheard.Indeed,wehaveremindedtrialcourtsthatalthoughthereareinstanceswhenapartymaybe
properlydefaulted,suchinstancesshouldbetheexceptionratherthantheruleandshouldbeallowedonlyinclear
cases of a litigants obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect to comply with the orders of the court. Without such a
showing,thelitigantmustbegiveneveryreasonableopportunitytopresenthissideandtorefutetheevidenceof
theadversepartyindeferencetodueprocessoflaw.32
Nevertheless,thenegligencethatactuallywarrantstheundoingoftheRTCsdecisionwasserialonthepartofAtty.
Mas,theRTCandAtty.Tumulak.
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TheprimarynegligenceoccurredonthepartofAtty.Mas.Hedidnotappearatthepretrialdespitebeingnotifiedof
it. What is very disturbing is that he was then an attorney in the Public Attorneys Office in Olongapo City whose
placeofworkwaslocatedinthesameHallofJusticeofOlongapoCitywheretheRTCwasthensitting.Moreover,
he did not offer any explanation for his nonappearance at the pretrial despite notice to him nor did he take the
necessarymovetoprotecttheinterestofMorteluponlearningthatMortelhadbeendeclaredasindefaultbythe
RTC. His nonappearance despite notice and his subsequent inaction for his clients cause manifested his
indifferenceandlackofprofessionalism,andisdifficulttocomprehendconsideringthathewastheprimarycause
whyMortelwasdeclaredasindefaultbytheRTC.
1wphi1

TheRTCwasequallyresponsibleforMortelsdireplight.ItappearsthatMortelengagedAtty.Tumulaktotakeover
ascounselfromAtty.Mas.Atty.TumulaknotifiedtheRTCofhisappearanceforMortelonDecember28,2000.The
RTCcouldhaveeasilynotedandactedonAtty.TumulaksentryofappearanceforMortel,or,iftheRTCstilldesired
to require the submission of Atty. Mas withdrawal as counsel, to direct such withdrawal to be first submitted,
especiallyafterAtty.MasfiledhiswithdrawalofappearanceonMarch23,2001.ButtheRTCuncharacteristically
didnottakeeitherofsuchactionsonthenoticeofappearancebutproceededtorenderitsjudgmentonthemerits,a
copyofwhichitdispatchedtoAtty.Mas(whoreceiveditonMarch1,2001)andtoMortelhimself(whoreceivediton
March7,2001).Ineffect,theRTCdisregardedAtty.TumulaksnoticeofhissubstitutionofAtty.Masascounselof
Mortel.Thedisregardcontinuedfornearlyayear,andtheRTCfinallyrecognizedAtty.Tumulakastheonlycounsel
ofMortelonDecember6,2001.ThereasonfortheRTCsdisregardofandlongdelayedactionuponamatteras
essential to the client and to the administration of justice in the case as the substitution of counsel is not easy to
appreciate,especiallybecausetheRTCtenderednogoodreasonforit.
WithAtty.TumulakleftoutandremainingunawareofthedevelopmentsinthecasebecauseoftheRTCsinaction
onhisnoticeofappearance,Mortel,uponreceiptofthedecisionandfeelingabandonedagainbyAtty.Tumulak,his
new counsel, engaged Atty. Lacambra to collaborate as his counsel. Atty. Lacambra filed on March 20, 2001 a
motionfornewtrial.CountingfromthetimewhenMortelreceivedthecopyofthedecisiononMarch7,2001,Mortel
probablythoughtthathehadfiledthemotionfornewtrialwithintherequiredperiod.However,theRTCconsidered
March1,2001asthereckoningdate,beingthedatewhenAtty.Masreceivedthenoticeofthedecision,andruled
that Mortels motion for new trial was already filed beyond the prescribed period. That action of the RTC was not
prudentandcircumspect,consideringthattherecordsofthecasealreadycontainedsinceDecember28,2000the
entry of appearance of Atty. Tumulak as replacement of Atty. Mas as Mortels counsel. The RTC should have at
least informed either Mortel or Atty. Tumulak or both of them that it was either allowing or disallowing Atty.
TumulaksentryofappearanceinordertoenableMorteltoseasonablyclarifyhisdiresituationand,ifnecessary,
eventorectifyit.ThatprudentialandcircumspectapproachwouldhavebeeneasyfortheRTCtotakebecausethe
RTCbecamealltooawareoftheneglectofAtty.MasinprotectingtheinterestofMortelfollowingthedeclarationof
Mortelasindefault.Inaddition,theRTCcouldhavereckonedtheperiodforMorteltobringthemotionfornewtrial
fromMarch7,2001,thedatewhenMortelreceivedacopyofthedecisiontheRTCsenttohimdirectly,insteadof
March1,2001,thedatewhenAtty.Masreceivedthecopyofthedecision,consideringalltheindicationsaboutAtty.
MashavingneglectedtheinterestofMortel.
Atty. Tumulak shared the blame for the predicament of Mortel through his own series of errors that mirrored an
ignorance of the rules of procedure. There is no question that the errors deprived Mortel of the timely means to
successfullyundotheadversedecisionrenderedbytheRTC.Atty.Tumulaksfirsterrorwasinfilingamotionfor
reconsiderationvisvistheRTCsdenialofthepetitionforrelieffromjudgmentwithoutincludingapropernoticeof
hearing.HenextfiledamotionforreconsiderationvisvistheRTCsdenialofhisfirstmotionforreconsideration,
whichtheRTCthendeniedonthegroundofitsbeingalreadyaprohibitedsecondmotionforreconsideration.This
wasanotherfatalerror.Theseriesoferrorsdidnotendthere,forAtty.TumulakoptedtofileintheCAapetitionfor
reviewoncertiorariinsteadofapetitionforcertiorari,whichwastheappropriateremedyduetohisalleginggrave
abuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheRTC.Thiswasonemoreerror.Theultimateerrorwasnotanylessserious,
becauseAtty.TumulakfiledintheCAinsteadofinthisCourtthemotionforextensionoftimetoappealtheCAs
November 18, 2002 denial of Mortels motion for reconsideration. Atty. Tumulaks moves in behalf of Mortel, no
matter how well intentioned, were contrary to the pertinent rules of procedure and worked against the clients
interest.
Thenegligenceandmistakescommittedbyhisseveralcounselsweresogrossandpalpablethattheydenieddue
processtoMortelandcouldhavecosthimhisvaluableasset.Theytherebypreventedhimfrompresentinghisside,
which was potentially highly unfair and unjust to him on account of his defense being plausible and seemingly
meritorious.Hestatedthathehadalreadypaidtheprincipaloftheloanandtheinterest,submittinginsupportofhis
statementareceiptforP200,000.00thatKerrhadallegedlysigned.Healsostatedthathehadactuallyoverpaidin
viewofhisarrangementforKerrtowithdrawP6,000.00eachmonthfromMortelsbankaccountaspaymentofthe
interest,astatementthathewouldconfirmincourtthroughthetestimonyofabankrepresentative.33
We held in Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals34 that when the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of
counselissogreatandtheresultissoseriousthattheclient,whootherwisehasagoodcause,isprejudicedand
denied his day in court, the client deserves another chance to present his case hence, the litigation may be
reopenedforthatpurpose.Also,whenanunsuccessfulpartyhasbeenpreventedfromfullyandfairlypresentinghis
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casebecauseofhisattorneysprofessionaldelinquencyorinfidelitythelitigationmaybereopenedtoallowtheparty
to present his side. Lastly, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which
resultedintheclientsbeingheldliablefordamagesinadamagesuit,theclientisdeprivedofhisdayincourtand
thejudgmentmaybesetasideonsuchground.35
Courtlitigationisprimarilyasearchfortruth,andaliberalinterpretationoftherulesthatgivestobothpartiesthe
fullestopportunitytoadduceproofisthebestwaytoferretoutsuchtruth.36Thus,acourtmaysuspenditsownrules
orexceptacasefromtheminordertoservetheendsofjusticeor,itmayaltogetherdisregardtherulesinaproper
case.37Toclingtothegeneralruleofhavingtheignorance,negligenceandderelictionofdutyofthecounselbind
theclientisonlytocondoneratherthantorectifyaseriousinjusticetoapartywhoseonlyfaultwastoreposehis
faithandentrusthiscausetohiscounsel.38
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the resolution promulgated on September 5, 2002 ANNULS and SETS
ASIDE the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 27902000 on February 28, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, in Olongapo City and REOPENS Civil Case No. 27902000 for the reception of evidence for the
petitionerasthedefendant.
Costsofsuittobepaidbytherespondent.
SOORDERED.
LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice
TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

BIENVENIDOL.REYES
AssociateJustice
CERTIFICATION
PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,IcertifythattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeen
reachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
1 Rollo. pp. 1314 penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestafio (retired/deceased), and concurred in by

Associate Justice Delilah VidallonMagtolis (retired) and Associate Justice Josefina GuevarraSalonga
(retired)
2Records,pp.72A73.
3Id.at7882.
4Id.at88.
5Id.at95.
6Id.at97107.
7Id.at125126.
8Id.at125.
9Id.at133134.
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10Id.at143.
11Id.at159.
12Id.at168175.
13Id.at181182.
14Id.at184185.
15CArollo,pp.215.
16Id.at9596.
17Id.at97101.
18Id.at110.
19Id.at108109.
20Rollo,pp.911.
21Id.at37.
22Id.at34.
23Id.at41.
24Id.at70.
25CARollo,pp.9596.
26SaintLouisUniversityv.Cordero,G.R.No.144118,July21,2004,434SCRA575,584.
27Gomezv.Montalban,G.R.No.174414,March14,2008,548SCRA693,708.
28G.R.No.91133,March22,1993,220SCRA274.
29G.R.No.94457,March18,1991,195SCRA418.
30G.R.No.125272,October7,1999,316SCRA317.
31G.R.No.L31974,July31,1987,152SCRA496.
32Id.at498499.
33CARollo,pp.3839.
34G.R.No.133750,November29,1999,319SCRA456.
35Id.at468.
36Gov.Tan,G.R.No.130330,September26,2003,412SCRA123,129130.
37Peoplev.DelMundo,G.R.Nos.11996469.September20,1996,262SCRA266.
38ApexMining,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,supranote35at468.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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