MALLARI VS.

CA
324 SCRA 147 (2000)
Huang, Janinna Alyanna L.

FACTS

On 14 October 1987, 5:00 AM

The passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and
owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr.
Collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing
Corp. (BULLETIN)

Along the National Highway in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan,

Bataan.

FACTS

Petitioner Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the
highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane.
Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of respondent
BULLETIN (Felix Angeles) coming from the opposite direction.
The collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while
negotiating a curve in the highway.

FACTS

Collision:
1. The left rear portion of the passenger jeepney

2. The left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN.

The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left
side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel
Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.

FACTS

On 16 December 1987
Claudia G. Reyes, (widow of Israel M. Reyes), filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City against
1. Alfredo Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr.,
2. BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the

3. N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company.

FACTS

The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death
of Israel Reyes was caused by the fault and negligence of both
drivers of the passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu
delivery van.

FACTS

The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was
the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery
van
considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by
Felix Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney
driven by Alfredo Mallari Jr.

FACTS

Hence, the trial court ordered BULLETIN and Felix Angeles to pay
jointly and severally Claudia G. Reyes,
The trial court also ordered N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company to
indemnify Claudia G. Reyes
It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants
Alfredo Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioners should be liable for

damages due to negligence as a common carrier
resulting in the death of a passenger (Reyes).

HELD

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held
that Mallari Jr. and Sr. who was responsible for the death of
Reyes.
The collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner
Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the
collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway,
he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had
seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera.

HELD

This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a)
and(b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has
the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if
he can not do so in safety.

HELD

Article 2185 of the NCC:

there is a presumption of negligence on the part of a person driving a
motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a
traffic regulation.

Petitioners herein failed to present satisfactory evidence to

overcome this legal presumption.
Therefore they shall be liable for the loss of Reyes life.

HELD

Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by

Mallari Sr.
assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and
to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the
circumstances (Art. 1755) ,
and any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is
right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art.
1756) .

LEGAL PRINCIPLE

Article 2185 of the NCC

othere is a presumption of
negligence on the part of a
person driving a motor
vehicle if at the time of the
mishap he was violating a
traffic regulation.

Art. 1755 of the NCC

oa common carrier is
bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight
can provide using the
utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due
regard for all the
circumstances.

Art. 1756 of the NCC

oin case of death or injuries
to passengers, a common
carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to
have acted negligently,
unless it proves that it
observed extraordinary
diligence.

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. VS. CA

179 SCRA 95 (1989)
Huang, Janinna Alyanna L.

FACTS

Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by defendant,

at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila
Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the
cargoes loaded on said vessel
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975
between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.

FACTS

The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane
operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1)
hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started
operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel.
Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel
obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the
vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to
the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded
that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel
and the crane.

FACTS

Vianas:
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner corporation (Aboitiz, for
brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.

Aboitiz:
denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel
was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer as the
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of
cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz.
It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of
Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.

FACTS
Aboitiz:
filed a third-party complaint against Pioneer imputing liability thereto for
Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly caused by the
negligence of the crane operator who was an employee of Pioneer
under its exclusive control and supervision.

Pioneer:
had observed the diligence of a good father of a family both in the
selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of
damage or injury to anyone including the victim Anacleto Viana
that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was the direct and proximate
cause of his death

ISSUE

Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable

for the death of Anacleto Viana

HELD

Yes
The victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence,

but it was the negligence of Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the

vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which
was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's
death.

HELD

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues

until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination
and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises.
Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until
the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted
from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier's premises.

HELD

All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after

leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is
a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure.

HELD

The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a

reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or
near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's
business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a
longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other
common carriers such as a passenger bus.

HELD

When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of

unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from
petitioner's vessel.
As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its
passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a
reasonable time to claim their baggage.

LEGAL PRINCIPLE

Common carriers are, from

the nature of their business
and for reasons of public
policy, bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the
passengers transported by
them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.

Thus, where a
passenger dies or is
injured, the common
carrier is presumed
to have been at
fault or to have
acted negligently.

This gives rise to an action for breach of

contract of carriage
where all that is required of plaintiff is to
prove the existence of the contract of
carriage and its non-performance by the
carrier,
that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the
passenger safely to his destination, which,
in the instant case, necessarily includes its
failure to safeguard its passenger with
extraordinary diligence while such relation
subsists.