People vs Jugueta

GR. No. 202124

Facts:
Two cases were filed against the appellants:
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 years of age
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at
Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms
the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the
acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident
other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants
Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during
trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder,
as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant
and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of
Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

Issue: WON the information filed against the appellants satisfy the requirements of Sec. 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
Held:
Yes. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the
requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must
charge only one offense.

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the
same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v.
Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against
him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap
upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Noncompliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may
raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect
is deemed waived.
HOWEVER, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to
move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question
the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall
be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.31
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted
murder, respectively, and proven during trial.

Matalam v. Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 165751
Facts:
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and
Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for their
alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul
E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and
Faizal I. Hadil.

On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. After the

reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam and
changing the committed offense to illegal dismissal from the service of DAR-Maguindanao
the complaining employees to their damage and prejudice amounting to P1,,606,788.50 by
way of unpaid salaries.
In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an
entirely new cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his
alleged refusal to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the
alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses.
He insists that the amended information charging a separate and entirely different offense
cannot be admitted because there would be a serious violation of due process of law. He
claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not informed that he is being
charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses and that he was not given
the opportunity to explain.
Sandignbayan contends that given the foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused
Matalam are not, after all, in any way prejudiced because an inquiry to the allegations in the
original cause of action would certainly and necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to
the inquiry of the allegations in the new cause of action contained in the Amended
Information. To remand this case again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a waste of
time considering that accused, in his counter-affidavit, had already explained extensively his
defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended Information sought to be
admitted. And definitely, his projected defense would be the same assuming that another
preliminary investigation be conducted and that he would be required to submit another
counter-affidavit again.

Issue: WON appellant is deprived of due process of law when Sandiganbayan admitted the
Amended Information without conducting another or new preliminary investigation.

Held:
Yes. Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that
before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is
beneficial to the accused.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to
be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after
the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an
information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect

the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts
constituting the offense charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the
prohibited act allegedly committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to
pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the amended information; it is
the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be
denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to,
and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants.
The rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information entitles an
accused to another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended information contains
a charge related to or is included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation
is not required.

People v. Tabongbanua
GR. No. 171271
Facts:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The
latter worked as the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, a law firm operated
as a sole proprietorship, and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San
Juan, M.M. On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused drove
Atty. Sua Kho to her condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San
Jun M.M. After handing his employers bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused
proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a glass of water.

Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused
stabbing her with their kitchen knife which eventually led to the death of Atty. Sua-Kho. The
accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified,
didnt want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company guest, a
certain Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay.

The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self-defense for lack of

evidence and fo being incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained
by the victim and his flight from the crime scene. As regards the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim, the Court of Appeals noted that
these circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the presentation

by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because it will
prejudice the rights of the appellant.

Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that such amendment should not be allowed

Held:
Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, provides that an amendment after the
plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is
obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial
amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.:
1. New allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction;
2. An amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one;
3. Additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by
such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood
would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence
which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as
in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of
substance.
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly
a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of
charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the
original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose
in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant. Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of rank, age or sex. Without any objection by the defense, the
defect is deemed waived.

Ricarze v. Court of Appeals

GR. No. 160451
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service
Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to
the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to
collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices
to Caltexs customers. After a daily electronic report from Phil. Commercial & Industrial Bank
(PCIB), it was discovered that unknown to the department, checks have been cleared and
were missing. Investigation revealed that said savings account where checks were deposited
had actually been opened by petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by
him under Gutierrezs name. A bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela
Cruz, positively identified petitioner as the person who opened the savings account using
Gutierrezs name.
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses,
after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private
prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence. Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that
the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and
Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution had rested its case that
SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA
and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no
personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private complainant
is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken
from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the
private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out,
however, that the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been
arraigned under the original Informations.

Issue: WON the amendment constitute a violation of petitioners due process

Held:
No. Section 14. Amendment or substitution A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made

with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor
did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the
forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well
before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.

Soberano v. People
GR. No. 154629
Facts:
In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador Bubby
Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in
the City of Manila. Their charred remains, consisting of burnt bones, metal dental plates and
a ring, were later found in Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were positively
identified by their dentists and by forensic pathologists from the University of the
Philippines.

A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information[13] dated 17 September 2001 was
filed by the prosecution. The Amended Information --(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao
as they are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and
P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via.
Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed
the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition [14] dated 28
September 2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit Amended Information and the
discharge of accused Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied.
The petitioners further aver that even if it is only a simple discharge under Section 14
of Rule 110, it is still necessary to seek prior leave of court. The prosecution simply filed an
Amended Information excluding Jimmy and William Lopez, Alex Diloy and Glen Dumlao,
without prior leave of court, and moved for its admission.
CA ruled that applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that
the Amended Information sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient support
therein, considering, firstly, that there has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when
respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the motion for reinvestigation in the
Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a prior leave of court given to the State
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to conduct the same, substantially complying with
such requirement under the second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of
court is defined a permission obtained from a court to take some action which, without such
permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an amended pleading, to
plead several pleas.

Issue: WON the amending of the information was valid pursuant to Sec. 14 of Rule 110

Held:
Yes. Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we agree with the Court of Appeals
considering that we do not perceive here any impairment of the substantial rights of all the
accused or the right of the people to due process.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an
amendment of an information to exclude some accused and that the same is made before
plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that the
amendment should be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the

exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of discharging them as
witnesses for the State.
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of
the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110
does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in
equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or
when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other
ground.

Pacoy v. Cajigal
GR. No. 157472
Facts:
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner.
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference
and trial on October 8, 2002.
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the
crime to Murder. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victims name
fromEscuita to Escueta.
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner
was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground
that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had
been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As
petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public
respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.

Issue: WON the amendment was merely in form or was in substance

Held:

The court ruled that it was merely in form. There were no changes in the recital of
facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court.
Since the amendment was merely formal, amendment may be filed even after plea provided
with leave and without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that disrespect on account of rank
qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we
do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of
the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide,
since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial
right of petitioner.

Crespo v. Mogul
GR. No. L-53373
Facts:
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal
Court of Lucena City. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information
filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the
Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the
letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor
was given time to file an opposition thereto.

Issue: The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to
whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits

Held:
Yes. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the
arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited
himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of
said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the
fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of
the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of
the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court, The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.