RA 7610

PEOPLE VS ABELLO

[G.R. No. 151952. March 25, 2009.

FACTS: The victim in these cases is
twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She
contracted polio when she was seven (7)
months old. She was not able to study on
account of her difficulty in walking.
On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00
o'clock (sic) in the early morning,
AAA was sleeping in their house in
Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro
Manila along with her sister-in-law
and nephew. She was suddenly
awakened when Abello . . . mashed
her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at
around 3:00 a.m. Abello again
mashed the breast of AAA
practically under the same previous
situation while the latter was
sleeping. In these two occasions
AAA was able to recognize Abello
because of the light coming from
outside which illuminated the house.
Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00
a.m., Abello this time placed his soft
penis inside the mouth of AAA. The
latter got awaken when Abello
accidentally kneeled on her right
hand. AAA exclaimed "Aray"
forcing the accused to hurriedly enter
his room. He was nevertheless seen
by AAA. The victim on the same
date reported the incident to her
sister-in-law and mother.

ISSUE: WON AAA is a covered

under the definition of child in
RA 7610.
RULING: NO.

More importantly, AAA cannot be

considered a child under Section 3 (a) of
R.A. No. 7610 which reads:
(a) "Children" refers to
person below
eighteen (18) years
of age or those over
but are unable to
fully take care of
themselves or
protect themselves
from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination
because of a
physical or mental
disability or
condition;
[Emphasis supplied]

The implementing rules elaborated on

this definition when it defined a "child"
as one who is below 18 years of age or
over said age who, upon evaluation of
a qualified physician, psychologist or
psychiatrist, is found to be incapable
of taking care of herself fully because
of a physical or mental disability or
condition or of protecting herself from
abuse.
While the records show that the RTC, the
CA and the investigating prosecutor who
filed the corresponding Informations,
considered AAA's polio as a physical
disability that rendered her incapable of
normal function, no evidence was in fact
presented showing the prosecution's
compliance with the implementing rules.
Specifically, the prosecution did not
present any evidence, testimonial or
documentary, of any medical
evaluation or medical finding from a

qualified physician, psychologist or

psychiatrist attesting that AAA's
physical condition rendered her
incapable of fully taking care of
herself or of protecting herself against
sexual abuse. Under the circumstances,
we cannot consider AAA a child under
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610.
In arriving at this conclusion, we
consider that since R.A. No. 7610 is a
special law referring to a particular class
in society, the prosecution must show
that the victim truly belongs to this
particular class to warrant the application
of the statute's provisions. Any doubt in
this regard we must resolve in favor of
the accused.
DcIHSa

From another perspective, we also note

that no evidence has been adduced
showing that AAA's physical disability
prevented her from resisting Abello's
attacks; the evidence only reveals that
Abello took advantage of the opportunity
presented to him (i.e., that AAA and her
companions who were then asleep) to
commit the sexual abuses; this inference
is supported by the fact that he stopped
his sexual assault when AAA started to
awaken. It can also be reasonably
deduced from these circumstances that
Abello sought to commit the sexual
abuses with impunity without AAA's
knowledge and without any interference
on her part.
In light of these conclusions, we cannot
hold Abello liable under R.A. No.
7610. However, we still find him liable
for acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC, as amended.
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PEOPLE VS DELANTAR
G.R. No. 169143. February 2,
2007
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FACTS:Accused Simplicio Delantar y

Redondo delivered his daughter [AAA]
to an Arab national by the name of Mr.
Hammond from their house at 2165-A P.
Burgos St., Pasay City sometime in 1994
selling her in prostitution to the said
[A]rab who committed acts of
lasciviousness on her person by kissing
her on her lips, her breast, her private
parts and even rubbing his penis against
her private parts.
Accused Simplicio Delantar pimped and
delivered the complainant, an eleven (11)
year old minor to Congressman Romeo
Jalosjos of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte at the Ritz Tower
in Makati where the said Congressman
for eight (8) times committed acts of
lasciviousness on her person when he
kissed her on her lips, private organ and
even raped her. That all these times, the
accused brought his child from their
residence at 2165-A P. Burgos St., Pasay
City
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of
RA 7610.
RULING: YES. Appellant's violation of
Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 is as
clear as day. The provision penalizes
anyone who engages in or promotes,
facilitates or induces child prostitution
either by: (1) acting as a procurer of a
child prostitute; or (2) inducing a person
to be a client of a child prostitute by
means of written or oral advertisements

or other similar means; or (3) by taking

advantage of influence or relationship to
procure a child as a prostitute; or (4)
threatening or using violence towards a
child to engage him as a prostitute; or (5)
giving monetary consideration, goods or
other pecuniary benefits to the child with
the intent to engage such child in
prostitution.
CIHAED

The purpose of the law is to provide

special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination, and
other conditions prejudicial to their
development. 70 A child exploited in
prostitution may seem to "consent" to
what is being done to her or him and
may appear not to complain. However,
we have held that a child who is "a
person below eighteen years of age or
those unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of their age or
mental disability or condition" is
incapable of giving rational consent 71 to
any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
In fact, the absence of free consent is
conclusively presumed when the woman
is below the age of twelve.
Under R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 31 (c),
relationship is not a qualifying
circumstance but only an ordinary
generic aggravating circumstance.
Thus, although it was not alleged in the
information it can nevertheless be taken
into account in fixing the penalty for the
crime because it was proven. 74 A
generic aggravating circumstance
provides for the imposition of the

prescribed penalty in its maximum

period, while a qualifying circumstance
changes the nature of the crime. 75
In the case at bar, the only evidence
presented to establish AAA's alleged
relationship to appellant is her birth
certificate 76 which mentions appellant as
the father. However, said document does
not bear appellant's signature. In fact,
appellant, in his testimony, denied that he
is AAA's father.
PEOPLE VS OLAYON
[G.R. No. 171863. August 20,
2008.]
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FACTS: The then 22-year old herein

respondent Gaspar Olayon was charged
with violation of Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 (THE SPECIAL
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
AGAINST ABUSE, EXPLOITATION,
AND DISCRIMINATION ACT) in two
separate Informations filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, of which the then 14-year old AAA
was alleged to be the victim.
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On or about 10:00 a.m. and 2: 00 pm of

January 27, 1997 in Taguig, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, with lewd designs, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with and
commit lewd and lascivious acts upon the
person of [AAA], a minor, fourteen (14)
years of age.
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ISSUE: whether consensual sexual

intercourse with a minor is classified as

child abuse under Section 10 of R.A. No.

7610.

molestation, prostitution, or incest with

children." (Underscoring supplied)

RULING: NO. As Section 10 refers to

acts of child abuse prejudicial to the
child's development other than child
prostitution and other sexual abuse 16
under Section 5, attempt to commit child
prostitution, 17 child trafficking, 18
attempt to commit child trafficking, 19
and obscene publications and indecent
shows, 20 the Court of Appeals did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding that ". . . 'sexual abuse' [as
defined under Section 5] . . . is a
completely distinct and separate offense
from 'child abuse' [as defined under
Section 10]."

For consensual sexual intercourse or

lascivious conduct with a minor, who is
not exploited in prostitution, to thus fall
within the purview of Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610, "persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion" of the child must
be present.

Consensual sexual intercourse or even

acts of lasciviousness with a minor who
is 12 years old or older could constitute a
violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610. For Section 5 (b) punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not
only with a child exploited in prostitution
but also with a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. 21
Section 2 (g) of the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases,
promulgated to implement R.A. No.
7610, defines "sexual abuse" as
including "the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist
another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the

In People v. Larin, 22 the information

alleged that the therein accused took
advantage of his authority, influence, and
moral ascendancy as trainor/swimming
instructor of the minor victim 23 which
the Court found constituted
"psychological coercion". 24 In
convicting the therein accused for
lascivious acts, the Court held:
It must be noted that
[Republic Act No. 7610]
covers not only a situation
in which a child is abused
for profit, but also one in
which a child, through
coercion or intimidation,
engages in any lascivious
conduct. 25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

And even in Malto v. People 26 wherein

the accused was convicted for violation
of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the
information alleged, and the prosecution
proved, that the therein accused who was
the minor's professor obtained the
minor's consent by taking advantage of
his relationship and moral ascendancy
to exert influence on her.
SDHTEC

In the case at bar, even if respondent

were charged under Section 5 (b), instead

of Section 10 (a), respondent would just

the same have been acquitted as there
was no allegation that an element of the
offense coercion or influence or
intimidation attended its commission.
PEOPLE VS ABAY
[G.R. No. 177752. February 24,
2009.]
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FACTS:

On March 8, 2000, appellant Roberto

Abay y Trinidad was charged with rape
in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 4 1 under the
following Information:
That sometime in December 1999, in
the City of Manila, Philippines,
[appellant] by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
commit sexual abuse and lascivious
conduct against [AAA], a minor, 13
years of age, by then and there
kissing her breast and whole body,
lying on top of her and inserting his
penis into her vagina, thus succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of her,
against her will and consent
thereafter threatening to kill her
should she report the incident,
thereby gravely endangering her
survival and normal growth and
development, to the damage and
prejudice of [AAA].
ISSUE: WON ACCUSED IS GUILTY
UNDER RA 7610.
RULING: NO.

In view of the enactment of RA 8353 7

and RA 9346, 8 the CA found appellant

guilty only of simple rape and reduced

the penalty imposed to reclusion
perpetua.
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Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA

7610 12 in relation to RA 8353, 13 if the
victim of sexual abuse 14 is below 12
years of age, the offender should not be
prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d)
of the Revised Penal Code 15 and
penalized with reclusion perpetua. 16 On
the other hand, if the victim is 12 years
or older, the offender should be charged
with either sexual abuse 17 under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under
Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of
the Revised Penal Code.However, the
offender cannot be accused of both
crimes 18 for the same act because his
right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected
twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act. 19 Likewise, rape cannot be
complexed with a violation of Section 5
(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (on complex
crimes), 20 a felony under the Revised
Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by
a special law. 21
DCASEc

In this case, the victim was more than 12

years old when the crime was committed
against her. The Information against
appellant stated that AAA was 13 years
old at the time of the incident. Therefore,
appellant may be prosecuted either for
violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or
rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal
Code.While the Information may have

alleged the elements of both crimes, the

prosecution's evidence only established
that appellant sexually violated the
person of AAA through force and
intimidation 22 by threatening her with a
bladed instrument and forcing her to
submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape
was established.
BONGALON VS PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 169533. March 20, 2013.]

zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33

cm. scapular area, left
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of Child
Abuse under RA 7610.
Ruling: NO.
The law under which the petitioner was
charged, tried and found guilty of
violating is Section 10 (a).

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FACTS:
on May 11, 2002, Jayson dela Cruz
(Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother,
both minors, joined the evening
procession for the Santo Nio at Oro Site
in Legazpi City; that when the
procession passed in front of the
petitioner's house, the latter's daughter
Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw
stones at Jayson and called him "sissy";
that the petitioner confronted Jayson and
Roldan and called them names like
"strangers" and "animals"; that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with
his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;
4 that the petitioner then went to the
brothers' house and challenged Rolando
dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but
Rolando did not come out of the house to
take on the petitioner; that Rolando later
brought Jayson to the Legazpi City
Police Station and reported the incident;
that Jayson also underwent medical
treatment at the Bicol Regional Training
and Teaching Hospital; 5 that the doctors
who examined Jayson issued two
medical certificates attesting that Jayson
suffered the following contusions, to wit:
(1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left;
and (2) +1 x 1 cm. contusion left

The records did not establish beyond

reasonable doubt that his laying of hands
on Jayson had been intended to debase
the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had
thereby intended to humiliate or
embarrass Jayson. The records showed
the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of
the moment and in anger, indicative of
his being then overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety
of his own minor daughters who had just
suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and
Roldan. With the loss of his self-control,
he lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child
abuse.
Not every instance of the laying of
hands on a child constitutes the crime
of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610. 1 Only when
the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
child as a human being should it be

punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it

is punished under the Revised Penal
Code.
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Considering that Jayson's physical injury

required five to seven days of medical
attention, 19 the petitioner was liable for
slight physical injuries under Article 266
(1) of the Revised Penal Code
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ROSALDES VS PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 173988. October 8, 2014.]

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FACTS: The petitioner, a public

schoolteacher, was charged with and
found guilty of child abuse, a violation
of Republic Act No. 7610. 1 The victim
was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having
accidentally bumped her knee while she
was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he
entered the classroom. Her maltreatment
left him with physical injuries, as duly
certified by a physician.
ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals erred in
convicting the petitioner by holding that
the acts of the petitioner constitute child
abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 761O
RULING: NO.
Although the petitioner, as a
schoolteacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction
of the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The
boy even fainted from the violence
suffered at her hands. 13 She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for

the sake of disciplining him. Her

physical maltreatment of him was
precisely prohibited by no less than the
Family Code, which has expressly
banned the infliction of corporal
punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child
care exercising special parental authority
(i.e., in loco parentis)
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In the crime charged against the

petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment
may consist of an act by deeds or by
words that debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being. The act need
not be habitual. The CA concluded that
the petitioner "went overboard in
disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless
and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left
thigh and when she held him in the
armpits and threw him on the floor[; and
as] the boy fell down, his body hit the
desk causing him to lose consciousness
[but instead] of feeling a sense of
remorse, the accused-appellant further
held the boy up by his ears and pushed
him down on the floor." 15 On her part,
the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that
caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner,
compelling his parents to transfer him to
another school where he had to adjust
again. 16 Such established circumstances
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was guilty of child abuse by
deeds that degraded and demeaned the
intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael
Ryan as a human being.

DE OCAMPO VS SEC. OF JUSTICE

[G.R. No. 147932. January 25, 2006.
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FACTS:
The present case arose from a sworn
statement of respondent Magdalena B.
Dacarra ("Magdalena") executed before
the Women's Desk of the CPD Police
Station in Batasan Hills, Quezon City on
10 December 1999. Magdalena stated
that on 4 December 1999, her nine-yearold son Ronald complained of dizziness
upon arriving home at about six in the
evening. Ronald then vomited,
prompting Magdalena to ask what
happened. Ronald replied that petitioner,
who was Ronald's teacher, banged his
head against that of his classmate
Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo").
Magdalena inspected Ronald's head and
saw a woundless contusion. Due to
Ronald's continued vomiting, Magdalena
brought him to a quack doctor
(arbularyo) on 5 December 1999. The
following morning, Magdalena brought
Ronald to the East Avenue Medical
Center where he underwent an x-ray. The
attending physician informed Magdalena
that Ronald's head had a fracture. Blood
oozed out of Ronald's nose before he
died on 9 December 1999
ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause
against petitioner for homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of
RA 7610 and for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.
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RULING: There is probable cause for

the offenses charged against petitioner.

Probable cause is the existence of such

facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief in a reasonable mind that a
crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty of the
crime. 23
In the present case, Ronald, a nine-yearold student, died five days after his
teacher, petitioner in this case, allegedly
banged his head against that of his
classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in
the records showing petitioner's specific
denial of the occurrence of such act.
Petitioner simply stated that "the headbanging incident happened but [she] did
not perpetrate it." 24 In effect, petitioner
admits the occurrence of the headbanging incident but denies committing
it.
The alleged intervening events before
Ronald died, namely: (a) the consultation
with a quack doctor, and (b) the threeday confinement in the East Avenue
Medical Center, are not sufficient to
break the relation of the felony
committed and the resulting injury. Were
it not for the head-banging incident,
Ronald might not have needed medical
assistance in the first place.

Charges of Homicide and Child

Abuse
Petitioner's single act of allegedly
banging the heads of her students had
two distinct victims, namely Ronald and
Lorendo. Therefore, petitioner has to
face prosecution for cruelty to each
victim. For Ronald's death, petitioner is

being charged with homicide under

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
27 in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI
of RA 7610 punishable by reclusion
perpetua. 28 However, this does not
mean that petitioner is being charged
with the distinct offenses of homicide
and child abuse for Ronald's death. On
the other hand, for her cruelty to
Lorendo, petitioner is being charged with
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of
RA 7610 punishable by prision mayor in
its minimum period.
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