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Promulgated:
ELIZABETH VILLA,
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APR 1 8 2016
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DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The employer appeals the decision promulgated on September
2006, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed its petition
certiorari and affirmed with modification the adverse decision of
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring it liable for
illegal dismissal of respondent employee.
1
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FIRST DIVISION
ROBINA FARMS
CEBU/UNIVERSAL ROBINA
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
.,
27,
for
the
the
Antecedents
Rollo, pp. 48-60; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with the concurrence o f
Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpalc (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamar
(retired).
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The petitioner admitted that Villa had been its sales clerk at Robina
Farms. It stated that on December 12, 2001, she had applied for retirement
under the special privilege program offered to its employees in Bulacan and
Anti polo who had served for at least 10 years; that in February 2002, her
attention had been called by Anita Gabatan of the accounting department to
explain her failure to issue invoices for the unhatched eggs for the month of
February; that she had explained that she had been busy; that Gabatan had
referred the matter to Florabeth Zanoria who had in turn relayed the matter
to Ngochua; and that the latter had then given Villa the chance to explain,
which she did.
The petitioner added that after the administrative hearing Villa was
found to have violated the company rule on the timely issuance of the
invoices that had resulted in delay in the payment of buyers considering that
the payment had depended upon the receipt of the invoices; that she had
been suspended from her employment as a consequence; that after serving
the suspension, she had returned to work and had followed up her
application for retirement with Lucina de Guzman, who had then informed
her that the management did not approve the benefits equivalent to 86% of
her salary rate applied for, but only Yz month for every year of service; and
that disappointed with the outcome, she had then brought her complaint
against the petitioners. 3
Id. at 103-109.
Id. at86-87.
\
-4
Decision
at
at
at
at
85-93.
89-90.
92.
117-130.
a;
Decision
1. Backwages
3. Overtime Pay
Total
-P 119,900.00
-P 7,194.00
-P 3 445.00
p 130,539.01
13,053.90
p 143,592.91
2. SILP
SO ORDERED. 8
Decision of the CA
The petitioner alleged in its petition for certiorari the following
jurisdictional errors of the NLRC, to wit:
10
Id. at 130.
Id. at 117-130.
Id. at 137-141.
Decision
IV.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED PETITIONERS INCLUDING
PETITIONER LILY NGOCHUA TO PAY PRIVATE RESPONDENT
BACKWAGES, SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY, OVERTIME
PAY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 11
13
Id. at 52-53.
Supra note I.
Id. at 59-60.
Decision
15
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 27.
~
Decision
.Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr., G.R. No. 191906, June 2, 2014, 724 SCRA 343, 356; Alires v. Empleo, G.R.
No. 180986, December l 0, 2008, 573 SCRA 583, 597.
17
Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department ofJustice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 549, 557.
18
Mangali v. Court ci"Appeals, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 236, 247.
19
Section 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Procedure; See Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, G.R. No.
204944-45, December 3, 2014, 744 SCRA 31, 52.
20
Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr., supra note 16, at 344.
'If
Decision
and that she had not presented proof showing that it had prevented her from
working and entering its premises. 21
The petitioner's submissions are bereft of merit.
We note that the CA and the NLRC agreed on their finding that the
petitioner did not admit Villa back to work after the completion of her 1Oday suspension. In that regard, the CA observed:
It is undeniable that private respondent was suspended for ten ( 10)
days beginning March 8, 2002 to March 19, 2002. Ordinarily, after an
employee [has] served her suspension, she should be admitted back to
work and to continue to receive compensation for her services. In the case
at bar, it is clear that private respondent was not admitted immediately
after her smpension. Records show that when private respondent reported
back after her suspension, she was advised by Lucy de Guzman not to
report back anymore as her application was approved, which was latter
[sic] on disapproved. It is at this point that, said Lucy de Guzman had
advised private respondent to tender a resignation letter with request for
financial assistance. Not only Lucy De Guzman has advised her to tender
her resignation letter. The letter of petitioner Lily Ngochua dated April 11,
2002 to private respondent which reads:
"As explained by Lucy de Guzman xxx your request for
special retirement with financial assistance of 86%/year of
service has not been approved. Because this offer was for
employees working in operations department and not in Adm.
& Sales.
"However, as per Manila Office, you can be given financial
assistance of V2 per year of service if you tender letter of
resignation with request for financial assistance."
shows that petitioner Lily Ngochua has also advised private respondent to
the same. These acts are strong indication that petitioners wanted to severe
[sic] the employer-employee relationship between them and that of private
respondent. This is buttressed by the fact that when private respondent
signified her intention to return back to work after learning of the
disapproval of her application, she was prevented to enter the petitioner's
premises by confiscating her ID and informing her that a new employee
has already replaced her.
Decision
raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised
belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play,
. . an d d ue process.-?2
JUStJce
22
Id. at 55-56.
n
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO) v. Caballeda, G.R. No. 156644, .July 28,
2008, 560 SCRA I 15, 132.
24
Quevedo v. Benguet Electric Cooperative, Incorporated, G.R. No. 168927, September 11, 200 I, 599
SCRA 438, 446.
25
Korean Air Co., ltd. v. Yuson,G.R. No. 170369, June 16, 20 I 0, 621 SCRA 53, 69.
26
Cercadov. Uniprom, Inc., G.R No.188154, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 281, 290.
27
G.R. No. 156934, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 445.
28
Id. at 452.
10
Decision
Under the circumstances, the CA did not err in declaring the petitioner
guilty of illegal dismissal for violating Article 282 29 of the Labor Code and
the twin notice rule.Jo
The petitioner posits that the CA erroneously affirmed the giving of
overtime pay and service incentive leave pay to Vi Ila; t hat she did not
adduce proof of her having rendered actual ove1iime work; that she had not
been authorized to render overtime work; and that her availment of vacation
and sick leaves that had been paid precluded her claiming the service
incentive leave pay.
We partly agree with the petitioner's position.
Firstly, entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof
that the overtime work was actually performed before the employee may
properly claim the benefit.JI The burden of proving entitlement to overtime
pay rests on the employee because the benefit is not incurred in the normal
course of business.J 2 Failure to prove such actual performance transgresses
the principles of fair play and equity.
And, secondly, the NLRC's reliance on the daily time records (DTRs)
showing that Villa had stayed in the company's premises beyond eight hours
was misplaced. The DTRs did not substantially prove the actual performance
of overtime work. The petitioner correctly points out that any employee
could render overtime work only when there was a prior authorization
therefor by the management.J 3 Without the prior authorization, therefore,
Villa could not validly claim having performed work beyond the normal
hours of work. Moreover, Section 4( c ), Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code relevantly states as follows:
Section 4. Principles in determining hours worked. The
following general principles shall govern in determining whether the time
spent by an employee is considered hours worked for purposes of this
Rule:
(a)
XX X.
(b) xx x.
(c) If the work performed was necessary, or it benefited the
employer, or the employee could not abandon his work at
the end of his normal working hours because he had no
2
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31
Now Article 297 pursuant to DOLE Advisory Order No. 1, series of 2015.
Rollo, p. 58.
Lagatic v. National /,ahor Relations Commission. G.R. No. 121004, January 28, 1998. 285 SCRA 251,
262.
32
"
Loon v. Power Master. Inc., G .R. No. 189404, December I 1, 2013, 712 SCRA 441, 457.
Rollo, p. 36.
4,
Decision
11
34
Decision
12
WE CONCUR:
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
A
JJ{),~
ESTELA~JPERLA~BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
'.
CEH.TIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.