Pangasinan Transport Co. vs.

Public Service Commission

GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940
FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co.
Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of
transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On
August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to
operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was
made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:
- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a
proper delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation
because of the growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that
has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion
to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public
interests in a proper and suitable manner.
The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights
and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC
has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate
issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never
heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.
In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased
to be juris privati or private use only.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
63 Phil. 139 Political Law Judicial Review Electoral Commission
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On
November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled,
passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a
resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election,

returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by
the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no
longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can
take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from
the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
Arnault vs. Balagtas
OVERVIEW:
-Kelangn lng naman pangalan ng tumanggap ng pera. Makulit ang petitioner at ayaw ibigay.
-nagbigay p nga ng pangalan pero hindi din siya.
-kaya ayun pinakulong siya sa Bilibid hanggang maibigay nya ang tunay n pangalan.
-tinananong lng dito kung may power ba ang Legislative na mag detain ng witness. OO
-ung issue na naserve n niya ang sentence niya ay out n sa topic natin kaya wala dito sa digest.
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of
the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The price paid for
both estates was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines adopted
Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine "whether the said purchase
was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties
responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises." In the
investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee was
asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-appellee refused
to answer this question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the
new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special
Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent
thereto.
In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an
affidavit, Exhibit A, wherein he gives in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition

of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which
he met one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The Committee did not believe this.
The Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. This Resolution reads as follows:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT
AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID
ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
ISSUE:
1.)
Whether or not a court may review a finding by the Senate Special Committee in not
believing the affidavit produced by the petitioner in giving the name of Jess D. Santos as the one
who received the P440, 000.
2.)
Whether or not the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as
ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952 valid.
HELD:
1.)
No. The courts should avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of
departmental discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion. In
the absence of a clear violation of a constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that
legislative discretion has been properly exercised. All that the courts may do, in relation to the
proceedings taken against petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional
guarantee of due process has been accorded him before his incarceration by legislative order, and
this because of the mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived life,
liberty or property without due process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully been extended
the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to be heard personally and by counsel in all the
proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering his continued confinement.
2.)
YES. In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-38201, it
was admitted and we had ruled that the Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to
answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information, i.e., by
reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. The argument is that the power may be used by
the legislative body merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the performance of its
duties. No act is so punishable unless it is of a nature to obstruct the performance of the duties of
the legislature.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body
obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its
power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have
intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority
and power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every
act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith,
with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious
witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or
authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the
courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The

former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts;
because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter
has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.
We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and
is committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the
defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of
constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference. (Marshall
vs. Gordon, supra).
PBA vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455, January 7, 1986
FACTS:
Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election for President and
Vice-President on February 7, 1986. The law was enacted following the letter of President Marcos to
the BP that he was "irrevocably vacating the position of President effective only when the election is
held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as Pres. by taking his oath of office ten days
after his proclamation." The principal ground for the challenge to the validity of the statute was that
the conditional resignation of the President did not create a vacancy required by Article VII, Sec. 9
which authorized the calling of a special election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos to run on that said
special election.
HELD:
After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices voted to declare the
statute unconstitutional. In accordance with Javellana v. Executive Secretary, of the view that as
there were less than ten votes for declaring BP 883 unconstitutional. The petitions should be
dismissed.
On the second issue, it turned out to be a political question. It can only be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election. Thus, it is outside the ambit of the courts. The
Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to the give the
incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president.
Noblejas vs. Teehankee
Facts
Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land
Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the
said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as
those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
On March 7, 1968, the respondent, Claudio Teehankee sent a letter which requires him to explain
why no disciplinary action must be taken against him for "approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the
areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas then answered that he could be only suspended and
investigated in the same way as a Judge of first instance and therefore, all these actions must be
submitted to the Supreme Court, conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary act (R.A. 296) and
Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

March 17, 1968 he received a communication from the executive secretary which states that he is
suspended and has a pending investigation for his gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the
public interest.
March 18, 1968, the petitioner applied to the court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter
to the Secretary of Justice claiming the lacking of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion on the letter.
Issues
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in
view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned Rep. Act 1151 and
Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
Ruling
It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District
Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.
In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance"
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended
or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by
a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same
privileges.
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer
upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act,
sec. 24, par.
2).
Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these
executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. It is thereby shown that where
the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First
Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal
language.
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had
really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging
this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is
ordered dismissed. No costs.