TAADA VS.

TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only
to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is
not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.
Bernabe vs Alejo
Bernabe vs. Alejo
GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary
Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September
18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole
surviving heir left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a
complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and be given a share of his fathers estate.
Trial courts ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to
give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil
Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after
the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of
the Family Code did not take away his right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son.
HELD:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a
minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new
code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children
are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural
children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition wad denied and assailed decision was affirmed

G.R. No. 182475 : November 21, 2012

LENN MORALES, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1992, petitioner Lenn Morales (Morales) was hired by Solidbank as Teller
for its Rizal Avenue Branch in Tacloban City. With said banks merger with respondent
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), the latter absorbed Morales and assigned him
to its Customer Service Relations-Reserve Pool (CSR-RP) which was composed of employees
who, with no permanent places of assignment, acted as relievers whenever temporary vacancies
arise in other branches.
Morales was later-on promoted as a Customer Service Representative (CSR). Federico Mariano,
the Senior Manager of Metrobank, informed Morales that he was covered by the banks Special
Separation Program (SSP) and that, in accordance therewith, his employment was going to be
terminated on the ground of redundancy.
On 27 August 2003, Morales was furnished a copy of a memorandum of the same date informing
him that, after a review of its organizational structure, Metrobank had found his services
redundant and will consider him separated effective 1 October 2003. Assured that his termination
was through no fault of his own but mainly due to business exigencies and developments in the
banking industry, Morales was notified that he shall be paid the following: (a) a redundancy
premium/separation pay, on top of his entitlements under the banks retirement plan; (b)
proportionate 13th month pay; (c) cash conversion of his outstanding vacation and sick leave
credits; and, if applicable, (d) the return of his Provident Fund contributions; and, (e) cash
surrender value of his Insurance. Morales then executed Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
acknowledging receipt of the sum of P158,496.95 as full payment of his monetary entitlements.
However, Morales filed against Metrobank a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Morales was illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales was illegally dismissed?
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
LABOR LAW: redundancy; quitclaim
One of the authorized causes for the dismissal of an employee, redundancy exists when the
service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the
demands of the business enterprise. For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid,
however, the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on

both the employees and the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of termination of
employment; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year
of service; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable
criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.
Contrary to the first and second errors Morales imputes against the CA, our perusal of the record
shows that Metrobank has more than amply proven compliance with the third and fourth of the
above-enumerated requisites for the validity of his termination from service on the ground of
redundancy. Under the SSP which Metrobank adopted in 1995, employees who voluntarily gave
up their employment were paid the amount of separation pay they were entitled under the law
and a premium equivalent to 50%-75% of their salaries. It appears that employees "whose work
evaluation showed consistent poor performance and/or those who had not been promoted for five
years" were also considered primary candidates for optional separation from service.
In implementing a redundancy program, it has been ruled that the employer is required to adopt a
fair and reasonable criteria, taking into consideration such factors as (a) preferred status; (b)
efficiency; and (c) seniority, among others. As these employees had no permanent place of
assignment and merely acted as relievers whenever temporary vacancies arise in other branches,
they were the most logical candidates for inclusion in the SSP.
Morales next insists that Metrobank failed to comply in good faith with the notice requirement
under Article 283 of the Labor Code which allows the employer to terminate the employment of
any employee due to redundancy by serving a written notice on the worker and the DOLE at
least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. Intended to enable the employee to prepare
himself for the legal battle to protect his tenure of employment and to find other means of
employment and ease the impact of the loss of his job and his income, said notice requirement is
also designed to allow the DOLE to ascertain the verity of the cause for the termination. As
correctly determined by the CA, Metrobanks compliance with this requirement is evident from
its service of the 27 August 2003 notice of termination upon Morales on the same date, effective
1 October 2003 or 30 days after the date of said notice.
While it may be accepted as ground to annul a quitclaim if the consideration is unconscionably
low and the employee was tricked into accepting it, dire necessity is not, however, an acceptable
ground for annulling the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to
execute it. This Court has held that not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy,
except (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. These two
instances are not present in this case.
Petition is DENIED.
Reciprocal Obligations Rescission
March 14, 2012F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC
vs.
HR CONSTRUCTION CORP. March 14,2012FACTS:

FFCCI entered into a contract with DPWH for the construction of the Magsaysay
Viaduct.FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HRCC for the supply of
materials,labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said
project.Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly
progress billing which the latter would then pay within 30 days from receipt thereof. The parties
agreedthat the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress accomplishment of its
completedworks as approved by FFCCI. Eventually, FFCCI did not pay the amount stated in the
secondand third progress billing, even though HRCC submitted its progress billins claiming that
it hadalready paid HRCC for the completed works for the period stated therein. HRCC
demanded payment but still was not paid so HRCC halted the construction of the subcontracted
project.
ISSUE:
Whether FFCCIs non-compliance with their contract make HRCC rescission valid
RULING
NO, HRCC had waived its right to rescind the Subcontract agreementThe determination of the
validity of HRCCs work stoppage depends on a determination of thefollowing: first, whether
HRCC has the right to extrajudicially rescind the SubcontractAgreement; and second, whether
FFCCI is already barred from disputing the work stoppage of HRCC. HRCC had waived its right
to rescind the Subcontract Agreement.The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in
reciprocal obligations. Article 1191 of theCivil Code pertinently reads:Art. 1191. The power
to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocalones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him.Theinjured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosenfulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.Contrary
to the respective dispositions of the CIAC and the CA, we find that HRCC had no rightto rescind
the Subcontract Agreement in the guise of a work stoppage, the latter having waivedsuch right in
its Subcontract Agreement, Hence, in spite of the existence of dispute or controversy between the
parties during the course of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC hadagreed to continue the
performance of its obligations pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. Inview of the provision of
the Subcontract Agreement quoted above, HRCC is deemed to haveeffectively waived its right to
effect extrajudicial rescission of its contract with FFCCI.
1wphi1
Accordingly, HRCC, in the guise of rescinding the Subcontract Agreement, was not justified
inimplementing a work stoppage