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METROBANK VS.

CABILZO
510 SCRA 259
Facts: On November 12, 1994, Renato D. Cabilzo issued a Metrobank Check payable to
CASH and postdated on November 24, 1994 in the amount of P1, 000 drawn against his
Metrobank account to Mr. Marquez, as his sales commission. The check was presented to
Westmont Bank for payment who indorsed it to Metrobank for appropriate clearing. After the
entries thereon were examined, including the availability of funds and the authenticity of the
signature of the drawer, Metrobank cleared the check for encashment in accordance with
the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules. On November 16, 1994, Cabilzos
representative was at Metrobank when he was asked by a bank personnel if Cabilzo had
Issued a check in the amount of P91K to which he replied in negative. That afternoon,
Cabilzo called Metrobank to reiterate that he did not Issue the check . He later discovered
that the check of P1K was altered to P91K and date was changed from Nov 24 to Nov 14.
Cabilzo demanded that Metrobank re-credit the amount of P91, 000.00 to his account. On
June 30, 1995, Metrobank, through counsel, sent a letter of demand for the amount of P90K.
The CA affirmed RTC judgment in favor of Cablizo.
Issue: W/N Cablizo can recover from Metrobank
Ruling: YES, the Court affirmed the CA judgment. In the case at bar, the check was altered
so that the amount was increased from P1, 000.00 to P91,000.00 and the date was changed
from 24 November 1994 to 14 November 1994.
But when the instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder in due
course not a party to the alteration, he may enforce the payment thereof according to its
original tenor. Cabilzo was not the one who neither made nor authorized the alteration.
Neither did he assent to the alteration by his express or implied acts. There is no showing
that he failed to exercise such reasonable degree of diligence required of a prudent man
which could have otherwise prevented the loss. When the drawee bank pays a materially
altered check, it violates the terms of the check, as well as its duty to charge its clients
account only for bona fide disbursements he had made.

Sps. Omengan vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 161319, January 23, 2007,
it was held that:
[T]he business of a bank is one affected with public interest, for which
reason the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith. In approving the
loan of an applicant, the bank concerns itself with proper [information] regarding its
debtors.46 Any investigation previously conducted on the property offered by petition-ers
as collateral did not preclude PNB from considering new information on the same property as
security for a subsequent loan. The credit and property investigation for the original loan of
P3 million did not oblige PNB to grant and release any additional loan. At the time the
original P3 million credit line was approved, the title to the property appeared to pertain
exclusively to peti-tioners. By the time the application for an increase was considered,
however, PNB already had reason to suspect petitioners claim of exclusive ownership
Phil. Banking Corp. vs CA GR. No. 127469
Facts:
Leonilo Marcos filed in court a complaint for sum of money with damages against Phil.
Banking Corporation (PBC). Marcos allegedly made a time deposit in 2 occasions the amt.
of P664,897.67 and P764,897.67 through the persuasion of his friend Pagsaligan, one of the
banks officials. The bank issued receipt for the first deposit while a letter-certification was
issued for his second deposit by Pagsaligan. Pagsaligan kept the various time deposit
certificates. When Marcos wanted to withdraw his time deposit and its accumulated interest
Pagsaligan encouraged him to open a letter of credit to the bank by executing 3 trust
receipts agreement. He signed blank forms for domestic letter of credits, trust receipts
agreements and promissory notes. He was required to deposit 30% of the total amount of
credit and his time deposit will secure the remaining 70% of the letters of credit.
He is now accusing the bank for unjustly collecting payment without deducting the 30% of
his down payment and charging him with accumulating interests since his time deposit
serves as collateral for his remaining obligation. He further denied making a loan of
P500,000 with 25% interest per annum covered by a promissory note produced by the bank.
The bank explained that the promissory notes he executed are distinct from the trust receipt
agreement and denied falsifying the promissory note covering for the loan of P500,000. The
evidence presented on the promissory note however is merely a machine copy of the
document. The said loan was already paid by offsetting it from his time deposit.

Issue:
Whether or not the bank failed to take a proper account on Marcos deposits and payment of
his loans?
Ruling:
The court held that the bank is liable for offsetting the time deposit of Marcos to the
fictitious promissory note for the 500,000 loan. The court upheld the findings of the lower
court on the discrepancies shown by the machine copy of the duplicate of the promissory
note and the suspicious claim of the bank that it could not produce the original copy thereof.
The mere machine copy of the document has no evidentiary value before the court. The
court held that the bank did not forge the promissory note. Pagsaligan did to cover up his
failure to give the proper account of Marcos time deposits. This however does not excuse
the bank to return to Marcos the correct amount of his time deposit with interest. Bank has
the fiduciary duty before its clients. Its duty is to observe the highest standards of integrity
and performance. Assuming Pagsaligan is responsible for the spurious promissory note the
court held that a bank is liable for the wrongful acts of its officers. The court made the
proper account of the total amount due to Marcos ordering the bank to give to him the same
plus moral and exemplary damages.

PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK, vs. CA et al


G.R. No. 128122
March 18, 2005
FACTS: 2 different persons with exactly the same name, i.e., Vicente T. Garaygay, each
claimed exclusive ownership of Lot 23 by virtue of an owners duplicate certificate each had
possession of during the period material covering said lot. One held TCT No. 9780, supra,
and the other, TCT No. 9780(693), supra. The technical description of the land appearing
in one copy corresponds exactly with that in the other. The date June 14, 1944 appears on
the face of both copies as a common date of entry. One, however, contained certain
features, markings, and/or entries not found in the other and vice versa.
On April 17, 1979, Garaygay of Cebu executed a deed of sale concerning subject lot in
favor of his nephew Joselito. The sale notwithstanding, the owners duplicate certificate
remained for some time in the sellers possession.
In another transaction, Garaygay of Rizal sold to Yambao and

Rodriguez the same

property. Buyers Yambao and Rodriquez would later sell a portion of their undivided interests
on the land to Morales.
Then came the June 11, 1988 fire that gutted a portion of the Quezon City hall and
destroyed in the process the original copy of TCT No. 9780 (693) on file with the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City. Barely a month later, a certain Engr. Hobre filed an application,
signed by Garaygay of Cebu, for the reconstitution of the burned original on the basis of
the latters owners duplicate certificate. One Engr. Cortez of the LRA did the follow-up on
the application. After due proceedings, the LRA issued an order of reconstitution, by virtue of
which Garaygay of Cebu acquired a reconstituted title.
Meanwhile, or on May 26, 1989, the deed of sale executed by Garaygay of Cebuin favor of
his nephew Joselito was registered, paving the issuance in the latters name. Thereafter,

thru the efforts of same Engr. Cortez, Lot 23 was subdivided into three (3) lots. Joselito
posthaste sold the first lot to Toundjiswho, pursuant to a Contract to Sell undertook to pay
Joselito the P.5 Million balance of the P2.5 Million purchase price once she is placed in
possession of a fenced-off property. And, for shares of stock, Joselito assigned the other two
(2) lots

to Century Realty which, after securing TCTs therefor, mortgaged the same

to Premiere Bank to secure a loan.


Clashing claims of ownership first came to a head when, sometime in May 1990, Yambao
and his agents forcibly prevented Joselitos hired hands from concrete-fencing the subject
property. The police and eventually the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) entered into
the picture.

In the meantime, Yambao, Rodriquez and Morales as pro indiviso buyers of the subject
lot, caused the of their respective adverse claims on Joselitos TCT They then filed with the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City suit againstJoselito, Century Realty and Premiere
Bank for quieting of title and annulment of said defendants fake titles with prayer for
damages.
Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment finding for the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, declaring Joselitos TCT No. 9780 (693) and all subsequent titles traceable to it
and transactions involving its derivatives as null and void. The trial court further observed
dubious circumstances surrounding the reconstitution of TCT 9780 (693), the more
disturbing of which is the admitted participation of LRA personnel in the reconstitution
process.

In time, herein petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed in toto the appealed
decision of the trial court.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court petitioners have
separately come to the Supreme Court. the three (3) separate petitions were, upon private
respondents motion, ordered consolidated.

ISSUE:
1.

WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding Garaygay of Rizal, instead ofGaraygay
of Cebu, as the real owner of Lot 23.

2.

WON the same court erred in finding Garaygay of Rizals owners copy, TCT No.
9780, instead of the Garaygay of Cebus copy, TCT No. 9780 (693), as the authentic
title covering Lot 23.

3.

WON Toundjis and Premiere bank are buyers in good faith

HELD: The instant petitions are DENIED and the impugned Decision of the CA AFFIRMED.

Both defining documents, Exhibit 1[cebu] and Exhibit B [rizal], appear to have been
issued by the appropriate Registry of Deeds and as such would ordinarily enjoy the
guarantees flowing from the legal presumption of regularity of issuance. But how and
precisely when the legal aberration occurred where two (2) owners duplicate certificates
ended up in the hands of two (2) distinct persons, complete strangers to each other, are
questions which the records do not provide clear answer. It may not be idle to speculate,
though, that fraud or other improper manipulations had been employed along the way, with
likely the willing assistance of land registry official/s, to secure what for the nonce may be
tagged as the other title. Consistent with the presumption of regularity of issuance,
however, the authenticity of one copy has to be recognized. And necessarily, one of the two
(2) outstanding owners copies has to be struck down as wrongly issued, if not plainly
spurious, under the governing Torrens system of land registration
1. The categorical conclusion of the Court of Appeals confirmatory of that of the trial court
is that Exhibit B is genuine and that Garaygay of Rizal is a real person. On the other
hand, Exhibit 1 was adjudged spurious. These factual determinations as a matter of long
and sound appellate practice must be accorded great weight, and, as rule, should not be
disturbed on appeal, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.

The courts finding that Garaygay of Rizal is an authentic person, once residing in and a
registered voter of Angono, Rizal has adequate evidentiary support in his voters ID, the
COMELEC and barangay certifications aforementioned and the testimony of an occupant of
Lot 23.
Moreover, facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom point to Exhibit 1 as being
spurious, necessarily leaving Exhibit B as the authentic duplicate copy. For starters, there
is the appearance and physical condition of the owners copies in question which would help
in determining which is genuine and which is sham. As aptly observed by the appellate
court, rationalizing its conclusion adverted to above, Exhibit B has no defect, except for
its partly being torn. Respondents explanation for the defective state of Exhibit B, as
related to them by Garaygay of Rizal, i.e., it was due to exposure of the document to the
elements during the Japanese occupation, merited approval from the trial court and the CA
Both courts, being in a better position to pass upon the credibility of petitioners witness and
appreciate his testimony respecting the less than usual appearance of Exhibit B, their
findings command the respect of this Court.
However, unlike Exhibit B, Exhibit 1 contained entries and other uncommon markings
or features which could not have existed without human intervention. Although any one of
them may perhaps not be appreciable in isolation, these features and/or markings, taken

together, indeed put the integrity of Exhibit 1 under heavy cloud and indeed cast doubt
on its genuineness.
In the same token, the payment by Garaygay of Cebu of land taxes on Lot 23 does not also
necessary detract from the spurious nature of his title. After all, any one can pay real estate
taxes on a given property without being quizzed by the local treasury whether or not the
payor owns the real property in question.
Other than paying taxes from 1949 to 1990, however, Garaygay of Cebu and this holds
true for his nephew Joselito did not appear before the current stand-off to have exercised
dominion over Lot 23. For one, it has not been shown that Garaygay of Cebu was at any
time in possession of the property in question, unlike his namesake from Rizal who managed
to place the property under the care of certain individuals who built semi-permanent
structure-dwelling houses thereon without so much of a protest from Garaygay of Cebu or
his nephew Joselito after the latter purportedly bought the property. For another, neither
Garaygay of Cebu nor his nephew Joselito ever instituted any action to eject or recover
possession from the occupants of Lot 23. This passivity bespeaks strongly against their claim
of ownership. Not lost on this Court are circumstances noted by the trial court which
negatively reflect on Garaygay of Cebus and his nephews claim of ownership.
In short, it appears to the Court that without doing anything, Vicente T. Garaygay of Cebu
has his title (Exh. 1) reconstituted. On the other hand, without knowing anything, JOSELITO
obtained TCT 12183 in his name and had the land subdivided and sold.These circumstances
demonstrate that neither JOSELITO nor his uncle, Vicente T. Garaygay of Cebu acted ante
litem motam like the true owners they claim to be in their respective times.
Several questions confound the Courts curiosity. Why were some LRA officials so interested
in the speedy reconstitution and in the subdivision of the land in excess of their bureaucratic
duties? Where did Vicente T. Garaygay of Cebu get his owners copy, Exh. 1? Why was
JOSELITO so evasive about his cousin in the LRA as shown in his examination?

As the Court sees it, the Deed of Sale was a simulated transaction because both JOSELITO
and his uncle admit this was a joint venture to sell the property in question. However, the
facts suggest that the joint venture was not limited to the two of them. The persons who
prepared and filed the application for reconstitution, and those officers in the LRA who
followed it up and who thereafter subdivided the land into three lots for easier sale, those at
the NBI who tried to persuade Yambao and Morales to settle the dispute . . . are apparently
part of the joint venture or stand to profit from it

LUIS Ma ONgsiapco

We agree that the petitioner may prohibit non-employees from entering the working area of
the ATM section. However, under the said Memorandum, even if the respondent wished to
go to the bank to encash a check drawn and issued to him by a depositor of the petitioner
bank in payment of an obligation, or to withdraw from his account therein, or to transact
business with the said bank and exercise his right as a depositor, he could not do so as he
was barred from entry into the bank. Even if the respondent wanted to go to the petitioner
bank to confer with the corporate secretary in connection with his shares of stock therein, he
could not do so, since as stated in the Memorandum of petitioner Ongsiapco, he would not
be allowed access to all the bank premises. The said Memorandum, as worded, violates the
right of the respondent as a stockholder or a depositor of the petitioner bank, for being
capricious and arbitrary. The Memorandum even contravenes Article XII, paragraph 4 (4.1
and 4.2) of the Code of Ethics issued by the petitioner bank itself, which provides that one
whose employment had been terminated by the petitioner bank may, nevertheless, be
allowed access to bank premises, thus: 4.1 As a client of the Bank in the transaction of a
regular bank-client activity.

It behooved the petitioners to revise such Memorandum to conform to its Code of Ethics and
their intentions when it was issued, absent facts and circumstances that occurred pendente
lite which warrant the retention of the Memorandum as presently worded.

The petitioners contend that the respondent is not entitled to nominal damages and that the
appellate court erred in so ruling for the following reasons: (a) the respondent failed to prove
that the petitioner bank violated any of his rights; (b) the respondent did not suffer any
humiliation because of the overt acts of the security guards; (c) even if the respondent did
suffer humiliation, there was no breach of duty committed by the petitioner bank since its
security guards politely asked the respondent not to proceed to the working area of the ATM
section because they merely acted pursuant to the Memorandum of petitioner Ongsiapco,
and accordingly, under Article 429 of the New Civil Code, this is a case of damnum absque
injuria;52 and (d) the respondent staged the whole incident so that he could create evidence
to file suit against the petitioners.

The petitioners contend that the respondent is not entitled to nominal damages and that the
appellate court erred in so ruling for the following reasons: (a) the respondent failed to prove
that the petitioner bank violated any of his rights; (b) the respondent did not suffer any
humiliation because of the overt acts of the security guards; (c) even if the respondent did
suffer humiliation, there was no breach of duty committed by the petitioner bank since its
security guards politely asked the respondent not to proceed to the working area of the ATM
section because they merely acted pursuant to the Memorandum of petitioner Ongsiapco,

and accordingly, under Article 429 of the New Civil Code, this is a case of damnum absque
injuria;52 and (d) the respondent staged the whole incident so that he could create evidence
to file suit against the petitioners.

CATALINA v DBP

Article 1253 of the New Civil Code provides that, if the debt produces interest, payment of
the principal shall not be deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered.
The respondent is a bank. To hold that bank debtors should not pay interest on their loans
would be anathema to the nature of any banks business. The charging of interest for loans
forms a very essential and fundamental element of the banking business. In fact, it

may be considered to be the very core of the bankings existence or being.

AZNAR V CITIBANK

In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach
must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.61 While the
Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he suffered when his
credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agencys personnel
insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant
his present petition as he failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank
breached any obligation that would make it answerable for said suffering. As the Court
pronounced in BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals,62 We do not dispute the
findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages as a result of the
cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages
and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury to those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for

damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria

Moran vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 798


By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera
Facts: Petitioner spouses Moran maintained three joint accounts with respondent Citytrust
Banking Corporation. As a special privilege to the Morans, a pre-authorized transfer (PAT)
agreement was entered into by the parties. The PAT letter-agreement contained the
following provisions: (1) xxx the checks would be honored if the savings account has
sufficient balance to cover the overdraft; xxx (3) that the bank has the right to refuse to
effect transfer of funds at their sole and absolute option and discretion; (4) Citytrust is free
and harmless for any and all omissions or oversight in executing this automatic transfer of
funds. On December 12, 1983, petitioners, through Librada Moran, drew a check payable to
Petrophil Corporation. The next day, petitioners issued another check in favor of the same
corporation. Later, the bank dishonored the checks due to insufficiency of funds. As a
result, Petrophil refused to deliver the orders of petitioners on a credit. The non-delivery of
gasoline forced petitioners to temporarily stop business operations. Petitioners wrote
Citytrust claiming the dishonor of the checks caused them besmirched business and
personal reputation, shame and anxiety. Hence, they were contemplating filing legal actions,
unless the bank clears their name and paid for moral damages. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. The CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners had sufficient funds in their accounts when the bank
dishonored the checks in question.
Held: No. Under the clearing house rules, a bank processes a check on the date it was
presented for clearing. The available balance of December 14, 1983 was used by the bank in
determining whether or not there was sufficient cash deposited to fund the two checks,
although what was stamped on the dorsal side of the two checks was DAIF/12-15-83, since
December 15, 1983 was the actual date when the checks were processed. When petitioners
checks were dishonored, the available balance of the savings account, which was subject of
the PAT agreement, was not enough to cover either of the two checks.

BPI v SANTIAGO
Verily, the aforestated requisites for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
have been fully complied with. The right of Spouses Santiago over the property clearly exists
since they are the registered owners thereof, and the existence of a Real Estate Mortgage
does not undermine the right of the absolute owner over the property. The violation of such
right is manifest in the threatened foreclosure proceedings commenced by BPI amidst the
claim that the principal obligation has been fully paid. Finally, to allow the foreclosure of the
subject property without first calibrating the evidence of opposing parties pertaining to the
action for the annulment of mortgage would cause irreparable damage to the registered
owner.
The right of BPI to foreclose the subject property is under dispute upon the claim
interposed by the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen that payments for the loan secured by
the property subject to the threatened foreclosure proceedings were already made. To
support their assertions, Spouses Santiago and Centrogen presented as evidence Union
Bank Check No. 0363020895 dated 20 December 2001 in the amount of P648,521.51, with
BPI as payee. From this, we can deduce that the right of BPI to foreclose the subject property
is questionable. We cannot therefore allow the foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage to
proceed without first setting the main case for hearing so that based on the evidence
presented by the parties, the trial court can determine who between them has the better
right over the subject property. To rule otherwise would cause a grave irreparable damage to
the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen.
Parenthetically, this petition affords us the opportunity to once again reiterate the
rule that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion

of the court and generally not interfered with except in case of manifest abuse. The
assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary
Page 11of 15G.R. No. 16911 6
12/26/2015http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/march2007/169116.ht m
injunction involve finding of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive
determination.
[28]
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. Court of Appeals, [29]
citing
Ubanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [30] we made the following declaration:
[T]he matter of the issuance of writ of a preliminary injunction is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, unless the court commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or
whether the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. x x x.
In the case at bar, after summary hearing and evaluation of evidence presented by
both contending parties, the RTC ruled that justice would be better served if status quo is
preserved until the final determination of the merits of the case, to wit:
For purposes of preliminary injunction, between the evidence presented by [the
spouses Santiago and Centrogen] and [BPI], the evidence of the former carries more weight.
The evidence of [the spouses Santiago and Centrogen] established that to allow extrajudicial foreclosure without hearing the main action for the annulment of mortgage would
probably work injustice to the plaintiffs and would probably violate their rights over the
subject lot.
Furthermore, this case involves complicated issues that must be resolved first before
altering the status quo. The issue of payment and non-payment of the loan and the issue of
breach of the second loan directly affect the rights of the plaintiffs over the subject lot.
Hence, the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status of the parties before the controversy
must be preserved.
The unyielding posture of BPI that its right to foreclose the subject property was
violated since it is permanently barred from proceeding with the auction sale is patently
erroneous. The RTC, in the exercise of its discretion merely intended to preserve the status
quo while the principal action for the annulment of mortgage is heard with the end view that
no irreversible damage may be caused to the opposing parties. We find nothing whimsical,
arbitrary or capricious in the exercise of the RTC of its discretion
Equitable Banking Corporation vs. Calderon
00000
GR.

No.

156168

December 14, 2004


FACTS
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad,
either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder
of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler,
who travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand,
Equitable Banking Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the
Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of
loans and credit card facilities, among others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon
applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used
for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines.
The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of
$3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986,
Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates went to Hongkong
for business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his
friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula
Hotel Hongkong. There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a
pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to

US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment
thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly
referred it to the store cashier for verification.
Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other
shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon
sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter
simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of
scissors.Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities,
Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought.
ISSUE
Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.
RULING
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called
damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be
a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be
awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., petitioner,vs.FIRST METRO INVESTMENT


CORPORATION, respondent.G.R. No. 132390May 21, 2004
FACTS:
On August 25, 1989, FMIC, through its Executive Vice President Antonio Ong,
openedcurrent account and deposited METROBANK check no. 898679 of P100 million
withBPI Family Bank (BPI FB) . Ong made the deposit upon request of his friend, Ador deAsis,
a close acquaintance of Jaime Sebastian, then Branch Manager of BPI FB SanFrancisco del
Monte Branch. Sebastians aim was to increase the deposit level in hisBranch.BPI FB,
through Sebastian, guaranteed the payment of P14,667,687.01 representing17% per annum
interest of P100 million deposited by FMIC. The latter, in turn,assured BPI FB that it will
maintain its deposit of P100 million for a period of one yearon condition that the interest of
17% per annum is paid in advance. This agreement between the parties was reached
through their communications inwriting.Subsequently, BPI FB paid FMIC 17% interest or
P14,667,687.01 upon clearance of thelatters check deposit.
However, on August 29, 1989, on the basis of an Authority to Debit signed by Ongand
Ma. Theresa David, Senior Manager of FMIC, BPI FB transferred P80 million fromFMICs
current account to the savings account of Tevesteco Arrastre Stevedoring,Inc.FMIC denied
having authorized the transfer of its funds to Tevesteco, claiming thatthe signatures of Ong
and David were falsified. Thereupon, to recover immediately itsdeposit, FMIC, on September
12, 1989, issued BPI FB check no. 129077 forP86,057,646.72 payable to itself and drawn on
its deposit with BPI FB SFDM branch.But upon presentation for payment on September 13,
1989, BPI FB dishonored thecheck as it was "drawn against insufficient fundsConsequently,
FMIC filed A COMPLAINT against BPI FB. FMIC FILED an Information forestafa against Ong, de

Asis, Sebastian and four others. However, the Information wasdismissed on the basis of a
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused.
Issue:
1.Was
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN FMIC AND BPI FB A TIME DEPOSIT oran INTERESTBEARING CURRENT ACCOUNT WHICH, UNDER THEEXISTING BANK REGULATIONS, WAS AN
ILLEGAL TRANSACTION?
2.Is the bank liable for the unauthorized transfer of respondents funds to Tevesteco?
Decision:
1.We hold that the parties did not intend the deposit to be treated as a
demanddeposit but rather as an interest-earning time deposit not withdrawable
anytime.When respondent FMIC invested its money with petitioner BPI FB, they intended
theP100 million as a time deposit, to earn 17% per annum interest and to remain intactuntil
its maturity date one year thereafter.Ordinarily, a time deposit is defined as "one the
payment of which cannot legally berequired within such a specified number of days.In
contrast, demand deposits are "all those liabilities of the Bangko Sentral and of other banks
which are denominated in Philippine currency and are subject to paymentin legal tender
upon demand by the presentation of (depositors) checks.While it may be true that barely
one month and seven days from the date of deposit,respondent FMIC demanded the
withdrawal of P86,057,646.72 through the issuance of a check payable to itself, the same
was made as a result of the fraudulent andunauthorized transfer by petitioner BPI FB of its
P80 million deposit to Tevestecossavings account. Certainly, such was a normal reaction of
respondent as a depositorto petitioners failure in its fiduciary duty to treat its account with
the highest degreeof care.Under this circumstance, the withdrawal of deposit by respondent
FMIC before theone-year maturity date did not change the nature of its time deposit to one
of demand deposit.We have held that if a corporation knowingly permits its officer, or any
other agent, toperform acts within the scope of an apparent authority, holding him out to the
publicas possessing power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any person
whohas dealt in good faith with the corporation through such agent, be estopped
fromdenying such authority.Petitioner maintains that respondent should have first inquired
whether the deposit of P100 Million and the fixing of the interest rate were pursuant to its
(petitioners)internal procedures. Petitioners stance is a futile attempt to evade an
obligationclearly established by the intent of the parties. What transpires in the corporate
boardroom is entirely an internal matter. Hence, petitioner may not impute negligence onthe
part of respondents representative in failing to find out the scope of authority of petitioners
Branch Manager. Indeed, the public has the right to rely on thetrustworthiness of bank
managers and their acts. Obviously, confidence in thebanking system, which necessarily
includes reliance on bank managers, is vital in theeconomic life of our society Significantly,
the transaction was actually acknowledged and ratified by petitionerwhen it paid respondent
in advance the interest for one year. Thus, petitioner isestopped from denying that it
authorized its Branch Manager to enter into anagreement with respondents Executive Vice
President concerning the deposit withthe corresponding 17% interest per annum.
2.Yes. We uphold the finding of both lower courts that petitioner failed toexercise that
degree of diligence required by the nature of its obligations to itsdepositors. A bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositorswith meticulous care, whether such account
consists only of a few hundredpesos or of million of pesos.10 Here, petitioner cannot claim it
exercised such adegree of care required of it and must, therefore, bear the consequence.

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