ALFREDO

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
INC., Respondents.

C.

MENDOZA, Petitioner,

PHILIPPINES

AND

JUNO

February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to submit all pending

incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution. 14

CARS,

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
January 14, 2011 CA reversed the decision of the trial court in
which the latter dismissed the complaint against Alfredo
Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
January 8, 2008 Juno Cars through its representative, Raul
Evangelista, filed a complaint-affidavit for qualified theft and
estafa against petitioner.
June 2, 2007, - In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged
that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car
Supervisor.
November 19, 2007 - its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia,
conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that
five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without
Rolandos or the finance managers permission.
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made
payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments
totalling P886,000.00.
It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under
Alfredos custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further
investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of
a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI.
Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted
amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo
pilfered a total amount of P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and
damage.5
MENDOZA: In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among
others, Juno Cars supposed failure to prove ownership over the
five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported
unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered
damage.6
March 4, 2008, - Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a
Resolution7 finding probable cause and recommending the filing
of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. 8
May 16, 2008 - He then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice.
While Alfredos motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two
informations for qualified theft 10 and estafa11 were filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City.
March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of
probable cause before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also
filed a motion to defer arraignment.

March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina

Capco-Umali, issued an order15 dismissing the complaint, stating
that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on
record which includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March
2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not
support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified
theft and estafa. x x x.
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
denied on July 3, 2009.
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of
probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal
case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor."
January 14, 2011 - the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case. In its
decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public
prosecutors findings of probable cause with her own findings of
insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause."
MENDOZA - filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this
court. In essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in
finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the
evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of
probable cause is broader than [the] executive determination of
probable cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the
determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the
prosecutor x x x."22
Juno Cars, in its comment, argued that Alfredo presented
questions, issues, and arguments that were a mere rehash of
those already considered and passed upon by the appellate
court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public
respondent, stated in its comment 24 that the appellate court
correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of
probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F.
Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of
probable cause.
MENDOZA, in its reply, reiterated that "judicial determination of
probable cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader
encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the
existence of probable cause."26 He argued that the findings of
the trial court should be accorded greater weight than the
appellate courts. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the
prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of
probable cause.

Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not

conducted.
HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated

January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal case against
Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
The conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within
the discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the
evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable
cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information
with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence"30 to determine whether there is probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial
determination of probable cause exists.
People v. Castillo and Mejia: There are two kinds of
determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
difference is clear: The executive determination of probable
cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to
support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of
probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
People vs Inting: The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation properwhether or not there is reasonable ground
to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trialis the function of the
Prosecutor.
While it is within the trial courts discretion to make an
independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for
the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the
prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutors
determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutors
finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo:
as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there
is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or
prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not
dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters
should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions
and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the
proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should
be clearly understood.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion in the public prosecutors finding of probable cause,
the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and
move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until
such appeal is resolved.
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor
Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and evidence were
"sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x." 37 There
was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it
beyond the discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid,
Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion to make her own
finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of
the accused and proceed with trial.

Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of

arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the accused
for arraignment and trial.
People v. Hon. Yadao: Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the
prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt
as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory.1wphi1 The courts first option under
the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause."
That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents. 39 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or
the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court."40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent
assessment of the evidence on record and concluded that "the
evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause
for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa." 41Specifically, she
found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent
evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by
Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these
vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the
charge of qualified theft. She also found that the complaint "[did]
not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office
files or their valuation purportedly have been removed,
concealed or destroyed by the accused," 43 which she found
crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article
315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the
matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against
Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge
must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to
lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the
evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the
evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of
probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the
other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not
hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that
justice may be served.

Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in

the prosecutors exercise of discretion requires the courts to
leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause[3]. Courts can neither override their determination nor
substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They cannot
likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the
prosecutor has not found a prima facie case[4].
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without
exception.
The Constitution itself allows (and even directs) court action
where executive discretion has been gravely abused[5]. In other
words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of
probable cause, review the findings and conclusions, and
ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable
cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation
when necessary for the orderly administration of justice[6].
The Facts:
January 17, 2002,- Unilever filed a complaint. NBI agents
applied for and was granted Search Warrant Nos. 02-2606 and
02-2607, against a warehouse located at Camia St., Marikina
City allegedly owned by Michael Tan, a.k.a. Paul Tan, for alleged
possession of counterfeit shampoo products in violation of
Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act 8293. The
search of the establishment yielded a sizeable amount of
Unilever products, thus the NBI filed charges for violation of
Republic Act 8293 (unfair competition) against Michael Tan,
a.k.a. Paul Tan. In his counter-affidavit, Paul alleged that he is
not Michael as alluded to in the complaint; he is in the business
of selling leather goods and raw materials for making leather
products, and registered under the name Probest International
Trading; he is not engaged in the sale of counterfeit shampoo
products and the Unilever products seized in his office were
merely for personal consumption; and lastly, that he does not
own the warehouse located at Camia St.
The DOJ State Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of
probable cause, citing that the evidence presented does not
show that he is the registered owner of the warehouse; that he is
engaged in the selling of counterfeit shampoos other than the
self-serving testimony of Unilevers representatives; and that the
pieces of evidence (counterfeit shampoo) found in the
warehouse are not in themselves sufficient evidence that Paul I
engaged in unfair competition. The Secretary of Justice affirmed
the Resolution, and Unilevers petition for certiorari was denied
by the Court of Appeals, hence Unilver elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, on the issue of whether or not there is probable
cause to indict Paul for unfair competition on the basis of the
evidence submitted by Unilever and the NBI.
The Courts ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
Determination
Lies
Within
Public Prosecutor

of
the

Probable
Competence

of

Cause
the

The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of

information in court is essentially an executive function that is
lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and,
ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice[1]. The prosecutor and the
Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the
conduct of preliminary investigation[2]; and their findings with
respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are
generally not subject to review by the Court.

Courts
Cannot
Reverse
of
Justices
Findings
Clear Cases of Grave Abuse of Discretion

the
Secretary
Except
in

The term grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or

whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility[7]. In Elma v. Jacobi[8], we said that:
This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act
amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is
fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must
clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his
determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This
requires the petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised
his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial
relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained.
[emphasis supplied]
An examination of the decisions of the State Prosecutor and of
the DOJ shows that the complaints dismissal was anchored on
the insufficiency of evidence to establish the respondents direct,
personal or actual participation in the offense charged. As the
State Prosecutor found (and affirmed by the DOJ), the petitioner
failed to prove the ownership of the warehouse where
counterfeit shampoo products were found. This finding led to the
conclusion that there was insufficient basis for an indictment for
unfair competition as the petitioner failed to sufficiently prove
that the respondent was the owner or manufacturer of the
counterfeit shampoo products found in the warehouse.
A careful analysis of the lower courts rulings and the records,
however, reveals that substantial facts and circumstances that
could affect the result of the case have been overlooked. While
the ownership of the warehouse on Camia Street, Marikina City,
was not proven, sufficient evidence to prove the existence of
probable cause nevertheless exists. These pieces of evidence
consist of: (1) the result of the NBI agents search of the office
and of the warehouse; (2) Elmer Cadanos complaint-affidavit;
(3) Rene Baltazars affidavit; (4) Unilevers representatives claim
that all the laborers present at the warehouse confirmed that it
was operated by Probest International Trading; (5) other object

evidence found and seized at the respondents office and

warehouse; (6) the NBI operatives Joint Affidavit; (7) the
subsequent seizure of counterfeit Unilever products from the
respondents warehouse in Antipolo City; and (8) other
photographs and documents relative to the counterfeit products.
These pieces of evidence, to our mind, are sufficient to form a
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of unfair competition
was committed and that the respondent was its author.
First, a total of 1,238 assorted counterfeit Unilever products
were found at, and seized from, the respondents office located
on the 3rd floor of Probest International Trading Building,
Katipunan Street, Concepcion, Marikina City. The huge volume
and the location where these shampoos were found (inside a
box under a pile of other boxes located inside the respondents
office) belie the respondents claim of personal consumption.
Human experience and common sense dictate that shampoo
products (intended for personal consumption) will ordinarily and
logically be found inside the house, specifically, inside the
bathroom or in a private room, not in the consumers office.
Second, the failure to prove that the respondent is the owner of
the warehouse located on Camia St., Marikina City, does not
automatically free him from liability. Proof of the warehouses
ownership is not crucial to the finding of probable cause. In fact,
ownership of the establishment where the counterfeit products
were found is not even an element of unfair competition. While
the respondent may not be its owner, this does not foreclose the
possibility that he was the manufacturer or distributor of the
counterfeit shampoo products. Needless to say, what is material
to a finding of probable cause is the commission of acts
constituting unfair competition, the presence of all its elements
and the reasonable belief, based on evidence, that the
respondent had committed it.
Third, the result of the NBIs search conducted on January 17,
2002 (yielding to several boxes of counterfeit shampoo sachets)
and the NBIs Joint Affidavits in support of the application for
search warrants serve as corroborating evidence. The striking
similarities[9] between the genuine Unilever shampoo sachets
and the counterfeit sachets seized by the NBI support the belief
that the respondent had been engaged in dealing,
manufacturing, selling and distributing counterfeit Unilever
shampoo products.
Fourth, there were also allegations that the respondents
laborers and warehousemen who were present during the
search had confirmed that the warehouse was being maintained
and operated by Probest International Trading. The NBI
investigators who served the search warrant also claimed that
several persons, introducing themselves as the respondents
relatives and friends, had requested them to seize only a portion
of the counterfeit shampoo products. Whether these claims are
admissible in evidence or whether they should be excluded as
hearsay are matters that should be determined not in a
preliminary investigation, but in a full-blown trial.
In Lee v. KBC Bank N.V[10]. citing Andres v. Justice Secretary
Cuevas[11] we held that:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of [the prosecutions] evidence. The presence
or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature
and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits.
We also emphasized in that case that:

In fine, the validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation,

as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level[12].
Finally, the subsequent events that occurred after the filing of
the petitioners complaint and the institution of its appeal to the
CA are too significant to be ignored.
In its motion to reconsider the CAs decision[13], the petitioner
pointed to the reports it received sometime in October 2005 that
the respondent had resumed its operations involving counterfeit
Unilever products. Notably, these significant reports, albeit
supported by the subsequent seizure of large quantity of
counterfeit Unilever shampoos[14] in the respondents
warehouse[15] (located at No. 13 First Street Corner Sevilla
Avenue,
Virginia
Summerville
Subdivision,
Barangay
Mambugan, Antipolo City), were ignored by the CA. We,
however, find that this development is significant, although they
were not part of the mass of evidence considered below. Even
without them and based solely on the evidentiary materials
available below, we conclude that sufficient grounds exist to
indict the respondent for unfair competition.
Determination
of
Probable
Merely
Requires
Probability
or Reasonable Ground for Belief

of

Cause
Guilt

The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on

evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused[16]. It need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt[17]. What is merely
required is probability of guilt. Its determination, too, does not
call for the application of rules or standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits[18].
Thus, in concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
very offense charged.
It is also important to stress that the determination of probable
cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a partys
accusation or defense, or on the admissibility or veracity of
testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters
are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case[19]. As
held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales[20]:
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. xxx The term does not mean actual or positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence
of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Guided by this ruling, we find that the CA gravely erred in
sustaining the Acting Secretary of Justices finding that there
was no probable cause to indict the respondent for unfair
competition. The dismissal of the complaint, despite ample
evidence to support a finding of probable cause, clearly
constitutes grave error that warrants judicial intervention and
correction.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered GRANTING the petition filed by Unilever Philippines,
Inc. The appealed decision dated June 18, 2007 and the
resolution dated August 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
The State Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to file the
appropriate Information against Michael Tan a.k.a. Paul D. Tan.
SO ORDERED.

then held AAAs right cheek, pulled her face towards him, and
kissed her left cheek.
Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying, and the latter
told her mother what had happened. Fearing that Roallos would
do something to harm them, BBB and AAA went to the police
station where a report regarding the incident was prepared. They
then referred the report to the provost marshal for proper
coordination and to effect the arrest of the accused. Thereafter,
the police and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the police
station for investigation.
In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He
claimed that, on the date of the incident, he merely stayed with
AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her mother;
that he went out of the office twice to meet clients of AVACC.
Roallos further claimed that his arrest was illegal since the same
was effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise averred that
he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was
he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.
July 26, 2007, - the RTC rendered a Decision 10 finding Roallos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610
June 30, 2008 Roallos Amended
Reconsideration12 was denied by the RTC

Motion

for

April 29, 2011 - On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision which

affirmed the RTC Decision dated July 26, 2007, albeit with the
modification that the awards of moral damages and civil
indemnity were both increased toP50,000.00.

Raollos vs. People

That on or about April 15, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, with lewd design, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of
one [AAA]6, a minor, 15 years of age, by then and there mashing
her breast and kissing her cheek, against her will which act
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
said [AAA] as a human being.
On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA went to BBBs office
at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB, however, was then out
running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mothers office
and wait for the latter to return. At that time, two women were
talking to Roallos inside the AVACC office.
AAA alleged that, after the two women left, Roallos went by the
door of the office, looked outside to see if anybody was around,
and then locked it. He then approached AAA and asked her if
there was any pain bothering her; the latter replied that her tooth
ached. Roallos then placed his left hand on the table while his
right hand was on AAAs right shoulder. Roallos then slid his
hand towards AAAs right breast and mashed itHe then mashed
AAAs left breast. He slid his hand towards AAAs abdomen.
AAA then stomped her feet and pushed her chair towards
Roallos. Roallos then left the office.
After about ten minutes, Roallos returned to the office and
approached AAA. He then asked AAA if she was hungry, the
latter told him that she would just wait for BBB to return. Roallos
then offered to give money to AAA for her to buy food, but the
latter refused the offer. AAA then felt Roallos body pressing
against her back. Thereafter, Roallos attempted to kiss AAA. He

August 19, 2011 - Roallos sought a reconsideration of the CA

Decision dated April 29, 2011,14 but it was likewise denied by the
CA in its Resolution.
Roallos claims that the CA erred in affirming his conviction
considering that the Information filed against him was defective
since it charged two crimes, i.e., acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He further argues
that he was denied due process as he was not made to undergo
a preliminary investigation. Roallos also asserts that his arrest
was illegal considering that the same was effected sans any
warrant of arrest. Moreover, he alleges that the charge against
him should have been dismissed considering the unreasonable
delay in the prosecution of the case.
Further, Roallos avers that the charge against him was defective
since neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information that was filed
against him and, thus, Roallos claims that the prosecutor had no
authority to file the said Information and, accordingly, the charge
against him was defective.
In any case, he avers that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
ISSUE:
WON Raollos was denied of due process for having been
arrested without warrant, and for not having been afforded a
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
In Miclat, Jr. v. People,20 the Court emphasized that the accused
is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest

should he fail to move for the quashal of the information against

him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection
to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering this and his active participation in the trial of
the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 21 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, in Villarin v. People,22 the Court stressed that the
absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely
raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a
preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively
participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary
investigation. Thus:
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation
must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This
is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a
reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-examination
and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the
complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of
probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after
the requisite preliminary investigation."
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a
preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation.
However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never
raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsmans verdict,
entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled
hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his
own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment
against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the
preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged
absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been
mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in
the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.23 (Citations omitted and emphases
ours)
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did
not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest
and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he
actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus,
he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his
arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.