Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
INTRODUCTION
CANON
1. The Director of
Religious Affairs vs.
Bayot, A.C. No. L-1117,
March 20, 1944
2.
Canon 1 Rule 1.03, Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Linsangan v.
Tolentino, A.C. No.
6672, September 4,
2009
DOCTRINE
It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character
and conduct."
lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or
skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and
impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar
is called.
"ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)as a measure to protect the community
from barratry and champerty.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only EXCEPTION is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees
for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he
is handling for the client.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced
(-representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of
a judgment which complainant might obtain).
It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty
and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship
and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp
Well-settled is the rule that GOOD MORAL CHARACTER is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the legal profession but it must also remain extant in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.
The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, , in addition to other requisites,
It is something more than an absence of bad character;
Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite
often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if
7. In re Atty. Saturnino
Parcasio, A.C. No.
1000. February 18,
1976
it is wrong. . . .
Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer.
Vast interests are committed to his care;
he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all.
An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .
In Re Application of Kaufman, the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be
successfully met at its very source, and prevented,
In Re Keenan, The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to
those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may
aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it.
Re Rouss: Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish
him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a
test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and
officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in
courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace
instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a benefit to his community a
Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.
in the Lontok case applied the rule that "a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots
out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense." "If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit
and capacity." X-not disbarred.
The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no
moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his act,
but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the
ground of professional misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment.
9. In re Marcelino Lontok,
43 Phil. 293, April 7,
1922
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all
his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interest
vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgement.
This is verily one instance requiring liberal construction of the Rules for the purpose of assisting the
parties to obtain just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their controversies without regard
to technical objections that do not square with the ends of justice.
It should be emphasized that a defendant who is properly declared in default is differently situated
from one who is improvidently declared in default. The former irreparably loses his right to participate
in the trial, while the latter retains such a right and may exercise the same after having the order of
default and the subsequent judgment by default annulled and the case remanded to the court of
origin. Moreover the former is limited to the remedy set forth in section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 by
virtue of which he can contest only the judgment by default on the designated ground that it is
contrary to the evidence or the law; the latter, however, has the option to avail of the same remedy or
to forthwith interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the order of default even
before the promulgation of a judgment by default, or in the event that the latter has been rendered, to
have both court decrees the order of default and the judgment by default declared void. The
defendant-petitioner's choice of the latter course of action is correct for he controverts the judgment
by default not on the ground that it is not supported by evidence or it is contrary to law, but on the
ground that it is intrinsically void for having been rendered pursuant to a patently invalid order of
default..
Not allowed that a non-lawyer should be practicing law (contempt in court)
Canon 1
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP
but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their
obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and
legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system" Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are
supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very
rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
(PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST)
-[t]he conduct or behavior of all officials and employees of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by, among others, strict
propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary.
the lawyer of the insurance company did not ipso facto become the lawyer for the insured in all
subsequent litigations arising from the accident.
in the absence of a client-lawyer relationship with the petitioner corporation, is unbecoming of a
member of the bar, to say the least.
The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and
thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or
manifestation of their failure. The same principle applies more forcefully to motions for continuance.
Postponement is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. Actions thereon will not be
disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of a clear or manifest abuse of discretion, resulting in a
denial of substantial justice.
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the
court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends-the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not
only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that
impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice."
As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the
administration of justice. The present administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of
respondent judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of
the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice.
Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be punished for instigating the filing of an administrative complaint by his
clients, in the guise of upholding their rights but actually to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court
orders and consequently obstruct the desirable norms and course of justice.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers,
as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is
a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
Rules on advertising & Solicitation
Gen. Rule: prohibited
Except: Advertisement in a reputable law list (in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be
misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
Rules of Court
Sec 21, Rule 3-indigent litigants are permitted
Sec19, Rule 141 to bring suit I forma pauperis
Pauper Litigant- the right to the access of court and of free legal services
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance
and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with
such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members
of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant
for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the
case dismissed or is still pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the
Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not
only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used
by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to
show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it,
the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be
gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and
third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him."
In Romero v. Valle, we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some latitude of remarks
or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should
be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed
by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary
authority of the court
4. Saburnido vs.
Madroo, A.C. No.
4497. September 26,
2001
5. Narido vs. Linsangan,
A.M. No. 944 July 25,
1974
6. In Re: Soriano, G.R.
No. L-24114 June 30,
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he
may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of
criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer of the court
-act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of
the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer
or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from the judiciary.
We see in respondent's tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence
of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
He violated the attorneys oath by submitting a perjured statement (case)
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final
judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which
1970
should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the
litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that something more can be done toward
overturning a final judicial mandate.
a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this
cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated
substitution.
This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law
profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the
apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby
severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with
heavier disciplinary sanction.
Contingent fees
A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always
be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness
attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement is
evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper taking
into consideration the length of services he rendered and the nature of the work actually performed
by him."
when in fact and in truth the respondents fully knew that no power of attorney or authority was given
to the petitioner by his client, the respondents motive being to embarrass petitioner to the officials,
lawyers and employees of said corporations, picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and no longer
trusted by his client all with the purpose of straining the relationship of the petitioner and his client,
voluntary withdrawal filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees,
amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of respondent
A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit
"should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of
the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness."
"No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of
service or responsibility."
despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products.
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, which confidence may be eroded
by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.(Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession,
respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer
to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession."
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of
decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. In various cases,
the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
2.
intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against the respondent judge which are obviously
uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by
the respondent judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their case for recovery of
possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has
equally shown his disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public
confidence in the latter and eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of
justice.
rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition in this
case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt for this Court and
exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the First Division of the Court and put them to public
contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to render
justice, thereby creating or promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of
"encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the
foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).
1996
5. Lacson vs. CA, G.R.
No. 113591, February
6, 1995
6. Bautista vs. Gonzales,
A.M. No. 1625,
February 12, 1990
7. CEIC vs. CA, G.R.
Nos. 112438-39,
December 12, 1995
8. TAN vs. CA, G.R. No.
97238, July 15, 1991
9. Mariveles vs. Mallari,
A.C. No. 3294
February 17, 1993
10. Gabriel vs. CA, G.R.
No. L-43757-58 July
30, 1976
11. Paas v. Almarvez,
A.M. No. P-03-1690.
April 4, 2003
CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT (14-22)
1. Junio vs. Grupo, A.C.
No. 5020, December
18, 2001
2. Hilado vs. David et al,
G.R. No. L-961,
September 21, 1949
3. Tiania vs. Ocampo,
A.C. No. 2285 August
12, 1991
4. B. R. Sebastian
Enterprises, Inc vs.
CA, G.R. No. L-41862
February 7, 1992
5. Ducat vs. Villalon,
A.C. No. 3910, August
14, 2000
6. Sevilla vs. Salubre,