CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PEOPLE VS. BAUTISTA

Facts:
The appellant together with the others had a drinking spree. Three other went home ahead and
left the appellant and the deceased, armed with a bolo, behind. Around 9 pm a neighbor
saw the appellant running after the deceased thought his window.

At around midnight the accused went to Hilario's house together with his brother and confessed
that he killed the deceased and requested if they can sleep in the house which was granted by
Hilario. The accused and his brother left the house in the morning. Hilario then wrapped the bolo
and surrendered it to the authorities. He then went to his friend Buyagan and confessed the
incident, thus he was compelled to report the matter to the police. The appellant interposed selfdefense in his behalf. He narrated that during the drinking spree the deceased told about the
hacking of his uncle by the appellant's cousin. He reacted saying that he is not like his cousin.

After their companions went home the deceased followed and badmouthed him. Raising his bolo
he embraced the deceased and grabbed the bolo. The deceased however threw a stone at him as
he ran. The deceased caught up with him and he then confronted and struck him with his own
bolo. He was found guilty by the lower court for the crime of murder reasoning that there was
treachery. The case was appealed. The appellant raised the issue that the court should
have decided that it was only homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not there was treachery in killing?

Held:
The Court said that the allegation of treachery must be proven together with the crime itself. The
court further added that treachery is present if the two elements are present namely: : (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of
execution. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack makes it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or retaliate. The records show that the deceased was totally aware of the
impending danger, based on the testimony that the appellant was running after the deceased and
caught up with him. Such circumstance negates that existence of treachery. Thus the decision of
the lower court should have been homicide not murder.

GALVEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994

Facts:

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide
and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado
and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.

On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed
an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was
granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn
from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new
informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the
arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the
motion to quash.

In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an
order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatementof the original informations, and setting the
arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment
was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued
by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners motion to quash filed for the new informations. As
earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18,
1994, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground
that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.

Held:

No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not
yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before
they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In
actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three
informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and
the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would
obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the
supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real
position.

Petitioners contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of
the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument.
They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to
charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail
once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with
amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering
that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter
of discretion under either an amended or a new information.

Contrary to petitioners submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial
court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held thatThe order of the
court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service
thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of
jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion.
The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the
irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the
dismissal and not certiorari.

MARIO FL. CRESPO, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL G.R. No. L-53373, June 30,
1987
Crespo vs. Mogul
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Lucena City.
2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.
3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied
the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977
but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court.
4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders
of the Court.
5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be
given due course.
6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the
accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for

review.
7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated
April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary
Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto.
9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that the
motions trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not
before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only
disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Courts independence and
integrity.
10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for
the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals.
11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of
October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
January 23, 1979.
12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution
of February 19, 1980.
13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their
respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be
ordered to dismiss the information.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?
RULING: YES.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST : Ledesma Vs Ca

G.R. No. 113216 September 5, 1997 RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC,
Quezon City, respondents
Facts : Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against
Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office,
docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit to the complaint. Finding
"sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed on July 6, 1992 an
Information for libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104. A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by
petitioner before the Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City
prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the
case. 5 Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September 7, 1992 was filed by
Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo. 6 On September 9, 1992, the trial court
granted the motion and deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final termination of the petition
for review. 7 Without the consent or approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for
Arraignment/Trial
Issue : WON the letter is libelous
Held : In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b)
it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable
Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate
distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear
Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center Petitioner's letter was written to seek
redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees
and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center.
It is a qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code
Petitioner's letter was a private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her
part. Her intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to
present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the
presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists; and in the absence of
malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege the existence of
malice Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or
one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a
countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage against petitioner's administrative action
against him
PEOPLE VS. FLORES

Facts: Accused-appellant, Lyndon Flores did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with treachery assaulted and kicked the vital parts of the victim Manuel Lazarte y Malvar. He
was convicted of murder by the trial court after proving his guilt and sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua. The accused had an altercation with the victim's mother Emperatriz
Lazarte regarding a cassette belonging to the former. Afterwards, the accused kicked Ato
Lazarte twice in his stomach as the victim was lying unconscious in the pavement. The accused
denied of having kicked the victim as he asserts that he merely touched with his right foot. In his
petition, accused-appellant that the crime committed is homicide not murder.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed was murder?

Held: The crime was murder qualified by treachery. An attack upon a victim who was
unconscious, thus could not have put up a defense whatsoever is treacherous. Article 14 No. 16
of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tends directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party may make. However the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Article 13 No. 3) should be appreciated in
favor of the accused-appellant. His intention was merely to inflict injuries on the victim. Hence
the penalty of reclusion perpetua was reduced to reclusion temporal in it's maximum period.
RTC decision AFFIRMED with modification

SANTIAGO VS GARCHITORENA
G.R. No. 109266
December, 2 1993
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Puno, JJ., concur.
Facts:
On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program.
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was
intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this
was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the
Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set
the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6, 1992, petitioner
moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for
inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However,
on November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment.
More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis
Garchitorena who would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft
charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first
securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure
order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity
and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges
in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country.
The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice
Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his
disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated
March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations
and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993.

Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or
"continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the
Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept
of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to
define and more difficult to apply.
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been
applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the
charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People
v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code
shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal
principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws.
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the
criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No.
324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the
Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No.
16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case
number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25,
1993 is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is
concerned.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS. V. PEOPLE, G.R. No.
192565, Feb. 28, 2012
Crim Pro - Jurisdiction
Facts:
Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against
spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before the
RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on March 15,
2000
and
was
raffled
in
the
MeTC,
Branch
47,
Pasay
City.
In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she
did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or
agency". The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay
City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and
that the facts do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the
Pasay City Court where the Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction

over the case against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the
Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
was denied.
When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling
of the MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
They also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and
jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented".
The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality where the perjury was committed, or where
any of its essential ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme
Court to address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy.

Issue: Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the Certification was presented to
the trial court?

Held: The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper venue
for the criminal action.
The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art.
183 of the RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction and
venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes an
affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an
affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is
subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.'
The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The
Court ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Art.
183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit
since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime
is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
venue
is
at
the
place
where
the
testimony
under
oath
is
given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where
the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, the determination
of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.