Nietzsche vs. Hume?

Post Number:#1 Postby Bhalps May 31st, 2012, 1:10 pm

I'm trying to work my way through Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality. It's tough
slugging, but this is my essential summary of his first treatise. Would anyone b
e able to comment on the accuracy of it?
A. Nietzsche makes most sense when read in contrast with Hume, the philosopher N
ietzsche obliquely refers to as that English psychologist.
B. Hume, as Nietzsche writes, presents a psychological account of morality: what
we call moral is what was once good for society a.
Originally
so they decree
stic actions were praised and called good from the perspective of those to whom
they were rendered, hence for whom they were useful; later, one forgot this orig
in of the praise and, simply because unegoistic actions were as a matter of habi
t always praised as good, one also felt them to be good
as if they were somethin
g good in themselves. (10)
C. Nietzsche has two connected problems with this argument
D. First, it is ahistorical; it only considers the present state a. Unfortunately
, however, it is certain that they lack the historical spirit itself, that they
have been left in the lurch precisely by all the good spirits of history! As is
simply the age-old practice among philosophers, they all think essentially ahist
orically. (10)
E. Second, because Hume thinks ahistorically, he does not have the ability to of
fer a normative account; Hume only offers a positive account
F. If, on the other hand, he had provided, like Nietzsche does, an historical ac
count, he would be able to see that the current morality is merely one of the hi
storical moment; and thus would be able to judge it and offer a normative accoun
t
G. Thus, Nietzsche is able to judge the value of these [contemporary] values by pr
oviding a historical genealogy of morality

Post Number:#2 Postby Kafkaontheshore June 1st, 2012, 3:09 pm

Hi there,
You seem to be reading Nietzsche as if he thinks that Hume is almost right, mora
lity is only down to arbitrary natural forces, and all Hume failed to do was fac
tor in the historical origins of the contemporary conception. This makes Nietzsc
he seem like a naturalist himself and though reading Nietzsche like this (like H
ume) is tempting it is actually slightly wrong headed. To see why it is best to
approach Nietzsche's project from the reverse direction.
His biggest worry is the threat of Nihlism, a state where willing itself "freeze
s to death"; a world without values stripped of meaning and purpose. The questio
n then appears to be where this threat comes from, but the real issue is how we
are to see this as a threat at all; that is it becomes a question of interpretat
ion. The genealogy of morality can be seen as an attempt by Nietzsche to reinter
pret the world in such a way as to re-orientate the way we see ourselves in it.
What he is trying to do then is not to give the 'truth' of morality in the sense
of a more factually accurate account, but almost the reverse; to show us how th
e desire for some 'factually accurate account' is actually itself symptomatic of
a certain point of view - that of the slave. The problem then is that reading N

unegoi

ietzsche as a naturalist renders him susceptible to his own critique, in so far

as a naturalist reading wants Nietzsche to be suggesting that his account is mor
e factually accurate in the slavish sense.
Why is the quest for truth symptomatic of the Slavish point of view?
To answer this question is is useful to reread that passage in GM 1 13 about the
lambs and birds of prey. The suggestion is that it is by positing the idea of a
'true' subject that is able to will, the slaves are able to make the masters res
ponsible - make them guilty for their actions. It is this positing of a fixed tr
uth behind the world that allows the slaves to effect their slave revolt in mora
lity. By positing this entity the slaves detract from the truth of our 'being in
the world'; "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer'
is merely a fiction added to the deed - the deed is everything" (GM 1 13). Again
this is yet another reason not to read Nietzsche as a naturalist - simply positi
ng some brain states instead of a immaterial soul behind the doer still leaves t
he slavish position of a true subject intact. What he wants us to do then is to
see that actions are always subject to interpretation; "everything that occurs i
n the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, ove
rpowering and dominating consist of reinterpretation, adjustment, in the process
of which their former meaning and purpose necessarily be obscured or completely obl
iterated" (GM II 12)
This then becomes the obsession of the slavish perspective. The drive for truth
"has become too strong for us to be able to want happiness without knowledge ; [it]
has grown as indispensable to us as is to the lover his unrequited love" (Daybr
eak, 184). What Nietzsche wants us to realise about this is that it can't give u
s what we need from it; even if you could know everything - fill out Wittgenstei
n's Book of the World as it were (which Wittgenstein also attacks in his lecture
on Ethics) - what would that mean, where would it lead? Nietzsche paints an unh
appy picture: Here there is snow, here life has become silent ; the last crowings
heard here are To what end? , In vain! , Nada! (GM III, 26).
He suggests then another alternative: "And as for our future, one will hardly fi
nd us again on the paths of those Egyptian youths who endanger temples by night,
embrace statues, and want by all means to unveil, uncover, and put into a brigh
t light whatever is kept concealed for good reasons. No, this bad taste, this wi
ll to truth, to "truth at any price, this youthful madness in the love of truth,
have lost their charm for us: for that we are too serious, too merry, too burne
d, too profound. We no longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils ar
e withdrawn" (Gay Science, Preface).
Now there can be no more clear attack on naturalism than this passage. If natura
lism is good for anything, it is to 'unveil, uncover, and put into a bright ligh
t'. Rather nietzsche wants us to reinterpret, or reinvigorate our standing towar
d the world, escape the slavish need for truth. To relight - in Robert Pippin's
words (who's book is largely behind what I have written) - our erotic striving i
n the way we comport ourselves toward the world.
I hope this helps, I think it is important not to read Nietzsche in relation to
Hume - people can and do, but they are forced to read selectively, avoid the bit
s where he attacks the "mechanistic senselessness" of modern science (GM II 12) e
tc. Perhaps more than anything I recommend Pippin's book on Nietzsche, 'Nietzsch
e, Psychology and First Philosophy'.
Good luck,
Sam