Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Legaspi
CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 175-176); RA 9255
Title
1. Grande v.
Antonio
GR# 206248,
Feb. 18, 2014,
716 SCRA 698
In relation to:
Title XIII. USE OF
SURNAMES
(Articles 364380, NCC)
RA 9255 An
Act Allowing
Illegitimate
Children to Use
the Surname of
their Father
(Amending Art.
176 of the Family
Code); IRR of
9255; Passport
Law (RA 8239)
Facts
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio
Antonio for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else. Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on
February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October
13, 1999). The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record
of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. Grande
left for the United States with her two children in
May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file
a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, appending a
notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of
Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio,
ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming
that the best interest of the children can be
promoted if they are under the sole parental
authority and physical custody of [respondent
Antonio]." Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA
attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and
jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody
to the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In
resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in
part the Decision of the RTC.
Petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of
the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the
minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was
denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present
Issue/s
The sole issue at
hand is the right of
a father to compel
the use of his
surname by his
illegitimate children
upon his recognition
of their filiation.
Held
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code,
originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now
reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname
of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent xxx wanted: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens
surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is
given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
xxx Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the
surname to that of respondent? Clearly, there is none. xxx
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
xxx On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where
there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word
"may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child
is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The
word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies
affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of
childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that
the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In
Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to
continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate
father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent
her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in
Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child
concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames
of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs
surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the
best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the
choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would
best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. xxx
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed
of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After
hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the
evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her
in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification
of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
2. Salas v.
the fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255. xxx
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. xxx Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic
law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance
an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
xxx This Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down
and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution. xxx
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the
IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their fathers surname upon the latters recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls,
and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they
will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these
letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not
provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the
children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
xxx
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children; b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week,
and may only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]: c.
The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at
the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and d. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the
sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
and appellate
courts erred in
ruling that
respondents
evidence sufficiently
proved that her son
Christian Paulo is
the illegitimate child
of petitioner.
may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit A-1) of
Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father
but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled
up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was
petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that
the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if
the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity.26Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a
public instrument27 and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the
alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also
indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the childs paternity.30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten
notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and
respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
xxx
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a
clear admission that he is the father of private respondents daughter and
were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence
which established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the
father of private respondents daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court
of Appeals, the Court sustained the appellate courts finding that private
respondents evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner
was overwhelming, particularly the latters public acknowledgment of his
amorous relationship with private respondents mother, and private
respondent as his own child through acts and words, her testimonial
evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary evidence. The
Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous
possession of status of a spurious child.
xxx
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Whether the
Compromise
Agreement entered
into between
petitioner and
respondent, duly
approved by RTCBranch 9 in its
Decision dated 21
February 2000 in
Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB,
constitutes res
judicata in Special
Proceeding No.
12562-CEB still
pending before
RTC-Branch 24.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
4. De La Cruz v.
Gracia
GR 177728, July
31, 2009, 594
SCRA 648
of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case
No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil
status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no
compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the
lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is
for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.23
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The
void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
xxx RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to
grant the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow
itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article
2035 of the Civil Code. xxx
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not
barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in
its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
petitioner and respondents Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to
law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February
2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having
been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have attained
finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise
Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to
law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be
appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch
24 is only reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary
value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to
the RTC-Branch 24 for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings
No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for respondents presentation of evidence.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public
or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Whether or not
the accusedappellant should
be ordered to
indemnify and
support the
victims child.
7. Tonog vs. CA
GR# 122906,
Feb. 07, 2002,
376 SCRA 523
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
10
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
11
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in
the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both
parents complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic
care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental,
social and spiritual needs of the child.[9] Neither does the law nor
jurisprudence intend to downplay a fathers sense of loss when he is
separated from his child xxx.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of
her child who is below seven years of age for compelling reasons.
Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years
of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound
by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the
childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which
instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third
person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on
the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the
proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated,
and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody
of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody
over her. xxx
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of
fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial
court.[13] It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule
only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the
parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet
another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith,
has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference
and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have
the custody over her person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
12
Should the
provisions of the
Family Code be
applied in the
instant case? As a
corollary Will the
application of the
Family Code in this
case prejudice or
impair any vested
right of the private
respondent such
that it should not be
given retroactive
effect in this
particular case?
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the
regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We
herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.[7] where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it
and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with
the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced
or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
13
Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative
father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor
when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285
of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the
case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same
despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of
the Philippines. xxx
9. David vs. CA
GR# 111180, Nov.
16,1995, 250
SCRA 82
Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of
the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the
parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from
each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation. For example, in the case ofSalvaa v. Gaela, 1 it was held that the
writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a
third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to
marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of
his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of
the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother,
the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to
have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her
rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
14
who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child
and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him
custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving
petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has
been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. xxx It
is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to
support her children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary
support to petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing
of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any
support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of
P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. xxx
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose,
the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent
has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment
of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the
child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support
can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to
support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being
less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the
RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is
over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be
upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and
here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child. xxx
Facts
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married
Issue/s
Whether or not only
Held
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states: Only natural children can be
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
15
legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry
each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private
respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when
the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. xxx
It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading
of "Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children,"
Article 89, a provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals
principally with void and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of
said marriages on their offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate
children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from
the beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they
are classified as "acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the
same status, rights and obligations as such kind of children. In the case at
bench, the marriage under question is considered "void from the beginning"
because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still
subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be
considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their
parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of
a prior subsisting marriage.
What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children
proper (those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other")? xxx In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was
invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly
not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269 but by
fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and,
consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter. xxx
Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the
basis of rights granted by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing
the substantive provisions of the law in force.
Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the
new provisions of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid on
the classification of children vis-a-vis their parents, and the corresponding
rights they are entitled to under the law. xxx The well-ordered delineation of
such distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part
of the framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize and separate one from
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
16
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
17
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
18
2. Abadilla vs.
Tabiliran, Jr
A.M No. MTJ-92716., Oct. 25,
1999, 249 SCRA
447
Whether or not
respondent is
culpable for gross
immorality for
scandalously and
openly cohabiting
with Priscilla
Baybayan.
exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of
the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be
legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of
acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As
has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to
be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at
bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be
reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on
par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share.
xxx The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the
corresponding gradation of their rights may conceivably be shattered by
elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate
children to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would
otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their union with a valid
marriage.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided
under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now
recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural
children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
We hold the respondent culpable for gross immorality, he having
scandalously and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla Baybayan during
the existence of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran.
xxx it appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly
living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that
he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all
surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on
September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975.
Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived
together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and
subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of
the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be
considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be
invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran
left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that
respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years
had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B.
Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of
cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
19
Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It
makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social
institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract,
but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C.
Aquino).
By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust
reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and
strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v.
Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).
As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We
are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a
proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the
Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of
the Civil Code.
With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has
likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates of
respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly
indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. xxx. It is important to
note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior
to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer
and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent
marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any
way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an
existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.
Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides: Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of
adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code:
(Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated
the above-mentioned provision.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The rationale of
legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate
children in terms of successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
20
scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege
of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of
marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many
years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia v. Sempio
Diy).
It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita
disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears that
on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent
entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (G.R. No. 1155451) which was decided by this
Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of his
family home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedly begot
a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure of his
wife to substantiate the charges. xxx It was also in the same case where
respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio
and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues. Thus,
his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn
and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are erroneous,
deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children.
Facts
Petitioner, on 23 June 1974, married Primo Lim
(Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a
certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to
have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that they
were the childrens parents. The children were
named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude
P. Lim (Michael).
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if
they were their own. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner
married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Issue/s
Whether or not
petitioner, who has
remarried, can
singly adopt.
Held
xxx It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex.
The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and
legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring
for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in
a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means
of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
21
age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for
at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered,
that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt
in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
22
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
23
24
2. Lahom vs.
Sibulo
GR#143989, July
14, 2003, 406
SCRA 135
xxx The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. xxx Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. Xxx Since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
xxx R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most
importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child xxx. The new
law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave
to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely
affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty
of due process15 that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it includes not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and
irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, xxx the Court concluded that
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. xxx In Republic vs. Miller, the xxx
Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of
the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently
with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside
the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules
of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
25
3. Republic vs.
Miller
GR#125932/Apr.
21, 1999, 306
SCRA 183
This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the
petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3,
1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a
Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the
petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. "A
vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend
upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept
of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny." "Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from
new obligations created after the right has vested."
"As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed,
the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the
case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
26
Whether or not
minor children be
legally adopted
without the written
consent of a natural
parent on the
ground that the
latter has
abandoned them.
Yes. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity
of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such
parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or
one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
However, In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did
not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
27
Whether or not an
alien married to a
former Filipino may
adopt in the
Philippines.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
28
not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law.
He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although
he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not
married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American
at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the
exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to
a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may
not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law
mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article
185 of the Family Code provides:
Republic v.
Toledano
Exceptions
provided
for
Whether or not an
alien married to a
former Filipino may
adopt in the
Philippines.
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they
did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", spouses Clouse are clearly
barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
29
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates
the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or
her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as
may be provided by law.
30
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband
and wife. It reads:
Republic v. CA
and Hughes
Pursuant to
Article 185 in
relation to the
exceptions set
forth in Article
184, an alien who
is a former
Filipino may
adopt a relative
by consanguinity
provided he/she
must adopt jointly
with his/her
spouse who must
also be
capacitated to
adopt in
Whether or not
making the alien
spouse a nominal
party to a petition
for adoption filed by
his/her spouse who
is
previously
a
Filipino to adopt the
latters relative by
consanguinity
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that
must be read along together with Article 184.
No. The view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a
status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as,
but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional
rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered
inconsequential to the parties. Hence, compliance to the requirement of joint
adoption by spouses is mandatory and cannot be circumvented by making
the alien spouse, a person not capacitated to adopt under Philippine Laws,
as nominal party in a petition for adoption.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
31
: Whether or not an
adopted child may
revert back to the
use of the surname
of his biological
parents.
Yes. Article 365 which mandates that "(a)n adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter," in correlation with Article 341 on the effects of
adoption, among which is to"(e)ntitle the adopted person to use the adopter's
surname.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to
the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings. 30 The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and
child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and
affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related
by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of
another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights
and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect
this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the
change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an
incident than the object of the proceeding. 31The welfare of the child is the
primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption. On
this point, there is unanimous agreement.
The law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does
not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and
only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction.
What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
Whether or not a
spouse who was
not named as one
Yes. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
32
An affidavit of
consent showing
explicit intention
the spouses to
adopt jointly is
sufficient
compliance to the
requirement
of
joint
adoption
regardless if the
spouse
who
executed
such
affidavit was not
named
as
petitioner in a
petition
for
adoption.
In the case of In
re: Adoption of
Michelle
&
Michael
Lim,
affidavit
of
consent executed
by
an
alien
spouse
who
seeks to adopt
was
not
considered
for
purposes
of
complying
with
the joint adoption
rule
on
the
ground that such
alien must, other
than
give
its
consent, meet the
qualifications set
forth in Section 71
of the petitioners in
a
petition
for
adoption but merely
attaches
his
affidavit of consent
is deemed to have
jointly adopt with his
spouse named in
the petition.
the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to
the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows
that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not
apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule
therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to
adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
33
Facts
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself
and her two children, petitioner sought the amount
of
P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing
respondents huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses
here and abroad. After due hearing,RTC cited Art.
203 of the Family Code, stating that support is
demandable from the timeplaintiff needed the said
support but is payable only from the date of judicial
demand,and thus also granted support pendente lite
of P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7months
Issue/s
W/N the CA erred in
deducting said
amount from the
current total support
in arrears
Held
The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
As a matter of law, theamount of support which those related by marriage
and family relationship is generallyobliged to give each other shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation,
inkeeping with the financial capacity of the family. The general rule is to the
effect thatwhen a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother
money for thesupport of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter
of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the
children. Here, the CA should not haveallowed all the expenses incurred by
respondent to be credited against the accruedsupport pendente lite.
1 An Alien Spouse must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
34
Calderon v.
Roxas
The grant of
support pendente
lite is an
interlocutory order
which cannot be
Whether or not an
order granting
support pendent lite
is an interlocutory
order and is
therefore not
appealable by
ordinary appeal.
Yes. an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory" e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion
for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or
inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order,
which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
35
Gotardo v.
Buling
Support consists
of
everything
indispensable for
sustenance,
dwelling, clothing,
medical
attendance,
education
and
transportation, in
keeping with the
financial capacity
of the family.
Thus, the amount
of
support
is
variable and, for
this reason, no
final judgment on
the amount of
Whether or not
filiation may be
proven by testimony
of the mother that
she had sexual
relations with the
putative father at
the time of
conception of the
child.
Yes. In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. We
explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by
corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father;
at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. We
explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either
physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations
with other men at the time of conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner
is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters
with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the
respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
36
1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed
to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary
support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and
categorical assertions.
No. The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only
upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide
sufficient support.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives,
by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
37
category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family
extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
NB:
Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under
Uy v. Chua
A
compromise
agreement which
denies
filiation
and has the effect
of waiving any
action for future
support
and
succession
is
void.
Whether or not a
judicially approved
compromise
agreement denying
filiation may serve
as proof to deny
filiation
and
consequently
bar
any future action for
recognition, support
or succession.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
38
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The
void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise
Agreement, already made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would
already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal.
Sy v. CA
A
person
convicted of rape
is liable to three
kinds
of
civil
liability
under
Article 345 of the
RPC:
a)
indemnification,
b)
acknowledgment
of the offspring,
unless the law
should
prevent
him
from
so
doing, and c) in
every case to
support
the
offspring.
Whether or not
support may be
granted in a habeas
corpus proceeding
even though not
prayed for by the
petitioner.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise
Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to
law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be
appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch
24 is only reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary
value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
No. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same
needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand. The case of Jocson v. The Empire Ins. Co.
and Jocson Lagniton (103 Phil. 580, 1958) explains the rationale for this rule:
x x x Support does include what is necessary for the
education and clothing of the person entitled thereto (Art.
290, New Civil Code). But support must be demanded and
the right to it established before it becomes payable (Art.
298, New Civil Code; Marcelo v. Estacio, 70 Phil. 215). For
the right to support does not arise from the mere fact of
relationship, even from the relationship of parents and
children, but "from imperative necessity without which it
cannot be demanded, and the law presumes that such
necessity does not exist unless support is demanded (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Tolentino, Vol. 1, p.
181, citing 8 Manresa 685). In the present case, it does not
appear that support for the minors, be it only for their
education and clothing, was ever demanded from their
father and the need for it duly established. The need for
support, as already stated, cannot be presumed, and
especially must this be true in the present case where it
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
39
Lacson v. Lacson
Whether or not a
parent
may
be
required to pay
support in arrears.
However, support even if not pleaded may still be awarded if such issue was
properly tackled during the trial. Applying Section 52, Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was tried with the implied
consent of the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been
raised in the pleadings. And since there was implied consent, even if no
motion had been filed and no amendment had been ordered, the Court holds
that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the issue.
Yes. Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully
exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give
support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish
support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical
relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an
equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of another.
2 Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
40
The
person
obliged to give
support
may
either provide a
fix allowance in
the
family
dwelling
the
person who has a
right to receive
support.
The
second
option
cannot be availed
of in case there
are
circumstances,
legal or moral,
which should be
considered.
Whether or
not
a
grandfathe
r, in lieu of
his
son
who is still
alive, may
be
required to
provide
support to
his
grandchildr
en.
Whether or
not
the
right of the
person
obliged to
give
support to
exercise
option as
to
how
support
will
be
given
is
absolute.
1)
Yes. ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support,
the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
According to Arturo Tolentino, an eminent author on the subject explains that
the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related
to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder
the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to
provide support do not have the means to do so.
(2)
Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option
under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica
and Rina.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto.
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to how he
could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the
determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to
stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case
there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
41
People v.
Magtibay
A
person
convicted of rape
is liable to three
kinds
of
civil
liability
under
Article 345 of the
RPC:
a)
indemnification,
b)
acknowledgment
of the offspring,
unless the law
should
prevent
him
from
so
doing, and c) in
every case to
support
the
offspring.
Gan v. Reyes
Unless
ordered
by the trial court,
judgments
in
actions
for
support
are
immediately
Whether or not a
court which tackles
a rape case may
accord the status of
illegitimacy
and
grant support to the
child conceived thru
rape.
Whether or not an
order granting a
petition for support
pendente lite may
be immediately be
executed even if
judgment has yet to
attain finality.
With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the
parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected.
Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they
had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship
with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back
here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
Yes. With respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out
of rape our recent ruling in People v. Justiniano Glabo (G.R. No. 129248, 7
December 2001) states:
Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article
345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that
may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of
the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in
every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code,
the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by
legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code
upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion
perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no "further
positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs
status." Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and
support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with
Article 201 of the Family Code.
Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered
by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory
and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule
which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the
judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent
reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate
execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between
those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
42
consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the
advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit
language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
When words of a legal provision are plain, we should make no further
explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget.
Whether or
not
the
public
respondent
acted
with grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction
in
upholding the denial
of the motion to
dismiss by the trial
court, and holding
that an action for
support cannot be
barred
by
res
judicata.
In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff
in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed
futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child.
Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation
between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to
believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from
him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for support.
The admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a
motion of the husband, in which the latter prayed that his obligation to
support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the prayer,
and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status,
from which the right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no
effect can be .given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has
been made as to the existence of the cause.
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding
upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not
conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to
third parties and future support cannot be the subject of. This being true, it is
indisputable that the present action for support can be brought,
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
43
12. David vs CA
TITLE IX. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS (ARTICLES 209-215)
1.
Becke
tt vs.
Sarmi
ento
AM
RTJ-122326/ January
30, 2013
Whether or not
respondent Judge
Sarmiento is guilty
of gross ignorance
of the law.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
44
2.
Lim
vs
Lim
GR# 1632029/
October
30,
2009
The governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil
Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental
Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority
encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they differ in other
concerns including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among
relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the obligation to provide support
arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the
same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts
during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and
the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants
only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but
also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the
ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners
theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material
deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support
even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their
descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by
blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family
extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
45
3.
Syvs
CA
4.
Madrin
anvsM
adrina
n
GR#
159374/
July 12, 2007
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA
8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue. (emphases supplied)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus
was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty
there was has been settled with the adoption of
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule
provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
46
5.
Viesca
vs.
Glinsk
y
GR#171698/
July 04, 2007
Whether it is proper
for the trial court to
alter
the
compromise without
the consent of the
parties
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
47
6.
neither the courts nor quasi-judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a
judgment different from their compromise agreement or against the very
terms and conditions of their agreement without contravening the universally
established principle that a contract is the law between the parties. The
courts can only approve the agreement of parties. They can not make a
contract for them.
Nevertheless, we cannot totally blame the trial court for having
granted respondents Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial
Rights. Perhaps, in its desire to finally put to rest the bothersome issue
concerning Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment and to prevent future
disagreements between the parties, the trial court saw the wisdom, as this
Court does, in providing the specifics in the said indefinite portion of the
Compromise Judgment. As we previously held in the case of Hernandez v.
Colayco
This is not the first unfortunate instance that a compromise judgment
of a trial court has given rise to subsequent prolonged controversy, only
because the trial judge failed to exercise the required degree of care in
seeing to it that neither ambiguity nor incompleteness of details should
characterize the agreement, much less the judgment rendered on the basis
thereof. The expressed desire of the parties to end their judicial travails by
submitting to a compromise deserves the utmost attention from the court,
and no effort should be spared in helping them arrive at a definite and
unequivocal termination of their problems and differences. It is high time that
the matter-of-fact treatment usually accorded by trial courts to motions to
approve compromises were abandoned in favor of the more positive activist
attitude the situation demands. In acting in such a situation, the judge
should bear in mind that the objective is to end the disagreement between
the parties, not to begin a new one. Thus, if the parties and their counsel
are unable to do it, the judge is expected to assist them in attaining
precision and accuracy of language that would more or less make it
certain that any disputes as to the matters being settled would not
recur, much less give rise to a new controversy.
Roehr
vs
Rodrig
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
48
7.
Laxam
anavs
Laxam
ana
GR#
144763/
Sept 03, 2002
Whether or
not the trial court
considered
the
paramount interest
and welfare of the
children in awarding
their custody to
respondent.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
49
8.
Vancil
vsBel
mes
GR#
132223/
June 19, 2001
Who
between the mother
and grandmother of
minor
Vincent
should
be
his
guardian.
Art. 211 FC. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. xxx.
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has
the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. InSagala-Eslao vs.
Court of Appeals, this Court held: Of considerable importance is the rule
long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their
minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one,
which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from
the nature of the parental relationship.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only
in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent,
still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that
she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will
not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the
duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a
guardian.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
50
Silva
vsCa
10. Perez
vs CA
GR#
118870/
March 29, 1996
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the
Family Code is the applicable law. It provides:
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall
take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (
Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean
legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact,
such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms.
The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory
character.
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than
seven years of age to their mother was explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound
the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good
of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to
be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any
effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that
a child below seven years old should not be separated from the mother
(Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of
the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) which
reduced the childs age to five years.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother finds its raison detrein the basic need of a child
for his mothers loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify
the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his
mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past
the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother
of
custody
and
parental
authority:
neglect,
abandonment,unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
51
11. Santos
Sr. vs
CA
GR#
113054/
March 16, 1995
The issue to be
resolved here boils
down to who should
properly
be
awarded custody of
the minor Leouel
Santos, Jr.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
52
the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be
an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position
to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support
for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from
his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of
his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be
construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against
him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help
enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a
chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth
and support which a father can give.
CHAPTER 2. SUBSTITUTE & SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY (ARTS. 216-219); ARTS. 2176. 2180
St.
Marys
Academy
vsCarpitanos
GR#
143363/
Feb. 6, 2002
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special
parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is
a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Respondents
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
53
Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James
Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence
of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of
the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
CHAPTER 3. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN (ARTICLES 220-224)
Obedenciovs
Murillo
A.M No. RTJ03-1753/ Feb 5,
2004
Capistrano
Obedencio,
Jr.,
charged
respondent Judge Joaquin M. Murillo of unjustly
dismissing Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000) for rape,
entitled People v. Dexter Z. Acenas.
Complainant averred that he and his wife
assisted
their
14-year-old
daughter,
LicelAcenasObedencio, in filing with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor a criminal complaint for rape
allegedly committed upon her when she was 11 years
old by her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas.
To his great surprise, respondent judge told
him that the case had been dismissed three days
earlier on May 22, 2001. According to respondent
judge, LicelObedencio had come to court,
accompanied by her maternal grandparents and Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Hallazgo. There she
was presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance.
Then, Licel took the witness stand and was asked on
matters contained in her affidavit. She recanted the
allegations in her affidavit-complaint and denied
having been molested by her uncle, Dexter. She
explained that her mother forced her to file the rape
charge because of family inheritance problems.
Complainant claims that the dismissal was
marred by serious irregularities.
Whether
the
dismissal of the
criminal case is
proper despite lack
of
consent
of
maternal parents
Article 220(6) of the Family Code gives to complainant and his wife the right
and duty to represent Licel in all matters affecting her interest. Thus, they
were entitled to be notified and to attend every hearing on the case. As a
judge, respondent is duty-bound to acquaint himself with the cases pending
before him. He should have known that Licel filed the criminal complaint with
the assistance of her parents, who are her natural guardians. It was
incumbent upon respondent judge to inquire into the reason behind their
nonappearance before the court instead of simply relying on the bare
explanation of the defense counsel that he and his client could not find Licels
parents. Respondent judge ought to remember that the accused, Dexter
Acenas, is the maternal uncle of the victim. That Licel came to court with her
maternal grandparents, and not her parents, on the day she was examined to
affirm her affidavit of desistance, should have alerted respondent judge to be
more circumspect. Being still a minor, Licel cannot fully comprehend for
herself the impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of desistance.
Given her tender age, the probability is that Licel succumbed to illicit
influence and undue pressure on her to desist from pursuing her complaint.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
54
CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN (ARTICLES 225-227)
1.
Neri
vs.
Heirs
of
HadjiY
usop
GR#
194366/
October
10,
2012
Whether sale of
property is proper
despite lack of
consent
parents
or children of the
deceased
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
55
2.
Cabale
svs CA
GR#
162421/
August
31,
2007
RufinoCabales died and left a 5,714square meter parcel of land. Brothers and co-owners
Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property
to Dr. CayetanoCorrompido with right to repurchase
within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided
the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each
getting a share of P666.66. Alberto died leaving his
wife and son, petitioner Nelson. On December 18,
1975, within the eight-year redemption period,
Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment of
P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido
only released the document of sale with pacto de
retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
56
redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until
reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Based on Articles 320 and 326 of the
New Civil Code.
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian
without necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his
property or one-seventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less
than two thousand pesos.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration
of the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which
needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner
Rito, sold the latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the
legal authority to do so.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of
sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and
all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided
share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the
others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they
only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part
which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently,
petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided
share of subject property.
CHAPTER 4- EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHIILDREN (Articles 225-227)
Title
Pineda v CA
Facts
Issues
Ruling
PMSI obtained a group insurance policy for its 1. WON Insular Life YES
sailors. 6 of the sailors, during the effectivity of should still be liable 1. The special powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and clear
the policy, perished while the ship sank in to the complainants terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent
Morocco. The families of the victims then wanted when they relied on company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-insured.
to claimthe benefits of the insurance. Hence, the specialpowers Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
57
of attorney, which
Capt.
Nuval
presented
as
documents, when
they released the
checks to the latter.
2. WON Insular Life
should be liable to
the
complainants
when they released
the check in favor of
Ayo and Lontok,
even if no bond was
posted as required.
collection and receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with
respect to group policies.
They gave the proceeds to the policyholder instead of the beneficiaries
themselves. Even the Isnular rep admitted that he gave the checks to the
policyholder.
Insular Life recognized Capt. Nuval as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners.
However, it acted imprudently and negligently in the premises by relying
without question on the special power of attorney.
Strong vs. Repide- third persons deal with agents at their peril and are bound
to inquire as to the extent of the power of the agent with whom they contract.
Harry E. Keller Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez- The person dealing with an agent
must also act with ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence. Obviously, if
he knows or has good reason to believe that the agent is exceeding his
authority, he cannot claim protection the party dealing with him may not
shut his eyes to the real state of the case, but should either refuse to deal
with the agent at all, or should ascertain from the principal the true condition
of affairs.
Insular delivered the checks to a party not the agent of the beneficiaries.
2. Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child without
the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's
decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child
exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in
such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum
(10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
If the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee
the performance of the obligations of a general guardian.
On group insurance :
Group insurance is essentially a single insurance contract that provides
coverage for many individuals, particularly for the employees of one
employer.
There is a master agreement issued to an employer. The employer acts as
the collector of the dues and premiums. Disbursement of insurance
payments by the employer is also one of his duties.
They require an employee to pay a portion of the premium, which the
employer deducts from wages while the remainder is paid by the employer.
This is known as a contributory plan as compared to a non-contributory plan
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
58
Whether or not a
sale by a guardian
of
a
minors
property
requires
judicial approval.
YES.
Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of
the property of his minor children does not have the power to dispose of or
alienate the property of the said child without judicial approval. And under
Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of the widow as
legal administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of
possession and management. Hence, the power to sell, mortgage,
encumber or dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89). Moreover,
the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith as they
knew right from the beginning the the transaction was without judicial
approval. Further, the minors' action for reconveyance has not yet
prescribed.
Facts
Respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy filed with the
Sharia District Court an action to obtain custody
of his two minor children.
Issues
Ruling
Is
a
wife,
a
Christian
who
converted to Islam
before her marriage
to a Muslim and
converted back to
Catholicism
upon
their separation, still
bound by the moral
laws of Islam in the
determination of her
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
59
fitness to be the
custodian of her
children?
not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into
consideration
in
deciding
whether
a
non-Muslim
woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid
down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the
ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial
support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and
moral situations of the parents.
The record shows that petitioner is equally financially capable of
providing for all the needs of her children. The children went to school at De
La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with their tuition paid by petitioner
according to the schools certification.
Silva. Ca
Title XIII. USE OF SURNAMES (Articles 364-380, NCC)
Grande v Antonio
Petitioner
Grace
Grande
(Grande)
and
respondent
Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although
Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else.Out of
this illicit relationship, two sons
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
60
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of
the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary
public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtis enough to establish the paternity of
his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental
custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be
taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname,
therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity,
one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that
an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
61
Remo v. Sec of
Foreign Affairs
Whether or not
Remo,
who
originally used her
husbands surname
in
her
expired
passport, can revert
to the use of her
maiden name in the
replacement
passport,
despite
the subsistence of
her marriage.
Petition denied.
Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage
subsists. No conflict between Civil Code and RA 8239 Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil
Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court (supra),
a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husbands surname upon
marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not
conflict with this principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does
not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in
recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman
who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is
not required to adopt her husbands surname. In the case of renewal of passport, a married
woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If
she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally
requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if
she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not
prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport,
she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or
(4) nullity of marriage. Since Remos marriage to her husband subsists, she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married
womans reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of
the marriage. Yasin case not in point Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in
Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to
another woman, Remos marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request
to resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume ones
maiden name in view of the dissolution of ones marriage.
Special law prevails over general law Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code,
the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
62
Dela Cruz v
Gracia
When
her
motion
for
reconsideration was denied,
Remo filed a petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Remo argued that RA 8239
conflicted with and was an
implied repeal of Article 370 of
the Civil Code which allows the
wife to continue using her
maiden name upon marriage, as
settled in the case of Yasin vs.
Honorable Judge Sharia District
Court [311 Phil. 696, 707
(1995)]
Jenie
was
denied
the
registration of her child's birth
because the document attached
to the Affidavit to use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF)
entitled "Autobiography," did not
include the signature of the
deceased father, and because
he was born out of wedlock and
the father unfortunately died
prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge
must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on
the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails
over a general law. Implied repeals are disfavored Remos theory of implied repeal must
fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently
conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so
that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the
latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.
State is mandated to protect integrity of passport Remo consciously chose to use her
husbands surname in her previous passport application. If her present request would be
allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her
husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport,
which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced.
Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport
applicants constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from
it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder
is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.
Yes!
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use
the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the
putative
father
in
the
private
handwritten
instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
63
paternity
to
the
child.
2)
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
Whether or not
petitioners
marriage
with
Virgilio
is
valid
despite
lack
of
declaration
of
presumptive death
of Sofio.
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because
Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of
absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their
marriage is legal and valid.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no
impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded
belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this
requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to
Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The
Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
64
presumption of Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption
having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to
marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said
marriage is legal and valid.
1.
Republic v Uy
Fujiki v Marinay
Rep. v CosetengMagpayo
WON respondents
change of name
was
affected
through
an
appropriate
adversary
proceeding
Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of the
recognized grounds in rule 103(respondent denies his legitimacy by affecting his
legal status in relation to his parents)
Since respondents desired change affects his legitimacy, rule 108 should apply
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be
filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected
(Makati, not QC) and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated
Decision of Trial Court was nullified
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
65
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
66
Republic v
Marcadera
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or
both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an
independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his
relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of ones
existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter ones
legal capacity or civil status.
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in
the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law.
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is
not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of
name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a
substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule
108.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
67
A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law,
there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. In petitions for correction, only
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be
raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of
name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to
say, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for
clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it
simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make
or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From
the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the
faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the
same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." The CA did not allow Mercadera
the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name
which she had been using ever since she could remember.
Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower
court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia
of an adverse proceeding. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the
motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now
complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Wherefore
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
68
Title
Corpus v Sto.
Tomas
Baldos v Ca
Facts
Issues
Ruling
In the realm of the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the oppositor is petitioners
son. Petitioners reason for disowning the oppositor is obvious; he did not live up to her
expectation; his wife is ungrateful to everything she did for her and the oppositor. Bad blood
runs in the veins of the parties. But while oppositor may have done an act that caused
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
69
Republic v
Cagandahan
Silverio v Republic
Republic v Kho
Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family
plaintiff to regret that she gave him life, such acts however, are not justifications of what she
prays from this Court.
An ungrateful act is not a ground to cancel a validly executed document, nor a reason to
strip a person of ones filiation. It may be a ground for disinheritance though. The
documents adduced on record are the best evidence of the parties relationship.
WON correction of
entries in her birth
certificate should be
granted.
Whether or not
Khos request for
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that
the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
70
Republic v Bolante
change
in the
details of their birth
certificate requires
an
adversarial
proceeding
Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the married status of
Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change the
date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship
and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were married alters
their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with significant implications on their
successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an
adversary proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as An Act
Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical
or Typographical Error In An Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
Register Without Need of Judicial Order, has been considered to lend
legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil
status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a
petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate
adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil
register is satisfied.
whether
or
not
respondent's bare
testimony,
unsupported by any
other evidence, is
sufficient to prove
that the change of
her name is not
resorted for illegal
purposes.
On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional
law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals for purposes of identification, and that changing one's name is a privilege and
not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either
his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. 12 Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds
to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid
confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
71
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.13
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of
what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court.
The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best
evidence available.14 What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to
borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of
the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the
event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged
in the courts."
In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in
order to avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground
under the afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the
less cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight.
Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is
not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police
clearance to the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements
of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact
that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the
declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further
fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition.
There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to
present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said petition is not resorted to for
purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused
by oppositor-appellant
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
72
73
Republic v
Bermudez-Lorino
were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the
erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express
provision of the law, the judgment was not appealable.
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at this level, the
hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the trial court had long become
final. Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law,
sets the tenor for cases scoured by these rules, to wit:
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall
be decided in an expeditions manner with out regards technical rules.
The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending
judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
74
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
75