Ynot vs. IAC [G.R. No.

74457, March 20, 1987]

Facts: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO 626-A.The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of asupersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and,
since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack
of authority and also for its presumed validity.
Issue: W/N the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation
of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution
Ruling: UNCONSITUTONAL.
The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and
property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of
its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved
for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs. ( IN RE: US VS.
TORIBIO)
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
(sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused
we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution
of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No.
626-A unconstitutional.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]

Facts: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition
for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52,
series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as
a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April
1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled
Issue: whether or not the statute or order is constitutional on the ground that the power shouldnt
have been delegated
Ruling: The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by
an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7
of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle
Pelaez vs. Auditor General [G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965]
Facts: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated
in the margin. Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted
the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and
2

void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial
board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation
of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated."
Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities
Issue: constitutionality of Eos
Ruling: UNCONSITUTIONAL. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is
"strictly a legislative function"
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a
statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond
the scope of his authority.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for
a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
APPARENT IN THE LANGUAGE (DELETION OF A PHRASE SHOULD THE PUBLIC
REQUIRE SO GETS WALA NA TALAGA SA EXECUTIVE KASI AMENDED NA NGA EH
BY DELETING THE PHRASE AFOREMENTIONED): The opening statement of said Section
1 of Act No. 1748 which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred
could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section
referred exclusively to the placet o which the seat of the government was to be transferred