Today is Saturday, July 30, 2016 Today is Saturday, July 30, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995

HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Zamboanga City,
respondent.
RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use
of maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). The petition reads:
1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City,
Philippines, and is duly represented in this act by her elder brother and attorney-in-fact, HADJI HASAN
S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special Power of Attorney, original copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof;
2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in accordance
with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but
sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center
Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites was officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain
Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
"B" to form an integral part hereof;
3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another
woman;
WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in
relation to Article 371 (2) of the New Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name
Hatima Centi y Saul.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as follows:
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance in accordance with
Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name
sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by
which the petitioner has been known (Ng Yao Siong v. Republic of the Philippines, L-20306, March 31,
1966, 16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25, 1977; Pabellar v. Republic,
L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary amendment of the petition within
one (1) week from receipt hereof so as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to. (Rollo, p. 9)
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule

103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the
dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083),
and after marriage of her former husband to another woman.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the ground that the petition is
substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of
name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's
maiden name and surname.
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to the instant
case.
In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others, contends:
5. . . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said petition is substantially one for change
of name, particularly of surname Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the latter being her maiden
name and surname. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of her marriage, and (2) her legal right to resume
the use of her maiden name and surname. In effect, if petition is granted, it will result in the resumption
of the use of her surname.
Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code). This is
the substantive requirements. And as to procedural requirements, no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority (Art. 376, Civil Code of the Philippines) (Emphasis supplied). Change
of name under judicial authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under
Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First
Instance of the province (now RTC) in which he resides, or in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court." The State has an interest in the names borne by individual and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. Therefore, before a
person can be authorized to change his name (given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry),
he must show proper or compelling reason, which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See: Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated, Vol. I, 8th Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former
desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply
with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a
petition for change of name.
The Court rules in the negative.
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v. Local Civil
Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956]; Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966]; Rendora v. Republic, 35
SCRA 262 [1970]; Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]).
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil
Register. Thus, this Court in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16 SCRA 483 [1966]), held:
In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to be
changed? By Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is,
that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real
name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons. A
name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community
when at variance with that entered in the civil register is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his
real name.
We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the
Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her
registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of
the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with

Muslim law.
Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as follows:
Art. 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance
with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the
spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Judicial decree ( faskh).
Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides:
Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become irrevocable, shall
have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage
in accordance with this Code;
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration
of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Under Article 187,
PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of Court and other existing laws, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws), shall be applied suppletorily.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after
annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is
permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
According to Tolentino:
. . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the use of
the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides
that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage. This is in consonance with
the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use only
her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband
in any of the ways provided by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724, 1983
ed.)
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by
prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first
name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer
exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use
of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373,
Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither
was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law

requires it.
In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner
before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her
former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance
with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or
rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the
onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial
confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a
specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by
competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of
civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it
is a right conferred by law.
While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and averment of concise
statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, nevertheless, giving it a most liberal
construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname on
grounds of her divorce from her former husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another woman.
The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of this case and would not serve the
public interest. We have consistently ruled that the remand of the case to a lower court for further reception of
evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the dispute on the basis of the records before it
(Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548 [1982]: Quisumbing v.
CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990 and August 10,
1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and surname.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Francisco, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., concurring:

From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in addressing him, he
identifies himself with this name, such that in his mind, he not only has a name but he is that name.
What's in a name?
A rose by any other name smells as sweet.
So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he decides to change it, the
law requires him to seek judicial permission to do so, even if it be merely to rectify an error committed in one's birth
or baptismal records, unless it be an innocuous clerical error. 6
On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an additional name is
the adoption by a woman who gets married of her husband's name. In certain cultures, this signifies her formal
joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the other, her acceptance therein.
Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the contracting of
marriage, or its breakup, the Civil Code has provided for each eventuality. For instance, Art. 370 gives a married
woman certain options with respect to the change of name reflective of the change of her civil status, without need

of recourse to judicial process:

It provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the mandatory "shall." Its
obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to, need not use her husband's surname. Clearly, no
law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to
resume the same even as she uses her husband's family name during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and
no fraudulent intent.
In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution laid down the basic
policy with respect to the standing of women and men in the eyes of the law, thus:
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded by law
and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To give substance and meaning to the
policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably
Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and
nation building. . . ."
Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to ambiguity or implied
from long-continued practice or custom, are now clearly granted to them, such as the right to "enter into contracts
which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstance," 7 equal membership in clubs, 8
admission to military schools, 9 voluntary PAG-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.

Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active collaboration of men,
should we refuse to recognize their right to the continued used of their (maiden) name and surname even after
marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor concession? Other than the bruising of the male ego, there can
hardly be any legal injury or damage resulting to personal, property or contractual rights of the husbands.
In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the Philippines, the use of
the title "Ms." to refer to women in general, whether single, married, widowed or separated, has gained acceptance.
Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the dissolution of the
matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the declaration of nullity of marriage or its
annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic dropping of said family name and the resumption of the use of
her maiden name. This is but in recognition of the change of her civil status from "married" to "unmarried." Such
right should not be begrudged her, whether her former husband contracts another union or not.
I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a Muslim like the
petitioner, is in the best position to understand the customs, mores and practices, as well as the feelings of the men
and women of his faith.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written ponencia. Allow me,
nonetheless, to express my views, in general, on the use of surnames by married women.
The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception involves a married
woman. When a woman marries, the law, or what I believe to be its intendment, would appear to mandate, in brief
outline, thusly
A. During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following names:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Notes:
(1) It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be somehow used.
Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law Center
(participated in by Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo Caguioa, Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos, Dean Fortunato Gupit and Dean Jose C. Vitug), a
proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and surname (after noting the provision of
Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the "fundamental equality before the law of
women and men") was turned down by the Committee.
(2) In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname employed before
the decree of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will revert to her maiden name
and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 357).
B. In the event of annulment of marriage
(1) If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and surname, but
(2) If the wife is the innocent party
(i) She may resume her maiden name and surname, or
(ii) She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless
(a) The court decrees otherwise, or
(b) She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code).
C. In case of death of the husband The widow may use her husband's surname (Art. 373, Civil
Code), or resume her maiden name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).
D. In case of divorce
The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's
surname (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and surname
(general rule).
Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment
where we would distinguish between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment) and
the instance when she is the innocent party.
E. In case of declaration of nullity of marriage No marriage having, or being deemed to have,
technically existed, the general rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name and surname, should
apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the husband's surname, she obviously should cease from
such use upon the finality of the decree of nullity.

Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J., concurring:
From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in addressing him, he
identifies himself with this name, such that in his mind, he not only has a name but he is that name.
Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the name his parents
have given him from birth. Recognizing the implications of confused identities, the law requires the registration of a

newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth reflective of his civil status. As a badge of identity, one's name is
protected by law from usurpation 1 or unauthorized or unlawful use by others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by law
from using different names and surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for business purposes provided this is
duly registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names or stage names, this must be done in good faith and there should
be no injury to third persons. 5 During elections, only votes bearing names registered by a candidate are to be counted in his
favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the poet who rhetorically asks:

What's in a name?
A rose by any other name smells as sweet.
So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he decides to change it, the
law requires him to seek judicial permission to do so, even if it be merely to rectify an error committed in one's birth
or baptismal records, unless it be an innocuous clerical error. 6
On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an additional name is
the adoption by a woman who gets married of her husband's name. In certain cultures, this signifies her formal
joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the other, her acceptance therein.
Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the contracting of
marriage, or its breakup, the Civil Code has provided for each eventuality. For instance, Art. 370 gives a married
woman certain options with respect to the change of name reflective of the change of her civil status, without need
of recourse to judicial process:
It provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the mandatory "shall." Its
obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to, need not use her husband's surname. Clearly, no
law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to
resume the same even as she uses her husband's family name during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and
no fraudulent intent.
In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution laid down the basic
policy with respect to the standing of women and men in the eyes of the law, thus:
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded by law
and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To give substance and meaning to the
policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably
Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and
nation building. . . ."
Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to ambiguity or implied
from long-continued practice or custom, are now clearly granted to them, such as the right to "enter into contracts
which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstance," 7 equal membership in clubs, 8
admission to military schools, 9 voluntary PAG-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.

Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active collaboration of men,
should we refuse to recognize their right to the continued used of their (maiden) name and surname even after
marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor concession? Other than the bruising of the male ego, there can
hardly be any legal injury or damage resulting to personal, property or contractual rights of the husbands.
In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the Philippines, the use of

the title "Ms." to refer to women in general, whether single, married, widowed or separated, has gained acceptance.
Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the dissolution of the
matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the declaration of nullity of marriage or its
annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic dropping of said family name and the resumption of the use of
her maiden name. This is but in recognition of the change of her civil status from "married" to "unmarried." Such
right should not be begrudged her, whether her former husband contracts another union or not.
I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a Muslim like the
petitioner, is in the best position to understand the customs, mores and practices, as well as the feelings of the men
and women of his faith.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written ponencia. Allow me,
nonetheless, to express my views, in general, on the use of surnames by married women.
The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception involves a married
woman. When a woman marries, the law, or what I believe to be its intendment, would appear to mandate, in brief
outline, thusly
A. During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following names:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Notes:
(1) It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be somehow used.
Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law Center
(participated in by Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo Caguioa, Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos, Dean Fortunato Gupit and Dean Jose C. Vitug), a
proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and surname (after noting the provision of
Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the "fundamental equality before the law of
women and men") was turned down by the Committee.
(2) In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname employed before
the decree of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will revert to her maiden name
and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 357).
B. In the event of annulment of marriage
(1) If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and surname, but
(2) If the wife is the innocent party
(i) She may resume her maiden name and surname, or
(ii) She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless
(a) The court decrees otherwise, or
(b) She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code).
C. In case of death of the husband The widow may use her husband's surname (Art. 373, Civil
Code), or resume her maiden name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).
D. In case of divorce
The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's
surname (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and surname
(general rule).

Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment
where we would distinguish between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment) and
the instance when she is the innocent party.
E. In case of declaration of nullity of marriage No marriage having, or being deemed to have,
technically existed, the general rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name and surname, should
apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the husband's surname, she obviously should cease from
such use upon the finality of the decree of nullity.
Footnotes
1 Art. 377, Civil Code.
2 Art. 378, Civil Code.
3 Art. 380, Civil Code.
4 Act No. 3883, as amended by Act No. 4147.
5 Art. 379, Civil Code.
6 Rule 103, Rules of Court.
7 Rep. Act No. 7192, Sec. 5.
8 Ibid., Sec. 6.
9 Ibid., Sec. 7.
10 Ibid., Sec. 8.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by
the name his parents have given him from birth. Recognizing the implications of confused identities,
the law requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth reflective of
his civil status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from usurpation 1 or unauthorized
or unlawful use by others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by law from using different names and surnames. 3 An alias
or assumed name may be used for business purposes provided this is duly registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen
names or stage names, this must be done in good faith and there should be no injury to third persons. 5 During elections,
only votes bearing names registered by a candidate are to be counted in his favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with
the poet who rhetorically asks:

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1351. September 3, 1998]

SARAH B. VEDAA, complainant, vs. JUDGE EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA, respondent.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Respondent Judge Eudarlio B. Valencia, Presiding Judge of Branch 222 (Quezon City) of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, was charged with gross misconduct and immoral acts by
complainant Sarah B. Vedaa in a sworn letter dated 15 May 1996 addressed to the Chief Justice through then
Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis.
Complainant serves as the court interpreter in respondent's court, and at the same time, is distantly
related to respondent as their maternal grandmothers are first cousins.
Complainant narrated the factual basis of her charge thus:
On May 8, 1996 on or about 2:00 p.m. before the start of the scheduled hearing of cases, the undersigned
complainant in her capacity as a court employee, being a Court Interpreter knocked at the door of the
chamber of the respondent, opened the door to inform the respondent that the cases scheduled for hearing are
ready. At this juncture, respondent directed the undersigned to come in said chamber. Being a subordinate
and thinking that instructions will be given, I did [sic] complied and went inside the chamber. When I was
standing beside his table awaiting for instructions, respondent held my hands. Bearing in mind that the
respondent is a relative and the holding of my hand was without malice, I did not make any reaction. It was
only when my hand was held for quite sometime and sensing ulterior motive, I pulled my hand. Respondent
stood up from his chair, hugged me and tried to kiss me on the lips which I was able to evade and his lips
landed on my cheek.
Feeling totally shocked by the actuation of the respondent and considering that he is a relative, I ran out from
the chamber and went to my office table to have a relief [sic]. With the dastardly acts committed in the person
of the herein complainant that caused mental anguish, a request was made on my co-employee, Mr. Eduard
Lorenzo to take my place in the court hearing.
In the resolution of 15 July 1996, we required respondent to comment on the complaint and, upon
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, placed him under preventive suspension and
referred the case to Associate Justice Delilah V. Magtolis of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On 13 August 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of his preventive suspension
and asked to have it lifted as he was entitled to: (a) the presumption of innocence against a false and
fabricated administrative complaint; and (b) due process of law. Moreover, the lifting of [the] suspension
order will not affect the impartial investigation of [the] case; and the suspension order will create a false
impression of guilt.
On 15 August 1996, respondent filed his Comment (cum Motion to Dismiss) wherein, as his defense, he

alleged that: (a) the commission of the alleged misconduct is inherently and highly improbable; and (b) the
complaint is motivated by [a] personal grudge. He then prayed once more that the suspension order be lifted.
In the resolution of 2 September 1996, we noted the motion for reconsideration and referred the
comment to the designated investigating Justice, Mme. Justice Magtolis, who was directed to conduct the
investigation and submit her report and recommendation within ninety (90) days.
On 19 September 1996, complainant filed her reply to respondents comment. She asserted that the denial
of respondent could not prevail over her clear and positive assertion and that she could have never been
motivated by a personal grudge; if, indeed, respondent had not committed the imputed acts, he would not
have requested immediate common relatives, such as the Mayor of Masbate, together with Fiscal Narciso
Resero, Jr., to mediate and seek her forgiveness.
On 7 October 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Second Motion to Lift Indefinite Preventive Suspension.
On 14 October 1996, we granted the inhibition of Mme. Justice Magtolis because her daughter and
respondents son were batchmates in law school and re-assigned the case to Mme. Justice Portia A.
Hormachuelos for investigation, report and recommendation. However, the latter requested that she be
allowed to inhibit herself to avoid being "misinterpreted" in view of her recommendation in another case
involving sexual harassment by a judge which resulted in the latter's dismissal from the service. On 22
January 1997, we granted the request and designated Mr. Justice Romeo A. Brawner of the Court of Appeals
the investigating Justice.
On 7 March 1997, we required Mr. Justice Brawner to furnish a report and recommendation on
respondents Urgent Second Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension; and in his Report and Recommendation
filed on 2 April 1997, Justice Brawner recommended that the motion be granted.
On 28 April 1997, we approved Justice Brawner's recommendation and lifted respondent's preventive
suspension.
Justice Brawner conducted hearings and received the evidence for the parties. Thereafter, on 13 May
1998, he submitted his Report and Recommendation, wherein he disclosed that the tedious hearing[s] starting
on March 5, 1997 and ending on December 10, 1997 piled up 2,432 pages of transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the eleven (11) trial dates when complainant and her witnesses Marife Opulencia, Joselito
Bacolod and Vife Legaspi, and respondent and his witnesses Bernardo Mortel and Neri G. Loi testified; and
made the following findings of fact and conclusions:
The complainant is the Court Interpreter while the respondent is the Presiding Judge, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 222 at Quezon City.
On May 8, 1996 at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, as was her want to do, the complainant went to the
respondent Judges chamber to inform him that the cases were ready for trial. She knocked on the door and
upon being told to enter, she poked her head inside the room and told the respondent that the parties were all
present. The respondent however, called her inside the chamber and bidding to the request, she went in and
stood beside his table. The respondent then held her right hand and tried to kiss her on the lips. However, she
evaded the kiss and it landed on her cheek. The respondent then held her left breast. In her struggle to beak
free of the respondents hold, the pen she held in her hand fell to the floor. She was able to free herself, hence
she picked up the pen and left the room in a hurry. No one was in the staff room when she went out and she
went straight to the courtroom to perform her duties as Court Interpreter. The rest of the staff were already at
their respective stations awaiting the Judges entrance. Feeling shocked at what happened, the complainant
approached Eduardo Lorenzo who was then on apprenticeship training in the court and asked him to help her
do the interpreting just in case the need would arise. Eduardo Lorenzo acceded to her request. The
complainant, however, remained in the courtroom during the entire session except for a few minutes when
she went out to the staff room to get a needed record.

During the whole time that she was inside the courtroom, the complainant never revealed what happened.
When the court session was over however at around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, she approached the court
stenographer, Vife Legaspi, and asked her if she was going somewhere. Receiving a negative answer, the
complainant requested her to accompany her (complainant) to Shoemart Shopping Mall (SM). They took a
cab and while inside and on their way to SM, the complainant could not hold it any longer and the dam
broke. The complainant was hysterical, trembling and crying at the same time when she told Vife Legaspi
that something terrible happened. She narrated what the respondent Judge did to her inside the chamber.
Upon reaching SM, the two ladies stayed at a fast food restaurant where they sat conversing for around 3
hours on what the complainant should do about the incident.
While at SM, the complainant called her best friend and classmate at the Manuel Luis Quezon University
College of Law, Marife Opulencia.
Marife Opulencia recalls receiving a call from the complainant at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of May
8, 1996. She was then in her office working overtime when a distraught complainant who could hardly speak
called her up. She then told the complainant to calm down, take a deep breath and relate what happened.
Crying over the phone, the complainant narrated what the respondent Judge did to her. Marife Opulencia
advised the complainant to go home to her parents and tell them what happened as it was a family matter, the
respondent Judge being a distant relative of the complainant.
The complainant then went home to Dagupan City and informed her parents who were both shocked at what
happened considering that the respondent Judge was a distant relative on complainants maternal side and a
colleague, complainants father being a Judge in Dagupan City.
The following day, May 9, 1996, the complainants mother went with her back to Manila as the former wanted
to talk to the respondent Judge about what happened. However, that day was the sports festival of the RTCs
in Quezon City and thus it was not a working day. The respondent Judge was not around and hence there was
no occasion for complainants mother to talk to him.
Because of the incident, the complainant could not face going back to work at Branch 222 and hence she
went on leave from May 10, to June 10, 1996. She subsequently requested that she be detailed elsewhere,
which letter-request, although citing a different cause for the detail, was approved and thus she was detailed
in the office of Judge Amelia R. Andrade of the RTC, Branch 5 in Manila.
Wanting the respondent Judge to face sanction[s] for his unbecoming behavior, the complainant instituted the
present charges for Gross Misconduct and Immoral Acts.
In her complaint, complainant stated that the respondent Judge made attempts to try to dissuade her from
continuing with her charges. She presented a common relative, Joselito Bacolod, to prove this.
Joselito Bacolod testified that respondent Judge is a grandson of his mother while complainant is his niece,
complainants mother being his older sister. Sometime during the last week of June, 1996, the respondent
Judge paid a visit to Joselito Bacolods mother. His mother then called for him and his elder brother. The
respondent Judge then requested all of them to go to Dagupan City and try to persuade the complainant and
her parents to drop the case against him as he was retiring from the service in two years time. When asked
why he would do such a thing to a relative, the respondent Judge stated that it was only a fatherly kiss and
besides, it was complainants hair that he kissed as her perfume smelled good. The respondent Judge gave
Joselito Bacolod P1,000.00 for the use of his taxi to go to Dagupan City.
Respondent Judge absolutely denied all charges against him. He categorically asserted that on that day at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon, he was inside his chamber waiting to be called if the cases were ready. The

complainant then came and knocked on his door and entered informing him that the cases were ready for
trial. He then prepared himself and stood up and got his robe which was hanging on the wall and as soon as
the complainant went out of his chamber, he followed, entered the courtroom and heard the cases that day.
He recalls that the complainant applied and was appointed as Court Stenographer in 1995 but she never did
any courtroom duty as such causing him to believe that she was not proficient at stenography. She then
transferred to the position of Court Interpreter sometime in October, 1995.
The respondent admits that indeed he and the complainant are distant relatives as their maternal
grandmothers are first cousins and that they visit each others families.
The respondent further declares that the complainant came to him and requested that she be detailed
somewhere near Manuel Luis Quezon University where she is a law student as she has difficulty commuting
from the office to school. However, the respondent did not agree to a detail as the position would not be
vacant and his court would be without an Interpreter. He did agree to a transfer so he could fill in the vacancy
and not unduly paralyze the operations of his office.
As he denied the request for detail, he surmised that this might have prompted the complainant to file this
false and malicious charges [sic] against him.
The complainant did not report for work after May 8, 1996 and he was informed by the Clerk of Court that
she was on leave until June 10, 1996. However, after the said date, the complainant did not yet put in an
appearance so he recommended that she be declared absent without official leave (AWOL).
He only found out about the case against him on August 9, 1996 when he was required by the Supreme Court
to comment on the complaint at the same time putting him on preventive suspension.
Coming to his defense are two of his staff, Bernardo Mortel, the Process Server and Neri G. Loi, the Sheriff
IV. Both executive an affidavit stating that because the Chambers door remained open, we saw Ms. Sarah
Vedana and the Judge conversing and we did not see any untoward incident happening inside the chamber,
much less the Judge allegedly hugging and kissing Ms. Sarah Vedana (Joint Affidavit, Exhibit 23). Further,
both claimed that they voluntarily executed the affidavit without any prodding nor pressure from the
respondent.
With these facts presented, the Investigating Justice has thoroughly sifted through the voluminous transcript
of records to separate the material from the immaterial facts, the true [sic] from the fiction. Amidst all the
complainants assertions and the respondents counter-statements, one thing stands out: that the incident did
happen the way the complainant said it be [sic].
First, the complainant narrated her story complete with details. She narrated basically the same story without
any change to her best friend and to the stenographer as soon as she was able to. Although the respondent
questions the time lapse between the actual happening of the incident to the time the complainant narrated her
story to the stenographer, this cannot be taken against her. She was aware that she had duties to attend to
considering the absence of the Clerk of Court and the Legal Researcher. She could not have left right after the
incident nor go blurting it out as there were cases ready for trial. Thus, as soon as it was possible, she
revealed it to the stenographer, Vife Legaspi, who claimed that the complainant was hysterical, crying and
angry at the time that she relayed the incident. She did not even wait for them to reach their destination as she
vent [sic] it out during their taxi ride to SM.
Again when she called her friend Marife Opulencia, the latter manifested that she was crying and was not
able to talk such that she (Marife) advised her to take a deep breath and calm down. If it is true that she was
just making up the story, then she must have been the consummate actress as she could even fake her

emotions and her hysteria.

Second, the respondent claims that the reason for the filing of the charges against him is his refusal to grant
complainants request that she be detailed in some other office nearer her school. There is something wrong
with this reasoning. The complainant lodged her complaint against the respondent on May 15, 1996 with the
Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. Subsequently because of what happened, she could
no longer report back to her workplace and hence she made the letter-request asking that she be detailed
elsewhere using the difficulty of commuting as her excuse. The respondent Judge recommended the denial of
the request in his 2nd Indorsement dated July 18, 1996, which is more than 2 months after the incident on
May 8, 1996.
If we follow the reasoning of the respondent that the charges were an offshoot of the denial of complainants
request, how come the denial came long after the incident happened and long after the charges were already
filed? It would appear that the complainant is psychic as she knew her request would be denied and so to get
even, she filed the complaint way ahead of the yet-to-come denial. The respondent Judges reasoning defies
logic.
Third, both complainant and respondent agree that they are distant relatives who maintain friendly and close
relations and who exchange favors with each other. Filipino families are close-knit and would rather keep
skeletons in the closet than air dirty linen in public. However, in this instance, complainant disregarded the
close family ties, disregarded the relationship and went on to denounce the respondent for his act. Why would
she go to the extent of breaking up friendly relations between relatives for no apparent reason? Unless, of
course, that her charges against the respondent are true that she feels she has to right a wrong against her
committed by the very person who she should look up to as her protector.
Her act of revealing what happened to her despite the tension it may create between their families, despite the
break-up of family relations, bespeaks the truth that indeed the respondent Judge committed such a dastardly
act upon her person.
Amidst this unfazed accusation hurdled against the respondent, he denies it all. But his denial is a feeble
attempt to exculpate him from the wrongdoing he is accused of. The clear assertion of the complainant and
that of her witnesses prevails over the denial of the respondent.
What must have possessed the respondent Judge to commit such an act against his very own relative is
difficult to comprehend. Was his lust too great that he would take it out on his helpless female relative in the
hope that being a relative, it would not leak out as some things are better kept within the family? He did not
reckon that the complainant would defy family relations and bare all if only to put a stop to respondents
shenanigan [sic], isolated though it may be.
Being a person cloaked with authority to uphold the law, the respondent Judge should be the first to be
circumspect in his behavior. As held in Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. V.[sic] Tapucar, 102 SCRA
494:
The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be beyond reproach and above
suspicion. The faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice cannot be maintained if a
Judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely
continues to commit an affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a
necessity in the Judiciary. x x x
This Investigation [sic] Justice believes that based on the facts and the law, the respondent Judge should be
meted out a punishment.

Justice Brawner then recommended:

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent GUILTY of the complaint [sic] filed against him, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that respondent Judge EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA be suspended from office for
sixty (60) days without pay.
The main issue in this case is factual and depends on the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, a
function which is primarily lodged in the investigating Justice. The rule which concedes due respect, and
even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases where
preponderance of evidence[1] and proof beyond reasonable doubt,[2] respectively, are required, applies, a
fortiori, in administrative cases where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.[3] The trial
judge is in a better position to determine whether the witnesses are telling the truth or lying considering that
the latter are in his immediate presence and can thus hear the witnesses themselves and observe their
deportment and manner of testifying. Unless it be shown that the judge has plainly overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if otherwise taken
into account, would alter the result, or it be clearly shown to be arbitrary, his evaluation of the credibility of a
witness should be upheld.[4] We find no room to accommodate the exception to the rule in the case of Justice
Brawner's assessment, which we find to be a meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the
complainant, the respondent and their respective witnesses.
While we concur, without reservation, with Justice Brawners factual findings, we are, however, unable to
adopt his recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed, which we find too light in view of the gravity,
nature and import of the offense as to complainant and the Judiciary.
It is truly beyond us what possessed respondent Judge to commit acts which may be deemed deplorable,
to say the least, against complainant, who, although a distant relative in legal contemplation, was from a
family with whom respondent admittedly maintained friendly and close relations. If this were a criminal
prosecution and assuming that the procedural and evidentiary requirements had been complied with,
respondent would be found guilty of, at least, unjust vexation, as defined by and penalized in Article 287 of
the Revised Penal Code.
As it stands, respondents violation of complainants personhood, coupled with his being a public official,
holding a position in the Judiciary and specifically entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice,
breached Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
mandate, respectively, that "a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities,"
and that "a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach." These most exacting standards of decorum are demanded from magistrates if
only, in the language of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to "promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in Castillo v. Calanog[5]thus:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals.
The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life
can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence: Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a
judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.[6]
Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual
than a seat on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol
of government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial court judges are those directly
in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which the Judiciary is bound to serve.
Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for
the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
epitome of integrity and justice.[7] In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our
democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.
That the acts complained of were committed within respondent's sanctum in his court and without any
third party to witness the commission likewise compounded the reprehensible nature of respondent's
malfeasance. By daring to violate complainant within the sanctity and secrecy of his chambers, respondent
did the utmost violence to complainant within a place which, properly viewed, is an integral part of a temple
of justice -- in his court.
Respondent judge likewise violated Canon 22 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which exhorts a judge to be
"studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example
to others." In De la Paz v. Inutan,[8] we held that the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more
importantly, of justice. From him, people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an
intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests. Thus, for the judge to earn and reciprocate the
respect, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. As such, he
should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.
Indeed, when a judge himself becomes a transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply in
appropriate cases before him, or before any court for that matter, as where he commits any crime punished by
the Revised Penal Code or special laws, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law
and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary itself, as well as the legal system.
Before closing, it is apropos to discuss the implications of the enactment of R.A. No. 7877[9] or the AntiSexual Harassment Law to the Judiciary. Under our system of governance, the very tenets of our republican
democracy presuppose that the will of the people is expressed, in large part, through the statutes passed by
the Legislature. Thus, the Court, in instances such as these, may take judicial notice of the heightened
sensitivity of the people to gender-related issues as manifested through legislative issuances. It would not be
remiss to point out that no less than the Constitution itself has expressly recognized the invaluable
contributions of the womens sector to national development,[10] thus the need to provide women with a
working environment conducive to productivity and befitting their dignity.[11]
In the community of nations, there was a time when discrimination was institutionalized through the
legalization of now prohibited practices. Indeed, even within this century, persons were discriminated against
merely because of gender, creed or the color of their skin, to the extent that the validity of human beings
being treated as mere chattel was judicially upheld in other jurisdictions. But in humanitys march towards a
more refined sense of civilization, the law has stepped in and seen it fit to condemn this type of conduct for,
at bottom, history reveals that the moving force of civilization has been to realize and secure a more humane
existence. Ultimately, this is what humanity as a whole seeks to attain as we strive for a better quality of life
or higher standard of living. Thus, in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of sexual harassment or hazing,[12] acts previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal. In disciplining erring judges and personnel of the Judiciary then, this Court
can do no less.

Plainly, respondent's conduct against complainant, a woman young enough to be his daughter or niece,
violated numerous Canons of judicial decorum. Respondents indiscretions may be deemed, for the lack of
more forceful and emphatic words, grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of the Judiciary and
conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service. The penalty of suspension from office, without pay, for
one (1) year is in order, this being his first offense.
If only to underscore respondents temerity, he even attempted to insult the intelligence of this Court and
its Members by claiming ill motive on the part of complainant in filing this suit, but the folly of his charge
was so readily exposed by Justice Brawner.
WHEREFORE, for violations of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 3 and 22 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct becoming an officer of the Judiciary and
conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, respondent Judge EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA,
Presiding Judge, Branch 222 (Quezon City), National Capital Judicial Region, is SUSPENDED from the
office, without pay, for ONE (1) YEAR, with the period of preventive suspension he has thus served so far
being credited to him in the service of said penalty.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, and Panganiban JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., no part.
[1] Sec. 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
[2] Sec. 2, id., id.
[3] Sec. 5, id., id.
[4] People v. Pama, 216 SCRA 385 [1992]; People v. Taneo, 218 SCRA 494 [1993]; People v. Jumamoy, 221 SCRA 339 [1993];
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 649 [1993]; People v. Quijada, 223 SCRA 77 [1993].
[5] 199 SCRA 75, 83 [1991].
[6] See also Junio v. Rivera, Jr., 225 SCRA 688, 706 [1993]; Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690, 697 [1994].
[7] Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27, 31 [1974]; Dia-Aonuevo v. Beracio, 68 SCRA 81, 89 [1975]; Association of Court Employees
of Panabo, Davao v. Tupas, 175 SCRA 292, 296 [1989]; National Intelligence and Security Authority v. Tablang, 199 SCRA 766, 776
[1991]; Imbing v. Tiongson, supra note 6.
[8] 64 SCRA 540, 548-549 [1975].
[9] An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment, Education or Training Environment, and for Other Purposes,
approved 14 February 1995, 91 O.G. No. 15 2144.
[10] Art. II, Section 14, which reads: The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
[11] Art. XIII, Section 14 provides: The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking
into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize
their full potential in the service of the nation.
[12] R.A. No. 8049, An Act Regulating Hazing and Other Forms of Initiation Rites in Fraternities, Sororities and Organizations and
Providing Penalties Therefor, approved 7 June 1995, 91 O.G. No. 33, 5204.

A.T. v Hungary (Communication No. 2/2003)

1) Reference Details
Jurisdiction: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women
Date of Decision: 26 January 2005
Link to full case: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/decisionsviews/CEDAW%20Decision%20on%20AT%20vs%20Hungary%20English.pdf
2) Facts
The author alleged that she had been subjected to regular severe domestic violence and
treatment by her common law husband and the father of her two children (L.F.) from
1998 onwards, even after he left the couple's family home. Although L.F. had allegedly
threatened to kill the author and rape the children, the author did not go to a shelter
because one of her children is severely brain-damaged and reportedly no shelter in the
country is equipped to take in a fully disabled child together with their mother and
sister. The author reported several incidents when she was beaten severely, including
one incident after which she was hospitalised for one week. In proceedings regarding
L.F.s access to the family home, following the authors decision to change the locks to
prevent him from gaining access, the Pest District Court found in his favour, and the
decision was upheld by Budapest Regional Court when she appealed. She filed for
division of the jointly owned property and instituted criminal proceedings against L.F.
but these were still pending by the date of her initial submission on 10 October 2003.
3) Law

UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women, articles 2(a), 2(b), 2(e), 5 and 16.

4) Legal Arguments
The Author
The author alleged that Hungary failed to provide effective protection from her former
common law husband, neglecting its positive obligations under the Convention and
supporting the continuation of a situation of domestic violence against her. She argued
that the lengthy criminal procedures against L.F., the lack of protection orders or
restraining orders under current Hungarian law and the fact that L.F. has not spent any
time in custody constitute violations of her rights under the Convention as well as
violations of general recommendation 19 of the Committee. She also called for the
introduction of effective and immediate protection for victims of domestic violence into
the legal system; provision of training programmes on gender-sensitivity, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the
Optional Protocol, including for judges, prosecutors, police and practising lawyers; and
provision of free legal aid to victims of gender-based violence, including domestic
violence.
The author maintained that she had exhausted all available domestic remedies, and that
although most of the incidents complained of took place prior to March 2001 when the
Optional Protocol entered into force in Hungary, they constituted elements of regular
domestic violence which continued to put her life in danger. She alleged that one serious
violent act took place, in July 2001, after the Optional Protocol came into force in the

country. The author also claims that Hungary has been bound by the Convention since
becoming party to it in 1982, yet has in effect assisted in the continuation of violence.
She also requested effective interim measures in accordance with article 5(1) of the
Optional Protocol in order to avoid possible irreparable damage to her person. She
noted that despite the Committees note verbally requesting the State party to provide
immediate, appropriate and concrete preventive interim measures she had not heard
from any authority concerning the provision of immediate and effective protection in
accordance with the Committees request.
The State
The State party did not raise any preliminary objections regarding the admissibility of
the communication, despite maintaining that the author did not make effective use of all
available domestic remedies. The State party conceded that these remedies were not
capable of providing immediate protection to the author from ill-treatment by her
former partner, but argued that it had in 2003 instituted a comprehensive action
programme against domestic violence.
5) Decision
The Committee opined that a delay of over three years in legal proceedings from the
dates of the incidents in question amounted to an unreasonably prolonged delay within
the meaning of article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol, particularly considering that the
author has been at risk of irreparable harm and received threats to her life during that
period. The Committee also took account of the fact that she had no possibility of
obtaining temporary protection while criminal proceedings were in progress and that
the defendant had at no time been detained.
The Committee decided to hear the communication in its entirety, considering that the
facts that were the subject of the communication covered the alleged lack of protection
on the part of the State for the series of severe incidents of battering and threats of
further violence from 1998 to the time of the decision. When addressing the merits of
the communication, the Committee referred to its general recommendation No. 19 on
violence against women which states that "States may also be responsible for private acts
if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and
punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation". On this basis the Committee
decided that Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations and had thereby violated the
rights of the author under article 2(a), (b) and (e) and article 5(a) in conjunction with
article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women.
In reaching its decision, the Committee referred to the State partys admission that the
remedies available to the author at the time could not provide her immediate relief from
the abuse, and that domestic violence cases did not enjoy high priority in court
proceedings, opining that womans human rights to life should not be superseded by
other rights such as the right to property. Concerning the author, the Committee
recommended that the State take immediate and effective measures to guarantee the
physical and mental integrity of her and her family and ensure that she was given a safe
home, received appropriate child support and legal assistance as well as proportionate
reparation. The Committee also made a number of general recommendations for the
State, including assuring victims of domestic violence the maximum protection of the
law by acting with due diligence to prevent and respond to such violence against
women; providing training on the Convention and the Optional Protocol to legal

professionals; and ensuring that the national strategy for the prevention and effective
treatment of violence within the family is promptly implemented and evaluated.

Concepcion vs CA
Concepcion vs. CA
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in
December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on
December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a
certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and
living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was
awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in
the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further
wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since
an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court
reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a
legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
HELD:

Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers
husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to
have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with
Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.
Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code,
the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the
presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right
to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames.
Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is
not related to him in any way.

Gender stereotyping in rape trial a violation of CEDAW (Karen Tayag

Vertido v. The Philippines)
In 1996, Karen Tayag Vertido worked as Executive Director of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and
Industry in the Philippines. She filed a complaint against the then President of the Chamber, Jose B.
Custodio, accusing him of raping her. She alleged that the accused offered her a lift home following a
business meeting one evening and that, instead, raped her in a nearby hotel.
In April 2005, after the case had languished in the trial court for eight years, Judge Virginia HofileaEuropa acquitted the accused of raping Ms Vertido, citing insufficient evidence to prove beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence charged. Her Honour based her decision to
acquit on a number of guiding principles from other rape cases and her unfavourable assessment of the
Ms Vertidos testimony based, among other things, on her failure to take advantage of perceived
opportunities to escape from the accused.
Ms Vertido subsequently submitted a communication to the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee). She alleged that the acquittal of Mr Custodio
breached the right to non-discrimination, the right to an effective remedy, and the freedom from wrongful
gender stereotyping, in violation of articles 2(c), 2(d), 2(f) and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
In her communication, Ms Vertido claimed that the trial judges decision had no basis in law or fact, but
was grounded in gender-based myths and misconceptions about rape and rape victims without which
the accused would have been convicted. She further claimed that a decision grounded in gender-based
myths and misconceptions or one rendered in bad faith can hardly be considered as one rendered by a
fair, impartial and competent tribunal, and that the Philippines had failed in its obligation to ensure that
women are protected against discrimination by public authorities, including the judiciary.
The Philippines observations on admissibility
The Philippines contested the admissibility of the communication on the basis that Ms Vertido had failed
to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Optional Protocol). It claimed that Ms
Vertido had failed to avail herself of the special remedy of certiorari.
Ms Vertidos comments on the Philippines observations
Ms Vertido countered that she was not required to exhaust the remedy of certiorari, as it could only be
sought by the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. In addition,

she submitted that, even if the remedy were available to her, it would have been ineffective in redressing
her particular complaint of discrimination.
CEDAW Committees admissibility decision
The CEDAW Committee declared the communication admissible, dismissing the suggestion made by the
Philippines that Ms Vertido was required by article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol to exhaust the remedy of
certiorari.
Views
The CEDAW Committee concluded that, in failing to end discriminatory gender stereotyping in the legal
process, the Philippines had violated articles (2)(c) and 2(f) of CEDAW, and article 5(a) read in
conjunction with article 1 and General Recommendation No. 19 (violence against women). The
Committee declined to consider whether or not article 2(d) had been violated, finding that it was less
relevant to the case than the other articles alleged to have been violated.
Committee member Ms Yoko Hayashi issued a separate, concurring opinion.
Right to an effective remedy (art. 2(c))
The CEDAW Committee affirmed that implicit in CEDAW and, in particular article 2(c), is the right to an
effective remedy. It explained that for a remedy to be effective, adjudication of a case involving rape and
sexual offenses claims should be dealt with in a fair, impartial, timely and expeditious manner.
The Committee determined that the Philippines had failed to comply with its obligation to ensure Ms
Vertidos right to an effective remedy. It noted that her case had languished in the trial court for
approximately eight years before a decision was made to acquit the accused and that, consequently, it
could not be said that Ms Vertidos allegation of rape had been dealt with in a fair, impartial, timely and
expeditious manner.
Freedom from Wrongful Gender Stereotyping (arts. 2(f) and 5(a))
In finding violations of articles 2(f) and 5(a), the Committee affirmed that CEDAW requires States Parties
to take appropriate measures to modify or abolish not only existing laws and regulations, but also
customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women. It also stressed that
stereotyping affects womens right to a fair and just trial and that the judiciary must take caution not to
create inflexible standards of what women or girls should be or . . . have done when confronted with a
situation of rape based merely on preconceived notions of what defines a rape victim.

The majority determined that the trial judge had expected a certain stereotypical behaviour from the
author and formed a negative view of her creditability because she had not behaved accordingly. It went
on to say that the trial judges decision contained several references to stereotypes about male and female
sexuality being more supportive for the credibility of the alleged perpetrator than for the creditability of
the victim.
Recommendations
Having found violations of articles (2)(c), 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee called on the
Philippines to provide appropriate compensation to Ms Vertido. It also made a number of general
recommendations aimed at redressing the systemic nature of many of the violations. These included
taking effective steps to ensure that decisions in sexual assault cases are impartial and fair and not
affected by prejudices or stereotypes.
Communication No. 18/2008, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (22 September 2010)
Decision