Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393.

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together

with others, was charged with libel by the then president
Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against
him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity
from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a
president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue
then the president would allow herself to be placed under the
courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to
be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for
herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by
Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents
behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in
which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. Manila,
G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967
FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760. There was the assertion of its being
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that
in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law,
no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable
and violative of due process insofar as it would impose fees per
annum for motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel (OMKA) , motel, or lodging house to
refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the

address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of

stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with
data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed
his signature in the presence of OMKA
That the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted
in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making
it unlawful for the OMKA of such establishments to lease any
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and
for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and
that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the
challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause
the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party,
in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its
investments, there is once again a transgression of the due
process clause.
In the answer, after setting forth that the petition did fail to
state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears
a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power.
The trial court ruled based on evidence or the lack of it, on the
authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to
the conclusion that the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 would
be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violates
the due process clause.
HELD: The validity of the ordinance must be upheld.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF. An
ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who must, in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality or city and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate
action, must be presumed to be valid and should not be set
aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights
under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the
ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut
its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no
factual foundation laid for overthrowing Ord. No. 4760 of
Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality
must
prevail.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption
of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not
the case here. No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of

validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance

set aside
POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila is a manifestation of a police power measure
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such it is
immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers
extending as it does to all the great public needs.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. The explanatory note included as annex to the
stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate
of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in
great part to the existence of motels, which provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and
exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill
seekers.
LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be
classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or
regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of nonuseful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes
only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the
police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from
the power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount of
license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide
discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the wellknown legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons
who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of
course, generally an important factor in the determination of
the amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone
[1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license
fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for both hotels
and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter,
first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and
second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. this Court affirmed the
doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court
that taxation may be made to implement the states police
power.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. The provision
in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila making it unlawful
for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common
inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases
full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as
transgression against the command of due process. The
prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because

there appears a correspondence between the undeniable

existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct
amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.
International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R.
No. 128845, June 1, 2000.
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the
local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry
discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more
than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the
point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay
for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this
jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental
notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for
short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of
the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own
teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such
personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have
been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests
to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as
a foreign-hire or a local hire: 1. What is one's domicile? 2.
Where is one's home economy? 3. To which country does one
owe economic allegiance? 4. Was the individual hired abroad
specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? The
School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded localhires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs,
taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also
paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than localhires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure,
namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement
were held on June 1995, petitioner International School
Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
parties.

On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The

failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to
bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over
the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary,
Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity
and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE
Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated
March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed
by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: WoN the schools act unconstitutional?
HELD: The petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is
hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the
practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher
salaries than local-hires.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon
by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female
employee as against a male employee for work of equal value.
Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization. The School
cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their
domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without
violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
The court said that: "salary" means a recompense or
consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in
another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium,"
or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it
carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for
services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full
protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital. These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should
such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public
policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates
of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the

School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes

public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of
this Court.
The court agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to
the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. A bargaining
unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised
of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent
with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to
serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law." It does not appear
that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining.
The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires
have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure.
Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the
same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are
accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These
benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to
their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the
former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining
unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise
of their respective collective bargaining rights.
Ayer Productions v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861.
international release, the historic peaceful struggle of
the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion pictureentitled
"The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and
other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his
approval
of
the
intended
film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television
play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional
characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background. David Williamson is
Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University
of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed
a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name,
or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation. Petitioners acceded to this demand
and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie
production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family
and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff
which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked
resemblance
to
Enrile.
Hence
the
appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE,

and the Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court

granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE.
The limited Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court
on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining
unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge's Order
of 16 March 1988 and made PERMANENT, and
b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March
1988 and 4 April 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, the
Court, in the exercise of its plenary and supervisory jurisdiction,
hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case
No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET ASIDE and DISSOLVE his
Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988 and any
Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued by him. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to
film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such
motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through
television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production
of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to
yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom
of
speech
and
of
expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and
hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any
right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and
concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the
history
of
the
country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events,
clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were
taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures
were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to
privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms
of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be
fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
Among the 21 historical markers and 17 monuments
surrounding the Texas State Capitol is a 6-foot-high monolith
inscribed with the Ten Commandments. The legislative record
illustrates that, after accepting the monument from the
Fraternal Order of Eaglesa national social, civic, and patriotic
organizationthe State selected a site for it based on the
recommendation of the state organization that maintains the
capitol grounds. Petitioner, an Austin resident who encounters

the monument during his frequent visits to those grounds,

brought this 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit seeking a declaration that the
monuments placement violates the First Amendments
Establishment Clause and an injunction requiring its removal.
Holding that the monument did not contravene the Clause, the
District Court found that the State had a valid secular purpose
in recognizing and commending the Eagles for their efforts to
reduce juvenile delinquency, and that a reasonable observer,
mindful of history, purpose, and context, would not conclude
that this passive monument conveyed the message that the
State endorsed religion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
HELD: The judgment is affirmed.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Thomas, concluded that the Establishment Clause
allows the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds.
Reconciling the strong role played by religion and religious
traditions throughout our Nations history, see School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212213, with
the principle that governmental intervention in religious
matters can itself endanger religious freedom requires that
the Court neither abdicate its responsibility to maintain a
division between church and state nor evince a hostility to
religion, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313314. While
the Court has sometimes pointed to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, for the governing test, Lemon is not useful in dealing
with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on
its capitol grounds. Instead, the analysis should be driven by
both the monuments nature and the Nations history. From
at least 1789, there has been an unbroken history of official
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of
religions role in American life. Lynch v.Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
674. Texas display of the Commandments on government
property is typical of such acknowledgments. Representations
of the Commandments appear throughout this Court and its
grounds, as well as the Nations Capital. Moreover, the Courts
opinions, like its building, have recognized the role the
Decalogue
plays
in
Americas
heritage.
See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442, 462. While
the Commandments are religious, they have an undeniable
historical meaning. Simply having religious content or
promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does
not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g.,
Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, at 680, 687. There are, of course,
limits to the governments display of religious messages or
symbols. For example, this Court held unconstitutional a
Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments
in
every
public
schoolroom. Stone v.Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 4142. However,
neither Stone itself nor subsequent opinions have indicated
that Stones holding would extend beyond the context of
public
schools
to
a
legislative
chamber,
see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, or to capitol grounds.
Texas placement of the Commandments monument on its
capitol grounds is a far more passive use of those texts than
was the case in Stone, where the text confronted elementary

school students every day. Indeed, petitioner here apparently

walked by the monument for years before bringing this
suit. Schempp, supra, and Lee v.Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
distinguished. Texas has treated her capitol grounds
monuments as representing several strands in the States
political and legal history. The inclusion of the
Commandments monument in this group has a dual
significance, partaking of both religion and government, that
cannot be said to violate the Establishment Clause. Justice
Breyer concluded that this is a difficult borderline case where
none of the Courts various tests for evaluating Establishment
Clause questions can substitute for the exercise of legal
judgment. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). That judgment is not a personal judgment.
Rather, as in all constitutional cases, it must reflect and remain
faithful to the underlying purposes of the First Amendments
Religion Clausesto assure the fullest possible scope of
religious liberty and tolerance for all, to avoid the religious
divisiveness that promotes social conflict, and to maintain the
separation of church and state. No exact formula can dictate
a resolution to fact-intensive cases such as this. Despite the
Commandments religious message, an inquiry into the
context in which the text of the Commandments is used
demonstrates that the Commandments also convey a secular
moral message about proper standards of social conduct and
a message about the historic relation between those
standards and the law. The circumstances surrounding the
monuments placement on the capitol grounds and its
physical setting provide a strong, but not conclusive,
indication that the Commandments text as used on this
monument conveys a predominantly secular message. The
determinative factor here, however, is that 40 years passed in
which the monuments presence, legally speaking, went
unchallenged (until the single legal objection raised by
petitioner). Those 40 years suggest more strongly than can any
set of formulaic tests that few individuals, whatever their
belief systems, are likely to have understood the monument
as amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a
government effort to establish religion. See ibid. The public
visiting the capitol grounds is more likely to have considered
the religious aspect of the tablets message as part of what is
a broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural
heritage. For these reasons, the Texas display falls on the
permissible side of the constitutional line.

warrant was subsequently quashed when it appeared they

were not deputized by the Bureau of Customs. On October 8,
2003, Rodrigo and Done were apprehended by operative of the
National Capital Region Police Office after allegedly receiving
the amount of P300,000.00 which they allegedly extorted from
Pocholo, who complained before the NCRPO. The NBI through
then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco filed an administrative
complaint against the two before the Ombudsman for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices. In their
defense, Rodrigo and Don denied extorting money from
Pocholo, who they alleged was the one who sent them death
threats and offered money for the settlement of his case. This
prompted them to seek authority from their Chief, CRIDIntelligence Service to conduct investigation on the
matter. When Pocholo called them up in the morning of
October 8, 2003, they formed a team to conduct the
entrapment operation against him for corruption of public
officials at Century Park. Pocholo at the meeting, dropped a
white envelope on their table and hurriedly left. When they
tried to arrest him, they were prevented from doing so by the
NCRPO-CISI operatives.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodrigo V. Mapoy, et al., G.R. No.

197299, February 13, 2013

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

It is well-entrenched that in an administrative proceeding, the
quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and not
proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty
to justify affirmative findings.
In this case, the Court finds substantial evidence to support the
charges against respondents for grave misconduct and
dishonesty. Records show that Matias sought the help of the

Rodrigo (Mapoy) and Don (Regalario), Special Investigators at

the National Bureau of Investigation, applied for and was
granted a search warrant against the premises of Pocholo
(Matias) at his warehouse located in Valenzuela City where they
were able to recover 250,000 sacks of rice. Thus, they filed a
case for technical smuggling against Pocholo, but the search

After hearing, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended

their dismissal from the service for Grave Misconduct and
Dishonesty, finding substantial evidence that the charges
against them were more credible than their allegation of a
supposed entrapment operation against Pocholo, noting that it
was not even authorised by their Deputy Director nor the
imprimatur of the NBI Director. The inconsistencies in their
statements show that the alleged entrapment operation
against Matias was an afterthought.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed the OMB
decision. It applied the equipoise rule in acquitting Rodrigo
and Don, since no evidence positively confirming that they
were not conducting a legitimate entrapment operation against
Matias who had an axe to grind against them. It was unclear
what really transpired at the Century Park Hotel, the CA
added. The Office of the Ombudsman and the NBI filed their
motions for reconsideration but was denied, hence the OMB
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman were supported by substantial evidence
warranting the dismissal of Rodrigo and Don from the service.

police to entrap respondents who were illegally soliciting

money from him. Hence, the CISU-NCRPO planned an
entrapment operation which took place at the Century Park
Hotel, Manila on October 8, 2003. Prior to the entrapment,
Matias withdrew P300,000.00 from his bank, which, in turn,
recorded the serial numbers of the bills released. During the
entrapment, Mapoy received the white envelope containing
P300,000.00 marked money from Matias and handed it over to
Regalario from whom it was subsequently recovered. After
their arrest, respondents were brought to the police station for
investigation and subsequently charged of the crime of
robbery/extortion. To a reasonable mind, the foregoing
circumstances are more than adequate to support the
conclusion that respondents extorted money from Matias
which complained act amounts to grave misconduct or such
corrupt conduct inspired by an intention to violate the law, or
constituting flagrant disregard of well-known legal rules.
Similarly, respondents have been dishonest in accepting money
from Matias. Dishonesty has been held to include the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud, untrustworthiness,
lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle,
lack of fairness and straightforwardness, among others. Hence,
their dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties
was in order.
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory of respondents that
they were at the Century Park Hotel, Manila on that fateful day
to entrap Matias for the crime of corruption of public officers.
As correctly found by the Ombudsman, nothing was mentioned
in the Disposition Form relied upon by respondents with
respect to their planned entrapment of Matias. It was only a
request to conduct further investigation which was not even
shown to have been approved. Moreover, the respondents act
of letting Matias leave the table after handing the money to
them is inconsistent with their purported intent to arrest him
for the crime of corruption of public officers. No law officer
would let an offender walk away from him. Furthermore, as
aptly observed by the Ombudsman, the presence of
respondents witnesses, Ramirez and Maure, at the hotel was
not sufficiently established, and no justification was offered to
explain their failure to come to the aid of respondents when the
latter were being arrested.
All told, the inculpatory evidence herein point to only one thing:
respondents are guilty as charged. Consequently, the CA
committed reversible error in applying the equipoise rule in
resolving respondents appeal.
Consolacion v. Gambito, 675 SCRA 452 (2012)
In an Affidavit-Complaint dated July 25, 2005, which
was filed with the OCA on August 1, 2005, complainant
Filomena B. Consolacion charged respondent Ms.
Lydia S. Gambito, a court stenographer at the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan-Laoac,
Pangasinan, with misrepresentation and unlawful
acts. Complainant alleged that sometime in November
2002, respondent came to her house and convinced

her to buy her (respondents) claimed tricycle, which

she described as, Honda (Make), KB503-022-019947E
(Motor No.), KB503-022-19947 (Chassis No.), MC-AR8213 (Plate No.), for 65,000.00. Respondent
allegedly needed the money for her sons deployment
for work abroad. As she wanted to help respondent
and the latters son, she agreed to buy the said tricycle
after respondent promised her that she [respondent]
would present to her [complainant] the documents
evidencing her ownership of the tricycle. Respondent
allegedly assured her that the said tricycle was not
encumbered. She handed to respondent the amount
of 65,000.00 after they executed a Deed of Sale of a
Motorized Tricycle, and respondent thereafter
delivered and transferred her possession of the
tricycle. Allegedly, respondent also promised her to
deliver the Original Certificate of Registration of the
tricycle on or before January 31, 2003. Respondent,
however, failed to make good her promise and,
despite demands, she failed to deliver the said
document. Complainant further claimed that her
repeated efforts to meet with respondent at the
latters place of work was in vain, as respondent was
always not around every time she would go there.
Complainant claimed that on July 14, 2005, a Branch
Manager of the PR Bank in Urdaneta City, together
with a couple of policemen, came to her house and
took possession and control of the tricycle [she]
bought from [respondent] on the claimed ground that
the said bank already owned it via foreclosure of the
Chattel Mortgage supposedly executed by
[respondent] over the tricycle. She insisted that
respondent never informed her about her
[respondents] mortgage transaction with said PR
Bank. In fact, she claimed that had respondent told her
at the beginning that the tricycle had been mortgaged,
she would not have bought it despite respondents
financial plea.
In her Comment dated January 30, 2006, respondent alleged
that when her son applied for work abroad, she borrowed
money for her sons placement fee from relatives and friends,
including complainant to whom she gave the tricycle as a
security, assuring her that her money [would] be returned after
two months following the arrival of her son abroad, or deliver
to her the certificate of registration also within that period.
However, the recruitment agency failed to send her son
abroad, and they were unable to get back the money they paid
to the said agency, as its manager could no longer be found and
the person who recruited her son had already died. She claimed
to have suffered trauma caused by the money taken away from
[them] by the recruiter. Consequently, she suffered
complicated illness (sic), spending much for medications up to
the present and causing [her] to be financially handicapped
most of the time. She also claimed that it was not her intention
not to settle [her] obligation, but since she is the only

breadwinner of her family, her meager salary is insufficient to

meet all the needs of her family, as well as the payment of her
obligations. She also informed the Court that there was an
ongoing conciliation with [complainant], and if the latter would
be amenable, she would pay her installment term until [her]
obligation will be fully paid. In a Resolution dated June 28, 2006,
the Court re-docketed the complaint against respondent as a
regular administrative matter, and referred the same to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan for investigation, report and recommendation.
On November 4, 2011, the OCA submitted its Memorandum
containing the consolidated report on the complaints. It found
Gambito to have committed acts constituting three (3) counts
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
recommended that she be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits. The recommendation
reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend
that:
1.
OCA IPI No. 05-2081-P be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;
2. These two (2) administrative matters be CONSOLIDATED;
and
3.
Ms. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan-Laoac, Pangasinan, be
ADJUDGED GUILTY of three (3) counts of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and be DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any
government office, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
Although the witnesses did not appear during the
investigation and some of the testimonies of those who did
were not completed, the OCA assessed the cases against
Gambito because of her admissions 1) that she entered into a
transaction with Norma Billamanca (Billamanca) to facilitate
two (2) cases for which the latter agreed to give her
15,000.00 supposedly to be spent for publication, filing fee
and sheriffs fee; and 2) that she received on different
occasions from Billamanca payment in installment amounting
to 7,000.00 and a bracelet valued at 1,800.00, but the cases
were not filed in court because Billamanca failed to give her
the full amount of 15,000.00. Gambito likewise failed to
refute in her letter-comment the allegation of Judge Emma S.
Ines-Parajas (Judge Ines-Parajas) that she admitted to the
latter, in the presence of another court stenographer, that she
used the complainant-judges name to exact money from
Billamanca. The OCA stated that such failure was considered
as an implied admission.
Furthermore, the OCA found that Gambito took advantage of
her position as a court employee as she used the name of the

complainant-judge to exact money from unsuspecting and

hapless individuals. The OCA also stated that Gambito failed to
live up to the high ethical standards required of court
employees thereby prejudicing the best interest of the
administration of justice. Gambito violated Section 52,
paragraph A(20), Rule IV of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, which refers to conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and which is classified as a grave
offense punishable with dismissal on the second offense.
Considering that Gambito committed on different occasions
and under different circumstances three (3) separate unlawful
acts, all constituting conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, the OCA recommended that the extreme penalty
of dismissal be imposed on her.
ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT GAMBINO IS
ADMINSTRIVELY LIABLE FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL
TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE AND, IF SO,
WHETHER OR NOT HER OFFENSE WARRANTS THE
PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.
HELD: Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Binalonan-Laoac, Pangasinan, is hereby
found GUILTY of three (3) counts of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and is hereby DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any
government office, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
In the case at bench, Gambitos misrepresentation regarding
the ownership and actual status of the tricycle which she sold
to Filomena B. Consolacion (Consolacion) for 65,000.00
unquestionably undermined the peoples faith in the Judiciary.
Gambito, a long time court stenographer, took advantage of
her being a court employee and her friendship with
Consolacion when she induced the latter to buy the tricycle and
promised her that she would give her the documents proving
ownership of the tricycle with the assurance that it was not
encumbered. For her misrepresentation and assurance,
Consolacion trusted her and immediately gave her the amount
of 65,000.00. Consolacion claimed that she was sincere in
helping Gambitos son and was disappointed when she failed to
present the Original Certificate of Registration of the subject
tricycle, despite several demands. What was even more painful
for Consolacion was the fact that there was a chattel mortgage
constituted on the tricycle and that it had already been
foreclosed.
In her Comment, Gambito explained that the money she
received from Consolacion was used to pay her sons placement
fee. She gave the tricycle as security with the assurance that the
money would be returned after two (2) months from her sons
arrival from abroad or upon the delivery of the certificate of
registration. She was not able to return the money because her
son became a victim of an illegal recruiter and she could not get
the money back because the recruiter had passed away. What
she did not disclose, however, was that the tricycle was already

the subject of an earlier chattel mortgage in favor of PR

Bank, Urdaneta City. Doubtless, Gambitos unethical
transactions and lack of forthrightness affected the Judiciary of
which she was a part. As a court employee, she was expected
to act in conformity with the strict standard required of all
public officers and employees. Although Consolacion later
withdrew her complaint, it does not help Gambitos cause as
these late recantations are viewed by the Court with disfavor.
The Court stresses that the conduct of every court personnel
must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may
cause to sully the image of the Judiciary. They must totally avoid
any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not
only in the performance of their official duties but also in
conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties and
functions of their office. Court personnel are enjoined to
conduct themselves toward maintaining the prestige and
integrity of the Judiciary for the very image of the latter is
necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and
otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral part
of that organ of the government sacredly tasked in dispensing
justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at
all times be defined by propriety and decorum, and above all
else beyond any suspicion.[
Another point against Gambito was her transaction with
Billamanca. She admitted in her letter-comment, dated June
14, 2005, that she facilitated two (2) cases (ejectment case and
petition for the issuance of lost title) for the amount of
15,000.00, which was supposed to be used for publication,
filing fee and sheriffs fee. She explained that the cases were not
filed in court because Billamanca failed to give her the full
amount of 15,000.00. The amount given was only 7,000.00,
delivered in installments.
Gambito likewise confessed that she received in installments
the amount of 9,000.00 from Lolita Erum (Erum), which was
supposed to be for the bail of the latters husband who had nine
(9) pending cases, and that she used the money to buy her
medicines and the college books of her daughter.
Indeed, Gambitos unauthorized transactions with Villamanca
and Erum constitute conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest
of the service. Under the Civil Service Law and its implementing
rules, dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service are grave offenses
punishable by dismissal from the service.
Under Section 52(A)(11) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dismissal is the penalty
for improper solicitation for the first offense. Section 58(a) of
the same Rule provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry
with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture or retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in
the government service, unless otherwise provided in the
decision.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized the heavy burden
and responsibility of court personnel. They have been
constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety,
misdeed or negligence in the performance of their official
functions must be avoided. Thus, the Court does not hesitate

to condemn and sanction such improper conduct, act or

omission of those involved in the administration of justice that
violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes or
tends to diminish the faith of the public in the Judiciary.