Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 23

National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries v.

Court of
G.R. No. 163942, 166295, November 11, 2008
DOCTRINE: A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit
Hotel Nikko. The problem arose in 2000, when the Union and the management of the Hotel
failed to arrive at mutually accepted terms and conditions of the CBA. Since the conciliation
proceedings also failed, the Union reported for work sporting closely cropped hair and
shaven heads. In response, the management of the Hotel prevented such workers from
entering its premises, claiming that these workers violated the Hotels Grooming Standards.
Because of this, the employees staged a picket outside the premises of the Hotel which lead
to a severe lack of manpower which caused the Hotel to cease operations in three
restaurants. The Hotel issued notice to Union members, preventively suspending them and
subsequently dismissing the Union officers for violation of the duty to bargain in good faith
and violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards and commission of illegal acts during the
illegal strike. The Union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor
practice and union-busting.
Whether or not the Union conducted an illegal strike.
Yes, the was an illegal strike. Art. 212 (o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as "any
temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute." The SC cited the various categories of an illegal strike, to wit: (1)
when it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law; or (2) when it violates a specific
requirement of; or (3) when it is declared for an unlawful purpose; or (4) when it employs
unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective; or (5) when it is declared in violation of an
existing injunction, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary
and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code; or (6) when it is contrary to an existing
agreement. In the case, the Union is liable for conducting an illegal strike for the following
reasons: First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a
deliberate and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel
and was, therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of the Hotel employees directly
reflect the character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that provides service
to top-notch clients. Second, the Union's concerted action which disrupted the Hotel's
operations clearly violated the CBA's "No Strike, No Lockout" provision. Third, the Union
officers and members' concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only
violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards but also violated the Union's duty and responsibility
to bargain in good faith.

Naranjo v. Biomedica Health Care, Inc.

G.R. No. 193789, September 19, 2012

DOCTRINE: The termination of employment must be based on a just or authorized cause of

dismissal and such must be effected after due notice and hearing.
Respondent Biomedica is engaged in the distribution of medical equipment with Karen Motol
as its President. Petitioners are employees of Biomedica. On November 7, 2006, all five
petitioners were all absent for various personal reasons. The next day, Naranjo, et al. came
in for work but were not allowed to enter its premises. Motol informed them, using foul
language, to just find other employment. Correspondingly, Biomedica issued a notice of
preventive suspension to Naranjo, et al. accusing them of having conducted an illegal strike
and were accordingly directed to explain within 24 hours to explain why they should not be
held guilty of and dismissed for violating the company policy against illegal strikes under
Article XI, Category Four, Sections 6, 8, 12, 18 and 25 of the Company Policy. Biomedica,
however, failed to furnish them with the copy of the said company policy. Naranjo, et al.
failed to submit their written explanation. Biomedica served Notices of Termination stating
that Naranjo, et al. engaged in illegal strike. Therefore, Naranjo et al. filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Yes, petitioners were illegally dismissed. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the following
standards of due process shall be observed: (a) A written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side; (b) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him;
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination. While Biomedica cites the provisions of the company policy which petitioners
purportedly violated, it failed to quote said provisions in the notice so petitioners can be
adequately informed of the nature of the charges against them and intelligently file their
explanation and defenses to said accusations. A mere general description of the charges
against the employee by the employer is insufficient. Moreover, to justify the dismissal of an
employee on the ground of serious misconduct, the employer must first establish that the
employee is guilty of improper conduct, that the employee violated an existing and valid
company rule or regulation, or that the employee is guilty of a wrongdoing. In the instant
case, Biomedica failed to even establish that petitioners indeed violated company rules,

failing to even present a copy of the rules and to prove that petitioners were made aware of
such regulations. Therefore, Naranjo, et al. were illegally dismissed by Biomedica Health
Care, Inc.

Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010
DOCTRINE: Any seeming infirmity in the application and admission of union membership,
most especially in cases of independent labor unions, must be viewed in favor of valid
Eagle Ridge's rank-and-file employees had a meeting where they organized themselves into
an independent labor union, named "Eagle Ridge Employees Union. The Union filed for a
petition for certification election. The employer opposed the petition on the ground of
misrepresentation and fraud in connection with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws,
the numerical composition of the union, and the election of its officers. Eagle Ridge alleged
that EREU declared having 30 members in the application when the minutes only show 26
members. It also alleged that one signature in the ratified constitutions was forged. The
employer further contended that five employees already withdrew from the union. EREU, on
the other hand, asserts bona fide compliance with the registration requirements under Art.
234 of the Labor Code.
Whether or not there was fraud in the application of the union.
No, there was no fraud in the application of the union. A scrutiny of the records fails to show
any misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by EREU to merit cancellation of
its registration. First, the Union submitted the required documents attesting to the facts of
the organizational meeting, the election of its officers, and the adoption of the Union's
constitution and by-laws. Second, the members of the EREU totaled 30 employees when it
applied for registration. The Union thereby complied with the mandatory minimum 20%
membership requirement under Art. 234 (c). Third, the Union has sufficiently explained the
discrepancy between the number of those who attended the organizational meeting showing
26 employees and the list of union members showing 30. The difference is due to the
additional four members admitted two days after the organizational meeting as attested to
by their duly accomplished Union Membership forms. The right of employees to selforganization and membership in a union must not be trammeled by undue difficulties. In this
case, when the Union said that the four employee-applicants had been admitted as union
members, it is enough to establish the fact of admission of the four that they had duly
signified such desire by accomplishing the membership form. The fact, as pointed out by
Eagle Ridge, that the Union, owing to its scant membership, had not yet fully organized its

different committees evidently shows the direct and valid acceptance of the four employee
applicants rather than deter their admission as erroneously asserted by Eagle Ridge.

Bartolome vs. Social Security System

G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

DOCTRINE: The term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in Article 167 (j) of the
Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited
to "legitimate parents.
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. Unfortunately,
an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his
untimely demise. Petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome initiated a claim for death benefits
under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union, over the
death of her son John Colcol, who she gave up for adoption, and alleged that she was the
sole remaining beneficiary. When petitioner filed her claim, the SSS denied it stating that she
was no longer the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioner herself. On appeal, the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the SSS ruling citing Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
Whether or not the biological mother is entitled to receive the benefits.
Yes, petitioner Bartolome is entitled to receive the benefits. The rule limiting death benefits
claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law. Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation
from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to
refer to "legitimate parents." The term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the
afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general
sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase
"dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not
distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance. Cornelio's adoption of
John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming
from John's death as a dependent parent given Cornelio's untimely demise during John's

minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole
remaining beneficiary.

Wesleyan University-Philippines vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 208321, July 30, 2014

DOCTRINE: An employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts

inimical to the interests of the employer. A company has the right to dismiss its employees if
only as a measure of self-protection.
Respondent Nowella Reyes was appointed as full time University Treasurer of WUP. Wesleyan
University dismissed Reyes since it allegedly lost trust and confidence owing to an interplay
of events (1) encashing a check payable to the University Treasurer; (2) encashing crossed
checks payable to the University Treasurer, when the intention of management in this regard
was to merely transfer funds from one of petitioner's accounts to another in the same bank;
(3) allowing the Treasury Department to encash the checks issued to WUP personnel rather
than requiring the latter to have said checks encashed by the bank, in violation of the
imprest system of accounting; (4) causing the disbursement of checks without supporting
check vouchers; (5) unliquidated cash advances; and (6) spurious duplicate checks bearing
her signature were encashed causing damage to petitioner. Respondent post-haste filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor. However, this was reversed
by NLRC. On appeal, CA reinstated the Decision of Labor Arbiter. Hence the Petition.
Whether or not there was a valid termination on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Yes, there was a valid dismissal. The SC explained the requisites of a valid dismissal based
on loss of trust and confidence: The first requisite is that the employee concerned must be
one holding a position of trust and confidence, thus, one who is either: (1) a managerial
employee; or (2) a fiduciary rank-and-file employee, who, in the normal exercise of his or her
functions, regularly handles significant amounts of money or property of the employer. The
second requisite is that the loss of confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and
founded on clearly established facts. In the case, there is no doubt that respondent held a
position of trust; thus, greater fidelity is expected of her. As University Treasurer, she

handled and supervised all monetary transactions and was the highest custodian of funds
belonging to WUP. The presence of the first requisite is certain. So is as regards the second
requisite. Indeed, the Court finds that petitioner adequately proved respondent's dismissal
was for a just cause, based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established
facts as required by jurisprudence.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Naval, Jr.

G.R. No. 195687, April 07, 2014
DOCTRINE: All allowances not specifically mentioned in Section 12 of the Salary
Standardization Law, or as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the
standardized salary rates prescribed.
Petitioner LBP granted its officers and employees Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and a
monthly allowance called a "Bank Equity Pay" (BEP). A Salary Standardization Law (SSL) was
enacted which provides for the integration of allowances and additional compensation into
the standardized salary rates save for certain additional compensation enumerated therein.
In compliance, DBM issued a circular (DBM-CCC No. 10) which stated that the COLA and BEP
granted to employees of GOCCs and GFIs shall be deemed integrated into the basic. LBP
likewise integrated the BEP into the basic pay of its employees. Thereafter, this Court
nullified DBM-CCC No. 10 in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit for the reason that it was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation but was
subsequently remedied. It appears that respondents started negotiating with petitioner LBP
for the payment of their COLA and BEP benefits over and above their monthly basic salaries,
and back payment of the same from the time that LBP stopped to extend them until the
finality of the Decision in De Jesus. Petitioner LBP, however, denied respondents appeal
based on a Civil Service Commission (CSC) ruling citing DBM Budget Circular 2001-03 which
prohibits the payment of COLA and similar allowances on top of the basic salary on the
ground that it would constitute double compensation. Hence, respondents instituted a
Petition for Mandamus before the RTC which ruled in their favor granting the petition for
mandamus and ordering LBP to pay herein respondents claim. On appeal, the CA affirmed
with modification the RTC Decision. The Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition.
Hence, this Omnibus Motion.
Whether or not respondents are entitled to the COLA and the BEP on top of their basic
salaries from 1989 up to the present.

No, the respondents are not entitled. Sec. 12 of the SSL provides that all allowances, except
for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and
hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad;
and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be
determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein
prescribed. Since the COLA and the BEP are among those expressly excluded by the SSL
from integration, they should be considered as deemed integrated in the standardized
salaries of LBP employees under the general rule of integration. Under the doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere, a point of law already established will be followed by the court
in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised. Thus, we can come to no other
conclusion than to deny the payment of the COLA on top of the LBP employees' basic salary
from July 1, 1989 because (1) it has not been expressly excluded from the general rule on
integration by the first sentence of Sec. 12 of the SSL and (2) as we have explained in
Gutierrez case, the COLA is not granted in order to reimburse employees for the expenses
incurred in the performance of their official duties.
Aromin vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 164824, April 30, 2008
DOCTRINE: Loss of confidence, as a ground for termination, should not be (1) simulated; (2)
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified; (3) arbitrarily
asserted; and (4) a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
Aromin worked for respondent BPI for 26 years and he was an assistant vice-president when
he was terminated from the service. Aromin headed the BPI's Real Property Management
Unit (RPMU) when the botched purchase by Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. (Limketkai) of a trust
asset held by BPI happened. Limketkai brothers met with Aromin to negotiate and discuss
whether they can pay the purchase price on terms instead of in cash. Limketkai tendered full
payment for the property but BPI refused to receive payment so the former filed a case
against BPI. Asked to comment on the material allegations of the said complaint, Aromin and
Albano sent to the BPI Legal Services Division a memorandum embodying the desired
comments. In the course of the trial in civil case, Aromin's testimony, apart from being
inimical to BPI's interests, contradicted what he and Albano wrote in their memorandum. The
RTC found the testimony of Aromin vital in determining a "meeting-of-the-minds" regarding
the sale of, and the price for, the Pasig property. The RTC rendered judgment finding for
Limketkai, the BPI-NBS sale being annulled and BPI being assessed for damages. BPI served
on Aromin a Notice of Termination, citing willful breach of trust and loss of confidence, as
grounds for termination, among others.
Whether or not Aromin was illegally dismissed.
No, the assistant VP of BPI was validly dismissed. The SC held that loss of confidence, as a
ground for dismissal, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position

of responsibility or of trust and confidence. As such, the employee must be invested with
confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care of the employer's
money and other assets. Aromin doubtless falls under the category of a managerial
employee upon whom trust and confidence had been reposed by the employing bank.
Violating that trust and confidence is a valid cause for dismissal under Art. 282 of the Labor
Code. It is abundantly clear to the Court, as it was to the CA and the NLRC, that Aromin
indeed committed acts which formed the basis for BPI's loss of trust and confidence in him.
Undeniably, the acts committed, inclusive of those done before he took the witness stand to
testify falsely against the interest of the employer, adversely reflected on his competence,
loyalty, and integrity. Said acts were sufficient enough for his employer to lose trust and
confidence in him. Thus, before us is a real case of betrayal of trust and confidence, duly
substantiated, to justify the bona fide dismissal of an employee.

Genuino vs. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 142732-33, December 04, 2007

DOCTRINE: An employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him or her by his or her employer or duly authorized
representative. In order to constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence should
relate to acts inimical to the interests of the employer.
Genuino was employed by Citibank sometime in January 1992 as Treasury Sales Division
Head with the rank of Assistant Vice-President. On August 23, 1993, Citibank sent Genuino a
letter charging her with "knowledge and/or involvement" in transactions "which were
irregular or even fraudulent." In the same letter, Genuino was informed she was under
preventive suspension. Genuino's counsel replied through a letter dated September 17,
1993, demanding for a bill of particulars regarding the charges against Genuino. Citibank
informed Genuino that it found out that Genuino with Santos used "facilities of Genuino's
family corporation, namely, Global Pacific, personally and actively participated in the
diversion of bank clients' funds to products of other companies that yielded interests higher
than what Citibank products offered, and that Genuino and Santos realized substantial
financial gains, all in violation of existing company policy and the Corporation Code, which
for your information, carries a penal sanction." Genuino's employment was terminated by
Citibank on grounds of (1) serious misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust reposed upon
her by the bank, and (3) commission of a crime against the bank. The Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision finding the dismissal of the complainant Marilou S. Genuino to be
without just cause and in violation of her right to due process. The NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter's decision with modification.

Whether or not the dismissal of Genuino is for a just cause and in accordance with due
Genuino was dismissed for a just cause but without the observance of due process. Under
Article 282 of the Labor Code, standards of due process shall be observed. The two-notice
requirement of the Labor Code is an essential part of due process. The first notice informing
the employee of the charges should set out clearly what the employee is being held liable
for. The employee should be afforded ample opportunity to be heard and not mere
opportunity. Since the notice of charges given to Genuino is inadequate, the dismissal could
not be in accordance with due process. However, the dismissal was for a just cause. Art. 282
(c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment for fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her employer or duly
authorized representative. As Assistant Vice-President of Citibank's Treasury Department,
Genuino held a position of trust and confidence. She could not feign ignorance of the
businesses of Citibank, and of Global and Torrance. Genuino did not even dissuade the
depositors from withdrawing their monies from Citibank, and was even instrumental in the
transfers of monies from Citibank to a competing bank through Global and Torrance, the
corporations under Genuino's control. Therefore, Citibank had valid grounds to dismiss
Genuino on ground of loss of confidence.

Baares vs. Tabaco Women's Transport Service Cooperative (TAWTRASCO),

G.R. No. 197353, April 01, 2013

DOCTRINE: Reinstatement means the admission of an employee back to work prevailing

prior to his dismissal which presupposes that there shall be no demotion in rank and/or
diminution of salary, benefits and other privileges. Where reinstatement is no longer viable
as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service
should be awarded as an alternative.
Petitioner was the general manager of respondent TAWTRASCO until its management
terminated his services. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint which the LA granted.
The LA Decision soon became final and executory as respondent no longer appealed. Owing
to the strained relationship, TAWTRASCO offered to pay petitioner separation pay, but
petitioner rejected the offer. Eventually, the two entered into a Compromise Agreement, in
which TAWTRASCO undertook to reinstate the petitioner. A few days later, a memorandum
was given to petitioner, transferring him to another terminal instead of his work stipulated
under the compromise agreement. However, it was found that he failed to return to work in
his new assignment. Petitioner on his part, deemed such assignment as constructive
dismissal and a means to embarrass him. He was tasked to discharge menial duties, such as
maintaining a record of the "in" and "out" of freight loaded on all TAWTRASCO buses and
signing the trip records of the buses going out daily. To be sure, these tasks cannot be
classified as pertaining to the office of a general manager, but that of a checker. Petitioner

filed a complaint for nonpayment of salaries and withholding of privileges which the LA
Whether or not there was a proper reinstatement of petitioner to his former position of
General Manager.
No, there was no proper reinstatement of petitioner to his former position. Under Article 223
of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation.
Verily, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and to other established employment privileges, and to his full backwages. The
"reinstatement" of petitioner as general manager of TAWTRASCO, pursuant to the
compromise agreement, was not a real, bona fide reinstatement in the context of the Labor
Code. TAWTRASCO at the outset, directed petitioner to report to the Virac terminal with
duties and responsibilities not befitting a general manager of a transport company. In fine,
the assignment partook of the nature of a demotion. Moreover, while Memorandum No. 10
was couched as if TAWTRASCO had in mind the reinstatement of petitioner to his former
position, there cannot be any quibble that TAWTRASCO withheld petitioner's customary
boarding house privilege. Therefore, the reinstatement has not been fully complied with.
Thus it cannot be said that petitioners absence was without valid or justifiable cause.

UST Faculty Union vs. University of Santo Tomas

G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009

DOCTRINE: Whether the employee or employer alleges that the other party committed ULP,
it is the burden of the alleging party to prove such allegation with substantial evidence.
There were two groups claiming to be the USTFU: the Gamilla Group and the Mario Group.
The former is led by Gil Gamilla who was elected as its president during a convocation held
on October 4, 1996 while the latter is led by Atty. Marino, the incumbent president of the
union. The Mario Group filed a complaint for ULP against the UST with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC and a complaint with the Office of the Med-Arbiter for the nullification of
the election of the Gamilla Group as officers of the USTFU which the MA decided in their
favor. On the other hand, the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit on the ground that USTFU failed to establish with clear and convincing
evidence that indeed UST was guilty of ULP. The acts of UST which USTFU complained of as
ULP were the following: (1) Atty. Domingo Legaspi, the legal counsel for the UST, conducted
a faculty meeting in his office, supplying derogatory information about the Mario Group; (2)
respondents provided the Gamilla Group with the facilities and forum to conduct elections, in
the guise of a convocation; and (3) respondents transacted business with the Gamilla Group

such as the processing of educational and hospital benefits, deducting USTFU dues from the
faculty members without turning over the dues to the Mario Group, and entering into a CBA
with them.
Whether or not UST is guilty of unfair labor practice.
No, UST is not guilty of ULP. Whether the employee or employer alleges that the other party
committed ULP, it is the burden of the alleging party to prove such allegation with
substantial evidence. Such principle finds justification in the fact that ULP is punishable with
both civil and/or criminal sanctions. With regard to the alleged derogatory remarks of Atty.
Legaspi, the three tribunals correctly ruled that there was no evidence to support such
allegation. As to the convocation, in no way can the contents of this memorandum be
interpreted to mean that faculty members were required to attend the convocation. Not one
coercive term was used in the memorandum to show that the faculty club members were
compelled to attend such convocation. Petitioner makes several allegations that UST
committed ULP. The onus probandi falls on the shoulders of petitioner to establish or
substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases as in other
administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at bar,
petitioner miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.

Mendros, Jr. vs. Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corporation (MMPC)

G.R. No. 169780, February 16, 2009

DOCTRINE: The requirements for a valid retrenchment are: (1) that the retrenchment is
reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not
merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, and real, or only if expected, are reasonably
imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) that the employer
serves written notice both to the employees concerned and the DOLE at least a month
before the intended date of retrenchment; (3) that the employer pays the retrenched
employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the Code; (4) that the employer
exercises its prerogative to retrench in good faith; and (5) that it uses fair and reasonable
criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched or retained.
Respondent Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) hired petitioner Alfredo A.
Mendros, Jr. as regular body prepman, later promoting him as assembler major in the
company's manufacturing division. Due to the severe drastic slump of its vehicle sales,
MMPC, sustained a financial loss. MMPC implemented various cost-cutting measures, such as

but not limited to: cost reduction on the use of office supplies and energy, curtailment of
representation and travel expenses, employment-hiring freeze, separation of casuals and
trainees, manpower services reduction, intermittent plant shutdowns, and reduced work
week for managerial and other monthly-salaried personnel. MMPC launched a temporary layoff program to cover some 170 hourly employees which included Alfredo. The temporary layoff move was still not enough to avert further losses. Accordingly, MMPC sent separate
notices to Alfredo and other affected personnel advising them of their permanent lay-off, but
with retrenchment benefits. This prompted Alfredo to file a case for illegal dismissal and
damages before the NLRC.
Whether or not Alfredos temporary lay-off and eventual retrenchment is valid and legal.
Yes, the retrenchment is valid and legal. The right of management to retrench or to lay-off
workers to meet clear and continuing economic threats or during periods of economic
recession to prevent losses is recognized by Article 283 of the Labor Code. The essential
requisites for a valid retrenchment are obtaining: First, there can hardly be any dispute that
MMPC suffered substantial and heavy losses in FY 1997 and continued to bleed in 1998.
Even the NLRC conceded this reality. Second, Alfredo cannot plausibly feign ignorance that
MMPC was in dire straights in 1997 and 1998. Neither can he impugn the bona fides of
MMPC's retrenchment strategy. Third, it bears to state that the aforequoted Art. 283 of the
Code uses the phrase "retrenchment to prevent losses". The phrase necessarily implies that
retrenchment may be effected even in the event only of imminent, impending, or expected
losses. Fourth, MMPC had complied with the prior written notice and separation pay
requirements. Finally, as the Court sees it, the merit rating system MMPC adopted as one of
the criteria for selecting who are to be eased out was fair and reasonable under the
premises. Therefore, the Court upheld the validity of retrenchment undertaken by
respondent company.

Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation vs. Serrano

G.R. No. 198538, September 29, 2014

DOCTRINE: Temporary "off-detail" or the period of time security guards are made to wait
until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client does not constitute constructive
dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond six months.
Petitioner Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation (Exocet) is engaged in the
provision of security personnel to its various clients or principals. By virtue of its contract
with JG Summit, Exocet assigned respondent Armando D. Serrano (Serrano) as "close-in"
security personnel for various corporate officers. In 2006, Serrano was relieved by JG
Summit from his duties. For more than six months after he reported back to Exocet, Serrano
was without any reassignment. Serrano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Exocet

with the NLRC. For its defense, Exocet denied dismissing Serrano and maintained that it was
Serrano who declined the assignment on the ground that he is not used to being a regular
security guard. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Serrano, while not actually dismissed, was
placed on a floating status for more than six months and so, was deemed constructively
dismissed. Acting upon reconsideration, NLRC ruled that Serranos termination was due to
his own fault. The CA, however, found Serrano to have been constructively dismissed.
Whether or not Serrano was constructively dismissed.
No, Serrano was not constructively dismissed. The "floating status" or temporary "off-detail"
of security guards employed by private security agencies, was considered by this Court in
several cases as a form of temporary retrenchment or lay-off. The concept has been defined
as that period of time when security guards are in between assignments or when they are
made to wait after being relieved from a previous post until they are transferred to a new
one. The Court has applied Article 292 of the Labor Code by analogy to set the specific
period of temporary lay-off to a maximum of six (6) months. Consequently, the DOLE issued
DO 14-01 providing in Section 6.5, in relation to Sec. 9.3, of which states that the lack of
service assignment for a continuous period of six (6) months is an authorized cause for the
termination of the employee, who is then entitled to a separation pay equivalent to half
month pay for every year of service. However, Serrano's lack of assignment for more than
six months cannot be attributed to Exocet because petitioner had already offered Serrano a
position in the general security service since there were no available clients requiring
positions for VIP security. It was only Serrano who declined the position because it was not
the post that suited his preference. Therefore, Exocet is neither guilty of illegal dismissal nor
constructive dismissal.

Go, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010

DOCTRINE: If an employee is moved from a higher to a lower class, he shall not suffer a
reduction in salary unless such movement is not the result of a disciplinary action or
voluntary demotion.
Petitioner Gonzalo S. Go, Jr. (Go) was appointed in 1980 as Hearing Officer III of the Board of
Transportation (BOT). An executive order was issued creating the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to replace the BOT. The issuance placed the LTFRB
under the administrative control and supervision of the DOTC Secretary. The DOTC Secretary
extended Go a promotional appointment as Chief Hearing Officer. LTFRB Administrative

Division Chief Cynthia G. Angulo stated that the promotion was to the position of Attorney
VI, Salary Grade-26. The instant controversy started when DBM informed the then DOTC
Secretary of the erroneous classification in the Position Allocation List of the DBM. The error,
according to the DBM, stemmed from the fact that division chief positions in quasi-judicial or
regulatory agencies are entitled only to Attorney V, SG-25 allocation. The corresponding
changes in position classification with all its wage implications were implemented. Go wrote
the DBM to question the summary demotion or downgrading [of his salary grade] from SG26 to SG-25. This prompted Go to file a protest.
Whether or not the reallocation of rank resulting in the downgrading of position and
diminution of salary is valid.
No, the reallocation of rank of petitioner Go was not valid. The summary reallocation of his
position to a lower degree resulting in the corresponding downgrading of his salary infringed
the policy of non-diminution of pay involving benefits of government employees. While the
DBM is statutorily vested with the authority to reclassify or allocate positions to their
appropriate classes, with the concomitant authority to formulate allocating policies and
criteria for bureau-level agencies, like the LTFRB, the investiture could not have plausibly
included unchecked discretion to implement a reallocation system offensive to the due
process guarantee. Go has established a clear, equitable vested right to the emoluments of
his position as Attorney VI, SG-26. He continues to occupy at least up to April 11, 2006
when he filed this petition the position of Chief, LTFRB Legal Division. His title to Attorney
VI, SG-26 is without question, having been legally appointed to the position. And being an
incumbent to that position, he has, at the very least, an equitable right to receive the
corresponding salary and emoluments attached thereto. Therefore, the summary demotion
to a lower salary grade, with the corresponding decrease in salary and emoluments after he
has occupied his current rank and position, goes against his right to continue enjoying the
benefits accorded the position and which his predecessors must have been receiving.

Salazar vs. Philippine Duplicators, Inc.

G.R. No. 154628, December 06, 2006
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, "a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the appealed decision."
Petitioner Estrellita Salazar became Sales Representative of respondent company, Philippine
Duplicators, Inc. Petitioner was terminated from her employment due to alleged falsification
of company records. Salazar claimed that the union president also gave her a copy of the

memorandum charging her of falsification; and that the memorandum was just a plan to
comply with the procedural due process leading to her termination which had already
materialized when the first memorandum of termination was allegedly shown to her.
Consequently, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondents. The Labor
Arbiter held that the dismissal was for a just cause but the company breached the twinnotice requirement as provided by law. However, on appeal, the NLRC, ruled that there was
no dismissal but due to strained relationship, Duplicators is liable to pay separation pay
instead of paying the indemnity. Salazar now questions the deletion of the indemnity since
respondents did not interpose any appeal and hence, no affirmative relief could be granted
to said respondents.
Whether or not the NLRC violated the rule in labor cases that an appellee cannot be awarded
any affirmative relief.
No. Petitioner's first ground in her Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC stated that Labor
Arbiter Caday's ruling that she was not illegally dismissed was "erroneous." In resolving
this issue, the NLRC overturned Caday's finding of petitioner's valid dismissal, and instead
concluded that there was no termination of petitioner's employment. As a consequence, the
NLRC had to recall the award of PhP 10,000.00 indemnity imposed by Arbiter Caday
although not prayed for by respondent Duplicators since the said award was inconsistent
with the finding that petitioner's employment subsisted. Without petitioner's dismissal, there
can be no legal basis for the indemnity; hence, Duplicators is not obliged to comply with the
two (2) notice requirement. In annulling the award, the NLRC merely exercised its
authority under Article 218 (d) of the Labor Code to correct or amend any error committed
by a labor arbiter in aid of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Petitioner has no reason to
complain that she was deprived of monetary benefits since the NLRC's Decision did not
actually benefit Duplicators as the PhP 14,095.76 separation pay granted to petitioner is
certainly greater than the PhP 10,000.00 indemnity deleted by the NLRC.

Andrada vs. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 173231, December 28, 2007
DOCTRINE: The employer bears the burden of proving the cause or causes for termination.
Its failure to do so would necessarily lead to a judgment of illegal dismissal. Employment to
the common man is his very life and blood, which must be protected against concocted
causes to legitimize an otherwise irregular termination of employment.

The petitioners are employees of Subic Legend Resorts and Casino, Inc. (Legend) who were
hired on various dates, in the Project Development Division on various projects. Legend
decided to retrench and terminate the employment of some thirty-four (34) employees
including herein petitioners sending notice of such action to the Department of Labor and
Employment. Legend has undertaken this action on the strength of the updated status
report of its Project Development Division. Legend sent to the 34 employees the notices of
retrenchment and offering them retrenchment options. On that same day, Labor and
Employment Center of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority advertised that Legend International
Resorts, Inc. was in need of employees for the positions which were very much similar to
those vacated by the petitioners. Subsequently, 14 of the 34 retrenched employees filed
before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal which LA ruled in their favor. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the LAs decision. Said employees filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA but it was dismissed on the ground that the retrenched employees were
validly dismissed from employment due to redundancy and not retrenchment.
Whether or not petitioners were validly dismissed based on redundancy and not on
No, petitioners were not validly dismissed. Retrenchment and redundancy are two different
concepts; they are not synonymous and therefore should not be used interchangeably. The
SC explained in detail the difference between the two concepts in Sebuguero v. NLRC:
Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Retrenchment, on the other hand, is
used interchangeably with the term "lay-off." It is an act of the employer of dismissing
employees because of losses in the operation of a business, lack of work, and considerable
reduction on the volume of his business, a right consistently recognized and affirmed by this
Court. It is however not enough for a company to merely declare that positions have become
redundant. It must produce adequate proof of such redundancy to justify the dismissal of the
affected employees. The pieces of evidence submitted by Legend are mere allegations and
conclusions not supported by other evidence. Legend did not even bother to illustrate or
explain in detail how and why it considered petitioners' positions superfluous or
unnecessary. The CA puts too much weight on petitioners' failure to refute Legend's
allegations contained in the document it submitted. Thus, in the same way, the SC held that
the basis for retrenchment was not established by substantial evidence, and that Legend
failed to establish by the same quantum of proof the fact of redundancy; hence, petitioners'
termination from employment was illegal.
Transocean Ship Management (Phils.), Inc. vs. Vedad
G.R. No. 194490-91, March 20, 2013
DOCTRINE: The law looks tenderly on laborers. Where the evidence may be reasonably
interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to them, the
balance must be tilted in their favor consistent with the principle of social justice.

Inocencio was a seafarer employed as second engineer by Transocean Ship Management

(Phils.), Inc. Inocencio's employment under the POEA-SEC was for a 10-month period and
went onboard M/V Invicta after the required pre-employment medical examination which
gave him a clean bill of health. Before the expiry of his 10-month contract or specifically on
February 19, 2006, Inocencio was, however, repatriated for medical reasons. On board M/V
Invicta he fell ill and experienced fever, sore throat and pain in his right ear. He underwent
tonsillectomy but was later found by a histopathology report to be suffering from cancer of
the right tonsil. Dr. Cruz then advised Inocencio to undergo chemotherapy and linear
treatment at an estimated cost of PhP500,000, but Inocencio could not continue due to the
failure of Transocean and General Marine to provide the necessary amount. This constrained
Inocencio to file a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for, among others, total permanent
disability benefits and sickness allowance. The LA awarded permanent total disability
benefits to Inocencio. Upon appeal by Transocean, the NLRC reversed the LA decision and
awarded only sickness allowance. The NLRC ruled that the illness was work related was not
substantiated by Inocencio. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision.
Whether or not the Inocencio is entitled to sickness allowance and reimbursement of his
medical expenses.
Yes, is entitled to sickness allowance. Inocencio got ill with what appeared to be tonsillitis
while on board MV Invicta, for which he was treated at a foreign port where the ship docked.
His malady still continued despite the treatment as he was, in fact, repatriated before the
end of his 10-month contract on medical grounds. With the foregoing facts, it is abundantly
clear that Inocencio is entitled to receive sickness allowance from his repatriation for
medical treatment, which is equivalent to his basic wage for a period not exceeding 120
days or four months. The POEA formulated the standard employment contract for seafarers
pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247, Series of 1995, to "secure the best
terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance
therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." The law
looks tenderly on laborers. Where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two
divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to them, the balance must be tilted
in their favor consistent with the principle of social justice.

Alabang Country Club, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 170287, February 14, 2008
DOCTRINE: In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security
clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause
is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision
in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the

employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an
employee based on the CBA's union security provision.
Petitioner Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Club) is a domestic non-profit corporation. Respondent
Alabang Country Club Independent Employees Union (Union) is the exclusive bargaining
agent of the Club's rank-and-file employees. Respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras
were officers of the Union. They were expelled from the union for alleged malversation of
union funds. The Union, invoking the Security Clause of the CBA, demanded that the Club
dismiss respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras in view of their expulsion from the Union.
The Club required the three respondents to show cause in writing within 48 hours from
notice why they should not be dismissed. Nonetheless, after weighing the verbal and written
explanations, the Club dismissed private respondents. Private respondents challenged their
dismissal in an illegal dismissal complaint.
Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed.
No, respondents were not illegaly dismissed. Under the Labor Code, an employee may be
validly terminated on the following grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2) authorized
causes under Art. 283; (3) termination due to disease under Art. 284; and (4) termination by
the employee or resignation under Art. 285. Another cause for termination is dismissal from
employment due to the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of
the CBA on Union security contains the provisions on the Union shop and maintenance of
membership shop. Termination of employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied
in a CBA is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. This practice strengthens the union
and prevents disunity in the bargaining unit within the duration of the CBA. The three
respondents were expelled from and by the Union after due investigation for acts of
dishonesty and malversation of Union funds. In accordance with the CBA, the Union properly
requested the Club to enforce the Union security provision in their CBA and terminate said
respondents. Then, in compliance with the Union's request, the Club reviewed the
documents submitted by the Union, requested said respondents to submit written
explanations, and thereafter afforded them reasonable opportunity to present their side.
After it had determined that there was sufficient evidence that said respondents malversed
Union funds, the Club dismissed them from their employment conformably with Sec. 4 (f) of
the CBA. Therefore, the dismissal was valid and justified.

R.B. Michael Press vs. Galit

G.R. No. 153510, February 13, 2008
DOCTRINE: For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements
must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have

been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which
he had been engaged to discharge.
Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine operator.
During his employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times, totaling to 6,117 minutes,
and was absent without leave for a total of nine and a half days. Respondent was ordered to
render overtime service in order to comply with a job order deadline, but he refused to do
so. The following day, respondent reported for work but petitioner Escobia told him not to
work, and to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. When he returned, a copy of an
Office Memorandum was served on him. Petitioners aver that Galit was dismissed due to
following offenses: (1) tardiness constituting neglect of duty; (2) serious misconduct; and (3)
insubordination or willful disobedience. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and money claims before the NLRC.
Whether or not there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondent.
Yes, the dismissal of respondent was with just cause. Habitual tardiness is a form of neglect
of duty. Habitual and excessive tardiness is inimical to the general productivity and business
of the employer. This is especially true when the tardiness and/or absenteeism occurred
frequently and repeatedly within an extensive period of time. For willful disobedience to be a
valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur: (1) the employee's assailed
conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude;
and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee,
and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the present
case, there is no question that petitioners' order for respondent to render overtime service
to meet a production deadline complies with the second requisite. Art. 89 of the Labor Code
empowers the employer to legally compel his employees to perform overtime work against
their will to prevent serious loss or damage. In the present case, petitioners' business is a
printing press whose production schedule is sometimes flexible and varying. It is only
reasonable that workers are sometimes asked to render overtime work in order to meet
production deadlines. The totality of his offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows
that he was a difficult employee. His refusal to render overtime work was the final straw that
broke the camel's back, and, with his gross and habitual tardiness and absences, would
merit dismissal from service.

Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Cooperative v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS

G.R. Nos. 191138-39, October 19, 2011
DOCTRINE: For union officers, knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground

for termination of their employment. But for union members who participated in a strike,
their employment may be terminated only if they committed prohibited and illegal acts
during the strike and there is substantial evidence or proof of their participation.
Respondent Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS, Magdala Multipurpose and Livelihood
Cooperative (KMLMS) is the union operating in Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood
Cooperative and Sanlor Motors Corp. KMLMS filed a notice of strike on March 5, 2002 and
conducted its strike-vote on April 8, 2002. However, KMLMS only acquired legal personality
when its registration as an independent labor organization was granted on April 9, 2002.
Thereafter, on May 6, 2002, KMLMS, now a legitimate LLO, staged a strike where several
prohibited and illegal acts were committed by its participating members. On the ground of
lack of valid notice of strike, ineffective conduct of a strike-vote and commission of
prohibited and illegal acts, petitioners filed their Petition to Declare the Strike of May 6, 2002
Illegal 6 before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Board (RAB) and prayed that the officers and
members of respondent KMLMS who participated in the illegal strike and who knowingly
committed prohibited and illegal activities, respectively, be declared to have lost or forfeited
their employment status. LA, NLRC, and CA ruled in favor of petitioners but ruled that only
34 workers to have lost their employment status.
Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to declare as having lost their employment status
the rest of the union strikers who have participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal
There is no question that the May 6, 2002 strike was illegal, first, because when KMLMS filed
the notice of strike on March 5 or 14, 2002, it had not yet acquired legal personality and,
thus, could not legally represent the eventual union and its members. And second, similarly
when KMLMS conducted the strike-vote on April 8, 2002, there was still no union to speak of,
since KMLMS only acquired legal personality as an independent LLO only on April 9, 2002 or
the day after it conducted the strike-vote. The petitioners have substantially proved the
identity of 72 other union members who committed prohibited and illegal acts during the
May 6, 2002 illegal strike. The Court finds that there was patent misappreciation of evidence
both by the LA and the NLRC, but the same was not corrected by the CA.

Peoples Broadcasting Service v. Secretary of the DOLE

G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012

DOCTRINE: The DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an

employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power,
subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC.
Private respondent Jandeleon filed a complaint against petitioner Bombo Radyo with the
DOLE Regional Office, for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th
month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed
payment of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. After the conduct of
summary investigations, the DOLE Regional Director, as affirmed by the Acting Secretary of
DOLE, found the presence of employer-employee relationship and ruled for Jandeleon. The
SC originally ruled that the DOLE Secretary has no jurisdiction to determine the presence of
EER. It ruled that the NLRC is the primary agency in determining the existence of EER. The
Public Attorneys Office moved to clarify the original decision as to the extent of the visitorial
and enforcement powers of DOLE.
Whether or not the DOLE Secretary may determine the existence of employer-employee
Yes, the Secretary may determine the existence of EER in the exercise of it visitorial and
enforcement power under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. The law did not say that the
DOLE would first seek the NLRC's determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be
disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The determination of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be respected. The expanded
visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered
nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing the employeremployee relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC. The Court issued the
declaration that at least a prima facie showing of the absence of an employer-employee
relationship be made to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE that will be
faced with that evidence, and it is the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if the same does
successfully refute the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Therefore, the Court
now recognizes that the DOLE has the full power to determine the existence of an employeremployee relationship in cases brought to it under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code.This
power is parallel and not subordinate to that of the NLRC.

Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc.SPFL vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 148839-40, November 02, 2006

Resolutions are merely interlocutory orders or provisional remedies. The aggrieved party
must await the final decision in the petition and then appeal from the adverse judgment, in
the course of which the party may question the issuance of the interlocutory orders as errors
of judgment.
Petitioner Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources Inc., Southern Philippines
Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL) is the recognized labor union of the rank and file
employees in the paper mill and plywood manufacturing plant of respondent Picop
Resources, Inc. (PICOP). In 1997, PICOP suffered serious financial and operational problems
that led to a declaration of a temporary shutdown for six months. Doubting the motives
behind the short term closure, NAMAPRI-SPFL filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Regional Office. The NAMAPRI-SPFL members
staged a strike. Respondent PICOP filed a complaint with the NLRC to declare the strike
illegal. Respondent PICOP permanently shut down the operations of its plywood plant and
dismissed the remaining workers. As a result, NAMAPRI-SPFL members engaged in another
strike and picketed PICOP's plant and mill. The Labor Secretary ruled the temporary
shutdown of the plant legitimate and the permanent retrenchment of the workers valid.
Petitioner assailed the Orders of the Secretary. On appeal, the CA ruled for respondent which
enjoined the enforcement of the Writ of Execution of Secretary of Labor and its Resolution
which granted the writ of preliminary injunction to respondent. Hence, this petition.
Whether or not the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its
No, the CA did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its Resolutions.
Resolutions are merely interlocutory orders or provisional remedies. The aggrieved party
must await the final decision in the petition and then appeal from the adverse judgment, in
the course of which the party may question the issuance of the interlocutory orders as errors
of judgment. As there was still no final judgment from the CA at the time of the filing of the
petition, then a petition for review under Rule 45 is not the appropriate remedy. In the case
at bar, granting arguendo that petitioner NAMAPRI-SPFL instituted the instant petition under
Rule 65 on the ground that the CA rendered the disputed Resolutions with grave abuse of
discretion, still, the petition must fail because the CA did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, petitioner
NAMAPRI-SPFL miserably failed to demonstrate even an iota of the alleged capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the court a quo. Without such showing, the
grant of the extraordinary writ of certiorari has no basis. In effect, the legality of the two
questioned CA Resolutions have been upheld and affirmed.