Introduction To Law

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
2016
AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
INTRODUCTION TO LAW 2016
AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY BAR TOPNOTCHERS

1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
2nd
2nd
2nd
3rd
3rd
3rd
3rd
4th
4th
4th
4th
4th
4th
4th
4th
4th
5th
5th
5th
Januario Soller, Jr.

Vicente Solis
Virgilio Gesmundo
Gregorio Batiller, Jr.
Cesareo Antonio S. Singzon, Jr.
Gabriel Singson
Antonio Navarette
Prospero Nograles
Teodoro Villarmia, Jr.
Basilio Alo
Liberador Villegas
Francis Ampil
William Veto
Jose Reyes
Redentor Salonga
Arthur Soller
Solon Garcia
Vicente Ruaro
Augusto Panlilio
Marius Corpuz
Nelson Victorino
Luisito Baluyot
Reynaldo Salutan
Thaddeus Venturanza
1972
1973
1977
1979
2010
1952
1957
1971
1966
1967
1971
1999
1951
1953
1960
1969
1972
1974
1975
1979
1992
1967
1980
1989
5th
6th
6th
6th
6th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
7th
8th
9th
9th
9th
9th
10th
10th
10th
10th
10th
10th
Eric David Tan

Jose Brillantes
Roldan Dalman
Jose Jesus Laurel
Yves-Randolph Gonzalez
Antonio Quintos
Rufino Luna
Sergio Apostol
Adolfo Angala
Arthur Cabilete
Raul Cabrera
Noel Sanchez
Efren de Leon
Ruben Cleofe
Meynardo Tiro
Amado Santiago
Ramon Aviado, Jr.
Ding Concepcion
Ernesto Maceda, Jr.
Franklin Ebdalin
Nicolas Gomez, Jr.
Giorgidi Aggabao
Grain Baysa-Pee
Darren L. Salipsip
2009
1960
1975
1981
2009
1954
1955
1958
1964
1966
1968
1980
1982
1977
1952
1958
1966
1990
1956
1967
1977
1980
1999
2010

Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon
Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. Nos. 203754-204418,
16 June 2015 ....................................................................... 26
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 177721, 3 July
2007 ...................................................................................... 27
In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 0709-13-SC .............................................................................. 29
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V.
Flora, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 ............................................. 30
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
118882, 26 September 1996 ............................................ 31
In Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee hearing held on September 26, 2013
against
Associate
Justice
Gregory
S.
Ong,
Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J .............................. 33
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua, A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ,
23 April 2010 ....................................................................... 35
Santiago III v. Enriquez, A.M. No. CA-09-47-J, 13 February
2009 ...................................................................................... 36
In Re: Charges of plagiarism against Associate Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17, 8 February
2011 ...................................................................................... 38
Atty. Melvin Mane v. Judge Medel Belen, A.M. No. RTJ08-2119 ................................................................................ 39
Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991
............................................................................................... 40
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, B.M. No. 553, 17 June 1993........... 41
In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534.............................................. 42
Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No. 5118, 8 September 1999 ... 44
TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Philippine Legal System ......................................... 1
Lopez v. Regala, G.R. No. L-25716, 28 July 1966 ............. 1
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, 15 July
1936 ........................................................................................ 3
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205728, 21 July 2015 ........................................................... 4
Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127245,
28 June 2000 ......................................................................... 6
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998
................................................................................................. 7
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906,
7 October 2008 ..................................................................... 8
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
10 November 2015............................................................. 11
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191894, 15 July
2015 ...................................................................................... 12
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, 19
January 1999 ....................................................................... 13
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 114323, 23 July 1998 .................................................. 15
Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010 ............ 17
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137 ....................... 18
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261,
10 November 2003............................................................. 22
Tanada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, 28 February 1957
............................................................................................... 23
i
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 15 September

2004 ...................................................................................... 45
Castaneda v. Ago, G.R. No. L-28546, 30 July 1975........ 46
In Re: Edillon, A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978 ................. 47
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring
Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of
the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, 8 March 2011................................. 48
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, 10 June 2002 ......... 50
Pacana, Jr. v. Pascual-Lopez, A.C. No. 8243, 24 July 2009
............................................................................................... 51
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 20
September 1996 ................................................................. 53
Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui, G.R. No. 152072, 31 January
2006 ...................................................................................... 57
Araneta v. Gatmaitan, G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, 30

April 1957 ............................................................................ 82
Eastern Shipping Line v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, 18
October 1988 ...................................................................... 84
Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013
............................................................................................... 86
Essential Legal Concepts............................................. 88
Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, 28 March 2008 ...... 88
Chinese Young Mens Christian Association of the
Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, G.R.
No. 159422, 28 March 2008 .............................................. 91
Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil., Inc. v. Pagdanganan, G.R. No.
167866, 12 October 2006 ................................................. 92
Antonio v. Sayman, G.R. No. 149624, 29 September 2010
............................................................................................... 94
Republic of the Philippines v. Yu, G.R. No. 157557, 10
March 2006 .......................................................................... 96
Lim v. Cruz, G.R. No. 143646, 4 April 2001 ..................... 98
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty Corporation,
G.R. No. 148568, 20 March 2003 ...................................100
Villa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 87186, 24 April 1992
.............................................................................................102
Padillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119707, 29
November 2001 ................................................................104
People of the Philippines v. Derilo, G.R. No. 117818, 18
April 1997 ..........................................................................106
Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, 28 October
1993 ....................................................................................108
The Executive and Legislative Branches in Relation to

the Judicial Branch ...................................................... 61
Marcos v. Manlapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15 September
19189 ................................................................................... 61
Marcos v. Manlapus, G.R. No. 88211, 27 October 198963
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 US 683 (1947) ...................................... 64
Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008. .......... 67
Soliven v. Makaisar, G.R. Noi. 82585, 14 November 1988
............................................................................................... 69
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006 .............. 70
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 2 March 2001
............................................................................................... 73
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.146710-15, 3 April 2001 . 78
ii
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January

1995 ....................................................................................109
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. No. 167459, 26 January 2011 ..111
Tong v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009 .113
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, 29
April 2014 ..........................................................................115
iii
THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM

Lopez v. Regala, G.R. No. L-25716, 28 July 1966
Quick Reference:
Lopez and Roxas were candidates as Vice President for the
1965 General Elections. Lopez won and Roxas filed an
election protest with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Thereafter, Lopez filed a case in the Supreme Court and
challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1793
which created the said tribunal. It is alleged, among others,
that it created another court beyond the Constitutional
provision regarding judicial power. The Supreme Court
ruled in the negative. The said law only supplements by
conferring upon the Supreme Court additional original
jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
Facts:
Petitioner Fernando Lopez and Respondent Gerardo
Roxas were the main contenders for Vice President of
the Philippines in the 1965 General Elections. The
Congress, acting as the board of canvassers,
proclaimed Lopez as the winner.
Roxas filed an election protest with the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal alleging that he was the one who
obtained the largest number of votes.
Thereafter, Lopez filed a case in the Supreme Court

for prohibition with preliminary injunction. He sought
to prevent the Presidential Electoral Tribunal from
deciding the aforesaid election contest on the
ground that Republic Act No. 1793, the law that
created the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, is
unconstitutional.
Lopez contends that the Congress may not authorize
an election contest for the positions of President and
Vice President since the Constitution is silent
regarding the matter. For allowing election contest,
the law appears to be inconsistent with the
constitutional authority of Congress to proclaim the
candidates elected. Further, it is alleged that the said
law has the effect of amending the Constitution since
it permits the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to review
the congressional proclamation for the president and
vice president positions, considering that the
Constitution was deliberately written to not have any
provisions regarding election contest over the said
positions.
With regard to the composition of the President
Electoral Tribunal, Lopez also contends that it is
illegal for any Justice of the Supreme Court to sit as
members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal since
the decisions thereof are appealable to the Supreme
Court on question of law. The Presidential Electoral
Tribunal is a court inferior to the Supreme Court and
the Congress cannot appoint the members by mere

legislation.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1793 is
unconstitutional for seemingly amending the
Constitution with regard to election protests in the
President and Vice President positions.
Ratio:
Before addressing categorically this issue, the
Supreme Court had the occasion to discuss what is
judicial power.
Under the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law. This provision
vest in the judicial branch of the government the
entirety of the said power, except as much as the
Constitution confers the same upon some other
agency, such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House Electoral Tribunal for election contest relating
to the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires
legislative action in (1) defining such rights and/or
prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2)

determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide said controversies. Thus, the Constitution also
provides that Congress shall have the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts, subject to the limitations also set
forth in the Constitution.
Prior to Republic Act No. 1793, election protest for
the president and vice president positions were not
justiciable, i.e. there was no legal right to demand
election protest by recount. Thus, the passage of
Republic Act No. 17931 had the effect of giving
defeated candidates the legal right to contest
judicially the election, demand a recount, and secure
a judgment declaring he is the one elected, as the
case may be. When law provided that the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme
Court, the law in fact conferred upon the Supreme an
additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive
character.
This means that the said law did not create a new or
separate Court.
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to
the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court
although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are
more limited in scope that those of the Court in the
exercise of its ordinary functions. Republic Act No.
1793 does not entail an assumption by Congress of
the power of appointment vested by the Constitution

in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of
additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution vested
the Congress the discretion to determine by law
whether or not a president-elect or vice presidentelect may be contested.
Thus, Republic Act No. 1793 is not unconstitutional.
proper determination of the respective powers among the

departments. Electoral Commission, while not exactly a
department, but an organ created by the Constitution, such
body is still subject to the reach of the court.
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Angara filed a petition for prohibition
to restrain the Electoral Commission from taking
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua. The
said election protest was filed against Jose Angara for
his election as member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
Prior to this case, Angara and Ynsua were electoral
candidates for the position of member of the National
Assembly. Angara was proclaimed as the winner in
the election.
On 3 December 1935, the National Assembly passed
Resolution No. 8 as confirmation of the proclamation
of Angara.
On 8 December 1935, after the issuance of
Resolution No. 8, Ynsua filed a protest before the
Electoral Commission. Thereafter, Angara filed a
motion to dismiss the protest primarily alleging that
the protest was filed out of the prescribed period.
Angara contends that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe
the period when protest may be filed. Any protest
filed after the said confirmation is filed out of time.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No.

45081, 15 July 1936
Quick Reference:
Angara and Ynsua were candidates for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas. Angara won the elections. On 3 December 1935,
the National Assembly issued Resolution 8 to confirm
Angaras victory. Meanwhile, on 8 December 1935, Ynsua
filed a protest before the Electoral Commission. Angara
filed a Motion to Dismiss, but the said Commission denied
the same. The controversy now before the Supreme Court
is whether the Electoral Commission could be subjected to
judicial review. The Supreme Court answered positively,
citing first the doctrine of separation of powers. In such
cases where there may be conflict in the powers of the
departments, the court is vested with the role to make the
3
As his Answer, Ynsua alleged that there is no legal or

constitutional provision barring the presentation of a
protest against after the confirmation of the National
Assembly. Further, this was in fact the last date set by
the Electoral Commission to file a protest.
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution
denying the said motion to dismiss filed by Angara.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the controversy and over
the Electoral Commission.
Ratio:
Yes. The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in the Philippines system of government.
Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, but it
does not follow that the three are to be kept separate
and distinct. The Constitution provided a system of
checks and balances to secure coordination.
The overlapping functions between several
departments makes it hard to exactly delineate their
respective powers. Thus, in cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can determine the proper allocation of powers
between departments.
The Constitution may be lacking in perfection, but it

has established a republican government intended
to operate and function as a harmonious whole.
The Electoral Commission is no different to the other
departments of the government. It is still bound by
the restrictions provided in the Constitution.
It is true that the Electoral Commission is not a
department of the government. Rather, it is an organ
created under the Constitution. However, it is not
correct to say that it is beyond the control of the
constitutional mechanisms of checks and balances.
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 205728, 21 July 2015
Quick Reference:
COMELEC issued a notice for the Diocese of Bacolod to
remove tarpaulins posted on its front walls. The said
tarpaulins contained a list of politicians labeled as Team
Buhay and Team Patay, in connection with the campaign
of the church against the RH Law. The Diocese immediately
referred the case to the Supreme Court. The issue in this
case, among others, is whether or not there was a violation
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Supreme Court
ruled in the negative. Generally, an immediate resort to the
Supreme Court is not acceptable. However, this rule admits
exception such as this case that involves genuine issues on

constitutionality and issues of transcendental importance.
Facts:
The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed against the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) regarding the latters Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials in 2013.
The subject of the said notice was the tarpaulin
posted in the front walls of the San Sebastian
Cathedral in Bacolod. The tarpaulin contains
messages against the Reproductive Health Law. Also
included is a list of politicians categorized either as
Team Buhay or Team Patay.
After a series of correspondence between the
COMELEC and the Cathedral Bishop, COMELEC
issued a letter ordering the removal of the said
tarpaulins.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution
for exercise of free speech, petitioner Diocese of
Bacolod initiated this case before the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there was a violation of the Doctrine
of Hierarchy of Courts.
Ratio:
No. It is correct that as a general rule, the observation
of the hierarchy of courts is compulsory. It is designed
5
to shield the Court from cases within the competence

of the lower courts, consequently giving more time to
deal with more fundamental and essential tasks. After
all, the Supreme Court is a court of last resort. The
doctrine was created to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective
and efficient manner.
The Supreme Court leads the judiciary by breaking
new ground or further reiterating the light of new
circumstances or in the light of some confusions of
bench or bar existing precedents. Rather than a
court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions
of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
promulgates doctrinal devices in order that it truly
performs that role.
The role of the Supreme Court to interpret the
Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional
rights when these become exigent should not be
emasculated by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
That has never been the purpose of the doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an ironclad rule. There can be direct resort if there are (i)
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed immediately. Also, another exception is (ii)
when the issue is of transcendental importance.
Other exceptions include (iii) cases of first
impression, (iv)constitutional issues raised and better
decided by the Supreme Court, (v) when the time
element presented cannot be ignored, (vi) review of
the act of a constitutional organ, (vii) when there no

other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, and (viii) dictated by public
welfare.
Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

127245, 28 June 2000
Quick Reference:
There a motion filed by the petitioners referring the case to
the Supreme Court En Banc. In the Third Division, the
members voted 4-1 against the transfer. However, in the
Court En Banc, 9-5 voted to accept the case. The issue then
revolved whether or not there was a proper transfer to the
Court En Banc. Citing Resolution En Banc dated 18
November 1993, it was ruled that there was a proper
transfer. The fact that En Banc voted to accept the accept
should indicate the importance and merit of this case that
warrants the attention of the Court En Banc.
validity of the said decision and the original certificate

of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of
subject area at the time it was so adjudicated,
determination of the validity of the disposition
thereof is in order.
The assailed decision does not indicate the
classification of the land in question, when the herein
private respondents obtained their decree of
registration there over.
Since there appears to be error, the petitioners
motion the referral of the case to the Court En Bank.
On 8 March 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1
denying the transfer. However, on 14 March 2000,
the Court En Banc voted 9-5 to accept the case.
Issue/s:
Whether or not case was properly referred to the
Court En Banc.
Ratio:
Yes. What happened here is a legitimate and valid
exercise of the residual power of the Supreme Court
within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the
Resolution En Banc of 18 November 1993, which
reads: All other cases as the court en banc by a
majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention.
Facts:
This is a resolution of the petitioners Motion to Refer
to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases.
The case involves a land of 99 hectares presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which
land had been adjudicated to private individual by a
court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the
6
The fact that paragraph 9 of the said Resolution was

cited is an indication of the sufficient importance of
this case to merit and attention and disposition of the
entire Court en banc. This finding constitutes a
reason cogent and compelling enough to warrant
that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide the
petitioners motion.
When the Court En Banc entertains a case for its
resolution and disposition, it does not imply that the
Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective
and fair justice. The action of the Court only means
that the nature of the case calls for en banc attention
and consideration. It is not an undue exercise of sheer
voting strength, but a mere decision based on wellstudied finding and sustainable opinion.
tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and

resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing
acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually
filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually
led an appeal to the Ombudsman, but the Ombudsman,
Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. The case was later
referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero. The
deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is
final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the
Supreme Court. She averred Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), however, the Court later
on declared this to be invalid.
Facts:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government
construction project including those under the
FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant
incidents developed between the parties. Fabian
tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation
and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him in a letter-complaint
dated July 24, 1995.
A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for
violation of Section 19, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil
Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his
preventive suspension. The case later led to an
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16

September 1998
Quick Reference:
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT
Construction
Development
Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business
with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
Distxrict (FMED). Misunderstanding and unpleasant
incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian
7
appeal to the Ombudsman - who inhibited himself and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order
exonerated the private respondents from the
administrative charges.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing

argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs.
The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this
Court a measure of control over cases placed under
its
appellate
Jurisdiction.
Otherwise,
the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden
the Court.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasijudicial agencies are now required to be brought to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated
and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R.

No. 180906, 7 October 2008
Ratio:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot
validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution against a law which increases the
Quick Reference:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by
military men upon the suspicion that they were members of
the NPA. They were taken against their will without any
warrant of arrest whatsoever. They were subjected to torture
and illegal detention. They were interrogated and forced to
8
confess their involvement with the rebels. The brothers

maintained their non-involvement with the NPA. However,
they were continually beaten until after 18 months they
escaped their captors. They filed a case in Court to prohibit
the Armed Forces from further detaining them and
threatening their freedom. While the case was pending, the
Writ of Amparo took effect. The respondents prayed that
their case be heard under the new Rule. The prayer was
granted and the Writ of Amparo was resolved in their favor.
The petitioners were compelled to divulge the records of
the abduction of the brothers. The Secretary of Defense
questioned the order. The Court ruled that the Writ of
Amparo was well under their power to issue. It provided a
remedy for the plague of enforced disappearances and
extralegal killings. The Court is empowered under the 1987
Constitution to promulgate laws which safeguard
Constitutional Rights of Citizens, in this case their right to life
and liberty.
Facts:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were
abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU
(Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit) upon the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of
the NPA.
Raymond was forcibly taken from his house in the
presence of his mother by uniformed men whose
faces he recognized as CAFGU of Manuzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. He was forced into an L300 van.
Thereafter, another person was forced into the van,

his brother Reynaldo.
The brothers were beaten inside a van and then
brought to a house. They were ushered into separate
rooms within view of each other. The brothers saw
each other being beaten by the CAFGU. They were
interrogated and being forced to confessed that they
were members of the NPA.
Certain High Officials would visit the brothers and
ask them questions. The CAFGU accorded such
officials great respect. While in the presence of such
officials, the brothers were not beaten.
The brothers met with Gen. Jovito Palparan who
instructed them to tell their families not to go after the
Army for Human Rights Violations and other claims if
they wanted to live. Furthermore, the general
demanded their cooperation with regard the capture
of certain NPA figures despite them denying their
involvement with the NPA.
After 18 months of detention and alleged torture, the
brothers were able to escape their captors.
After their escape, the brothers filed a petition in
Court seeking to prohibit the military operatives from
depriving them forcibly of their liberty and other
basic rights.
During the pendency of the case, the Writ of Amparo
took effect on Oct. 24, 2007. The Manalos then filed
their omnibus motion under the Writ which had
recently taken into effect.
The Court granted the Writ prayed for by the Manalos

was granted by the Supreme Court and the Secretary
of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces
were ordered to furnish the Manalos of the results of
all investigations both official and unofficial. The
medical records of the Manalos while under
detention were also ordered to be furnished.
Issue/s:
Whether or Not the Supreme Court can issue an
order commanding the petitioners to disclose the
details regarding the abduction of the Manalo
brothers and other materials related therewith i.e.
medical records.
Ratio:
It is within the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate the Rules regarding the Writ of Amparo.
The Writ of Amparo (or Writ of Protection) was a Rule
issued by the Supreme Court in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances. It was an exercise for the first time
of the Courts expanded power, under the 1987
Constitution to promulgate rules to protect the
peoples Constitutional Rights.
While Constitutional rights can be protected under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, such a remedy may not
be adequate to address the problem of extralegal
killings.
10
The new Writ of Amparo, which allows summary

proceedings providing for interim and permanent
reliefs offers a better and swifter remedy to the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, both of which are extremely timesensitive.
The Writ is both preventive and curative in
addressing the abovementioned crimes. It is
preventive because it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of the said offenses. It is
curative because it leads to the punishment of
perpetrators through the disclosure of records both
official and unofficial.
The Writ of Amparo, and the power of the Court to
order the disclosure of records regarding forcible
abductions helps ensure that military officers can be
served with notices and court processes in relation to
any investigation and action for violation of the rights
of Citizens.
The Writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys
of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

217126-27, 10 November 2015
Quick Reference:
A preventive suspension order was issued against Binay Jr.
(Mayor of Makati). Binay Jr. obtained a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) from the Court of Appeals against
the suspension order. The Ombudsman assailed the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (CA) to issue the TRO.
The issue was whether or the CA had jurisdiction to issue the
TRO. The Supreme Court held that the CA had jurisdiction
because Paragraph 2 Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act
saying who cannot intervene in the investigation process of
the Ombudsman is unconstitutional.
The Office of the Ombudsman argued that the Court

of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue a TRO because
of Republic Act Republic Act 6670 (Ombudsman
Act).
Binay Jr. argued that it was well within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals to issue the TRO and that the
Ombudsman had no right to issue a preventive
suspension order because of the Condonation
Doctrine.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to issue the Temporary Restraining Order on the
preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in grave
abuse of discretion when it used the Condonation
Doctrine.
Facts:
A complaint was filed before the office of the
ombudsman against Makati Mayor Binay Jr.
He was accused of plunder, graft, and corruption
practices regarding the Makati City Hall Parking
Building.
On March 11, 2015, the Office of the Mayor of Makati
received a copy of the preventive suspension order.
On the same day noon time, the Court of Appeals
(CA) granted a resolution for Binay Jrs Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO).
Ratio:
The Supreme Court ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of
Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional and
invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in the landmark
case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998),
which, in turn, held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27,
RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect of increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and
concurrence, in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution.
11
The Supreme Court abandoned the condonation

doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO, as it did so base on
good case law, considering that the abandonment is
prospective in nature.
Court reversed the Sandiganbayan decision because

Duncano, while being a Regional Director, only had a Salary
Grade of 26.
Facts:
Danilo Duncano was a Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade
26.
On March 24, 2009 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) charged him with a criminal case for
violation of Republic Act 6713, particularly that he
failed to comply with his obligation to accomplish
and submit under oath his statement of assets
liabilities and net worth (SALN). He also failed to
disclose his interests in Documail Corporation to the
prejudice of the public interest.
Duncano prayed that the case against him be
dismissed arguing that his case does not fall under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan i.e. that his
position of Regional Director with Salary Grade 26
does not fall within the scope of the law.
The OSP contended that under the law, being a
Regional Director, Duncano was under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of
Salary Grade.
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191894,

15 July 2015
Quick Reference:
Danilo Duncano was a Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. He was charged with failure to declare his
statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN). He also
failed to disclose his involvement in business interests which
according to the Office of the Special Prosecutor was
prejudicial to the public. The case against Duncano was
heard before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Duncano
contended that his case is outside the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and must be heard instead by the Regional
Trial Courts. He filed a motion to dismiss the case before the
Sandiganbayan but was denied. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Sandiganbayan and ordered
the case dismissed because Duncano did not fall under the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided under R.A.
8249 which provided that only executive officials with the
position Regional Director and above and a Salary Grade of
27 and higher are under Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction. The
Issue/s:
Whether or not the case against Danilo Duncano fell
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
12

authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as
trenching on that sphere of executive authority. The SC does
not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment
rendered upon it. What it cannot do is modify or amend the
final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the
court loses its jurisdiction to amend the decision but retains
its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment
and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision.
Ratio:
No the case did not fall under Sandiganbayan
Jurisdiction. The Court ruled that the phrase
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher
qualifies regional director and higher. This means
that in order to be subjected to Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction, the executive official must be a regional
director or higher AND have a salary grade of 27 or
higher.
The distinction gives life to the legislative intent. The
Sandiganbayan is allowed to devote its time and
expertise to big-time cases of the so-called big fish
in government rather than those accused of petty
crimes or the small fry which helps the court
decongest its dockets.
However, those with Salary Grade below 27 may still
be subject to Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction if they fall
under the enumeration of R.A. 8249, Sec. 4(1) a to g.
Facts:
The DOJ, through the Department of Justice, filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the January 4,
1999 issuance of the Supreme Court of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of
Echegaray.
The DOJ, represented by the Solicitor General,
argued that the Court no longer has the authority to
grant
the
TRO
because:
1. That the Court lost its jurisdiction the moment it
rendered its judgment that is already final and
executory;
2. That it is encroaching on the powers specifically
vested by the Supreme Court to the executive
department
in
granting
the
TRO;
3. That the purpose sought to be achieved by the
TRO is nil due to certain supervening events that
transpired.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.

132601, 19 January 1999
Quick Reference:
It is the submission of respondents that the Decision in this
case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
13
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in
granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the
finality of judgment has already been rendered.
Ratio:
No, the Court was within its authority when it granted
the TRO despite the final and executory judgment
having been rendered already.
1. The Court did not lose its jurisdiction when it
granted the TRO. In its decision, it categorically
answered the contention of the plaintiff in such that it
is not changing its judgment. The Court is merely
suspending its execution temporarily.
It was emphasized that the Court, in rendering the
judgment lost its jurisdiction to amend, modify or
alter the same, but it retained its power to execute
and enforce it. It was further stated that the power to
control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction.
The 1987 Constitution, according to the Court,
strengthened and broadened the power of the Court
in matters like these. It gave the Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, i.e. the right to
life.
On a final note regarding the first contention of the
respondent, the DOJ acknowledged this Courts
14
jurisdiction when it filed a Manifestation and Urgent

Motion to Compel the trial judge to disclose the
Warrant of Execution containing the date of
Echegarays execution to the public. The jurisdiction
of the Court, it emphasizes, does not depend on the
convenience of the litigants.
2. The respondents contention that the issuance of
the TRO encroaches on the power of the executive is
also rejected. Section 19 Article VII of the Constitution
cannot be interpreted as denying the powers of the
Court to Control the enforcement of their decision
after their finality. It is not a usurpation of the
presidential power of reprieve, although it has he
same effect.
It must be noted that the powers of the Executive, the
Legislative, and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict does not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the
right to life.
3. The Court made it a point to clarify the rationale
behind the issuance of the TRO. The Court had to
decide on the petitioners Very Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of a TRO with a mere (5) hours prior to the
execution of Echegaray. They had been placed in a
very difficult position because it was such a short
period to ascertain the validity and substance of the
allegation contained in the Very Urgent Motion.
They also had no way of checking and verifying with
Congress because it was in recess at that time. The
Court took an extremely cautious stance by

temporarily restraining the execution of the
petitioner because of fear that any error of the Court
in not stopping the execution will preclude any
further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard.
At the end of the day, the TRO had achieved its
purpose. It crystallized the issue on whether the
Congress is disposed to review capital punishment or
not. Supervening events like the (1) pronouncement
of then President Estrada that it will veto any law
repealing death penalty; (2) the resolution of the
Congressmen that they are against the repeal of the
law; and (3) that current actions undertaken by
Senators Roco and Pimentel are futile.
despite petitioners several demands. The appellate court

concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not
have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus,
the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's
award. The issue in this case is whether or not the arbitrator
had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. The
constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude
the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Facts:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a
foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of
Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the
private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED.
The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and
controlled by the Government of India while the
private respondent is a private corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.
The conflict between the petitioner and the private
respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent
to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, 23 July 1998
Quick Reference:
The case is about the enforcement of a foreign judgment
awarded in favor of petitioner; a foreign corporation owned
and controlled by the government of India against private
respondent, a corporation organized and existing under
Philippine Laws. The conflict between the petitioner and the
private respondent rooted from the failure of the
respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement
to the petitioner even it had already received payment and
15
petitioner even it had already received payment and

despite petitioners several demands.
The petitioner then informed the private respondent
that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant
to Clause 16 of their contract, which stipulates that
the venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra,
resolved the dispute in favor of the petitioner setting
forth the arbitral award.
To enable the petitioner to execute the above award,
it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge
in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India.
This was objected by the respondent but foreign
court refused to admit the private respondent's
objections for failure to pay the required filing fees.
Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the
foregoing order and several demands by the
petitioner for compliance therewith, the private
respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by
the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the
enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the
foreign court. The private respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause
of action. The petitioner then appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the

dismissal of the complaint.
In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the
RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have
jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties,
thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the
arbitrator's award.
The petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the
dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.
Ratio:
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based does not preclude the validity
of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a
foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the
fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in
which such judgment was rendered differs from that
of the courts of the country in which the judgment is
relied on.
16
If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an

Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon
failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order
of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and
the
assailed
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint
before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is
REVERSED.
15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice

Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the
Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15,
Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a
provision on nepotism.
Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17,
2010 decision of the Court.
The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council
to resume its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancy created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list
of nominees and submit it to the incumbent
President.
Movants argue that the disputed constitutional
provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1),
clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments
to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they
contended that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in
disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010

Quick Reference:
This case is about the Motion for Reconsideration on the
decision that directs the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to
resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidate to
fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of
Reynato Puno. The movants of the cases states that the
constitutional provision on midnight appointments also
intended a ban on the members of the judiciary. The issue
is whether or not the Constitutional Commission extend to
the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during
the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII. The Constitutional
Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Constitutional Commission
extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15,
Article VII?
17

Levi Lincoln not to deliver the remaining commissions.
Among those commissions not delivered was that of
petitioner Marbury. Petitioner Marbury filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of the United
States, asking that his appointment as a justice of the peace
be completed. The Court denied Marburys petition,
holding that the Supreme Court does not have original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
Ratio:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the
Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments
during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio
Morales quoted from the records of the
Constitutional Commission did not concern either
Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13,
Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the
Supreme Court.
The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling
that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the term of the outgoing
president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme
Court
Facts:
Sometime during the Presidential Election of 1800
Thomas Jefferson won as the third president of the
United States defeating then incumbent president
John Adams. However Jefferson would not assume
office until about a month after he was proclaimed
winner. On his last day in office, President John
Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and
sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of
Columbia under the Judiciary Act of 1801 (Organic
Act), which modified the Judiciary Act of 1789. The
act established ten new district courts, expanded the
number of circuit courts. It essentially gave the
President at that time the authority to appoint Federal
Judges and Justices of the Peace. The Organic Act
was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of
the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took
office as President. One of those appointed was
William Marbury.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137

Quick Reference:
In the interim between the presidencies of John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson, John Adams named forty-two justices of
the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the
District of Columbia under the Judiciary Act of 1801.
However, when Thomas Jefferson took office, he instructed
18
In order to complete such appointments, such were

to be signed by approved by the Senate and
delivered to those appointed. Although all these
appointment were approved it was impossible to
complete all such deliveries before the end of
Adams' term. Given such as Thomas Jefferson took
office he instructed Levi Lincoln not to deliver the
remaining commissions. One of those whose
commissions were not delivered was for the
petitioner Marbury.
Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States for a writ of mandamus to compel
Jeffersons Secretary of State, defendant James
Madison, to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary
Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under
the authority of the United States.
Petitioner Marbury, seeing that his appointment was
not completed, filed a petition in the Supreme Court
for a writ of mandamus.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the authority

to review acts of Congress and determine whether
they are unconstitutional and therefore void.
Whether or not Congress can expand the scope of
the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond
what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has original
Ratio:
Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when
the Executives constitutional power of appointment
has been exercised, and the power has been
exercised when the last act required from the person
possessing the power has been performed. The grant
of the commission to Marbury became effective when
signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties
of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual rights depend upon the performance of
that duty, the individual who considers himself
injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy.
The President, by signing the commission, appointed
Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner Marbury has a right to the
commission.
If so, does the law provide Marbury with a legal
remedy.
19
Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed

thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the
completion of the appointment. Having this legal
right to the office, he has a consequent right to the
commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain
violation of that right for which the laws of the country
afford him a remedy.
The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of
Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and
interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other,
the Court must decide on the operation of each. If
courts are to regard the Constitution, and the
Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary
act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified
in Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a state shall be a party. In all other
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in the
20
discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial

power between the Supreme and inferior courts
according to the will of that body, this section is mere
surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If
Congress remains at liberty to give this court
appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and
original jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of
jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without
substance.
The Supreme Court does not have original
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it
must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to
exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that
it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that case.
Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the
delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain
an original action for that paper, and is therefore a
matter of original jurisdiction.
The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the
United States in one Supreme Court, and such
inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time,
ordain and establish. This power is expressly
extended to all cases arising under the laws of the

United States; and consequently, in some form, may
be exercised over the present case, because the right
claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power, it is declared that
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall
be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction.
It has been insisted at the bar, that, as the original
grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme and inferior
courts is general, and the clause assigning original
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court contains no
negative or restrictive words, the power remains to
the Legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that
Court in other cases than those specified in the article
which has been recited, provided those cases belong
to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of
the Legislature to apportion the judicial power
between the Supreme and inferior courts according
to the will of that body, it would certainly have been
useless to have proceeded further than to have
defined the judicial power and the tribunals in which
it should be vested. The subsequent part of the
section is mere surplusage -- is entirely without
meaning -- if such is to be the construction. If
Congress remains at liberty to give this court
21
appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has

declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and
original jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of
jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without
substance
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate
jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms,
and that, if it be the will of the Legislature that a
mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will
must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must
be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that
it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that case.
Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the
delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain
an original action for that paper, and therefore seems
not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.
Neither is it necessary in such a case as this to enable
the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
RULING: The rule must be discharged. (Application

for writ of mandamus of Marbury is denied.)
NOTE: This case is very important in American

Common Law because this is the case established, for
the first time, the definition and scope of the power
or judicial review. In the Philippine Legal System, this

case also bears importance, because of the fact that
the Philippine Legal System shares a lot of the same
principles with the American Common Law.
the mere specter of this creature called the political

question doctrine.
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."
The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.

160261, 10 November 2003
Quick Reference:
A resolution was adopted in the House of Representatives
that directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
The issue in this case is whether the resolution thereof is a
political question. The Supreme Court state that there are
two species of political questions: (1) truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political
questions. Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial
review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation
of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions, which are not truly political in nature. From the
record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by
22
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee

on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution.
This
second
impeachment
complaint
was
accompanied
by
a
"Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political

questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial
review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions, which are
not truly political in nature.
Tanada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, 28

February 1957
Quick Reference:
Issue/s:
Whether the resolution thereof is a political question
has resulted in a political crisis.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The

Supreme Court is not being asked by Taada to decide
upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by
Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question.
Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from
the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
Ruling:
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter
of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended
to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political
The SC can take cognizance of the case and ruled that the
issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question
connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
23
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary

authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction

against respondents, to be made permanent after a
judgment to oust respondents is passed.
Respondents contend that the Court is without
jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET members,
since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate.
They contend that the present action is not the
proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.
Facts:
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the

Nacionalista Party (NP) elected respondents Cuenco
and Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) upon the nomination of Senator
Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for
minority party nominees, were filled with NP
members to meet the Constitutional mandate under
Sec. 11, Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen
Party (CP) Senator Taada. Consequently, the
Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the
respondents as staff members of Cuenco and
Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination by
Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules
for the Senate, violates the Constitution since 3 seats
on the ET are reserved for minority senators duly
nominated by the minority party representatives.
Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on
Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a
violation not only of Taada's right as a CP member
of the ET, but also of respondent Macapagal's right
to an impartial body that will try his election protest.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Courts have jurisdiction over the
matter.
Whether or not the issue is a political question or a
justiciable one.
Ratio:
This is not an action against the Senate, and it does
not seek to compel the latter, either directly or
indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their
duties as members of said House. Although the
Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six
(6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of
the Senate.
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the
Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the
manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As
24
the author of a very enlightening study on judicial

self-limitation has aptly put it:
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand,
by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on
the other hand, to determine whether the powers
possessed have been validly exercised. In performing
the latter function, they do not encroach upon the
powers of a coordinate branch of the, government,
since the determination of the validity of an act is not
the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the
one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom
devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other
case we are merely seeking to determine whether the
Constitution has been violated by anything done or
attented by either an executive official or the
legislative."
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power"
is vested exclusively in the Congress of the
Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power
of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the
authority to inquire into the legality of statutes
enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and
approved by the Executive, there can be no reason
why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like
that of any other branch of the Government, may not
be determined in the proper actions.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties
to a litigation cannot properly be settled without
25
inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of

either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty
to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating
the fundamental law and paving the way to its
eventual destruction.
As already adverted to, the objection to our
jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue
before us is political or not.
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in
legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers
to "those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for
determination in the present case. Here, we are
called upon to decide whether the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on
Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that
said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall

be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the
second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and
hence, is null and void. This is not a political question.
The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary
authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon
is subject to constitutional limitations which are
claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within
the legitimate prove of the judicial department to
pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.
Whether an election of public officers has been in
accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute
prescribed election procedure in a given situation,
the judiciary may determine whether a particular
election has been in conformity with such statute,
and, particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on the
constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439;
emphasis supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only
jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein.
Film Development Council of the Philippines v.

Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. Nos.
203754-204418, 16 June 2015
Quick Reference:
Republic Act 9167 aims to collect amusement taxes
from class A and B movies.
Section 13 and 14 of the Act were assailed because
the taxes would not go to the benefit of the Local
Government Unit.
The Regional Trial Court assailed the Act/Law as
unconstitutional
The issue was that since only sections 13 and 14 were
assailed, should the entire law be struck down as
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that no because Republic
Act 9167 has a separability clause which basically
means that the other provisions of the law can still
stand even if Section 13 and 14 were to be
invalidated.
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act 9167 establishing the
Film Development Council
The purpose of this law was to collect amusement
taxes from class A and B movies.
26
All other cities in the Philippines were conforming to

this law except those cinemas in Cebu City.
Sections 13 and 14 were assailed by the cinema
proprietors because the amusement taxes would not
proceed to the benefits of the Local Government
Units (LGU)
The law was struck down by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) as unconstitutional.
petitioners contested said appointment by claiming that

respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, therefore ineligible for
the position. Furthermore, petitioners contended that
although 11 years after respondents birth his father was
granted Filipino citizenship through naturalization, it would
not make the respondent a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Respondent Ong however claimed that he indeed was a
natural born citizen by presenting a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration as well as the Department of Justice
as proof. According to the facts, respondent is a naturalized
Filipino citizen. He must prove his citizenship under the
time-line of three Constitutions. Without proving such, he
cannot accept the appointment under the law. Thus, he can
actually be prevented from the appointment by injunction.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the entire Republic Act 9167 (RA
9167) should be struck down as unconstitutional.
Ratio:
No. The Supreme Court held that RA 9167 has
separability clause which section 23. With this clause,
even if sections 13 and 14 would be invalidated, the
other remaining provisions of the law can still stand.
Facts:
Respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of
the Office of the President, appointed respondent
Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement
of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
However the appointment was recalled by
Malacanang in view of the question relating to the
citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
Petitioners contend that the appointment is patently
unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

177721, 3 July 2007
Quick Reference:
Executive Secretary Ermita, in representation of the Office of
the President appointed respondent Gregory S. Ong as
Associate Justice in order to fill up the vacancy due to the
retirement of Associate Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. However,
27
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese

citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and
that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese
citizenship.
The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at
the time of respondent Ongs birth on May 25, 1953,
his father was Chinese and his mother was also
Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Ratio:
No. Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
The alleged subsequent recognition of his naturalborn status by the Bureau of Immigration and the
DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court
stating that respondent Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father. The chain of
evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos,
respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen,
contrary to what still appears in the records of this
Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court
his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship
under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is
done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation
of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be
prevented by injunction from doing so.
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

provides that No person shall be appointed Member
of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court
unless
he
is
a
natural-born
citizen
of
the Philippines. Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines natural-born
citizens
as
those
who
are
citizens
of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
Citizenship.
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that

eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father
was finally granted Filipino citizenship by
naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a
natural-born citizen and presented a certification
from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
declaring him to be such.
28
In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet,

A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
Quick Reference:
Amado Macasaet alleged that a certain Justice of the
Supreme Court accepted bribe money in consideration of a
criminal case of which she was the ponente. Macasaet
alleged that through several exchanges with his source, he
found out that 10M pesos was sent to the office of Justice
Ynares-Santiago on separate occasions. Said money was
claimed by a secretary of the Justice. Justice YnaresSantiago belied the claims and the Supreme Court en banc
called forth Macasaet to explain his allegations. A
committee composed of Retired Justices found that
Macasaets allegations were unbelievable. Macasaet alleges
that he was protected by his right to freedom of speech,
particularly freedom of the press. The Court ruled that the
Independence of the Judiciary must be protected,
especially from baseless claims as those propounded by
Macasaet. The freedom of speech is not absolute and must
work in consonance with other imperatives of Democracy
such as Judicial Independence.
Facts:
Amado Macasaet in his Business Circuit column with
the newspaper Malaya, published a series of articles
29
(4 in total) regarding alleged acceptance of bribe

money by a Lady Justice.
The first of the articles did not specify the branch of
the Judiciary that the certain Lady Justice was
working for. However, the succeeding two articles
disclosed that the Justice involved was a member of
the Supreme Court.
The publications alleged that the Lady Justice, later
disclosed as being Justice Ynares-Santiago,
accepted the bribe amounting to a total of P10
Million to dismiss a graft case filed against ChineseFilipino businessman, Henry Go.
The Assistant Court Administrator Midas Marquez put
the subject of the allegations in the High Courts
Agenda. On Sept. 25, 2007, the Court en banc called
forth Mr. Macasaet to explain his allegations under
pain of indirect contempt
In his explanation, Macasaet was shown to be
inconsistent with the details of his accusations. This
was confirmed by a committee composed of Retired
Justices which recommended, after finding the
accusations to be unbelievable, that Macasaet be
held in contempt of court.
Macasaet argues that his right to freedom of the press
is a preferred liberty and is equal if not superior to
judicial independence.

protected especially from baseless and unbelievable
claims such as those espoused by Macasaet.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the allegations of Mr. Macasaet were
protected under the Constitutional right of free
speech, from which the freedom of the press
emanates from.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge

Florentino V. Flora, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
Ratio:
The Court found Macasaet guilty of indirect
contempt.
It has been consistently held that while freedom of
speech, of expression and of the press are core civil
liberties of citizens in a democracy, such freedoms
are not absolute.
In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales, it was held that
while the right of freedom of expression occupies a
preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, it
is not without limitations. As the revered Holmes once
said, The limitation on ones right to extend ones fist
is when it hits the nose of another.
In this case, the freedom of the press being asserted
by Macasaet has had an adverse effect upon the
public perception of the Supreme Court. His
allegations proposed that the High Court can be
bought. This heavily degrades the Judiciary, the
Supreme Court nonetheless as the bulwark of
democracy.
The Independence of the Judiciary is integral to the
publics faith in the justice system. Hence, it must be
Quick Reference:
Judge Floro was reconsidered to be a judge.
After becoming one, he committed acts which were
in violation of the Canon of Judicial Conduct.
A complaint was filed assailing his capability of being
a judge.
The issue was whether or not Judge Floro is fit to be
judge.
The Supreme Court held that no he is not fit to be one
because he has violated Canon Rules and the Canon
of Judicial Conduct.
Moreover, he claims to be a psychic and sees things
which prove that he is mentally and psychologically
stable to be a judge.
Facts:
Judge Floro was previously considered unfit to be a
judge because of his psychological condition and
state of mind.
Eventually, he became a judge
30
Judge Floro faced 13 charges calling for his

disbarment and removal from his office.
Some of these charges included alleged partiality in
criminal cases which is against the Canon Rule and
Canons of Judicial Conduct
He allegedly violated other Canons Rules of the
Canons of Judicial Conduct
He also claimed that he has psychic powers.
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 118882, 26 September 1996
Quick Reference:
This is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. Acting on
the said petition, the Court resolved to require respondents
all of whom are the accused in the aforesaid criminal cases,
to comment thereon within 10 days from notice, to issue the
temporary restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin
respondent judge from taking further action in the said
Criminal Cases. It appearing that private respondents failed
to file their respective comments within the period,
respectively, the Court resolved to require said private
respondents to show cause why they should not be
disciplinary dealt with for such failure, and to file the
required comments, both within ten (10) days from notice.
Thus, so as not to unduly delay the disposition of these
Criminal cases, we now resolve to dispense with
respondent's comments and to proceed with the
disposition of the petition. One of the essential
requirements of procedural due process in a judicial
proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it. In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina,
as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, cannot be
Issue/s:
Whether or not Judge Floro is fit to be judge
Ratio:
No. The Supreme Court held that Judge Floro has a
medical condition that rendered him unable to
properly serve as a judge with integrity.
A judge should avoid being queer in his behavior,
appearance and movements. He must always keep in
mind that he is the visible representative of the law.
His claims of his psychic powers and seeing things is
strong evidence that he is mentally and
psychologically incapable of being a judge.
31
considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an

impartial judge. Judge Espina's previous decision in favor of
respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable
basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality.
The Honorable Pedro Espina, is hereby declared
disqualified. It is further ordered that these criminal cases be
re-raffled
to
another
branch
of
the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
Facts:
Before us is a petition for review with an urgent
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order which seeks to:
annul and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals in "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro
S. Espina et al.", insofar as it denied the People's
prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina
of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City from
hearing Criminal Cases entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al." and "People
of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and;
b) enjoin respondent judge from conducting further
proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases.
- Acting on the said petition, the Court resolved
to require respondents all of whom are the
accused in the aforesaid criminal cases, to
comment thereon within 10 days from notice,
to issue the temporary restraining order
prayed for, and to enjoin respondent judge
-
32
from
taking
further
action
in
the
aformentioned Criminal Cases.
- It appearing that private respondents failed to
file their respective comments within the
period.
- Respectively, the Court on June 26, 1995
resolved to require said private respondents to
show cause why they should not be
disciplinary dealt with for such failure, and to
file the required comments, both within ten
(10) days from notice.
- As to respondents Johny Santos & Antonio
Alegro (prisoners at the Tacloban City Jail),
copies of the resolution requiring them to file
comment were returned unserved with the
postmaster's notation "unknown in said
address". The Court, on October 11,
1995 directed the Solicitor General to serve
the same on said respondents and to inform
the Court of such service, both within ten (10)
days from notice.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due
process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be
an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before
it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled
to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge which was
explained in Javier vs. Commission of Elections
This Court has repeatedly and consistently

demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just.
prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in

handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have
been more prudent for Judge Espina to have
voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal
cases.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a previous decision of the judge can
serve as a sufficient and reasonable basis for the
prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in
handling criminal cases.
In Re: Allegations made under oath at the

Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on
September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB14-21-J
Ratio:
Yes. One of the essential requirements of procedural
due process in a judicial proceeding is that there
must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it. The judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
Herein, Judge Pedro Espina cannot be considered to
adequately possess such cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence
to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in
view of his previous decision in.
Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane
Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the
Quick Reference:
The case surrounds the "pork barrel scam" involving Mrs.
Janet Napoles (Napoles) which involved money that was
sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) and allotted to members of the House of
Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned
massive protest actions all over the country. Prior to PDAF
scandal, however, Napoles had been involved in another
case (Kevlar Case) wherein it was proven by the testimony of
her cousin Benhur Luy (Benhur) that she had used Justice
Gregory Ong (Respondent) as a connect in order to have
Napoles acquitted from said case as the case was held
before the Sandiganbayan and Respondent was a Justice of
said court. Prior to her acquittal in the Kevlar case,
33
Respondent was spotted and such was evidenced by a

photograph posing together with Senator Jinggoy Estrada
who was the one who introduced the two. It was proven that
Napoles had indeed utilized Respondent in order to get
acquitted from the Kevlar case and Respondent's act of
voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two
occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1,
Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Facts:
Benhur testified against Napoles regarding the
Kevlar case.
He essentially was a whistleblower of Napoles and
since he worked closely with her he spilled to the Blue
Ribbon Committee how Napoles was acquitted in the
prior Kevlar case
Benhur stated that Jinggoy Estrada introduced
Napoles and Respondent in a social gathering
pending the Kevlar case which was evidenced by a
photograph of the 3 of them together.
Ledgers of Napoles also evidenced bribe
expenditures which had about P100 million to the
name of Respondent.
Respondent vehemently denied the imputations
hurled against him:
asserted that he could not be the contact or
"connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he
34
never met or came to know her during the pendency

of the Kevlar case;
Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or
"inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it
was decided based on the merits by the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body.
The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R.
Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J.
Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could
not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even
by their peers;
On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an
amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case,
respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was
attempting to tarnish his reputation without any
proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have
received money from Napoles considering that her
mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;
Ong admitted he went to Napoles' office twice,
sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the
Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010
He further explained the reason for having met with
Napoles which allegedly was to have access to the
robe of the Holy Black Nazerene in order to heal him
of his prostate cancer.

have been less than circumspect. He should have
kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety
and endeavored to distance himself from any act
liable to create an impression of indecorum.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Respondent was guilty of violating the
doctrine of judicial propriety.
Ratio:
(Respondent found GUILTY)
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles
at her office on two occasions was grossly improper
and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June
1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with
litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence
in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all
impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also
to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential
manifestation of reality.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that
they give no ground for reproach. Respondents acts
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua, A.M. OCA IPI No. 072630-RTJ, 23 April 2010

Quick Reference:
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged grave abuse
of authority and gross ignorance of the law by Petitioner
Ocampo who alleged that respondent acted improperly
during a special proceeding between Petitioner Ocampo
and his wife for custody of their children. Petitioner alleged
that respondent judge acted arbitrarily and unfairly when
she ordered a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor of
Ocampos wife as well as ordering monthly payments for
support in the amount of P50,000. However, during the
investigation, it was recommended by Justice SalazarFernando that the case be dismissed as the allegations
lacked substantial evidence and that judicial officers cannot
be held liable for erroneous decisions when rendered in
good faith.
Facts:
Petitioner Ocampo charged Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua with harassment, grave abuse of
35
authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross

misconduct for her actions during a special
proceeding where Ocampo was the respondent.
The said special proceedings was petition by
Ocampos wife for sole custody of their minor
daughters.
Ocampo alleged that respondent Judge ArcayaChua: 1. Denied his motion to dismiss despite
overwhelming evidence justifying such motion; 2.
Scheduling the hearing immediately a day after the
summons was served upon the respondent; 3.
Improperly issued a TPO and 4. Ordered payment for
monthly support in the amount of P50,000 without
sufficient basis.
Respondent Judge commented that the suddenness
of the schedule of the hearing was never her intention
but rather, the summons were supposed to be
delivered earlier but was unsuccessful because the
respondent was not at his residence during the first
delivery of the summons.
Respondent Judge likewise stated that the issuance
of the TPO was rightfully anchored on the provision
of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262.
Furthermore, Ocampos wife originally prayed for a
monthly support of P150,000 but the court only
awarded the P50,000, as it found that to be a
reasonable amount.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua can
be charged with gross ignorance of the law.
Ratio:
NO. During the investigation, Justice SalazarFernando recommended that the Ocampo case
should be dismissed. She stated that as a matter of
policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts are erroneous.
The Court sustained the recommendation of Justice
Salvador-Fernando that the case be dismissed in the
absence of substantial evidence that respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the charges brought
against her.
Santiago III v. Enriquez, A.M. No. CA-09-47-J, 13

February 2009
Quick Reference:
Complainant Genaro Santiago III filed an administrative
complaint against Respondent Court of Appeals (CA)
Justice Enriquez, Jr. for gross ignorance of the law and gross
incompetence in rendering an alleged unjust judgement in
36
a previous case. However, the Court ruled that an

administrative complaint is not the proper remedy when
there are other judicial remedies available, unless the
challenged Decision is tainted with fraud or malice. Through
the principle of judicial immunity, judicial officers are
protected from being held criminally or civilly liable for an
erroneous decision given in good faith.
Facts:
Complainant Santiago filed with the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for
Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate
of Title No. 56, which the court subsequently granted.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the decision
to the CA.
The case was raffled to Justice Gonzales-Sison of the
13th Division of the CA, where Respondent Enriquez,
Jr. was the chairperson.
Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her report to which
the Respondent expressed his dissent. In view of his
dissent, Respondent requested that there be a
Special Division of five to rule on the matter.
Subsequently, Respondents dissenting opinion
became the majority opinion and the Special Division
decided to reverse and set aside the original decision
of the RTC.
Complainant then filed an administrative complaint

against Santiago, charging respondent with Gross
Ignorance of Law/Gross Incompetence.
Respondent Santiago commented that the complaint
was just a tactic to harass and inhibit him from
handling the case. Respondent also contends that an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to
determine whether a Decision is erroneous or
contrary to law.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the complaint has merit.
Ratio:
NO. The complaint has no merit.
The filing of an administrative complaint against a
judge is unwarranted unless the Decision made by
the judge is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty
or with deliberate intent to cause injustice.
In this case, there was no showing of such fraud or
malicious intent in the Decision of the Special Division
of the CA.
The principle of judicial immunity protects judges
from being held criminally, civilly or administratively
liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good
faith. To rule otherwise would make it impossible for
the judiciary to function. In order for the proper
administration of justice, the judicial officer or judge
should be free to exercise his function without fear of
37
personal consequences, as long as he does so in

good faith and without fraud, malice or ill-intent to
cause injustice.
Facts:
(Short background on Vinuya case)
Petitioners in the Vinuya case claimed that in
destroying villages in the Philippines during World
War II, the Japanese army systematically raped them
and a number of other women, seizing them and
holding them in houses or cells where soldiers
repeatedly ravished and abused them. Their petition
for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan before the International Court of
Justice and other tribunals were denied by Justice
Del Castillo.
On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental
motion for reconsideration that Atty. Roque
announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo of
manifest
intellectual
theft
and
outright
plagiarism when he wrote the decision for the Court
and of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized
sources to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment. They charged Justice Del Castillo of
copying without acknowledgement certain passages
from three foreign articles:
A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle
and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International
Law (2009);
Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime
by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (2006); and
In Re: Charges of plagiarism against Associate

Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-717, 8 February 2011
Quick Reference:
Following a Supreme Court decision, the petition filed by
the Malaya Lolas Organization in accordance with Vinuya vs.
Romulo was dismissed. Atty. Roque Jr. acting as counsel for
Vinuya et al questioned the decision. He claimed that Justice
Mariano del Castillo who acted as ponente in the case
plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice
twisted the true intents of these books to support the
assailed decision. As such, Justice del Castillo was said to be
guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable
negligence. But, it was held that there was no plagiarism. in
the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was
attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by
Justice del Castillos researcher, the attributions were
inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice
del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own. But, even
if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling
on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011),
the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
38
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J.

Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
These sources were twisted and used without proper
attribution and made to look that these sources
support the judgements arguments in dismissing
their petition when in fact, these sources even make
a firm case for the Petitions claims.
UP Law in which he replied that he was from Manuel

L. Quezon University. Judge Belen responded by
saying Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot
equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I
know this, not all law students are created equal, not
all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are
created equal despite what the Supreme Being that
we all are created equal in His form and substance.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Judge
Administratively liable.
Ratio:
No, there is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as
emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in
2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to
judicial bodies.
Belen
can
be
held
Ratio:
YES. The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial
Conduct reads:
Rule 3.04. - A judge should be patient, attentive, and
courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the
court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into
the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the
courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
that a judge should be courteous to counsel,
especially to those who are young and inexperienced
and also to all those others appearing or concerned
in the administration of justice in the court. He should
be considerate of witnesses and others in attendance
upon his court. He should be courteous and civil, for
Atty. Melvin Mane v. Judge Medel Belen, A.M.

No. RTJ-08-2119
Facts:
Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane charged Judge Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of Branch 36,
Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of "demeaning,
humiliating and berating" him during the hearing in
which he was counsel for the plaintiff. During the
hearing Judge Belen asked Atty. Mane if he was from
39
it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate

language during the hearing of a case. In his
conversation with counsel in court, a judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to
obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants
and lead to its unjust disposition. He should not
interrupt counsel in their arguments except to clarify
his mind as to their positions. Nor should he be
tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or
premature judgment.
A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or
unjust may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their
clients and to the adverse party and his lawyer, so as
to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business
before the court. He may utilize his opportunities to
criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of
attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do
so in an insulting manner.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no
monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the
Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking
of the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of
Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to
discharge his functions and duties
Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3

September 1991
Quick Reference:
Respondent Monsod was nominated by Pres. Aquino as
Chairman of the COMELEC. The petitioner challenged the
nomination alleging that Monsod did not satisfy the
requirement of being engaged in the practice of law for at
least 10 years. However, the Court ruled that Monsods past
work experience did, in fact, satisfy the requirement and that
the term practice of law is not only limited to the conduct
of cases in court.
Facts:
Section 1, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be a Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders
of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
40
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by

President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC on April 25, 1991.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod.
On June 18, 1991, Respondent Monsod took his oath
of office and assumed the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Petitioner Cayetano challenged the nomination
because Monsod did not possess the required
qualification of being engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years and asked that the appointment
be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod passed the 1960 Bar
Examinations and is a member of the Philippine Bar.
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences

as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator satisfies the
requirement of being engaged in the practice of law
for at least 10 years.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, B.M. No. 553, 17 June 1993

Quick Reference:
Legal Clinic, Inc. was established by Atty. Rogelio Nograles
and offers paralegal services to Filipino clients. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. posted an advertisement offering services for
divorce in Guam, which is against Philippine law. The issue
is whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice
of law. Held: The Supreme Court held that the Legal Clinic
offered services which may only be performed by licensed
lawyers. The Court also noted that lawyers must not
advertise themselves, but their skill and reputation is
sufficient for their self-promotion.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Monsod has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
Ratio:
YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases in court. It embraces all other aspects such as
advising clients and preparing legal documents,
among others, which is done outside of the
courtroom.
There are various definitions of the term Practice of
law and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the
Facts:
The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a corporation that renders
paralegal services to clients in the Philippines.
Although its largest stockholder and incorporator is
lawyer Rogelio Nograles, the company does not hire
the services of other lawyers.
41
The Legal Clinic posted advertisements for its

company, which offered to aid in securing divorce
services in Guam, whereas divorce is generally not
permitted under Philippine law.
Petitioner contends that The Legal Clinic, makes
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.
Sought for their positions, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Philippine Bar Association (PBA),
Philippine Lawyers Association (PLA), UP Women
Lawyers Circle (WILOCI), Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and the
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) all
rejected the position of respondent The Legal Clinic
that they were merely offering paralegal services and
not actual legal services, contending that the name
The Legal Clinic gives the impression that the
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
renders full legal services.
responsibilities, and is not merely limited to litigation

in court. It includes rendering services such as
pleadings, special proceedings, foreclosure of
mortgages, enforcement of claims, etc. The Court
held that it does not matter that the United States has
paralegal firms because paralegals are a profession
on its own in the U.S., with specialized courses offered
in American universities. Whereas in Philippine
jurisdiction, no such specialization exists, and thus
only a person admitted to the Bar may render such
services. Likewise, the Court held that The Legal
Clinics advertisements did indeed give the
impression to the general public that it renders legal
services in the practice of law, and not merely
paralegal services. The Court also noted that lawyers
must not advertise, as their skill and reputation must
be sufficient for their self-promotion. The Supreme
Court
enjoined
respondents
from
issuing
advertisements similar to its divorce advertisement,
and prohibited it from engaging in practices
prescribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics.
Issue/s:
Whether or not The Legal Clinic, Inc. offers legal
services as defined under the practice of law, and
thus should not be allowed to make such
advertisements and misrepresentations.
In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534

Quick Reference:
Congress passed Republic Act 972 which was meant to aid
bar examiners who affected by the War. Section 1 of RA 972
lowered the passing mark of the Bar Exams from 1946-1955,
Ratio:
PETITION GRANTED. The Supreme Court held that
the practice of law covers a wide-range of
42
while Section 2 stated that after attaining a grade of 75 in a

bar exam, the examiner is deemed to have passed that
subject for subsequent exams, if any. The issue is whether or
not RA 972 is unconstitutional for encroaching the powers
of the judiciary Held: The Supreme Court partially granted
the petition. With respect to Section 1, the Court held the
period from 1946-1952 as unconstitutional for encroaching
the powers of the judiciary. The Supreme Court has the sole
authority in determining who may practice law, and the duty
to determine the standard by which persons are accepted
in the legal profession rests on the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not RA 972 is unconstitutional for
encroaching the powers of the judiciary.
Ratio:
PARTLY GRANTED. With respect to Section 1 of RA
972, the Supreme Court held that the period
covering 1946-1952 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while
the period covering 1953-1955 is IN FORCE AND
EFFECTIVE. The Court noted that Congress itself
stated that the purpose of the Act was to aid law
students who had inadequate preparations due to
the War. However, the Court noted that it is its
prerogative on who it may admit to the practice of
law, not Congress, and thus it is an encroachment of
the separation of powers. The Supreme Court held
that lawyers must be held to a very high standard, and
Congress may not lower that standard by its own.
With regard to Section 2, the Court held that it is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL because (a) it was not
embraced in the title of the Act, which was meant to
affect only bar flunkers, and (b) provides a permanent
system for an indefinite period.
Facts:
In 1952, Congress passed Republic Act 972, or
otherwise known as the Bar Flunkers Act.
Section 1 of RA 972 was to lower the passing marks
of the Bar Examinations from 1946 to 1955, provided
that no grade in any subject is below 50%.
Section 2 provides that a bar candidate who obtained
a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and shall be
included in the computation for subsequent bar
examinations.
The purpose of RA 972 was to allow law students from
the post-War era who had difficulty studying the law
due to a lack of materials destroyed by the War, as
Congress itself stated.
43
Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No. 5118, 8 September

1999
Quick Reference:
Marilou Sebastian hired the services of Atty. Dorotheo Calis
to procure the necessary travel documents in order to travel
to the US. Atty. Calis charged a fee of Php150,000 for his
services. He subsequently informed Marilou Sebastian that
she will be using the name Lizette Ferrer in her passport,
which caused Sebastian to ask for a refund. Calis convinced
Sebastian otherwise. Sebastian was caught in Singapore for
using false documents and was deported to the Philippines.
She asked for a full refund from Calis which was only partially
complied with. The issue is whether or not Atty. Calis
violated a breach of professional ethics. Held: Yes, Calis
violated professional ethics for unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, deceitful conduct. The practice of law is not a
right, but a privilege granted by the Supreme Court to those
who can pass their high standards and the qualifications it
sets. Calis was disbarred.
Atty. Calis charged a fee of Php150,000 to procure all

the necessary documents.
After a series of partial payments, Atty. Calis informed
Sebastian that she will be using passport bearing the
name Lizette P. Ferrer.
After realizing that she will be using spurious
documents, Sebastian sought a refund from Atty.
Calis.
Atty. Calis convinced Sebastian that he will take
responsibility should she be caught, and will also
subsequently give a full refund.
Sebastian flew to Singapore where immigration
officers noticed her spurious documents, was
detained and deported.
Sebastian sought a full refund from Atty. Calis but
Atty. Calis only partially complied.
Sebastian then subsequently filed a complaint
against Atty. Calis.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Calis violated a breach of
professional ethics.
Ratio:
While Atty. Calis was initially only suspended, the
Supreme Court disbarred him for unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, deceitful conduct, as well as a
violation of his oath as a lawyer. The original
judgment sanctioned only a suspension, because the
Facts:
Marilou Sebastian hired the services of Atty.
Dorotheo Calis to procure the necessary travel
documents needed to travel to the United States.
44
Court held that Sebastians knowledge of Atty. Calis

act mitigated his liability.
However, after
reconsideration, the Court found that Atty. Calis
unduly put Sebastians life in danger and thus held
that a more severe penalty is appropriate. The Court
stated that the practice of law is not a right, but a
privilege granted by it, and such a privilege may be
revoked if it finds that such person no complies with
the high standards of the Court and the qualifications
it requires.
Facts:
Cojuanco Jr. filed a complaint for disbarment against
Palma.
Palma was hired by Cojuanco after he used the
services of ACCRA law and he became fond of Palma.
The two parties became very intimate with each
other, when Palma would frequently visit Cojuancos
house and even tutor his daughter Luisa who was a
student at the Assumption Convent.
On June 22, 2982 Palma then went to Hong Kong
with Luisa and there they got married.
Complainant then filed a disbarment case against
Palma.
Complainant states that Palma is a married man with
three children and therefor he cannot marry Luisa.
On August 24, 1982 the complainant filed for a
declaration of nullity of the marriage between Palma
and Luisa.
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action and that there is no
allegation that he acted with wanton recklessness,
lack of skill, or ignorance of the law.
Respondent stressed that he married Luisa with the
utmost sincerity and good faith and that it is contrary
to the natural course of things for an immoral man to
marry the woman he sincerely loves.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended that the respondent be suspended to
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 15

September 2004
Quick Reference:
Respondent was hired by Petitioner to be his legal counsel.
Respondent married the complainants daughter in Hong
Kong, despite already being married with three children.
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against the
respondent. Respondent argues that he is a good lawyer
and that his marriage with complainants daughter has
nothing to do with his practice of law since he is in love. The
court ruled that there is no distinction between a lawyers
personal and professional life. The court ruled that he
should be disbarred considering that he knew his marriage
with complainants daughter would be considered
bigamous.
45
practice law for 3 years, because he knew that the

marriage he was entering into with Luisa was a
bigamous marriagae and is penalized under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Castaneda v. Ago, G.R. No. L-28546, 30 July

1975
Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondents act of marrying
Luisa would warrant his disbarment.
Quick Reference:
Petitioners filed a replevin case against the respondent.
Judgement was then rendered in favor of petitioners and
the house and lot of the respondet was sold at auction to the
petotioners. The petioner now says that the sale should be
null and void because the judgment was made against his
personal property and that the house and lot is part of the
conjugal property of Ago and his wife, where the wife has
one-half share and therefor should not be put up for auction.
The petitioners now contend that the petitioner, his wife,
and their counsel have misused and made a mockery of the
legal system. They maneuvered for 14 years to resist the
execution of judgement through unhonorable tactics. The
court said that it is the duty of the lawyer to guide his clients
responsibly and his duty is first and foremost to the cause of
justice and not to his client.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court (SC) stressed that there is no
difference between transgression committed in the
lawyers professional capacity and his provate life.
When Palma married Luisa, while still being married
to Hermosisima, his act constitutes grossly immpral
conduct, which is a ground for disbarment under
section 27, rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The court ruled that the respondent committed
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as
a lawyer.
The penalty of suspension is not commensurate to
the gravity of his offense.
The penalty given is disbarment.
Facts:
Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit (an action
seeking return of personal property wrongfully taken)
against Ago
46
In 1957, judgement was rendered in favor of the

petitioners, ordering Ago to return the machinerires
of pay a definite sum of money
On August 1961 a writ of execution was issued for a
sum of P172,923.87
Levy was made on Agoss house and lots in Quezon
City
The house and lot was sold via auction to Castaned
and Henson
Ago , now being joined by his wife filed a complaint
to annul the sale on the count that the judgement was
for Agos personal property and his wife has a onehalf share in their connjugal properties and therefore
it cannot be used to satisfy the judgement
Petitioners contend that the respondents, together
with their counsel, Atty. Luison, have misused legal
remidies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgement
They maneuvered for 14 years to resist the execution
of the judgement thru manifold tactics in and from
one court to another
Ratio:
The court ruled that Atty. Luison has allowed himself
to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a
true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack
merit of his case
If the lawyer finds his clients case is defenseless, then
it is his duty to advise the latter to acquisce and
submit
A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable
In Re: Edillon, A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978

Quick Reference:
The IBP filed a disbarment case against Edillon for nonpayment of IBP dues. Edillon argues that it is
unconstitutional for the IBP to require monthly dues,
However the Court ruled that the IBP has every right to
disbar Edillon because according to Sec. 10 of their by-laws,
non-payment for one year merits disbarment. The Court
ruled the disbarment of Edillon.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondents and their counsel
conspired using legal remedies to thwart the
judgment
47

Ratio:
The court ruled that the IBP can disbar Edillon for
non-payment of dues
The IBP is dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionaly and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the
personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers
Also the Court said that, entering into the IBP is
voluntary and therefore Edillon cannot complain
against its by-laws
Facts:
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governers unanimously
aadopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative
Case No. MDD-1 recommending to the court the
removal of the name of the respondent from the Roll
of Attoryneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues to the IBP since the latters
constitution notwhithstanding due process
On January 21, 1976 the IBP submitted a resolution
to the Court that states that they will give the
respondent until June 29 to pay his dues or they will
recommend to the Court his disbarment
On January 27 the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution, Edillon then replied and
still refused to pay his dues
The IBP then replied to Edillons reply by saying that
according to Section 10 of the IBP by-laws if a
member of the IBP does not pay his dues for 1 year,
he will be disbarred
The respondent on the other hand states that, him
being forced to pay dues is against his constitutional
rights of liberty and property
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled

Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M.
No. 10-10-4-SC, 8 March 2011
Quick Reference:
This is a plagiarism case wherein respondent lawyers are
being charged for plagiarism in the construction of the
Vinuya v Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) case. Not
only should they be disciplined for their violations to the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), but they must
Issue/s:
Whether or not the IBP can disbar Edillon for nonpayment of dues
48
also be punished to uphold the integrity of the Supreme

Court of the Philippines.
Facts:
Works were allegedly plagiarized from the Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230)
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, works
plagiarized in the Vinuya decision include the ff:
Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents article A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens
Christian J. Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in International Law
Mark Ellis article Breaking the Silence: On Rape as
an International Crime
The decision reportedly plagiarized the above
mentioned articles. Furthermore, what made the
plagiarism even more vague is the fact that materials
directly lifted from the above mentioned articles were
used to convey points that were the complete
opposite of what they were truly meant to be. This
makes the misrepresentation and the plagiarism
even more unforgiveable.
The argument that the ponente cannot be expected
to have been thorough in citing sources is a weak one
as this is a matter of discipline that is expected of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
It is then the opinion of the Faculty of the University of
the Philippines College of Law that
Plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v

Executive Secretary is unacceptable
Endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire
Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of
the Philippine judicial system
Does damage to the primordial function of the SC as
the ultimate dispenser of justice to all
To save the honor and dignity of the SC as an
institution, the ponente of the Vinuya case must
resign, without prejudice to any other sanctions that
the court may consider appropriate
SC must take this opportunity to review the manner
by which it conducts research, prepares drafts,
reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a
recurrence of similar act
Issue/s:
Whether or not the 37 respondent law professors
should be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court.
49
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or

misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the test of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not bee
proved.
Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against
a Judge to the proper authorities only.
Canon 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends
to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing
the court.
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, 10 June

2002
Quick Reference:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Magulta for taking the
money of Burbe while failing to file his case in the proper
courts. As a lawyer, there is a responsibility to uphold
towards justice that goes beyond the need for payment. This
responsibility binds all lawyers regardless of the payment
that they have received which is why Atty. Magulta was still
liable for a 1 year suspension from the legal profession due
to his actions.
Facts:
This is a disbarment case involving the respondent,
Atty. Magulta, filed by complainant Burbe in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Burbe met Atty. Magulta who agreed to help him with
his legal needs.
Respondent prepared demand letters and other
legal purpose pursuant to the agreement that they
had with each other.
A filling fee was demanded by the respondent before
he filed the case in the proper courts.
Ratio:
Yes, the respondent lawyers are to be disciplined in
this case but only to remind them of their lawyerly
duty. Further or subsequent future violations will
merit a higher penalty.
50
After a payment of 25,000 pesos by the complainant,

there was still no update on the status of the case.
Respondent would avoid communications with the
complainant until complainant decides to visit the
clerk of court himself.
Complainant was surprised to find that the case was
not filed by the respondent
In his defense, respondent alleged that the 25,000
peso payment was an incomplete payment of his
retainer and therefore, he was not bound to filing the
case due to this lack of payment.
Further, complainant admitted that he used the
payment for other personal purposes first but offered
to return it through two post-dated checks.
The current case with the IBP is now filed against Atty.
Magulta due to malpractice from misappropriation of
clients funds and rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the CPR.
The lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client,

even if the client never paid any fee for the attorneyclient relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Atty. Magulta had a
responsibility and obligation to maintain fidelity to
the law and he went against this obligation through
how he dealt with Burbe throughout this entire case.
Pacana, Jr. v. Pascual-Lopez, A.C. No. 8243, 24

July 2009
Quick Reference:
This disbarment case against Atty. Pascual-Lopez was filed
due to the evident conflict of interest that she took
advantage of. Conflict of interest exists when the
acceptance of the cause of one client goes against the cause
of another previously accepted client. As a lawyer, there is a
duty to eliminate conflict of interest, but in this case, Atty.
Magulta used it to take advantage of the complainant and
posed as a mediator when in fact, she was wrongfully
representing both clients with directly conflicting interests.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Magulta can be disbarred due
to misappropriation of clients funds and rules 16.01
and 18.03 of the CPR.
Ratio:
No, disbarment is too heavy a penalty. However, the
court decided to suspend Atty. Magulta from
practicing law for a year due to the charges against
him in this case.
51
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Rolando
Pacana, Jr. (complainant) against Atty. Maricel
Pascual-Lopez (respondent)
Charges against respondent include flagrant
violations of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibilty (CPR), namely conflict of
interests, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure
to render and accounting of all the money and
properties entrusted to her.
Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC), now
known as Precedent Communications Corporation
(Precedent), is an affiliate company Multitel
International Holdings Corporation (Multitel)
In 2002, Multitel was subject to demand letters from
its members and investors due to failures in
investment plans
Complainant became the assignee of majority of the
shares of stock of Precedent and was also the trustee
of a 30 million peso deposit at Real Bank
Being confused, complainant sought the help and
advice of a friend and fellow member of Couples for
Christ (CFC), respondent Atty. Pascual-Lopez.
Respondent gave legal advice and helped prepare
standard quitclaims for the complainant
Respondent offered a retainer agreement with
100,000 php acceptance fee. Complainant refused.
No formal written document of any sort was executed

stating that respondent was the official legal counsel
of the complainant.
Complainant followed the advice of respondent and
went to the US while the case is pending to avoid
conviction.
When complainant returned respondent refused to
acknowledge him as her client and insisted that she
represented the investors of Multitel instead.
Respondent insisted that because there was no
formal written agreement making her the legal
counsel of the respondent, then she was not bound
by the CPR.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Pascual-Lopez is bound by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and can
therefore be disbarred due to conflict of interests,
dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render
and accounting of all the money and properties
entrusted to her.
Ratio:
52
Yes, Atty. Pascual-Lopez is still bound by the CPR

even in the absence of any written agreement and
was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
The respondents argument that she was not bound
by the CPR because of the absence of a written
agreement is weak in the presence of the obvious

legal advice she gave the complainant. The
determination of fidelity to the practice is not limited
by the presence of written agreements. Further,
conflicting interest is present when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test whether or not in behalf
of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue
of claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform and act in a way that will
injuriously affect his first client in any manner.
There was an obvious conflict of interest in this case
that Atty. Pascual-Lopez took advantage of and is
sufficient grounds for her disbarment.
complaint dropped Raul Roco as party-defendant on the

promise of revealing his clients and was affirmed by the
Sandiganbayan while denying the inclusion of the other
defendants upon their failure to, as ordered by the PCGG:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission
of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship;
and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their
respective shareholdings. The defendants then filed a
petition for certiorari among several grounds arguing that
the Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case,
the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA
lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the
other information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorneyclient privilege includes the identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are
not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers
alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
Issue: Whether or not the attorney-client privilege may be
asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners
client(s) in the case at bar. - YES
Held:
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the clients name would implicate that client
in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his
identity is privileged.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 20

September 1996
Quick Reference:
Facts: Defendants (ACCRA Law Partners) and Raul Roco
assisted in the organization and acquisition of corporations
linked to a complaint before the Sandiganbayan by the
PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery
of the alleged ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG in an amended
53
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated

documents was part and parcel of petitioners legal service
to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral
part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in
the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of
the clients name would obviously provide the necessary link
for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
exists.
Facts:
This case is in relation to a complaint dated July 31,
1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the PCGG against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery of the
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the (PCGG Case No. 33, Civil Case No. 0033,
Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, et
al). The defendants of this case (partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
Law Offices- ACCRA Law Firm) as well as private
respondent Raul Roco admitted in the assistance in
the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in the Case No. 0033 and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as
nominees-stockholders of the said corporations
involved in the sequestration proceedings.
54
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential

Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a
Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint and
Third Amended Complaint which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG
Case No. 33 as party-defendant. Respondent PCGG
based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as
party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal
the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominees/stockholder in the companies involved in
PCGG Case No. 33.
The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners
(ACCRA LAW) from the complaint was duly set for
hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its Comment, respondent PCGG set the following
conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of
the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in
favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan
promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case
No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG. ACCRA lawyers
moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution
but the same was denied by the respondent

Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938,
invoking as one of the grounds:
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.
Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorneyclient privilege includes the identity of the client(s).
The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not
limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers
alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged
matters.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the attorney-client privilege may be asserted
in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners client(s) in the
case at bar. -YES
Ratio:
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely
dependent upon the degree of confidence which
exists between lawyer and client which in turn
requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and
fruitful exchange and flow of information. It
necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
55
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege

not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and
professional responsibility.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should
not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the
general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United
States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client.
Reasons:
The court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.
The privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is
a client.
The privilege generally pertains to the subject matter
of the relationship.
Due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope
in the dark against unknown forces.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general
rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions:
Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for

which he sought the lawyers advice.
Ex-Parte Enzor- A state supreme court reversed a
lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the
name of her client on the ground that the subject
matter of the relationship was so closely related to the
issue of the clients identity that the privilege actually
attached to both
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig- Where a strong probability
exists that the disclosure of the clients identity would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for
which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability, his identity is privileged.
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted the
New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim to
the effect that he could not reveal the name of his
client because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation. Also, in the matter of Shawmut Mining
Company.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case
against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the
clients name, the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name
is privileged.
Baird vs. Korner, a lawyer was consulted by the
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the
undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case

criminal charges were brought against them by the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
56
The circumstances involving the engagement of

lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal
that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the
alleged clients name would lead to establish said
clients connection with the very fact in issue of the
case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which there would
be no attorney-client relationship). The link between
the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or
legal service sought was duly established in the case
at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in
the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG
which constitutes petitioners ticket to nonprosecution should they accede thereto:
o (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
o (b) submission of documents substantiating
the lawyer-client relationship; and
o (c) the submission of the deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can
readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the
financial and corporate structure, framework and setup of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners
gave their professional advice in the form of, among
others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment
covering their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the
aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners legal service to their clients. More
important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal
advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation
of
ill-gotten
wealth
in
the
aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception,
revelation of the clients name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to
build its case, where none otherwise exists.
Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, and sought to

represent them. An agreement was entered upon by the
parties stating that the contingent attorneys fees would be
based in any and all amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN
PESOS (P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds. A
Compromise Agreement was executed between the
Zuzuarreguis and the NHA stipulating among other things,
that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties
would be at P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds
or a total of P54,500,000.00. The records show that the
amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas
amounted to P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds. Computed at
P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters
property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total
price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the
NHA was P54,500,000.00.
Then the Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money
and Damages on 14 November 1989, against the NHA, Jose
B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas and Atty. Santiago N.
Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the
NHA bonds be turned over to them.
Petitioners Roxas and Pastor contend that the letter of
agreement executed regarding the payment of contingent
attorneys fees must be upheld as a contract is the law
between parties. Thus, they are entitled to P23,980,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not the letter-agreement dated 10
December 1985, executed by the Zuzuarreguis, and Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, fixing the exact amount that must go to
the former, should stand as law between parties.
Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui, G.R. No. 152072, 31

January 2006
Quick Reference:
Facts: During an expropriation case filed by the NHA
involving the Zuzuarreguis for a parcel of land situated in
Antipolo, Rizal, they engaged the legal services of Attys.
57
Held: The Supreme Court held that although there was a

valid contract, and that the contract is the law between
parties, according to Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, a contract for contingent fee, where
sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty
of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
SC cited Licudan v. Court of Appeals, where it did not allow
the Contract for Professional Services between the counsel
and his client to stand as the law between them as the
stipulation
for
the
lawyers
compensation
was
unconscionable and unreasonable.
and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, states that in cases where contingent fees are
sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under all
the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject
to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such
that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and
reasonable fees.
Supreme Court with the case at bar, held that the awarding
of almost P24,000,000 pesos as contingent fees to Attys.
Roxas and Pastor is unreasonable and unconscionable
reiterating the fact that the Courts may reduce it. This is in
line with Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
In 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed
expropriation proceedings against the De
Zuzuarreguis for a parcel of land situated in Antipolo,
Rizal. They engaged the legal services of Attys.
Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, and sought
to represent them.
On 10 December 1985, a Letter-Agreement was
executed by and between Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr.,
Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the one
hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago
Pastor, on the other. The said Letter-Agreement
confirms an amendment to their agreement
regarding attorneys fees as lawyers and counsels for
the Zuzuarreguis properties expropriated by
National Housing Authority covering ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-NINE (179) HECTARES. It was stated that
the Zuzuarreguis are willing to accept as final and
complete settlement for our 179 hectares
expropriated by NHA a price of SEVENTEEN PESOS
(P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of THIRTY
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P30.4 Million), all payable in NHA Bonds and
committed to pay the contingent attorneys fees any
and all amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN PESOS
(P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds.
As a result of the aforesaid NHA Resolution, a
Compromise Agreement was executed between the
Zuzuarreguis and the NHA in Civil Case No. 26804.
58
The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among

other things, that the just compensation of the
Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per
square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision
dated 20 December 1985, the RTC, Branch 141,
Makati, approved the Compromise Agreement
submitted by the parties.
On 27 December 1985, the NHA Legal Department,

through Atty. Jose B. H. Pedrosa, released to Atty.
Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis, the
amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer Bonds as
partial payment for several parcels of land with a
total area of 1,790,570.36 square meters located in
Antipolo, Rizal. On even date, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas
delivered NHA Bonds to Antonio De Zuzuarregui in
the amount of P15,000,000.00. On 04 February 1986,
the amount of P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was
again released by the NHA to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas
in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis. On 14 February 1986,
the Zuzuarreguis issued a receipt for receiving the
amount of P30,070,000.00. This receipt included the
P15,000,000.00 given to them last 27 December
1985. Again on 17 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis,
through Beatriz Zuzuarregui Vda. De Reyes, issued
another receipt for the amount of P450,000.00 in
NHA bonds. The total amount in NHA bonds released
to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis
amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the
records show that the amount turned over to the

Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to
P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds. Computed at P19.50
per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters
property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a
total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount
released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The
difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the
yield on the bonds.
Then the Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of
Money and Damages on 14 November 1989, against
the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas
and Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis
demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be
turned over to them.
Petitioners Roxas and Pastor contend that the letter of
agreement executed regarding the payment of
contingent attorneys fees must be upheld as a
contract is the law between parties.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the letter-agreement dated 10
December 1985, executed by the Zuzuarreguis, and
Attys. Rosas and Pastor, fixing the exact amount that
must go to the former, should stand as law between
parties.
59
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that although there was a
valid contract which is a meeting of the minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to
render some service, it sustained the decision of the
Court of Appeals granting the return of the NHA
bonds to the Zuzuarreguis but applied a different
computation regarding the contingent attorneys
fees.
The Supreme Court based its decision in Licudan v.
Court of Appeals, where it did not allow the Contract
for Professional Services between the counsel and his
client to stand as the law between them as the
stipulation for the lawyers compensation was
unconscionable and unreasonable.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and
Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their
professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that
contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They
are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, viz.:
13. Contingent Fees.
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by
law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always
be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness.
and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, viz.:
CANON 20A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01.A lawyer shall be guided by the following
factors in determining his fees:
1
(a) The time spent and the extent of the
services rendered or required;
2
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question
involved;
3
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
4
(d) The skill demanded;
5
(e) The probability of losing other employment
as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
6
(f) The customary charges for similar services
and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
7
(g) The amount involved in the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
8
(h) The contingency or certainty of
compensation;
9
(i) The character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
10
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
However, in cases where contingent fees are
sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case, and should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to
its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the
60
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is

tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge
only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to
reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is
excessive and unconscionable. Thus, Section 24, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court partly states:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to
fees.An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy,
the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be
paid therefore unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront
ones sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. It
becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to
determine
the
reasonableness
or
the,
unconscionable character of attorneys fees
stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received
an amount which was equal to forty-four percent
(44%) of the just compensation paid (including the
yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis,
or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the
P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full

blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it
did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is,
undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the
circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order.
-o0o-
THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE

BRANCHES IN RELATION TO THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH
Marcos v. Manlapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15
September 19189
Quick Reference:
Mr. Marcos wanted to return to the Philippines, but Mrs.
Aquino, considering the consequences to the nation of his
return, barred his return. The liberty of abode and the right
to travel are guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, while the
right to return to ones country is guaranteed by
International Law. However, due to the residual powers of
the President that are grounded on general welfare of the
people, Mrs. Aquino has the power to deny the rights
guaranteed in favor of Mr. Marcos.
61
Facts:
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent,
for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into
exile after causing twenty years of political, economic
and social havoc in the country and who within the
short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class
by itself.
Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government
is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Mr. Marcos and his family.
The petitioners contend that the President is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her
to do so. They advance the view that before the right
to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency
of the government, there must be legislation to that
effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international
law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the
return of former President Marcos and family to the
Philippines?
Ratio:
The Constitution provides that the executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. It
would not be accurate, however, to state that
"executive power" is the power to enforce the laws,
for the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one of
the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law.
On these premises, we hold the view that although
the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
The Constitution declares among the guiding
principles that the prime duty of the Government is to
62
serve and protect the people and that the

maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.
In the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing
action for these plans, or from another point of view,
in making any decision as President of the Republic,
the President has to consider these principles, among
other things, and adhere to them.
In the present case, the problem of the President is
one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of
the President, as steward of the people.
President Marcos died, and President Aquino reaffirmed the

decision to bar the Marcos return. Marcos family filed a
motion for reconsideration on October 2, 1989. The SC
denied said motion on the ground that as movants, Marcos
family failed to present compelling reasons to overturn the
original decision. Likewise, the SC reaffirmed the Presidents
decision as part of the residual powers vested in the
President, as supported by American Jurisprudence. The SC
found that the decision to bar the return of the Marcos family
to the Philippines was not arbitrary or done with grave abuse
of discretion as the present circumstances warranted such
bar.
Facts:
On September 15, 1989, the Supreme Court (SC)
dismissed, by a vote of eight to seven, the original
petition, after finding that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
denying former President Marcos and familys return
to the Philippines, given the present circumstances.
On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos
died in Honolulu, Hawaii. President Aquino
reaffirmed the decision to deny Marcos return, for
the tranquility of the state and order of society.
On October 2, 1989, Marcos family filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, raising the following arguments; (1)
to bar the return is to deny inherent right of citizens
and rights guaranteed by the Constitution, (2) the
President has no power to bar a Filipino from his
Marcos v. Manlapus, G.R. No. 88211, 27

October 1989
Quick Reference:
By a vote of eight to seven, the Supreme Court (SC) on
September 15, 1989, found that the President validly denied
former President Marcos and family from returning to the
Philippines. On September 28 of the same year, former
63
own country, (3) No basis for barring the return of

Marcos remains and the Marcos family.
Solicitor General argued that the motion for
reconsideration is moot and academic as to the
deceased former President. The Solicitor General
also asserts that the Marcos family sought to return
under the guise of right to return to destabilize the
country, as evidenced by Mrs. Marcos statement that
the current President Aquino is illegal.
used for the other powers. The SC holds that such

view applies to the Philippine Constitution, as it has
been patterned after the American Constitutions
separation of powers. Furthermore, the SC
acknowledged that among the duties of the
President is that of the protection and promotion of
the interest and welfare of the people. The barring of
the return of former President Marcos remains and
family under present circumstances is in compliance
with such duty, absent any clear showing of
arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the President may validly bar the
return of Filipinos.
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 US 683 (1947)
Ratio:
Yes, the President has residual powers, which
includes the power to bar the return of Filipinos to the
country, which in this case is the Marcos family. The
SC holds that the movants for the reconsideration
failed to present compelling reasons for
reconsideration. Also, the SC upheld that the
President has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power which are
necessary to comply with the duties under the
Constitution. Such view is found in American
Jurisprudence, as espoused by Hamilton and
affirmed by Taft, on the American Constitution,
highlighting the sweeping language used for the
executive power as compared to the limiting words
Quick Reference:
President Nixon was issued a subpoena duces tecum by the
US District Court of Columbia to produce tape recordings
and documents relating to his conversation with aides and
advisers. Nixon argued that he has absolute executive
privilege. The issue here is whether the subpoena should be
quashed because it demands confidential conversations
between a President and his close advisors that it would be
inconsistent with the public interest to produce. The court
stated that: We conclude that, when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
64
administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion

of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need
for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Facts:
This litigation presents for review the denial of a
motion, filed in the District Court (DC) on behalf of
the President, to quash a 3rd-party subpoena duces
tecum issued by the US District Court of Columbia.
The subpoena directed the President to produce
certain tape recordings and documents relating to his
conversation with aides and advisers. The court
rejected the Presidents claim of absolute executive
privilege, of lack of jurisdiction, and of failure to
satisfy the requirement of Rule 17(c).
On March 1, 1974, the grand jury of the US DC for
Columbia returned an indictment charging 7 named
individuals with various offenses, including
conspiracy to defraud the US and to obstruct justice.
The grand jury named the President, among others,
as an unindicted coconspirator. Upon motion of the
Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was
issued to the President, which required the
production of certain tapes, memoranda, papers,
transcripts, or other writings relating to certain
precisely identified meetings between the President
and others.
65
The President publicly released edited transcripts of

43 conversations; portion f 20 conversations subject
to subpoena in the present case were included.
The President counsel filed a special appearance
and a motion to quash the subpoena accompanied
by formal claim of privilege.
Further motions to expunge the grand jurys action
naming the President as an unindicted coconspirator
and for protective order against the disclosure of that
information were filed or raised orally.
DC denied the motions and further ordered the
President or any subordinate officer, official, or
employee with custody or control of the documents
or objects subpoenaed, to deliver the originals, as
well as an index and analysi of those items, together
with tape copies of those portions for which
transcripts had been released to the public by the
President.
DC rejected the jurisdictional challenges based on a
contention that the dispute was nonjusticiable
because it was between the Special Prosecutor and
the Chief Executive and hence intra-executive in
character; it also rejected the contention that the
Judiciary was without authority to review an assertion
of executive privilege by the President.
DC held that the judiciary, not the President, was the
final arbiter of a claim of executive privilege. The
court concluded that the presumptive privilege was
overcome by the Special Prosecutors prima facie
demonstration of need sufficiently compelling to

warrant judicial examination in chambers.
The President filed a timely notice of appeal from the
DC order. Later on, the Special Prosecutor also filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment
Issue/s:
Whether the subpoena should be quashed because
it demands confidential conversations between a
President and his close advisors that it would be
inconsistent with the public interest to produce.
Ratio:
Since the Court has consistently exercised the power
to construe and delineate claims arising under
express powers, it must follow that the Court has
authority to interpret claims with respect to powers
alleged to derive from enumerated powers.
We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty
of this Court to say what the law is with respect to
the claim of privilege presented in this case.
In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the
President urges 2 grounds. The 1st ground is the
valid need for protection of communications
between high Government officials and those who
advise and assist them in the performance of their
manifold duties.
Human experience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well
66
temper candor with a concern for appearances and

for their own interests to the detriment of the decision
making process.
The 2nd ground asserted by the President in support
of the claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine
of separation of powers. Here it is argued that the
independence of the Executive Branch within its own
sphere, insulates a President from a judicial
subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and
thereby
protects
confidential
Presidential
communications.
However, neither the doctrine of separation of
powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances. When the privilege depends solely on
the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in
the confidentiality of such conversations, a
confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim
of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept
the argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of Presidential communications is
significantly diminished by production of such
material for in camera inspection with all the
protection that a DC will be obliged to provide.
To read the Art. II powers of the President as
providing an absolute privilege as against a
subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal

statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the
public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and
nondiplomatic discussions would upset the
constitutional balance of a workable government
and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.
We conclude that, when the ground for asserting
privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use
in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the
fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March

2008.
Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16
Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People's Republic of China.
67
In connection with this NBN Project, various

Resolutions were introduced in the Senate to conduct
an inquiry in aid of legislation in connection with were
various bills pending in Senate. Respondent
Committees initiated the investigation by sending
invitations to certain personalities and cabinet
officials involved in the NBN Project. Neri was among
those invited. He was summoned to appear and
testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25,
2007. However, he attended only the September 26
hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the
other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using
their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was
initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA
acquiesced to convert it into a government-togovernment project, to be financed through a loan
from the Chinese Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before
respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him
P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,

when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear
and testify on November 20, 2007. However, in the
Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo
R.
Ermita
requested
respondent
Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony
on the ground of executive privilege.
On November 20, 2007, Neri did not appear before
the Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the
latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to
explain why he should not be cited in contempt. NerI
replied Committees, manifesting that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege. The
Committees found Ner's explanations unsatisfactory.
They issued the Order citing him in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the communications implied by the
subject three questions subject to executive
privilege.
Held:
YES. The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct
thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But,
the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid,
it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the
Senate or House duly published rules of procedure
and that the rights of the persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected. The power
extends even to executive officials and the only way
for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of
executive privilege.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized
in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
68
relating to these powers may enjoy greater

confidentiality than others.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita
premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions "fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public
officials" necessary in "her executive and policy
decision-making process" and, that "the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic
as well as economic relations with the People's
Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that,
indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power"
of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine
jurisprudence.
Second,
the
communications are "received" by a close advisor of
the President. Under the "operational proximity" test,
Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third,

there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Soliven v. Makaisar, G.R. Noi. 82585, 14

November 1988
Facts/Issues:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues
were raised: (1) whether petitioners were denied due
process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima
facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2)
whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran
were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not
the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.
69

immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue
of the office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case
in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Ratio:
1.Moot and Academic.
The Sec. of Justice sustained the City Fiscals finding
of a prima facie case against the petitioners. Also, it
should be noted that instead of submitting counteraffidavits, Beltran filed a Motion to declare
proceedings closed, in effect, waiving his right to
refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
2. NO. What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
3. YES. The rationale for the grant to the President of
the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction But this privilege of
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006

Quick Reference:
Facts:
In issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and
General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited
PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing.
Ratio:
The following rules may be culled from the cases decided
by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
70
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that

the following requirements are met:
cases involve constitutional issues;
for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question;
for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396,
particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same
holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, CachoOlivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged
direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful
search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question
their legal standing.
It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure
of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law.
Facts:
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari
and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order
No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria MacapagalArroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and
protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances
are void for being unconstitutional.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency:
I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic
of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency because the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
71
extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and

the extreme Right, represented by military
adventuriststhe
historical
enemies
of
the
democratic Philippine State.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the
declaration of a state of national emergency and after
all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted
PP 1017.
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the
police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal
of their assemblies. During the dispersal of the
rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant)
petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing.
Ratio:
Locus standi (Legal Standing) is defined as a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
In private suits, standing is governed by the realparties-in interest rule. It provides that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-ininterest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the
72
plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the

relief sought.
In matter of mere public right, however . . . the
people are the real parties . . . It is at least the right, if
not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that
a public offence be properly pursued and punished,
and that a public grievance be remedied. With
respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that
the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public
funds to his injury cannot be denied.
For a private individual to invoke the judicial power
to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient
that he has a general interest common to all members
of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result.
The following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to
sue, provided that the following requirements are
met:
cases involve constitutional issues;
for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal

disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question;
for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
Now, the application of the above principles to the
present petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396,
particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The
same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409,
Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They
alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest
and unlawful search committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal
standing.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President
Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he
can be dragged into court litigations while serving as

such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction
to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and
judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in
the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. However,
this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people but he may be
removed from office only in the mode provided by
law and that is by impeachment.
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 2

March 2001
Quick Reference:
Facts:
The Case Is A Petition By Estrada Alleging That He Is The
President On Leave While Respondent, Arroyo Claims She
Is The President.
Governor Singson Went On Air And Accused Estrada Of
Receiving Millions From Jueteng Lords; P220M In Jueteng
73
Money And 70m In Excise Tax On Cigarettes From Governor

Singson.
Cardinal Sin Issued A Statement Asking Estrada To Step
Down As He Had Lost Moral Authority, Former President
Aquino Also Asked Estrada To Take The Supreme SelfSacrifice And Resign. Fidel Ramos Also Joined And Even
Vice President Arroyo Asked For Estradas Resignation But
Estrada Held On And Refused To Resign.
And The Articles Of Impeachement Was Signed By 115
Representatives Or 1/3 Of The Members Of The House Of
Representatives Which Eventually Led To The Senate
Formally Opening The Impeachment Trial Of Estrada.
During The Trial A Testimony Was Made By A Senior Vice
President At Equitable PCI Bank Stating She Saw Estrada
Affix The Signature Of Jose Velarde On Documents
Involving A 500m Agreement With Their Bank. Later, An
Envelope Which Allegedly Contained Evidence Showing
Estrada Held 3.3B In A Secret Bank Account Under The
Name Jose Velarde Was Put To A Vote And By A Vote Of 1110 The Senator Judges Ruled Against Opening The
Envelope. Prosecutors Walked Out In Protest Of The Ruling
And In A Few Hours Thousands Of People Assembled At
EDSA Shrine.
Estrada later agreed to surrender the office and began
negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
but before the negotiations were finalized and executed
chief justice Davide administered the oath of arroyo as
president and on that same day Estrada and his family left
the palace.
On that same day, he also signed a letter stating that he is

unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and
by operation of law the vice president shall be acting
president.
After His Fall From Power, Estradas Legal Problems Began.
Estrada later filed with the supreme court a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the ombudsman from conducting
further proceedings in his criminal cases until after his term
as president is over. A petition for quo warranto was also
filed praying for a judgement to confirm that he is the lawful
and incumbent president temporarily unable to discharge
his duties and that arroyo is only holding the presidency in
an acting capacity.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner resigned as president or should be
considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when
respondent took her oath as the 14th president of the
republic.
Ratio:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts
of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied.
As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not
write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
74
Malacaang palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001

after the oath-taking of respondent arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined
from his acts and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
president.
Facts:
The Case Is A Petition By Estrada Alleging That He Is
The President On Leave While Respondent, Arroyo
Claims She Is The President. In 1998, Estrada Was
Elected President And Arroyo Was Elected Vice
President. Since The Beginning Of His Presidency,
Problems Kept Eroding His Popularity And His
Decent From Power Began When Governor Singson
Went On Air And Accused Estrada Of Receiving
Millions From Jueteng Lords; P220M In Jueteng
Money And 70m In Excise Tax On Cigarettes From
Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee And Committee On Justice Then Began
Joint
Investigations
And
The
House
Of
Representatives Committee On Public Order And
Security Also Began Investigations. Representatives
Also Spearheaded The Move To Impeach Estrada.
Later, Cardinal Sin Issued A Statement Asking Estrada
To Step Down As He Had Lost Moral Authority,
75
Former President Aquino Also Asked Estrada To Take

The Supreme Self-Sacrifice And Resign. Fidel Ramos
Also Joined And Even Vice President Arroyo Asked
For Estradas Resignation But Estrada Held On And
Refused To Resign.
Soon Enough His Economic Advisers Resigned And
The Articles Of Impeachement Was Signed By 115
Representatives Or 1/3 Of The Members Of The
House Of Representatives Which Eventually Led To
The Senate Formally Opening The Impeachment
Trial Of Estrada. During The Trial A Testimony Was
Made By A Senior Vice President At Equitable PCI
Bank Stating She Saw Estrada Affix The Signature Of
Jose Velarde On Documents Involving A 500m
Agreement With Their Bank. Later, An Envelope
Which Allegedly Contained Evidence Showing
Estrada Held 3.3B In A Secret Bank Account Under
The Name Jose Velarde Was Put To A Vote And By A
Vote Of 11-10 The Senator Judges Ruled Against
Opening The Envelope. Prosecutors Walked Out In
Protest Of The Ruling And In A Few Hours Thousands
Of People Assembled At EDSA Shrine. As More
People Gathered And With Others Such As Students
And Teachers Walking Out Of Classes To Show Their
Concordance The Call For Estradas Resignation
Intensified.
Thereafter, The Chief Of Staff Of The Armed Forces
Had Withdrawn Its Support For The Estrada
Administration Followed By The PNP. Cabinet
Secretaries And Bureau Chiefs Also Started

Resigning From Their Posts And Rallies For Estradas
Resignation Exploded In Various Parts Of The
Country. Even Estradas Announcement Of Holding A
Snap Election In Which He Will Not Run As A
Candidate Did Not Diffuse The Crisis.
Estrada later agreed to surrender the office and
began negotiations for the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power but before the negotiations were
finalized and executed chief justice davide
administered the oath of arroyo as president and on
that same day estrada and his family left the palace
and issued a statement wherein he said that although
he had doubts about the legality and constitutionality
of arroyos proclamation as president, he did not wish
to be a factor to prevent the restoration of unity in
society and he is leaving the palace, the seat of the
presidency for the sake of peace and order so that the
healing process of the nation may begin. On that
same day, he also signed a letter stating that he is
unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office
and by operation of law the vice president shall be
acting president.
After his fall from power, Estradas legal problems
began. Several cases of bribery, graft, corruption,
plunder, perjury, serious misconduct and illegal use
of public funds were filed against him. Estrada later
filed with the supreme court a petition for prohibition
to enjoin the ombudsman from conducting further
proceedings in his criminal cases until after his term

as president is over. Estrada also later a petition for
quo warranto praying for a judgement to confirm that
he is the lawful and incumbent president temporarily
unable to discharge his duties and that arroyo is only
holding the presidency in an acting capacity.
In a resolution the court resolved that it did not issue
a resolution declaring the office of the president
vacant and ordered the parties to refrain from
discussing the cases while they were pending
decision by the court. A 30 day status quo was also
issued enjoining the ombudsman from resolving and
deciding on the criminal cases against Estrada.
Issue/s:
Whether or not conviction in the impeachment
proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada, in the negative and
on the assumption that petitioner is still president,
whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
Ratio:
None of the parties considered this issue as posing a
political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question
whose factual ingredient is determinable from the
records of the case and by resort to judicial notice.
Petitioner denies he resigned as president or that he
suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he
76
submits that the office of the president was not vacant

when respondent arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning
of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides:
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office or resignation of the president,
the vice president shall become the president to
serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the president and vice president,
the president of the senate or, in case of his inability,
the speaker of the house of representatives, shall
then act as president until the president or vice
president shall have been elected and qualified.x x x.
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as
president or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as
the 14th president of the republic. Resignation is not
a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question
and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be
an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by
acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is
not governed by any formal requirement as to form.
It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It
can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did
not write any formal letter of resignation before he
77
evacuated Malacaang palace in the afternoon of

January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001
or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner
resigned as president.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the
resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow
the succession of events after the expose of governor
Singson. The senate blue ribbon committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of
petitioners alleged misgovernance in the blue
ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The
articles of impeachment filed in the house of
representatives which initially was given a near cipher
chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed,
it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or
more than 1/3 of the house of representatives. Soon,
petitioners powerful political allies began deserting
him. Respondent arroyo quit as secretary of social
welfare. Senate president drilon and former speaker
villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then,
his respected senior economic advisers resigned
together with his secretary of trade and industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened,

the peoples call for his resignation intensified. The
call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11)
members of the impeachment tribunal refused to
open the second envelope. It sent the people to
paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of january 16
was over, the edsa shrine was swarming with people
crying for redress of their grievance. Their number
grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration
quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at
bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the
circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did
the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the court these
circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value,
was never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis.
To be sure, no person can be compelled to render
service for that would be a violation of his
constitutional right. A public official has the right not
to serve if he really wants to retire or resign.
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a
public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal
or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot
use his resignation or retirement to avoid
prosecution.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment

proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of Republic Act 3019, bars him from
resigning.
We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an
impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative
proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the
time petitioner resigned because the process already
broke down when a majority of the senator-judges
voted against the opening of the second envelope,
the public and private prosecutors walked out, the
public prosecutors filed their manifestation of
withdrawal of appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when
he resigned. Estrada Vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452,
G.R. Nos. 146710-15, G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.146710-15, 3 April

2001
Facts:
Same as Estrada v Desierto March 3, 2001
78
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court disregarded the clear and
explicit provisions of Art. XI. Section 3 (7) of the
constitution and the settled jurisprudence thereon.
Ratio:
Petitioner contends that this court disregarded
section 3 (7) of article xi of the constitution which
provides:
(7) Judgment In Cases Of Impeachment Shall Not
Extend Further Than Removal From Office And
Disqualification To Hold Any Office Under The
Republic Of The Philippines, But The Party Convicted
Should Nevertheless Be Liable And Subject To
Prosecution, Trial And Punishment According To
Law.
Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be
first convicted in the impeachment proceedings
before he could be criminally prosecuted. A plain
reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion.
The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first,
it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a
limited reach . . . I.e., it cannot extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the republic of the Philippines, and
second, it tells us the consequence of the limited
reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings
considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted
79
shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial

and punishment according to law. No amount of
manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitor
submission that the provision requires that his
conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and
punishment for the offenses he is now facing before
the respondent ombudsman.
Petitioner contends that the private and public
prosecutors walk out from the impeachment
proceedings should be considered failure to
prosecute on the part of the public and private
prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the
senate is equivalent to acquittal.40 he explains
failure to prosecute as the failure of the
prosecution td prove the case, hence dismissal on
such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.41 he then
concludes that dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of
applying the rule against double jeopardy.
Without ruling on the nature of impeachment
proceedings, we reject petitioners submission.
The records will show that the prosecutors walked out
in the january 16, 2001 hearing of the impeachment
cases when by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges
refused to open the second envelope allegedly
containing the p3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in
a secret bank account under the name jose velarde.
The next day, january 17, the public prosecutors
submitted a letter to the speaker of the house

tendering their resignation. They also filed their
manifestation of withdrawal of appearance with the
impeachment tribunal. Senator raul roco immediately
moved for the indefinite suspension of the
impeachment proceedings until the house of
representatives shall have resolved the resignation of
the public prosecutors. The roco motion was then
granted by chief justice davide, jr. Before the house
could resolve the issue of resignation of its
prosecutors or on january 20, 2001, petitioner
relinquished the presidency and respondent arroyo
took her oath as president of the republic. Thus, on
february 7, 2001, the senate passed resolution no. 83
declaring that the impeachment court is functus
officio.
Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the
impeachment case against him. Even assuming
arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not
every invocation of an accuseds right to speedy trial
is meritorious. While the court accords due
importance to an accuseds right to a speedy trial and
adheres to a policy of speedy administration of
justice, this right cannot be invoked loosely.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for
an unreasonable length of time are what offend the
right of the accused to speedy trial.47 the following
provisions of the revised rules of criminal procedure
are apropos:
80
rule 115, section l(h). Rights of accused at the trial.

in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights: (h) to have speedy,
impartial and public trial.
rule 119, section 2. Continuous trial until terminated;
postponements.trial once commenced shall
continue from day to day as far as practicable until
terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable
length of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor
and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial
on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In
no case shall the entire trial period exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial,
except as otherwise authorized by the supreme
court.
Petitioner therefore failed to show that the
postponement of the impeachment proceedings was
unjustified, much less that it was for an unreasonable
length of time. Recalling the facts, on january 17,
2001, the impeachment proceeding was suspended
until the house of representatives shall have resolved
the issue on the resignation of the public prosecutors.
This was justified and understandable for an
impeachment proceeding without a panel of
prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment
process. However, three (3) days from the suspension
or january 20, 2001, petitioners resignation
supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the

impeachment court became functus officio and the
proceedings were therefore terminated. By no
stretch of the imagination can the four-day period
from the time the impeachment proceeding was
suspended to the day petitioner resigned, constitute
an unreasonable period of delay violative of the right
of the accused to speedy trial.
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he
is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His
arguments are merely recycled and we need not
prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In
our decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends
and turns up to the present time. We held that given
the intent of the 1987 constitution to breathe life to
the policy that a public office is a public trust, the
petitioner, as a non-sitting president, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting president. Petitioners
rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised
new spins are based on the rejected contention that
he is still president, albeit, a president on leave. His
stance that his immunity covers his entire term of
office or until june 30, 2004 disregards the reality that
he has relinquished the presidency and there is now
a new de jure president.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a
non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit
81
during his term of office. He buttresses his position

with the deliberations of the constitutional
commission, viz.:
mr. Suarez. Thank you. The last question is with
reference to the committees omitting in the draft
proposal the immunity provision for the president. I
agree with commissioner nolledo that the committee
did very well in striking out this second sentence, at
the very least, of the original provision on immunity
from suit under the 1973 constitution. But would the
committee members not agree to a restoration of at
least the first sentence that the president shall be
immune from suit during his tenure, considering that
if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he
might be spending all his time facing litigations, as
the president-in-exile in hawaii is now facing
litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas: the reason for the omission is that we
consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez: so there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas: there is no need. It was that way before.
The only innovation made by the 1973 constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez: on the understanding, i will not press for
any more query, madam president. I thank the
commissioner for the clarification.
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term
and tenure. The term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and

fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds
office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.50 from the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president
from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his
term.
Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but
bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not
really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but just
to take advantage of the immunity attached to the
presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the
criminal cases pending against him in the office of the
ombudsman.
The issue is whether the EOs were valid and whether undue
delegation of legislative power was granted to the
President.
The Court ruled that the EOs were valid because the
Fisheries Law authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to enact rules and regulations to protect
fish fry and fish eggs. Given the valid delegation of rulemaking power, the validity of the EOs issued by the
President become apparent, given the provision in the
Constitution granting the President control over all
executive departments, among which the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is included.
Facts:
The President issued Executive Order (EO) No. 22
which prohibited the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay
Said EO was amended by EO 66 and 80
A group of Otter trawl operators, praying the an
injunction be issues to restrain the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director
of Fisheries from enforcing the said executive order,
filed a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory
relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of
First Instance of Manila
The Court rendered a decision declaring EOs 22, 66,
and 80 invalid
The argument being that only the Legislature, not the
Executive, may restrict trawl fishing
Araneta v. Gatmaitan, G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L9191, 30 April 1957
Quick Reference:
The President issues Executive Order (EO) No. 22 which
prohibited the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay. A group of
Otter trawl operators assailed the validity of the EOs and the
power of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to enforce said EOs.
82
Respondents filed an appeal, arguing that the lower

court erred in ruling that the President has no
authority to issue the EOs in question
Issue/s:
Whether the President has the authority to issue EOs
22, 66, and 80; and
Whether EOs 22, 66, and 80 were valid for the
issuance thereof was not in exercise of legislative
power unduly delegated to the President
Ratio:
Yes, the President has the authority to issue EOs 22,
66, and 80
The Fisheries Law authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to promulgate
regulations restricting the use of any fishing device
including the net trawl fishermen use for the
protection of fry or fish eggs
The same law also declares unlawful and fixes a
penalty for the taking, destroying, or killing of any fish
fry and fish eggs
Thus, even without the EOs in question, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources may authorize
the banning of trawl fishing
The Constitution, in Article VII Section 10 (1), provides
that the President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus, or offices and the Revised
Administrative Code, in Sections 63 and 74 place the
83
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources

under the Presidents control
Thus, the President has the power to issue the EOs in
question
Yes, the EOs are valid and are not in exercise of
unduly delegated legislative power
The power to legislate and the discretion as to the
execution of the law are different
The power to legislate is limited to the Legislature
The discretion as to the execution of the law (rulemaking power) may be exercised by the Executive
Insofar as this case is concerned, the Congress has
already exercised its power to legislate as seen in the
Fisheries Law, and Congress has also authorized the
Executive, through the office of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to promulgate the
rules and regulations to carry into effect the
legislative intent
Thus, the EOs and the restriction of trawl fishing are
valid and do not qualify as undue delegation of
legislative power

in the law, and the standard is to protect the rights of OFWs
to fair and equitable employment practices.
Eastern Shipping Line v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633,

18 October 1988
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco, the husband of private respondent,
Kathleen D. Saco, was the chief officer of the M/V
Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages under EO
797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the
principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction
over the case as the husband was not an overseas
worker.
The petitioner, Eastern Shipping Lines (ESL), does not
contend that Saco was not its employee or that the
claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does
urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a
domestic employee and consequently his widows
claim should have been filed with Social Security
System, subject to appeal to the Employees
Compensation Commission. ESL also avers that
granting if he was an overseas worker or not, the
award made by the POEA was not contained in the
contract of Saco and thus, should not be made to pay
them.
POEA says that Memorandum Circular No.2
prescribes a standard contract to be adopted by both
Quick Reference:
Vitaliano Saco was the Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern
Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo. His wife
sued for damages under E.O. No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc., does not contend that Saco was not its employee
or that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it
does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a
domestic employee and consequently his widows claim
should have been filed with Social Security System, subject
to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.
Memorandum Circular No.2 prescribes a standard contract
to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies, and this said contract has a clause as to the
death benefits being awarded here. In addition, the
provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed
written into the contract of Saco as a postulate of Police
Power. Held: The Court held that Memorandum Circular No.
2 of the POEA is not violative of the non-delegation of
legislative power. In this case, both tests (completeness and
sufficient standard test) are correctly applied since the law
leaves nothing for POEA to do but to enforce what is written
84
foreign and domestic shipping companies, and this

said contract has a clause as to the death benefits
being awarded here.
In addition, the provisions of the said circular are
nevertheless deemed written into the contract of
Saco as a postulate of Police Power.
POEA granted judgment for private respondent,
giving her death benefits totaling Php 192,000.00.
ESL raised it to SC, saying that the MC is violative of
the non-delegation of legislative power
Issue/s:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the
POEA is violative of the non-delegation of legislative
power.
Ratio:
NO. It is not violative of the non-delegation of
legislative power.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
viz., the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
85
out the boundaries of the delegated authority and

prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
In this case, both tests are correctly applied since the
law leaves nothing for POEA to do but to enforce
what is written in the law, and the standard is to
protect the rights of OFWs to fair and equitable
employment practices.
The reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature
has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to
carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is
called the power of subordinate legislation.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The
temporary restraining order dated December 10,
1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Belgica v. Ochoa,
November 2013
G.R.
No.
208566,
19
Quick Reference:
Several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for
being unconstitutional. The Court held that the PDAF is
unconstitutional for many reasons specifically, it is violative
of the principles or constutuional provisions on separation
of powers, non-delegability of legislative powers and
checks and balances.
Facts:
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) as enacted in the 2004 General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary
support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition
was dismissed.
In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from
86
the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government

agencies for scores of ghost projects."
The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of
six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles
(Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than
20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the
NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of
PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the
money was diverted into Napoles' private accounts.
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA)
released the results of a three-year audit investigation
covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to
2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo
administration. The purpose of the audit was to
determine the propriety of releases of funds under
PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP) by the DBM, the application of these
funds and the implementation of projects by the
appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled
corporations
(GOCCs).
The total releases covered by the audit amounted to
P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP,
representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total
PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been
made nationwide during the audit period.
Accordingly, the CoA's findings contained in its

Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were
made public, the highlights of which are as follows:
Amounts released for projects identified by a
considerable number of legislators significantly
exceeded their respective allocations.
Amounts were released for projects outside of
legislative districts of sponsoring members of the
Lower House.
Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total
amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private
lots without these having been turned over to the
government.
Significant amounts were released to [implementing
agencies] without the latter's endorsement and
without considering their mandated functions,
administrative and technical capabilities to
implement projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects was not
undertaken by the [implementing agencies]
themselves but by [NGOs] endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were
transferred.
The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of
the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.
Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law

and regulations.
Eighty-Two
(82)
NGOs
entrusted
with
implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772)
projects amount to [P]6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part
their utilization of the Funds.
Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some
implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant
with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers
alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy Non-governmental
Organization (NGO).
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the
CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the
87
principles of/constitutional provisions on the nondelegability of legislative power.
Ratio:
Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article,
insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is
lodged in Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be exercised
only through legislation is clear from Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the
power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart
by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for
(b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such
fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary
that they themselves also determine.
As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the

power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and
given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow.
Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed,
as unconstitutional.
-o0o-
ESSENTIAL LEGAL CONCEPTS

Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, 28 March
2008
Facts:
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez
and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez, two (2) criminal
informations for libel were filed against Cristinelli S.
Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 218.
88
That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in

Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
CRISTENELLI SALAZAR FERMIN, publisher, and
BOGS C. TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid
with offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas
District, Quezon City, and circulated in Quezon City
and other parts of Metro Manila and the whole
country, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, publicly and acting with
malice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously print and circulate in the headline and
lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June
14, 1995 when in truth and in fact, the accused very
well knew that the same are entirely false and untrue
but were publicly made for no other purpose than to
expose said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to
humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to be a
fugitive from
The Regional trial Court affirmed the libel case while
the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Fermin
but acquitted Tugas.
Petitioner (Fermin) posits that, to sustain a conviction
for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly
participated in or consented to the preparation
and publication of the libelous article. This
principle is, allegedly, based on our ruling in U.S. v.
Taylor, People v. Topacio and Santiago, U.S. v.
Madrigal, U.S. v. Abad Santos, and U.S. v. Ocampo, as
purportedly clarified in People v. Beltran and Soliven.

She submits that these cases were applied by the CA
in acquitting her co-accused Tugas, and being
similarly situated with him, she is also entitled to an
acquittal. She claims that she had adduced ample
evidence to show that she had no hand in the
preparation and publication of the offending article,
nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval
of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Fermin is liable for libel.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the arguments of the
Petitioner are too simplistic and the cited
jurisprudence are either misplaced or, in fact,
damning. Foremost, U.S. v. Madrigal and U.S. v.
Abad Santos are not applicable to the present case.
U.S. v. Madrigal pertains to a criminal prosecution
under Section 30 of Act No. 1519 for fraudulently
representing the weight or measure of anything to
be greater or less than it is, whereas U.S. v. Abad
Santos refers to criminal responsibility under the
Internal Revenue Law (Act. No. 2339).
The other cases are more in point, but they serve to
reinforce the conviction of, rather than absolve,
petitioner.
89
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under

Section 6 of Act No. 277 which provides that: Every
author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper,
or serial publication is chargeable with the
publication of any words contained in any part of
said book or number of each newspaper or serial as
fully as if he were the author of the same. However,
proof adduced during the trial showed that accused
was the manager of the publication without the
corresponding evidence that, as such, he was
directly responsible for the writing, editing, or
publishing of the matter contained in the said
libelous article.
In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was
made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus,
it was held that Article 360 includes not only the
author or the person who causes the libelous matter
to be published, but also the person who prints or
publishes it. Based on these cases, therefore, proof
of knowledge of and participation in the publication
of the offending article is not required, if the accused
has been specifically identified as author, editor, or
proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication,
as petitioner and Tugas are in this case.
The rationale for the criminal culpability of those
persons enumerated in Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code was enunciated in U.S. v. Ocampo, to wit:
90
According to the legal doctrines and

jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of
a publication containing libelous matter is liable
for the same by reason of his direct connection
therewith and his cognizance of the contents
thereof. With regard to a publication in which a
libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also
all other persons who in any way participate in or
have any connection with its publication are
liable as publishers.
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26
Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St. Rep., 629), the question of the
responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a
newspaper was discussed.
The question then recurs as to whether the manager
or proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal
responsibility solely on the ground that the libelous
article was published without his knowledge or
consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper,
such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to
charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its
publication.
A person who makes a defamatory statement to the
agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both
civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared by the
agent and all others who aid in publishing it.
Petitioner argues that Ocampo has been clarified by
the CA in People v. Beltran and Soliven such that
Maximo V. Soliven, as publisher of The Philippine
Star, was acquitted by the appellate court in view

of the lack of evidence that he knew and
approved the article written by Luis D. Beltran
about then President Corazon C. Aquino in the
newspapers October 12, 1987 issue. Petitioner
submits that People v. Beltran and Soliven serves as
a guide to this Court regarding the criminal
liability of the publisher of the newspaper where
a libelous article is published. Put differently, it
appears that petitioner wants this Court to follow
the CA decision and adopt it as judicial precedent
under the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis, embodied in Article 8
of the Civil Code, is enunciated, thus:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence
to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a
decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument.
Unfortunately, the Beltran decision attained
finality at the level of the CA. Thus, if the CA
seemingly made a new pronouncement
regarding the criminal liability of a publisher
under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, that
ruling cannot bind this Court unless we purposely

adopt the same. Be that as it may, we find no
compelling reason to revisit U.S. v. Ocampo; to
modify it would amount to judicial legislation. Article
360 is clear and unambiguous, and to apply People
v. Beltran and Soliven, which requires specific
knowledge, participation, and approval on the part
of the publisher to be liable for the publication of a
libelous article, would be reading into the law an
additional requirement that was not intended by it.
Chinese Young Mens Christian Association of

the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, 28 March 2008
Quick Reference:
The Court held that the final Resolution of a previous case
between the parties governs the right of the parties in the
present case under the principle of stare decisis because the
facts and issues of the present case and of the previous case
are similar to one another. The principle of stare
decisis directs that, once a court has laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to
that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties
and property are the same.
91
Facts:
Instead of remanding the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA), the Court held that the final
Resolution of the Court in the previous case,
"Remington Industrial Steel Corporation v. Chinese
Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine
Islands," governs the right of the parties, under the
principle
of
stare
decisis.
With this, respondent Remington filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that it was denied its right to
due process when the Court, instead of remanding
the case to the CA for further proceedings, decided
the merits of the case by considering the final
Resolution as a precedent in the present case, and
that the principle of stare decisis is not applicable
because the parties and facts in the present case
differ from those of the final Resolution. On the other
hand, petitioner YMCA filed its Opposition to the
Motion for Reconsideration.
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,

and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same, regardless of whether the
parties and property are the same. The common
issue of law in the two cases was whether possession
of the ground floor units was unlawfully withheld
despite constructive delivery thereof. In the final
Resolution, the Court held that possession of the
leased premises was unlawfully withheld. Once a
case has been decided one way, any other case
involving exactly the same point at issue should be
decided in the same manner.
Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil., Inc. v. Pagdanganan,

G.R. No. 167866, 12 October 2006
Quick Reference:
Winning customers of petitioner Pepsi received the winning
number 349, but were not able to collect their awards
because the security codes they received were incorrect,
prompting the former to sue the latter. Respondents
Pagdanganan and Lumahan filed a complaint against
petitioner based on the same ground, but the Court ruled in
favor of petitioner under the principle of stare decisis since
the facts and issues of the present case were already
resolved in previous cases involving the same facts and
issues. Under the principle of stare decisis, it is the better
Issue/s:
Whether or not the principle of stare decisis is

applicable to the present case.
Ratio:
YES, it is applicable.
The principle of stare decisis directs that, once a court
has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
92
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law

as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same.
Facts:
Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a
promotional campaign entitled Number Fever.
Petitioners announced the notorious three-digit
combination 349 as the winning number. However,
petitioners learned of reports that numerous people
were trying to redeem 349 bearing crowns and/or
resealable caps with incorrect security codes L-2560FQ and L-3560-FQ, which did not correspond to that
assigned to the winning number 349.
Despite of the anouncement of the petitioner with
regard to the error, respondents Pagdanganan and
Lumahan demanded from petitioners the payment of
their corresponding cash prizes. However, Petitioners
refused to take heed of the aforementioned
demands.
Respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners
for sum of money and damages in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), but the latter dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action. Respondents
appealed the Court of Appeals (CA), which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
CA denied the same.
Petitioners argues that by virtue of the principle

of stare decisis, their previous cases against other
customers who also experienced the same error have
already settled the issue of whether or not petitioners
PCPPI and PEPSICO are liable to holders of nonwinning 349 bearing crowns and/or resealable caps.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the principle of stare decisis applies
in the present case?
Ratio:
YES, it applies in the present case.
93
There is no question that the cases of Mendoza,

Rodrigo, Patan and De Mesa, including the case at
bar, arose from the same set of facts concerning the
Number Fever promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI
and PEPSICO. Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa,
Pagdanganan and Lumahan are among those
holding supposedly winning 349 crowns and/or
resealable caps. Said crowns and/or resealable caps
were not honored or allowed to be cashed in by
petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for failing to contain
the correct security code assigned to such winning
combination. As a result, the rejected crown and/or
resealable cap holders filed separate complaints for
specific performance/ sum of money/ breach of
contract, with damages, all against petitioners PCPPI

and PEPSICO.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8
of the Civil Code, to wit: Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines. With this,
it is quite evident that the appellate court committed
reversible error in failing to take heed of our final,
and executory decisions considered to have attained
the status of judicial precedents in so far as the
Pepsi/349 cases are concerned. For it is the better
practice that when a court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
where the facts are substantially the same. The
doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim
that a principle or rule of law which has been
established by the decision of a court of controlling
jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a
similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability in the law and does
not require identity of or privity of parties.
Antonio v. Sayman, G.R. No. 149624, 29

September 2010
Quick Reference:
Res judicata does not apply in this case because the subject
matter of Civil Case 1, the 7,500 sq. meters of the property,
is different from the subject matter of Civil Case 2, the
remaining 8,403 sq. meters of the property. There is bar by
prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought
to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. But where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action,
the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not
as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept
of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment.
Facts:
Pansaon sold only 7,500 sq. meters of her property
to Monje. The deed of absolute sale was duly
notarized. Macedonio Monje immediately took
possession thereof and constructed a house.
The heirs of the deceased Pansaon sold the subject
property, which was already sold Monje, in favor of
Spouses Manguiob. Immediately thereafter, spouses
94
Manguiob had executed an absolute deed of sale of

the entire 15,903 sq. meters of the property in
favor of their sister-in-law, Avelyn B. Antonio, the
entire property. The sale was duly notarized.
Monje knew it only thereafter when he received a
letter from Antonio, informing him that she is now the
registered owner of the subject property under a new
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
CIVIL CASE 1: Aggrieved, Monje filed before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for the
annulment of the deed of sale and the TCT in favor of
Antonio. The CFI decided in favor of Monje, ordering
the cancellation of the aforesaid documents.
Petitioners Spouses Antonio appealed the abovementioned decision all the way to the Supreme
Court, which ruled in their favor. CIVIL CASE 2: With
this, petitioners filed a case for a sum of money,
accounting of the proceeds of the copra, and
damages against defendants in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). However, the RTC dismissed the case
on the ground of res judicata.
Petitioners appealed with the Court of Appeals
(CA), but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Ratio:
NO, res judicata does not apply in the present case.
Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. A final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on all points
and matters determined in the former suit. The
principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1)
bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment.
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between
the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is
the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness
of judgment.
The Court has previously employed various tests in
determining whether or not there is identity of causes
of action as to warrant the application of the principle
ofres judicata. One test of identity is the absence of
Issue/s:
Whether or not res judicata applies in the present
case?
95
inconsistency test where it is determined whether the

judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior
judgment. If no inconsistency is shown, the prior
judgment shall not constitute a bar to subsequent
actions.
The more common approach in ascertaining identity
of causes of action is the same evidence test, whereby
the following question serves as a sufficient criterion:
would the same evidence support and establish both
the present and former causes of action? If the answer
is in the affirmative, then the prior judgment is a bar
to the subsequent action; conversely, it is not.
Aside from the absence of inconsistency test and
same evidence test, we have also ruled that a
previous judgment operates as a bar to a subsequent
one when it had touched on a matter already
decided, or if the parties are in effect litigating for the
same thing.
The Court does not agree with the conclusion of the
RTC and the CA that Civil Cases 1 and 2 involve the
same subject matter. The bone of contention in Civil
Case 1 is confined to the 7,500 square meter portion
of Lot No. 1 bought by the predecessor-in-interest of
respondents, while the subject matter in Civil Case 2
is the remaining 8,403 square meter parcel of the
same lot. Since there is no identity of subject matter
between the two cases, it is but logical to conclude
that there is likewise no identity of causes of action.
Both the questioned rulings of the RTC and the CA
may have arisen from an apparent confusion that the

whole of Lot No. 1, consisting of 15,903 square
meters, is owned by respondents. In sum, the Court
finds that there is no res judicata in the present case.
Republic of the Philippines v. Yu, G.R. No.

157557, 10 March 2006
Quick Reference:
In 1966, the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the
expropriation of Lot No. 939 as against Valdehueza. In 1986,
the Court of Appeals (CA) annulled a sale by Valdehueza
to Yu of the same lot subject of the 1966 case. The 1986 CA
decision became final and executory. In 1992, Valdehueza
filed a complaint for reversion on the ground that Republic
abandoned the lot and was thus no longer the valid subject
of expropriation. The SC found that the 1992 case is barred
by res judicata. The SC elaborates the elements of res
judicata, (1) judgement is final, (2) jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties, (3) judgement on the merits, and
(4) identity of the subject matter, parties and cause of action.
The SC likewise explained two concepts of res judicata, that
of bar by prior judgement which applies when the 4
elements of res judicata are present, and that of
conclusiveness of judgement which provides that the
matters directly and actually resolved in a prior case cannot
96
again be brought up in a new case. In this case, Valdehueza

claims that the new case is valid as the abandonment of the
lot gives rise to a new cause of action. Assuming that there
is a new cause of action, the SC finds that 1992 reversion
case would still be barred by conclusiveness of judgement.
The status of the lot has already been resolved with finality
in both the 1966 and 1986 cases. The 1992 case is thus
barred by res judicata.
Case is now before the SC. Republic claims the

ground invoked by Yu (Abandonment of the lot) did
not give Yu a new cause of action.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the 1992 action is barred by res
judicata.
Ratio:
The 1992 action is barred by res judicata. The SC
elaborates that res judicata lays the rule that an
existing final judgement or decree rendered on the
merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction
on the points and matter in issue in the first suit.
The SC provides the elements of res judicata, namely
(1) the judgement sought to bar the new action must
be final, (2) the decision must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgement on the merits, and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. The SC further provides two concepts of res
judicata, (1) bar by prior judgement, and (2)
conclusiveness of judgement. Bar by prior
Facts:
In Valdehueza v. Republic (1966), the Supreme Court
(SC) affirmed the judgement of expropriation of Lot
No. 939 in Lahug, Cebu City. It ruled that Valdehueza
was not entitled to possession of said lot, but only to
its fair value.
In Yu v Republic (1986), the Court of Appeals (CA)
annulled Valdehuezas subsequent sale of the same
lot to Yu, holding that Yu and company were not
purchasers in good faith. Judgement became final
and executory.
On October 1992, Yu filed a complaint for reversion
of subject lot (On the ground that Republic
abandoned the lot and thus was no longer a proper
subject of expropriation), Republic refuted the claim
on the ground of res judicata. Trial Court dismissed
the case in favor of the Republic.
On appeal, the CA found no res judicata in the 1992
case and remanded it to the Trial Court.
97
judgement applies when there is identity of the

parties, subject matter and causes of action. The
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgement provides
that facts and issues actually and directly resolved in
a former suit cannot again be raised, even if such suit
may have a different claim or cause of action. In this
case, Yus argument rests solely on the assumption
that the abandonment of the lot gave rise to a new
cause of action. Assuming the assumption is valid,
conclusiveness of judgement would apply, as the Yu
v. Republic case (1986), which is final and executory,
clearly nullified the sale. Yu has no right over the lot.
Res judicata applies, Petition is granted.
the ground that Vera Cruzs claim of 200 square meters

failed to outweigh the limitation imposed upon Lims title
covering 5,432 square meters. Court of Appeals (CA)
found for Vera Cruz, finding the Trial Court committed grave
abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice. The Supreme
Court (SC) affirmed the CA decision, finding that the Rules
of Civil procedure only provide for two grounds to cancel a
notice of lis pendens, (1) the purpose being to molest the
owner against which the notice is sought, and (2)
unnecessary in protecting the notice applicants rights. In
this case, the SC found that the notice of lis pendens only
applied to the 200 square meters claimed, and thus did not
molest Lims rights, and was in fact necessary in protecting
Vera Cruz rights.
Facts:
Vera Cruz alleges that he has been in possession of a
200 square meter portion of Lot 4204 since 1960
covered by TCT No. 191498 (Aldaba Title) owned by
Aldaba. That on January 1983, Aldaba sold said 200
square meter portion to Vera Cruz.
In 1993, Lim filed a complaint for ejectment against
Vera Cruz, who claims to be an owner of said Lot,
being a portion of TCT No. T-16375 (Lim Title)
registered in Lims name.
Vera Cruz filed a complaint for quieting of title,
annulment and damages alleging that Lim acquired
the Lim Title in bad faith, by fraud and/or clever
machination.
Lim v. Cruz, G.R. No. 143646, 4 April 2001

Quick Reference:
Vera Cruz claims ownership over a 200 square meter lot by
prior possession since 1960 and subsequent purchase from
its owner, Aldaba, in 1983. Lim claimed ownership over the
property by virtue of a title covering 5,432 square meters
which included the 200 square meters claimed by Vera
Cruz. Vera Cruz filed for the attachment of a notice of lis
pendes on Lims title to protect his interests. Lim claimed
that such notice must be cancelled for being only for the
purpose of molesting Lim and not being necessary in
protecting Vera Cruz rights. The Trial Court decided the
case in favor of Lim, cancelling the notice of lis pendens on
98
Vera Cruz subsequently caused the annotation of a

notice of lis pendens on the Lim Title to protect his
right over the property covered by said title. Lim
moved to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the
ground that such notice for the sole purpose of
molesting Lim and not necessary to protect Vera
Cruz rights.
Trial Court cancelled the notice of lis pendens on the
Lim Title on the ground that Vera Cruz claimed right
over 200 square meters did not outweigh the
limitation imposed on the Lim Title, which covered
5,432 square meters. The Trial Court instead required
Lim to file a bond commensurate in amount to the
value claimed by Vera Cruz, as a compromise
safeguard.
The Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the Trial Courts
decision holding that the Trial Court committed
grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice.
The CA thus reinstated the notice of lis pendens.
Case is now before the Supreme Court (SC). Lim
alleges that Trial Court was correct in cancelling the
notice of lis pendens as it was for the sole purpose of
molesting Lim and that it was not necessary in
protecting Vera Cruz rights.
Ratio:
No, the cancellation the notice of lis pendens was
improper. The SC elaborates that lis pendens has
been conceived to protect real rights of a party
causing its registration. Such notice would serve as a
warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer
that the property is in litigation. The SC notes that the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the
court after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded. Petitioner claims that the
notice covers the entire 5,432 square meters of the
Lim Title, and thus, as the Trial Court found, molested
Lims rights as an owner. However, the SC finds that,
by express provision under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the notice of lis pendens applies only to
the particular property subject of litigation, which in
this case is the 200 square meters claimed by Vera
Cruz, not the entire property covered by the Lim Title.
Such notice then was not for the purpose of
molesting Lims rights as an owner, and was
necessary in protecting Vera Cruz rights. The SC also
notes that the Trial Judges imposition of a bond is an
acknowledgement that the cancellation was not in
order. The purpose of the doctrine of lis pendens is
to keep the properties in litigation within the power
of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to
Issue/s:
Whether or not the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens was proper.
99
prevent the defeat of the judgement or decree by

subsequent alienation. Petition is therefore denied.
Facts:
On June 1996, Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (Atlantic) and
Herbal Cove Realty Corporation (Herbal Cove)
entered into a Construction Contract whereby
Atlantic would construct four units of townhouses and
one detached unit for Herbal Cove. The contract
period was 180 days starting on July 1996 and was to
terminate on January 1997.
The period was not followed. Atlantic alleged that the
period was not followed for reasons attributable to
Herbal Cove, suspension orders, additional works,
force majeure, and unjustifiable acts of omission or
delay on the part of Herbal Cove. On the other hand,
Herbal Cove denied such claims and instead pointed
to Atlantic having exceeded the contract period
aggravated by defective workmanship and utilization
of materials not in compliance with specifications.
On November 1997, Atlantic filed a complaint for a
sum of money with damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Atlantic also filed a notice of lis
pendens for annotation on the titles of the Titles
covering the construction projects.
On January 1998, Herbal Cove moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, as the contract
provided a clause requiring the parties to submit
their dispute to arbitration. On April 1998, Herbal
cove filed a motion to cancel notice of lis pendens on
the ground that the complaint for sum of money is a
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty

Corporation, G.R. No. 148568, 20 March 2003
Quick Reference:
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (Atlantic) and Herbal Cove Realty
Corporation (Herbal Cove) entered into a construction
contract where Atlantic would build townhouses for Herbal
Cove. The construction was not completed on time by
Atlantic, and Herbal Cove refused to pay. Atlantic filed a
complaint for sum of money and filed for a notice of lis
pendens based on such complaint. The Trial Court denied
both at first, but on reconsideration allowed the notice of lis
pendens on the basis of the pendency of an appeal. The
Court of Appeals (CA) found that the complaint for sum of
money was not a sufficient lien to impose a notice of lis
pendens and thus ordered the notices cancellation. The
Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the CAs decision, on the
ground that the complaint for sum of money did not
constitute a proper lien on the property as to justify the
attachment of a notice of lis pendens. The SC elaborated
that the notice of lis pendens as a general rule only applies
to cases involving ownership and use of property relating to
a title. This does not include the personal action of claim for
sum of money.
100
personal action and thus not subject to the

application of notice of lis pendens. The Trial Court
subsequently granted both, dismissing the complaint
for sum of money and cancelling the notice of lis
pendens.
Atlantic filed a motion for reconsideration. On
reconsideration, the Trial Court maintained the
dismissal of the complaint for sum of money, but
reversed itself as to the notice of lis pendens,
ordering its reinstatement.
Herbal Cove filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
Petition for Certiorari. The CA granted the petition
and reinstated the original judgement cancelling the
notice of lis pendens on the basis that the original
complaint was a personal action and thus not subject
to an attachment of notice of lis pendens.
Case is now before the Supreme Court (SC).
Atlantic alleges that CA erred in reinstating the notice
of lis pendens, claiming that the money claims
constitute a proper lien upon which a notice of lis
pendens may be based upon.
notes that as a general rule, the only instances in

which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are
(a) an action to recover possession of real estate, (b)
an action for partition, and (c) any other court
proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or
the building thereon or the use or the occupation
thereof. Additionally, the Court has held that
resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to
cases that involve title or possession of real property,
as it also applies to suits seeking to establish a right
to, or an equitable estate or interest in a specific real
property, or to enforce a lien, a charge or an
encumbrance against it. This case does not fall under
any of the situations provided by the SC. The SC
notes that while Atlantic may have moved on the
premise of a contractors lien under the Civil Code,
such lien only applies to preference of credits, and
does not on its own constitute a proper lien upon
which a notice of lis pendens may be based. The SC
also notes that while the Trial Court was correct at the
first instance to have cancelled the notice of lis
pendens, it erred on reconsideration when it
considered the pendency of the case as a factor to
necessitate the notice of lis pendens. Having failed to
constitute a proper lien for annotation of a notice of
lis pendens, the cancellation of the notice was proper.
Petition denied.
Issues:
Whether or not the money claims constitute a proper
lien for the annotation of a notice of lis pendens.
Ratio:
No, the money claims do not constitute a proper lien
for the annotation of a notice of lis pendens. The SC
101
Villa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 87186, 24 April

1992
Quick Reference:
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the
Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu regarding the violation of
Section 3, paragraphs (a), (e), (h), and (i) of R.A. 3019, also
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On the
other hand, the Sandiganbayan found the accused Jimenez,
Montayre, Villa, Leonor, and Sucalit guilty of violating
Section 3, paragraphs (a), (c), (h), and (i) of R.A. 3019.
The main issue is whether the decision of the acquittal of the
CA promulgated 6 months before the decision of the
Sandiganbayan bars their conviction pursuant to the
doctrine of the law of the case.
The Court agreed with the Sandiganbayan which held that
the doctrine of the law of the case only applies to the same
parties of the same case and that the case decided by the
Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu and the case decided by the
Sandiganbayan are separate and distinct cases. Thus, the
doctrine of the law of the case shall not be applied.
Facts:
Investigation of the alleged anomalous transactions
at the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
Mactan International Airport led to the filing of
102
criminal charges against David, Centeno, Dario, and

Robles
The Criminal Court of Cebu found all of the accused
guilty of violating Section 3, paragraphs (a), (e), (h),
and (i) of R.A. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and also found that Jimenez,
Montayre, Villa, Sucalit, Leonor, and Bustamante
were equally liable for conspiring with the convicted
accused
The presiding judge directed the Chief Prosecutor of
the Ministry of Justice to conduct an investigation for
other possible violations of R.A. 3019
The investigation led to the filing of an information
with the Sandiganbayan against Jimenez, Montayre,
Villa, Sucalit, Leonor, and Bustamante
The case against Bustamante was dismissed without
prejudice for lack of a prima facie case
The facts of the case were established as follows:
Dario, Centeno, and Robles negotiated with Jimenez
for the purchase of transformers and electrical
supplies for the Mactan International Airport
Montayre issued the Requisition and Issue Voucher
for said supplies
Jimenez approved the requisition and Leonor
certified the availability of funds
Jimenez signed the Advertisement Form, and Sucalit
delivered it to Rocen Enterprises
The Bidding Committee, which included Villa

approved the lowest bid for the articles, the lowest
bidder being Rocen Enterprises
The requisitioned articles were delivered in July by
UTESCO, a losing bidder, to Rocen Enterprises,
leading to additional charges
The articles were supposedly inspected from June
25-30
Rocen Enterprises, owned by Centeno, turned out to
be registered with a line of business in paper
products and printed matters, not electrical supplies
The defense of the accused were as follows:
The acquisition of the electrical items was an
emergency measure necessitated by the brownout at
Mactan Airport
The Cash Disbursement Ceilings would expire on
June 30, so the items requisitioned were made to
appear to have been inspected before such time
Jimenez disclaimed responsibility in determining the
reputability of the supplier
Montayre contended that his participation in the
transaction was limited to requisitioning the electrical
supplies and that he had nothing to do with
canvassing the prices, determining the winning
bidder, and determining the reputability of the
supplier
Villa argued that he did not participate in the canvass
of the requisitioned items and that he processed the
vouchers on Montayres direction
Sucalit testified that she had no responsibility to

determine who were qualified to participate in the
bidding
The Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty of
violating Section 3, paragraphs (a), (c), (h), and (i) of
R.A. 3019
While the case was pending in the Sandiganbayan,
the CA promulgated a decision reversing the
conviction of the Circuit Criminal Court in Cebu on
the ground of insufficient evidence
Issue/s:
Whether the decision of the CA bars the conviction of
the accused by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the
doctrine of the law of the case
Whether there was conspiracy among the accused
Ratio:
No, the doctrine of the law of the case is not
applicable.
The doctrine of law of the case means that whatever
is once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule of decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case so long
as the facts on which the decision was made continue
to be the facts before the court
The Sandiganbayans case is separate and distinct
from the Circuit Criminal Courts case and the identity
103
of the parties are not the same so the doctrine of the

law of the case cannot be applied
Res judicata may not be applied as well because the
identity of the parties are not the same
No, only Jimenez and Sucalit were in conspiracy
Montayre and Villa were held to have no criminal
intent in their actions because they did not take part
in the canvassing of supplies and the determination
of the reputability of suppliers
The issue in this case is whether the CA erred in

claiming that res judicata barred Padillos claim for
damages.
The Court ruled that while the requisites of res
judicata are present, the law of the case dictates that Padillo
may claim for damages in the separate civil case because in
the decision made by the CA regarding the case for
ownership, the CA merely suspended the civil case for
damages instead of requiring the claims for damages to be
filed. The doctrine of the law of the case dictates that the law
of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,
may be applied to that one particular case.
Padillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119707, 29

November 2001
Facts:
Padillo, alleging that she is the absolute owner of a
251sqm. parcel of land in Quezon Avenue, Lucena,
filed a petition for declaratory relief and damages
against Averia and Casilang for unlawful refusal to
turn the property over in her favor
Padillo prayed for the issuance of an injunctive writ to
place her in the possession and use of her said
property and for respondents to pay jointly and
severally PhP 150,000.00 for the annual unrealized
income for the use of her property, PhP 80,000.00 for
attorneys fees, and moral and exemplary damages
Casilang filed an Answer specifically denying the
material allegations against him
He alleged that he vacated the subject property so
the case against him should be dismissed
Quick Reference:
Padillo filed a civil case for damages against Averia as
regards a property which Padillo claims ownership of. The
case for ownership of said property has been filed
separately from the civil case for damages. The Court
resolved the case for ownership in favor of Padillo, causing
the trial court to resolve the civil case for damages in her
favor as well.
Upon Averias appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
declared that the civil case for damages cannot be resolved
because res judicata applies to the case for damages the
res judicata being caused by the resolution of the case for
ownership.
104
Averia filed his Answer with a Counterclaim and a

Motion to Dismiss wherein he invoked another civil
case against de Vera-Quicho, the owner from which
Padillo claims to have purchased the property
Averia raised the defenses of litis pendentia, laches,
estoppel, res judicata, and lack of cause of action
As it turns out, prior to the civil case filed by Padillo,
the property in question has been subjected to three
actions, namely, Civil Case No. 1620-G, M.C. No. 37482, and Civil Case No. 1690-G
In Civil Case No. 1620-G, Marina M. de Vera-Quicho
was ordered to execute the necessary documents
over the property, and the Register of Deeds (RD)
was enjoined to desist from entering any
encumbrance/transaction on said title except in favor
of Averia
In M.C. No. 374-82, Padillo compelled the RD to
register the deed of sale wherein Margarite de Vera
sold to Padillo half of the lot and the building erected
thereon
The RD refused to register in view of the restraining
order from the previous civil case
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena ordered
the RD to register the deed of sale
In Civil Case No. 1690-G, Averia filed for the
rescission of two deeds of sale, namely the (1) deed
of sale reflected by the M.C. No. 374-82 and (2) the
deed of sale between Marina de Vera-Quicho and
Padillo
The case was dismissed for improper venue, because

it was not filed in the RTC of Lucena
Averia assailed the decision in M.C. No. 374-82, and
the Supreme Court (SC) declared that the RTC had
jurisdiction to order the registration of the deed of
sale; the SC also ordered for a new trial
In the new trial, Padillo was declared as sole and
exclusive owner of the property in question
Going back to the current case, Civil Case No. 9114,
the trial court decided in favor of Padillo, requiring
Averia to pay damages for the unrealized income,
attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages, and
costs of suit
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
trial courts decision based on res judicata
The CA argued that the petitioner should have
already included the claim for damages in M.C. No.
374-82, especially since a new trial had been granted
in consideration of all the civil cases involving the
property
Issue/s:
Whether the CA erred in reversing the trial courts
decision
Ratio:
Yes, the CA erred in reversing the trial courts
decision
The requisites of res judicata are:
105
finality of the former judgment,

the judgment being rendered by a court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties,
the judgment being based on the merits, and
the identities of the parties, the subject matter, and
the cause of action being the same
While the requisites of res judicata are met, the
principle of the law of the case warrants a different
conclusion
The law of the case is different from res judicata in the
sense that it only applies to one case and res judicata
forecloses in one case what has been done in another
case
The law of the case in this particular case shows that
the CA incorrectly ordered the mere suspension of
Civil Case No. 9114 instead of dismissing the case or
ordering the claim for damages to be filed
Thus, even if erroneous, Padillo cannot be faulted for
pursuing her claim in Civil Case No. 9114
The law of the case is that the civil case should only
be suspended
The Court, however looked into the award granted by
the trial court and reduced the same accordingly
Damages must be proved so the speculative
damages for unrealized income is reduced by the
Court
No merit was found for the amount of the moral and
exemplary damages
People of the Philippines v. Derilo, G.R. No.

117818, 18 April 1997
Quick Reference:
Derilo, Baldimo, Doos, Confuentes and one John Doe
were charged with the crime of murder committed by a
band. At the time of the commission of the crime, such was
punishable by the death penalty. When the new
Constitution (1987) came into force, it provided that any
death penalty imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The Court held that being a penal law, such
provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be applied to
the crime of murder committed in 1982 by appellant, based
on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the
presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless the
contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied
Facts:
Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doos,
Alejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe were
charged with the socalled crime of murder
committed by a band.
Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro
Q. Baldimo was apprehended and brought within the
trial courts jurisdiction.
106
At the time of the commission of the crime on January

1, 1982 and the conviction of the accused on October
12, 1986, the substantive law in force dealing with the
crime of murder was Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code which took effect way back on January 1, 1932.
Said provision provided that any person guilty of
murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Then on February 2, 1987,
a new Constitution came into force after its ratification
on that date by the people. The 1987 Constitution,
regarded by some as progressive since it contains
new provisions not covered by our earlier two
Constitutions, proscribed in Section 19, Article III (Bill
of Rights) thereof the imposition of the death penalty,
as follows:
o Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
Responding to the alarming increase of horrible
crimes being committed in the country, Congress
passed a law imposing the death penalty on certain
heinous offenses and further amending for that
purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special
penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic

Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993.
Issue/s:
Whether or not RA 7659 should be made to have
retroactive effect.
Ratio:
No. Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act
No. 7659 may not be applied to the crime of murder
committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the
principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the
presumption is that laws operate prospectively,
unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly,
plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily
implied
107
In every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved

against the retroactive operation of laws. Nor can the
prospective application of Republic Act No. 7659 be
doubted just because of the constitutional provision
leaving to Congress the matter of the death penalty
in cases of heinous crimes, since Congress did not
otherwise provide.
One of the universally accepted characteristics of a
penal law is prospectivity. This general principle of
criminal law is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that no felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior
to its commission and was applied by the Supreme

Court in two early cases to mean that no act or
omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author
punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time
the act was committed. Besides, to give retroactive
effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No.
7659 would be violative of the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Among others, an ex post facto law has been defined
as one which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed. It is settled that a penal
law may have retroactive effect only when it is
favorable to the accused. Obviously, with a penalty
more onerous than that provided by the Revised
Penal Code for murder, the pertinent amendment
thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 cannot fall within
the exception to the general rule on prospectivity of
penal laws.
Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, 28

October 1993
stipulated petitioner Albino Co delivered to the

salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated
November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was
dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason
given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against
Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court. The case
eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged,
and his being sentenced to suffer a term of
imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the
salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance
of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4)
years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in
Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery
of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an
obligation was not considered a punishable offense,
an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the decision issued by the Court be
applied retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.
Facts:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and
refloat a sunken vessel and in payment of his share
of the expenses of the salvage operations therein
108
Held:
No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of
the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4
of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have
no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided."
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy
to perceive. The retroactive application of a law
usually divests rights that have already become
vested or impairs the obligations of contract and
hence, is unconstitutional.
The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Court's decision of September
21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14
that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered
by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective
effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of
the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, 4

January 1995
Quick Reference:
Petitioner (Leouel) met Respondent (Julia) in Iloilo City and
eventually got married. They lived with Julias parents
thereafter and bore a baby boy. The couple started to
quarrel more often as time went on; primarily about how
Julias parents kept meddling with their relationship. Julia
soon left for the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels plea
for her to stay. Julia negged on her promise to return to the
Philippines at the end of her employment contract and
refused to communicate with Leouel for a span of about 5
years. Leuoels attempt to locate Julia in the US had failed
which compelled him to file a complaint for Voiding of
marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
grounds that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. After thorough
review of the construction and deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee, the Supreme Court ruled that
the circumstances and facts surrounding the case at bar do
not justify nor come close to the standards required to
decree a nullity of marriage which must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
109
Facts:
Leouel who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in
the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
They lived together with the parents of Julia.
Julia gave birth to their son named Leouel Jr.
The couple often quarreled because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs.
Somewhat short of two years after getting married,
Julia left for the US for a job as a nurse.
Leouel pleaded with Julia not to take the job but she
took it anyway.
The first time Julia contacted Leouel was via a long
distance call after 7 months from her departure.
She promised to return to the Philippines after her
contracted had expired but never did.
Leouel, not knowing the whereabout of his wife, went
to the US in the attempt to locate Julia under the
auspices of the Armed Forces of the Phil.
He was unable to locate Julia thus filed a petition for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Leouel contended that the failure of Julia to return
home, or at the very least to communicate with him,
for more than five years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to
enter into married life.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the marriage is void pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code. NO
Ratio:
The case was essentially a review of the deliberations
of the Family Code Revision Committee and their
interpretation of Article 36 and the definition of
psychological incapacity
The law does not provide a definition nor does it
provide examples since doing so would limit the
definition of psychological incapacity there being a
wide variety of psychological disorders.
The
guidelines,
however,
for
establishing
psychological incapacity was that the same had to
be characterized by: (LANDMARK)
Gravity
Juridical antecedence
Incurability
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
110
The fact that Julia refused to communicate for years

do not equate to the psychological incapacity
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
juridical antecedence which Jose failed to prove Bonas

psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Facts:
Jose (petitioner) met Bona (respondent) back in
August 1973
Jose was a young lieutenant in the AFP
Bona was a 17-yr old college drop-out
Their romance and sexual intimacy led their marriage
a year later before a judge in Basilan.
They acquired no property, debts nor any offspring.
They found an abandoned baby girl and registered
her as their daughter in 1976 and named her Ramona
Celeste Alano Ochosa.
Due to the nature of his work, Jose was assigned to
various parts of the Philippines and rarely cohabited
with Bona since she preferred to stay in her
hometown, Basilan.
In 1985, Jose was appointed as Battalion
Commander and was given living quarters in Fort
Bonifacio where Bona and Ramona joined him.
Two years later, Jose was charged with rebellion for
participation in a faild coup detat and was
incarcerated in Camp Crame
Apparently Bona has been having illicit relations with
other men from the onset of their relationship up to
the time they moved together in Fort Bonifacio.
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. No. 167459, 26 January

2011
Quick Reference:
Jose (Petitioner) and Bona (Respondent) fell in love and got
married. Since Jose was an Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) officer he was stationed away from Bona for the most
part during the first 12 years of marriage until they were
given a permanent living quarter in Fort Bonifacio where the
couple lived together with their adopted daughter Ramona.
Apparently Bona was was illicit sexual relations with other
men from the beginning of their marriage and continued
until they were stationed in Fort Bonifacio. After Jose got out
of jail for being charged with rebellion, he filed for the nullity
of his marriage on the ground of Bonas psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. The
Supreme Court (SC) ruled that based on the landmark case
of Santos v. Court of Appeals followed by the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, Jose failed to
prove that Bonas infidelity (psychological incapacity to fulfill
essential obligations of marriage) existed prior to their
marriage and existed at the time of the celebration thereof.
In short, the landmark cases laid down the requisite of
111
Example: Bona was caught having sex with Joses

driver while Jose was away.
Jose used a military pass to leave Crame and confront
Bona about the rumors: she admitted.
Jose drove Bona out of their living quarters and
brought Ramona with her.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and went to live with Jose.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage before the Makati RTC seeking to nullify his
marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage.
3 witnesses testified about Bonas marital infidelity
Fourth witness was a psychiatrist who testified that,
after conducting several tests, she reached the
conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder due to:
Excessive attention seeking behavior
Historically traceable to parents behavior
Incurable
RTC: Granted the petition for annulment on the
ground that the psychological incapacity of the
respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and
INCURABILITY.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
said ruling to the Court of Appeals contending Joses
abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
CA: Reversed RTC ruling
Issue/s:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. NO
Ratio:
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, it
was observed that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic
requirements of psychological incapacity as
mandated in Santos, it was laid down in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina the following guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable.
112
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state
The Court is not convinced that the totality of Bonas
acts constituted psychological incapacity as
determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There
is inadequate credible evidence that her defects
were already present at the inception of, or prior
to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged
psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence.
The only evidence of Bonas promiscuity prior to her
marriage to Jose was the latters testimony in open
court.
The psychiatric evaluation report do not provide
evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of
Joses one-sided assertion
Psychiatrist evaluated Bonas psychological condition

indirectly from the information gathered solely from
Jose and his witnesses.
Bonas sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only
be convincingly traced to the period of time after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said
marriage.
Tong v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, 31 March

2009
Quick Reference:
The guidelines of the Molina Doctrine on psychological
incapacity, decided after the case for annulment of marriage
was filed before the RTC, should still be applied by virtue of
stare decisis. Hence, Benjamin and Carmens marriage
should not be annulled by virtue of psychological incapacity
for failure to fulfill the guidelines set in the case of Molina.
Facts:
The Petitioner Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting
were classmates in medical school and fell in love.
Thereafter, they were married after Carmen was
pregnant with Benjamins child.
After the birth of their 6th child, Carmen filed for a
declaration of nullity of their marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the ground of
113
Benjamins psychological incapacity, as provided by

Article 36 of the Family Code since Benjamin was: 1)
An alcoholic; 2) Violent because of his excessive
drinking; 3) Compulsive gambling; 4) Irresponsibility
in failing to financially support his family.
The RTC annulled the marriage.
However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
RTCs decision since the guidelines on psychological
incapacity set in the case of Molina, previously
decided by the Supreme Court, were not fulfilled.
Carmen argues that the Molina doctrine should
not be binding in the case at bar, since the case
was promulgated on February 13, 1997 whereas
Carmen filed the case before the RTC on October
21, 1993. Hence, the doctrine on stare decisis,
which enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions, does not apply.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the leading case of Molina applies in
this case by virtue of Stare Decisis.
Whether or not Benjamin is Psychologically
Incapacitated, as provided in Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Ratio:
Yes. While it is conceded that the case was filed
before the guidelines set in Molina was promulgated,
114
such guidelines should still be applied to the case at

bar. interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute
is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court
is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine
and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
No. the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from
such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago. The psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception
of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she is about to assume. In this case, respondent
failed to prove that petitioners "defects" were
present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but
such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any
pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her
husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove
such "defects" to be incurable.
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.

180016, 29 April 2014
Quick Reference:
The Court should execute the sentence provided by the
legislature through the Revised Penal Code despite being
severe and excessive as applied in the case at bar, and
Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code instead submit to the
Chief Executive its findings to suggest for a modification of
the law.
Facts:
Tangcoy and Corpuz met in Admirale Royale Casino
in Olongapo City, where the former was engaged in
the business of lending money to casino players.
Corpuz found out that Tangcoy was also engaged in
the business of selling jewelry. Thus, Corpuz offered
to sell Tangcoys jewelry on a commission basis.
Tangcoy agreed, and turned over several jewelries
such as bracelets and necklaces for Corpuz to sell.
Corpuz never returned the jewelry or the value of the
said jewelry amounting to P98,000.00.
Thus, Tangcoy filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for the crime of Estafa against
Corpuz. Corpuz was adjudged guilty and was
sentenced to imprisonment for the indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 mos. of Prision Correccional

in its medium period as MINIMUM to 14 years and 8
years of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period as
MAXIMUM. T
he Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and
modified the sentence to 4 years and 2 months of
prision coreccional as minimum to 8 years of prision
mayor as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional
P10,000.00 or a total of 7 years, as applied for the
range of penalties imposed on persons convicted of
crimes involving property adjusted to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when the Revised Penal
Code(RPC) was enacted.
Corpuz appealed the decision and further averred
that the sentence was too harsh of a penalty for the
alleged crime.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the execution of the sentence be
suspended for being too harsh and excessive.
Ratio:
No. The Court held that it could not modify the said
range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation. As supported by the several amici
curiae invited by the Court such as Dean Sedfrey
Candelaria, Dean Jose Diokno, the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
legislature's perceived failure in amending the
115
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be

remedied through this Court's decisions, as that
would be encroaching upon the power of another
branch of the government. In line with Article 5 of the
RPC, the Court shall instead submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.
-o0o-
116

Introduction To Law

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Introduction To Law

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

INTRODUCTION TO LAW

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY