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Pasay City
- versus

I.S. No. XV-13-INV-15-B-00416

For: Violation of R.A. 6539 AntiCarnapping Law and Falsification
of Documents under Par. 1, Art.
172, RPC.



I, JOWELL JO N. CHING, of legal age, Filipino citizen, and with
address at 16 A. Mabini Street, Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, after having been
sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and say that:

I am one of the respondents in the above-entitled case.

I vehemently deny all the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit
and pray for the outright dismissal of the case insofar as I am concerned.
In light of the perjured claims provided in the ComplaintAffidavit, provided below is a series of facts and circumstances leading to
this baseless and malicious accusations against me:
a. Sometime during the first week of December 2014, respondent
Charles Philip P. Lu offered to sell to me a certain Porsche
Boxster with plate number BEU-656 in the amount of Nine
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P900,000.00).
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b. Since I am experienced in the buying and selling of second

hand vehicles and to avoid any complications, I first required
Mr. Lu to produce pertinent documents as to how he acquired
the said vehicle, including the Land Transportation Office
(LTO) Certificate of Registration and the Official Receipt of
Registration corresponding to the said vehicle. In turn, Mr. Lu
furnished to me a copy of the Deed of Sale1 between him and a
certain Fenix Ceza International Corporation (FENIX), and the
corresponding LTO documents2 registered under Mr. Lus name
showing proof of his ownership over the subject vehicle. After
producing the said documents, I told Mr. Lu to give me at least
one (1) week to decide whether I will buy the said vehicle.
c. As further precaution, after obtaining a copy of said documents,
I inquired with the LTO as to the validity and authenticity of the
said documents related to the subject vehicle under Mr. Lus
name. After verifying with said office, I found that Mr. Lu
acquired the said vehicle from its previous registered owner,
Fenix3. Further, I found no encumbrance/s whatsoever attached
to the subject vehicle. Finally, there was not a single notice
whatsoever coming from the Philippine National Police
Highway Patrol Group (PNP-HPG)4 or from the LTO that the
Porsche Boxster was reported as stolen.
d. With that, I concluded that the Porsche Boxster was indeed
rightfully owned by Mr. Lu and that the corresponding
documents related thereto were in order. And as a result thereof,
I agreed to Mr. Lus offer and bought the said vehicle at the
agreed amount of Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P900,000.00) and to formalize the sale thereof, a Deed of Sale
of Motor Vehicle5 dated 12 December 2014 was entered into
between me and Mr. Lu.
e. Approximately one and a half (1 ) months after the
consummation of the sale, a Subpoena issued by the Honorable
Office was given to me by Mr. Lu charging us with Carnapping
and Falsification of Documents.

Please refer to Annex O of the Complaint-Affidavit, and adopted hereto to form part of the CounterAffidavit.
A copy of the LTO Certificate of Registration is hereto attached as Annex 1.
Please refer to Annex K of Complaint-Affidavit, and adopted hereto to form part of the CounterAffidavit.
A copy of PNP clearance is hereto attached as Annex 2.
A copy of the Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex 3.

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After consulting with my lawyers, I can clearly say that I am
not guilty for Carnapping under Republic Act No. 65396 and Falsification of
Documents under Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of Carnapping
under R.A. No. 6539 are absent.
Section 2 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 defined
carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the consent of the latter, or by means of violence against, or
intimidation of a person, or by using force upon things.
In People v. Renato Lagat7, the Supreme Court had the
occasion to lay down the elements of carnapping, thus:
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized
under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the
That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the
offender himself;
That the taking is without the consent of the
owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things; and
That the offender intends to gain from the taking
of the vehicle.

From the face of the Complaint, I am not guilty of carnapping
for reasons provided below. I did not take the vehicle from the complainant.
The acquisition of the Porsche
Boxster was made in good faith and
with full consent of the registered
owner of the Porsche Boxster, Mr.
As stated earlier, before I bought the subject Porsche Boxster
from Mr. Lu, I required him to produce all the documents as to how he

Otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972

G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011.

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acquired the said vehicle, together with the LTO issued OR/CR
corresponding thereto. Further, and to reiterate, as a preventive measure, I
likewise inquired with the LTO as to how the subject vehicle was acquired
by Mr. Lu and found no discrepancy with the documents given to me by Mr.
Lu. Thus, I was convinced that Mr. Lu is the absolute owner of the subject
From the foregoing, it is clear that Mr. Lu, as the owner of the
said vehicle sold the same to me in his own free will and volition. Neither
did I force nor influence Mr. Lu to transfer the ownership of the vehicle to
me. Considering that the sale was consensual and freely entered into, the
element of appoderamiento or unlawful taking is obviously wanting.
10. Further, with the exercise of due diligence in not only
painstakingly investigating on the history of transaction related to the subject
vehicle, but also inquiring with the PNP-HPG whether the same was
carnapped or otherwise, I can easily be considered as a buyer in good faith.
There was no indication on the face of the pertinent documents that the
subject vehicle was carnapped, much less that I do not know the nature of
the transaction between Mr. Lu and FENIX as I was not a party thereto. In
fact, a PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate 8 dated 09 January 2015 was
issued certifying that the subject Porsche Boxster was not in the list of stolen
vehicles at the time I bought the same from Mr. Lu.
11. Thus, the presumption of ownership created by Mr. Lus
certificate stands.
12. Furthermore, considering that at the time Mr. Lu offered to me
the Porsche Boxster and I bought the same on the basis of extra ordinary
diligence I exerted to verify the authenticity and validity of the documents
under his name, I cannot be held liable for carnapping. I did not transact
with the complainant neither did I took the vehicle from him. In fact, neither
did he produce pertinent documents that he has a claim or notice filed with
the LTO or PNP over the subject vehicle when I conducted thorough

In Amante v. Serwelas9, the Supreme Court held that:

Petitioners wish to establish bad faith on the part of
respondent for purchasing a jeepney which was registered
not to Amante Motors but to Danilo Bicomong. Was this
sufficient proof of bad faith on the part of a purchaser?


Please see Annex 2, id.

G.R. No. 143572, September 30, 2005.

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Whatever internal arrangement the motor shop may have

had with Bicomong regarding why the latters vehicle was
among those on display in its premises was not the
responsibility of respondent buyer to inquire into. What
was crucial was the valid certificate of registration in
Bicomongs name, true and clean on its face. Respondent
buyer was not required to go beyond that.

14. It is highly incredible that complainant ruefully alleged that I

received and acknowledged the alleged payment using a Deed of Sale
notarized by a certain Atty. Gervacio B. Optiz, Jr.10. On the contrary, I was
the one who made payment because I was the buyer of the Porsche
Boxster duly registered with Mr. Lu.
15. Thus, I see no reason why I should be held liable for
carnapping, as recklessly insisted by complainant. With the elements of
carnapping lacking against me, the instant case must fail.
II. The elements of Falsification
under paragraph 1, Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code are absent.
16. Likewise, my lawyers are convinced that I am not liable for
falsification under Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that:
ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use
of falsified documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article
in any other kind of commercial document.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence
in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or
who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any
of the false documents embraced in the next preceding
article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this
article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in


P.5, Complaint-Affidavit

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17. In Santos, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court

enumerated the elements of falsification under Article 172 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, thus:
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
in Article 171; and
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.


Neither of the foregoing elements exist against me as discussed

Lack of knowledge that the Deed of

Sale between FENIX and Mr. Lu
was fake negates the crime of
19. I am not a party to the sale that transpired between Mr. Lu and
FENIX. In fact, I only learned of the alleged sale of the subject vehicle when
Mr. Lu proposed to sell to me the Porsche Boxster which was already
registered in Mr. Lus name. Further, and to emphasize, I exercised due
diligence in investigating on the history of transaction related to the subject
vehicle. After thorough investigation, I was convinced that Mr. Lu is the true
owner of said vehicle.
20. Further, my transaction for the acquisition of the vehicle was
with Mr. Lu, not with FENIX. In that case, how can I have possibly cause
to appear that complainant have participated in the sale between FENIX and
Mr. Lu, as suggested by complainant? With all due respect, this is very
absurd and ridiculous.
21. Considering that the OR/CR of the PORSCHE BOXTER is
duly registered under Mr. Lus name, we executed a corresponding Deed of
Absolute Sale over the subject vehicle for consideration amounting to Nine
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P900,000.00).
22. Therefore, I immediately transferred the vehicle under my name
as new owner thereof.
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23. Clearly, I did not execute nor caused introduction of falsified

documents in order to acquire ownership of the vehicle. Nor did I use any
falsified document to effect the transfer of ownership of said vehicle to my
24. Finally, complainant is making an impression that I, together
with the other respondents, are in connivance for the transfer to the subject
vehicle knowing that complainant is allegedly the owner thereof. I beg to
25. I did not even meet nor communicated with respondent Michael
Go with respect to the subject Porsche Boxster. To reiterate, I only
communicated with Mr. Lu in order for me to purchase the said vehicle.
Since I did not do so, how can there be a conscious design between all
respondents and for me to acquire the said vehicle?
26. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
27. In Bahilidad v. People12, the Supreme Court elucidated the
concept of conspiracy in this wise:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed.
Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime, all taken together, however,
the evidence must be strong enough to show the
community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it
is essential that there must be a conscious design to


Article 8, Revised Penal Code.

615 SCRA 597

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commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of

intentionality on the part of the cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed
some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the
execution of the crime committed. The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of
the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other
co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused
at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it,
without any active participation in the same, is not
enough for purposes of conviction

28. Applying the afore-stated doctrine, it is apparent that I am not

in connivance or conspiracy with other respondents. The ComplaintAffidavit simply revealed a failed business partnership between respondent
Mr. Go and complainant. Complainant admitted that he gave Mr. Go an
authority to sell the said vehicle, and entrusted possession and control of the
Porsche Boxster to the latter13. Likewise, complainant admitted that he had
knowledge of the above-mentioned sale of the Porsche Boxster 14 but the
proceeds thereof were not remitted by respondent Mr. Go. Due to the
foregoing, complainant jumped the gun in concluding that I am in
connivance with Mr. Go and the other respondents. This is clearly illogical.
29. I am engaged in the buying and selling of motor vehicles for
____ years. Through my experience, I make it sure that before I bought any
vehicle for my disposal, I exercise extreme caution in order to prevent any
complications. The purchase of the subject Porsche Boxster is no exception.
As stated earlier, I requested for one (1) week before I closed the sale with
Mr. Lu. During that period, I investigated on the documents and the previous
transactions surrounding the said vehicle. After obtaining the relevant
information and documents pertaining to the subject vehicle, I decide
whether I will purchase the same.
30. From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that conspiracy between
me and other respondents is highly impossible and would have never
31. All told, the accusations against me for carnapping and
falsification of the documents over PORSCHE BOXSTER are totally false
and baseless. Considering the foregoing, there is nothing left to do for this

P.3, Complaint-Affidavit.
P.4, Id.

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Honorable Office but to dismiss the instant case against me as the

prosecution against me will be a waste of government funds which should
have been intended to other important matter.
32. The Supreme Court, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals15,
discussed the purposes of a preliminary investigation. Thus:
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to
free respondent from the inconvenience, expense,
ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the
course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of
his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a
competent office designated by law for that purpose.
Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the
state from the burden of the unnecessary expense an effort
in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising
from false, frivolous or groundless charges.

33. Further, in the case of Cojuangco v. PCGG16, the Supreme

Court said, that:
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not
intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual
affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires
into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the
end in view of determining whether or not an information may be
prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation
is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case.
Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so
that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a
matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation
has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding.
An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and
for, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is
rendered thereon.
The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly
empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is
no less than that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court
judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a
"judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be
considered to be a quasi-judicial officer.

34. On a final note, these false charges caused me embarrassment

not only to my business colleagues, but also to my family. As the same was
only done by complainant to tarnish my reputation and his assertions are
based on mere conjectures and false statements, I am filing a criminal case

G.R. No. 113216. 05 September 1997.

G.R. Nos. 92319-20, 02 October 1990.

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against him for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
simultaneous with the filing of this Counter-Affidavit.
35. I executed this Counter-Affidavit to attest to the truth of the
foregoing facts and circumstances and to impugn the crimes of Carnapping
and Falsification charged against me by complainant. I pray for the outright
dismissal of the instant case.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand on this 24 th
day of March 2015.

March 2015 in Pasay City. I hereby certify that I examined the affiant and I
am satisfied that he voluntarily executed this Counter-Affidavit.
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and that I
am satisfied that he voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit.

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