G.R. No.

161434
March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the
presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material
facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a
natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.
Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding
qualification of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection
with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme
Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as
a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law

on respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as

evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born
in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of
residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie,
though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of
paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate.
The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of
bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only
before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by
the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of

Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President, SEC. LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H.
BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-inCharge of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional
the designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H.
Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed
respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer,

concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging
the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold
any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition,
Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she
assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2,
2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautistas concurrent positions as DOTC
Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution .
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a
judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer
exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the
appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator
effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the
present petition moot and academic. Petitioners prayer for a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is
likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there
is nothing left to enjoin.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC
of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the
constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet
Members and their deputies and assistants.
Held:

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA

Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional

prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact
that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him
with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. But even in cases where supervening events had made
the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and public. In the present case, the mootness
of the petition does not bar its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct
application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in
any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:

Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official
family is all-embracing, the disqualification was held to be
absolute, as the holding of "any other office" is not qualified by
the phrase "in the Government" unlike in Section 13, Article VI
prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives from holding "any other office or employment
in the Government"; and when compared with other officials and
employees such as members of the armed forces and civil service
employees, we concluded thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as
the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general
and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the
1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as
a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant
to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the

President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their

deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect
to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal
severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language
used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given
a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances
cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being
appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided
under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary
of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of
DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the
exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where
holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of
the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an exofficio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of

respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity
with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and
VOID.
Note:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of
the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary
of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to
sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment
because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person
to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of
the term. However, where the person is merely designated and
not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office
only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered
only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer
security of tenure on the person named.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties

intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is
intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US
578 SCRA 438 Political Law Constitutional Law Ratification of

Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been

a Treaty Validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement

implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its

obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.

**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith &

BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the

very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive

st

On the 1 of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of

agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their

rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was

ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA

ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US

is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as

serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the

the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US

crime was committed within the countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to

Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given

the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy

under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation.

was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other

The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA.

Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in
the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is
self-executing.