IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.

MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as follows: Is a marriage
contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines? Are the
marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? As the
decision of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect marriages consummated by not less than one
hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of
the cause can be realized. We proposed to give to the subject the serious consideration which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left
property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong
Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit
in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had
been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang,
married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence presented by both
sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not
sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With
reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge
reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately
proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage;
accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial
judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased
Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As to the facts, we can
say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court. As to the legal issues submitted for
decision by the numerous assignments of error, these can best be resolved under two heads, namely: (1)
The validity of the Chinese marriage; and (2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.
1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo was married in the
city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the Emperor Quang Su, or,
according to the modern count, on February 16, 1985, to a young lady named Tan Dit. Witnesses were
presented who testified to having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was also introduced in
evidence a document in Chinese which in translation reads as follows:
One hundred
years of life
and health for
both.

Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully answers the venerable Chiong Ing,
father of the bridegroom, accepting his offer of marriage, and let this
document serve as proof of the acceptance of said marriage which is to be
celebrated during the merry season of the flowers.
I take advantage of this occasion to wish for your and the spouses much
happiness, a long life, and prolific issue, as noble and great as that which
you brought forth. I consider the marriage of your son Boo with my sister
Lit Chia as a mandate of God and I hope that they treat each other with
great love and mutual courtesy and that both they and their parents be
very happy.
Given during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the reign of the
Emperor Quang Su.

Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his marriage during
which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left
China for the Philippine Islands and sometime thereafter took to himself a concubine Mora by whom he
had two children. In 1910, Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as
appears from documents presented in evidence, was permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the son
of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however, never returned to his native hearth and seems never to have
corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any further relations with her except once when he sent
her P10.

The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of the claimant Cheong
Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His Honor noted a strong inclination on the part of the
Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son,
Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. His Honor also noted that reliable witnesses
stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in
Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are not disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the trial court. The
immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the deceased
Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and
the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted without
these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are
valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first
necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact,
and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion ([1910]), 16 Phil., 137; [1913],
228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines and the Supreme Court of the United States were called
upon to decide, as to the conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant, between the descendants
of an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage. The Supreme
Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding that the Chinese marriage was not
adequately proved. The legal rule was stated by the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine
marriage, followed by forty years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited,
after the death of the husband and administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage,
"save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of
such impediment." Another case in the same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22 Phil.,
216).
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy
concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and
unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.
Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.
The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of an acknowledged
natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the affidavit of Cheong Boo before the American
Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North Borneo. But we are not called upon to make a pronouncement on
the question, because the oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error.
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is fairly complete. He
appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to the year 1896. At least, in the year las
mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine Islands. There he was married to the Mora Adong according
to the ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest)
Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is established by one of the parties to the marriage, the
Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one of whom was the
father of the bride, and another, the chief of the rancheria, now a municipal councilor. The groom complied
with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods.
The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of the father of the
bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran. Then the Iman asked the parents if they had any
objection to the marriage. The marital act was consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito
net.
From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the Chinaman and the
Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five children, two of whom, Payang and
Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong
Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public
documents. Thus, when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of registration,
Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written consent
to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom is prevalent among
the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or friend, especially when they do not swear on the Koran
to tell the truth, it seems to us that proof could not be more convincing of the fact that a marriage was
contracted by the Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong, according to the ceremonies of the
Mohammedan religion.
It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced in the very beginning
of this decision, namely, Are the marriages performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the

Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into
consideration.
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of any court
inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel of any
denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of the word "priest," and only considering the phrase
"minister of the Gospel of any denomination" would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of the
Christian religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation. "Priest," according to the lexicographers,
means one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and considered as the medium through
whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon,
blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest.
"Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a
religious sect having a particular name. (Haggin vs. Haggin [1892], 35 Neb., 375; In reReinhart, 9 O. Dec.,
441; Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and
Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.
The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of
marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage,
that they take each other as husband and wife." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise
ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a
valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony
performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity.
Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan
ceremony, the remarks of the priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is
likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife
and did thereafter live together as husband and wife. (Travers vs. Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage Law which have just
been quoted and discussed. The particular portion of the law which, in our opinion, is controlling, is section
IX, reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have authority
therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or
omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and
that they have been lawfully married."
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the legislative intention
in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated between Mohammedans. To quote the judge:
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the Spanish law before
revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages, and it is not to be presumed that the legislator
intended by this law to validate void marriages celebrated during the Spanish sovereignty contrary
to the laws which then governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind, nothing could be clearer than
the language used in section IX. Note for a moment the all embracing words found in this section:
"No marriage" Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized" Could any other
construction than that of retrospective force be given to this phrase? "Before any person professing to
have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority" Could stronger language than this be
invoked to announce legislative intention? "Or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission"
Could the legislative mind frame an idea which would more effectively guard the marriage relation against
technicality? "If it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and
that they have been lawfully married" What was the purpose of the legislator here, if it was not to
legalize the marriage, if it was celebrated by any person who thought that he had authority to perform the
same, and if either of the parties thought that they had been married? Is there any word or hint of any
word which would restrict the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian marriages?
By what system of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such precise language the
curious idea that it was restricted to marriages performed under the Spanish law before the revolutionary
authorities?
In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would ascertain from other
sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General Order No. 68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the Philippines has, time and
again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law, and executive proclamation. The Treaty of
Paris in its article X, provided that "The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes
her sovereignty shall be secured Instructions to the Philippine Commission imposed on every branch of the
Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ... That
no form of religion and no minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or upon any citizen of

the Islands; that, upon the other hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in
following his calling, and that the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute."
The notable state paper of President McKinley also enjoined the Commission, "to bear in mind that the
Government which they are establishing is designed . . . for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Islands" and that, therefore, "the measures adopted should be made to conform to
their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices. . . . The Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced
the main constitutional provisions establishing religious toleration and equality.
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in the same path. For
instance, in the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the Captain General of the Philippines and the
Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government guaranteed "with all solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants
of Sulu the free exercise of their religion, with which it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it will also
respect their customs." (See further Decree of the Governor-General of January 14, 1881.) For instance, Act
No. 2520 of the Philippine Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of the Court of First Instance and
justices of the peace deciding civil cases in which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such
action is deemed wise, may modify the application of the law of the Philippine Islands, except laws of the
United States applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and customs. . . ." (See
further Act No. 787, sec. 13 [ j]; Act No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the Legislative Council amended
and approved by the Philippine Commission; Cacho vs.Government of the United States [1914], 28 Phil.,
616.) Various responsible officials have so oft announced the purpose of the Government not to interfere
with the customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs, as to make quotation of the same
superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were inspired by the
governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the marriages of the Indians, the Quakers, and the
Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is, that a marriage between two Indians entered into according
to the customs and laws of the people at a place where such customs and laws are in force, must be
recognized as a valid marriage. The rule as to the Society of Quakers is, that they will be left to their own
customs and that their marriages will be recognized although they use no solemnization. The rule as to
Mormon marriages is that the sealing ceremony entered into before a proper official by members of that
Church competent to contract marriage constitutes a valid marriage.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that
a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.:" (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U.
S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs.Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and
Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by
legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the right
to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid
marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.
(Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4 Conn, 209; Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N. C., 273.)
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will mot
effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention
into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the
deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void, would
be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least one hundred fifty
thousand Moros who have been married according to local custom. We then have it within our power either
to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions
bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block
or to advance settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court in the cases of United
Statesvs. Tubban ([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33 Phil., 285). We do not,
however, believe these decisions to be controlling. In the first place, these were criminal actions and two
Justice dissented.. In the second place, in the Tubban case, the marriage in question was a tribal marriage
of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the marriage had been performed during the Spanish regime by
a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil. In neither case, in deciding as to whether or not the accused should be

given the benefit of the so-called unwritten law, was any consideration given to the provisions of section IX
of General Order No. 68. We are free to admit that, if necessary, we would unhesitatingly revoke the
doctrine announced in the two cases above mentioned.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage.
We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages performed according to
the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is unnecessary to decide.
Inresume, we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved and that the Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has
only the rights of a natural child, and we find the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid,
thus giving to the widow and the legitimate children of this union the rights accruing to them under the
law.
Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a partition of the
property in accordance with this decision, and for further proceedings in accordance with law. Without
special findings as to costs in this instance, it is so ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORA DUMPO, defendant-appellant.
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

RECTO, J.:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites and practice of the
Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is alleged that Dumpo contracted another
marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived together as husband and wife. Dumpo was
prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a maximum of eight years, and one day of prision mayor and
minimum of two years, four months and twenty one days of prision correccional, with costs. From this
judgment the accused interposed an appeal. The records of the case disclose that it has been established
by the defense, without the prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to the contrary, that
the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground
that her father had not given his consent thereto.
We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the validity of a marriage
between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact of which no judicial notice may be taken and
must be subject to proof in every particular case. In the case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony
of Tahari, an Iman or Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans, to
the effect that the consent of the bride's father or. in the absence thereof, that of the chief of the tribe to
which she belongs in an indipensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. If the absence of this
requisite did not make the marriage contract between Mohammedans void, it was easy for the prosecution
to show it by refuting Iman Tahari's testimony inasmuch as for lack of one there were two other Imans
among the State witnesses in this case. It failed to do so, however, and from such failure we infer that the
Iman's testimony for the defense is in accordance with truth. It is contended that, granting the absolute
necessity of the requisite in question, tacit compliance therewith may be presumed because it does not
appear that Dumpo's father has signified his opposition to this alleged marriage after he had been
informed of its celebration. But this presumption should not be established over the categorical affirmation
of Moro Jalmani, Dumpo's father, that he did not give his consent to his daughter's alleged second
marriage for the reason that he was not informed thereof and that, at all events, he would not have given
it, knowing that Dumpo's first marriage was not dissolved.
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the
marriage alleged to first been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan
being undissolved, cannot be considered as such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime
charged in the information.
Wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is acquitted of the charges and if she should be
in detention her immediate release is ordered, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

HULL, J., dissenting:

Under section 25 of the Marriage Law Act No. 3613, "marriages between Mohammedans may be performed
in accordance with the rites or practices of their religion . . .," and as stated in the majority opinion we
cannot take judicial notice of such matters but that they are subject to proof, as is any foreign law. The
person "learned in the law" who was presented as an expert witness for the defense, did not know his age,
but it was estimated by the judgment as fifty-four years. He gave his occupation as that of a fisherman and
stated he had performed two marriages. He does not know how to read. He was not asked any questions
as to whether there was a difference between the marriage of a young woman living with her parents or a
woman who had been emancipated.
In the evidence of the prosecution, it was shown that the second marriage was solemnized by an Iman, a
Mohammedan religious official, seventy years old, who was living in the vicinity of the contracting
parties.lawphil.net
There was no quotation from the Koran regarding the essentials of a marriage ceremony according to the
Mohammedan religion, and I agree with the trial court that the evidence relied upon by the majority
opinion, is not worthy of serious consideration. If consent were in fact necessary, it can well be presumed
from the subsequent actions of the father of the girl. She left his house and after the second ceremony
lived openly with her second husband, this with her father's full knowledge and at least tacit consent, for
many months.
I therefore believe that the sentence appealed from should be affirmed.
Vickers, Goddard, and Diaz, concurs.
WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Platon A. Baysa for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be
legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. This decision
was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on July 12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a
letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. However, on June 28, 1962, the same Board of
Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of members, rendered a new decision reversing that of
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. On August 9,
1962, petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the
decision, but the same was denied for lack of merit. Whereupon, on September 14, 1962, petitioner
initiated the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of
Manila which incidentally was considered by it as a petition forcertiorari.
In due time, respondents filed their answer, and, after the parties had submitted a written
stipulation of facts, attaching thereto some documentary evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision
granting in, toto the relief prayed for. Thus, the court declared valid the decision rendered by the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 3 while it restrained respondents from excluding petitioner from the country.
Respondents interposed the present appeal.

It appears that in the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in June, 1961,
petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto
Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that they had several children all
of whom are not in the Philippines; that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader;
that on June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among others, that
petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a nonquota immigrant; that this decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was
duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu proprio decision
rendered by the Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of members dated June 28, 1962 the
latter found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in evidence
as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship"; that said Board further held that, it
appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first
visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she
married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went
to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to
China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit
likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his
date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.1wph1.t
In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband
Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration authorities concerning their
alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929, coupled with the fact that the only basis in
support of petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and documentary
evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship," the Board of Commissioners motu
proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its finding
that she was improperly admitted. Thus, said Board made the following comment:
The only basis in support of the claim that she is the wife of Perfecto Blas is a mass of oral and
documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship. She relies on the
records of Perfecto Blas in connection with his cancellation case and the testimony of the supposed
children in the previous admission proceeding. But this claim is belied by the admission of Perfecto
Blas himself, in the hearing conducted by a Board of special inquiry in connection with his entry on
January 23, 1947, that he was married to one Ng Yo in Ki Say, Chingkang, China in 1936, his first
visit there being in 1935; he could not therefore have been married to herein applicant in 1929.
The above comment cannot be disputed, it finding support in the record. Indeed, not only is there
no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is
punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the
pretended marriage in China in 1929. This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family
relations. Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that
in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by
a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the
gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section
2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is
valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19
of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the
Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the
Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the
law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of
proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same as any other fact.
Courts cannot take judicial notice of what such laws are. In the absence of pleading and proof the
laws of a foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our own. (Yam Ka Lim v.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46).
In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law, it will be presumed
to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil. 472).
In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be
the same as those of the Philippines. (Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867).
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein,
and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's marriage, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. As a corollary, the petition for mandamus filed
before the court a quo is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in
its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendantsappellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where
she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a
well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises
Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in
love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their
marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a
piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for
his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which
was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize
because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the
intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted
that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never
asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escao spouses sought
priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid
marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish
priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because
on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not
remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar
Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila.
Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing
as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with
Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to
escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition,
drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application
that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she
intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial

District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in
open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage
(Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with
him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband,
and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present
husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife
and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and
Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages
and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable
for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents
on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta
Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by
the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both
consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the
presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil
law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State
but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not
essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act,
which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because
of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed,
the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage
was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442,
448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest
arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of
Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently
suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even
granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was
vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely
voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done,
and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for
non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce
that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe
County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in
force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii;
and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in
contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in
view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give
rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties
(Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort
cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her
previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise,
that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a
person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez
to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord
with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered
under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As
a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710
became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect
merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the
Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision
in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory
and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is
wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated
and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The
word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo
Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the
proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine
law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced
or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the
Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of
the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p.
72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late
Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her
husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's
animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own
letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In
these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great
unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff
was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that
he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners
and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such
unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically
defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto
Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek
to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they
abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that
Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should
not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez
(27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original
suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age,
she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so
doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good
faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the
marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely
solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or
result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts
under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate,
although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He
may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long
as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her
to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of
advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by
actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court
actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million
pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by
publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that
there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a
promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to
remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant

entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told,
we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's
fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao,
by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must
have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the
court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair.
This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence
of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife,
the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
The latter was substituted by her heirs when she died during the pendency of the case in the trial
court.
2
The original complaint included the Roman Catholic Church as a defendant, sought to be enjoined
from acting on a petition for the ecclesiastical annulment of the marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao; the case against the defendant Church was dismissed on a joint
motion.
3
In the present Civil Code the contrary rule obtains (Art. 53).
4
She was naturalized as an American citizen only on 8 August 1958.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders,
dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge,
which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon
Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that
he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so
that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the
trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due
course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they
had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that
respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community
property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is
the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty,
Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond
of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay
down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at

Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the
couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was
born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living
apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as
Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986,
directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly
filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 8752435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of
the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the
sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was
filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the
Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform
the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to
defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of
the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was
also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of
both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as

direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce
decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the
aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional,
and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the
offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as
jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The
so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not
apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and
vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the
crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized
by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity
to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or
petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary
since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is
of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the
action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage
in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner,
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison
d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence
the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action
would be determined by his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such
capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at
the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing
suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution
can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated
differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours,
yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have
the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or
wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said
to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and
appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We
have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state,
in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis
supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature,
the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was
filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant
that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial
court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to
render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his
pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce
for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor
marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of.
The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated
that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows,
even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null
and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it
cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed.
There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within
the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule
and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case,
by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the
same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had
duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but

which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the
one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid
also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an
absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife
actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the
woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free
to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory
that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no
decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an
American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is
concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under
the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the
application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an
injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute
divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose
marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the
new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as
the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid
also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an
absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife
actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the
woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free
to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory
that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no
decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an
American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is
concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under
the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the
application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an
injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute
divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose
marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the
new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as
the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They
were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.Eventually Fe
sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a
private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in
a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina
Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan,
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced
by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the
six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court
required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being
submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," [2] disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972.Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial
approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged
by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo.On
27 November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly,
equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. [5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that
the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15
February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.
[7]
Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of
birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in
violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the

court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of
the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. [8] On 18 April
1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there
is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the
Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the
issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law
which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; [10] nor as to their respective hereditary
shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after
the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the
motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the
submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married
to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of
the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim
in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
[13]
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. [14]Petitioner
opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. [15] The trial court did not
grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." [16] It maintained that
their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We
deduce
that
the
finding
on
their
citizenship pertained solely to the
time
of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the
time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce
was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was

no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; [17] it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.
[19]
Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the
time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently,
respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to
the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. [20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt
of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, [21] the same lacks merit. For forum
shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. [22] The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to
the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis,
all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of
petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and LENITA
MABUNAY HUGHES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Westremundo y. De Guzman for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay
Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June 1990,
the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma.
Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living
with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to
the adoption.
On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. a petition for
Review on Certiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court referred the
case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assigned a lone error on the part of the respondent court, thus

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF SPOUSES JAMES
ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO
ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt. Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known
as "The Family Code of the Philippines," is explicit.
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts
rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his
or her Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance
with the rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases
enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to
paragraph (3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of Executive Order No. 209,
expressing as follows:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
The old law on adoption, Presidential Decree No. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), exactly adopted
that found in then Article 336 of the Civil Code. Article 29, Section B, Chapter I, Title II, of the said decree
provided :
Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be
exercised as if the child were their own by nature.
Observe that the law then in force used the word "may" under which regime, a joint adoption by the
spouses was apparently not made obligatory. The provision was later amended, however by Executive
Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of President Corazon C. Aquino. The new Article 29 expressed,
thus
Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be
exercised as if the child were their own by nature.
If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the
adoption shall not be allowed.
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the
spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the
same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for
joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find
governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child
of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with
this Code.
The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized that James
Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This view of the
appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate

paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as,
but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the
adopted, as well as support and successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be
considered inconsequential to the parties.
We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring not
so much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also realize that
in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social and
intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been designed.
When, however, the law is clear and no other choice is given, 1 we must obey its full mandate.
Even then, we find it difficult to conclude this opinion without having to call the attention of the
appropriate agencies concerned to the urgency of addressing the issue on inter-country adoption, a matter
that evidently is likewise espoused by the Family Code (Article 184, last paragraph, Family Code).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 At least until such time as the "rules on inter-country adoption" are provided for by law
pursuant to Article 184 of the Family Code.

UGGI LINDAMAND THERKELSEN and ERLINDA G. BLANCAFLOR, Petitioners-Appellants, v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee.
Campos, Mendoza & Hernandez for Petitioners-Appellants.
Solicitor General and J. Domingo de Leon for Respondent-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ADOPTION; DISQUALIFICATIONS; ALIENAGE BY ITSELF DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOREIGNER FROM
ADOPTING A FILIPINO. The present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters
those aliens that are either (a) non-resident or (b) who are resident but the Republic of the Philippines has
broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone
does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under our laws.
2. ID.; ID.; ACQUISITION BY ADOPTED OF CITIZENSHIP OF ADOPTING PARENT NOT REQUIRED. It is not a
condition for the approval of an adoption that the process should result in the acquisition, by the person
adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

DECISION

This appeal was taken against a decision of the Manila Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in its special
proceedings No. D-00007, denying appellants application for adoption of the minor Charles Joseph
Blancaflor Weeks.
The factual background of the case is stated in the decision appealed from to be as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In this adoption proceeding, the petitioners are husband and wife who were married on June 2, 1962, or
barely a year ago. The minor sought to be adopted, born on February 16, 1960, is the natural child of
petitioners wife. His father was Charles Joseph Weeks, who abandoned mother and child after the latters
birth. He is said to have gone back to the United States.
Except for the legal impediment hereinafter to be mentioned, the facts before the Court may warrant the
approval of the adoption sought herein. Petitioner husband is a Danish subject, who has been granted
permanent residence in the Philippines (Exhs. "D" and "E"). A former employee of Scandinavian Airlines
System, he is now Manager of M. Y. Travel International Hongkong Ltd., with a monthly salary of P1,200.00,
plus allowances. It does not appear that either petitioner has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. On the other hand, the minor sought to be adopted has been living with them ever since the
marriage of petitioners. Petitioner husband has treated the minor as his son, and the latter calls him
"Daddy." Although the possibility exists that petitioners may yet have their own children, the adoption at
this time, before any such children is begotten, may strengthen, rather than disrupt, future domestic
relations."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court a quo denied the adoption sought, saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In Sp. Proc. No. D-00011, adoption of Benigno Lim, this court has had occasion to rule that a Filipino
cannot adopt an alien (Chinese) minor about 19 years old. The adoption would not confer Philippine
citizenship on the Chinese, but could definitely: legalize his stay in this country. It was also stated that
conversely, an alien cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a citizen of
the aliens country. As petitioner husband in this case is a Danish subject, it has to be held that he cannot
legally adopt the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is of this country, following that

of his natural mother."cralaw virtua1aw library

If we understand the decision correctly, the adoption was denied solely because the same would not result
in the loss of the minors Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter.
Unfortunately, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court did not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it
is clear that, if pursued to its logical consequences, the judgment appealed from would operate to impose
a further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those required by law. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General in his brief, the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters those
aliens that are either (a) non-resident or (b) who are resident but the Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not
disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either
class.
The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for the approval of the adoption
that the process should result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the
adopting parent. This finds no support in the law, for, as observed by this Court in Ching Leng v. Galang,
G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27 October 1958, the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and
not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It
is not within the province of our civil law to determine how or when citizenship in a foreign state is to be
acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order to forestall circumvention of our
exclusion laws does not warrant denial of the adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting
parents, since it is not shown that our public policy would be thereby subverted.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the court a quo is directed to
allow the adoption sought. Without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

NG HIAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellant.
Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 26th of November,
1915, by the presentation of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
From an examination of the record the following facts appear to be proved beyond question:
First. That on or about the 30th of October, 1915 on the steamship Tian there arrived at the port of Manila,
a woman, Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, together with two children, Ng Tio a female of the age of 9 years, and Ng
Hian a boy of 16 years of age (the petitioner herein);
Second. That Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco had been born in the Philippine Islands, of a Filipina mother and a
Chinese father;
Third. That Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco was married to a Chinaman by the name of (Filipino name) Juan Uy Tue,
(Chinese name) Ng Chion Tue:
Fourth. That Juan Uy Tue (Ng Chion Tue), before his marriage with Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, had been married
to a Chinese woman with whom he had some children, the petitioner herein and also one called Ng Guan.
It appears that Ng Guan was residing in the Philippine Islands at the time of the presentation of the present
petition;
Fifth. That the Chinese wife of Juan Uy Tue died while the petitioner herein, Ng Hian, was a very small child;
Sixth. That the said Juan Uy Tue, after the death of his Chinese wife, was legally married to the said
Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco;
Seventh. That the said little girl, Ng Tio, of 9 years of age was the daughter of the brother of the said Juan
Uy Tue, born of a Chinese father and mother; that the father of the little girl had given her to the said
Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco;

Eight. That Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, being the stepmother of the said Ng Hian, adopted him and was
bringing him to the Philippine Islands to study.
After the close of the investigation before the board of special inquiry, during which examination the
foregoing facts were presented, the said board refused the right of each of said children to enter the
Philippine Islands.
Later, on the 17th of November, 1915, a rehearing was granted for the purpose of examining other
witnesses upon the question of the right of said two children, Ng Tio and Ng Hian, to enter the Philippine
Islands. At the close of the second hearing the board of special inquiry admitted Ng Tio, but denied the
right of Ng Hian to enter the Philippine Islands. From that decision an appeal was taken to the Collector of
Customs and by him affirmed on the 23d of November, 1915. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus in
the present case was presented on the 26th of November, 1915.
The petition and answer and the record made in the department of customs were presented to the Court of
First Instance. The court, after an examination of the record, reached the conclusion that the petition (Ng
Hian) was entitled to enter the Philippine Islands. From that decision the Collector of Customs appealed to
this court. The question which the Attorney-General presents is whether or not the minor children of a
deceased resident Chinese merchant have a right to enter the territory of the Philippine Islands. That
question has been answered by this court in numerous decisions in the negative. (Lee Jua vs. Collector of
Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 24; Tan Lin Jo vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 78; Cang Kai Guan vs.
Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 102; Yat Tian Un (Sun) vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 487; De
Eng Hoa vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil. Rep., 490; Ex parte Chan Fooi, 217 Fed. Rep., 308.)
It is true that the petitioner, Ng Hian, had never been in the Philippine Islands before. It is also true that the
said Marcosa S. Dy Jingco was his stepmother. She swore positively that she had adopted him. That fact is
not denied of record. Until the fact is denied we must accept it. There is nothing in the record which shows
or tends to show that she had not adopted him in good faith. The question whether or not Marcosa S. Dy
Jiongco could bring Ng Hian into the territory of the Philippine Islands as her adopted son has been
discussed by the Federal Courts of the United States. In the case of Ex parte Fong Yim (134 Fed. Rep.,
938), the court held that:
A Chinese merchant domiciled in the United States has the right to bring into this country with his
wife minor children legally adopted by him in China, where it is shown that the adoption was bona
fide, and that the children have lived as members of his family and have been supported by him for
several years.
The court further said:
Of course, the question whether the adoption is a genuine one is a question of fact, open to
investigation . . . . The evidence shows that the practice of adopting children in China is very
common, that it takes place substantially without legal formalities, but that the rights and
obligations of children adopted and recognized as such are similar to those of natural children.
Under these circumstances I can see no difference between the legal status of adopted children and
of natural children. The Supreme Court (of the United States) having decided that a Chinese
merchant domiciled in this country has the right to bring into it his natural children, I think that the
same decision is authority for the proposition that he has the right to introduce his adopted
children.
Upon the theory, therefore, that Ng Hian had been adopted by his stepmother, and upon the theory that
she has a right to enter territory of the United States, without objection, we are of the opinion and so hold
that Ng Hian has a right to enter the territory of the Philippine Islands as her adopted son. Therefore the
judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo
ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No.
15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and
custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife.
Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live
Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.)
and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the
court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of
2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without
delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to
the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification
Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 6 by the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine
passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616. 7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines8but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in
1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned
her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both
the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her
husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding
ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992. 12 Her
two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10
July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No.
017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's
candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her
youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon
learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually

expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral
arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. 18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her
earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. 19 The couple began preparing for
their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester;20 coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; 21 and inquiry with Philippine
authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As early
as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. 23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately
followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to
arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half
of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were
issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006. 30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change
and abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April
2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May
2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006. 33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City
where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been
residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. 36 Under the same
Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. 37 As
can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared
that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as
citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name
and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She
also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999. 41 This passport was
renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA. 42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, 44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites
stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said
affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner
stopped using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." 49 On that day, she accomplished a
sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S.,
specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present. 51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator
for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence
in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC,
the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the
day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. 57 The
petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due
course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition. 60 Essentially, Elamparo's
contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections. 61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino
on account of the fact that she was a foundling. 62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer
natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not
qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with.64 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is
deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen. 65 According to
Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn
declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the
country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that
assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she
still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be
counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also
on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the
belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition
for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that
the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and
residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered
citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the
place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her
COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect
and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines
as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest
mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of
domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people
to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader. 68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's
COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016

National and Local Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same. 70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P.
Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were
consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, 71 docketed as SPA
No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her
for the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown
parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood
relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that
what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in
the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude
them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen. 75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that
foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not selfexecutory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers
natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and
petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year
residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the
time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011. 81 Additionally, Tatad
questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her
husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S. 82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139
(DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a
natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under
the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as naturalborn citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident
of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates
against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did
not meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition, 85 docketed as SPA No. 15007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President
should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for
said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of
the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. 86 Contreras contended that the
reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the
date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. 87 He asserted that
petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as such,
she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not
invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of
petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an
elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing
her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents. 93 Otherwise
stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed
to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225
or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government
enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her
as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San
Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of
choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country,
purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even
before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile
are complied with.100 She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign
citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice. 101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a
mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is
not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that
she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the
elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, toGRANT the
Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POELLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with
the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution.
On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo
ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were
issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the
two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held
in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE
the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated
cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December
2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December
2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for
President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or
cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The
exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the
issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided
or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide
the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which,
in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government;
and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and
sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported
by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed
by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or
the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience
to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section
17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the VicePresident, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution.
There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which was
affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation
in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving
the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification
is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences
are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility,"
on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is
not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa.
We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications
prescribed in 2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications
provided in 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured
in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determiningbefore
election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts
for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his
favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not
be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case,
his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This
is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8,
1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is
why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for
the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the
election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations
made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as

"sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns andqualifications of members of Congress of
the President and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the
amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15
February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. 107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided
by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be
summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court
that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the
other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled
or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior
authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by
which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are selfevident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases
equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as
in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the
COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens
under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments,
when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort
at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood
relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded
to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted
in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That
said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a naturalborn Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not
a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens.
Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude
the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if
not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such
parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it
tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) 111 that from
1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census
statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and
4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62%of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were

1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In
the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were
270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740
Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures.
Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was
found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino. 112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1wphi1 She also has typical Filipino
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly
Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of
the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can get
pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such
that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner.
We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were
1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the
Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born
Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number
of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661.
This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a
natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that
the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be
affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a
Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or
perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking
those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise
suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered
their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a
theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one,
but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given
the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a
decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why
this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of
an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense
are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is
a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court
held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It
may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following
exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural
children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to
natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I
refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the
Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a
foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas
Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution
need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of
unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on
the subject exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the
notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution
law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the
Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children
followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral
Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for a
textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional
silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need
to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can
even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to
convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art.
IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando:
the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane
society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a
discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument
that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on
those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social
justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which
provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the
first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens
of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court
will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art.
15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's
nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of
the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. 120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the InterCountry Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption
of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and
this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and
include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under
Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. 121 Secondly, the object of
the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly,
the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the
election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced
by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. 122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which
approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to
Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's
status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law
include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to
legal systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination
in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as
embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. 129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the
UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the
right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and
their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child
would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or
social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of
the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's
parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the
parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in
which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found,
contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not
a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961
"United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the
UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the
"International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled
that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban
as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only
sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty
states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and
regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where
onlyfour countries had "either ratified or acceded to" 135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005.
The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded
to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted
principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ
Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally," 136 support the notion that the
right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered
as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe
have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow
the jus sanguinisregime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2
February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly
refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted.
Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only
to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings
as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents
are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings
were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own
making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a
member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings
renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or
to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225
did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain
"Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes
in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process
that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which
cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow
him to recover his natural-born citizenship.Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his naturalborn citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that
natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No.
9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it
had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected
inBengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person
who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is
"repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out
that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized,
and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be naturalborn or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As
such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always
revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v.
Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine,
we cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should
be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood
when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names
of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been
contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption
is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended
birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate
"shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records,
books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare
and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be
kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her

birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case
for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false
material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day
before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines
before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner
must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the
requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she
put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning
date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2.
an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. 152 To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile
and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing
her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the
shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of
her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February
2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March
2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the
First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011
filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner
on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased);
and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the
Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family
home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its
Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24
May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first
two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus nonrevertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis
of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in
July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied
on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments,
the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree
that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa
or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since
petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation.
In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the
candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not

involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With
the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's
acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted
that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the
citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer.
The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her
one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents,
the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent
resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is
overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon
her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight
company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess
items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S.
house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24
May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here).
Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005
it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visafree as abalikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting
a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors
who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad
and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the
opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant
members of society upon their return to the country"164 in line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society,
it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one
year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate
himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children
and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and
overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented.
There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication
in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its
rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been
decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled
that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015
COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine
resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement
in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC
as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned
residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband
returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be
counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May
2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which
the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to
the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge
that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the
return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence,
to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive
admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means
conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a
COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven
(7) months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was
telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically
returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that
domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006.
However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here
to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a
petition forquo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from
which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under
R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner
recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United
Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press.
Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep.
Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances
that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her
Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC
when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have
truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore,
when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have
been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly
mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012
statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this
Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC.
Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office. 168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced
dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United
States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as
inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator"
which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the
Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration,
[petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown,
ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that
determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for
election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have
been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and
substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary
reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was
not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the
declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6)

months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was
uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made,
petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public
was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016.
Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are
facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of
residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA
to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in
Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was
enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family
home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled
[petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K.
Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's
abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4
May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually
built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the
exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in
her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President
of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all,
deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitledEstrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA
No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the
petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the
First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
isDECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May
2016.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice