^-

TV

17 March 1959

NSC BRIEFING
CUBA
I.

Fidel C a s t r o ' s campaign a g a i n s t , d i c t a t o r s h i p s h a s assumed two d i s tinct

forms:

encouragement of r e v o l u t i o n a r y p l o t t i n g a g a i n s t

"dictators" and pressure for the exclusion of "dictatorships"

from membership in the Organization of American States (GAB).
A,

Castro iias denied any intention to intervene militarily but

5iaa publicly declared his intention to assist anti-dictator
revolutionary groups4

Cutta has become a meeting ground for

revolutionary groups desirous of receiving Cufcmn armSj equipment or financial

B,

support.

Argentine l e f t i s t Ernesto "Che" Guevara has been given authority

by Fidel Castro to deal Vith revolutionary groups.
level members of the

Some low

Tr

26th of July" movement are probably

aiding e*ile groups.

1,

"Che" Guevara he5 demonstrated proCoiasfcunist sympathies

and lias tended to f a c i l i t a t e Communist a c t i v i t i e s in Ctiba.

C,

Castro's campaign against dictatorships is at variance with

other liberal leaders in the area t principally
President Betanccjurt and former Costa Rican
Figueres*

They fear that Castro's dealings with Communist

exile groups would introduce proCommunist regimes.

Figueres may assist r i v a l non-Communist rebel groups

Revolutionary plotting in Cuba is directed primarily ajjainst

ments of Dominican Republic, Haiti T Nicaragua and
cu-,35. rj

A,

Castro has demonstrated most interest in the aotmfall c-f

Dominican dictator TrujilXo.
1.

Anti^Trujillo groups have alsotoe-coneactive in several

countries other than Cuba, notably in Venezuela, taut so
far tipve failed to achieve unity,

Castro1 s apparent vehicle i s the Companist-influenced Union

Pa t r i o tic a Dominicans {UfPD-Dominlcan Patriotic Union).

3.

AntI~Trujllci preparations in Cuba are not believed to

have progressed much beyond the planning stage, although
there are reports that revolutionaries are being recruited
for training,

4.

Propaganda, including radio broadcasts, i s being directed

against the Dominican Republic.

B.

Castrc's interest in Haiti, wbere the Duvslier government i s

serioti3lv weakened by internal deterioration as well as by ester nal threats by e^ile groups, i s primarily as 3 potential
base for attack against the Dominican Republic*
1*

Haitian exiles in Cub^, led by mulatto political leader

Louis Dejoie, have been permitted to broadcast

inflammatory

propaganda attacks against the Duvslier regime.

2*

There is no firm evidence that Haitian exiles are training

in Cuba for an iavasionary expedition despite claims that
Cuba is supplying both men and arms.
a.

However, many men are available for recruitment t

includ-

ing former Cnban revolutionaries, Haitian sugar workers

in Cuba, aod mercenaries of other nationalities t
C.

Plotting against Hicara^ua and Paraguay is hiTidored by lack of

unity among opposition groups involved.

1,

Both countries are probably of less immediate InteTeSt to

Cuba than the Dominican Republic and Haiti, although
Cnstro is believed to support the communist-influenced

Union Patriotica de Nicaragua (OTN-NiCaraguan p a t r i o t i c

Union) against Niearaguan president Somoza,

Nicaragua

is more susceptible to invasionsj however, tbaa the

Dominican Republic
I I I . Efforts to exclude "dictatorships" from membership ia the QiS will
probably be limited by the reluctance of many Latin American
countries to intervene in the Internal affairs
A,

VencEuelan President Betancourt f i r s t

of member nations.

proposed their exclusion

:iA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SANITIZED
FOB
*SC

TH1
Brlt/lnf (198th}, Tbttriutir, ft torch LOU

DELETED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BAY OF Pi

Llfht of
to t * Ulc*a

4.

T*a

full l u l l hoar.

WTTQff

HSC BRIEFING

1359
CUBA

E*

Cuba' e r e v o l u t i o n a r y government i s d i c t a t o r s h i p ucd : er Prime

Minister Fidel Cistro,
A.

d?

Castro has absolute power and 1B sole arbiter of P I I governfedttt policies and fictions,
1.

."

L _ .

He has had no fdministratlve experience ind resorts to

demagogy to whip up popular support,

E,

Castro f s economic policies^ such as agrarian reformSj cattiag

rents and u t i l i t y rateSj hsve alienated most sound business

and commercial groups*

1,

Castro's numerous capricious public statements, i*fl,

calling for 9 one-class society, hsve lso caused spprehen

Jf, t?ij D ,*i st*,e talk d C c ^ t i zPtd$jrrCe-v^f'*k*i ^

C,

Tbe

l1

war crime trials 1 1 have created erlticiem st hojae fls well

as abroad,
D*

However, Castro s t i l l retains overwhelming popularity i/ith the

lover classes*

II*

CastroTa strong anti-America a a t t i t u d e ,

shaped by intense

was again revealed in a 22 Uarcti speech, following a moderate

tbe SAme platform ty former Costa Ricati tresldent FigJeres*
A,

fi^ueres di&cussed "perils that threaten the revolution."

1*

Businessmen and the ^ealtby should not be antagonized and

the leaders of the government must guard age lust

deaajjofju

and dishonesty, which lead to tyranny^

2.

Figutres ur^ed Cubans to understand toe facts of the cold

ftn<J that "a groat power canaot ptrmit *n eneny to esist"
close to i t s shores.

B,

Figures 1 moderate approach strongly refuted

official
1.

rjy Castro and bis

news ftrgan*

Favoring A "neutralist" position in world affairs,

Cftfitro

implied that the US Naval Ease, Guantanamoj endangers Cuban

2*

Caetro also accused the US of supporting Latin American

dictators and! s*idi that the US encourages tflti-CAstro
activities*

I I I . Communists, operating openly end legally,

the organised labor rnovejnetitj

have gained foot bold a in

the armed forces, pad possibly the

press,
A,

The government is not now Coommnist dominated or controlled^

ever t filthcmgn the potflntlpl Jfor further Communist penetration
exists*
1,

Castro has Indicated he will not allow the Conuminists to

"steal the revolution" from him,

2#

So far, boweverj there has beerj no serious attempt to

proscribe Comrnmiist a c t i v i t i e s ,

3,

A vehicle for Communist penetration oJ tbe army i s a

0-6 flection wMcb Is ia charge of

-T

e<3uefttiag1f the

Harpist teachings are prevalent*

IV.

CAstro*s campaign against dictatorships has assumed two

encour^geweot of rcvolutioiaary plotting against "dictatorships
and pressure for the exclusion of "dictatorships 71
in the Organiiation of. American States (GAS),

fj-r

Am Castro has denied any intention to Intervene Jaillltarily*

Cuba,

Ahowover, has become ft meeting ground for revolutionaries

desirous of receiving Cuban arms, equipment or financial

support.

XT'I
Argentine pro-Communist Ernesto
with revolutionary groups.

l1

Che'r Guevara his teen

ome low level nepbers of the

July" jnovemetit are probably aiding exile groups,

1*

"Che11 Guevara, one of the original group vho invaded

with Castro, haE f a c i l i t a t e d
On 16 March be stated:

Communist activities in Cuba.

"ffe are going to get a Soviet

ambassador here in Cuba one way or a pother/'

^^

_L.

'/

Castro* in his campaign against dictatorshipa,

is

with otber liberal leaders In the area, principally Venezuelan

President Betancourt and former Costa Rlcan President Figueres.
They fear that Castro's dealings with Communist-Influenced

exile

groups would introduce pro-Communist regimes.

1.

Figueres and Eetcncourt may a s s i s t rival non-Comnunist

rebel groups.

Revolutionary plotting in.Cuba i s directed primarily agaiust the

governments of the Dominican Republic,
A.

flalti

end KicAra^ua,

Castro i s apparently supporting Communist-influenced Dominican s

fJIcaraguaa exile groups.

B*

Castro*s greatest interest i s Q overthrowing Dominican Dictator

Trujillo*
1.

Bis Interest in Haiti i s primarily as a potential base for

operations against the Dominican Repunltc*
a.

An invasion of Hait, however, might SparS a "Caribbean

war" since the Dominican Foreign Minister informed

the

Embassy that an attack on Haiti would be considered aQ

attack on the Dominican Republic,
2,
C.

Nicaragua 1B of less immediate, interest to Cuba but i s

susoaptlble to invasion ttasn tbe DomiBican Republic*

Preparations against "dictatorships" probably havo not
beyond the planning s t a g e ,
ppfv^

"

33

FOB tBI

or
ex.

s
B3

Si \

JOB* a . FARSIUGTOJI

April

tiSC BAIEFING

32 April 1953

GT,

CUBA

I.

Castro continues his one-man rule; no Indications lie intends

relinquish control over any government policies and: actions*
A

if.'

Agrarian reform program and Beiaures to reduce reats and

utility rates alienating business groups but no sign yet of
organized opposition; Castro retains overwhelming popularity

among lower classes,

II,

Sucb nationalistic and anti-American statements as the U3 "seat

Batista tanks and airplanes at a peso apiece to fight against
people*' not repeated during visit here? but there are at least
two Communists in his entourage+
A.

On 20 April Raul Castro in an attack on "enemies of Cuban

revolution" savagely attacked the US^ er-President Tigueras
Costa Rica, the international press, and ^ leader of CubanAmerican cultural institute.

Raul fiaid speech not impromptu

Jiut "carefully considered,|h

B,

Castro^s a t t i t i i d o s and p o l i c i e s probably undor^oing

hs revolutionary fervor subsides and as he gains p o l i t i c a l
experience, bLit basic programs and b e l i e f s v i l l

probably

remain unchanged
C

ConviELced t h a t US influence in Cuba has r e t a r d e d s o c i a l ,

economic and p o l i t i c a l development; Apparent t h a t he d i s t r u s t s
US- and while seeking economic benefits at tbe same time trying
to loosen s t r o n g economic and p o l i t i c a l

III,

ties,

Conununista, operating openly, fcave gained: footholds in organized

labor, armed1 f o r c e s t

and press*

A.

Highly publicized pro-Communists "clheTr Guevara, and Raul Castro

hold top positions of command in the military; pro-Cojiununist
Carlos Franqui edits 9elf-styled ''official1' newspaper and is
press advisor to President I/rrutia.

Hay open for further Communist penetration; Castro his niede D O

serious attempt to proscribe Communist activities*
A*

Indoctrination programs in the schools for educating the

illiterate rural masses reported to be strongly anti-American;
Communists believed participating in committee to rewrite
text books; Marxist teaching included in military education
program*

B.

Catholic church, howevert is alarmed and planning treasures,

including formation of a Catholic political partyj to combat
Communism,

Cburch irritated that last rites not permitted

to some who nave been executedt

V,

Caste's campaign against dictatorships has undergone modi fixation.

A.

From a position of open and aggressive support for axitidictator movements, hct claims to have moved to a more cautious
one of moral support and has taken token steps to prevent tne
launching of invasion expeditions from Ctiba.
1,

There had been no action, however, against Communistinfiltrated j^ro-ups generally associated Tith^frChetr Guevara
and Raul Castro.

2,

Support lor CojnJnunist-infiltrated Nicaragua^ and Dominica

exiles also continues; exile groups still operate freely
in Cuba.

r:\ .^v

O.k HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1997

July IBi*

FOB TOI

ITSC H t l g (411 th},

16 July

brlsfinfa mre

;DELFTED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BW '

tfa* *tdtrltrtm!f

NSC BRIEFING

16 July
AREA
case hae aroused C a s t r o , as well us most o t h e r

(TS

officials,

a g a i n s t US for g i v i n g asylum and p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n t o

t h i s " t r a i t o r , ri
At

But case dramatizes Conuaunist danger for Cubu public* and

r ? ' ;

Ctstrc has called Diai 1 defection a

fl

eruel blow'* to the

tlon,
B,

Castro becoming i T r i t t b l e and jumpy, bat remains determined

to use any means, including force, to put over his program,

C,

Cuban ftrms purchasing missions are in arope and: a cargo of

iemi-aQtojnatic r i f l e s

II

from Belgima Brrrived in Havana l a s t few

President Urrntia'fi public attack Uonday (13 Jaly) on Commtuiism was

Strongest anti^Communist statenent by uny Cuban o f f i c i a l

since

January, thoagb i t was coupled with attacks on OS re Diaz Lani*

A. -Urrutia accosed Comnunists of trying to uiake Cuba au instroment
of t t e Soviet cold war against the US and said Coimuflists are
t r a i t o r s to Cuban revolution.
EJ+

Previous auti-Ccunmunist comments were deleted by Castro from

Urrutta'4 reply to Dias Lana' l e t t e r of res lunation.

IJI,

Six Chinese Communist

ri

Dewsmenfl now In Cuba, spme of ttcm

to set up new Chinese-language newspaper to serve Cuba.^

commorjityt
I"V.

the largest in Latin America,

"Che1h Guevara, now in. India, contacted Communists there on foreign

policy of non-alignmentj according to CIA source-

A.

Guevara told Indian Communists that Cuba's

by presence in Cuba of US naval base at Giii]itanajn>, l?ut
will eventually be rid i f

it,

a Kaiser acted re Suez. Canal

and thea Cuba, can show true foreign

V.

Unsuccessful coup attempt in Honduras of Sunday (12 July) not

directly related to Caribbean c r i s i s *

5
UJ

policy colors.

-2-

DELETED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BAY OF ? m

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

OTHER LATIN AUEftlCAH

CASTRO EXCESSES

Cunhi
In Havana, f e ^ s proposed Brazilian efforts to discuss vitb
Fidel Castro A Cuhyi-US rapwould be. inopportunet
i t i s th* del i t era i* jpolioy of the Cuban Qovto sainthid relations
th-e United 3tht*a in a
a t i t e of agitation, Cunha r e cently advieAd Foreign llinlater
Later to refute Cuban ?oriffQ
Hintstec aofcfK invitation to
aoae to HstfUfc unless th.e vidLt
would cleftrly be useful. Th*
BBbABsador f*lt It would b*
used Inste-fcd to Indicate BrAzlllan srnpattiy fcd4 to give prestige to tba Cuban Government1ft
^irresponsibleLaiftr' apparen t doci S iOP

not to go to Cuba, at t b l * *tufl

indicative Of ft
disapproval Ol Ci*tro 1 s
sive method*, an attitude which
i s becoming apparent in Othtr
Latin American countries.

In. auflj1 November> P r e s i dent Ee-tancourt of 7*ne*utlaj .

one of Latin Amflrts^a noet r e p
nffcrAttO leaders,
criticized signs of 1Castro'*
"authcritnrl*H fule."
He told,
tha Cuban Gove-rnme-nt that ft
visit to Vene-^uela of

Haul C a s t r o an,d| riCho'h Guerfcrft

would t* "iQooavenient,"
J
periOrtftily demanded th*
of the Cuban ambassador In
CaracA# tar indiscreet
responsible behavior.
Colombian unbauStdOr recen
advised the Cubun r o J g
try that CftstfO'C toleranc* Of
the a c t i v i t i e s of Cfllonbian po
i i t i o l ^ilfr* could disturb
good R-e Lit ions between th*
oountrle*. To t l s govermiePt
hs ch*rftttefised.CaBtrOrs accusfltlosa againat the United
States as ill-adviead
J Jfl
a trr-itRtion over
the uuejtpetted arriTftl of
Cubans m-Ath no docunentatt-on
durlos the August nesting of
the A**rioan forelfD ulaiote
In Santiago was ^tightened by
the B*tr*dlpLomatlc p
OJ the Cuban
Ouitem*Ian Ptfrjide-n.t Ydii s diatuTOed by the
to C^ta of
d
/
*t Haul CM t ^& h a invlthtfton
ty the fitidfi-cliLl and Other en-'
courftfopeat ne believe* th
Ci,3tr5 p
PD n.t j-sa L -PEpgaiLn ta

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1997
OF IUUEDIATE INTEREST

30 Hovember 1959

NSC BRIEFING

SINO-SOVIET BLOC CAMPAIGN IN LATIM AMERICA

I,

The bloc is attempting to exploit tbe -relaxation of

since Ebrushchev's visit to the US tn an effort to
cial, diplomatic and cultural relations! with Latin Africa
accomplish its lon^run objective Of decreasing US influence i
this strategic area*
A.

Mexican visit of Hikoyan-highest ranting Soviet official

ever to visit Latin Americaand large Soviet delegation for

en

opening of Soviet exhibit was significant move in this direction and cHipha*i=^s increased importance USSR attaches to
Its propaganda and penetration efforts in area.
1.
B

Mexican reaction to Hikoyan and the exhibit Has been cooL

Recent article in Prayda, which pointed up Impact on Latin

America of Khrushchev's viait to US, claimed "revest ablishmei:
and development of friendly relations witb USSR is a real
and great cause associated with hopes for guaranteed
national independence a^d a better life for Latin American
peoplesd"
1.

Moscow recently doubled broadcasts to Central America tn<

increased by a third those to Brazil *

C.

In several Latin American countries, businessmen, some labor

leaders and certain government and congressional leaders
are pressing for trade and diplomatic relations jith bloc.

SECR
I.

Important Brazilian trade delegation no* in Moscow;

Brazilian Foreign Minister spoKe of possible review
of Brazilian relations witn DSSR at time Khrushchev
visit to US announced; other Brazilian politicians
subsequentI7 called for diplomatic relations or jnore
trade with bloc.

2*

Venezuela is considering renewal of relations with bloc,

and recently granted permission to Czechs to establish
commercial agency in Caracas.

3,

Bolivian congress passed resolution in Sept. calling for

relations with USSR and voted funds for Bolivian mission
in Moscow; reported informal Soviet offer of $60,000,000
credit to Bolivian national oil company reinforced
domestic pressure*

II

Latin American Communists are implenenting some oi the strategy

which tfcey planned in Moscow early this year in special clandestine conference at which 1* of 20 area parties were represented
and irnich Soviet Presidium member Otto Vt Xuusinen and other
Soviet "observers11 at tended..
A.

Latin American Communists were told then to deemphasize

Hcscotf direction^ improve coordination of area jfctivities,
and to stress "national liberation from imperialist yoke,"

fl+ They are now effectively exploiting ltftist-nationalist

elements in developing a coordinated s_nti-US propaganda
campaign on the themes of: LJS support of dictators, the
"liberation movements" in Cuba and Venezuela, and Panama
Canal issue.

American Ceunniiiinis ts arc developing a series of

regj.onftl

front movements to implement the Moscow guidelines,

n p ^ * a Communist-dominated women+s congress met

mid-November in Santiago^ Chile.

Among the speakers

tbe pro-communist Mrs. Raul Castro.

it voted

resolutions supporting Castro^ revolution and the

national izatioo of natural resourcest ^nd denouncing
ties with the OS.
Ill, Jit a meeting of Latin American Communists in Peipingfollowing
the Moscow meeting--CTiineee leaders demonstratod. considerable
interest in an expanded role In the guidance of Latin American
Communism*
A,

Pelping particularly active in augmenting exchange of visits

developing propaganda network in the area, and in training
Latin American Communists in China.

Three weeks ago pelping

increased broadcasts to Latin America i>y one-third.

IV.

Communists hav^ Registered important gains this pear in pene^

tratlDR Cubaji revolution and other aspects of Cuban life*
A.

The Cuban government continues its rapid trend to the left,

bj 26 Wov^mber sh&keup*
1,

ProCommunist "Che" Guevara, new head of Hationn.1 Bank,

i

no* in position to implement hi3 precept that, to become

truly independent, Cuba, must sliift pattern of trade away
from dependence on US*
2.

Guevara's minimal economic: tpovledg-t colored by his

concept Of Cyban revolution AS A. class struggle that
will change economic Structure and social
3-

3.

Mew mipister of public works, Osmani Ci&nfuegoE, is

probably a- Communist,

A.

Officials replaced arc relative Moderates; others likely

soon to be replaced.

Communist-Influenced National Agrarian Reform Institute

UNftA) becoming all-powerful.
1.

lHRATs pro-Communist director Said, at a closed

meeting in early October that the Institute is the
'Veal government of Cuba," according to a new CIA
source flho attended the Meeting*

2.

At tbe meeting ridel Castro Bald lie would obtain funds

neces&ar? for IflfcA sine? through it the ovt will control
the entire economy,

3.

IHRA expropriations and other activities to date do

indeed suggest plans to control production and sale
of all agricultural commodities, cattle, minerals,
petroleum, and other r/s.w materials.

4.

Land& taken are organised as state-owned cooperatives,

not given to peasants as promised by Castro,

5+

Wearing other hat

as head of IKEA's industrial section,

pro-Communist Che Guevara has almost unlimited powers in

formulating foreign and domestic economic pc-liev*
On the surface Castro seems to have received a setback
in Cuban Labor Federation elections for executive council
lastffeefe,but Communists remain strong in labor.

-4-

J
l.

David Salvador, who has record of cooperatioD with

Communists, rapiains Fidel Castro's hand-picked
secretary-general of the labor federation.
the resolutions passed by the congress were strongly
anti-PS and in general parallel international
Communist

-5-

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASEmi
AS SANITIZED

.. I. .. ' "
L

JJTQB

T B B ASCXHU)

4, Ha than presented tba Cuban pap*r

on tb* liipllcation* of OuevtfVs naw
l
for him by J.C*

THOMAS J. PATTOV.

tt natarial
ID

ft

ULLRICH. RrVIEW PROGRAM

NSC BRIEFING

IS

CUBA
I.

26 November Kovernment s h t k e u p i s l a t e s t move by regime in I t s

trend to the
A,

left.

Saakeup brings pro-Communist "Che" Guevara, even more to t:

fore as new head of N a t i o n ! Bank, LVU j ^ u % r * >s 1,

Guevara, 31-year-old Argentine soldier-of-fortune,

iE

now in position to Implement h l a p w a e p t that, to

ti-uly independent, Cuba must sfcift pattern of trat
from dependence on OS*
3,

Guevara has no economic backeround and has concept of

Cuban revolution as a claig struggle that will
economic structure and social sy&tea.

3,

New minister of public Toris t OSUHDI Cionf ue^os, is

probably A Communist.

4.

Officials replaced are r e l a t i v e moderates; others likely

i?oon to be repla-ced

3.

Commonist-influenced National Agrarian Reform Institute

(INRA) becoming all-powerful.
1,

INEATs pro-CommQniet director said at a closed

in early October that the I n s t i t u t e i s the "real
meet of Cuba/' according to a new CIA source

At the meeting Fidel Castro snid he would obtain funds

for INRA sicce through it tte govt Till
entire

3.

INRA expropriations and other activities to date do

indeed suggest plans to control production a_nd sale
of all agricultura.1 commodities, cattle, miaeriLs,
petroleum, and other rtT materials.

4.

U m d s taXea are organized a& state-owned cooperatives,

not JLven to peasants as promised by Castro,

C*

On the surface Caetro seems to have received a setback La,

Cuban Labor Federation elections for executive council 3&st
week, but Communists remaAn strong In libor4
1,

JJavld Salvadort who has record of cooperation with

Communists, remains Fidel Castro'a b&nd-plcfced eecretftr7of tte labor federation.

-2-

h>

30 November

REVIEW PROGRAM
ii-LtASt INRJLl 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR; Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Estimate of the Current Situation in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for the Director's information

Z* The appointment of Erne at a Cbfc Guevara as President of tbe
National flank; confirms the lasc estimate presented to the DC1, vbieh
Announced CaBtro'fi intentiori, of makiag every Unit of the Cuban Government
subordinate to tbt AgrafUn RefflT-m lustitute. Gu*vata's aseumptlCm of
tbig posiCLon Could eisLty be the lirat step towatds the
all banks in Cuba and tb* issuance of worthless, bonds in

for

deposit* HOW in the

.3.
be in t

January iStb ii a crucial date in Cuba.

By tbtn the harvest will

IS Castro can collect for the entire harvtit ht will tiave about

$500, 000, 000 to pour into the. govcinntierit, i. e, thfi Agrarian Refc-rni
Institute, In previous years this money was avBilablc to private citizens.
4.

In Cuba today theRC arc various opposition groups scattered

throughout thE country.

Out group which, although in widely separated

parts of the: island, is in EtRong opposition to Castro is made up of the

twenty thmis and -plus ear-officers and

CJE-3 oldie rs

of Batista's army wbo,

if not in jail, cannot g&t wo*k because they are classified * E enemies of
the state.

However* tht only cohesive military group which is- opposed to

r. -t

FidcL Castro is composed of some twenty -seven hundred men Ln tb*

Dominican Republic under the command of General Pcdra^*,

Ptdraia

appears to be th* Only military officer ojf high rank with an

foliowingt

Pedraza ia n ot too closely linked with Oatistah as b*

retired from active service by fiattsta in 1953, when BatistA toolc over
power irom Prlo.

He was pressed back itito ictive service towards the

of ttc TCvolution.
S* Pedrata ba* told opposition leaders that be wotild iead an irraed
force jgatnst Castro- ftnd> if successful, would obey the civU autbnritiej
wbo took over fi-orn the Cast To

'

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1997
Ks&m>

16 December 19S$

NSC BEIEFIWG
COBA

I.

Cuba actively pursuing n e u t r i l i s t foreiga policy and

closer t i c s with Afro-Asian bloc.
A*

Shift toward neutralism began on return of prO-Comjnunist

"Che" Guey*m In September from 3-month t r i p to nine

J*fro-/sian countries and Tugoslavia,

B.

rorelga M i n i s t e r lUul Roa Informed tm General Aeeeinbly

lit September t h a t Cuba regarded OS and USSR systems jfi
t*in evils and would a l l y i t s e l f with uaderdoyeloped
nations of frflrld,
1.

HOa plfttuaing t r i p to Cairo in January, wblcb may

to other AfrU-^siap countries,
Jodleate RoaTs t r i p mty b* followed by

high-level economic mission and UAH ambassfldor t o Cuba

advisedfl

[ t h a t bis suggestion that Rnul

Castro be invited t o VAFi considered "great idea" by

Eoa and Guevara+
D.

UAB ambassador promoting s a l e to Cub* of gyptijm cotton

which Guevara says Castro does not vatt to bu^
US.

E.

Cut* Issued p u b l i c e t a t t p e n t suggesting conference of

umierdieveloped c o u n t r i e s f o r pid-1360 i n HAvanq. Attendance
of 28 A fro-Asian and some? L a t i n America EL tiations proposed,
hut we nave no evidence t h a t

I n v i t a t i o n s hive been

ftlto ^

drawing closer to Slno-50vi?t bloc

Soviet exhibition, vhich closed in Utnlco 15

to opon L& Havana JLn February.

Reliable ?nhassy source ssld 11 December that Roa plane
visit

to Communist China in January.

2 -

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1997
14

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NOT RELEVANT
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JCMOCHX

13 January 1$&O

nsc
CUBA

Castro ovt continues to taJto over lands and Industries without

legal notification or promise of compensation,
A.

National Bank President Cn& Guevara continues to solidify

position In poer by putting his own proteges In key
posts.

II.

Four teams of Cuban diplomats tad economists are now visiting

over 30 African, Asian t 4$&dit*rrftbeM wnJ Latin American
countries to discuss a. proposed agenda lor a "conference of
hungry nations" which. I told you last nonth Cuba is trying to
promot**
A*

foreign Minister K&ul Roa f in C&iro for the Aswan Dam

inauguration, had three Interviews with Masir^ whose govarament Is already strengthening CTAR-Cuban trade and political
ties.

1,

It was announced to the press last night in Cairo that

Castro and Nasir will exchange future visits.

B.

Roa will also visit Morocco, Tunis, Libya, Yugoslavia,

and Greece.

III. The Communist-infiltrated Cuban Workers + Confederation announced

on 11 January that it would invite Latin Anterie&n latK>r
Zfttions to laeet in Havana In February to discuss plans for a.
congress at which a new ^independent" LA labor
would be formed.

Such a federation was diseased by Latin American Communists

attending the 21st Party C a r e s s in

WqS cov

as long: ago

as

last February ftad wae proposed by CTC Officials in Jiovenber

59 vhen their confederation withdrew from the Inter American
Regional Organization of Workare, whicfc is affiliated wita
j Free Union.

IV*

, recent developments indicate increasing Cuban contacts

with Communist Chin*, and v* think Castro will probably roco E ni Ee
Feiplng sometime this

Qfi \tv

policjr

In keeping

i^itiwe^d in 1M of granting price discount* to

bloc customers (but tot to Free KorId purchasers)p Cuba

sold China 50,000 tona a t 5 perwnt below the pravailing
market price of $66,00 per ton. ^
B.

it ia sported thtt SO Chinese industrial tnd agricultural

technicianstpp*rently requested by Defense Minister Raul
CMtro--would arrive In Cuba during January.

V.

Soviet Exposition brought from bfexlco City to open in Havana

4bout 1 Feb.
A.

USSR p l M S & simultaneous strong propaganda effort

featuring films, concerts, an<j visits by leading Soviet
cultural representatives.

'

^i

;?;

-V:L- I

COi\tMUNIET INFLUENCE IN THE

CUBAN GOVERNMENT
.

- .

064529

\--$-%,--'

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE

yim

JzklSf.

CUBAN GOVERNMENT

Introduction

The objective of the Fartldo Socialists-Popular (FSF Cuban Communist Party] at thai time is to incre^Be its
control over Fidel Castro and hie government without unduly
empJiaB.izi.ng the em Stance of Cn-mmuniet Party members in
official positions. Its tactics, therefore, are to conceal the
membership,, recruitment^ dr rtaffiliatlon of Party members
who now occupy key position a in the government, Thia is in
accord with the- training in inlegaL and illegal activity^ which
Communist Farty leaders from Latin America, have be*n. given
in China sine*- 1956^ epitomited in a secret training
prepared by the CF China which states, in part, tka.t:
"All of the Party members who work in
and institutions ahoul.d patiently retain thmr
legal pasition far a long tim*. wfithout r*vftiling- their
Party affiliation* They shoidd gain power in the orgattiz-ations and institutions in which they work and they
should retain their legal position as long as necessary. "
Through Eheee secret P*rty menibera, the FftTty is able to
influence governmental policy, ind bring about the appointment
of additional CcmmnniEt Party members (flsCret or known) to
governmental positions, and/or the diermesal or neuttalistation
ot individuals who cannpt be easily influenced or uted as fronts.
Thus within the Cuban government today there are same known
Communist a (particularly in tlue Armed forces). *OTH* secret
Commuflifit Party membera -vrh.n meek to guide and direct
governmental policy and adjnlnistratiBn, and numerous
Communists, often young and inexperienced > who are used by

S-E^C-R-E-T

r- ::l::

the Conrimunists to fljcecutc their plans for national and international subvereion. These secret memberg are also used to
defend "unity of action11, i s advocated by tht CortLmuftist
Party and its known leader^ in order to prepare public and
official opinion for the acceptance of recognized Comtnunlsts
in progressively higher ieve-ls of government.
These secret Conrtmuniit P i t t y members are in close
contact vfith. known Cammuniflt Party l*a<3tr&, such a.s Blag
Roci, Joaquin Orddqui, S^vetn A^uirre. and Carlos Rafael
Rodrifuei, who- establish public ComrnuTtist Party policy and
arc in turn, in contact with the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union {CPSUJ and the international Communist apparatus. tt
is the intention of th* Cottimuniats to eventually bring- such
known Communist Psrty officials into the gDvernment> hut
only after the 2tth of July Movement (M-26-7) and other
revolutionary political parties have been infiltrated sufficiently
to insure protection foT the Communists under the guise ol a
"popular democratic government of national liberatlonu lr

Since the victory of the Castro forces, Cowrnunist infiltration of the Cuban government and government--Supported
institutions ha.s been progressing rapidly at all levels. This
report cannot cover, in detail, the entire scape of the Comnnijnist effort, which is totalitarian in nature. It concentrates,
therefore, on evidence of Communist policy and planning
prior Co the rebel victory and on three areas of major Communist effort. These three areas, on whic-h. the Communists
have concentrated successively as their strength, and influence
hawiiscreascdj are control of the armed forces, control of
agrarian refoirn and the peasantry, and control of foreign
policy in support of the USSR. These are treated in the
following sections*

>'-'-

i-E-d-FL-E,''

~-\

Z.

;-\.y. '
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.':-

The nature of the Communist policy- and tactics can be

t r a c e d b a c k to the Cuban C o m m u n i s t F a x t y p r o g r a m d e v e l o p e d
in 1956-57 and officially approved in Dece.mber 1957. after
Cuban Communist leaders had consulted with Soviet leaders at
the Eixne of the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the
JS OIB he v i k I t e v o l u t i o n in M o s c o w . T h i s p r o g r a m t w h i c h i s the
prototype of that -which the Cafitro government is now carrying
out> vsa.3 described by the party to be an interim program - "no el program a socialists del deiarrollo future sino el
pro gram a democratico, nacional-libertado y agrario del
desarTollo actual" {"not the- socialist program for future
development t hut the democratic. agrarian, and national liberation!Bt program for current development11). It is tho
program, therefore.! titat the Communist Party wants to see
carried out Udder Fidel Castro's "bourgeois " governrnftnt in
anticipation of the next Stage in which the proletarian dictator'
fihip will t>e established - - after "democracy and national
liberation" have EeTved their purposes and w k n the Communist
Party is officially in control. The CcunmuniEts have avoided
public discussion of Lh.eir program for this next stage, however.

/> r g- : L
O^V
'.;.":fj.

The Development oi Communist Policy and Activity during

the Guerrilla^ Wat,

Following the approval of the Cuban Communist Party

by the Communist Party of. the Soviet Union, th* full
weight of the intetnational Communist apparatus began tn be
mabilized in Support oi the Cuban. Commuitt3ES and their effort
to further penetrate and gain control over the 2oth of July
Movement, Ie4 by Fidel Castro, Ln Jvlottoiv, representatives
of all the Latin Ame rican CPfS wtre instructed in XJecBTnber
1957 Eo pass resolutions and hold solidarity demonstrations in
behalf of the J'Cuban People", In January 1953, the Cuban CP
addressed a letter to "all socialist and workers 1 parties of the
world" and established an office in Mexico ("care of Sr.
Baldomero Albarran h Apartado 77JL Mexicot D T F, f ') through

rffce-

which support was coordinated. The International Students

Union and the World F e d e r a t i o n of D e m o c r a t i c Youth asked
t h e i r affiliates to s p o n s o i p r o - C u b a n demotis*ratious. Within
Cuba the Gomjmuniiats intensified t h e i r efforts to gain official
recognition from the Zitth. of July Movement. They would not
Support the A p r i l 1958 s t r i k e called by the ZGth qf July Movem e n t BO t h i t they could u s e the failure of the s t r i k e a* an
a r g u m e n t in fa.vor of Collaboration With the CtHniminiBtS.
Within the 26th of July Movemtnt itself. p r o - C o J n m u n i * t s
s u c h aa E r n e s t o { n Che JI ) Guevara and Raul Castro- i n c r e a s e d
t h e i r etfortB to p e r s u a d e non - C o m m u n i s t s , Such aa A r m a n d o
H a r t and J o r g e Almeida ( c u r r e n t l y the Minister of Education
and the Chief of the Air F o r c e respectively), to a c c e p t C o m muni3E views and auj>port. Guevara, an Argentine VrhQ
b e c a m e one of the m o s t i m p o r t a n t guurrilla. c o m m a n d e x s , is
now d r e t t o - r of the Cuban National Banft i n d I>irector 0-f the
Industrial D e p a r t m e n t of the A g r a r i a n RefaRjn I n s t i t u t e {INRA).
Raul Castl-O, F i d e l C a t r o r s younger b r o t h e r , is now M i n i s t e r
pf the Arrn-cd F o r c e s r

tfv--

One of the. p r i n c i p a l c o o r d i n a t o r s of C o m m u n i s t P a r t y aid

to the C a s t r o m o v e m e n t was Carlos Rafael J t o d r t g u e ^ chief
D fc
* he CubELft ComrnuniBt P e a c e Movement, S e c r e t a r y of P r e s s
and P r o p a g a n d a of the >SP and c u r r e n t l y D i r e c t o r of Ho^ f the
P S P n e w s p a p e r . R o d r i g u e z , a kncnum CoTTimuniet P a x t y official,
holda no g o v e r n m e n t position at the p r e s e n t t i m e , b a t simce
195o has developed into one Q/ the c l o s e s t poljtital a.dvisors of
Fidel C a 3 t r o , I^aul C a s t r o , and E r n e s t o Guevara. He haa oven
been c o n s i d e r e d , as of D e c e m b e r 1959* a s a p o s s i b l e Replacem e n t for the p r e s e n t M i n i s t e r of the T r e a s u r y within the Cuban
Such, an appointment has not m a t e r i a l i s e d b e c a u s e
C a s t r o and otb*r government l e a d e r s feel that the public
IS not yat p r e p a r e d tt> a c t e p t "unity" on the g o v e r n m e n t a l l e v e l .
However, it ia apparent that C o m m u n i s t and p r o - C o m m u n i s t
newsmen a r e constantly testing public opinion on this Subject,

j
i

In early 1958* Rodriguea explained the policy and strategy

of the Cut an CP toward the guerrilla movement of Fidel Castro,,
which the Communists had criticised as being bourgeois and
"putsehist", Rodriguez no- revealed, in meetings with ioreign
Communist leaderE>that the Castro movement had become- a
"movement of the masit" h and that "unity of action" (i.e.
inclusion of Communists) had "been achieved "at tho base1' on
the bftei-Q of opposition to the dig.ta.tcirship* H.e Stated, hoWfiVCT,
that because the time was not yet ripe for propounding a. truly
Gommunist-in spired "Na-tioxial Liberation Front" h tht
nists were making but Limited suggestions to the Gagtrc
ment which did not involve "profound chinges".
In accoxdanca with the-ir ne-w strategy the
begin, about May 195c1, to organize small guerrilla units nr to
join the- 6th of July Movement as individuals opposed to Batistawho made no attempt to bargain far recognition, asking only
that they be allowed, to fight with the Ca.stTo foTcesT As
iightersj these individuals, or *mall groups were accepted. The
ComiTiunist Party, hou/everj continued to bargain for public
recognition s.s part of the anti-Batista coalition. Such recognition was rejected by the various TI on ^ Com muni * C revolutionary
gr-paps which signed the Caracas "unity11 agreertitnt with the
M-^6-7 in Jlily 1?5&. In August3 however, reports from within
the Communist Party indicate that a separate agreement was
worked out between the FSF Youth OrganiEltion (the Juventud
Socialicta) and ctrtain leaders of the &th of Judy
though not at the highest l*vtl*. This agreement was with
Castro who' the Communists ha.ve claiine-d WAS onCC a
t of the Juventud" Socialista r It vfas worked out, or
afttr he had broken out of the Sierra. Maestri to
form the "Second FRont Frank Pais", a separate command,.
From this time on, evidence of CcTnmuTiift influence1
rapidly, particularly in the Second Frontp as did provocative
actions and allegations against the United States. These
provocation* &n4 allegations were quickly given world-widt

S-E-CT-R-E-T

publicity through the Communist fionts and press, revealing

an. orgaiiised pattern of cooperation between Jt^ul Castro and
the Communists. Unde-r Raul Castrata guerrilla command,
the gXOUnjdwtirk was laid for the reOTanization of the pea-S^nts.,
Communists among the organizer g concealed their
affiliation. Significantly j Jo He Fepe Ramtf*a; appointed
by Raul Castro as Secretary of Peasant Organisation of tJw
Second Front in the eaily summer of 1958, finally identified
himself as a Communist Party mamber a yeax later According:
to the CoininuTiiBt pa^ty oTgan rmadamento s. io r May 195^j a
Regional Peasant Congreia -waa ield on 21 September 19SB in
the Secotid FT nut -with tht aid of Raul Castro, Subsequently, in
rtfiponae to the "deTnaods11 oi Hit peasants, Fidel Castro in the
Sierra Ma^stra hcajd^uartern promulgated the "Agrarian Law"
the right of the pearAanEa to the Land. According to
hy thr- time the vitto-ry vf-as won there

"hundreds" of peasant OTTgaaiiatian* in the vaxious Te.beL

command*, croated with the help and protection of the Rebel
authorities.
before and after the victory of the
movement, the main qonqer^i of the psxty was to develcp the
guerrilla force into a ''people'j army" -- that is. a politically
indoctrinated force imbued *vith a basic Marxist And antiStates idtolngy+

Carlos Rafael RodfigUBiz -want to the Sierra in. July or

and remained for *evea nicntha. HIM tamk vrai that
of preparing and coordinating th* work of political indoctrin*tion being carried on by Cornmualots within the guerrilla
movement, including the influencing of FldaL Cittro hUncelfb
The Communist* dAyTa-loped^ *nd tlwn exploited, educational
programs within the armed forcei* From petition*
the rebel movement, some cloie to iinportant
they encouraged political dia cuss ion In m attempt to dii credit
reports And diteoiuit opinions which might reflect ftvonbly on
\

-E~CVlV- r

tit

f^iTr T

S-ErC-R-E-T

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'

State- policy> while advancing the theme of "national

libexatiqn" as the solution to all Cuban problems, economic
as 'Well a t political- Among theznselve-Sj, the Communists
Itudied the works of Mao Tse-tung, Lenin, and Other. "Comi t revolutionary
Communist Infiltration of the Armed Farces since the
Hebel Victory.

V;\"

if.'-'

Shortly after the victory of the Castro fames* on 1

9&9p political indoctrination classes were instituted.
at La Cabana fortress in Havana. This indoctrination was
carried on Under the protection of "Che" Cuevax-a, who had
been made Commander ol La Cabana, and under the direction
of Captain Antonio Nunez Jimenez (a crypto-Corn muni it) and
Captain T_,Tiis Mas Martin (a Jtnown Communist) a s well as
other Communjgts and M-26-7 leaders who had received some
indoctrination in the Sierra and were known to be sympathetic
to Communist ideology. These in-eluded Captain Pablo Rivalta
Perez h a Communist teacher from Santa Glar-a who fought
undtr the name of Moises Pete a, and Luis Alberto Lavandeyra
Brama, Who had been indoctrinated in Marxism by "Che"
Guevara ^hile in the Sierra de JEscarnbrayh Some of the
were members of the C0rnnrjuniSt youth.
who had. bfiftn sent to the Sierra to join the guerrilla
in the last days of the campaign or who had been
enrolled in the army after- its victory, such a Ore etas Quintana
Marque.z. (Secretary Genexal of the Citanabaccia regional JS

As a result of such controlled assignmeatSj l.a Cabana

became the center for thft concentration of CDrnrnuni&t and
pro-Gomniunit personnel Turho were to become the age tit for
tpreading Ccmmunist propaganda, thxovignciut the i r m e d farca
J^Tiia Fa jar do ^9Cftlona3 a Cominiinist P a r t / member, -was
made Chief of the Military Police of La CabanaT Wluie in. tM*

S-E-

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strategic position he was secretly responsible to the ^Party

the administrative: control of the Communist youth who j<
the army and were assigned to indoctrination courses. These
youths when ordered to join the army were sent to a certain
recruiting office where their identification as PSP members
wae noted and confirmed by an officer vrho was a Communist.
These reciuits, unlike the non-Communists, were then Sftnt
to receive Party instructions jfrom Fa jar dp. They were told
that the Party docs not now consider it wise to establish "cells"
in the army, but that Party members should Operate individualJy
and make themselves "outstanding" through liard work and
discipline, They were told that they should contribute five
pesos monthly to the Paity h read Hoy daily, and instigate
political discussion3 whenever possible* following the line
suggested" in Hoy but never deviating from, the petition* taken
by Fidel Castro and high, M-2G-7 leaders. Each was informed
thatj after hja mill tax y assignment, he would soon be approached
by a Communist P-arty member who would be his Party contact,
bringing him propaganda and training literature and carrying
tack re ports* suggestions, and complaints to the National
Committee of the Party.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez WAS again directly involved in the
organization and teaching of the political indoctrination within
the- army. Rodriguez and JoACjUin Ordoqui Mesa wer? given
Special privileges And entree to all military establishments L
QtheT Communists were a.ssigned, through the influence of
Raul Castro, to the "cultural department" of the Armed Forces.
These included Alfredo GuevaraN who had been custodian of thebank account of the M-26-7 in Mexico, and Oscar Ortiz, who
became an instructor at Gampo Libcrtad in Havana, Elsewhere
in Cuba, particularly in Orients h Communists were appointed
to key positions in the Army, Although not appointed-Eo the
highest commands, they could control educational a*id propaganda
activities, ox report on officers who were actively OT potentially
anti-Communist. .For example, Ane:I Escalajite Colas, a close

S-E-C-R'-E-T

?'^

relative of Anibal Escalante, the editor of HoyH was made

adjutant to the Chief of information o the rebel army in
Orient* Province. Other Communists, who had not participated
in the fighting, but who had wotked in the Communist fronts,
such, aa the cultural organization Nueetro^ Tieippo w^re called
d n
to aid In the educational work nf the army. An example is
Amadn Pajenqve y Siini de la. Fena.

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Cuban Communist leaders hive reported to foreign ComtnunisE partite that the political indoctrination given within the
army is controlled by Communists. Th& purpose of this
indoctrination Ha& not ben. to emphasize or identify ha role of
the C-oromunist Paxty gr to train Communist party members,
but rather to develO'p a cadx* of pro-Communi&t and ctypto^Commiinist tnstructor& and propagandists who accept the
elemtntaRy principles of histDricaJ materialiam and its
a*incia.ted beliefs which make up the o-called "Bcience" of
Marxian socialism, Tftese ptineipies include the inevitability
Of the decline of capitalism, the collapse of "colonialism" and
tH
impe.ri&lism"h and the development of Socialism, and. Communism in the image oi the ChinfrSe and Russian SyStvtnS. The
emphaii* in the political indoctrination tourge has been on the
development of CKtf eme nationalism, hatred f&r the United
States based on "evidence" (datXxij; frfirn the nineteentb centUTy
to the present) o outrages aftd ir.jurieS auffeied hy Cut?- a.5 the
result of United States political and economic ' 'interference1' in
Cuban aifiira. The course a also deal with the need for agrarian
rcioim &.tl^[ Other generally progressive measures, aglin with
the emphasis an. the "lib*-ration" nf Cuba, frofft foreign controls
rather than on the manner in which the agrarian reform and
other measures are bein$ executed.
Aa, a refluJ.t a the Communist-controlled
courses, the pxeJletentii] appointmertt of Co-mrtiunists and
Communists to controlling positions in th= army, and the
elimination of anr^-Comrnunists> n an - Com muni st s, and

.=?!=.'.

euspttted TronconfozrmistB through, ft variety of devices, the new

Cuban axmy^ ia rapidly coining under the control of th*
niat fraction established within it.

^M

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i .>'+.

*^:

Communist leaders have stated, in secret

that their autceaa is due to the influence: over Fidel GAstlo of
bis bxother Haul - - -whom they consider to bf the: Jl bradns JI of
revolution - - and M Che" Guevara, The Soviet political specialist
on Latin A r n e r l c i , B+ ErmoUev, went e ven fnether in a speech
delivered, in MDECOW in May 1959, ErmnlaeT stated ^ t CubaL"ia
tbe "revolutionary center of i i t i n A m e r i c a " , And that
Fidel C a a t r c ' s government contained many 'Kinxeliatle
^
from tho petit* bourgeoisie 4 EAUI Ca^trg i s , 'Speaking among
QUTflelvea11, a. Communiut. Raul C a s t r o CnRrenriy holds the key
position of Minister of the R.*vol-utoaiAry Aruied F o r c e s , and Las
been designated by Fidel, Twho i s the "maximum l e a d e r " , as the
l a t t e r ' e succeaaor in eveax of hie death or incapacity.
Neither ftaul nox f'ChclF have ever admitted being Communist
party member a. and ven within the Party thi* is denied. However, Raulrs "former" membership in the Corn munis t youth
OrijaTiiiatian ha.* bstn acknowledged, an. occasion, withie. tfc,c
Party, and ad long ago a a 1953 he held a responsible position '
on the pf CpaxaLtory cownnifi flion fox the CDmimini at -front Congress in TJefenae o the Bights of Youth held in Vienna, During
and since the ievolution he continued to work closely wtth the
Communist youth, in Cuba, His wife> Vilrna EspLn, ia active:
in several Communist fronts. It has been Raul Castro who haa
most actively supported1 the eoordina.tion of tnternational Cornmunist youth activities in the Caribbean area and has: called for
a "Latin American youth congreaft" to be hold in Cuba in midlyh-Qs and has eruppoxted the convocation oJf a Latin American
1
'peoples' congtcaAr\ wtich ha.a been, a Communist .objective
since 1956. In view of the evidence, it is not unlikely that both
Raul and his wiia axe> in fact, secret members of the CommuParty at the tare sent tiJTiB +

;D

IE iaems less probable that "Che" Guevara is 4 Communist

.Party member, However, his close association with Commu.nists gguB back nnany years, and it is known that he .was a.
.member of tho Mexican-Russian Cultural Institute when in
..Maxicu. After he joined Fidel, hia wife, Hilda. Gadea (a
^Peruvian), acted in a liaison capacity between Soviet military
advisor* in Mexico And various Latin Ameirican revolutionaries
in exile. She also worked closely with perJone identified ae
Soviet international intelligence agents. {GadeaT now
divorced from "Che", is currently employed in the Cuban
Agrarian Reform Institute.) "Che" was one of Fidel Castro's
small gRoup which invaded Cuba in. December 1956. A s m
advisor to Fidel and later the Commander of Ills own column,
he encouraged the study of Marxism among the guerrilla
forces and defended the Comrnuui s E s, though with, tmphiajg
si way a on "national liberation". Subsequent to the victory,
he was, charged by Fidel to orgaciiae Cuban ajd to the foreign
TevolutinnaRies who flocked to Cuba {including tho Be with whnm
Me wife h^d. Worked in Mexico), ind used his authority in an
effort to force these groups to accept Communists as equals
in '"unified" movements, Guevara's activities as commander
of La Cabana fortress, the nature and activities of hia
appointees t the character of his trip to Africa, Asia, and
the Middle Eitt. and hi^ policies ae Chief mi Industrial
Devel&prtent of the Agrarian Ecform Institute all attest to
hia defiire to use the Cuban revolution! to support Soviet
foreign policy, which seeks to promote the "national liberation
fitjru
Egle" in Latin America and eleewhere as a means (A.
attacking the United1 States ind developtpg a neutralist Woe
susceptible to Communist pnetration t Although
has relied an JuiOWTL CorumuTustE as bodyguards,
adjutants, ajid appointees, and has favoTed Communists
among the foreign revolutionifita asking for Cuban aid hit
denials that the. Cuban revolution is Com muni st-jLnflue need
or supported indicate strongly that he wishes to exploit Cuba
a-s the model of \justifiable. popularj nationalist movement

11

Vhich will generate enthusiasm in other Latin American

countries and underdeveloped Countries -where
weak or discredited.

'l^:?
"iilil

.Jfe

*. Communist Influent within the Agrarian Reform Institute,

! i f

i' " '? :

V$l&:
^^
'i-.
^j$^
&!?
*J

m
"x?I.'
if^t
".Ift
$f\
ili:" 1
j$- r

Following the initial drive to infiltrate t1 revolutionary

a r m y and control the political indoctrination and loyalty of its
memlwr*, the Communists shifted their attention to the next
important objective - - t h e infiltration *n4 control of the Agrarian
Reform Institute (IttnA^ The Institute was officially established
in June 1959 under the Agrarian Reform L^w drafted by Antcnio
Jirnenea with guidance and advice from Raul C a s t r o and
M
Che " Guevara. Foreign Communists were also ecu suited,
a EiOniaio Encin?- of the Mexican CoirirnuniBt Party* pOBSibly
because of hi9 exptxieuce in the organization of communal
farms in Mejeico during the Cardenas presidency* Nirnes Jimenez^
vrho has worked publicly for the Communists since 1949 and is
reliably reported to e* s. " s e c r e t " member of the P a r t y , wa*
ippainte^d the Executive Director of the Institute.
The INJL^A., both in theory and p r a c t i c e , is a government in
itself. It e x p r o p r i a t e j , manages, and disposes land and Other
property, it ui\dertakeS public TPQrks , c r e a t e s schAOls* isftuct
publications, carries an "cultural activities' 1 , Operate* itciros,
and negotiate-6 for econornic aid and t r a d e -with foreign f i r m s .
Nunea Jimenez has told his high 1NRA. chiefs, in p r i v a t e , that
they are in fact subservient to na o t h e r agency of government.
Theae INRA chief a a i t , in p r a c t i c e , considered to "be
in the Soviet sense, and have authority over inilitary
civilian officials within th* difltrictfl they control. Thft chiefs
include aorne known and Dome suspected CpmBouniAtB, and in
the lower level* of the hurea-ucracy are nitmerous known P a r t y
m e m b e r s , Waldo Medinad the ENRA1* general counsel t ie it
Communist, as are a number of o t h e r s on the INRA Stalf, Thus
pianning and admfniBtration of the INRA ie ComrriUnist -influenced

S-Eyfc-R-E-T

.".
1.
?;
r ./

jljj^:
'''^

?$

at the very liighest levels by Communists and sympathisers,

who rely on advice from the Soviet and Chinese Communist
P a r t i e s in an attempt to bring the functions of IWHA into closer
agreement with the Communist theory of state control. For
fcxampte:
since it* formation, INIUL has con C e nt r ated, not on
116
t
distribution of land to landless peasants* but on the organization of peasants into collective* or CDoperatives whftre they
a r e to receive "profits" rather than "wages". ThoTe. is no
direct tribute paid to Communist Party inspiration, not does
the PSP claim credit for INRA's activities. However, in
practice, the Communists have been the otdy gRoup ajnon
Caatrc.rs trusted foil owe r a iu Cuba who have the experience
and organiiation to draw up dRaft pro grams, draft r tgulati&n s ,
&r
"atudieE" which appeal to the government. They ha-ve been
careful to leav* the iTiitia-tive in Fidel's hands, but to guide
Fidel's revolution BO that it willj in time. Openly re,ly on
Coitimuni&t advice. Thush after the formation of cooperatives
undcR INRA had been approved, the Communist theoretical
organ Fundament&a, for November lVSIt, published an article
concerning the nature and function of cooperative BH supplemented
by a translation of the "Reglamenta Modelo para COOpcrativas
Avaniadas d ProductO te* AgricalaB" (Model Regulation ior
Advanced Agricultural Cooperatives) of the Chinese People's
R e p u b l i c . T h e s e c o m m e n t * a l l e g e d l y w e r e o/Iered. i n a l l die interested" manner, though some had already been accepted.
They present an ideal picture, hut the voluntary atid democratic
a&pectn which they pretend to favor are invalidated by c o n c e j to the "present stage of the revolution^. F\j[tl<iajntntos
states that the success of tha cooperatjvej will depend on the
quality oi administRa.tion by DIRA, and suggests that "in this
first stage3 it would be advisable (or each of the cooperatives
to have t n a s s e s s o r general^ appointed directly by the INRA^
who, even though he might not p o s s e s s technical knowledge t
would be politically prcpajEd to orient the worker a and the
cooperative itself along the paths laid. OUl by the Revolutionary
G
" ^his suggestioti^ which, has become a matter of

13

practice, iff the biflis for the appointment of CortLrmmiata

Com rntmiflt sympathisera to control the cooperatives,
as they pose as the moat faithful supporters of the
and are "politically prepared", despite ignorance of agricultural
practices.
The IMHA is only out of the government sgemcie* which the
CnmmuniEtB acejk to control, but it iB the moat LmpOxtAnt ana
lor their purpose* as it will allow control of Cuba's economic
wealth through a centralized bureaucratic tyttem, Through
INE_A- they will alno be ahle lo organize Communist control over
the peasantry, thereby preventing the development ttf afenceftBflful
couatertevolution.
The Castro government haa planned other igancieB, such a*
the Nitinnal Institulo nf Urban RefoTin (iNTtU)* to extend control
over ether sectors of the population. The INRU ia to he
establiahcd. in FebniAty I960, ind repqTteidly iwill have COHfiac&tory powers over sZl urto-n land, houses, biaildings, and
peraonil property attached to real property. Owners of confiscated property are to be naminally reimburoedj INRU wiU
dcvclqp or sell fcuildingfl or dwelUnga QD, the basis of popular
or individual nee4J and tenants will be allowed to puxchaa*
dwelliagt through payments equal to their farmer rent (which
the government has already reduced). Through the reallocation.
of urban pTdperty( the JJTB.U wjlj. he in a j&o*itfon to control the _.
nrrjan bourgeoiiie and to buy the loyalty of the ttxbaji proletariate
It ia believed that Comrnunlst Infiltration in th* D^RU will follow
die pattern set in the IMTLA-, though. thi& remaino to be SCtn. It
ia already apparent* from rernarke me4e by Fidel Caatro In
private, that the true pattern of "dejwaeratlc" gaverruntn.t vhich "
he plana to entabliahift a btixcamcricy controiled by repra jentativos
of the Army, the INUA, the LNRTj, and other aulonomouB ageuclAB,
rather than one controlled by popularly elected officialt. It It
also apparent that th* bureaucracy 'which ! now developing under
Castio will be largely controlled.by the Communlti Party nv its

"****"*

!4

I _ - _ I - J - .

^H

s and; thai elected officials tod political parties

may, as in the Soviet Union and China., play hut
roles ia
5,

Goramunast Influence on Cuhan Foreign Policy.

After initiating their drive to infiltrate tim Army and INRA,

h were their fijrjt priorities th Communists and tfcei*
turned to control af Cuban foreign afaj>i?. Jn
b*en more concerted vrftti ecmcedling" direct
Conunuaist piTticipatiaii th*ti in other field?, fat ihcitr itiilueDce
eteadily grown* They Jiavt obtaiped the support of high.
&f the Cuhan uoveramecit - Fidel Castro,, Raul Caatto,
"CheJr Guevara, Armando Hart^ and Haul Ryoa. fthe Forriga
Miuler) ior vixipua int*rruatiflnal projects wiuti are known to
be Communist inspiied^ saie liaviog been formulated ia
The puzpaea far -which the Commnnistfl are -uHing Cuban
ior eign polity be come a evident from a rftview oi Soviet Commiinist
Paxty objective* in Latin America* and specifically, Soviet
efforts to promote a Latin Amcxican pJpeople8T congress".

The broad objectiveH of tuxrent Soviet policy toward Latin

America Tvojre suggested in an article in Komjnunigt fan
importaut CFSU tJiearetical organ) in februaj-y 1956, Eigned
by M, Danilevicii* Tiis article attacked the United State* a,&
contToUiag I*au& America in the Interest at militarism, and
profit, and noted ths applicability to Latin Am*xica oi tbe
c&jam unique > ie*u*d by the Bandung Confex ence, rega.rding
the "subordiiiatiou oi nations to foreign etislAvjnr>ntp domination, and exploitation". Furthjar on it claixned that "th* wojldnjg
by the CwnrnufiiiH parties^ was emerging as the
defemler of national inlcreats, political and
peace and rlemotrscyh fl Jtt rep<trtedr
with approval, the formation of "broad cpalitkms af patriotic
forces'1 and noted that the development of relation* between the
\

"Socialist countries" and J-atin America will "facilitate the

cooperation of these states in matters concerning the supporting
and strengthening of peace. 11 The article waSj tn effect, both a
diT active to the C orn muni Jt parties and an offer to nationalist
elements of Soviet Bupportr
Coinciding with, the publication of the KomjauniBt article, a
special secret conference of Latin American Communist del eg ate A
to the XK CPSU Congress was held in Moscow under Soviet
auspices. This conference emphasised coordination of Communist
activities in Latin America, and prapos*d the JralcLing of a
"peoples' congress'1 which would ge "anti-imperial let" in nature
and inspired by the Communist a, though attended mainly by
democratic personage a not linked with international Communism.
Jt is apparent that this "peoples' congress" was designed to
circumvent the generally favorable attitude of LJ.tin American
governments toward the United States by gaining the support of
prominent persons for dl anti-imperialist" resolutions or demagogic
proposals compromising to United States policies,
:

.
^^
-

';

The Communists were unable to organise or find sponsor*

ior this Mpeoples' congress" in 1956 or 1"9 5 "?> and in December
1957 were reprimanded in Moscow by Soviet Communist Party
officials Charged with J_.atin. Ame rican liaison. The Soviets
insisted that the "peoples 1 congress" had become a matter of
high priority, a-nd requested further action. Consequently
>
various Latin American ComnrunJBt party representatives met
privately at the Argentine Peace Cemgrejs in May 1G5B to discuss
the organization Of the cangre&s, -which WJIE mentioned publicly
(for the first and only time} in the Bulletin of the World Peace
Council later in the y*ar. A tentative date for thft Congress
(4-7 December l/58) was set, hut again the Communists had
difficulty in finding non-Communist sponsors and, .AS the
Argentine government became increasingly anti-Cemurmnist,
the Congre-SS -was poBtponed+ Subsequently^ it was decided to
hold It in (nine otker country t where conditions would, be more
favorable.

16

It

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In February 1959. the CPSU again sponsored a secret

conference of Latin American Communist party delegates in
Mosuw, ftt the tixne of the XXI CPSU Congress. The subject
oi the "peoples' congresfl" v a t again diicusaedj and it was
decided that the main.the me should be the "defense of nationai
resmoxcee, dh As before, the Soviets indicated that "antiimperialiHt"langusg Should be avoided in gaining support
for the cc agree a. altEiougli the final re^QhitioEtA sJionId be
exploitable for the autL-unpflriBliet campaign* The Comnnintst
initiative in calling the congreBS Ahould b* concealed, ajad
leaders auch as La*ato Cardenas of Maxico, Fidel Castro of
Cuba> Romulo BeEinccujrt of Venezuela, and Jose FigueRea o
Costfl Kica were fiuggested as persons who might be "uaedlh to
convoke the meeting, thereby assuring it of popular support.
Finally, it was decided that "fraternal delegates" from Africa
and Asia were to be invited.

"

A* Communist influence in the Cuban government

increased, responsibility for the organization of the "people*1
congress" Tva transferred to the Communist Party of Cuba+
The. ami-Communist 4tdternents and actions on the part of
Fignerea and Betanccnijrt> other wise relatively favprably
diflpoecd toward tJie Caetro goveTnmenth probably have
eliminated tiem from c&n side ration as poSBihle aponaorft of
th* Cotigrcsg, However, a new spokesman has teen found in
Armando Hirt> tae youthful Cuban Miniater of Education who
liad already revealed hi& pro-Cornrnuniflt tendtncie* by
appointing Antonio Muses Jimenez to a ccnrU"nirisiotl charged
with rewriting the ii^toxy of Cuba for v&e in the public oefrools.
Hazt was acting At interim Foreign Minister in July 195^T prior
to the appointment of R&ul Roa, and used this position to greet
foreign delegates to the "AgJraxian Reform F<Jriuiilh^ He told
theftedelegatep that, as Minister of Education:
"1 have the intcrntioia of convoking MI Cuba a congress
of politicai leaders and Latin Arnericaja personalities,

17

among vhosrn will be intellettuala, not specifically

government delegates, representatives of institutions.
universities, and the workers. In that congress it \rill
be possible to trace the lines of tie political future of
Latin America. I t } s necessary to establish the fact
that it is not only the governments and their armies which
determine the policies of countries. "
In advancing this project (-which foreign Communist parties
quickly identified a.s the "people &' congress r planned in MO&CPW
Hart revealed himself as the instrument of the Communists, '
who through n'unity from below" are seeking to circumvent and
subvert legitimate governments in the conduct of their national
and foreign affairs.
when Foreign Minister Roa went to the
Foreign Miniaters1 Canferenct in S^ntiftga de Chile tn
gust
Education Mtnietei- Hart we tic alia 3-9 head of 3. special
to meet with leaders of opposition group* from various
ecuntxies. Thes^ Included representatives of various Communist
and Socialist parties, memberi of labor organicationm^ youth
frnovementfl, and political oppoaition fronts, Hart was a o m panicd by Carlos ReiaeL B.odrigue5 of the Cuban Com muni ft
:Party, i n ( i w a B j o i n f t j later by Raul Caatra. These leaders
met Unofficially, independent of the Foreign Ministera, in
&rcer ta exajninfr (according ta Radio Peipingj the problem of
atrcngthening the "national and democratic movement" in Latin
America., Sutsequentayj the National Action Front (FHAPJ of
Chile, which played hc-st to the meeting, aTinaunced its fi4het*nce
to Hart's proposal fox holding L "congress of democratic
peraonags. iepteaentative* of political paitiea and eoclal and
cultural organisations. " lUul Cajtn?, who went to Santiago to
meet with youth representatives, announced hia support ni HtrE's
proposal in September, i t which time ha also propound publicly
that the Latin American youth cangreee h held in Havana,

13

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.:

-r\'

Paralleling the unofficial meetings attended by Hart and

Castro, the representatives of the various Communist
met secretly at the headquarters of the Communist
Party of Chile. Each leader reported on condition* in his own
'country, the problems which faced the Goiflrministe, and the
i discontent which might be exploited by the no H The Cuban
representative^ Carlos Rafael Hodriguea, waa appointed to.
'vi&it various Latin American countries and %Q prepare a study
on the social and1 ecuncmic situation which would be lined in
preparation ior the "peoples' congrea B'1. Subsequently.
Rodriguez visited ArgentinaN Bt&xHt Venasuela, and other
countries wtere ht conferred with various Communist Ieaderi3,
asking them to pRepare material, and to vie it Cuba to further
discus the matter. In October, theref&re> representatives of
the Communist Parties of these countries met in Havana, during
the plenary session of the Central Cormnlttric of CP Cuba. They
sec a tentative date for the Congress in early I960 and planned
an agenda which would stress the economic develojsment of
underdeveloped nation^, anti- imperial is mT anti-coloniaJism,
-and the struggle against "dictatorships". It was also decided
that the congress fthould be forrnadly convoked through a
manifesto signed by well-known naTi-CcmmurustE> prohahlyincluding Laiato Cardenas of iMexico^ Salvador Allende of Chile.
QswaJdo Aranha of Brizil, Wolfgang Lerrasabal of Venezuela,
and others described by "Qie31 Guevara as forming the flpoiseihle
nucleus of a unified position" which might lead Latin American
countries to develop the "enviable cohesion m-aiiiaiPied by the
Afro -Asian countries since th* Bandung C<mferenceT " Although
the sponsors of the conference havT not as yet issued their
manifesto, and some have not even been approached on the
:
.matteTj die various Communist parties involved in planning
the congress already hare special Teprestntativea iu Havana
forming a pRmanent organising committee.
The Latin America.n "peoples congresdl> as planned by the
Soviet and Latin American Comrnunistflj is clearly the type o!"

-governmental Communist-controlled f "popular" meeting

which the International Communist Movement desires prior
td (Or as a Substitute for) Action on the official levelT It "will>
if held, be similar In purpose to the "Asian Conference for
the Relaxation of International Tensions" which, wap held in
April 1955*. just prior to the Bandung Conference, and which
gave rise to the Asian SolidaRity Committee* It will be similar
to the second "Arab Peoples' Conference", which, when united
with, the Asian campaign, gave rtge to the Aira-Asiin Solidarity
Confer^tice held in Cairo, at vddeh was established the AfroAsian Solidarity Commitea +

ll '

.V

The campaign In Ititin America to unjli"/

and nationalist elements, to tiue detriment o the United States
and the advantage of the Sino-Soviet blocd thus fellow^ the
paEEern set in Asia. The otganiaets have been a small group
of profe B-EJonaJ Com muni at party members aided by reliable
sympa-thiaers already active in front activitiea. As in Asia,
the Communists want to follow up the "populs-r" congress with
action at an official level; thus Danilevith., writing in
in 1956, set the Bandung Conference as a. model
for Lratiti Americaii antL-colonial action. At that
Daniltvich noted that Apolitical d*vtloprtient11 La Latin
wa.5 not as 'AdvancedIr as in Asia., obvionely referring ta the
anti-Commtinist otientation of the governments > and not to the IT
long history aS political independcace. The Communist infilEration ot the CftStro governrnent in Cuba has changed this pictureh
however, and has now given the CommuTtfata an opportunity to
operate at the official diplomatic level. This h*s bee a done,
apparently, largely through the influence of Ernesto -("Che"!
Guevara and the medium of Raul Roa, the Foreign Minister,
who recently called for i "congress of underdeveloped nations"
tn be held in

'

The tour of Emtsto riChft"] Guevara to the Afro-Asian

countries (June-Setternber 195^} initiated the Guban policy of

S-E-

i j . .

'

attempting to draw Latin America, closer to these countries in

defense of a "neutralist31 policy. Official formulation of the
policy, however, and the accompanying reorganization of the
Cuban Foreign Ministry apparently awaited ths return oJ
Guevara from his trip. The nature of the ne.^ policy was first
outlined, informally, by Guevara on his arrival at the airpoxt
on 3 September. It -was next described by Raul Castro an 11
September, at which tune he approved the Communist -inspired
plans far youth and peoples' congresses in Cuba,. Guevara
further defined the policy on 14 September, and finally, Foreign
Minister Raul Roa officially delineated the new policy at the
United Nations General Assembly on 24 September,
The new Cuban policy emphasizes Sovereignty and independence; neutrality with respect to the capitalist and Communist
blocs; and solidarity-with, the "underdeveloped nation*lr of Asia
and Africa. Cut an officials have particularly emphasised the
"third positiotiJl. Guevara firmly states that he is not a Commimlstd and that he believes Cuba does not need a Communist
system "at this rntunent", Roa has called capitalism and
Communism "'twin evils lr . Yet in practice^ Cuban "neutralism"
i& used as a means ol" attacking- the United States to the benefit
of Luternational Cornmunisim. Moreover, it is apparent that
foreign policy, aa carried on by the Foreign Ministry is
supplemented at all levels by government-approved activities
designed to circumvent foreign government* by appealing
,J
directly to certain groups who are opposed, or potentially
opposedt to their governments* Thu* the Cuban government.
largely through "Cheri Guevara, is known ta have provided
training, supplier, advice, and propaganda support to revolutionary groups seeking to oveithrow the governments of the
Domini cart Republic, Haiti, Guatemala. Honduras* Nicaragua,
and certain other ijatta American countries^ Comrryunlst or
pro -Communist groupa have been particularly favoredh ReprE ~
Stntativei of youth and student organizations, labor PTganisation:
and other groups m foreign countries are given subsidized trips

S-E-C-R-Z-T

to Cuba where they axe subjected to propaganda, and indoctrination*

Cuban diplomatic officialst aa well a* nOn-governmental r e p r e sentatives, are used to facilitate organizational activities abroad,.
For example Cuban Ambassador Rene Rayneri Par la in El
Salvador has been actively involved; in SalvadoraTi labor and
student affairs,, and reportedly supplied Cuban funds to help the
Communist-dominated General Confederation of Salvador an Labor
organize a congress to which other Central American leader*
would be invited. In another instance, the Guatemalan government specifically accused the Cuban Ambassador, in conjunction
with other high Cuban officials, o complicity in an Oppositionist
plot againfit the government. In November 1959, the Venezuelan
government rejected Cuban Ambassador Pividals1' efforts to have
Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara visit Venezuela.
A* parE of its uno/ficjal foreign policy and to promote "unity
fr&rtt below11 the Cuban government has encouraged and subsidized
Cuban participation in Communist - f tOnt cemgresses , g-vich as the
World Youth Festival in Vienna (attended, by 140 Cubans) and the
Cornmunist-organiied Latin American "Wonien's Congress in
Sa.ntia.go d,e Chile. It has encotiraged the holding in Cuba, of
intei- national meetings, often of a Communist-front character,
and the participation of foreign "ohservars 11 (including Soviet
representative 3) at Cuban meetings, such as Che congress of
the Cuban Confederation of Labor. On occasion, Cuban officials
use such meetings as platforms for the exposition of Communistline viewt an foreign affairs. Thus Antonio Nunez Jimenez
Communist Director ol the Agrarian Reform Institute, used the
"Jnter-American Radio Announcers' Congress11 in Havana as a.
forum for attacking the relationship between the United States
and Puerto
The decision of the Cuban government to orgS-nite a
of underdeveloped nations" in Havana in late I960 is
One facet of the new foreign policy. It 19 apparent that the Communist parties in the various Latifl American countries, through

-O^R-E-T

the reeearch undertaken and the non-Communist support

acquired in preparation for the "peoples' congress "> will
be prepared to offer arguments in favor of various PJajitiunpertalist" or Mant-colciiaJlM views or to levy demands on
the "imperialist" or "colonialist" powers. It is probable that
the Communist parties in Asia and Africa, through their
frontEH will aiao seek to encourage official participation in the
and to influence the delegations.," Under the conditions
in Cuba, the congress t if holdd will certainly b need
as a fDTurn for the presentation of demagogic appeals and
denunciations based, in all probability! on the preparatory
work done by the Communist patties. It is even more certain
fctiat the activities of the congress^ regardless of the true outcome, will be propagandized as a victory far the Unity ftf
"hungry nations" against imperialist and colonialist oppressors.
This will he possible through the controlled Cubaji press, now
almost completely at the service of the Castro goveTiunontr -and
the Communist-dominated Frenga Latina, which now ha.s working
agxeemants ^ t h TASS, the Wev China News Agency, and vari&uE
Satellite or Communist -infiltrated agencies in other parts of the

As with the "peoples1 congress" t it is probable that the

Communist* "wish, to avoid direct participation of known party
members in the "underdeveloped nations conference". Raul
Roa', the Cuban JTQreign Minister, has k e n closely associated
with Communists and Soviet agents, but is not believed to be a
Cornjrnujust Party member or necessarily a ayttipathi3er+
urd0 Ealer AlonsOj new CubaJi Ambassador tp India -who is
visiting the Middle and F-ar East to seek Asian support for the
congress, was vreU k^own as a Cuban. Conuinunlst Party member
between 1933 and 1951. He j&ubliaJaed A column in Hoy, the CP
newspaper, until 1945, and has beta Cuban tarrespdndent of the
Daily YTprker, t i e organ of the CP of t t c United States. As of
, however, hiri wag referred to- in Hoy aj an "eacpelled" Communist Party member who had joined the AntenticQ Party of

S-E...

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S-E-M-E-T

President Prio. As is the caie with many "expelled" or

"former1' Communi B ts T it is not known whether he haa, in fact,
broken with the Party* or whether he remain a a. cryptoComrrjunist who ha.e been assigned, in the words of Liu &haochrih to "gain po^yer in the CRganizations and institutions in
which he works lor m long as necessary, without revealing hie
party affiliation, if

In review, it iB evident that after the increasing military

itrength and popular Support enjoyed by Fidel Castro became
apparent in early 1958> the Communists decided to take advantage
ot the movements democratic nature and the youth and political
inexperience of its leaders. With the aid of Raul Castro mad
"Che" Guevara., they infiltrated the guerrilla forces and later
gained control over the political indoctrination and personnel
in the arjmed forces. They then put their organexperience to work in the Agrarian Reform Institute*
using concepts supplied hy the Chineee as a mean" at diverting
Fidel Castro from a policy of aid to individual peasant families
to the organisation of large-scale "cooperatives" controlled byappointed officials. Najct, in the field of foreign relations, Communi at* Bought tp inspire or control government policy. Covertly*
Cut an Communist Party leaders have conferred with foreign
Communist leaders, including thotE of the USSR and. China, and
have drawn up plans and undertaken studies for execution ny the
Castro government. Overtly, Communist sympathize re in the
government ha.ve encouraged participation in Cammuni Qt-front
and have aided foreign groups in opposition to the
fcovermneiitij in L-atin America. Final\y, an the
official diplomatic levslf ConumunistB have apparently provided
the inspiration fox i n attempt to develop unity among thei "underdeveloped" nationa, uaiajj ^'anti-imperialiacn11 and Jl anticolonieJiam'J as s. basia fox comrnon action> while claimtng that
such, unity vvitl promote neutraliam and independence.

S-E-

-E-T

E-E-jC-R-E-T

v::

That such neutralism and independence is regarded by

Communists only as & step toward international Communiet
ctornination is evidenced in the words of the Cuban Communist
Party programj which are paralleled in Communist party
programs throughout the world. The ultimate goal if that of
leading Cuba to "Socialisni" ander the: guidance of the Cornxnuniat Party, woich signifi&a the incorporation of Cuba. Into the
d
'Socialist Bloc" headed hy the USSR and China and controlled
by the interuatio.nal Communist party apparatus.

^C^R-E-

WOT RELEVANT
TOeAVOFPIQS

AMERICA

rsl

Continue to Expand Hola in Castro flBglaB:

Caro rttime is believed to be considering the appdint
meat O f Orlos Rafael Bodriguea as minister of finance to
repine* Hoiamto Diaz Astarain, tbe compliant but ineffective incumbent, who was an obscut* naval officer until M s
appolntjfleat to the cibiDet U s t November, Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez, a loading number of the Oofflnupists1 Popular SoeiaXist party and editor of tb* party dally, has long been
aaiong Castro's close advisers. The heavy workload of
Pldfll Castro and hii? chief aides, "Che- Guevara, Antoalo
Nunes Jimenez, and Haul Castroall tbree of them indistinguishable fron Communistsmar dictate the sharimr t
of administrative responstbiiitieg witb Eodrlgu*z even
tHougb his open Commujitst affiliation would be a political
r St
M 1 * ! 1 ? ^^ *
f ^ " ^ *- f l r l - SHortaee of truing
persoanel JLs seriously affectlug the Foreign Ministry.
The slztb Cuban anbassador to defect In the p a s t 30 4ajre
tn anbassador in Bonn, announced on U July that tie will
asylum in the United States,
12 July 60

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Page 2

/ SS S

la ji move of considerably p o t e n t i a l xigiii! iczuice, all

provincial officers of the powerful Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC) have been ropLsLted by 'V^n who truly
to the TCVOITJtIpa-ary tnovewont in which the country
lives, 1 ' according; to the Cuban p r e s s . The CTCr ttto
chief instrument of control over labor, i s oow almost completely Communist
m^

the presence of Czecn tecl

Cuba's chief military base.

at

Two prominent Panarnanian p o U t i e i a a s aod the

i
and Kescican ambasi^dors in Panama, r e a c t i n g to Khrushchev's
9 July offer of Soviet support to the Castro regrmeH agroe
that the US nov has ample basis to c a l l ' Immediately for OAS
action against Castro, They a r e convinced that Khrushchev
has overplayecT h i s hand.
g Miaistor Ro*, who landed in Now York without
q s n g prior porniasiori to come to the United StatoSj
on 11 Jly requested in urgent meeting of the United Nations
Security Council to consider the worsening relations between
the_JJnitgdfcM3tatgs_a.D<i Cuba. As e a r l y as ? July, accordtng
tc
V H B B H l ^ M l j H B i H H W > R o a informed the UAH ambassador in Havana that Cuba would submit i t s case to the UK
aod asked UAR. help in s e t t i n g the support of the governments
of Ceylon and Cambodia, Roa added tha^t the Soviet Union
has alroadiy offered i t s suj

12 July

Pago

s s

14
CUBA
Bnthuaiaatic I n i t i a l response of Caetro officials

to Khrushchev's

public support tfaa reflected In speeches at 10 July maae r a l l y , but

there was an interesting contrast between nCbefl Guevara's and FIdal
Castro's speeches that suggests Fidel's possible embarrassment
a t Soviet embrace of his regime,
A.

Guevara told crowds "Cuba today is a glorious island defended

by the rockets o tho greatest military power In h i s t o r y . . .
tfe are practically the arbiters of vorld peace*"

GL. I

But Titffcl, in his sickbed TV talk on t t e Bane day, vhile recogsizing Khrushchevfa "spontaneous" declaration of support, eald:

33 =

rr

Cuba does not depend for the defense of i t s sovereignty and

Independence on Soviet rockets, but rather on the reason and

Justice of i t s cause."
i*-.

-!

C.

By 13 July, Guevara Indicated that be fray h^ve had a change of

heart ween he said In an interview:

"Any Soviet Attempt to estab-

lieh a CoBHuniat s a t e l l i t e in Cuba would be resisted to the l i s t

drop of blood"
D.

Moat educated Cubans oppose alignment with Soviet bloc, and

though opposition fltiH unorganized and leaderless, U3 embassy
believe* Implications oJ Khrushchev*a speech eticul4 be a powerful
lnfluenOB In developments over next few veeka.

II.

I n t e r n a l l j , trends continue toward tiEnter dictatorship and enhanced

Communist Influence

"coun te rrevolu 11 on axle s

1.

JL^Ki. ordered detention 17 officers of

Castro's army.

B.

pro-Caetro lawyers, some in militia uniform, seized

Havana Bar Association add on 8 July named new governing board,
1.

The dtjly elected board la protesting to President Dorticos,

who ia president of National Bar Association, but probably
to iio avail*

2.

Ambassador Bonsai commentsi

"This is another important step

in establishing monolithic support of government by professional institutions"

C+ Cuban pressj Announced 8 July that n i l provincial officers of
Communiat-controlled Cuban Workers' Confederation have
replaced by men "who truly respond to the revolutionary
moment ID vrhich the country now lives. 1 1
D.

Cotnsmnist leader Carlos Rafael Hodri^uea is becoming

and we have reports t&at t e laay be named minister of

1*

He has long been one of C&stro's closest advlseraj but until

recently has remaiced in background,

B,

Cuban ambassador in Bonn defected H July vitb strong antiCastro, anti-Communist declaration and announcement he wouH
*ork to oust Castro *
1.

F.

He was eiKth ambassador to defect In last 30 days.

US Embassy has growing feeling that Ca&tro may be willing to

sacrifice Cuban interests for sake of tfh*t appears to be his
greater arabItIoQ--bmnJtliatiOn of OS, wrecking of Inter-American
system, and eventual "liberation" of a l l L&tiu America*

Castro's iLlnasa apparently eenuin&r b^t ws have only the reports

of hie doctors to go on.

They say he bas ellght lung infection,

which suggests pneumonia, or pleurisy and will be laid up for

several we^s.

There i s notbiag to confirm rumors of a mental

I l l - CastroTs ministers of economy and conuiiarce reported! worried over

poSHiblo US embargo on foodstuffs, but are confident they can lick
oil and sugar problems.
A* Reliable contact of embassy's agricultural attache- says these
officials fflel they would face ''dangerous situation' 1 If US cuts
off food shipments to Cub* (primarily l&rd, rice* flour r ana
corn,)

They fear t h i s miuld be worse than imminent shortage of

farm and industrial machinery parta*

B+

Current very depressed market for tinker charters eases Soviet

effort
1.

to Euppi7 Cuba with oil-

J*sSS5P^=2^^^CTH-iBmB* depressed market Atittf Soviet Union

P^HI deliver o i l to Cuba and other dist&ot markets at
competitive prices

2.

British t Korvegian goveraineiita have already indicated to

American embassies their

inability to Influence tanker

ownei-3 against accepting1 Soviet charters or; to violate

existing arrangements.
IV.

In 12 July press conference, Khrushchev ridiculed reports of Soviet

interest in military bases in Cuba:

"A most s i l l y fabrication.

What

do we need bases In Cuba for?"

A,

Highly doubtful that Soviet Union would carry I t s commitments to

Cuba to extent of establishing base

V.

Ajftionjj the U9 acts of "intervention" and ^aggression" cltod in

request for UN Security Council action m^s "the reccot meeting of the
HSC* at which- the future of Cuba was discussed as if that country
were a factory or a subject people*"

VI.

Khrushchev's missile threat and Cuba's c a l l for UN Security Council

debate have startled Many Latin American governments out of e a r l i e r
aloofness, and Majority favOP formal inter-AjBfcVic&a
of problem.
A.

consideration

C^H^J

OAS Council la to meet Saturday morning to consider Peru*s r e quest for meeting of foreign ministers.
1*

Meeting ifould be primarily copcemed with Cuban problem*

2,

Several high-ranking Argentine foreign aialgtry

bad favored a similar

3N

officials

initiative,

Brazilian foreign ministry o f f i c i a l s favor n strong stand

on Cuba*

4*

Chile i s now expected to support a c a l l for an OAS meeting on

Cuba despite I t s previous Insistence on nn informal Latin
American effort

5.

to conciliate US-Cuban differences.

Host srt&ller Latin American coma t r i e s have for some time

etfpported view th^t tbs Cuban ?egm i s a btISphere problem.

B*

But most Latin Americans fear dojnestic reaction to pro-Castro

groups +
1

Brazilian t Boltvltn, Chilean t Peruvian, and Yenezufllan

officials

have expressed concern that pro-Castro strength

lq their countries will

limit their ability to support the

C\

Mexico, probably traditionally the moat sensitive to any suggestion of foreign interference in internal affairs t has

1.

Strongly pro-Cuban l e f t i s t minority attacking US policy on

Cuba and pressuring Lopez H&teos governmarit to take firn^r
pro-Cuban stand*
a+

On 7 July Influential l e f t i s t ex-president Lanaro

C&rdenas attacked US "economic aggression" against Cuba,
compared Cuban position today to Mexican position ait*r
foreign o i l interests seized tnete ID 1938*

OojAmunlst leader Vicente Lomb&rdo

Toledano reliably

reported planning mass rally In Mexico City at uooaHied

date^ ostensibly to support Lopez Uateos, but probably
to presaure hiii into flrntar pro-Cistro policy*
c,

Leftists may further seefc to exploit Innate Mexican

reseatMent of tJ3 "interference" la Its affairs,

2t

Only clarification of Ueiico r s official positioii on Castro

regime given in 11 July press release by foreign Minister
Tello,
h,

Oetlfl-redl recent pro-Cuban statements by Mexican congress

sen do

(t

not nece&Sfirilv" reileot opinions of Lopez

Uateofi adninistrittion.
b.

Recognised existence in Mexico of "deep affection" for

Cuban people t

c*

Advocated efforts to solve US-Cuban difficalties within

framevork of OAS t

VII,

Latin Americano appear surprised; at u3 announcement of new aid

plan for hemisphere.
A

Only official comment to date la from Brazil,

president

Eubitschek ifl press statements JL1 and 12 July seemed

he not consulted, expressed hope that plan, when fenoxm,
show US has adopted positive attitude toward his "Operation
Pan America"
li

Said "palliatives and emergency measures^ will never cure

the i l i a that beset Fan-Americanism*

2*

Kubitfichek's cnief foreign policy advisor quoted

and in pr*HH 11 July as eafiuff "ridel C&gtro had to make
a pact with Russia before tfoe US would think about OPA*"

S<

Bolivian leader right-win^ government forces commenting on

Cuban situation 12 July eaid privately "unlikely any Latin
American country would speak out very strongly against Castro
in OAS since a l l grateful to him for awakening US to Latin
realities.'1

LATIN AMERICA

<jufttetnalap Exiles* Contacts With Cuban Government

B31-915S3fiffiSBL
B

Argentine communique regarding

ound i n a pouth &d<?r&&eed t o tli* Cuban Embassy
the opinion t t t t one o* the iteng proved there
iff a link between Guatemalan "en if rant*" living ia Argent in*
And the Cuba a Government, After mention ing items found! in
the pouch such a,g books on guerrilla. wafR$"foruGe
in
finer-*
C:ll
d ant
r l l l a ^ctlofis
Ifl
northern
Argentina,"
V
I
^
^
S
S
^
^
"
tentlon 1lJTorc&ftiJ lyir to a l e t t e r flthich e^ne for ttanuel Oallch
i t l the correct addressj thus proving the connection
rj
the Cuban
i

GaHch used to be secretary general of An organlof Cuatemalana vho received Asylub in Argantina after
revolution In Guitemalu in 1954*' In \recent monthst howhe reportedly ha,a been connected with an international
croup 1 OCA ted in Havana, and Caracas and tea*Jt>d by foJ^ner
folJtt&iri&lAu President Juftn Jbsa Arerato* jftccordling ta AH un-<
tested source with Oubaji cocaections lit Buenos Air ad, t i e fritteBAlftvn e x i l e group in Argentina, i s 1H close contact with
Cubft-'fl press agency, Frenaa Latlna/ Guatemala bjfie been deeply concerned tfeat Cuba toigbt ltd revolutitttary plotting by *
the exlleflj eonie
of whom are fblende of Argentine-born "die"
Guevara, Cubha1^ econotlic tsar who lived In
the revolution,
propagat

GO

IWTBLLIGEKCE DIGEST

Page 5

& R i a t i o p s Continue to Daterlorate: In

gp;
kfa ^ ^ T , iirnoato "Chs Guevara, one of Cuba's top
p o l i t i c a l leaders, Bade a number of disparaging remark
Venezuelan President BetaDcourt whicb will probably intenei
the division in Venezuela over tJxa explosive l s S u f l of relit
witb tti* Cubnn Governmeut and cquld evantually lead to *n flpn
r i f t between the two c o u n t r i e s .
Referring to the receot fatal
fihoqting by Caracas police of * pro-Cuban propagandist, Guevara
tejTned the Incident a murder, and called Itetancourt "sinply a
prisoner of his forces of repression," and of a regm wnicb
clans? to be democratic. , r , "
Guevara, added that
60

CUHRENT INTBLLIGEKCE DIGEST

Page 4

of the

th
the

S re
I*

n t ] i e Cuban

that the gaSiza

Influence fletmcSrt to
in bnth foreign

INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Page 5

"

CURREhT iflrELLlGEh'CE WEEKLY REVIEW

CUBAN' TJE?EL>OHltTfl

Fidel Castro 10
care of doctor*, but
the oxt4nt of him llluejs i s
tH ff* rflHAifiS t h e

duDDt o th.
RrolutioD t o the CwtAB a u s t a ,

PAftT I
PART I t

OJT
MOTE5 ftJTO

has
j t o ds-pOnd r ibd should
-health ' dictate th*t In
Uttp jovn,
l
i d l t
r would

PCB

to

INTEREST

CiA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

REtEASEAS SMflTBa

Page o f $
Pago

l of

CLIRilEKT ih-TEtLIGENCB TfEEXLl

"1B60

Raul Castrowho has cut short

his foreign tour--wowletfraat
7
aueceBBor or caretaker
There tra
indita-t Ions that
Castro1a authority in the 1
may have been sign ifj reduced in recent weeks
that the pre-Ctmmunlet cliqup
hy the ambitious *nd harddriving "Che" Guevara may ba.v6
gained correspondingly In power.
Guevtra, whose m,dnil n 1E t rat i?O
Abilities
contrast sharply with
CastrohE own disorganized methods Of governing has1 hecom* the

the Castro
i s faced * i t h y o w i g p
on a nutber of fronta. Thoufih
aeria-d* pfltroleym sSortag** donot ftj>p*ar immtasfttt vajrly proh-

tconoty and
t
niluence in oth*r
of. government. A -ui
BOUTC* *th hifeh
contacts in the regime p
in l a t e July that Guevara bud
replaced Cflst^o1a bodjffuard*
m-lth. his own personal
guard*.
Concern OTer CfcStro1* pre&ent
etatft of mind JB given as the
reason for OneTarawa reported
action, wbich tn fllfect woul4
uk Ca*tfO ft

Scheduled daLiveries on
both Snvi*t and frefl-wprLJ tant-

v i r t u a l tsar of Cub* * etat*-

ltmia eouli Come fro* a thortag*

of refiatry ipare part* dDd special lubricftBtSj
Soviet o i l (Seliverisa t o d i t s baTe not
Sufficient to meet Portal
demand, buit with
l
ti(m( eupplius should be adequate- to [prevent a serious o i l

eTs rer*tl ttat

considerably

Dottleoa, A former Communist Tbo fcas never r*-

has sbown himself to be

personality than hM
Btatua would I p
be mould. btcoo an even

.it
y
Two oaral

i n r l u e n t i a l fieura i f Fidel
Cietro should, taapoxAt 1 y or
permanently leave
The Argentin* and
in SivanatheuBBlvt* unusually t s t u t e
observers---"are ^Booming convinced
that Castro ia bteo*d in
e, f r i s o r e r . Are
dor Anoedo,
A irsoia*l friend
Of Ctatro H a t reAcfefld that ton
aftor-h*atine on

tfr reported f^m^

that t h s t r suppLies

ordars for

a r r i t of ' ! couaterrtvoltJonarie*'
and investigation of acts of
sabotag** A source with contact?
itt gov*rpment circ-l-fifl reported
tn late Julj that ttie
become LVBI9 0< a

th* umwd forcea and I s

^
pjpdrttin.* nmnent to aXcod*lrtpator.
On the tnterji*tlonftl front,
tne ^ i m l e u t itttacks ml otter
t delivered

PAhVT I

OF 1HMEDWTB

PART IT

H0TE3

Page

1 of 1&

IHTELlvlGEBCE WEEKLY

I960

by "CheHI Guevara and other?

Latin American Youth
havfli further *roused other Latin
Amflrican fiortrnaents aftin*t the
regime, Venezuela, d for
i s formally prote-stibg
description of Ftfesideat BetariTfd-jrt h* the '" aria one r
fDeat f a for-c-aa of
" Ttp Cubap charges
may haTa re perCUE4ton* a t t a *
fort-h.coming ma-eting oi t h e O1S
f i
n i n i 4 t e r LD Costn flick+
Vetitzuoli' s cbfcrjea athe TrujiliQ dJctatorsh
ioJatrB are to
t h e d&ng*TS t o the
intfAiWTican fe^stert posed by
Cuba's incraasiagly alose ties
with the 3ino-Soviet t l

PfiBT [
PART I I

HeJtiC0> ceBting t o
harj> clash in th OAS on t h i s
subjectd hia non at least initial
Braallian and Canadian svppoft
for FV Joint *ffort to ^mediate
tho dispute h*t*sfifl, Cuba and
United S t a t e s . " 9uth a.n^ effort
would appea.1 t * some hemtaphere
>jovBrniB.eiitB: uch i s Cnileh but
others---includtnft Araettii]Ar CoT.onbi*.j apdi Peru and. toat $1 the
Central American countriesa.p~
pCAT to support the United States 1
vie* that OAS actl&n 19 nccesaarj
to deal l t h the Cubap
sine* i t 1* nor* than a
US dtp put o ndi iuvolvea. a
challenge to the Inte
w h i c h e,ll QrVS

Of IMMEDIATE WTEftEST
NOTES

e of a

ITL THE

-1

Cuba: The potential exists for a power struggle between Raul

CastroTTldells designated \\slrt and 1 "Che"Guevara, who has al- Q
ready assutaed much of the authority formerly exercised by the

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1997

DAILY BRIEF

i,
Lit

t-

6 Aug 60

CENTRAL JNTELLIGEKCE BULtEHN

Page 1

elder Castro, The danger to the regime of euch a pow^r struggle will increase If Fidel Castro^ illness fa prolonged. Neither
Rai>l Catro> Guevara, nor the increasingly Influential President DorUtfofl possesses Fidel C&etrole great popular appeal
among lower income groups, upon which the regime haa come
to depends
Meanwhllej Cuban officials have exhorted delegates to the
Communist-donifnat&d Latin Araerlcaji Youth Congreaa lo carry
the struggle initiated by Cuba for "Latin Amerjcan liberation1'
back to their home countries.
LATE ITEM

:
u

*USSR-Cuba: Two off Let ale ol the Soviet Chief Engineering

DI rectorate- "the component ol Moscow Is Mirtiatry ol Foreign
Trade responsible for.the supply oi arms and military equipment
to foreign countrteshave been In Havana. One ot the&e men,
Yajstr^bcVj Is the Soviet official responsible for the shipment to
nonbloe countries of mtlltajry equJprrtent from the Black Sea port
of Nlkoteev, where almost all Soviet arms shipments originate,
Hie pre^r>nce In Havana strongly gugge^ts that Moscow has agreed
to provide military aid to the Castro regime* Similar arrangemerits between Czechoslovakia sjA Cuba may hav* bfeen worked
out earlier (hl& year, althougji no bloc arms are believed yet to
been delivered.

5 Aug 60

5 Ag 60

tr

I:-

DAILY BRIEF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BOLtEtfH

'"SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSA^^^

V/SS;

LATIN AMERICA
10

CO

Agentina Concerned Qver Cuban Links ffith Peronistets:

The Argent in eTTiniba&s&dor t o WasningtQR i s s a i d t o have s t a t e d
recently that t l s country i s watching tne Cuban situation only
inasmuch as i t affects Argentina becaus& of the presence 1ft
Cuba of certain well-known Peronlstas and also because ojf the
prominenc there of Argeatins-born "Che'1 Guevara, Cuba's economic tsar. This report is attributed to a. usually reliable
Latin American with good contacts in Latin American social
And diplomatic circles in atoxico. However, I t underplays
Argentine concern over possible international Communiet i&^
ter vent Ion In the frau inhere? demonstrated by Buenos Aires*
request of 15 Jnly to Pretnier Castro to disavow t&rttshctiev's
rattling, but i t accurately reflects the concern over
lints with Peronista subversive a c t i v i t i e s .
The so tire e r e p o r t s t h a t t h e A r g e n t i n e e* - d i c t a t o r was
a t f i r e t opposed t o t h e s u p p o r t b i s f o l l o w e r s gave t h e Cub in
l e a d e r b u t , f i n d i n g h i m s e l f i n & m i n o r i t y , f i n a l l y agreed t o
" a l l y himself * i t h C a s t r o F " AS reconuoended by tvo Important
P t r o n i g t a l e a d e r s now l i v i n g i n Cuba. Links with Cuba
s t i l l opposed by some Per on 1 s t a s tn A r g e n t i n a , such as
Pez-oriista Youth Group, which r e f u s e d t o a t t e n d t h e r e c e n t
L a t i n Americin Youth Conference I n Ravana. The L>?nitii^a.ii
ambassador to Belgium, F o r f i r i o RubirOss., r e c e n t l y served
an i n t e r m e d i a r y between Peron In Madrid urid h i s suppc-rters
i n Cuba,

15

60

DIGEST

Page

IlfTELLIGEMCE tfEEttLY REVIEW

CUBA AND TPE CARIBBEAN

The Goviet ship

arrived at Harani with, a

4J(Jff&-ton c-nrea on jSe?tBBberd
the f i r s t PHJOR bloc Arma ahipnant to thft Castro rejiras L Th*
cargo apoarflDttr iflcludod
armored vshielea r art i Llery;
a variety of othfrr wgapoaa
ejuJpciB-nt, Jot aircraft
may hAr* baea d*lIvarei. In
Jtiljr, four ttr firfl Sovf,at MT-4
rB aud ftt leaat 10,000
r i f l e a and SHbnmchisfl
had bees delivered to
Havana,

Polloviag Cfcstro'a 2 Sptn.tn>uiicaant ttat CiJbd

e&tftblisfc r*I*tions with
gi

Jth* h*fld of t h e Ha-

pSrtloffice: of the Sew Chip*

HWB Agency has aotlfid the
Cuban Foreign Winijtry that t*
had been dMignatod. py PeipitiB
to negotiate the eKchnnge of
J i l i
gliati
have *cnt conera-tulatorj
ueatftjrea to their counter parts
i t Cuba since Castro's spaacn,
will, pay his
lOBg-proalsed v i s i t to Caha
after bis trip to Haw York for

PART I

II
1TI

the opening of the UN Ganeral

The- Cubaq GOverntont haa

unted that Fidel Cnatro
blBBtrlf ia to toad Cubar a DN
Genar#l Assembly dalega
which w i l l a l t o include
aliDister Roa and Nune*
tft* head of Cuhfc's CoHinjiiiatdi
Agrarian ftaform Enta. CAatro will use the
forum for further attfccfcs
On the Unites State* tad %&
hold up h i s revolution as aa OK,
tmple' Jt-r a l l underdfrvLoped
nations and colo&inl at-*a.
Cuban d+Lee&tlon Ij e
t o Buppcrt the Soviet
On a l l important i
nwhtl*, opaa oppoa
tiou to Caetro inside Cuba
t i l l Hncoordlnnted *nd
6ffactive: lemership, the
Castro forces fcpparently ha v *
had no success in routine the
g u e r r i l l a haad* that h*ve teen
Torniue in the Epcamhrny J^ount a i n s of central Cuba (or aome

OP

3 oi 11

WOTES

1 of 21

AND PERSPECTIVES

ItflELLICEtfCE WEEKLY ItETIEIT

IS

moatas- Castro public1? mimithu importance of t i e

on 9 SeptemberN tut
i
actuaLly appears
the
t h t threat -&f a
build-up

&pri*Li3lyL

iaatJrued reports alle^fl tht

the head of the Nationa-l BinK,
' GuevAra-, whose
In ftwerrllla. warfare the

Caban
with the Castro r e gime 44 IS September Dd wnnts
to come- to the United. States,

WET J

rHTEREST

OF

Faee 1 Of El

II
PART I I I

Page 4 of LI

/NT>

^.+ h n

CUBAN DEVELOPJHEPTE
r

Pidel Castro a
p
>t the United Mat ions tag
patently whetted his appetite
for International p o l i t i c s Had
Etrengtheaed his vlaw c-i himself us a leader of the peopla r
nQt Only of Latin America, but
of ill underdeveloped countries,
iti their "atRuggle a gains}: imperil, l i s a . " Tfce- vlvtutlKy unqualified id ant if! cat to a O*
Cuba's foreign policy with t t a t
Of the USSB, evident In Cn&tVQ't
UN a.do"r*Et shows signs of heldf playad down and the theue
Of Cuba's PEHV^latiOD With
world neutralist letdera ;
straaijed. Oa hi* re tarn to
Cuba, 1 Castro declared: that
Ghana s rikrunah aay TJ-itit Cuba
t b l s year apd NJ.r may '
t
Hh
Tb? CaEtro refine H which
has triirtD inCre:astng propaganda
support to the Cfiuse of the
TAlgeriaa rfrtClE, is apfareDtly
Cftto act BJ host l i t e r t h i s month
ff a c^bf&ronce econsOTBd by
C l t 1 1
based la Koroccc. The eoraniittea
eaber repr&ei]tiDe
tbo ComBUQists 1 World Fetffi-ratiOn Qf
Trade Unions, bad urged Havana
as the s i t e of the conJer*nCS.
On bis departure Iron
On S3 September, Caatro
that be expected to
return to the United Nfttioo* in
few weeka, and How Tori hotel
mintpora reported oa 3
that CubAna had bean

PART I I

NOTES Alfft

reservations for a party beaded

h-j Fid*l or Raul Castro beginning 23 October, Castro told
a Cuban televisIon audience on
30 September that "ve are thinking of presenting a- notion in
the United P*tione Against
racial seflrerfction In tba United
Cuba's withdrawal on 4 Oe0* Ltt Candidacy, for a tfN
Security Ccu B cil ceat h which i t
had l i t t l e hope ef winning nHj
have been in. return !for t promise
by sone Latin AneriCftn dnl*5Ations for support for a eoeipej.1
seat next yearL
Cuban propaganda Media continue their nlsost hyaterical
ittAC^s Cn tb United fltatea,
and tomeh proclaim thut tho
erabaasy s advice ^o Am
cillzenB to leave Cuha
shadcws armed Intervention by
the United States, The $luOF000,000 US Government - owned
Kltaro nickel plant was seised
by tht wtrterE' militif en 1
October following the deliver;
Of a US note announcing cloaure
of th* pJ-Bnt because of conI
flats lory Cuban.jtaKes. Castro
responded publicly, Baying, 'They
d t i l l i o n dollars on eeund 40 billion on arms*
but now, after o^pjottiDg our
minera1resourcti for n*oy
h
object to paying a 25
t t i n . , , . Let toe
plant b* Closed."

Page. 10 of 27

CUHRIST INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

6 October 1660
Cuban eov-ernment agencies
iearful of the imposition oi controLs on exports to
Cuba, According to- rumars prevalent in Havana, they aTfl
ompiTjtea in the United
to parchnse scarce ttena
tin: indirect shipment to
Instructions have- been
sent by the Katisftal Bank of
CMba t o 2.11 Xm York banks c o n -

cerned to transfer to the United KiaedOni OT Canada, the U l ance.s held lor the acecujit of
Cuban, banlcs,

balances
by Cuban
bants as
ed to be

The amount Of

and. securities }ieid

banfcs !_ New Vork of 3i Au-gu^t Is reportslightly In excess o-f
The Tutornational

y Fund CLHF) *aa l i k e -

wise instructed to- diapoe of

$1^5,Dap in gold heAd by t t e
Fund raj- t h t Esinlt of Cuba and
to transfer t i e proceeds to
the Bank of EngLand,
These nOves are probably
to safeguard
any freezing
the United States.
of Cuban gold held by
tne
g Cuba's w i t h drawal from the fund. It ao,
i t would memo B. furtheR s o l i d ifieation of Cuban trftdo t i e s
the Soviet bloCr Thr*
currently no bloc members
in t h e IMF.
On 3 October, the National
Dank- df CubSr purchnsfld in KBV
York the en.uj,vil.nt of nearly
*4,Sfl0,00i) in pound* s t e r l i n g
and ordered it4 deposit in London to tne account of the Czech
State Bank.. This transaction
probably a payment fa* bloc
A BoJSftriAn trAde delegation, headed hy the f i r s t deputj/ foreien tride (uijii^teR, arrived in Ctiha. on JO 5*ptembBR .
the expected trade iftreenoiit
will be the seventh concluded
ty Cuba t h i s year with bloc
COuntRies. Tn.e second major
Q! military equipment
the Soviet ' Union

PAP.T

recen 11y. arrived, and fUT ther

shipment* are expectedr
Che Cuevftra. i s to visit
Moscow In tarly PovembeR for
the anniversary celebratioaa af
the Soviet revolution, and
Carlo* Ft*nqui, pro-ComrauniEt
direotcr of the goverftment'a
newspaper, And several other
neirsnen left On 29 September
to study 3ovtet journalism.
other Cubans DOT are
sfrtullite c a p i t a l s . At the
iinit tine, two fast Cermnn and
two C^tch professors ar^iv*^
in Cuba In lAte September aa
ot the Ojbftn. Qovernment.
Ctiou Xn-lfti'g message to
ID late September, on
the. occasion of the fernU-'i * * tabl 1 ahisent of diplomatic re^<
la.tiop.3 between rlHavana and Feipi&E, promised every possible
tuppoRt and assistance to
Cuban people, In case of
The "International Volunt a r j tabor1 Brigade,,M which aame
to Cuba, under COwmunist-frcnt
sponsorship l u t Juily t o work
OD a Cuban school teuttfr h left
on 1 Oetob&r a*tor ft
featuring an address by
Qiievarft told the youths,
were said! to have represented
^3 countries, t M t "*e Of thl*
generation will see the world
liberated completely, even li
we hive to undergo the greatest
*f sufferings."
QD the domestic EC*n0,
the arme-d fortes ftpd nilitift
are evidently s t i l l *uff#jing
casualties in the Regime's ef*forts to suppress gutrriLln
activity in the Escanbraj Jl
tains. Press souRces reportthe lAucichinr on. 4 October o
an all-out sOvernniont drive to
rout the guerrtllfce and the
capture by gov*jfjnflent forces
of a.n arms cache destined for
the rebels flhith had been
by an a i r c r a f t from an
destination.
On 2 October the Catholic
archbishop of 5*ntiago, in

ROTES AHD COMmEKTa

Pane 11 of 7

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIE1"

fi October I960
OriUote Provincs, Hfttied- R pastoral letter tonStituting the
atrongest anli-COtoHBist s t a t e nent y e t niade by any church, off i c i a l io Cuba. T-be archbisho
*ccorfl*qff to- a higb Church, off i c i a l , Uteuda to folio* up
paatornl 1fitter* about out* a
month, rffgardlC&S of ^ b a t th
Cuban bithop^ da, Alttough tha
is went in Cuba, i t Is in

PAKf 11

a psychologically fnvar*hle
tion in Ori*n.tB to head *uCt A
caBpAiffo b(eauBfl nany priestfi
there ofcrticlpated In the fight
against thfe B*tiata' dictatorEhio h
and the ArCbhlehap himself 1B
credited with Bavinf Fidel CftSt r o ' s 11 fo ta:tS&3 after h.9 hftd
cagtursd. bj

HOTEE AND ODlHItNTS

12 o i 37

.'L

i. K. ii t i o n t o

the US
of a p a r t i a l Grabargo on s h i p ments to Cuba, Moscow has
s teppej up i t s propaganda
age of tne Cuban s i t u a t i o n . The
Soviet press now c a r r i e s da
warnings &1 a]leged American
plans for "counterrevolutionary
invasions" from Guatemalan bases
and denunciations of US trade
r e s t r i c t i o n s and of Ambassador
Bonsai's r e c a U ,
On 22 October
Soviet propaganda media gave
f u l l and prominent coverage to
the reception of a Cuban j o u r n a l i s t delegation by Khrushchev
and top Soviet j o u r n a l i s t s , and!
I z v e s t i a ' s front page was donainatedl by r e p o r t s of "Invasion
p r er>p a r a t i o n s organized by t h e
US,

-ju*

At tne United Nations on

19 October, Soviet delegate
ZorIn departed fr< the t e i t of
a speech cm eUsarmament to make
a statement Supporting Cuba,
noting Cuban accusations of "US
aggression And acts of Intervent i o n " and charging; tha United
S t a t e s with a policy of "open
m i l i t a r y provocations." Moscow
baa, however, avoided! any sugg e s t ! op t h a t the USSft night i n tervene m i l i t a r i l y in Cubfl^ dud
t n e r e have been no references
t o Khrushchev*s threat on 9 July
t o uee rockets in support of
-- ..Castro.
ID i t s nonblt>c trade the
USSR i s apparently giving top
p r i o r i t y to filling Cuban reQuireinents^ and in tfqe wake
new US eccDflnk restrictione
will probably move to demonstrate
s t t l l further i t s willingness to
up in CCODIUDIC terns I t s
26 Oct fio

and p o l i t i c a l support of
tbe "national liberation s t r u g gle."
ifoscow already hu.s made
considerable and. r e l a t i v e l y
c o s t l y readjustments in i t a s h i p ping operations to accommodate
Cuban petroleum requests and to
siake timely d e l i v e r i e s of such
items as f e r t i l i K o r 5 r wheat, and,
more r e c e n t l y , agricultural
chinery
Havana probably T i l l seek
a d d i t i o n a l economic support from
the b l o c . Hottever, because of
tho nature of i t s i n d u s t r i a l
p l a n t , Cuba may be forced to seels
immediate a l t e r n a t e sources of
supply in n on bloc countries-poss i b l y Canadawhich are better
equipped to supply Cuban Import
needs + Tbis may e*ert further
p r e s s u r e on Cuba's foreign exchange p o s i t i o n .
1r

Chfl." Guevara, president .

of t h e Cuban National Bank, l e f t
on 21 October for an economic
mission to the bloc and now i s
ID Prague conferring with economic o f f i c i a l s , fia I s scheduled
t o go on to t h e US5H, Communist
China, Sortb Korea. and East

GA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASEAS SANITIZED
1997

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Page 1

CURREKT INTELLIGENCE

M HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM a,

RELEASE AS SANmZEO
1997flufiv*ra s ten-rhaa eco-

1*85

CUBA AND TSH CARIBBEAN

nomic Hlesion t o Cz.flctosloTt.fcHn

ttti*
t * TJSSAj C o u u n l s t Cb4n*> HOrtb
and East Gerninf l e f t
on SI October. On the eve
Of his dep*rttfred Gu*v*ra told
a television audience tfa*t be
was erring prinMRilr to qagotlate
Cuba'* commercial eifctinge for
the coming year un-der trade
pActs with these CQu.ntriBB L
Guevara will probably seat e i pjEnded arrangement* with the
b l o c tO- COBOBQBBte f o r i t BTOS
that Cuba dan no longer
froa the United State*.
becau4 of the nature- of Cv
i n d u s t r i a l plant, i t nay fee
forced to e*lt Inuaediat l
aatlve SOUITCB-E of gupplj in
nomhlCo countries N whjc-h.
equipped to supply Cuba's

needs.
TV (ftIt clearly implied
effort* toward the further economic : Integration of Cuba with
the bloc. Se referred to '--.:.
foreign M ccfirid0i n in the Cuban
.^trolUfB, I n s t i t u t e ^who are
K*injj t4 the TJSBH to get ft
Jet"
d Inpllefl tbut bloc
in otfifrr

Cuba and Rn*nia signed q

e a a e q t *Bd technical
protocol in Earana
35- Oc-tcberH and a J c i n t coni ^ tffrolftred their intsnt exchange amba&
Toe com.poflitio& Of the
dl
s:uege4tm that tbat
provide Cuba with
ataiataaoa for i t a
petrolsurn
yf bfta mjQve^ OB fieveral
fronta t b i * past veek to fOsteir
tha taipTMsion that tbre i s t
r e a l daiiffeif t h a t tfe* US 111
Intsirveiifli m i l i t a r i l y Lu Cub*
und tbat h Iq t h a t
s d
USSR atiinds jfefidp to lead
to Cuba4
t

FART I
II

OF

apjUreatly to
l
of U3 lntentlCDB and Co otinuLite coaa
ti
by ttto n e u t r a l l s t a In the
KBtloiLS wblch ulgbt
put tbo Tfnited Stntea i A An
position h
Soviet propaganda
vFfl
of the
s i t u a t i o n bis been '
d now ibcludea
EUj>fed up
at alleed AaericD
dally
l
JOT opnte
^
s TPith
of US trad* r e s t r i c t
and of AjubnEsador BOQBBL'B r

call, I t the United Mationt, tba

Bpviet delpiti-oa lias come
atronjly in support of the
Cubnn oomplaiqt, rtich
the cha^: that tb tfS
t o begin a
g
ol the country - h it a
few d a j * "

Despite these effort* to

arouse concern orer the possibility- ot VG Intervention in
Cubftr i t seens u n l i b e l j that
t b t DUflfl antio?Sates aucb
4Qtln. JCbruafrcfeev'a th
on 0 July1 toUiii4 sockets
noceaaffy" lo^defeuss of the
Castro government in tbe eveat
of tf3 eeeressiom wa* Bo qualified as not aetnaIX? to cona t i t u t o a. CommitRHnt to anj
Bpeclfio course o *etionft
i t hes a*Ter Ijeea repeated.
jTurttiflrin'SrWj TA5B q u o t e d K h r u - '
Bhcbe? at Baying In A press
interview on 39 fieptenbfT when
pstad about bla rocket threat.

Page . 4 o f 1 1
1 of 21

CURREHT I[fTELT,IGEHCE ifEEKLV REVIEW

27 oc-tober
foa naedn't w o j

does not Intend to

Cubs, t h l * naarra that
1* no danger whstGOevor.
soviet bloc
inenta to Cuba . thus far
Arras, Bitihinfl
ntiartillery, *tnJ
p
are tsipe-cted. The
quantity c t h i s equipment ia
clearly excessive far' Cuban internal needs ai]d
will permit Release of CubR+s
turgd wflapcJDB for
military support elsewhere in
th.e tieai&pnarBj cbould this h*
thfl Cuban it,tent loo.
Is viev of the lack of qualified p&rsotfnel to Cuba, the CflstRo rejjime * i l l ba reiulfoJ to
rely heavily on the Soviet bloc
for training the Cu&An nilitarjf
in tft* use and ma i tana Jic* of
the acir weapons-and
relfltad i-teiiii eacti MB
tioasflq.uipnei]tfiita"Radar Crflastng cuaterB of Cubans
probably be sent to the bloc
for training, particularXy if
tba Cistro rtgLae follow*
through wltb I t s app*rent cfclaion to build up n qualified
f
force" haufrd on SOri*t
CaDmn C-overae-nt rato tba new US export
by .tncreastnff i t *
s t t a c t * on tin- United
for thLB "new act of
a Egress Ion. * On 2i Octoher,
f tto robainiq
ID Cuba
IJOat other Latid Americin
eovertuaenti appfiar to i a a l
the. og Action wAfl jmtlfierf
Official circles in feeyico
^
p
Hud faol I t Drill five CUfltro to
important propBgA'adi aCrinttt*
ia tb.* faemiapbr+ Other t*ver
th
bil
y j t i
to tba
US position, bJ^e B3ipre*fi?d oonbflt

PA&r 1

be a *tron^ negative Reaction

tba Latin, iaerican public.
Soraa of these gove-raments
nay Also see the move As obviattte need for t h e i r orn
p

I s ftaj f u t u r e m u l -

t i l a t e r a l santtiodB agftin&t the

Caitro r*^ioe. Uoy Uitim
Aii*ricfth laarfera prefer to pepard
ta* CunD ls*u3 IB a bllit&rl
i
prohlem botweea tba Ltaited Stnte*
nd Cuba, Add the Ecuadoreao
foreign atniata-r frftnklj e i l i d that a number erf Latin
gernuflDta *re too
to run Ahead of
OD t h i s Issue.
Th* Caatro regim*,
been etiti*rratBeJ bv a
be? of defections this
anuug CubAD o f f i c i a l s abroad,
i
lp r e o a l l i n s dipand consular ojfficeira to
thijit Official* In Br*.z.il *Dd Mexico are already r e turning tom.a-r ind apre * i l l prabfcblf, f o l l o r . A dacrea of 7
Eajpt-BBfc#r removed jiob tenure
rlghte froa JForelfa ^afvic-e
persdjnnel. I t la bacoiiitog >pparetrt that tlos* otliclflla *e{fded "raXlable" for forflijn
ira thoaq -who Qnqu#g } accept IIHJ Are *illiajj
to pronot* the Communist position
OD CuCan and international Issues.
Tbe CuhAD ambassador appointed
to Paris os SO October, for instance r has- a long record of
C Qnnuflit t atoola tions r
Scattered oppoaitl&n groups
contiaue active Irusida Cuba despite elaborato eovaromeqt efforts
to tv9 the laprBBdlOD th
been flped <tut.
j
y And
id annj p a r t s of tha
i J d
wwa i s Orient*
u^^At tfiit *. oer
fora*" of JtbDUt SO
persota 1 tided on Che north
coast on ap nbout 00
tb
ADD

OF IKED I ATE

C of

NOTES

1 of

W:
IHTELLICEHCE WEEKLY
27

activity noted in that province

lands support to reports of
continued guerrilla Activity,
Tbero is e t i l l no indication,
howeverd that th* opposition
has tbs unity a ud leadersnip
to become a genuine
to the regime.
In the c i t i e s , tenants Are
reported to bava reacted with
enthusiasm to the 15- October
urban rarem law, which, offers
them the prospect of becoming
hOiue-ow^ers. The 'government
probably calculated that tlao
sol id itiCaton of i t s svcuort
ilLCOtne t(mpif

Tro^lo!

than eompenEate for t&e

alternation of t h e landl o r d s , JBaciy &1 Tfhom. TiLI l o s e
aol-e Eource of
I Che
Loo o l 'r*v01utlODBry watch
4 Onus i t t ee* N throughout the -COUAtrp.
Thej *re Bvidantlj in r e apoaea to Fid*l Cuatro's c a l l on
a A Sflptflinbef for the e ? t i b l l s ^
meqt o i a bUtut warden informant
neCvorh in tcnfno and c i t i e s as
anotbtr instr^ftfrnt to combit
l1
coidrit6rrevol'utiC'nfry intrigu-eh n
The CubJi] Armj G-fl JE t o have
"Conpltte rflspcnsibJ-ltty" for
ths committeeh

:.. .:

OT

PART I I

6 of 11
TOTES

Pace 1 of 21

a and.NoL4j?Y
- * ;

nf.:"=: V> -^.-'ch^

TliG

-ml Ircm the Norfh VI ct-

Vietnam ors Eiifi fjn'i^r^;-:- :'z-~':.! i t v t L

KP.VETIS,

i]~3set that

the coEimurJ^isi bs issui-L- c i 15 tfovembsr* Worth Vietnam

hsiis consular posts in EarniS, In&ragfila, "and India; but
Guinea is the GTIIJ nor;bloc iKLtion to which z. North
;~jSE;dc-r is pvesstitly ^cci'S^ited. KJf<oi v/ill viev? csi
lE of its firet dlBin;:4ft:o ptst in the ivestern
cis a major brestthrougr; ITJ ;t3 cafflpiigu for greater international at
V"/.-:as8Q ia a further move by Cuba
toward soligr.vity isrith t!:& ^[.:j-^v^t bloc. Cuba will then
have c^^iorrxatic FGlaticns wiLU &\1 Eirto-Sovis-. countries except Aibisisij Mongolia, ^rd nai-Geriiiany. It lias concluded
Err;.7i.i-f;i'l;E.iIi ecoaoanic s2'.'-,.:-:.:eii: with Sas* Germ any, and
diplc^iitic reccgafcton its;' ^ "- iii"-snift63t. The raost recent
tcc^cmfc asrc&mtnt aiJ/.'i Ln.," O:"!:^ '.vith a blec coiL";try v/as .
eJsncd on 5 Gitobs? with ?^'..j3-^i and was the ci^l:tii trads
j ^ ^ j*.d icirtr:lc^i cssiaisles ._'. L Ki^'vi; tcncludcd tJiJs yea^ with
CT> 2- oioc c-'^iiiry. Ctifcin is"^U'j -^1 r irJi Prssidont Ou&vara,
2 J re?/ ea a Ki^ioii to fivs si-1:--; cci'-ntries, is e j e c t e d to
a. ITZ^S .^i'2eiaent with Noi'th Ko?^a next
;-s*i Arsiy Inspector Graeral Wilil3J3 Galven visited
K^iGi list ?,*ny, In Sfiptemc-L,' a Nortli Vtetr.a^s^s party ccni':^ ccmssitteo Hvsriiber altc: in^r an ncacL&nfic conference in
!s:dto ^r.c-^coJ his inteistt^.i to visit Cuba, init the Visit
;/;-?"tritly ric-ver materialtsc^L
will n s i
licly

end a goveri.inent.oeiegatitKi to Ciibi on a goodThis group may ba on hand v/hon recqgnition is pub-

Vietnam may agree to supply small quantities of

rice to Cuba under a token trsce agreement behveen the two *
countries. Cuba previously was considering the purchase oi .
rice from Sout1! Vietnam, but probably will switch this order
to rlrjici following tiie establis^jment of diplomatic reJatLons+
A sr.nll qi5Entity of NorUi Vietnamese rit& hss already been
slix^TitC to Cui;a on Soviet account, antf several s
schedojgj.fro-ra Communist China, *

-_ I

29O=t60

CENTAL fNTELLIGENCE ELfUETIN

Page 1

--Che Guevara's economic mission has left Cuba for the

USSR, Communist China, and other bloc states to arrange
for next year's trade with these countries and to further

29 Oct GO

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 4

y
integrate Cuba economically with the bloc. Soviet propaganda
coverage of the Cuban situation has been stepped up and now
includes dally wtrnfngE of
allegedhAmerican plajis for "counter
ft iar
re volutionarr invasion*''i 111
\F
^ denuntUtiona of US trade
T
restrictions ""'
"
'

Oct 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 5

IMTEtfJdEHU WHO*

a\
- CUiWUI

CJie
of Cubit's
tryntam
l a probably
f
of tha country'a

1B scheduled to
go next to
for

similar
to
Ciibn,4^ trade
technical aE^
wltti Covmimlet China
July, Guflv^TL ta
to trovel from Pfripiue to Kortb
P vhna tnnli

economic policies,
rived on 2? Ottofoer tn
tliu second atop
on hift
to five Sin*jSovi*t hloc
L*

In

Cxe-ch-

atop ie to tw
bo al^aad a

0 0 0 c r e d i t to Cuba t o t
j
*
aoa *nd n * E o t l * t e d d a t a 1 La f o r
th cotiln^ jftiir o f a, g
t r a d e agraoBBnt BlgrKid l a s t JUn*.

- ^ Cu Dft

tZftc])

no tnd 1-OJI 11 on
Intends *t tliia
to tr*>*l to the other
bloc countriesPelted,
1B

ffry{

t TTft^ {" fl^H.

motorcjrtlejs] And1 fit^tionnry fiBginee^ utid eventually trucKs and

nutoHOblleg. CuCvara may blsa
hnva bud's nrra D [ons h la t o
the Czeche JOR the

that

1ms

in, tfogcow, QUOVBTB. IB

'

no inc3tca,t4.oq that Cuba h i s necmrsd proqiuas in the bloc 1uir

the purchae* pf Dore than
40 p*rcurit (
sugar )fports vhic]
bloc la already ccrnib 111ecj t o
buy.

And ft

concluded

trade

Amflrlcao (MV*1
* raport that 25
tachnicltne are In Cuba
p the Cubfin

on the
from the
Tb* t
tal nuubAr of auch
will eventually
higher ftffurfi, aod nopo
pnsnt probablg
will be cent t a CuhH. Further
units at thu ubatl ClvLllmh
n i l l t i a aro tielioved to have
byiin Iflsuocl Suvtet 'Jll arniB
durin(t tha weelt ot 30 October,

ported t o bo nefrotintInfi
Wlkoynn^ presumably on tho d e t*ilfl at Cubad-Soviet trade
for ISS1, and h may b t t a h p t
tp ipcraftH* tU* $100,000,1100
credit DAgotlbtad iflSt

r .>.

3 FOR RELEASE

RuiHAnlK^

navu

vitlt the Cjtatro re-

Cuba haft

s faR tEl^re lu

Btet

l a s t Uarcl) wltn
Genus Stato BanJc
will prpbahly gdek en
dlon during; th,

Th ojcpanded Csnach c r e d i t -f
Is rdportftd ita the Cuban
ta be for th.ft purpa&a of rea c t i v a t i n g " Cubans
Industry and la ta be uned t o
[LQSd IPQx4

ID

.rit-^Pip. Tfl,

\ .

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

REEASE fN FULL 1997

with Cut*n

i octobsropt r e i a i f l e d fay
u n t i l the 2fith t ^b.an Cuban
c h t
fl-n
t-mtnapt invasion njora TOAchini a peakKbru
efrcliGV acA^d attorned b i s r e l u c t a n c e t o ba draYD i p t o
a reiteration
tf his fl July
I" * r*ply to a r e q^b
t o comnsnt OU- Pt(ttant
that tho warains was purely
he raid Ja*

like such etatfl-iapts

t o bo
really symbolic,fl For tllta^
ha ftddftd^ i t i e eaB*Dtlnl that
thraftt of Iflnot ra^tarlaliia.
thera will ba no m4 t o
tho reality of our utate-

Aotioirr

have b**en Junta l i e d l u

d on the

IBI*

onn*ifi6tDca tUffhta were

a? and 26 October from Cuba
tha Swan Islands a.nd tlio
^*
alft C i t b
.here thfl "
are

propagand* on 2 Movenbar imieflated th^t tha aeict

t a c t i c of the regip* irill be t o
tluit tae i-nnparULliBtinVftBion tDrees"
tttinj

TIBS

VOlujftU o f COBBrtDt Od

TJ3 pianH for an ipvaBlOq of

Cub*, i t ha3 TBlied heavily
on cltationa
from ir4in
presA accouqte mud! * void ad
O f f i c i a l oommentavy, TttB US
in MoflCOMr AtigHBatS t h i s
i Vieh. n o t t o a tlje Sc-wiet puliHf: u n duly.
the

the
thft COUBla

v on A virtual wir
n t i c 1 p*tion of what
ernB9dt repeatedly
plns for UP
at Cuba by US'Spport*(l "COUJBl t
On
3D ottotwRi the
torate of th*
militia.
c a l l e d on a l l "Hi*
in ttiA Efl-Vallft- a reft t-n
- t de^iB13*1*^ points AB, part o
C "national mflbi1iJ*tican t o
meat the invaders.
Eomfl mili t i a unlt vera ptfnt flran tliare* t o Other points In

Hutfov#rr a I6a.dinjj mo-ibBr o l

ui^erffround opposition tove^ent
vithin Cun* reported on 37 October tb*t th* Ca*tro rff^in* i B
plnpnins t attgai a bombing n t -

tac* itHPit on qarttin Ci*b*n trH*t* wit" Cuban plane a

G t l f c t t lnslra
pi-t-w^n. would be need t o Bapport Cuban propagasda. at hone
an* to "prove" i t s chargB
it til* Uftlted 3ttt*P fiow
ditfcuBBftd * th* unitftd

j ..
^ :
a
J

A pdflSibla indication at
Cuban t a c t i c s with r%apeet t o ttta 113 HfcV*l Base ftt
Guuntariano Hay caiaa tn &b t n t
via w BVOH by Pidel C a a t r o t o
a UAH nawKi-ltn* I I s quoted
as jaayihtf thfit Cubapa are n o t
euch idlDta th aa t o t r y t o
th* baao by force- I n ..., Cuba Will despaBd
LTlited Httiana that
JH1.^re

bafl \H

CUBAN CEVELOPHEHTS

Che
, p
of guha'* banking
e probfchiy the
ot the country's
economic J^O1IC1BB A
on 29 October in
the iflcond stop on his
to five Sino-EOvitt
oslovakia.^

PART 1

II
PART H i

OP

OM e r a d i t t o Cuba, t o *40,qM,000 md neaotiat&d details lor

the coming year otf A a*nsral
trad* agreenrt-nt signed last Jun
The expanded Cx&th credit
ifl reported i s the Cu&ji-a PR#BH
to L* for tHe purpote of ."R*activating" Cuba1a Au
isdtistry and i e to be
to
S.a Cuba

IHTEEEET

MOTES
PATTERNS ASJ> PEHSPECTI.V53

Page 3 of 11
1 of 21
I of 13

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REV LEI"

;9 Novauher

^ a-Hfl stationary oneventually trucks, and

autonobllea, Guevara may a l s o
t*vfl nade arrangements to pay
the Czechs tor the military
frquipoieBt Cub* has received,
and for the -Current t r a i n i n g
of Cuban Air Force personnel
in
ID WJoaco*h ^ e v * r a I t r*to bo nepatla.tldE with
presumably on the fletJ.L of Cuban-Soviet trade
fflf 13&L, and he mijf attempt
to i&creaE* the $LOO,000,000
Soviet credit negotiated. 1fttt
Te-truaryH Thus fa>r the^C JL>
aa iodlcation that Cuna hits s e cured prunists in the bloc tor
t&a- pu i*c DAS* of morfl th*u tUe

apprMioit*l7
40 percent ot
Cubah ST36SH? t i p o r t e which thn
bloc i^altea-dy ccmnltttd to
if *chedul*d to
go nest to p a i p l n j , DrtEumably
for neeetition* Similar to
those Jn 150*60^. Cuta.'E trad*
chnical JtsslBtanc9 agrflwith Convunist China lrere
l a s t July. Guev*rft lq
to travftl frou Pelplnff t i North
where trade and coopor*Te^ma-cits &re ejiffl-a ted
to he cone luded h Cuevim's
last step it to he in East
Germany; he signed . pnt-^aT
last uarrch with the
<j*TTiian State Bank and
mill proha-fcly *eeli
during the
ia no indication
that GutTara Intends a t t h i s
to travel to the other
rjouhtriflaPola.nd, HunRumatia, and Bulgaria
that ha.vo -.coneliidlSdl' t^ade
apreeuenEs * i t s the CaitrO
regime <

CU1)*B
r

announcing such a
Havana suggefltfld t h a t
comunlqud be
on 1.5 ifoveiabflr+ At
Quiftea 1B the only nonbloc nation to irhleh a. North VietnamflbftttAdoi Is aco red itat)
frill View establishment
of lte fixJt dlplcB^tic post
In the pesters henlcphflre as
a Bttjor hraaltthrcugh. in ttt
i
(or t**at*r
acceptance.
tuts l i t t l *
to offer Cuba econcmJLCAllyr and
the *Btablifihment o# d.lpLo u t i c r e l a t i o n s wltn. thft.t t i t e l l i t e i s lo.Oortant chie-flj as
a, furtieir Bto^fl by Cubft toward;
COlidnrlty with t h e Blno-Sovis
bloc. Cuba already t i e d i p l e M.tlC rel*rtioaa with a l l other
bloc countries but Albania t
M l i
and & o t Germany,
diplomatic recognition of
the i t i t may be lm
The AoBrlcan naval
has racaivad Jt1 jraport t t a t 25
Czech technician^ a r e in Cuba
v,vtctag the Cubaji uiiJltaJCy
CH t b * weapons already delivered
frojfl the Soviet b l o c , th* t o t a l nLuibe.r ol si^ch. ttchn ic ia na
probably will eventually reach
a much higher figure<H a.nd more
mi l i t A. r r equipment probably
w i l l be sent to Cub*, Further
u n i t e of the Cuban c i v i l i a n
mllltifl ar* believed to tive
been lssudd Soviet bloo aruq
the week of 30 Octobar
Meanwhile, In h i s i n t e r view with Cuban j o u r n a l i s t s
on 34 Octobernot released by
TASS u n t i l the 2tb, vhCQ Cuban
chftrgBH of an Imhlno-at i h -

Hion were reaching a petit Kbroehchev again shoved hia reluctance to be drawn /.lcto \. too
precise a re i t s * * 11 Ot orof bis fi ju,iv

the immintnt flatahlistment oi

relations between
and ITorth Tlfttnnn,

OF IMMEDIATE IKTEBEST
PART- II

t e seel

the approval of trisTfortta

La.biese Govtrumeiit f o r
J

AHD

P*t* 4 of

I Of

CUEHEHT INTEU-IGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

threat,
la * reply to a r e quest to comment an frtmtenttitt
that the wimlne was Prely
ht said, he- 'Vould
tfich Statements
t s bfr
really symbolicFM For t h i s ,
be jsddo-d, i t is essential t h a t
" imperial is
t a ' t h r e a t of i n ter wept ionH1 wot oateriftliB*.
"Then tberewill be no &ee"d. t o
t e s t th* reality vt our s t a t e ment
"

a
units lere
uegr&*s of a l e r t .
on
of the- aray nayT **d
t i r force ord.*red sttyntiifl r e port* e?ary three hour?, h&d
a i r afid anvtl patrols were ins t i t u t e d in Tarious arenaT StAof th* iatfrroal military
network mere ordered, on 34-Dour duty. Rec.&anAissADce fllghtE irtre sadv on
27 and 28 Oetofte-r froa. Cuba over
the Swan IElands asd the Caatettilan. CA^ihhfraD
coastare^a
where the 1hlQvasi(Min forces t r e
assembled.

Although tha
Soviet
press his Taalntalnad a large
volime of -coanuent on alleged
U-3 plans for as invasion of
Cuba,
i t has Tilled h i l
on1 c l t a t t c m Jf ro

Cuban propaganda on November sua-ftstftd that the n&xt

vf th* reginue will he- to
that the "imperijtliit
supported invastQD rorco-iM T e n 1
frightmifld off ifro& Bftfcinff their
attach, by the Cuban pripjrfatioikfi,
HoTTfrv*r, a Lftadiag: uambs-r of the
und-flrgroyed oppoEltion uoveuant
within Cuba rapottedJ on 57 October that the Cftfttro re-Eme la
planning t o stage &. b&obltiff a t tach i t s e l f on certft.jL.A Cuban t a r Vitti Cuban plane-* nirted
OuatekBrlan ip*ijniA + Thia
"attack111 would he ute-i to support Cubfm- propaganda
at hone
and! to "prove'1 i t * chargea
againfit tne United Stntfcfl cow
being di&ouase^ at th* United
Hations.

official

townentary. The- US
in Hofic-u-w saggtsta ttiis
r*f leet a wLsh not t o a
t h t Soviet public uniuly +

On the drnesflc scene ( th,a

Ck*tfo reg-imfr h put the Count r y ob A v i r t u a l TT4Jf fa*tA.agf t&
antieipatioift ol whtt tKo 6VORTuneot repeiCadly charges are
plans for an laatli-ent taTteioD
M
of -Cuba by TJS-aupported
counhh
te^r&volutionaTy
elements. On
30 QctGhe*, the Jiitiimal, d,lpeoOf the Cubitn m i l i t i a
on a l l oalft u i l i t i a u e n
ii the Hftvana .r** tg RBcemhLe
at designated poiats as p i r t or.
a "nfcttonH
taobillzation"
ts
the invta^i 1 *. Some n i l nbit* ware aent from, the
area te o t t e r points- in
ti-B countryd infl aBBftmblioB. of
nillitiamen took plac* in sany
t of t h * iElandn On 1 Moradio stationfe in thft
yit-gfid Cu&abs t o 4Obte
blood for "the OABualtlea of
a possibilfl imperialist invadon/

A possible ifi4it*ttoQ
- Cubaa. t a c t i c *
respe-ct to the US Naval &.sa at
<rMm.bta.DEH.iaoi Q>.y cams in in taterTiew fivtn by Fidel Castra to
m, UAH ne-wfliMrt. ffe- i s quoted
as saying Chat Cub^fe* ure u^t
such "idiots" as to t r y to
*eia;e< the base by force, mAtead, Cuba w i l l demand througH
tbe halted Nations

bean; tstillau.ninL.CD4atAl
on the Isle of Pises,

rr
III

. >

- .

OP IMMEDIATE IhTERCST

NOTES

PATTERNS

Pit* 1 0-f 21

AMERICA
Arni3

To Guatemalan Leftists
The Castro regime is giving financial assistance and!
intends to provide weapons to
the Guatemalan ComauniBt party
and, a Communist-infiltrated
Guatemalan revolutionary group,
according to a usually reliable
source with contacts among hig&
Cuban officials. "Che" Guevara,
with the approval of Fidel and
Ravi Castro, is eaid to have
given the Guatfllnajan groups
$15,000 last month On the condi
tion that the Guat^ma-LjLn Communists play the leading role
in the revolution -

Guatemalan President Arbeax, nor in Cuba, Is

to be tha "Havana representa
live" at tte movement * The
oal is the destruction of the
Guatemalan Army and the arming of tte "masses/1 as in
Cuba*

t
r
t.
*
*
t
t
t

4 Hov 60

DIGEST

Page

CUR-REST lUTELLIGliMCE WEEKLY REVIEW

3A HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RQfASEASSANIWED

1997

CUBA* DEVELOPMENTS

Observances in Havana Of
four more Soviet
tbo Analversiry of ft>e
l e f t &. Soviet port
Revolution include-fl a Special
otti 26 October for Cuba aboard
reception for tha- 5a*let nbasi- the freighter Arkhan(eiHk. Cuba
sador fiven by tha- frovernaantreceived perhaps
cOntrolled labor can Itderation
u n y as ten such helicopta-ra P
Had attended by high Cuban off A c A a LB . Amba a ea.doi' Jfv d ryavtseY
cohflrm ea.rpledged Soviet "aid and
for the Cubm revoluguns tivvt* beea. issuefl
tion, 1 '
to units of th* Cuban Arm jr.
Che Guevara, 04 the Moscow
leg Of his flve-aati&n Sino-Sovlet bloc economic passion, i s fued. a atateaent for the 7 November f estlvitief in whicb. heinplied a si*ili*jLty between
tbe early ptst-ruvolytiOnary1
4trog[ls
of the Soviet people,
n
the f i r s t in the ivorld to
fake
powerh in their own ba.mds^11 tad
Ciita jj Current fliperi^acea, hTe
addd thfct the Soviet
"supported us by your
t o th.* inpfiriBliBta^ thus 4t
t h e i r mach.ifia.ticjjj
Cub* . " Itosqov pr*J<
oi a reoflpt a>:b by
Dortlcoa auggegt* ft
Cubmq-Sovlet decision Co cLJL
t h a t Cutan nQbillaatioa &bd. the
Soviet rockt t h r e a t have so
far averted t h * ''imperialist
apfregsiob" t h a t A week aijo was:
decla red itnul nn t .

Ea.at

Pftul Verne-f, who atteadlsd the

Luitst party congress
l i s t Aitfuat, said Late l a s t
n&ntb that Cubn will probably
*
its
li

of closer Cuban - Bast

ecoqonle coop erati*n will hethoroughly esplored. in the
future
B n a probably r a f e r r i n j to thn schedtiHed a r r i v a l
of Che Guevara's economic
sloq in b a t Qerpany l a t e r
jtMttft &(* arly BextH - Cuban
J o u r a a l l t t a v l s l t l b f Est Germany on -4 November signed an
Agreeiifriit irlth ''East ^vrnan
Journalist
a" for cooper1* t i On i a
the " h 4ntl-lEiperi.alitt htrueel#'
to th* East
agency.
An Increasing number of
Cuban delegations are now
traveling in the 3Ino-Soviet
blooi pla b a l l e t troupe and a
"P*aCe novrjn.But delegation
in the USSfii jodnailiB
g
tlont Are visit(Qg EAst Germanj
and USSR; a laijof delegation la
In t t USSR; and a "health"
tlsajlon ta.a beeq ^1*1 ting Conuunlat Cbina and North Korea.

umtibly Cubans, being t m i n e d

in Czechoslovakia jnr bt,v4 bad
no1 j>rltr f l i g h t
p
in * undergoing primary
in p i s t o n - t y p e plane*H
to Cz+CbOBlOvakia for t r a i n i n g
l a s t JirtT And l u g u a t .

Iff I s Prague.

PAHfT 1

o r IMMEDIATE IPTI:RST

II

AND

Pag? 4 of

1 of 20

IKTELLWBWCE WEEKLY KEVlET

S November 1SC0

Grobart, si
cld veteran: of tba
Cdnjnun i * t UD'VHneiitj llvfiO i n

Cuba between 1&2< and LGSO, Re

a. Cuban Citizen in 1&36,
Tkich he WAB repeatedly
Afld. reliablp reported to be tbe
top Soviet fluent in th& Caribbean
He is known to have been
in the councils
of the
Cuhau Coaaunist*1 Popular Soc i a l i s t party. In 19S0, D e K a
emugeLfld out of Cuba, on 4 Soviet
vessel and alnce then fcaj presumably been in Fragus or Moscow.
Meanwhile, Cuba is apparently seeking to circumvent u"&
esucrt controls by expanding
trade relations with Curuadia
and Western European f i m s vbicb
could; provide cquipnent voa.va.ila b l t in tne blot at thlg time.
The- p-fgss b&a reported the negot i a t i o n of a dflftl under T?hicn a
"pool" Of Canndtun and British
flmDS would s&ll Cuba, aquipneot
and buy Cuban sufm md gasoline
the Jutter premumnb1j refined
Sro Soviet crude t the sponsors
fil th* "JJMJ&II' wjuldj rauortedljInvite Heat Buro-pejtn finns to
join.
A Canaatan Bunas^ officer
in BAvana told the U5 Bnbasey
on 4 NoveTDhcr t n a t th* press
s fronts wtre prgaunatly btted
the a c t i v i t i e s id Cut.* of a
di
promoter who l jfenown
to hive diBCkUjied such, a scheme
with Cu.b*tt edoijomic officials,
fke CauafliAn. expretigd an uafftTorfihlt opinion Of the pronotsr an4 dcubt&d: that Any "responsible" Canadiaa interest
TfQuld Join in the. aclttn*. flowe r e r , ha CQuld iio-t diJtOaiat the
pOAnllrilltr tbat Boqa independent distributor iq lfljj*di
ba intr4td in

PART I

PART" II

Tne Cistro jefftna continuea

i t s a c t i v e pro-pijanda aypport
for leftiat-royolutioaarr ijroupt
in othoi< Lfttia American, count r i e s and to reportedly Aiding
aoae pf them tt.iteri&lly. A u s ually reliable, gourc* with
tacts AttOnff h.lgt Cubaq effi
reports, for tnttnce d that C
Gu#vArnh with t h e approval ojf
Fidel and Haul Castro, i s givins
f IjunCiil asaittance im$ inteud.*
t o provide wetfons to t i t Qua
temalan Comnuqiit party And 1
Couunui]ist-infiltrated Gvntenalan
revolutffroarj flfaup on the condition tbat thft GunteuBLlAD Communists- play the leading rols in
a. revoluttca detlgaed ta dastroj
th* Ctiatcmalan Army and mm th#
Husarji. Fornier Ouatema 1 au President Ai-beat And flu a t em* inn Communist leaders Portuay and
Pellecer rjow are in Cuba and
re-portedly are involved in tne
Plot

sudden resurjjfrnco of
l e f t i s t influeqt* in El Salvador
a f t e r tb* 3Q oet^twr coup could
lead to a. aitu&ticn eaailr *rploited by tfifl Cuban* and Qou:ld
become a serious tbrht to
Gudtiulan t,Qd othr Central
overn**" f s <
Co*tii Rle* reported, t o Pre-sit Sftraoza that an officer at
t o t Cuban Embassy in C*5tn Rioa
had premised military ai4 to
the Nic^raguaa revolutionary
movementr
Cuban p r o t e a n da media flouto attack Venezuelan Prevident Setaaccurt, aa4 to stippot-t
extreme l e f t i s t and.
opposition t kia
CotHhuniat and,
PArtiea ao<t ttt<
la Braailj Arfftu.tina> (
otii*r countrteii hay* publielj
declared th.#ir Support for Caatro

IMMEDIATE IHTEREST

NOTES

5 Of 0
1 Of 20

CURRENT IttlELLiriENCS

1390

i.ij recent wcfcka. and a usually

reliable Brazilian student

source reports tbat the Cuban
&ibaeay in Rio de Janeiro orEauiaed and ftuanced the proCaatro d emona tra t lost there on
4

Peruvian' concern over tta* r e ported infiltration ot CutUrt

agents into1rtelgfcbofi n.fc E4ufrdor,
The Cubans purpoee^a Are said,
to be to cause d 1 stu,rt*atee

the ullitLl in Santiago Province

has been notably tnprored in
discipline and effectiventseand concludes that i t la probably capable ot supprtaan *ny
rebellion or Jh vis ion by oc-unterrerolutlona.rles . Saleotfrd
ailitiaBeo XT* being formed, into unite to fiAndla some of the >
more complex w4-pi5ns suoh n
antiaircraft ftftlllery received
froa the Soviet bloc.

during the Lest^tr-f^t^i.CXa conference scheduled to Open la

the Eoua.dorean cfcpAtal next
Kirch and .to ftLippcrt ,. Ecuador' position in ite border
dispute with Peru.
Ea.va.aa coatinuta to
strengthen i t s militfcff

the
civilian militia, on the pretext Of ptopftring for an &ttncfc
by " imperiii 1 ist-baclted
couaterrevolutionnrlea. 11 A usually
reliable eOurce resident in the
cf Santiago revert* that

"

PART }
PART If

CoBBiunist penetration ot
tb.3 ullltia.^ nyobftbl
io adjutant ai a nilitAry dist r l c t Instructed a 4ubdrdinate

that, In ojf<l&jr t o Organize the

m i l i t i a in hf zone, he snould:
Tartioufl military and
lndRH, Includ.ia.ff leadera ot th* Popular Sociallat
)

OF IMMEDIATE 3HTE&EST
NOTES fl.tfD CUHirtTT4T5

Pas* 6 of S
1 of

GENERAL

jaat Garnany and Cuta Establishing

Cultm-itT Tl&a " ""
Six Eafit Getfoan
rectors, who bad attended it
erencv0 I D Kexlco, vent to Cuba,
la September is official guests
of the Cuban Education Ministry,
according to a usually reliable
source* On its return to East
the delegation reported
a.gree*ata had been concluded with Cuban educational
organ!stations callltifif for the
East German Advanced School for
Economics, to send teaching and
correspondence-course material
to the. University of Havana and
to the directors ot the Cuban
Communist newspaper
The Cubftoa reportedly expressed an intere&t in further
agreements and contracts providing technical personnel,
l
teachers, study pl&QBt
other teaching materials
Appropriate &.st Geripan offices
have been instructed to review
tbelr teaching aiit*-riala for
translation into Sp&aieb.. Aa__L

^*^^

L^L

_|V

^F u

JU

up by the Cuban GoveroneDt hae

*lri.dy beoo seat to East Berlin
for consideration*
Panl Turnert a
member of East Germany's polltburOj Apparently spent tvo
moDtbs ia Cuba, this eummer and
evidently ms.de some progress in
his reffine*s drive for expansion
of economic tad cultural relations and diplomatic recognition.
"Che" Guevara, t&e ComMunlet
president of the National Bank
of Cuba, is scheduled to visit
East Berlin later this year.
Along with other blqc countriest
East Germany is expftndJing trade
and supplving technical aid and
has agreed to construct several
cotnplete industrial installations in Cuba, The talevlgion
services of &.st Gernany and
Cuba concluded an agreement in
A^G^st providing for continuoug
exchange

j^_

of a culutrai agreenent drairn

ak HISTORICAL RBflEJN PROGRAM

RELEASEASSrWITlZED
1997

14 Nov 60

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

::
I

INTELLIGENCE 1EEKLT RETIEl

23

, - ' . - - .

' < -

'

tt HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1997

THE CMSAS

A* the CfcBtro
tlnuej to strragthtn And
It* police t*t control, i t i s
th.t on* of Ltt
i* tb* ntlitia.j, a
of soak* JJ(J j. iiCi(J "voiunbeing orgiinlzed with l a ffi?ianicy throughout
the Island. Organizationally
d i s t i n c t fron tha regulftr hntfdl
force>, this militiJt ia equiv-

FAflT I I
. Ill

on a population tM-lll to

a 5>600>000-nian

organiaa-d. a?to*
g
CoiBBaoist urjing late lust year,,
the ailitift bAs gRoin BhTkedly
in rACftnt weeks I.B ft rcult of
the officially inspired "war
s p i r i t " of lute October, l i e
threat Of An "iBBlnent i

Page $ o)t 13
1 af IX

INTELLIGENCE tKEUT
1S60
fr&m t h e tfnttod S t a t e s wa* used
t o J u s t i f y a. n a t i o n w i d e uphill
satioaandaa Intensive train lap
prOfric to *repare "tha people."
fa r e s i s t "imp?riiiList agr*Bion." Altbouffh the ao t i l 1 t*.t ion
aad "the defenso of our resolu- r
tion by tha &cniJ,a.liBt count rl**'
not art credited *ltli barlny
{?t the inmedlj-t* threat

ttn) prennLutlan of a. a
l e syaonyBUHLS with "the
ol th* p e o p l e ^ ,n obje
Co*auU*t And p r o thraughout Latin
i s a aecesttkry
ji
of a Bucc43sfol jftvolutioa
d
oust be accoapanlen by the deEtructt&n of the regular
d
f
i

Vhile ttw bulk ttt militia

hotlt on and ytmen-i r part-time n i l l t*ry traifilqs *Dd politc*l ini
*. hard ctfxt is
full-time duties nortta responsibility of the

ire be-inf tratiie-4

ift a r t i l l e r y , are
to tiriyfft.cture antilad other slctilaf
objects^""aad are operating tt
leut sow of the

tub* a MlLltla

t HOTJB o f the:

of invasion, tfca mUitLfc continue* t o be strengthened.

t Ifloa oetwot-t.

Caban

i n orgftpiifttl&a Abd
to
that of Corauulet Cfa
1*
not
only A force for police
but A Bane of Subject lac a.
pumber of Ciiftapj to llita.rr
di9clplln Rnd p o l U l c t l lndoctrisatlOfi. the militia Also
provide^ the reside vitb A cbep
labor force mTbilei It reduces the
threat of Bilitlcil
HtBBiniine ffOB Cuba's
serious unemployment p
It could also trove valuahla
the lees
penetration is
at all revels of tb,
In COmpqMDlBt

PART I I

Aim

Uvftuvhlle, the econoaiic

ulaaion beaded by
arrived tn Peipls? ou IT
bar after r^cfliTiff
e
*ttDtlon ipd lavish prititt
earlier BtOfV in fragu^ J-nd
In Pilplnf^ Ouevar
an "intioat*" talk with
-tuDST on lfl Hfrvftraber *ad ..
bailed -Couunist Chtnfc for i t s
of bur bewhorn
addlitnc: that
"S3 rears of
si
...has revealed
n.
n.tnt
road
for
tJta America**11 Aftr a tour of
a Cbinvoa
Gueara
that "the
from.
to
the p e o p l a ' s
and mil
the
b

Raj* fl of

CRET
August

sc NO
Copy No,

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
REVIEW

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

OFFICE O f CLWHtNT

B*CT

v///////////////////^^^^

W'%7.Sift//

,;

TOPJ&ctfET Diptffr
C1TRHBHT HTrfiLUGBPCE "VBELY

1BB4EIL

ud.den resignation of
d
fron th* Br*Blllaa
on 20 Aufuat ha* precipitated a constitutional .
CTllim because o* the td***nt
Oppoaltion of far Mid later
Vvnja nd other military leaders
to the assiim.pt ioa of QuadroB1
power by l e f t l e t Vies hPresident
Jofto tioulart. Gaulart B right
to succession h u U*ftn supported
Od constitutional frouitdB by
nest political Leaders and a
aLnority of the UitAry, partfc:ularl_ lower *! Minister Lott
&Ud Uw cQBmUEidor of t i * 1powertvl third krmj in aoutiem - Bra-
H i . On 31 August,
l l

the

lutioa to
lato

tb* or*loffice
form at
ltb , prime

ty
* period of
tanaloa with tha
ovet
hti policy/ of cloaar
With bloc countvte*, And fen
DutbuTHt of public Criticlas
for btvlsg ffiveq Brazil's
> latest decoration to Chs
0uv*r. The prec].
tloaB of -bis Impulsive
E
tttto B.r*3 however, a t l i l unclear'
if hv ins counting on
being w*pt bftck rruickly into
the prea^deocr 'by a wave of
public protect, h* froatljr
iajudged public opinion.
There were a auaber of Initial
expressloaa of diaaa7h bjjt the*idepretld aubaequent reaction
Criticism, at Quid
TOM f.Or :i
.ct ing lrraaponalbl} 1 in the
f*CB_of admitted JiffJCultieH.

ros
An effort t*
publ1c
opinion
la bia faror j
iitinpr1 h-i* rflflifnation to Us
pressure. Such 1
night; toCS off intl-TTS

31 Jtu& Cl

tr.tlona on a largev i c i l t thn

thoaa lBMdlBtelr i^llowlag his
refllgnation L
OQUlay th a Career

Hie 43-y^Fttf^dljd . "Jangu"

Soulart cgcntt from n ^ell-to-d
backfrQuqd Lit ths state of Rio
Orande do $nl, of which bis
hrutlver-it-l*w, Leone 1
1B eurre-htly governor,
tna> thtfllksLcvr o f h i e nationalpolitical ctreer In ISM,
warn a i>rotsg* of Prealde^
and vac generally, regarded
political Jteir when Vargaa co* i t t e d suicide in August lmS4r
ttdHit had tried particularlj
to build! up labor Support QT
binaelf, cooparatiag in a nunbav
of ways ith the Communists for :
this purfioa, Ullitary reaantBcnt
of his lftit Vi** ftnd varied
a c t i v i t i e s as *lnl4t*r of l*bor
tad. caual hl fovC+d rvslgoAtlon
froa Vargas' cabinet in February
IBM
Supported by bll own Brazilian
Labor t a r t * add Ssveral other*,
and accepted *s running ante b?
the popular K/ubitacaek; Qaulai^t
worn the vice-presidency is the
L95i election had further
strengthened hit political
organisation during EubltscbekrB pYesidrncr. In the 1900 election both
be nd his presidential running mate,.
*S-mr ITlnlstar Lott. r*teived
Cowauniot endjorsett&At,
B djoleat*4 Quadroa1 running-mate by
a. coaaiderably
snallor BftryiD than
Qutdraa1 edge, over
ts president

to Jceep Goulhrt at ara'a

g
polttLcHly but sent hi* to th
Uflaa and ConouniBt China a few
weeks ago on ha official v i s i t r
During hi* Chinese v i s i t ,
went out of his wky to praise
successes of B*o Tse-tDng and the
Chinaaa

P*E* S of 30

ffEEKLT BBVlBft

CURREHT

4 taps beffinniBg with a TOte

aj*inat anj
dison d
cussing
the
i
h China admission
issue at the forthcoming UN
General Assembly, Ihile in
Pelping. he completed A trlde
agreement eaLling for trade
of $231004,0010 *ftcti wiy
Concern f o r CHJEJ t l tu t icmJtll t r
The reaction of Denys and
the two other ferries iniBtena
to the prospect pf Goulhrt's
wielding Quadras' pow*rB W*B
a na.turi.1 consequence of
touUrVa past career and
general reputation i t * poLttiCil . opportunist, Trail as
tbe growing concern in Bra^'
iilian military eirtleB aver
QnH-dTos' policy on closer
rl*tion.& v i t a t n t tcunnrLLnist
bloc , llue-h. of the- Support
realpnation nirwit
not to h.Ia
political aop*tl but to the
general feelqrnuch Btrcmger
in Brazil than in nost Latin
Jlnerlcan cauittrlvvthut conBtitutioniLity sh^Mld be r e spected in ticies of c r i s i s L
Hilitai-y leaders f i r s t
soughti a I t t a l *olution -whereby Congt*** tfould amend
the
constitution to Trtu1 foul art
froa office and provide for ah
acceptable -uccssor. A conatituticBil apHndaetit can be
prapoaed hy one fourth at
either c h a f e r And beconea
law i / pas>d in two aucceastT4
votes hy two thirds of tHe
t o t a l nemberehip of each house
Of CoojreBB, Congi-eeaiptn
B.pi*rently f e l t ; bo^tvtr, that
harrinf Goulart would, offvnd
the popular Brazilian feeling
l l l

31

61

Moreoverh the
Constitution provides that if
bath tbe presidency and the
Tice presidency ahouLd be vAchted
during tbe first half of * presidential term, tltctlons must be
held1 within SO tfys, *hile auch
elections would normally appeal to
many of Brazil 1 * political leadtrt
most of the apibitious nen with a
food chance at U10 to-p post now
hold poatu which would bar the*
froa tHcopLins; presidential candidates within the next several
Constitutional precisions bar
from. casdida.cy those who have been
governors or cabinet ministers
within six mohth* of the electiond
as we LI as "a President who u y
blue ejeercited the office for any
time in the terra immediately
preceding.V "
React ioria Atroad

Latin ABtrlcart public r e actio-o. to Quadrca1

haa i^n*ctd aluoat
aurpriae, accopnled by a nuaihei1
of paj-allels drawn b-y the preaa
betweenh thJL* Tcnt and President
Vargas suicide in 194. Except
from Cuha, there hfts thus far been
l i t t l e commentary on the question
of the presidential succession.
President
who hat f*ced growing
B t
rijhtUt oppooitlon to his proC t , leftist foreign policy in
wflekBh Including some
plotting aga.iaat hia

is

4l4nwd by

' acTTSnna^Teflra th*t

in
ciRcunstances in Ecuador
might force bin. out of office.

ave 4 pronounced
vffect in Jtcuadoi- 1)*C#TOBQ of the

1TKKLT KETI -

Papa 10 o f 3p

OPJEdtET

Dj/NAR

CUHR5HT IHTEliLIGENGE WEEKLY RBVIE*

political-military
la tin* two countries,
The Argentine Government, which
recently confronted sharpljr
adverse reaction* from, its
Military leaders wHfrri Cuba's
economic czar Che G
visited President Fr
iauried lately after hi a
mith. Quadros in Brazil,
maintained, a. cnutlo.ua reserve
on the Brazilian situation.
One official characterized
retirement and its
as prlaftrily an
internal Brazilian ffair,
Th+ Mexican qoveRiiMnt, which
alonf with Ecuador and Brazil
baa followed policies ; favorable
to the C**tro reglm.*.
United it* comments o
zilianflcvtiL-opnentBto
lity
A H thret
l l presumably
their Cutn-liiflplrefl
p J
to B&diato the "Cuban1*3 piFDbleii'1a pRoject which.. I
n u
Cutsion alnc#.rly June r
r

The Castro regime baa

attributed QuniroB' resignation to prepare* from tht TJS
ftirf bramled i t *B prt of th*
PS "Iperlal,Htn plot to t n Clrcle and iaolftte Cuba. Th*
Cuban react itju re fleets considerable concern aver t h t loss
of one of. it* principal friends
in tbe heiiisohere. In a public
address an 29 Augustj Castro
urged the Brazilian people to
"ttike up inut, , , and taJee to the

Doustalna add JunEleV' to fight

the military leader* iho are
trying to keep Vice Prtttdent
Coul*rt from becoming pr^fcident,
The Brazilian Comauftlst pH"tr,
whifih. Irto often collaborated
with eoularth haa {tn#T&lly
Kept in the background during the
past fem- days but has
decided to agitate if
for his return to the country^
aild access ion to tht presidency.
Both Moscow and P*ipingh
following a line tlnilAr to that
of Cuba, have plttCad the respossib i l i t y for the Brazilian situation
on "imperialist" PS mfcehinatlons
de^lfnVd to oust a 3ta.tv4BAn who
Fa attetaptiraa: to free hia country frorni the P5 "aK>nopu-liatieM
and "colonialict 1 ' yoke h and have
also denounced the efforta
of
"reactionary' element* to block
fiouLftrt.
LQC-H-I Situation

Many aspects of th* Situation in Brazil are j t i l l fluid

&nd confuaed.
Denys on 30 August
relieved the Third AR^T -coimander,
General Wachadp JLqpe*, but ordera
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ h a v e been issued in
Hio Grande to arr*t *ny officer
tent to relieve lUchftdo Lopea.
Early on 31 Auguat a gofernsent
connunlqae announced that the
Second Any, with *ir und naval
Supporth had und*Rtaken an
"action In fc^ce-" flg*iasX
Cr*nde do Sul,

TOP
3i

Au*

ei

RETIEW

Pare

11 of 30

E3VED m BHIKE1994
CIA HISTQRE^i l?e.EW PROOUM

TITLE:

Counterintelligenca In Counter-Guerrilla
Operations

VOLUME:

H. H.

ISSUE:

Surraner

YEAR:

1963

STUDIES
INTELLIGENCE
A comedian of articles on the historical, operational, doclrinal. and Ihcorehcal asped* oi

All traiemcnts of faa,-opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence arc ihose of

the authors. Lhcy do no1 necessarily reflecr official positions or views o f ihc Central
^enc^ or any other US GovemmerU entity. pasl DT present. Nothirg in the
should be conslrucd as asserting or implying. US Government endorsement of an
article's feciual statements and interpretations.

Guerrilla mttUigtnce, uwyr to

combat itt ond
p
rott$ in counter-guerrilla
fan.

COUKXERHNTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-GUERRT1I
VL H.
If one b to become proficient la counter-guerrUU open- 1
tknu,1 on* must prepare by learning TOTythlng there Id to
knew about guerrilla openUnm. it foUom that If on* Ifl to
bftpoow knewiedgeabto Id the ipeclalt? et countHimemgue
in oDunter-guetrfliA opemtloru, ooe must know tbt olsjtlves,
organlietlonii p&ttatis, and m^du* cpenndl at tjpitnl guerrilli Intelligence. X% will be comforting to thn coujqterguerrtlJa lnteLL%Ke offlcer to know something also of the
c4tuit#rjjiteU!gno meUiodlg employed Is^ guerrlllu, io the tWnt ,tl4ftt they have a methodlaii counterlntfllil|emt
Intelligence
Intelligence needstheir Essantlfl) Elements of Infarmirtion-^differ from those of
fQECU?

For CODTUkUDDEl fOTCU It bftt] long BI1

doctrln* that tbe division commander n&fa ta know how

many battalion* of Infantry, mrtlllerj, or armor are on his lm-

mwliate tmat, how many a n within reuaiocting dlstuw, and

how lonr would It Uk# Dor retnforcHneflU to vrirt In tupporting posttlonx. He wants a l addition^ order-of-hatUe tnfonnaUon such A* t h e Wentltiea of uuiti and conunanderi.
He $Hk$ ftnawtrm to such queationfl as vheUter the en#my jj
going to attack, irtaert, when, with how many tnttaliocu, and
with what objecttres, vhtfaer be will defend b pcotUon and In
strength, whtthw he will uritlidrtw and whfln and
1

Hot* thit Ihli mrtlele la coolUud atnctlj lo tb*

jp*ct of tbebro&dcr comMpt *irua(ftr
eurrentir
DUlt ID

C1 m

whither, such EEI stem from the objective of conventional

warfareto Impose one's will on ttie enemy by whatever force
Is necessary.
This tttRbifestlv Is not BJid cannot be the objective o( fcuerTUIA narfar*. GumUJ&a" objectives Arc to haiou, weaktn,
decwnlizcH disrupt: they cannot hop* to tain, ware against
massive conventional forces. Their EEI item from these obkjaow .ajhotit HMWOiattt ot jmall con*.
J AddlroofTclachQenta h their timing and UfeuTout&L
Th*7 must toon Intimately the terrsln along such loatts to
select good points for amfeufh or attack, Thev tnut b u v
the tfdntin ofTerlng mpproachem to then points and pwtftle
routes of wlthdfftwil ftom tha. Thy have to know bow the
convoys and detachments axe armed and protected.
Moreover, the guerrillas must know In detail tha complete
layout of installaUons like fortified vUla^u, supply/ dumps, and
command posts which Uwy art QlOK to Attack, their deJenjdre stnicturej and th itrength, tactical pra^tic*!. and weapon* of the C^sVdS. what booty/ the trurtmllatlons offer, and approaches and withdrawal routed from them, They heed Intimate knowledge of rail Unes and roads mid of bridges and
other critical points en them suitable for sabotage or attack
from unbuOi. Their tn&in concern with the kind of inielllg e n needed bj canrentlorial forces U lor defenflfne
they seek Information on movements of major entmj
to be forewarnftd of enclrdementG or sweeps of their base 01
bivouac Bleu.
What are the wurcea (or these kinds of Information and
v h a t aart of inteUlgtnce or^nnUatlOD ti formed to procure It?
In their e l j fortDttlve period^ at least, most guerrilla hands
of the past have bad no formal lnt*lli*ne orgimlzatroa;
many of their leaders b a n not bad the sophistication tven
to harbor a conseknis concept cj Intelligence^ The FAthan
brtbeanen on the Korthw$t Fktmtier f old India, whose main
Jport sod Urellhood h u for centuries been the ambushing (rf
cararans In mountain p a s m and tthtj Oak* suerrULm'type attacks on their neighbors In th* conduct of blood feuds, might
be called natural **p*rt* At fuentna Warfare, They rtabUy dont eft down in council to organize Intelligence
tlon forces Of process collected information; but you

-t..f

r-

a ^

CGW

imagine ft tribesmAH EkulMng nigh up on a mountainside,

cajnouftaged by natural coloration and his tloth, hatching
canvut routes btlow for great distances MM! tfien, by runner
or Blgnaic, parsing the word to his fellow* that It Is time to
get Into position far Attack. Despite Jomo Keny-tlA's education In London And MowoW and the sophistication at severe
otter Klkuyu leaders In tbe Miau MAU guerrilla nctfcHU of th*
bitl%etc; but you do find nJetrauee to the (dvanUigie tha
"(inestet" enjoyed In knovtag tii* u e a better *iid hla "added
AdTBot4t of goool observation points both on tb forest fringe
u i d on the moorlcnd u e a x "
R^gatdJesa of Its lack trf forma] r>rjfftnlzatlonF
of anr vblch enjoyi anj success baa a
g
coUectloo agencythe people on the gitujund. If
th* guenillA movement In fact prlng3 from these people, If
It reprewmta a popular n q of reeling (^a4nst the government or occupying power, the people on the groundthe
peasant of coolie fArmerH the laborer, much erf whateTier middle CLBSSH then &19will *d InforniAUon to the guerrillas
spontaneously. As the guerrilla leader becomes expeHenced,
he wlU Improve on this spoutwieoiu flow by teaching tne people ftccuraqr In tlwtr reporting and by Instructing the most
Intelilgmt, trustworthy, and courageousffiTthem In what ba
pftrtlcuJirly needs to lenow and In how to make- observations
and Jteport them. He will also augment It with trained patrol*
bad with clandestine ftgenta, toe latter particularly for petietnUotu. E will work to ttnprore the speed, wcuracj, and
Aecurltv of Ute cammtiaiHtlotU by which this information
gets to him, whether by runoen,riijUAb*or electronic means.
In CcmananLrt prartJch pftftlcuuuly, If not all Uit pecpfe In
tlw area fully tuppest the gaerrlH* ffortt those who do not
be h&rMsel t j prewurea and If neccas&ry by tertorlst
and at fbe azne tbnc Indoctrination teams will exercise pettUAalan flm the populACt Ultlmattlj', as the movement grown, th* CommunLrt guerrillu wUl develop rather
Hftjoi P, W, R u t , C, Th* Sard IhbUUlllof nuUlm,
In Sfltfa.* 4nnf CUaricrtrn V&L 01 lOctobtr 1954 P,

CGW

sophisticated Intelligence requirements, organization, and pro.

ductlon. Intelligence documents Captured by the French
from the Ho Chi MLUi forces before the 1AM Geneva agreement lo divide Viet Nam Included remarkably accurate enterol-battle studies On the French unite and Other situation reports, Eummsjies, and ettUnates of a high caliber.*
The guerrillas' prlmaiy source of Intelligence 1B then the
In which thXfuerrltlb fldilwiffir^Ttae EUetrlUa
effort may be mnythlnf from a primitive. Instinctive .ctlvilv
In the catuai hand of the teaser to fuDv organized work under
a true Intelligence staff Section aX the main bate or redoubt
Collection fadlltEes can run the gamut from the spontaneous
reporting of haphazard Information to a system of patrols, ob*
serration posts, aurvelllancc teams, sentries, ctandestina networks, penetration agents, prisoner Interrogations, and technical lntelligencer Communist-directed ptttrrfHas will tend toward the sophisticated, the more BO the longer they operate
then, Ls the Uitelligenct target. Uw problem confronting the counterintelllgenoj organization of any counterB^ierdlla force, How does that organization go about Its ta&
of slopping, disrupting, manipulating, or Degating the Intelligence operation* of Uit
tht Fitkfrom their Sea
Certainly It appears from this anatyals that the greatest
single probtam U that of jrtopplng the flow of Information from
the people on the ground to the guerrUlu There Is a choice
of two approaches to this problem. The flrrt is to move the
people fram lie gucrrtUa areaparUcul&rly the peasant or
coolie lumerq, but al all th* populaUon of small villagesto
relocation center* where thev bare nelUief accera to lnfora, K, TUnrnrn. Doctrine mad TacOct oj Rrvolittionaiy
VUt Ufnh in Iniothtwt,. R*ad
A U T * 7 ot HHUU toAterlkti m SMPTlIla intaUlfcccc U
u Kb appKuJlx to thu paper.
* 0am* DuneDt ttJ of confurtm m dtlunittaf the t*4fc of
lflUHIe>iwt with n ^ e c l t* Uut at poaitfT tattillEwoee SJWI tlut
of HimteMmuiftbt mctium i n dlseiuMd in a oot ipp#ndBd to
thU t

MI CGW

mutton nor contact Mtb the guerrillas, Tbe stcond Is a cnusire application of normal potlce/cotintertntelllgenct prowdures-^delectlng and Identifying the people that supply Inforamttan to gucmUajH their guerrilla contact?, and their
couriers, courier routes, letter drops, or other means of commtuilcatlcm, and then taking eJtiVr the defensive steps of appreh*rj,dingr interrogfctlng, n d Imprisoning these people or the

/WjaatoMpaentJrtteratbSFKrotrjBSces fili^ enough, but it must

be otvlou* ttut carrrtng sitber on* out Lj an absolutely stagTbe r e t o u t l w method ti not an InnoTmtton; It h u beerr
demoiutnttadl that It can b* tffecUte, Tbe Russians, for xample, hare proved the harsh effectLveoeu of atom d*portaot population la tbe Baltic states and rtsewher*. TA
the BrltLsh-UalATUi Security Forces carried out more
humane and limited relocation operation^ combining these
with other fornu of action tc cut oft the Communist Terrorists
from contact} Trith the people, not only for wunterintellipurpoKs but to present their gettLa^ from then food,
i, and other klncU of support,1 The French undertook
rather massiTt rtloCfttlon tfforts tn Algeria, wher* whole new
tamt, with Khootat medical faclliUes, thopi, water supplies,
and all requirements for living were created, adiuinisteretit and
guejrded hy the French Army. At present relocation operations are being carried nit In South VJet Nam along the
Laotian border.
4

fht Conduct 0/ Antt-tfttrM Gptrattoru fti Malaya

Of UM BfitUb (l*tr AUHjia) b n q (3td editJofi, 1S.
tiion "bfldjflnUl")J chapter m , WCUJHU S {ATOAI FUitJ o/1
J^iiHty forwii utd 4 lrA *rtf /Vui) r Thla 1* bejroDd
th* tert eoont*r^u*rrilU ejHratloxia HUADUII u t n t tt 14
bT KHDBrtndeatftBf COW that th* p*cul|#t ttradJttoH
Malar*tt* CWntt "minotitf C*imMb u nuiiuxwiu M
MUkjaiu} tMtlftff UM d e u o i t mpportinf the CTa rmtlwr Utfcn
rhol* pojWJUon. u d the drc*slxEtinD of filiU pjreniiMnt,
tercet, UHI DUUU17 hncet bctnf 10 Uniquely BritishmUt K
vtliA tat anpllcatloD lHvher*; hut It dlitUla *rwn nun?
of ejtperienee great txatuat tft pncUul fUl<iu>cfl on
which Is elHrir appltc*IA* W P**C * the world

la
tbe
thfl

not

Cf m CGW

fcrfll undoubtedly continue to be situations when relocation la *n essential step in counter-guerrilla action. Some
of It* aspects are completely outride the competence of untericteULgEnce (oreesthe construction of housing for the
people the prevm of food and water, sanitation and medical care, and schools, the mounting of Indoctrination programs to change the loyalties of the people, the stationing ot
-

force*. Other aspects;

genet responsibilities.
First Is the painstaking process of checking the tna Ada
o* titt pespb: Eoorad to the relocation stteh dttcnnluliig that
they art not guerrilla espionage agent*, active member* of the
Communist Party, en working tor any other sutTerslve orguiitatiofl. This ent&Us a requirement b&sic to all couxiteriDteUh
geiwe operationseffactine recorda. The vetting snd name
tracing ttilt la a very large one. To approach It practically,
one must begin with personnel who haw been gi?en any official position w responsibility, with especial emphasis cct the
tenter's security forces the police and KLr-deterua forces,
then the clrii officials. When Wrtte have been vetted, the Job
of checking the population at large can be attacked,
CounteruitdLlgence personnel bust draft or be consulted
hi the drafting of plan* lor control of the population
Identity efijij, travel perniits and controLs, curfew, neighborhood or block registration and control systems, the selection,
and training ct personnel for these, etc The development of
an informant net is an essentlAl step in counterintelllgetice
control; it fortu part of what Eric Lambert. BrLUsh Ml-fl police assistant Jtafj officer, ipealdnr fnnn the BriUati expulIn Malaya, and Kenya Colony, calls the "police intelLtnet at tttf village lewL" rJgetber, the block reglstrftUon system and the informant network form one of the most
effective means of defensive oaamtertntelUgenoft, detecting the
presence ol subversive or espionage agents and Identifying
them and then- contacts.
In, the altematfrt metltod used to ihut off contact between
the fuerriUu and the peopte In ttw atea, the cotmterintelllgene* t**k is probably even more dlflJcult than in relocation.
This was the method u n d by the FUlpinos In the CommuntBt-

- '.r.

O fa CGW

controlled Am knc^n u "Hufclandlm/1 and Jt vorked. Colette]

Napoleon V&leriano, tbt officer of the FhillppLn* Annj who
primarily responsible for dwrtoplnp the "Battalion ComTurn" i n i "Hunter-Killer Team" technJqu** employed H
aucttarfully ID destroying the HulEbftUntpd on Luzon, dettiibes elements of the cotmterinteLUgeitce aspect or the opHour twin* (EamWiud IBB It 0 CompanT) with lidl* Mb vet*
oTBItahed, cttuLitlnff of Ac to tight men, wltb UK rtfifcing
la nbMflB. U U r *1 Urcre ttunj p| Uw nitt" COHIJKHIUOII
ddHL AttigDHl uiutoiu mi* Ttzied. but atoottiity th*
were ft^nlrcd to pnetrmta tilt rasptct ire* twrctlr and rtporl gH
Dbttrrattoiii OQ til* ioluUtuiti b / raJifl. Contact I'rcnuentjr *
now werj otfaHT bcur DH tlu hw.
Q-t rmttd bouH In the
t**n n( Pindl u d bleed & flunllr to eupf tha twiiw U cer
for MZ3 opcntlTes. Th* littn gnup t u M*lned to COKI
i Uu mtiaklpal ttceutlft Ukd the torn chief of
hth) lUapect ty &S.
at ttrt teupowr fluptnujliiii ^C the mit vH hibeij
corptu In EtuclKodla d o n 1S, it "M poifkbln J Ihc Tib BCT
to deUin (aspect) luddfluttlr. Od tba ttnarj tht tft* populict
Art subletted. t deep-covared "trrn(HniJF1 It v t i tecomnvondtdr
thit Mranl IbdMdUlv be "toitctud" iAd broubt lo TO) ECT
HQ for UMmpUHi, hopbir tt** th* indJndBMji, after
of th* piflleetlTe uurttTfl of ttt* lavenuneut
kodUnf. Will be mmde to tell Qua truth ftbout FutdL
Tlw recuiii*nfl*lloiu wetB ipprflrBfl MM! pfttioprttte orderr

The tttmi wen a,hle kr nutCh DO ItU Uuo 00 lodlTldtMb

dUftwat pgttati ct the B * mithout bebat delected t r tb* tnmblULQtH flmplctonj (tew mort about bidden paver of tlM Huk*
In r > s a > la no MtnAii cue dtd tb tujor or th* chjaf of
Kport U K ajappemtmew ttt tbfr PO c hi tb 7ttt BCT.
With *DQ4 tfvatmtDt utd CnqiHUC appctta to tha
{Itie OccretUlr of fftJmul Dtfemc partlolf atlDi) (ad, bate; Thlft
WtM Or, Utftarvty. later Ptmttrkat ot Uu FtUUpplnn] to epBrm.tc
wltn ttu* fOfenunent mod prvnUttt at taooeitif wwtrd*, Uu
eve&huUr a i m tqi with vUrUlnf infbrmatleHi.
all datainw upeM en tbdr Jrtr of Hut Mprloalt,
m m detuiH4l&ftiit| Won nSSoe^ tMck to Oflld t t u u
PIJHU fot lwldcmttoo or confldmuildq, Theae lafomtr
were eanfuttr rUmflflxl u d ana&kftd lubd commred wlti

Cl rn COW

p u t inleUlftrK Dies u t v bock u 1HJ_ Out of u palDBtakjne

effort, 8-1 M I tine to establish tft* following infelllfTDce p*llni;
m Find! wa important (4 W Huk DrfanlutJDiu In JLusaq
due to IU prvidmlty tc tti* city of HutiJ*H thr canter Of underground appanltui of the OwmmtCd*t Pmrtj of We counter.
*lf Thtrtfoi*. It M Itoportut tfaftt PtDdl ibonid ftot catch
til* i t t n t l n Of the AST PC; u pot l ta rarrttgned
bj Mae AFP iv Fp, tbt U u ramt bt lipt ^uRF' tecbor
It V H euumEmlj IciHvn to the art* Uut Hijt tewp
trfcllDfia ATC prohibited, la Ui* u u , the m t , q K
matter of [tat. U iqppoKd (4 be voMtd hf taiidtq
rtondOfl WO be dl Uuvufbj fvpplj tj#nta ipecUlcU
pointad bj UH UiiDlclp| s t y r . Direct tfprouh to
or luhthjtaiili u putklahmhle hj fltt^
149 Hlik WBmrfefl fufltlni dejlrout to uek fheltet ID
FlftdJ mint irtt *t proper jKnnitckiD from Unit p
vho In Him *111 mate Hropm: unBgcmeutft with FtwdJ
(horlttH.
15! Hut AKrtera tnnllSc ta nr (nia HtlnUa reLe hriel
Ing* from fiwll Huk tntelUfenc* offle*ri on current vltuntfoiu
Of their dtiUiwtlou, u e (lTtn JHH WOTIK And eurcbied on
new C0UJlt*iMtaca.
it} PajwU tDAtMtmntf H u t b t d b D judged
f
j
or i e c * l c L l n n t a m not dJJclpUHd w i m m t h e munlclpt] rea r
but i n b y Inof p n t c t l w aeepeUjf U d n i p p o d a n d Uilci outaldc

of Pandl. Erreral lnBUncti wn dted hett Uu major 4d

Iht poliu chief coiuplrtu. In the kJdnip-murder of indhlduBii
th>t mrt ordered! punlaiied by toe Buk filah commaDd.
(7) DurlBf the jwat J u n . HTraJ PC ttrrlnm were all and
Oa malnUlnea LQ Fajidt ttlt btetiiH o( thtir tmmil mlze *JMJ
pW KCUtltj eonM tail? have been Wiped Obt t y 1*J Hukl.
ThflH firrtKU Irtre left unmoleJUd ta mlileiLd,
on tb* i n i .
(St H U M at Indltlu2i wen nbolUted H u U n Huk
4fDU In FUHlL. itartlng off with Uu mujv't m , pollcenun, rfcH u d praapgnam burineanaun, eU.
With acTeml BOhi atatuqeflU, etch atatemeut canohgntlnf
with othm, cdndnal acUD4U Were uubtated m l n s t ait Individuals
Cited Or inraJTcd,
Tbe UguMtUnn a( tfte Ptodl u o c t i u r j btok* the B,ak t n t
rfana
n w Manila, which In 1 llr^a way huntlm&g UuHr
ttldt actliUlci to tha CUJ infl UMIT Uaiaon and oontrol
8

a ^ ccw
Uxuea with tbeir iettTe Arid anlbi ID C*mtr*J Luxan. Twnl
Hitf courier, uuj vrffe bo tad from MinUt

tor

This kind of countertolelllcence effort resembles In many

respects the criminal Investigation methods employed hy the
police frgalnjft powerful crlmioil f&ngi who have the jnjppqrt
of large humbejrs of people, and for Uila reason and others the
police art likely In most conotrtu to tw t h e ^ w t effective,
agency for carrying it out1' Tljf'ineUioSf ckurforotfonnaiits
Id every villager nirreUlAnce persHUWU pfttroLs disguised as
guerrilla*, combat squadi with gre*t tmtbUJty and! advanced
camjminto&ttoflg capable of m c t i b g t once U> dull repwu,
:
ildllfuj interrogatbn, extensive recotdA uurtfuUy built up BJI4 '
cniaa liutened, *nd counteruit*iJigen anajyrts to study the
guerrilla latelllgeoee or^AniutiAa. define Its taotiuj openndjL,
nd idsniitjf JtapcrnalJU*i.
from its major opeeliU problem deriving from support
of the guerrillas by people on the ground, counterinteiligenct
his tasks Hn comater-gnenllla, action relating directly to the
guerrilla forces and their organic Intelligence
vhlch manifest the usual twin tspatto, defensive end
U14 defensive aspects la llxst the normal job of
the security of the police or mtutarj forces engaged
In ttie eoimtcr^iierrUla opcfttttom. CauaterinteUlgenw peraottiwl tnufit conduct tnlnlnf, or must prepare training
plwu and material and train Instnicton. to Indwtrlnate the
forces In problems of -Kurliy, Tbe [mpojtuict of thla reIs highlighted In the Malaya toanual Teferad to
It* chapter XIV, **ttoo 5. "Military Security
Countet Intelngeace^ makes toe following obsemtions:
Aa the MET tMMtjaa OObSTuUft Partyl dJ cot poaaesfl tb*
TH*FTn*J onaBlwlloo. of * Btft 6laai euen^r,, It null exploit tnrj
ftwurw Of tateUfgetLu to ttdrm (be Injjaiu ( (nllrior iwte.
Tbuu, In addlUAD to tHe direct Kraeq of Uu iOn Tban, tbt MCP
hBf efUbllahed taetworic of vfffiti and tnona*At* thrauctwot

Cf to CGW

Uvt FtdemUoD whose tajfc (4 to Either lalmnaUOfl and {wjq i|

quickly to the CT (Conunuiiit TUTOrlitfl IThe tuint) IfailJtftffj [HniaterlDtrillctfic* stall ittUoni 1b miii.
tary baadqufttfUnl are rttpoadble (or the appUcaUan of;
(*} Pnventlv* meuurM tn dcnjr the o r tit opportunity of
(tlblfif kDowltdfe ot Dur lnttntUras.
(bt UtUctiTe n t i n i u coacarnerl with the
wuritr
to

of the

li

Mttltarr B*turlt7.Tb* If clrtr irtdn

Iml Irfaij hiHHttttl t m t u a H Agmlnft 0P
1*T b**a th* diftct nmlt of 1M4 of
^b CT nwiBBient out of >A * E due to tn the ( U n or
operwtlODi l u i Ukto ptaw btCtUM of btd.
, ptutiEQiurlr u m w

wt

to optntlaiul n*M conti*cto uul thelf Hnployeai, VbA u e

11 Tninertbte to Cf pftttdn, qukKly bKoma t w i n of
atreseilu k the unit* tDfmged, ttft naimu tad pdnarulltfet Of
officers aad, tlnleu ffrt*t tan 1J ( I B 1 1B erdMlni raiiOBj^ can
Jtotcut with aom( iceurscy future unit (Ji*P of IAC^UDU.
Security U aiiny tided u d the CT do notrtU*n one *0Ur
only tot Information. All ranJct n pnosi* to u n t e v W t umuUIr
through iwaHj\ thnngbtluaKa IfaanDar TO counter inlMttnc** nf Uuttttrit; a( aut^tUl. ! mctbodi ol
taenE ptptfl, inointinHlt e^utnlfl, uiuulhorlHd entry
to WP t>xmlB r i othar bicMba of Kturltj there a only
KmMly: pevper t e n r i t r tTklabag. Th* *tperrta|0d fl( thii
1B the tufc ( the Volt Security Officer, utUUdfarUM OUnt) (&J
and Ui< MnicltT JUrtndu, to ttunire ttwt ill rxnfci
la qofortUBMtxIj oalf tod tm* of ttu
U d aaeujilK 4a It tl With the polle* u 4 Cflmt.
that mort OC Its Ume bt tokm up tn the ifivcttltiitlDQ of bnaiih<*
o* *ecorl(y th*t In. Ltfttdy dc;cufT4.
The Qftutt (tl iUfl aota up cartatn atMdEOf oontwat oivmnleat
* Uttmi of pUMi *nd ptnnJtj, and amnfe* mth th* bdhp o*
BADch for Uurouib Wttouj aod tariflctUofi of 4tt tmbat thoH merely limit tlu preblem. Thsj m*y tnakt It
difficult for an Jafonner or 4gmt to l*td u n q to mJlltarj ettab.
cr. huTuV gat In, b be nbl* to do nuch hann4 but

.'-

a
thtj cwinat exelud* the Agent nullify U*e orfc ni the*
uuld*.
Ttt objtt 01 rtandlut control! I* bj * process 4f
to tflrow Into relief intLfliUts or penans ifttt aeon to be
and to m**t thun tbt nbjeot of inTeriJtHioa,
trained, MCiuitjr mtod*d pcnoiuiel will not onlr
f
:

knformdtJon tttm (*IU* to th* CT boj^ In adACrtm; U

Ufily m * ^ * ^ ^ e . o f c l ^ ^ a ^ b 5 P ^ ; - i f f

dejkutum troa ttita and Htlit the counttmjfiiJjp;n&i

eHlprt.

Since Uie fortgoln^ is tae omjy netlon In this IDKUUEI dtvoied to the ubjt of counteriatelllctaHp ltd writertt n i dently oomslfXend uuntGrlnteUJgtnce a purely (WELS1T mat(*Tr This would n all probatLJty not have been the case \t
either tba Special Brunch of the Malayan C m or MI-6 eouia.terplonage people bad written It Toe offensive counterLntdlifence operations which ewi t * employed against
rUJas Include penetrationa, provacfttlonx, doubl* genti,
in pl*caall of the clusfc devkes of counterr Of these, the jowt tfftctlve is undoubtedly peneEven Communist fuerriUa foreeij *rw u e pnitoiftf
mow euilty-tnindl ttian most others, are always under
pruauie to build up thtlr atrenjjtli; tnejr aJways are
for additional men. It If extremely difficult for
with ttieli requirement for Uw htgnext degret of mobflJty, to
build up tDuntermteHlgenc* record* bod mafntotn them, m d
they a r t tbenfore hampered ia matlinr th* JOORDSI security
check on new recruit* who rfwv up or are brought la by old
members.
FenctrnttoDj i n n used by both the Abwthr and the Gestapo
Of tbe Hazt fctwa In Europe Awttis World War U with
degrees of nusoess, depending In p u t on the country
they were empioje^t Their succeas v u especially gnat In
France against tfce "Free F^rencb" Oaulllst resistance
forces, which were cOisssallj lacking In security caEuclousneas,
but also agaliui tbe ooDapftrtmented sabotage gKupa
11

in CtiW

and led by the much better tndnd and

of the British SOEr
The clAHicaJ dmlW* agent operation wouJd presumably retain In coajnterimmgenti? activity against guertillu eJl the
hazards and problems so well described In a recent article Iq
the studies-' Yt a distinct form of double agent operttloa
to have narked very well In caunter-guertUlL action. In
ttve trratllke KenyAColony, What other
agent i e ^ 5 f ajppliesTo the utooHhOig DptnHou
T

On* 4btpa at p m t t n l k a Afeanti Introduced Into the BOB md

group* mtS Isd hj * FrtwJujuUi, tnooc&t (o J u n bun
,
known bjp the codt e n i *# "Onad CUftf*uV" EUcrviied inia
KD emxiy 3OE rroup tb VrEivct, be i u neofnlzed to b4ti qtiallUei
fff lC4dnblp tad waj Oovn to VnfliAd lot tniulfka md bnanf ht
bade M to. odlieer la th* (Troup. Hot kraff aftertMrd. NUl amutftrIntelfigHDce torus united neaj^ 411 mnben of U fruup. Q i u d
Cltmeul "escaped" MHI (O< Into watMt with UMtber
frmip. Thla
in tutu m i Hn IDUHJ op. tod <3raut Cliatfliit H*upe4*
i
After UiH luipld^u* corr*M it w HatwaslWe fw U
petHniltr illu Ju A ptttetntoc, bat be tt op ttttnlnf
tar the Qenduia In which he dereloDrf A whale catpi of p*nrtr*.Eli
* fLr(y Ucge number ot whom w*i* tudiUl In
BOtt aabQUgt. or Othtr nolftUic m u m , 1Ui
Aftnr the Utentton or Ffcrla. the jmseat Wlltar, tflta a counterlnteUI#tDC offlctr In the Joint ITiU^ntlxhAeiKb fipb^tJ Fbftt*,
with otnwH of the 80S Secuiily SKUHJQ in trytnf t? trtct
amd fit>rehen^ Onod dtoimt, but be n i btni found. It
n*t*r even OttHrmiEied whetJber lie had bcn > Oennan a^ent

t tin time ot bis flmt nernltm*iit Into 8OT tnt* <venf prorom rtcmlted by the Oerutuu later. Two other Alftwho b*d bllowed * patten muth lite thmt of Ortiid, Cttrocnt,
i n n MTCStBd In Pmria *BtT the llhettBOi^ flin a
triaJ, tod ihot. Tbey had been ncnilted. Into Mb SOB Ht
group opttmtlnf o c u tbe Bwlti border fend h*4 tbawn #aeh
Uut tliBj wc flown to Enehftd foe tnUUfit and fttttmed to Uu
(ranp M U n t e a u l And rftdld openlot nspectlvdr. Puflnf tt
^
J
b
f
^
up . Dumber Of m-eifJalwrlflS snttpa which, In
6IHp*nmttlt4tkiD practice, bad bad c*nt*ct with Uib OK
left It tttlEtlr t t e * . 1fh| luummltr M t o u lunstlttUan
And tbc DUt-Uhenthn arrtrtt TBje coafaadoo* at the two men,
eBUbllsbed Ihtt toey h*d been atfenft BrwMarnvn, but tt
not be determined whether thW wen tnilnna at Qnnd
*T, , Bcvram, "Obnmtlou ata tlje Dmhlc titsatT SVwtttt VI I,
p. M.
12

in CGW

out by Inspector Is* Henderson when he turned the

captured Man Uau around and *ent (bem out to tract dawn
their fellow*? The preconditions for t b u c operations seem
to have been the primitive mauls of the targets subject to
Intense superstitkuis, tojaltiu which appear strange indeed
to the occidrittU while man, &nd an operations officer who
tnew these characteristics and the people so well that he
Aie act fenetully to be found, to Sure, but tAerrTb B. Iftree
psrt OJ one whole black continent, ripe today for Communist
nxlattatlon. where they m*.y obtain, and such opentlocti
Iw dEcirable amonf; other tribes than the KJkiiyu+ How
HJendersons do we have?

What agency should Undertake the oountetintelngence *frt far the couater-guerrillb foreesf B?ery eountrv has Mine
kind of police Joree, at well as its military /orces, in dScfi state
of being: *nd Jt ennnot be dvubted Uitt in most ttnintifo the
pollM, vhateTer their type or orgaoiatloa, will b# closer to
the people, will know local oaaiMons, wlu more eaauy be able
to oreaniia. normally In r&ct will already I w e orULlzed> Infunu&tkt nets, and win therefore prove mote eflLcacknu In the
collection of cantlntal%er,ce Information tor this type of
vATfore than Hgentfea of the armed forces would
Th* opimem that police will always b* superfcir to ftnul
forces In c^unter-tnaureency cpen.tlons was rectntlj expressed b? ELaiko R BJemu, chief of ttaJT to Oenexn] MlhalLwb In TupalftW* during World War XL1* Th*r can produce toteUigHjja better thsn the pjmed ^
ha said, because they Bet It b u n tbe people everywhere; Uw amud
forces cBonot get inteLUccnce (ram the front because then
Is no front. He referred to Che experience In Mftlajm. wbetc
tbe polk* were nivays kept on top In the opttitJoos, sud the
at* I4o Hesdersoo wllh PMtro OrwHUTt, T h e Huat far
(Landxm, IKS), trrlHWHl In SlWter m 1, p. 1ST.
tmech berare Uiejolat Uin.tMj R c w n n s l b a l CtA,
J U now elTllbm offljcUl In OK DOM of tb TTA

Wutkn

a in

supported them with strikes ngaimrt concentratioru of

the rebels when a cancMitration could be located, H pointed
out the greater flexitiillty and mobility the polic* harir for Instant blow* or counterblows against guerrillas and their usu>
Ally better communlcatloos forsucb actlan*.
Th*rt IB much of interest along tola line In tht>
manual prerlouslv cited TbftJDttUng para^Tapb.^
fc^uJKiy

->'

tha twnptlfn la
Tbt TMPi*lDUity Jl
Itorce U Ibe
with tft* Civil Owetzuxubt, Tl
of CWl Auth.Drt.ly
inadTunrrat tot tbe m
In th current Btawrpntr. tbfl Anud Vtaroet b i n bert
m tft uppoit Ibe CirM Pover In l(c tuk fft KeUnf flllt lad
Inf anafd Cnnummljt termilia. En tddltlDD, t. Horn* OuLrd b u
1i*ai formed.

The main elements of the operational plaa lor

which had been dereloped by t Otnermi QtiEEB, wre discussed
1. Ibe Brtea* P1*B, WbJcb c a n t ID(D effect ea lil June.
Utaed. at hrinslor proper Administntlfe coutnl to 4 popul*Usn
vblch hAd itener bMH cwrtroOtd before. The main *JV*ctft or
Plan were:
Uw WTrrill*Ji
W Tin rmpkl rtttiero(lit of aqwUvn
of Poll nn
Tue rvcTultraent und tmaJnc of CID mai B|HCU| Brmadi
peroanL
fdj tne Army to jhHrriA; t, m | "^^n w CruKiHrk ct troopi
Uuvufhput the cmwtty to wp|wrt the ftboe, tud ki tt*
un.fr Unw to ptcrli** t rDOitt*tLi pf hxreee to the
cktiinf flf prloritr LTHL
(J Itae PoUu uut AJrmf to Opmte la nannkt* *oootd. *E*
In thJi^ Joint PrjiLefl/4mr flpemllonm) tcatnl U
t ill Imbj and Ibera u i do** Inteffritliin
of Police and Klllbur

(EJ

POUM

Tht chain of cwnmftnd e^Ubllshed DJ Che Brtggfl Flan tr>

amred that ^thew was always completa tnttgntlon of Emergency eflorV and that the Security Forces "haw Always bseu
acting In support of tht Civil
U

a in

The anil paragraph an tail plan is worth repeating here,

for It t&tes objectives tthfcli appear likely to b* valid In every
cwmter-jasuxgeiHjy situation ID which the United States may
participate:
Ttv* PIAQ K M tuenutW fa thorough but tong term
and It would ta umMlEtLe tq lock for *Btfr *od
It mrtAHl * tagfexl elfltrtbg ni tfc* tountty Iran South to North,
taring behind ftrong pojtet furejjod EM| AjUulniflTition
- ^--fr ^WijhjflJW* or-Bt*Jte hw
'*
nWRLa [tb* Bblijiit Ilicn Lfbftmtloa Army, or OoTimnnlut ftmr
xiUa funx) frutn the rtrt of the rural ptulatln, (hue t u U i n f
J
th* latber to fwl taft to eonw forward with lnformtlwx wtllbt ut
the tame tin}* teprlvtaf the MRLA of tlwlr ie*nj of mpport

attd. BO foRuta1 them toto thft open v h t n they; could better lie1
'
cfeMt with tar the BT<

The roles of police and military forces as described *lse*here In Chapter H I t n worth study u a model of the
Idea] orEanlzfrtlon wnerwef counter-Insurgency or counteroperations have to be carried <mtr The phUosophv
which ihtse wits vte based b ciunined up in tbt second
. of the chapter (3OV5 on "Intelligence^;
StiH ttrttt Ix DO 9 U U c( wr In
for QtnULutii| bur nd order Is itLD that Of the FWICR, In Ihfl
u m war tr-.c rtspo nsl hliitj for producUH laitUlsencB 1U1 rub)
witfaj UL etwcLsJ Brmnch ( Ihe POUH. In Tlew ol th* itoe ad

InporUzice 4f the pnMttn. howeret, jpedkl tntclUsne OfftnicatUm h u been huilt ur*.

What the slie of the problem requlied was Joint

operations centers minntd by Special Branch and military Intelligence personnel. One aspect of their division or labor Is
jurtlculirly inteine&tlng: "All membert of the public who
haw Information to glw should: be phased on to the POIIM,
vho alone w4U handle agents uid infonneta. On no ictount
vQl ffliUtatr unlta tun Uitlr own agenta or Inlcrmers,"
The altuatloD In MAI^JTV, of course, vlth Its aJmut kleallr
developed Kcurltv force* OTCanlzatloa, is one vblch United
Stated forces will n i d f if ercr And In a country they are Inited to KsLst tn a couiiter-ffuettill". effort. It might be welL
howtirer, to hold up this kind of organluttoa as tbe coal toward TPhich to wari, not onljf beuusa the police can normally
be exported to do a fu1 better Intelligence and nintlnt*lU15

in CGW

grace Job than the local military fortes, but &l because
when the emergency situation Is over the Ametfcim will bar*
left behind the foundation* of & better governmental and: Intemal security structure.
It is unlikely ttut V-Sr forces win themselves e n r be doing
flu cauhtcr^grarriUi Job In any country; their role will be to
local forces to do it competently. Anjj

^4g|j^ r en^^d^^

emergency situation will" hare been declared, perhaps martial

tiWi but no true belligerent situation &t recognized In Intermtkma] law. Under these ctrcumgtaocfis It wouldfoedeol
oblii, l a piusuit nt tb* hutg-rgJiee (o*l of establishing * Sound
CITU ^ovemment responsive to the wtehtg of the governed, to
fctep the cLrll au tiwrlly in control at alt tlmct
There thould certainly,, In any ca*e, be no contending between different elements of the VS. continent ent to support the Indigenous torctm as to whether the police and dril
forco or ttie mlUtary should h&it primary responsibility for
the conduct of the operation. This question should be
u A matter of national policy before any U.S. elements
engaged, and it should be settled hi the nay which will
most surely toward a aound, strong damociaUc govemmnt
when the operation is finished.
APPENDIX: Survey ftf Sources tn Oiucrrflla rntctUgenov
It la * puzzling anomaly that one of the poorest murces of
Information concerning the intelU^nce methals developed
and used by guttriHai la the writings of the great and alleged
great guerrilla leaders. Mao Tse-ttmgia 7u Chi Gum,1 a comprehcualve znanueLE on the organization, training, equipment,
and tactlca of guerrtUM, fcacu, mafeu onlj one explicit reJerenoe even to n need for information about the enemy; at
page SO ii asslRna the "uati-Japtnase sU-defenje unit*,**
mnon^ other reapondbltltfei, that of 'securing information of
the enemy/ 1 tqtelilg*ncet not to mentltm counteiintelligence,
Is otherwise completely Ijjbored
1

On Guerrilla

Warfntt.

Trmn&tntlD Dd IntlOductlOa br Brtff.

E. OrVBih, USUC, HeL fFtiedcrfcfc A, Prater, 19tU,

16

Ernesto "Cbt" Guevara., newly touted V a guarrUla authority, does Include In his recent book ft section on Intelligence,
u (allows:
Tfaunr yountU and your ttwiny (Uid you Mil be able 1* win
* hundred tattlu." Nothlnf bejpi th* combat ftm* bion U i u
Ccurtte Batillljep**. But b+ i u n to wrt fact fro& fletfen. A*
soon u part offlus tiki, mall dillteries e*o be tot up within th*
ittu, try to gel tattlUfflnce (tent t h t i r a r , tft* wnsuo
in."--

rtitBMi'imd m

cotJuJdkn jtad

This paraprt|jhp with Its remarkahl* Instruction on the subject f lnteUlgence communications, Is the unajdiig totality ol
Quarafm h*j> to smj on the iubjt of podtlva intelllIn the field of countiiAtelllgenceh however, h* apparently had o% iJtarttoHJghtA, In Appendix 4H pages 66
to Cfl^h
r*c*nt popuUr moTtmtnia h**f nirervd frew lsadepreptraUon. ftequeqtljr, the Jecrtt BtrrlCfl of the EUveraLof
ruler* laant* About ptotuud conspiracy*. Ahsolbh tic5 It
tnuclaj. Tbfr hufflftn materiMl nrnxt bt thnaen with are. At ttaiei.
thla jwjuan l> ffcij; at othtrfl. entrctnelj difnrulL One h u to
da *)th thoie Thfl are inUtNt-*UltJ and
14 Jain !EL tba flfhl for MbfrAUoD, There U ao
a p p v u t u . Tet than Is co rnui* ftor
ftntmy, even It thtffmairUl*oifanlnlloin t** been
UuUtnttd by ipiea, for DO u o n tbin &ni or two pertlns Hhcmld
be familiar with prepuAlory plMU. Keep nrw TOlbnteert awaj
from fcej pltcflj.
volM>dK Bitft IWJTL attythiin beynnd hln unottdlate
He*nr dlscun plait! with ajajoat. CHeck lncotnlug HAd
bull. KtrtiF *b*t eontHii evcta number turn. Work
lit* In U%nu> n*r ixuUrUtutUr' TTUCt M onn bejnmd the
ptciallj Ddt mMiea, "nw eHtny via toudoubtadlF tty
ta M*r vaaen: for Mpiomn*. Th* revoIuUonuy *rtKy pi-epbrinr
tjr Wmr mint b* an MCttlc ud ptrtncUj dbdplliKd. ADJOEW *HO
Oea t i * arden of hl# nptilorf *o& mtttt cmttct
vomea mod QUKT oiitalderi, bnmnet baDDcvoUi miut IK
imaidiatelr 'Cr vioUUaa of rrfOlatlaiurr
, - r O( CDBiKt tll*w * DO
Of HO men, tut tbae $00 mnrt t e apllt up, bKBUH (! to
4 group U bound to i.ttn.et tttentipri, u d tb) la cue of
the eaUn tmcc otmld be
KU
Ottmra

tm Qiterrtilx ITor/ar*, TrtiuJatlDn b j

JH*KU-

17

r.-

' ' * '

^ i

' '

O In CGW

Tbi location at bead^DAften may be TtTtdlfld. to most of )t

puup tod erre M the niwtim pl*c* for the loEttntwn. tyt the
tadm of the anuplncy thoold ippr ttwre only n n l v *cd
no anpntmUac DOCCHUBU rt to be kept thcr*. rb* kdi
chould 1U7 In duptned, tscnt hiding plicn. LocaUonj of i m P*l< fbould Dot b* knows b> im>rT ULBD on* of (VD p m o u . Aims
ij not to IH> dictribuled tmtu the pptntlOD I* xenjr (a itui^ *o
H ml U tSdaiuBr tho UtTtiTAd aod to 4VDld powlblt IOM of
tl
l t
Hgapec Qtffp, bad written xtensl>Kly about pieirlllA n h
fare. His essaya, collected In a book published In 1961t combine * monotonous naltentlaa irt U tbm rf close relatLcmrttlp b4tven the people end fte OntUnunlit amted fiwcea vttb
historical treatlM* en the liberation or North Viet Nam.
Then U much repetitive material on the manner In which
guerrillas derttoped and were ctrganlted u d nine dlscusdon
at pjerrilli tActiu, but nothing whatever DO tb* p&rt played
tf LatelLgeiict
Oneral Vo"b fotoes, hmrmr, ft* ther havn developed into A
t l j army, have not neglected their intelligence
The following passage from one at their training document* begins to reflect the military intelllgeDce Interests ot
but mppllH i l to
I,ttL4JTidij.ilH 1 ( M 1 for R P i u 4i lnteUJ|erwc tfldoti miut
b irtlvifl,, EDiuifewf, p*Mj>]caci(5uffp reallrtc l i d calm In Ltc lk.
t. lB.tLliji#iK4 busetff Befen mnuatlnc 11^ Attack, J^I u u t
letrq H t l r Uw ttambar of wenif trocpt tnd thdr imumeat,
H OUT Gra Cbtm m u t h+ t UWt qiuL Letm *JJ ymi can ahoul
Ih* coomandtr *t tb* HUfDy/ trwp*, TOIL jbouid J A rtudj
tt HlffUe Of tin ensmj toidtenL fbi LDutku tf Uiitr
inch u UockHdUHti iod IUAVJ
J
p
plnxmtR,
JWW P4OT flxn tb*n i m Witud, i atetium or 4 company:
Ufr memy units by pjanttet or name, P^BJ eat thi pq\upm*nl
ach antt, the llrtpowtr Of wtdch It It ctptbla nd the pg]IU]
d lltUJT tnJalng TBMIIT1 by tfae enemj troofH,
3, Tin dirKt and indirect mctioda of obtaJuliUj IntetUfVDtc:
dlcect toeihpd U to UH four own penoniI utd. ID ttdd Qwni
at At BftnltiL When pm tend Evnta ctp rlllftl or cltttt.
*Qeiieral Tft Nfuj^n Ollip, f u p U i t Wcrh

PuHbbluf HOUH, a m o i 1B41K

IS

O in CGW

nnltl Adopt * cor*T c h U that of pfBiant, ftihertnon or

a eooli*. Whin 70a tend jtiur affcnU Into Ih* countryside, A
IpHl*] cover U not npefled. taut your rneo muiL tie UK* to hid*
In the b r u t and buit t a b t*r to Kt*J *"*j from welltncwu
6lce*h HICft M wter boEea or fprlnga. where the fatal *riU be
alert (or thaoL Agvcta In tb* countrrtlde Uliut b* careful to
lemte no tnlli or other trace* of tibeir p r e n .
Til* ludlfttK method t* ^ necniit your acmti from t.f.ffbS thi
pebt Tbn 4h0uld CbAMt JOUT tftnti from Uu (ZDupf
thu* vtudled, tnln them, and put them to wk, Tell u e h on*
Chat ha mint anlbnlt npoTU
at fixed lnt*ftAlih and anajiee tor
p
tc codUet TOUT m men i4tnc ajfiu o(
IbteUtgBIDCB mportljif; In obtalnlnc a tiport tnrai TOOT
on
be
tt
fJ
a. Tb* Tocatton ot the t w v and the ruune of the commander,
h, Tta podUooa of nuUtalAt runs. blocUiouet, tfemchta and.
ill Other Vfiwng or *eik place* In the bajjt
, I^a HlitknLihJp befwviu th tntmj Mlerf tad th* dtlttaft
pdpuiitUffl *.t Hi*t oa*e.
4, CkraunoulcattaQ luUIUrt, Da UMf b a n
. The b l routci of *Lppnj*ch to re(W*t [tOU th* c u t .

sections of the Viet Mirth document also contain Instmctlon In intelUfe n aspects of opexatloiuj
S a l o n DdluitEiai J unbuA operation, you miuft
ttvdr your ljinta' i*pcrtfl. on the Eltu&tiirtL imOotf the
in tb* tie*, b p e d m r ttttfly the ramie* "hr whJdi and the
t t wtoct enemy, troopa mcrfi ihlOV^b the Uh. HOT Urge U t
tbMC etKnr fOTt; tw fast do they mnn; what weapon* do
&MT7' D they h*T DUCMlU fUiUT II
b f
tkmF IE U ewntlal that tha ruemf be tisamt* Ot ear
Only the commaiider Rfid UU Agent* ihovld knav that tht*e thtD*

ue
The discussion of amhudui which icttim tnciutot tuaay Iteffta
of Intelligence Impart And. ptita emphtada on the eflect of inttUlttact on pbuu and tactics. The aame ! true ot the sectloiu eotltled "Raids an Enemy B U H , " ^'Gkneral Opexmtlnp
Frtrtdples.'* and HlEiti.Dli8hlng Your Ba**,'h In the l u t
on buUcaUOa Is gtitn ot A acuneirtiat more ADphlstlcated
of th# problem ad wamunlcaUan with
tbui Uuit dltplayd by Srr Ou*vart: ". . . or-

in CCYf

guuze your Intelligence nets In ttat area, especially arranging

for coirnnunlcBtlom between your agents And yourself." The
d
concludes OD a realistically grim not*: "Intelllgeiic*
uid senior officer* must study judo mid ail method* of
o-hand combat to assist them In avoiding capture.
They nawt plan to tafcn the most extrerofl measure* to arold
capture. It capture seems inevitably Uiej should plan to die
fit H
tJf.f-.J..

o( gpod books written by ofQcen who had experfence In g

rttlft opertfaiu dutine World War H. From tbe soma
kernel of wisdom can be extracted wtth effort, but they suflcr
aa BnatjUcfl] or training texts because they were not Patented for such purpojh being pr*i*nted simply aa exciting
yams Jar public consumption.
One of the few bocks maldu^ a dcUbcimte attempt to bring
together historical examples of guerrtUa ftctlvltles and to extract (ran them sound principles is a fairly recent one from
4 British source, Guerilla Warfare, by C. N, M, Blair, an MI-6
officer* Chapter 7 oi this boot, "Summary of GuerUJ. Warfare" consolidates the principles distilled from 4 century and a
half of history, Jta section on LntaLUfencc begins on paije
1S7:
Kflt onlT to tire Umnlr uJannmUon of tbvmj cUrtly
them, but i l fur m e VUCCCTS or thalr awn opermtlon* g
tfat catmr, out of Urn 4rat euQtUl for i n y p u i l l l i tota it to
KtabUah an effldcut inteUlfltD&t syHtemr rjutil Cbt UHTEm*nt
hM d*elcnnM3 lulo , ImrfK 1 WKtesprtid fuarllJa QPfUlatlOD
UMIT mala Deed wtU be Uctleal lutelUfeoce on n e b antten u
tflttnj mo'ettjecit*, concentratJloEM u d Intentions, w]tn~lttKd thA

ont*rintelllBenjce 1 upectvtfDdnt of floesiv ttterqplj & peoaUr*t* lie eu^riSSnt own arfinUatToa. To utlstj tbatt K<ralr*torats. gserlllu mvBi blTt tbtlx irtm tactical [nltUlgra
hitUke tbe ottuprtnt tnr-^ther will U H hmto ta r r
Ob ttu 1ml pairalmn, who a tUfn will h*T fq ptutnta
^ B#CUTHJ KTflCU to obtain the nHHJrr lnfiniiuJHjL
If the esemv * n muDM ta ubtAla iqUtQfUM ibout
the tuerULu throutll tht IOCBJ papuIaUonh tlwy a thesudTO
U baudJcsppad in thUx counter-nalitBiiiCt uQvttlH. It
thtnion, axtremeij Important that the local pejHilaJttQQ. tre
y BrtUata hanl^trT Of Dcftac* (London, 19VT1,

20

CGW

In active jjmpithr with Uja fuerUt**, uuj It le Intererttof to

lh*,t Ln eferr WGCtttiUl culpilfii reTlW*d la %kia- boot Uida loul
jupport h u beta fhrthcomlnt
Ltt h U th* tutirllk Core* upmitd^ It *rlfl nquln tttltftft: fanot MJJ far UB openHoof *md own ieetmtr tapi aiH u
Ehroii^ti rfi^TTiti cuerniMi or dimduUsjc
la Hum ejUft oJ th ,

nurxu
7

Oaenctoi
Alllad.

la UM put bu tca to dlHtnduu thlt

d
1

.!

t a d Of WC-ild Wki 11 atUt

mi

to * TO?

i
extent Do

u ih*

It Ktou not*woithy (hat enen this tnort iophl$tlaited effort to Wsntify principles dot* not reacb to concrete partkuI a n on cubjecU like means of coUeetlng lnlannAtlon (except
to strws rtHan on tht population) T rneana of
tng ccllected Informatbn to guerrilla headqu&rtarj or
ge.nc sfr?nomF uid the yftem for tJH4UJgence processing
within the headquarters.
Brig. Qenttftl GsfiiUel B. Griffith, bi hh LtitroductJon to the
tnuutatlon of Mao Tst-tun^, covers the subject
more completely, both for positive LnteUiijeciM ind for
the decMTfl
1B
inerrtttn 4Pntfciu,
Vhwtt il the ebtflajf? In what ttnofUif What don fai
to tfQf Wht ta the ftLte of blA equlpmentt btt mpprj4 hjj
An Ml h4entateHl^icrll,bold* tad lutliuav h rtimld u d
btt troop* tou|h, tfidrmt, KHJ vail dtftelpmurl. or
T*1M

OutttUlu u p t tbe DMOAert el th+lr

to pcv*14 tlu n m n to> tbvw u d

mor* diUJlkd

GoemU* lniciUienu ntt* M* tlgtrttr orrivhad utd. penutrt.

In t i^urtuu u n , vu^ pemu irilbaut pUoa mutt be MD(Mtn4 HI f^eni^-flld men u d wnun, boyi driving cr wtrti^ glib
tdbdidf tublv f u u l*Aoren> itorttcepen, acft^J ttajtftera.
prlwttr
*c*Tenjflra, Ttn local csdrat *^rat tinttat4Vhoa ttTto ft or KX^ to pndiKt Ml DHl'itbk la-

dmr !! infotmntlon ef ttaeauctn* to

t h e i r eiKOV, WOO UE

(n UL faopuutnlde Cog. TntMl lit.

"

'

"

a in ccw
ability to gel lnfonn*UAn m i m constant comphlnl ol ttu
[innfJUte diuinc tht nrel tour Qupprejaloo. Onxpaltns. U Lt
later of tht Jipmtt* la China m i f the French In bath.
IndKhifaa md Algal*, Thti ll a caancterlstk fmtu of all
(rutrrUU wui, The enemy 4tu4* u m ft llfbtai tUgc; from
toe Mrtauu around bim tbauuadA of iuve& ey Intently
hii erery mottj ht* etiry gctiue. fftjtb h4 itrikca out, he
the tit, hl4 tmttfoiilJti i n tatubtaltalr M Ini
Oftdnj; betsoH flf JUjml
COndJUoat C( Uudr ^
eJ terninH UKT i n kbit tu PM It to tcelr 4dTUUia *nd

. . .

^#fc.

Within U A OmfHmment a^encJea Uuste htue been recent

attempt* u> build up a body of doctrine on guerrLUa forces^ Including thdr Intelligence, tn an etrly 1B&2 draft entitled "An
Approach to Counterg^errlUa Warfare" (Confidential}
s.1 the U^. Army Intelligent C E D ^ Fort
, is this brief treatment:
A modd fequlxetajflut lor tomxatnl BUrtQ* oper*tlom II utl*UjEflnce. Knowledge C( the enemy fl the tty to ^Urrilla tureen,
Th< euetrjlti, lemder ciuuiol taiu the tneny by mrpritt unkH
lie fcno*l Where tbe *n*nyr la tfl be t * fiTeo. time tnd in what
In addition to A cttilxn clasderiine nrt, a fuerrllta
mint have a n u l l pomp at men trmined In
iMnifi trtifl ctn mare In enemy territory;
tbe neq.tUrti inlenatJrjnp i n d return safely U>

The Departmtnt of the Arnty Field Munutl 31-21, "Onierrllla Warfare and S^WCIAI Forcai Opertloru'h (September
1561) Is authorllatlTf with respect to the intetUgtncs netda of
the U.a Army Special Force*, ibe units designed to create
guerrilla*. It covers the EEI for a BpecUl Force team before
It Is launched Into an area to orgtnlze ^UBrrUlu and also ha* fc
good lilt u( EEI within the juatrUla Area after irrlvai of tbe
teua, Tbe reader is referred to Chapter S, "tbeater 3uppcrt^" 3ctlon H, HHIntel%enoe," and Chapter 7h '^Orguilutton and Developmtn.t of the Area CotQinAH<1/h Stctlon IV, "Intelligence in Guerrilla Warfare OpemUcm*l Art#&." The
muiua] ftUs fix cbort, however, with rMpect to Inftructlnn
tn tbe organization of collection mewM and in tjie modus
oper&ndl, organization, sod opemtlon ef tntcttlpDce production liAUlUa *t guerrtliB. bases or heodquuteri, ft also db-

in CGW

poorly between posltlre and

mattera.
The meat complete and probably the soundest analysts of
guerrilla warfare In general and Jjts lDtelUgmce utd counterIntelligence *tpecl& In particular which the writer h u been
able to find Is the Guide to QuertfHa Warfan published, by the
Operations School of CIA1* OfficejM nijtilng under, date of
graph *t page J on the "Role of Intelligence, 1 ' a
and detailed, discussion of tateWgeaca mattery it. contained In
m action beglnnlag on. page 2B coT*rlng "OeneraJ
ujice.lh "Operational ReeottnalstAoee" (especlttity
"Sources of Infortnittoti Which Supplement
tuJB5anceH-nmy personAd, frJsuUjr and nuitraJ permna
Jn the rea> enemv documents, enemy mftterkl, mips, weather
forecasts^ tn&ny nuilo brOAdcbteN and atHal pbotogr&phd
uid flnftUy "Esplona^*." A trbole chapter beginning on p4e
49 Is dtvoted to the subject ol "Security," the jftjfst two and a
half pages of which are teiHy conoamed with the defensive
aspects of c0untertntehMieiu!r
NOTE: The CuwnUxinteUlgtiu* Punctloa nod It* LunJtetlapj
One are* of semantic conlution with. po^lbJt practical canderi? from the detaitkxn. of countertntelUgenefl
epproved offlcJaUjr by tlw National Security CouncQ and
Incorporated Into WSCTO S, tniia* It Include countermibierelan as well aa counterespiaoAge and counter5ot*ije. Miuiy
people ID recent times, Lndudlng JoumaUtU *nd erai high
goTemment Dffidids, hftTt referred to suerrlUa warfare at the
equiratant of mtyrenLaL H would be urufortunate U ft tbould;
therefore be concluded that counterlntelUgetnn penouieL
hare the ttAe or eren the major rode la coynter-taerrLtU M ttoo; (to Imrtaan reflection thould nuke clear how much this
la beyond their capAblHtiea.
On tbe otber hand, tt |o perticularly hard Irj emmter^uerrOlA ^pentloos to dJrHngulsh betwun what la properly
poalUve lnteLUgeact and what la counteiliit4UJgenc. Thus a
U.a. Army oflBier writing about eiHmU)>guerrll1a operaUotu

, - . >

COM

In South Sorts, 1 harlne emphasised a& items of positive

gencir the need for complet* order-of-battle bifomoatton on
unit, lo Include eadi member at each unit, continued:
TtnanailVr file* thaold include alt local connection!;.
nurihtr c*n prmade bur aon to rinrnDfltr, At . pirrilJa
be Motored While visiting his wira or (lrt Jfriebd. Special
EQiut be Dqadf to kill or capture tuarrllU leadm

This statement typifies thft lo* thinking tn regard to liu

telllgerice and counterinttUlgenoe which pervades most writing*, about counteT-gwrrUU w f w t .
From ft seniaitUcfl
rtaadpoint the ortfer-cf-battle Uifonnttlonr which In oonveH'
tlonU warfu^ would tw poUrt Jntellifence, must with ttspect ta guerrilla aUtlty+ If that b the ara* ad subversion,
be wun.trintel%enM. But this uphlftry aaidt. the tftsh trt
getiing a mother la persuade a son to surrender, or of etbig
communlcatfcms equipment, or of getting at t gtlerrtLbv. leader
through his fir] friend, la not positive Intelligence btrfc .somtthtng; that requires pror*sslonAl counterkntelligcnct knowhow.
The point to b+ emphasized la t i n t , white ft \i manlf^tlT
fjnpossJWe *or CfntnUftinieMgtnct forces to rarry fty thornsalfti tot whole tespotis\b01ty for couoter-giujrirUU operationj, their ro]e in these operationa Is a critics one on whlth
tht auceea of the enterprise can vety well hanf. 1/ anyont
has any doubt about this rtatement. Jf t him read Ian Henderson'a lasclnatln^ book, dted above, about the flnal tracking
dovn of the most dimectvud of ell the Haul Mail guerrlLLatetmrlsta, Klmathl, and try %o imagine nmitary positive Intel%ence personnel w ewm AHIed clandestine espionage people not trained in counteriatelligience or police-type vorfc accoffipUtiilng what this Special Branch Inspector did
' L l OoL Mho. K. Bwbe. Jf^ TJA Thl^ -Brttlnr U tHWrrill*/
" terf RtvieB, PAcember UK (pHbtLeatlOn erf Ue Cammind dud Oene n l StaiT Collefe. Ft Le*Ttnwarthh

.fc-:

CENTRAt

I NTELLIGENCE
I.

.J

APPIOVEDfODRLLLASE
UTLJU1II7

IbKil
IbXt)
ITI

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA
fofmari on os of 0600

26 October 1962

TCEFARED FOR THE EKECUTTVE COMMrTTEt

OF THE HAT1OHAL SECUMTTf OODHCIU
TUKTHfil\DlSSEWlHAtK*J OF INFORMATION
<HTAIKHQ HEREIN IS N O T AUTHORIZED,

AGENCY

26 October
SC No. 08181/62
CONTENTS
I,
Surveillance of BS October shows that the construction of IBBM and MREM bases in Cuba is proceeding
largely on schedule; now level photography confirms that
the JD3BM bases will use the 1,020-nautlcal-nile &S-4 nlssile. Vo additional sites, launchers or ulsslles have
been located> but there is road construction around Hemedic-s which suggests the fourth IRBJH sit* we have been
expecting there, We estimate ,tnat it would cast the USSR
bore than twice as much and take considerably 'longer to
add to its ICB1I strike capability from the USSR as great
an increment as the potential salvo froa Cuban launching
sites*
II,
Only two Soviet freightersand five tankers,
one of then already past the quarantine lineat111 are
headed for Cuba, The BELOVODSK, with twelY* M - 4 helicopters, is inthe North Atlantic; the PUGACHEV appears to
have slowed or stopped several days west of the Fanaaa
Canal. A total of 16 dry cargo ships DOW are carried as
having turned back toward the USSR on 23 October.
Two Soviet civil air flights are scheduled for Havana
with passengers; cargot if any, is not known. One bay be
turned back by Guinea today. A TU-114 is scheduled via
Senegal to reach Havana 1 Poveubar,
III,
There are further Indications that sons Soviet
and satellite elements, particularly air and ground element a In Eastern Europe and European Russia, are on I D
alert or readiness status. No major deployments have
been detectedf however,|
15 some
have bees placed on five-minute
alert ID East Germany, where two Areas along the West German border have been closed off for exercises.
Moscow highlights Khrushchev"a Acceptand* of V TbaDt's
appeal in a bid to start US-Soviet negotiations Peiping,
however, is irritated that the Soviet response to VS action
is not stronger. The GoBununlsts still deny there are any
offensive weapons in Cuba.
IV*
There Is no major change or significant new development in non-bloc Teaction to the crisis. Host of the GAS
nations have offered to participate la some form In the
quarantine, and NATO embers have agreed with ainor reservations to deny Landing and overflight rights to Soviet
planes bound for Cuba.

TO^SECRET

> It

SAN
f4t.UA COMFUX

Jl'

26 October 1962
I.

THE SITUATIQH IH CUBA

Photography of 25 October sh3*B continued rapid const ruction activity at each of four URDU sitefl, The us* of
camouflage and canvas to cover critical equipment At these
sites continues*
ITo niw missile sites bave been identified, but road
construction activity in tbe Remedies area suggests plans
to locate the expected second IttBH sit* there.
Low level photography clearly indicates that tbe URDU
sites are for the E3^4 (SANDAL) 1,0200-nautical mile ballistic bisslle system, Photography of 03 October shows cables at two HRBH Bites running iron missile-ready tents into tb* woods where generators probably are located. Ttiis
strongly suggests tbat missiles are being checked out In
the tents.
It now is estimated that San Cristobal Site 2 will
achieve a full operational capability on 26 October instead
of 25 October Heavy rain has recently fallen on this site.
Tae four Soviet cargo ships originally en route to Cuba
which were suspected to be delivering ballistic Missiles
are continuing their eastward course towards the USSR.

Ltary equipment already supplied plus that

which will be needed to c<mpl*te the missile sites under
construction* Is estimated to amount to at least $750 million, and nay be as micb as $1 billion. One-third of this
Is accounted for by tbe 1RBU and URBU systems. Although
the cost cf setting up these sites in Cuba appears high,
It would probably cost the USSR more than L*IC* as nuoh
to establish a comparable increvent in the VSSR to the present Soviet JCBM strike capabilities against the US* Boreover , MRBU/lHBtf systems can be positioned in Cuba in considerably less ti* than would be needed to construct ICBM
bases in the

1-1

Efforts to step up Cub&fl military preparedness continue,

The armed forces remain under strict orders not to fira unless fired upon. There still Is no indication in COMINT
that Cuban tactical aircraft have

Military traffic is heavy on most of the country's highways, and! several roads and beach areas have been closed to
all civilian use. Press reports from Havana state that the
city is bristling with gun emplacements and other evidences
of military readiness* Che Guevara reportedly has established
a military command post at the iotfD of Corral de la Palna in
Plnar del Rio Province, and Raul Castro is alleged to nave
gone to Orients province--his usual post during previous military alerts. Fidel reportedly remains ID Havana.

I beneath
tha surface calm regime officials are apprehensive over possibilities of Internal uprisings and/or and Invasion, Suspected dissidents are being rounded up "

zation procedures &cd irritation with supply

s
moblii-

h& general public continues its display of outward

, tranquilltyj
capital or L&s Villas Province, reported drastic new consumption controls on gasoline
and motor oilj similar measures nay have been instituted
elsewhere. The broadcast also described reports of food
and fuel shortages as "rumors spread by the counterrevolution at the service of Tanlcee imperialism.17 The broadcast
was presumably aimed at discouraging acara buying, which
has been reported from several Cuban cities.

1-2

II.

SOVIET 5HIPPIMG AMD FLIGHTS TO CUBA

Only ti> Soviet dry cargo ships ar* believed still to

be en route to Cut)Aapparently carrying non-military cargoes* The BELOYOPEK, presently in the North Atlantic]"

|The other ship, the E. PUGACHKV,tfbicb.is en

route^TOBTVladivostok,nay have slowed down or tenporarily
stopped in the North Pacifict Several days out^frora the
Panama Canal.
Five Soviet tankers also are en route to Cuba, one
having already passed into the quarantine zone. In addition, four European satellite ships, including an East German passenger ship, appear to be continuing their voyages
to Cuba.
A total of 16 Soviet dry cargo ships now are estimated
to have altered1 their courses and headed back toward the
USSR on 23 October. Mostif not allare believed to have
been carrying military cargoes *
The USSR has scheduled two special civil aircraft flights
to Havana * An IL-lSj apparently routed via Guinea and Braail > probably will arrive in Cuba tomorrow. A Guinean official told the DS embassy on 25 October that permission for
such flights via Conakry would be refused,ftftdit is possible the aircraft, already en route, will not be allowed to
transit Guinea. A TU-1I4 is scheduled to fly via Senegal
to Havana, arriving there on 1 November. Some passengers
are to be aboard both flights but the cargo, if any, is not
known.

11-1

26 October 1962
III.

THE SITUATION IN THE BLOC

A,

MILITARY

We have noted the following Soviet military developments; an assessment of tbeir significance will be ie
sued Inter this morning by thD US IB Watch Committee.

Ground I Soviet forces In Germany nay be preparing for

a major exercise. Two temporary restricted areas have been
set up in East Germany along the border with the Federal
Republic, effective through 4 November, Both areas axe below air corridors into BerllD and in close proximity to major east-west autobahns. Any troop buildup In these areas
could be readily oteerred. -*

III-l

NavalI Exercise activity continues in the Pacifict

Baltic And Black Seas.

A Vladivostok radio broadcast noted, tb&t the Soviet

Pacific Fleet was in a readiness state as ordered by the
Supreme Command.
The OK naval attache* to Moscow was denied a. trip to
Leningrad on 25 October{ This may have been because of
the return of nerchant ships on the Cub&n run.
The East German Havy baa apparently cancelled leaves.

B.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev 's prompt acceptance of D Toast's appeal on

Cuba is calculated to strengthen Soviet efforts to involve
the UB in protracted negotiations. The Soviet leaders
clearly believe that a temporary suspension of arms deliveries would be a small price to paLy for arrangements which,
they hope, *ill effectively forestall further US actions
against the military buildup I D Cuba,
In cementing on Khrushchev's reply to C Thant, Fragda
this Darning urged that the US exercise caution in the present crisis* This advice is btfeked up by i Hed Star article
entitled "Cuba is Not Alone," which repeateT^revious claims
concerning the accuracy and destructiveness of Soviet rocket A and reiterated tbat the USSR has "successfully solved
the problem of the antimissile missile." Numerous reports
appear in todayfs Soviet press of nestings ID the USSR protesting US "aggressive actions'* and pledging support of the
policies of the Soviet government *
There has been no change I D the tone or substance of
Moscow*3 approach to the US revelation of the presence of
Soviet offensive weapons In Cuba. Ill his rebuttal to US
photographic evidence of missile bases in Cuba, Serin in
the UN charged that the photographs were forgeries and reiterated there was no peed to establish such bases outside
the USSR. Repeating this themef Soviet propaganda continues to claim that the US Is making use of tbe "big lie"
technique in its charges against the Soviet Union and to
deny tbat there are any offensive weapons in Cuba.
Elsewhere, bloc spokesmen remain cautious in their
private statements On tbe Cuban issue, suggesting that they
have Dot as yet been given a line for dissemination to
foreigners. Soae bloc representatives have sought to give
tbe impression that Cuba was not important enough to the
USSR to cause it to go to war at present.
Communist China apparently is irritated because tbe
Soviet Union has not adopted a more aggressive posture,
Peiplng has portrayed the cautious Russian statement of
23 October as a, declaration, of intent to ''smash" US aggressiont called the US a "paper tiger," and urged a. "resolute
blov-for-blow struggle" to combat American noves. Chinese
Communist press statements tend to minimize the Russian
role in the Cuban crisis while playing up the Importance
of support for Cuba by the Chinesecalled "the most reliable friends of the Cuban people."
111-3

TOP

The East Gera&n regling has decreed an operational readiness alert for selected party officials, who hive been authorized to carry firearms and instructed to maintain legs
shoving the whereabouts of those of their Subordinates who
occupy key positions In the district and county-Level party
apparatus. In addition, the regime has called for daily reports on the state of popular norale.
In the only Baet European consent thus far on developments at the UN, the East German news agency described the
President's reply to U Taunt as "a noncommittal US propaganda maneuver jtl adding that the announcement that the
quarantine would continue "conjfirtwd that; US President Kennedy is not prepared to accept the proposals qf. U Thant
and N. 3, Khrushchev,..."
Hungarian and Bulgarian authorities may have Interfered
with connunicatlous between tbe US Legations in Budapest
and Sofia and the Department of State. Both legations use
local, national-owned circuits, communicating with Washington via Vienna or Frankfurt* The Legation In Sofia reported
the telex circuit out of operation during the night of 234 October and the circuit fron the Legation la Budapest
was subject to frequent interruptions during the day on 24
October. The US Charge" protested to Hungarian Foreign IHnistry officials, who assured hint that there would be no
further difficulty.
AntI-Amerlean demonstrations of varying scale have
been staged In four of the five East European satellite
capitals where there are US missions, A Hungarian news
agency reported that 10h000 Inhabitants of Budapest had protested in front of the VS Legation on 24 October, but
reports "the local scene is quiet*"
The sane day sone 500 students at Warsaw Polytechnic
Institute organized a protest rally hut returned to class
when extra police hurriedly were stationed around the Embassy, The Gonulka regime reportedly does not intend to
permit demonstrations or conduct an internal propaganda
campaign for fear of sparking a war scare and: a run on food
which are already low.
Also on 24 October, a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry official assured the US Minister that "if a demonstration was
organizedt protection also would be organized!*" Three hours
latex, tbe arrival of a strong police guard at the Legation
dampened preparations for a demonstration, and a crowd of
youths dispersed.
I1I-4

TCT

TO
Yesterday, Ih000 feecba pulled down the flag and
smashed windows at tne US Embassy in Prague. Police earlier refused to clear a path through the demonstrators
for ftn embassy ear returning the Charg6 Iron in official
luncheon.
The Ulbricht regim has called for "solidarity deuoagtrations." YesterdAy Baet Gerqtm police directed a US
Army pitnsl Into A street wherw eucb A rally was underway,
The car was beat upop and lost radio contact with US headquarters in Vest Berlin before breaking free and returning
to West Berlin+

m-s

* NON-BLOC
The UN Security Council baa suspended Its debate on
the Cuban crisis lode finitely following: tba announcement
by Acting Secretary General U Thant that he would consult
privately with representatives of the US, TJ3SH, and Cuba.
Fending; tta& outcoua of these consultations, the flnon-Aligned
grqup" has also halted Its plans for spansoring a resolution in the Council.
Except for some reduction In the nervousness of the
Vast Gernfui press^ there Is little reflection in Don-bloc
comment of the turnaround of Soviet ships and the US and
Soviet responses to rJ ThantTs proposals for avoiding a
confrontation on the high seas,
?
are continuing instances of demonstrations in
Asian, European and Latin American countriesT but participation is limited largely tn Communist and avowedly pacifist elements, At this hour none seems likely to assume
massive proportions.
Tha Shah of Iran has not commented publicly, but Foreign Minister Aram told Ambassador H O I B & B on 24 October
that the Iranian delegation at tbe UK was being instructed
to give full support to the US progr-an, Including extensive lobbying among the Afro-Asians with an eye toward
possible General Assembly consideration of tbe

General Lebanese opinion is reported almost "Jubilant"

at what is considerad A great free world victory^ particularly because the tJS challenge is directed at tne USSR
rather than "pygray Castro." The official Greek attitude
Is that a NATO public endorsement of tbe US quarantine Is
preferable to statements by individual governments. Athens'
permanent representative In Paris has been Instructed to
support move in thia direction *

ippre
aqua'
Turkey and Soviet installations in Cuba may lead to Communist pressures on Turkey Foreign Minister Erkin told Ambassador Hare on 24 October that it is essential for Turkey
to receive needed military equipment quickly. A general

mobilisation order has been issued by the defense and Interior ministries instructing security forces to work jointly
to combat subversion and sabotage.
g
Premier Ben Bella, grunting an appoibtuent
to charge Porter only after two-day delay, expressed hope
for continued US economic aid, but reiterated his conviction that as a matter of principle "Cuba unfit be supported*"
Be charged the US violated the ON charter by resorting to
unilateral military action. The Moroccan acting foreign
minister concedes tLe U Taint plan for a moratorium en military shipments to Cuba 1B unrealietic without
t
Foreign Affairs secretary Dlallo of Guinea has assured
Ambassador Attwood that his country has no intention of grantIng- the DS3B landing or overflight rights for air movements
to Cuba. He stated that Guinea had refused a Soviet request
for this purpose in
Asian reaction* remains In low key, partly because of
preoccupation with the SibO-Indian border clashes. Cambodia, however, bas announced its decision to establish
diplomatic relations with Cuba,
Uruguay has now joined the other members in support of
the QAS resolution. All OAS members except Brazil, Bolivia,
Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay have offered to participate in
some way in tfifr quarantine.
Tne two Argentine destroyers to be used id the quarantine will sail OIL 2S October. The Argentine Ambassador to
the OAS has been instructed to urge that a joint command be
set up under the OAS for naval quarantine operation rather
than unified US commands. Venezuela has already urged a
meeting of the Inter-American Defense Board+
Mexico, traditionaly against intervention, has somewhat reluctantly agreed to support whatever measures the
OAS adopts. TheTe has been no Indication whether this support would Include active participation in the use of force,
but president Lop*** Uateos has said that any action should
be under the control of international organizations+
Socialist presidential aspirant Senator ALlende of
Chile is reportedly unhappy about the effect of the blockade on Chilean politics because be believes the firm US
stand has changed the public nood against the leftist coalltionF FHAP. Allende's chances of being elected in 1964
have been considered food but bis pro-Castro stand now may
work Against him.
IV-2

Brazil sees Itself as a peacemaker I D the Cuban situation, proposing that the UN undertake denuclearization of
Latin America. Rio feels this would permit Cuba and the
Soviet UDlon to Save face, thus diminishing the danger of
confrontat* an.

The Communist parties and other pro-Castro groups in

Latin America were apparently caught unprepared by President Kennedy's action. They are believed to have plans for
large-scale frtrikea, sabotage H, and demonstrations In case
Cuba is iovadad or a counterrevolution breaks out, hut
they seen not to have thought out In advance what to do in
1 S drastic situations. Actions D O T being organized call
for demonstrations and marches and for telegrams to government officials, together with a propaganda barrage protesting the "blockade." The Comjuunists In Latin America nay
feel that precipitous action in this less-than-all-out situation Is likely to prorotee drastic reprisals tfhlch could
cripple their potential for large-scale strikes and sabotag in future emergencies. The ConunUDist Party of Brazil
has Instructed the Commun1st-dominated maritime federations
to organize a boycott of US ships,
The scattered violence and bombing which Is taking
place in several countries may bfr th* work of C<unmuniflt&
already unhappy with Moscow's reluctance to Support widespread revolution in Latin America or of other hot-beaded
pro-Castro groups. These terrorist activites appear badly
planned and largely ineffective*

IT-3

TO

..I
*

Canada placed itself Golldly in support of the US action with strong speeches in ConHrons on 25 October by Prime
Minister Dlefenbaker and Libergl leader Pearson. While
stressing the need to find ft peaceful solution, Diefenbaker
said that Cuban missiles were a "direct and immediate manace to Canada," and he brushed away arguments about the
legality of the quarantine with the comment that they were
largely "sterile and Irrelevant," He announced: that Canadian Narad forced now BTB on the same readiness footing BB
US units.
Noweglan Foreign Minister Langed addressing parliament
on 25 OctoberT expressed support only for direct negotiation
between the US and USSR. The Undersecretary In the Norwegian
Foreign Ministry, however, told the Yugoslav amoa'ssador that
the Soviet action in Cuba was like placing an armed aircraft
carrier off US shores.
Ip Italy: Prime Minister Faafanl's somewhat equivocal
line grows out of his fear of upsetting the delicate balance
In the center-left government, We now have reports that
Nennl's Socialist party will tafce a line sympathetic
to Cuba rather than the US, although one spokeBASH earlier said
that In any showdown fi majority of Socialists would side with
the Teat.
Officials In Spain and Portugal ere supporting the US,
A strong statement is expected from The Hague. The Belgian
reaction is "better tban expected," and official* are Surprised that the US hfl$ not yet put Cuba on the COCOU list.
In the British House of Commons on 25 October, Labor
leader Gaiteke 11 expressed sympathy for the US, but also
anxiety over possible Soviet retaliation, KTacnlllan endorsed
the President's action and said the missiles were unquestionably offensive, Any Cuban settlement, he said, would have to
Include an accurate check on their removal, after which the
world leaders should try for "wider negotiations."
At their 23 October meeting, the EEC Foreign Ministers
showed "striking unanimity of support and understanding" for
the US position, but felt that heneefor h it will be difficult
to Separate the Cuban and Berlin problems. There was considerable dissatisfaction with the Berlin contingency plans, and
Spaak felt that the fruitless East"Vest "soundings" should be
replaced by a "serious" conversation.
In. West Gen-anr, where there Apparently Is panic buying,
Defense Minister Strauss told the US HAAG chief on 25 October

that the National Defense Council was unanimous In

that Bonn should ajo to any length to support the US, even
If It courted great
The Trench press on 25 October reported that French
armed forces have been put on "Number T*o alert," the final
stage before general mobilization. Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville, however, does not believe there will be any
Soviet action in. regard to Berlin,,
With certain minor reservations by some countries,
agreement nOv has been reached vithln NATO to deny landings
and overflights to Soviet aircraft on Cuban runs, The US
now ig requesting that C&ech and Cuban aircraft-be given
similar treatment, or that they be harassed. The Canadian
decision to search Cuban and Czech planes is cited as an eaauple of effective harassment.

IV-5

 I I .

i.

^ . -

'-:

.'.*..

;. <

"

.. v

r"

C E N T R A L

1N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y
''

.';.:::.
.'./..-

.':

..?,',?_ _.i-

AI'I'KOVED -'OK KELEASE

DATE: DEC

---.^.VL
.

. .

THE CUBAN SITUATION

2fl December 1062

EO 12953 6.1Cc)>2SYrs

FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMrrTtE

OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
PUKTHER DE5SEM1NAT1ON OF WFORMATION
HEREIN IS N O T AUTHORIZED.

TOPSE

1.1-1

. . . .

. - .

f
'

This
ieosrifcy of
, TJE Cuffc T
J i L ^ in anv jnanuer to
nei [JrejuclLfJaE
e benefit of any

ED

(l)>25Yrs

- -

rtJ.i .J __+_

iLi-L-Hl

TOP
SO

16 December 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM:

The Cuban Situation

The Continuing Sovlettfllitary Presence in Cuba;

1, Since the withdrawal off the Soviet strategic
lisalies and the I L - 2 H H we have not noted any significant reduction In the number of Soviet Military personnel In Cuba. We estimate tbat sone 16,000 remain,
3. Recent photography of the four Soviet armored
group encampments reveals continuing activity and no
signs of preparation for withdrawal. Construction of
barracks at the encampment near Artemlsa was continuing
as recently aa 12 December. An estimated 6,000 Soviet
troops are stationed at the four
3, The 24 Soviet-controlled SAM sites remain
operational and buildings are being constructed at
some of the sites. An estimated 4,000 Soviet personnel man the SAK sites. There is no operational reason
why these weapons could not be used against US reconnaissance aircraft at any tine,
4. Three coastal defense cruise missile giteg appear" Operational. They are manned by An estimated 1,000
Soviet military personnel.
A fourth such site was abandoned last month, but the equipment has probably not
been renored fron Cuba. Photography indicates that it
was apparently delivered to the Campo Florido installation, ten miles east of Havana, where cruise missile
equipment has been noted previously.
5. The 39 UIG-2lCs known to be in Cuba are almost
certainly operated solely by Soviet pilots. At least some
of then are equipped with air-to-air missiles. In addition, Soviet personnel dominate the air defense systemh
Including the early warning radar network.
6, Eleven of the 12 EOUAR-^class miss lie-equipped
patrol boats have been sighted in recent photography

EO

TOP

TOP
appear still active. These boats are
operated by mixed Soviet-Cuban crewsH

BO 12953 3.4(b)(1)>2

S r There are no reliable indications of

planned: reduction In the Soviet military presence nor
of Soviet intent to turn over their sophisticated
equipment to the Cubans.
Cuban-Spyiet Relations:
9. Indications of the nature And extent of future
Soviet economic support for the Castro regime nay emerge
from the discussions now underway in Moscow between Soviet leaders and veteran Cuban Conraunlst Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez. Rodriguezt who accompanied the Cuban trade
mission to Hoacow early ttala uonth, told the preaa in
Moscow on 12 December ths.t his talks vill "cover wider
problems" than trade. After comaentitiff on Soviet lotiffterm credits gxanted Cuba In the past, he said that now
Cuba's duty Is to "steadily reduce the need for credits,
These comments seen to reflect both a continuing Cuban
effort to squeeze as much as possible fron the Soviets
and possible Cuban concern that Moscow may now be bemore tight-fisted In its aid policies.
10+ A clandestine source who was in contact with
personnel of the Soviet embassy in Havana early tbls
month reports that Rodriguez la seeking a ten year, $40
million loan from Moscow, a new agreement on consumer
goods Imports, and a higher price for Cuban sugar sold
to the bloc* The special premium price Moscow bad agreed
nearly two years ago to pay for Cuban sugar has now been
exceeded by the world market priceH

.3.

EO 12956 3.HbHM>25Tra
{3}

BO 12953 3,4(b)(l)>25Yrs
(SJ

The Internal Cuban Situation:

11b The stresses of the recent crisis period on
the Cuban leadership could well lead to high-lev*1
changes in the near future. Fidel Castro's own role,
however, atill appears dominant and there is no infornation that bis posit inn is being; challenged by any other
Cuban leader.
12. There la atill no evidence to support reports
from untested clandestine sources that Che Guevara
left Cuba on 6 December for a year's "leave of absence'4
for health reasons and! that President Dorticos has been
Granted three months leave. Guevara's most recent public appearance was on 7 Decebber when he delivered the
latest of a series of particularly aggressive pronouncements. Guevara, In his 2ft November interview for the
London Dally Worker tame closer than any Cuban leader has
yet to publicly criticizing the Soviet missile withdrawal.
He also reiterated his batred of the US and stated in
strong terns the important role of Cuba in providing the
example for Latin America's "anti-Imperial1st revolution."
He listed a number of other Latin American countries: which,
be called ripe for revolution and where guerrillas "are
already in tbe field."
13. Student agitation for the removal of tbe veteran
Communist rector of Havana University, Juan karinelln^
could be the beginning of a new drive against tkoldtF Communists vho have not adapted to CastroTs leadership.
Marinello Is accused by the students of having supported
the Soviet position, not Cuba'st during the recent crisis
period. The University students are widely regarded as
anong Castro's aost vigorous supporters.
14. Public statements by Cuban leaders suggest that
the Cuban political machine modeled after bloc Coflnuniat
parties may be formally organized early in the yearT perhaps next month at a First National Congress of tbe United
Party of the Socialist Revolution+ Preparations for the
party congress have been underway for some months in what
regime officials describe as "the election of the best
revolutionaries by their comrades at every work center
throughout the countryH" This suggests that tbe new party
Is to be built on a completely new base and that former
political organizations such aa the old Communist party
and Castro'a 36 of July Movement are not to be incorporated
en toto. Guevara has stated that the initial membership
T the party will be between 60,000 and 0,000 militants.
-3-

TOP

ED 12956 3.4(bHl)>5T:r.B

Stannary of Reports From a Cuban Military Officer:

15. During the past week we have received a nutiber
of reports fron a Cuban military officer who ha* had
first-hand Information on a number of aspects of tlis
Cuban unitary situationH Sons of his information is
nwT much of it tends to confirm information previously
received from other sources I D lass detail* and "OSt of
it appears true. The source appears reliable on subjects relating to Cuban Military activities: his Information on Soviet Jnilitary activities in Cuba Is generally
secondhand and not as reliable.
16. The officer had first-hand knowledge of mil*- .
tftry construction activities In uany parts of the Island.
Ee provides detailed Information on the construction of
military storage facilities In caves in various, parts of
Cuba and especially on three specific cares on which he
Is most knowledgeable. Be strongly doubts that Soviet
missiles ire being concealed In Cuban caves* although be
grants that this would be technically possible in a few
of them. He reports that the items stored. In caves include riflftSj nachineguns, ammunition, emergency rations,
explosivesj and gasoline, Refugee and other clandestine
sources bare previously reported On the utilization of
caves for military purposes, but this source has provided
the most detailed And useful information yet received on
this subject. The general belief ie that these storage
sites are intended to be used by guerrilla forces in the
event the island Is Invaded.

3.4i

IT. The source offers Information on the Soviet missile buildup In Cuba, but on this subject he appears to
rely largely on secondary sources. Be doubts that all the
strategic missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba, but
bases this oa having learned of more missiles coming Into
Cuba during the buildup period than he has beard of departing the Island. In describing the various concentrations of Soviet military personnel in Cuba he repeatedly
states that he does not know the precise Dumbers. or functions of the personnel in these places: since no Cubans
permitted In ttoe sites,
lfl.

The source states that en or about 29 Wovember

I THIS

is

information indicating that these Installations might be

BO 12959

3.fl(bMl>>253Trs

-4-

TO

EO
(3)

over to the Cubans, The source also statedd

as nia personal opinion, that the SAM sites is Cuba
would, probably be turned over to the Cubans eventually
and that Soviet forces throughout the island would
gradually be reduced as the Cubans became capable of
hand ling tbe equipment. He stated that the MIG-21S
have not been turned over to Cuban control andt In fact,
that Cuban pilots have not been penultted to fly the
planes* This tends to C O D first information frOft
sources, although the source's added covmnt
that the MIG-2Is might be sent bach to the USSR if the
**US puts pressure on" cannot be aval urn ted.
1&. The source describes at length the numbers
and functions of Chinese Communist military personnel
In Cuba, confirming our earlier Impressions tbit the
Chinese Connmnists are playing a veryttitiorrole in
the military picture In Cuba, fie states, in fact, that
"it is to be emphasized that in the military don*in, tbe
show Is exclusively Cuban-Soviet." The Chinese Coununist military personnel consist of only 0 to 25 men assigned to tbe ChineBe Comaunlst embassy who advise the
armed forces ministry on the operation of the weapons
sent by PelpjLag to Cuba and, in addition, about five
Chinese Communist pilot Instructors at the San Antonio
d# las B*Da& ftrbaae+ H does not know the quantities
of Chinese weapons is Cuba, but says they include bazooka,!,
land ninest and possibly 37nm antiaircraft guns,
19, The source's report on Castro+s plans with respect to the US Kaval Basft at Guantanano Bay and on Cuban military activity in the base area Is consistent with
information from other sources on this Issue+ The gist
&t his report is that the regime continues to regard legal
net Ionspecifically "through the United Nation-*"as the
only way in which it night fulfill Its aspiration ol
winning control of the base territory. \~~
ED 12956

EO
(S)

-5-

EO 129SB. 3T, 4 (bj

20. The source dascribes several events which

lead hln to conclude that the Cubans have been very
careful to avoid any incident near tts base that
provide the US with * provocation Justifying ma attach
on Cuba, He states that the Cuban military buildup in
the base area is extensive and in depth, but defensive
in nature4 This is generally confirmed by other sourcest
including extensive photographic reconnaissance of the
area around the base.
2lH The source's general comments on the CutaanSovlet alliance are admittedly based on bis own opinion;
nevertheless It is apparent that It Is the opinion of
an Intelligent and perceptive individual, He described
the alliance as an "unholy" one, with each aide attempting to use the other for Its own ends and: each constantly maneuvering to gain advantages over the other. He
says Castro is trying to squeeze the Soviet Union for
every bit of economic support possible and "the USSR
knows thi3 and Castro knows it does." He says the
USSR 10 trying to make CaStro expendable; "Castro knows
this and the USSB knows he knows it." In general, he
feels Castro remains in a strong personal position In
the regime and Soviet efforts to control him or weaken
his position, the source 1 tiplies, have not been successful.

BO 12358 3,4

iS

4)
-

1 April

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECOHD

SUBJECT;

Meeting at the White House 1 jlpril

Subject - Brazil

PRESENT!

Tho President
State Department: Secretary Husk,
Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under
Secretary Johnson, and Vr, Ralph Burton
Defense Department: Secrotary
,
Deputy Secretary Vance, General Taylor
and: General O'to
White House Staff: JHeasrs, Bundy,
Moyors, and Beedy
CIA:
Wv.

The Director, Colonel Klft(j an4

FitifiGcrnlil

1, The Meeting cojamejited with a briefing on. the

latest lntelligeiice reports by Oolcmel KiJdg including
i
from the 10 A'clock tolecon botveen Stute and
Gordont Hatters seemed to be more
to the inaqrgonts than the? had been the previous
particularly in view of indications that General flruel
ie moving Second Army troopa to tho Sao Paulo border.
2. Secretary Rusk said that Aj*aeaador Gordon
was not advocating u,S. suppnxt At this time. Only tbe
Paulistae had requested such, aid and this without definition, AntbjBsador Gordont with whom the Secretary agreed,
believes that it would be vrong at this stage to give
Goulart An aati-Tflnkeo banner.

APPROVED rORIEUASt
DfiTE:MU?<OZ


3. Secretary Husk referred to & trleak" the
ovening before regardinp the Movement of a Naval
task force to the area of southern Brazil. (General
Taylor said that tJtere was not actually n leak tout
that it appeared to be a deduction by newsmen ba&ed
on knowledge that a special meeting at the Joint
Chiefs toofe place,) It wftfi Agreed that newspaper
queries concerning the Naval movement would be
treated roirtineljr and that it trould not be shown
as a contingency move having ta do with Brazil,

(C)

s, There wag an aside on Panaua concerning the

OAS language concerning U.S. discussions with
tho cnvernn&nt ol Pjiruma. Th& Presideiit gav* as hie
opiriion that this iangua^e, which appeared to please
the Patianmniana, did riot to him appear to differ from
that which we had previously used,
6r
In another interjection! th* President askod
what the effect of Senator Fulhrlcht'e speech had been
nbroad. Mr, Dnll reforred to his recent trip to Europe
during which ho addressed thoWAtU council fprior to the
Fulbriffht speech). He said that the NATO people had
agreed that the U.S. had not clearly stated its position
vis-a-vis Cuba. Mr, Ball belleve* that the Fulbright
speech aay Rive ammunition to those *iio do not fnvor
Aur Cuba policy in the first piece. He also added that
tho Che Guevara tspoecn In Genova had been Audi too I O U E
and had therefore protwibly laid an egff. Me aaid that he
<tid not thinh that, as far as econonlc denial against Cuba
is conterned, the Fulbright gpeech nould have very much
effect in Latin America as there wae very little
trade anyway. Tins Preaident iaimlrod whether we are
endeavoring to explain the basis of our present policy
to Fnlbrifht, Secretaj^r Husk aaid that tbis had teen
and is being done, The President observed that Senator
FiiIbrlent probably e enjoying the halo aet on his brow
by the New 7ork TiJes and tho Washington Poet and will
probafcly wish to retain the headgear* Mr. Ball said

.;.-A>::W':i-

IP

IP

-.

v . .-

I'V**

- >

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 35-64

Situation and Prospects in Cuba

^m&

^pfeT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

THE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION1

I(. THE ECONOMY

Current Situation

Economic Outlook

III. THE INTERIVAL POLITICAL SCENE

Cuirent Siruatipri

,,.,

Security Machinery

Outlook

LI
,

IV. THE \(ILJTAflY FORCES

.13

Current Situation
Oudoolt

[I

1J
,,

r_fl

The So*irt Military Pr*Jcncr

Jjg

ChaflWJ flf Rciritroduction of Strategic Weapons

17

V. FOREIGN POLICIES

T h t Problem of SAMs Mid U-Zs

Overtures Toward the TJS
Latin AnKTin Policies

...

17

19
,,

. . . 20
,30

CUBA

- -

',.

VLF OF X

4-T

'

"

. :

r.T

C A R I B B E A N

S*ikr

S E A .

^ 1

'

'

'

'4 '

i H f Baarr J J i l i

'

^-1

^pET

SITUATION AND
PECTS EN CUBA

THE PfiO&LEM

To assess, the Cuban situation and the outlook over the P**E year
OK

CO INCLUSIONS

A. Though the downward treod of the Cuban economy seems

to have slowed and perhaps levelled off, %ve believe the economic
situation will be stagnant over the next two years. Inept management and low labor morale will persist, Living levels are likely to
become slight!v lower, and shortages of foodstuffs, housing and many
types of consumer goods will continue. Slight gains [n industry are
jlfctly, but these will probabfy be offset by same dedine in the agricultural sector. (Purtu. 3-7, 9-13, 17-19)
B, Export earnings in 1965 and 1966 are liktly to be belo^v
levels-, because of lower su^ar prices and poor prospects for b
tiallv larger production ai sugar and other export commodities. The
vaJue of total trade with the Fret World can be expected to decline
during the period. We believe that the Soviets and other Communist
countries will provide sufficient credit assistance U> prevent a. seriously
damagingdiOp in total imports-. In these circumstances, Cubai heavy
economic dependent* on the Communist world vri\\ con tino*. (Par&s.

8, 14-16)
C- Depressed lewis of consumption, the imposition oi worfc normsH
and forced labor and jectiritv duties will tend to narrow the regime's
popular support. However, the huge security apparatus will almost
certainly prevent popular dissatis faction from bringing down the
regime-- We think it likelv that a number of military officers have
lost sympathy with certain of its policies, but we doubt that there is

military disaffection on a st-:^ sufficient to ili.re.iten Castro, Major

deterioration in the internal situation or serious difficulties within the
government could alter the picture, " u t YVukl ke unlikely to undermine Castro's power position in [ess than several years. We believe
bis death ^voutc! lead, in Fafrlv short order, to & povrer struggle of
unpredictable outcom*. [Paras. 2O-3G)
D The Cuban armed force* ire much the best-equipped in Latin
America and, except for Brazil, the largest. Their capabilities have
continue! to improve, chiefly as ji result of the delivery at additional
weapons from the USSR an<f Cohan acquisition of weapon systems
formerly under Soviet control. The compulsory military service program, introduced last November, will probably cause an initial droo
in the level of training and efficiency, but uill permit improved
selectivity of recruits for the active forces, and 'ill eventually produce
a much larger trained resent- [Paras. 37^*3)
E. There are almost certainly DO Russian combat units still in
Cuba- Upon completion of current v/ithdrawals, a. Soviet MAAGtyne presence, mostly technical and maintenance personnel, of about
2,000 will probably remain so lonj a& the Cuban arnu?d forces reTPiin
dependent an the'USSR for technical and material support to maintain their complex Soviet equipment. [Faros. 44-45)
F. During the period of this estimate, the Soviets are highly
unl&clv to reintioduce strategic weapons into Cuba, though they
have the technical capability to Jo so clandestinely. They mi^ht
use Cuba for support of their submarines, but so long as they calculate
that the risk would be high, they would not push such * venture
vtrv far. (Paras. 46-47)
C. The Cuban-Soviet relationship remains intact, although frictions have continued. Castro, though willing to lean to the side of
the Soviets in the Sinc-Sovwt dispute, has rs Fused to Join in any
formal condemnation of Peipin^. He L* concerned lest a further
improvement in US-SovEet relations leave his regime more isolated
and exposed. Though the Soviets almost certainly consider Casto
to be erratic and undependable. they have little choice but to continue to support him- (Paras. 4$-$2)
H. The most explosive question in Soviet-Cuban relations, as
well as between Castro and the U5, is the continuation of U-2
erflights. Castro and Khrushchev have conducted a program of
ov

warnings, threats, tind compLOuiise s u^restLons to induce the L"S to

desist. It Es a]most certain thfit Cuba no^ has full control <jver
the SAM system-and consequently the capability to shaat down a
U-2. Thus we believe that the Soviets can only gi^e advice, backed
up by their potiticai and ecotiunnLc- leverage, though we cannot wholly
e^ciu^e the possibility that they have retained some Sort of physical
restraint on an actual firing. Nevertheless, we be-lieve that Casern
does not intend Co force the issue until after" the US elections, when
he will seek UN action. If this fails, there Es considerable danger that
he would order a shootdown, taltatatinr^ that the US would not retaliate in Force or that, if it did, the resulting hue and cry would end
the overflights. An impulsive reaction hy- Castro Or even an unauthorized ihootdown is always oassible. (Ptrffl-f. 44, 53-56}
T. Ci^tro has a serious interest in improving relations with the
US, as a. means of reducing the pressures an his regime- He pr&bahly also wnsiders that his recent gestures are useful to buiJd a retord
of Cuban reasonableness and flexibility in prtpiration for Cubas appeal to the UN on the U-2 \siut. He will probably matt Further
overtures From time to timt, but there is little chance that he will
acctdt at any early date to the conditions the U"S has stated, (ftinw.

57-38)
J. Castro's efforts to foment revolution in Latin America have suffered setbacks during the past year. He is probably somewhat less
sanguine about the chances for quiet success. Nevertheless, be will
almost certainly continue to provide aid and subversive training to
potential revolutionaries. He may pr^s tot early aggressive action
by some Castroist groups, even though their immediate chancts seem
ptK)rt hoping that their repression \would eventually produce conditions
more favorable for exploitation. (Faras. 59-62)

DJSCUSSFQN
I. EN TROD LJC NO N
L TEic appeal of CiittTOi revijjcjjtion u wearing thinner, thnugh fits
On the instruments; of [[w^er remains firm L>nrJngg the year
since oar List
y
assessment of Cub,!.1 the Castro regime has itnd Trwne s^th^ks than
accomplishments, more nribtrujn ion tftin triumph. The economic dtfficijUie.s hate
been pdrtK-utarlv evident; these | u i ' * orO^ht & Further narnJwing in popular
iuppoft and tfiejeailng resort to methods ai iejneiin\i and. tSir^ar. The hope*
ui the Cuban Leaden For raped %&int by sympathetic rc^TiLur ioniiry- "roup^ ehcin L i t i n Artierica- were dealt serichti ^jEoivs,
and! hy the Ur,iii]ian r-rvnJution in April.
1. On the other lund. Lhcie hJvc bttn some impOrMnt
forcrs have cOnSide^aMy jmrwoved the:f ovfii^U cjpyh:iiria!, Lifg;*ly throug.h the
accjutsil ir?n f>( nvaia Soviet "L'jpOns j n d ^telpDn iystems. The regime^
scaJe eEort in technii[, vcH^tiofiiL. an<J general eduction h i t moved
though i t some expense to the qua!ity nf education nn the praftssL-nflal
The pjogiam nf training and indOrtr(natin subversives irom o-ther oountrics
has cantinucd. On- the economic $ide. suhjt^flti^l Soviet aid is coatinuin^ and
Jii*h ^vor3d jjfLtfa permitted gtwd earnings from a sm-LlL 1964 sug^r crop, aiduij
Cvba"> effort to ejcpand imports oF ciiticallv needed cquipmciir from
suppliers.
Ik THE
Currtril
3. There were canti'iitJn^ aspects ic Cuba's KOnomic perrJornmncc in
Hegjftted as a whole, it as another bad year: totJtJ jiroducdciii was Ltelow that
of 1362 and CraJi N'itJPn^t Frodu (CNP) remainrd substantially bcln^v that
of 1933, the !a*r nietevoltatianary year. On the positke jitfeh however, the rat*
of WQdOtTiEc decline, which has been rapid \n recent tears, seems to ha^e slowed
or teveJled oE. D^ti to i*t afatlabfe suggest [hat stAEjnation at a low ltve(
continue thrtnijh 1964: flight 3in; in LndustrijJ output a/e likeJv, hctt
will probably be offset by tQfn* dedirt* in the- agriculture sector.
4. W e estimate Cuban sugar output in JSfrJ i t AppTQ^rtUttk (he s4m.c
as in 19633,3 sniliifln metric tonsthe smatteit crcp in IS years-.- The
regime had hoped For * I S T ^ T harvest, atid. the Tcplftnlinrf of cane- Fi4tJrtikeci
in 196S and 1G63 reii^rit ha.ve. made, this passible. Hwever, Flurricaruc Flora
damaged some cane and intended transport and supply difficulties. The
regime's nationalisation ^ (niddle-siied firms IA October \ the Second Agrarian
H
3

NlE fl5-63. "SiruatSn *nd Frpei;u ui CbtiaL djttri J4 Jon* 1961

T b * L962 CTOp " * i i >l.B mkltion tnoj, crflpi in lilt |>je-Ciitra yean WETE
5 rruJLkm

Re:<?r:nl j b o created new problems m suijLir prudvction.

an early sr.irt at trua ha:-vsst. the orLjScLLiin^ yf t:J\ iJijn 'voJn:ntecr~
k
and the use of army units, the Tegune on<^ .Lgain hjiJed to lure or drive an
adequate labor fnrce i-nta the grueling u-Qrl; of tEn? C:me fields. Harvesting niu
also adversely affected by military airrts. tipttcally the brge-se-ile m&Uliii[ian undertaken in V(ay. Increased ui*f was mj-d^ of txna Ui^din^ machines, but
this seems to liave mad^ unly j miT|rin.il d-Lrrar&Lict. Cuiwcqueiltly, snmi;
remained uncut when the harvest season -sndtd in J
5- Thr TegEme'i g*ner,n| LnabUJty to cnanj^c .igncultur4 L* also L'videsit [n
Ifiwer yLLtput of most olhe* crtfTj?. Hurricane Flar,i. th-e JiLitiyniilJjJtion dfitriir.
and the diversion of knd FTOIH food jrtd indusfji^il crops to cane Imve ^"i^11
Other depressin^ factors. The le^ijri* ii Crying to institute nsnre mtenske farming methods and inweascd Hipplieattnn tf tertLli^tf. ^ut it is prahauie thji
dvction in nonsugitt ajrieulturc this y*-tt wit! Jjt a ^ n l^^tr t3ian tfi
level of 1963.1
6. There has proibaLiLy been ;i ilEght incrtiuatf in ii^dtiStriol output sinte early
L963, reujlticig: largely from jn LmprtjvemeciL in. thij ^upnN- of import^ luiils ;LP<1
ifbdustrtll n w materials and from Uie opLTiicij of som-? flew pliAiJEi, most of (Jifim
built with Soviet Bloc aid. md under the lupension of Soviet Bloc
Ne^trthcJeis, SCiniiter rjf Irtdustrips Che Cue^riLra njntinues to
p
satisfittion with the slow pace of ifliurtriat expansion and the Low produ.cti\-ir.of industrial labor.* None of the Longfr-ranje. Sovict-Snaneud mining or pow?r
projects hAve yet m e into operation. Plan* for l,irge-scde industrialization
hava been sbeK-ed for the indefinite future.
7, By and Urge, the Cuban t&nstruiiion industry is still i:i the doldrums: Us
pcrformince in 1963 dipped below that af the previou.* veir, i n 4 the plan inz
1964 cilts for rto increase-. Cuban, nfrkisla ha^ic- pybEtck admiitteJ tfiat con,,
strudian on a number of pton.15, some where the machine ty was delivered lon^
, hai lagged behind schedule.
&- Cubin. traJ* data fat 1963-1 ibow an inc?eise oE S2j mil I ion [n exports
1342, a rise attributable to hijhec prices f&r sugjr. [mports In 1963 TOSE to
1

El I; mwdl tiDting th*t liie Cdtvui econdmie pbn [{jf 3M4 calll :ar aalv 4 t.3 pert*nt
creue ewtr WSJ [n the lOtiL irnmuil of food, i^iihblf for nnfitmpcio^ Inqliiing ifnforb,
tE thil ggn3 li fulfilledind (he- Cu.ba.nt h^'E H5(J<J*TI met pllrt gaals in ttw purit
not b* -ewHgh (P1 lep ilp wih. lh* SdnuaL pijjiuljriGn growth, arvi per npLu p w
c-irt, In Frbrtliry DE "iiij year, ddnjijirf the UTii/nprrtiLi-fl p*r=acnLnc* fff 4 c
during L383 uid. tn cilll^g far nsw ctiurb, laid, ^V-e carinrtt rat oci DUI
irtdtrftriaE lJlli it? tlnv that tiey an ran enou^k t-5 rest on, *0t e ^ n 50 [ t one fiflger
on. Wfl must il l j t o*SW pmc IKIKIJ. That S nuc "jjt."
'The LBS1 rjjde- li-Jijrtt ire taJurn Fpjra J m*n.Jt aLT|Gij*d ttacunicnt. TTiij. WUTCC a
aswratr UL rnajiv aE lU deui!j r and w ; axn ^Urjed M give it mOrtf cnod*nrt "Jtgiv DUX
pntfcitlgu. Ttwrt* prDJecti^n; ^BPT, rHvertheufij. tosed npftfl. j cara^kr^ble Ewd*1
d*riee-; thoy plural C*jhiD eipOrtS gt S-lTo rsidLJim atnl ^ a r t i ar J73O million Far
Fuirirtf ]Ljht will t s throvrft oq th* isiu* ivhen Sa^iei p j j-titiiiifi tw (inf >*ir ice
bu( thli wi3L IHtlK fir j niDarK ot ja.

since 155E. This incre,1>t ^-J? Lilmnst entirely i.i imports br>m
the Communist countries ilnt; nrueE1, of it wai deliveries of rrudi(P-?rv ;ind equipment financed by devdopinenc credits. For 1964 thtf value of Cuban exports will
again incrtSS^ largely because of the high ivgai prices which prevailed when
mo4t of the crop was sold Impends as a whole nay go up skg.hiLy in 1&&4.
a Hsft LJI imports from the FTCS U u *ld is Likely On be largely offset by a
In imports from tin; Cuiiimunist counirits. "fhe 3evl gf Soviet ossiiMn
1964 'q]] probably oe appreiiJbiy l>elahv the S350 million level of 1963.
CUBAN FOfi]GM TRADE
(in LiidliQftf o^ JDILITIJ

IMS

WJ5

I960

MSl

IMI

19B3
( prelimtnirvj

_ Zmorts [rDB J

Fw* ^^"orW
Totnl

tn

..

40
SD5

15
T.30

[a
fii5

LM
JTO

4J0
1J5

JD5
l!i

350
L95

3JU
230

415-

T53

9*3

62D

S25

5^0

S-I5

600

. . oejl.

negl.
SM

IWijl.
730

[3=
4M"

JLJ
190

6-14
120*

"05
1M"

...W

650

T5fi

515

T05

730*

S33*

S35

L:S CiMfltn pivmenri df i t i mJU-sa jn L961 and S33-rndLhSnis

9. The- CaaCrt regLrne has gEven. cOmtderible attentian to the problem of

flbtAining the parts and other produclJaD requisites needed (O Tflaintain Cuba's
capital plant, largck of US ratnttiicrure. Th* Soviets have nnt prairided t-lui
material in 4d*^vate quantity, Mid. Cwba has had! tn rfinert Srce skills and
funds tfltfl uneconomic effort* tff mate parts by fund iiid. to uie substitute m^terEat and equipment. Castty unproT-TiatiOn \&i teen neccssarj- to establish
aew forei^tt suppliers, ivho ria^-e ateul ma.iim.um prices fav vitally needed
SuppLieS10. In these circumstances, the Castro regime hai mtensificd1 its effort! to
expand, trade relation) with. Western nations. By these means it hopes not mhto mitigate the adverse efiwts of the US eonnomic demit p^ograni but also to
reduce its om poLbical Isolatiou. Beciuie the Soviets and Other Corrununist
oDuotries allowed: CasoTOi to reduce his shipments o-f i u | i r to them during, 1363
and. 1984, he hai btert *ble to CBpiuIize gn hJgh sujar prucej tempnrarilv
obtainable ia the Free World Sod (Q irwaeasc his eimuigs gf onnverbble CUJreocv. Convertibtc currency reserves- now slind at about S"3 mtUiorj, and
pfgapects for foreign eschiin^e earnings this year are- rrasOnsblv good. Mort'
over. Castro b*s been able M secure from, the UK and Ff jnce same 330 rtlillian
of nrtdiuun term crcditf fof LU-genlJy needed trSflSfOrt and. conBtfv^on equipment. Some of thii is being delanfired in 19S4; some is to be shipped in 196511. The mnsi gtarin| wtaknrii of the economy has. b*en the- regimes frivn
ry mismanagemrnt ifld ineptitude. After the Te^iolurian. the regime

launched *m slUunsidcret pro^rcm uf forred-drnfr ind^trijiiziHiOn d agritt^HL-aL dmirsificition: the nios< ;mportajii remit of this waj to undermine the
t3ijJis:Led tjsis tv su5.11 production. *(>" the :<inie Ins complied rha
circle: sugir i i :15a in i i i * ^aiL-LiwW :iftd tlw *Oiu for iT0 is 10 niiJlion tons.
nded calcte ppj^Ltction For food and jriJustfEjl suppl-.- ia iLtiQthci p r i m a l
at lh# administration. FoJIon-Lng T*Liid niitinnatoalion of the grtat b l k
i i
of Che island1;; :onomic activity, the r ^ i m * adoptcti a ddocirinaiw
Marxist
npproiich toward the rndiugernL fctu-tinn: in iri puiscil of
more and more economic fciWii!imenlS ^^t^^f mjd part of Ur 3 e JL
"oonsolidatcd z^-H^i^.~
wLtli .ill ^ L [ o r def!3i:i-!iii:ifcEng ,uitnonty .
in Havnnil. But so Hine-cOiMminS und: hiitCiiupMtic h^i the diiim-mafcEnij
process beenmti that Ciwl*o himself l^s damiwd tJ^e system itdd catted for decentralization iind Che ewrcise 0^ much more reirwniLbLlJh- .it local '
1 ' Cuban affiriali have teen frank to u y that lhw ecanomit slarnties
Tioraccurale enough for sOvnd pUnnirtgbut (hey pLin and f J ^ i n d p
The Loss through defection, of skilled Ubor Ltnd m,nU^e^Lil Lilent has
a cumuLatLv* *d\er S = effect Not many of the nc^v- managers srem (0 be enst
rjorucjous: <Juruig 1963 ttw ilste LnduSCrLit * n t c r p r j fe!i short by almost 2oO
million p^sos Or the. 6ST miKn p*s that they rtere supposed to turn over * B I
rheif incomw to the Cuban budget. P h i p 5 mo^r Sibus nF all :s die re-iise t
candnumg hilitfe to provide m^inu^fuL m ^ L i l iac^hves for .vorkr Jnd
farmerJ- T I I B impoiitioft of work norms an(3 ^ t^rt(*ed work w k have, con
tributed to the decline in Ulr
t
Economic Outlook
11 The latest irl the r e j i g s series 0? effortJ W improve administration of
the KOnomv i i the s u m p t i o n by P f s i d ^ t Etafticos of the rales of Economic
Minister and director QF planning But Cwha's problems of inept management
Srtd low Labor morale are not r^lv
soLvabic: they represent a ^ r y biifit
limiting factor on the performance at the ccanomy ^ ^ H short-run futiue at
Icait. *Alsr> oJ prime tmportaeiM Ln appfaiiin- o^-*rtlt prosprCtS for the nefl
twfl years is the owtlool; Cubiin eafnin^s from sugar iwporti.
14 Recent rbwp dLLn^9 in su^Sf futures tnil^e praspcCfcf midch less pr^misEni! For 1965, and probably rV 19Bfl as welL World spot prices, which, bad
hft a pe*k of A3 M t l t 3 H p 0 " ^ * U t t ] G x '* r a - m ' fl?c acH* w e r e E d te
^ l i oeflts l i i t NovcmW, are n^v bel^v 5 nta : rugSr fvryres for 1955 indicate
a further dedinc. Assucnin^ pric on this jert^ral LvB| lot aales to norn
Communiit rtuntries, the Caitrff regime would have 0 aspanri sygflr prodLLCtini
bv about 20 pcrrtflt to eirn as much > 1963 LH ifi 1964; rt0cvcr, it would
hive bo Mil the entiro incre^c to the Bloc ,nt the asreed price- oF 6 certli per
pound.*
DurirtC C a M ' j vUdL to the USSR laH Jrtn^a.-y. irrt Savicl*, in elfat. =Tl=ndrri B W O
tik wnmiHHnt a Tr,Dd-L965 to pi? 1 W .^nft p*r pcund for Cuban ^
T ^ Jammy
l
19H.
L7. 4 million tacu; l'SflS-l^Tn, 5 rtiJlifln r

15, Such an expansion or output <i pflSSife^e : j^t niiLkely. Although the
regime Ls moving jraduallv ahead wltEi its program nf cc^atin^ additional \ami
to cane produced, iL prab-abl^ "ill not be able Co Overcome th serious labor
s h o r t y Which has charactered i n * last three harvests. The regtme- j p p t n r t
now to be ronvjncthi thai JL aolutEon can be found only through m;ch;i niznd
harvesting techniques. Soviet machinery thus (nr h^s been H fttsappomtment.
Cuban vte ft harvesting equipment it still at the ?=cp<jrii!iLiitaL sfagtf. and we
doubt that mcchiniwtiQn ^ElL provide more thin mar^uiat relief duTiflg the
next
16. During the at of 1*4 and the first part of 1963, tEur CastrQ
aLmoit ccrtainlv obtain additional crcdEts frnni U'tstern European firms
contracting to iypply equipment Co Cuba. There^fwr thu jvatiHjjj]:cy &F such
crrdits i^iH depend, to a jrtiidf!Ti b k degree M C^lan ffl^nin^s ffom the: IBS5
guga^ crap and on t h * picsptcts for exports in 1966. The outlook for bath
is unfavorable, aod there wLll prabablv be Some decJJ!ke in (he (QtiL vialui
oi Cuban esporta. i"n thLs case,, iiflpOffj would. aJma^t certainly decline also,
pecLatlV rram the FrM World:, as Cuba's suppliers b c ^ m to have cloubfi itwu.t
Cuba's (Trrdit'worlhifltfss. At least bv 1966, JnA p t r h i p i aj ea/Ly as 1965, Cuban
foreign trade is likely to he below the-1964 level. However. v>e believe ( h i l
the Soviets and Other Communist countries will pjovide Cuba sufficient credit
to prevent a serioujly dartuigJng drop En total imports.
17. The outlook for development ai the industrial and MrtiOfucttOn 3tors
of the economy i& do*elv reLated to die prospects For [mports. With tntal
Imports likety to be iw higherand perhaps low^ithan in 1964, there vrill
be little opportunity to increue i t t p p t i of building material*., irtdmtria] raw
mal^fials, spare parts, ?fld fuels. .\ny increases in industrial production and:
construction Ln 1965 and 1966 are Lkelj- tfl be
lfi. Tbe regime') emphasis on techniml edvtition in the
and universities m i l tcrwi, over the [ong term, to aid gro^tri, especially En the
iridustriaE sector. This fairtor is not likely to have 1 major impact during, the
next t*TJ v*4J), however, Thft pgTffl 1* still relatively new, the shortage
of trw'ued EeachejH is serious, and the regime has so far succeeded in
Out only port of its planned massive shaft of ftud<nll M technical
13. In JUDI, we hetievfl that (he Cubn economy v J ! opefate at a lav level
for the next two yeaxi. Because of population growth, the individual
standard Is LJtely tn hecoiflc- ilighdy ^vnrsc. Shortages of foodifuJfs,
trtd fnany tvpes of consumer goods "dJl persist. The regime's prolonged failure
to deliver the economic benefit it pFomiMd, together with its probable need
[JO introduce additional belC-tightieninj nrcasttres, will be likcjy to
its base of popular

III. THE INTERNAL POUTLCAL SCENE

51tuariort
H), As the ravtfUit&an lliU East impetus, t!)ij reij itm: haa l)een shifting
iagly to :ri*th.ocEs oF expulsion and riinrcHsiud in. u r g i n g ;Lhoad u-irh its 10CsaliiatiQn pn>5fii:n. Tin; Cu&in Ltjiiers a?e iijjph ing sume measures
from the Soviet Bloc without iUccsfuLLy adiptsnii tEufrn ta Cuban clkar
they are ciot putting COOLL^I Lit-in Q-jivat intu ft ^stifm whicb the Swiss
bassadw in Havana ias referred ta ;nj. "MarMwfl tlia-eha.-ch.il."1 The regime
absorbed small industrial, service, and r t b i l businCiscs in'o tSie nLiBitc govern
mertL-nin lector t> the economy w d hiLj talicn ,n rmmbe- of stefis In tin; saciyHanJ

tion proews1. tt has practatmed three new ta^-s in Hit piut year: die Second
Agrarian B^arm, the Wort Norm and Whge ClJihiii^aliori L,iw, and the Ob]igatory Military S^n'ice Law.-. Jf fully impCem^utcd. the tt-jye Liwi wil! h;ive a
proFavnd effect an practically i l l CUUSITIS- Thcv itriLc not anW i t thr interests
of those aEready dEscn^lsanrcJ with the regime uut ilso at the p^ftKurts and
itudent!. who make up much of Castro's ytron^Kt supporr.
21. The Second A.g?ariiirt ftcform oi October IU63 espropriated moat farms
ovei? 193 JtrcE. Some 7.000-3,000 F M ^ S have been nHtcted, and Jtatc Q^TICTihip * f agrfcultuml line! has increased trunn appen\imitely -W perrtnl to "0
pcrterit. This, in itself, was a rremtndous bluw to Culw's mnservalive rural
jector: inoreovief, many Emali^i1 farmers JIV con^ipCtfd. that their turn w i l l com*;
aoon, despite Fidel r i Tcpeated isfturanccS to the con.t:;^J. The re^inrt his been
attempting to fore* the tmall fiifticrs to sell a]3 their ptfoductj to the government
wlJection agertties: but black rtUfLetEnJ mntinu-cs ori a considerable scile.
Within the East Few wajks, the party fieufjpfliwr ffory has warned peasant!
who work on state farms that they muil no [ongcr >*ep txn^i or ^ruw vegetable
gajdens o theif own.
2. Thffwwl; norrrL and svaje Kale s^steriL cun-ently being Lnnrad-uced throughout Cuba wEI Apply to agricultural as WPLL as injustrisl Labor. The reginie
has bc*n moving cautiously in thit Geld, jeeki[Lg to stritij a. bslincc between the
poLitkal ddlrability of keeping ^arfcers rcaionabU iitis6*d and the roonomic
iuMd to ifiaeai? output and reduM cost through deallocation of urorkers on a
mafor scale,, and -tKraugh impreivemrnt oE the p c r f o m u n ai the individual
Tic- reginw [aunched its work norm program an an csperimcp.ta.1 bajis
than 18 nwnths ago, and. it has beta sharply eipsnicd this. yr- VVarlirrs:
arc Vasng Etted into right salary ctassificitiyris. The norrna themselves are not
high, but those who Fill bclo^v them will [ e pay Mid the re^itfle p]a<kS graduallyto riiae nortJis. Already the trpdltiOtia] Chrtitmas arid vacaticm bonuses have
been eLLmLni-ted, the typical w-nrlt week has been t r e n d e d from -W w -S4 hoiurs.
and some holidays have been aboLijhed. Re^imSfitatioo of tlrt Lahflr force lias
been increased bv the LJivance of work cards to employed j f l d upemploy*d.
23. The. Obligatory Military Service Law is d e s i r e d In part to provide a chedp
Force- ivhich the regime can use ^-hcrijvcr ;t i s fit Populjr rejction has

;ET
JO adverse [h$\ the re-^i^e hiitf l>**ii forced uito a pubik
to assuage angry Cuban mothers. A number oi prospective draftee*
defected; a few have prabably- |Qmsd ulaurg-snt groups- T"^ uetLii]ty For
dodging is jtiff""*3 r n t d l as sis yeaia in prison. The regime has
announced, that students, perhaps the mast pri^ile^ed class in Cuba, n vill no
longer be exempt frflm the draft. A further SQuice of resentment qn thti pj*t
of many yuunj people Li a reMflt decree specifying that students must participate r e g u l a r in -jrnduclive '.v-urb:, iz wail as keep up with clicir
5.4. Antipathy betwraen the "otd" Cnmmijnisrs (members at (ha g
p
prior to Castro's revolution) and the "new"" Cfltnmvntjts (wtw arc FEdflisLTi
revclutionaries firtt Srtd Communists second.) has persisted JIVIK the days of the
revaitttDanary Gghtingwhen the "old" Communists, in Fidel's own words,
"hid under the bed." Th-ii behind-the-scents conflict fliW into the Open onus
again in March of this year ui die t r i j l of Marcos Rodriguez; several important
"rid Cnrrununists were aCCuil of jhietding for yens A member of the regfulir
C&mmuniSt P&rlv who h a a betraved nnn-Cnmmuntst icvoEutiodujy studertt Jesdfiij
to Batista. Castjo himself had! Co intervene directJy in the trial; in the name oF
unity and do preserve same batartts behvaeft the two groupings, hi pJpefed
Over the dispute- Bvt the quarrel remains viery much alive, and. the rucent
appo[n.tmen.t do second-echeLon govemmeg.E potts of i*^ - frli l o ^ l FkleluOs who
had been ounsi^iiid to obscurity by "aluT Communist lend-crs suggests that the
btter hive (oJt grovnd1.
25. Infighting of this sort has been One of the rtUOnS that C t 0 n i United
Party nf the Socialist Revolution (FURS} has been so tang in the pjocess of
formation. He originaJly saJd it was CG be completed by early 19631, but by
February 1SSJ it claimed leas than 33.WQ of a profecteti 55,000 memtwrthip.
and formation at the Erst PUBS celt iii the armed forces did not occur tmtiJ IS
December 1963- Progress has also been flowed bv th? difficulty oF triining
prospective mcinhers hrom thfl t*0f]y-educated c]ass and by diSerenoes ai
opinion between teadtuyg Ggures in the nsw party and some 0v*mmcnC bureau
CrStJ about who ts to exercise what powert. But prflbabty the moa-t unportant
impediment has been Fidel1* Q^m mtsgivinjs about his ability to buiJd die kind
nf party he cOuM t n t He is acutely aivant t t i t the PUP5, Price hAly ionned.
wilt mtain a potential to challenge his OWfl higblv-p^rjonalLzcd rule. Thus
be is movia^ floaty -ifld cautiously hokling the pirtty. formed: PTJF5 la^getv
to l a idviiory lot*, while he retains tbe pd^er to mate a]] important decisions.
36. Castro has also retained close control over the militarv and! Ov^r the
appointment oF offifrefJ to key alignments, A Few members of the miEitoiy have
oVeotedl and: others, among them officsj, have aJmajt certainty ]oit sympathy
with certain of the regime'* policies, though they are not w\l\in% to take the Hik
oF overt Opposition at this time. We, nevertheless, doubt that there is military
dijafiection on a scale sufficient to threaten the regime.
3^. Castro has not been able lQ put an end. to insurgent activity. Small
guerrilla, bands continue (Q operate fiom the mountainous areas oF Pinir del Hiu.

to

Las Villas, Cjma^iLev1. and Orients piovftLCifi. The regime aecmi part icuJiifh
concern^ rMl an txp-nnsiOn of o-^rriiLa activities :n con junction u i i h .1 successful [ilnJ^ig b<-- Cuban a.tiles cnuld incite elements of tin; population to revolt.
We do not bclie-.'e that the present capabilities ai the e.\iles fultify thi* (*.ir.
but w do tliink the Fear is real. Indeed, it UMS almost rerttfinK- tlie primary
reason fof the extensive Cuhan military j l t r t urtd mobiJi^tLan that took pldci1
in
28. The very Fact that the regime is ncTvaua i n d has mo^ied during
rt'L^ tn arrest iind diL ruthtciily wilJi amiiJ] numbtrs of nup*cted agents and
other opponents has probably inctemrd its jhort-temi j*curEty. The Inrgr Und
iniiflasing number of potential appOrlfia(3 Qi til* regime within t h * caunLry has
never had much oppartunity to o r f i n i i e For \utv unintd action. Tlu: e]ahcT,itt;
internet secttrity m*chiner\' which now *wits jnakes dLEEiden.t
j
l
activity e>cn iOfe difficult
Security Machinery
39. Cistro'j Cuba remninJ A polJ state. The principal suevrih- and counterinte!liffence arganLntion, the Deparhnent of State Security, with au esiimS^u.
personnel strength of about LO.000, mauitJiLnj units thnougliout the cOuntrji- and
*ppircntly has be*n efftrctiirt in-infiltrating and exposing wuntei-revnlution,irv
groLips, Et works dowly with all the Othef security agencies and especially
ivith the huge Itid ubiquitouj OT^aniza-tion of ^loluntrrr inFi>rrnanrjthe Committees For the Defense of the Revolution. Throughout the country, in ruriit
area* Si weU as in Almost every city block these informants report to the l o n l
committee t h * results of spytflg on their neighbort, Committee membership if
claimed to be aJmKt a million and 4 half- Local committees dilbribvre food
rationing cards, hand out propaganda, and orpntze "voluntary" iyork
wmmitteci i t higher echelons assist the jeewity agencies In maintaining
of all ISpecta of private lift. Parallel informant roles are played by the L'niun
of Towig CominMnists. the Federation of Un iv-erjity 5tuaents, and the Frdifration of Cu.bn Wnmen,
30. The potice arganliatinnsthe Bureau of PutJic Order, the Technical Investigation Department, and (tie N'atioruil Identifieitiort DepartmTnta
ehafgFd with ordinary 1*# enrdrccment dvtiei: they have * t c t i l of ai least
I0?000 personnel, nearly haU in the Havana area. The Popular Defense Fora;
cOfflprises absut l00r000 dviljafl workers, men and ^vomen, who serve, part
time. They come primarily from the old. miittia icservc. Except in case of
emirrjeticy, their miasion is (JO help police and security fences maintain onier1.
31. The, Cuban foreign inteHigence aervice, the C*nal Directorate of [nlelligencc (TXrl), with * Jtafi af about 500, maintains Geld itations in every
county with, ^vhich Cuba has diobmattc reEations and. has representatives
distributed throughout Europe and Latin America. In tht Western
its mtssion is "erpOi't of the revolution" pfgniatibn ni revolutionary

11

from subversion ta guerrilla ivariarr, Dy ever* possible technicuc ot

p g
and violence. T'bc DCF has trained nd continues to train ^UCTTIIIA and intellig e n t agents and Support* their jctivitiss throujr.o-j; General America and :n
mOtft South Am^ric^n -sountries, as well I S assisting kfci^t political canri;djtte*
and penetrating Cuba's L'KLIC or^anLzatLuns Th i3 Jatttw function may deprive
<?!ute fl(dtefS of the a 3!-important Dltmcnr. of syrpfise.
32. During the past year, the Casdo regime h*S tfjnsiderabk expanded two
countcrirtsurgency hodLti. the "Fight Against Bandits" ^LCB!1 acid rhe "Fij;hc
Against Pirstei" fLCFJ, thou^li e sell] have no iipftptacjte ngurts on thfrir
strength. Full-time elite, organi^atiOnJ. the;/ probably cn5ige in more armed
accfem than ifty oihft- seetir'tly force. Units of the LCE-, (he Larger and marc
. hit'C -en|a^l in numerous tielicopter-asSLtKd iweeps. and encirciemtJnti.
culminating in. skirmishes WL(JI jvenUJi bands. The LCP ap-sriit^S coastaL
pQ**J 5fld [tiih'ol i;oj.tE, LLs-ing smjll stations ^locij Cuha'i 3,[KW-miJe
to prevent c\i[c infittratEcms. ii -e]] aj the eieape oF disaffected
Both groups work clorfln-' A'ith tiie Ei^pjitmen; oF Stjtc Security.
A third org-flniaattQ^ ^ofrtied in late 19C3 is the Nation^] FTuntiflr C u u d Corps,
rhe control of the- Ministry oF Interior; its mission L* atic eoastil defrcue.

33. In -Jitw of the tjctensiveness und fwrvistxeness -of; this security apparatus.
the chances appear verv small (hat under present circvnilacicfts papuiir d u j
niffTctJOn ^ i t h the jegtme- ^vill be transFormfd iotP an effective rffort I* bring
Jt dfl^vn. Cjscrai has demonstrated a remajkatle ability to pnrs*T-.e a worbaole
degree of unity JrtWnJ the disparate groups involved id the regime. H-c hlJ
twen tbh ta make the great buEfc of the po^vJatton acceptwithout active
Oippasitionthe. *OCiaJi(iori and regimentation. oF hh rr-a]uU0r1^4. The Abititv of the regime to suj*vive mayr of course, be lessened bv 3
major deterioration in the- btfJiX internal situation. Acrifinoflv and disajreemen-t
within the govrmmrnt. P^er such matters at Hit expert of revolution or the
advantages I n d disadvantages of rapprochement ^iLh the US. could lead to a
power struggle among rejinw leaders that would jerioujty weaken the- gonemment and reduce the -effectiveness oF t h * security organizations. AnoUief pqssibilitv which might ehangt the odds fqr survival watild be m.rtiwi'ei so oppressive
as to precipitate large-scale demanstratjonB, and! 10- gefLerally unpopular thai;
etemenU tn tha securitv Force) and military Forces ould refuse tc- intenitnc
or might even iide with die people, Ho^vevef, changes ai this nature- extensive
enough 10 urtdermina Cutro's power rKHLtign would be [iLely to tak* same years.
33. If CiJrjC were to die or be removed frocn the scene during the n*^t year
Of two, the immediate TpOdie of the tegime, including the. military, Tivould
probably be- * raHviflg together to tjy to bo-Id tKe popuLace in line and to defend
a"ain1t a. feared US intervention- There is, ho^vie\Tr, no Cuban On the scene
who appears to ha^e sufficient persona! power acid popular support to

rontain und cnnrj-Qi thr p o ^ ^ f u f c^ersc furcei ^vithui che revolution.

Ka] Castro, the designs tea successor, nor Che Guevara, nor any other member
of the "inner t i r c k " has the personal qualities jusd following required to control
Cuba as Fidel has done. In hii t Stay 196-J speech, Castro revealed that,
it he should t.ill. h* espfrfted the ItttdVrship of th.i= PURS to assume c&mmind.
He appa-HrttJy unticipatcr tJi.it his successor would lie A committee presumably
led by ?he "inner circl*.' with trie PL'ftS N'.uJoiul !?JriSL;[Or:ttr ^ r n y r d Ewhtnd
them.
However Caitro's immrdiatc sucttEiion is armnged, xve beiiev* that there
he no mar* than a brief period oi unity after Cjstro's dcpartine hettrne
a major pGwrr j t r u ^ E ^ bei^fln. VV'e Kuinat predLtt wiifi Jnv confidence theoutcome of s^ch rt struggle, Cwtainly dot role of the Cuban military ^vdl be
Among the many possiyte i^yultt wf J pow-er struggic WODUH b* ihe
of J regime much !tke Cistro's, dominafed by men who support him
j n d supported" and accepted by most military eJements. .Lnfltn^r pOaiihe- i regime led hy a ngfL-Coinmunrst leftLst individlual pt cUqu*
1
that rtEented Cis&a's cortimunizarjon at the crtjinaj 6th of July movement/
Such an *vtfnt would probahJy firtd tin; security forces with dueled iile^iariMs
and would moil litt^Jy riSult irt civil strife or ei-] civj] war. Some non-CocnmufiJSt group might ish to call for US assistance, [n sum, Ci3tro"s death
would jeapifdrte the type- of political pattern which new fttijis in Cubaand
muse a dramatic
, THE MIL3TARV
Srntion
3". CAJCTO'S armed forces huiv'e gto^vn fram a ragtag bafld of gucnillai in
the Sierra. Staejtra to much, the best-equipped military farce in Latin Amwica
iai, except for Brazil the liigrsi. We estimate the. personnel strength of
Cuban forKS to he mare than IOQ.0QO men on active de>-: Armv, 90,MO: Navy,
8^)00; Air Force, 4,000; ground-hased air defense {radar and! iurfoce-tfr-air
pilMlJe jyitHfml). S.000. In addition there are about S5h000 in the ready iesve
and i IM.MCr-man hocneguStrd militia called the PopuEar Defense Force; the
latter, ho^evef r has only a limited, fflmbat car>abitity i n d is: useful p r b u r i l v
for local d>rcu r r*ar-ggtni wcurity, i n d a manpower pool in, time of emergency.
33. The Soviets hive supplied the Castro regime with mare thin enough
modern rauitary equipment for its forcrs. Its elaborate air defense j y j t t m
indudes 24 SAM sites; an ertenstve air niT^tillance fsdar netivorb; apd 135
.MIC njhrers, mclwdipt; 40 MiG-21's. The .\U Force's: helkopterl are of par' A nnn^onun^niif K g l n t jfato W cunuiLznd braai wjpfKJrt jmoiig the- Cuban prtplc wnuJd
b t t punnc hij^ilv n^rianallihic potievri arud jiumlnJn marv of (fie to^aliitie
ffltinoi!

13

p
f&r operations <i jraiftst LIU uterus And eicil-c landings,
transport a i i c n f i are being yswt in cOiiital patr-st

CUBAN HOLDtNGS OF MAJQR MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Other A m i ore d

50

F i d d ArtilJEry u n d Antitank G u r u

L_JO>

Culi-

900

FROC B&tlift Ljunchjci

MiliLuy Ttu^i?

..

Sites

a
.21,500
^

Sit*J

'.

(TL*JI dJiou ? lb

Air E5tfcnic Radius

Jet Fl^h

M[C-13 ( FARMER)
(FlSHfiEDJ
Bents. [SO

50-L SubdoMni . .
Torpedo Boate f Pf/F_)

$
3|

39. Mcsc of the increase \n Cuban miEilan? eapabUiciej avtr the past IS
mnnths has resumed riqm t!ve detivery of -additEanat Soviet ^'eipons and from
the acquuirion i f i*Teapon systemi formerly u.n^4r Soviet control. The SOT-W^
delivered taoty, patrol craftr MIG Gjhters, artd tame additions] 5AM
and nussiles since the 1962 missile crisis and have tUnifcrrrrf DD the
Cubans the cruige and surfjee-ta-air mrssiJiij tyjtfms. KOMAR cALULk bdatsr
1 Jrt Sghters. and ground fdrces weapani. inctudins FROC focti^tJ.
forS sr< we|]-c^u[ppcd to Wtfnbat inrcmaS resEslacic* j n d to repe3
siifltt of 4 L T * US [ntcrventian. bvt tick erperience in the use DF
of the newly acquired Soviet weapons. Although Cuban forces are e*'
perierjced Ln small tinit operations, they stiitE suffer from tacli of braining in
large-scale exercise* or in jnint operarioris necessary for more rEective]y QQjn*
bating mart time raids and! intemat insurgency, DtEc:enci in trinsportaLion
and logistical jupprjrt also hinder mLlitary readiness and operations.
40. In the e\-*nt of US invasion. Cuban plans evident]}- envdsjve a i t r t n ^
resiitiTicie at the poirit oF attick, fottowed by ,i defsnst of pre-selected
posittQnf and, finilLy, bv gucmUa warfare. Only a small proportion of
Cuban forces, however, would be lito:ly to cam- on prolonged guerrilla opcri(1- The Cuban Navy and Sir Force ;ire defrnsi^ly etfoipptd, trained, and
oriented, \either force his fnfct ch,nn a LEmited offensive capability: the Na

14

SECRET

: ^

*^

CUBA

Selected Military Sites

*

SAM ir*

Crvit* numil. ail-

. .

XLO . I r

Biurrm^L

3IB

am...

for sample. Licks Undine craft. The ALT FQJCC. whiJe capable of p
jsOroe Support to guerrillas m " [ i p C<iribbeiin ,ire:L. tacl:r the :urhft
more 'turn a very smaJ!

43. The ^-onscjmtian km- u-ent [nta c-ffect in December 19S3. nnd the first
conscripts u-ere called up ,it the end of March,. The Law cecuir.es all Cu(wn
mates between [he ;L^S o 17 ;Ltid -15 to roister and most to participate Ln full
r part-time military service, and It extends Hie ,urtLve duty service from two
to three yean. 1 One effect of the dr&t'c is liitfLy to 1)6 Jin initial drop in the level
of (nin big and efficiency at the units to which the draftees am aisE^ncd. Over
time, the mast important military results; wi[[ be to establish A mucu toiler
trained reserve arul j iufpty selected [Wrsonnel tm opefacion and main ten unce
of the recently acquired nid^-anced
. A fee* an initia] increase Ln the size nf the active armed forces, discharges
probabiy keep the CNIOTI m i I iUry tlb[i4hrneeH dose -0 it* present strength.
And following the temporary drop in the levei of training and efficiency, training i|] prcbitbJy become -mune advanced, to include combmed Operat:MJ and
more rechnJcaJ initruction. Military organization may heca^ie somewhat more
standardized. Nonetheless, Cuban forces~n]] probably cantinue to dispby most
of the same Shortcomings and vulnerabilities that (Jiev ha^-e in (he past. Lack
of eorrtbat e^periertce add dependence on tJie USSR for advanced Crauning and
material support ivi]] continue to be tn-<i nf the mort serious.
The Sowitt MiliTory
44, The Soviets have continued to- ivithdraiv military personnel during J9S3and I9W aj they have gradually completed training of Cubsuis on various modem weapon systems and turned these systems over, ane after jnothcr, to Cuban
control. Soviet withdrawalj have been paralleled by ctslf-enrt to Cuba of a
variety of items of military equipment and supplies, primarily, it appears, for
the purpose of bringing Cubin twtdinjj in mine of the systems up to full
Jbrength- Tba 5AM system has been turned over to the Cubans, aftd they almost certainly have fuE[ dpcranrana3 candol. Thusr the Cubans almost certoinCy
hive the capafciiLEy to shoal down, a U - i 3
+5. There we aJrnost certainty no RussLan combat units still present gn the
island. Almost all of the Soviet pcrscmnrt who jnanncd the SAM and early
LTJUIET the nn Li^r, injtlucic<i TCCELT-C K ^ H peiGi per month inxtrid
e flH &J peso pay, Usu wiil prttuhly m u l l t i i divmg DF jbriKi' 9Q mdtiDn JHBOH per
Todmictma ctiuch n m d r f by the Cuban twjony will b aain*J. A bjgo and clwjp
Fflrtfl will he cccibed hit nicli jpbu oi jiddnj. in jupsr !hir,-L;. FiuLJy, Lhimj^Ei Te;iitntmn of QIE=[ idult3 r CiiCrO lt^a J ! I 1 W ^ m*thj(liWH to ^iJ in
l
(h* pOfitlluOB.
*Xhie SA-i surf ace-1* nil muddr ij - itnn hjJ in riluintud nia.tiniam p
about Js rnuCirj] rtlil aild 1 maumum elfwijie jltitlrfe tapibi)ii>' oF itU!

unrnin>' radar s y s t ^ f taw* returned to the USSR; - h e n the r t deport,

u-ilL r e ^ i i n ,in organization of the MA AC type, rh* majority Q: wham * T * technical ana m;iintenan.ee personnel. About i m pcTsontiet of this type ^ " prob*
ah[y remain so lon^ Jis'Castrt continues tQ be dependent D n the U&SR For (he
technical and material import ruwwsury for maintaining t l i *
I
*qip
the Sm lets hane snp:ipd.
of Reintroduction of Sl*3legic
46. We think it highly unlitely that (] LfSSR will, within the r i i of
estimate, attempt to rcuitraduo? jh-.-itegEc mi^jJea intfl CLLIII. 1 " Evm if the
SovE^li t*Ue\cd (hat there was a chanrt of completinj such rJeployments undetected., they wnwld rrto^nii? thiH. to Li^vir the dtsErtrd, [litiiL tffect. the
mEssilrt would siLbSi^uimtLy Luye to be ruvfiiilcd. TEiey would be aware, chercfor*, tliat i t some paint ,i eftsis af thtf ::evercst ^inrf ^ould. nrise ifl an amm where,
S3 proved
in 1SS3. rhe USSR
diiddvanMjc.
Tlie same Line of argup
USSR [s
[s at
at a gruie
g
j
J
S
i
d
l
i
t
th
Cubans
of
otEtfiweaiwns
that mi^ht
mi^ht be
be
ment anpJ:e?; tn Si^vist delivery- ta the Cubans of otEtfi- weaiwns that
rtniLdercd "affensi" byy rh* L"S (eg., li^ht bombers or Eubm^rinMJ. though the
l tlift nik of U5 cOwtiteraction uOuJd
Jdnot b
Soviets mi^hl estimJIt* tli.it
be. so
47. T i l * Soviet! mi^ht s [ess risk in using C u b i fur loffistEcnt tuppcrt of
their iubmatin-s. This aeet is very Large, but r^LL;ir piitrols in tite Western
Atlantic have not been established- RcfuetLn; and rrpALr :aL[L[tdc3 in Cwhi
would JO fai to &iwreome (JiEScuEtics oF distance and tfansit time ntJ thereby
w&^Jd fncrewe Soviet cJpabiJitiH- The USSR ^^JOLlLd not expect to Jocep the
US En the dart for long about tuch a progrim. but it might believe thot A Spad.ual deveLapment LA this du^etianoCCMionaL brief vjjits, say. by indivHiuaE submarines vwiuld confront the US with difficult problems of rtSfloru*. On (he
other hand, [he Soviets would almoU c*r(ajn[v EKpKi sharp reaction! Uom the
TJ5. So [on.5 as they calculate that the risk wrj[d be high thev T,voL[td not push
such 3 venture ^'erv fir.
V. FOREIGN POLICIES
Cuban-Sewer Relation)
A&. The C-utart'5o^irt relationship remains intact, although nrittiopJ have con.
tinned. Cutro's contict with the Soviet jjnnassador has become rcEaCi-ve-Jv infrequent: hE has failed to appear ?t uifious sacUlE Eifnctians of the Soviet E31oc
embassies: he contitnj 6a treflT the Chineie CammunEsts Snd Albanians as d o
j ; Afid the Cu.ban press frequent Iv ^uns In tandem a TASS article and nnc
the y*ic CAino Sues AgencyCaacrfl his ncvei signed the tt-ban treaty. Lndtrni. lait 5eptrmbm- he
the relaxation of East-^"?gr, Tensions is much Jess important than
Hive i t i r ( J . ( 1 L ^ L capabititv1 of eisndMtineljf
nw ?iit or annthrr 5?Mt canfcDRtatirJn wflyla he
jblc ta (Trtfli.

17

Cuba's 5]:^hf as Ha smijll country-, attacked. sjJudwoVd, agiimi whidi ,i P

&f Ljnrfecla*ed war i* being followed , ." By inference ric unused the Snviets
of undv* rrienC-:rts toward the im[ieri,ilist cflerrueii of C ^ a . Cutro- and Cine
Guevara huv^ lon^ CKfJOnndMl the necessity tor nQLent retolutiori, a n o t i o n
much closer to the Chinese ttuin to the Soviet doctrine. They h a i t iiJso remained essentially in comp^itiun wiiLi inosc okUlin*. Soviet-picked Communist
parti** in Latin America. And in C u l * itself. Castro has acted to prevent the
Nfo^co^vori^utfid "old" CotnmuciL>ts from Attaining ,i d^rrtiiiant role i.ri the go-*"'
or in hii United Pitrty of the SiKiaJist RevuLntEan. In lhort. Castro
Larjc mcaaure a i in4fl^idcnce of action. t? has
o
ni*|
; to t*an to the side of th-e So^irta in the Sinfl-So^ict diifmte, but h* fails
En rhc most irflfortant tail of ]ay,i I tj:: M.'LLLLngneiS to join iei a
i
of
PE
. The Soviets, for (heir pnit, (3nnot rigflid CistTt as cither very dcrnffidor vcrv1 CdnsEstrnt- HEs tjottsm mull taK theif patience, the adminiitrative
methods of his regLmt! must mute them u-onder tvhethfr a tiable CocmrmniJt
state n reallv be molded from Cuban cEay. Tlicir aid isttt Eor L:fie-pin| t h *
Cuban economy afloat ia large eno^gh to be burdensome; certain SovEet officiaLE,
4-eJl as some from the Eastern Ettropean cOufltrLts:, wtiicli t i n ) 1 a reliitively
mode*t psrt of the Wr-hflEi. Lia^e Lonj ^.urteTtfd about pouring fund* down the
Cuban rat-Sole.'1 But the Sonets have not tried ia hrin^ O i t t o Lnto line bv
writhhoJdLnj aid, despite tlw rtumter df occasion* iu u-hich ha has fiQuted their
interests. Irtstead, Khrushchev EL^IS catered to his e^& and. during his visit* to
the USSR in the Spring of 1953 and in January 19$J. woord him for weeks w t h
attention and natter)-.
5t. AJthough Castro pjaLE^ies (hac he cannot survive ^Ethotit Soviet support
d thiE he must rontinue to m;]y on the tren*tj gf Ufge-Eak Soviet ecan&tfitc
and mititwy aid", hi will not suhmit K5 ^nueh Sov-tet disciplin.fi and cOnl^oL. He
knrtw; that the Soviets regard" thtrrf itate in. (iiaintairnn-j a Communist Cub;i i s
3 major one. Thui he atmOit certainly believes (hat he hjiand, in fact, he
prpbabEy does h*i^apprEable room f-or maneuver. CMCTO w i l l conttfiue to
be quite; suspicious of atry Emprov-etnent En US-Soviet reLatiofis. Appa/entLv hi?
fear Es nCrt that the Su\Ticti woyld sell turn out in bilatwil n e g a t i o n s , but that
they might stand by while US ecanonttc pnessui^s, ejdle raids, and an
tinn of adv*r*e- Factor! gradually eroded his position beyond recoiTiTV.
SL The Sov-iflli seem to have ]ittta chi?ice hut to continue trwif -patient sMp
port for Caitrn. They ^&\. almost eertiinly cOLinsel him IQ caution in dealing
uHth the US and in fomentrnj re^olutiOnJ in Latin rVtmeRca; thp.- will not. however, be able to compel him to Follow such a course. Thsy will try (0 [Tiate
Cuba viaolfi as An esam&le to other small nations ind 41 a project to which Soq

By the end of 1904. Ctinununisi ertKlomic usiiuciee Esr^niiLTUftf tn Cuba IWLI[ jmotitiT
to ffima $650 milJl4Q. T t m t ciptTKlitijrci hart b t i apfiTOxiirutECv ox F-j||i>v*: L98 L330
JuiiliOS; 1262S33a miliarj; l^flOabout SJ50 mdliw
\ ' < ^ auili^l in
10 be at Itaut S500

SMlff

viet prestige is cnrnmittet: in the t-ire uf iictli t;-.e US asd Cniu.nEst CIi;n.L.
For, de>p>ite ?JJ their1 difficulties widi him, Cuba tinder Ciistru rep^^t* iliw
best vEctarv for llx Soviet ;jmD iTi (li^ ^st several i-cars ;ind r.rieir' (u^r bie-ikthrough in the Western Hemisphere.

The F^oblem or" SAMs and U-2i

53, The mrat espLonne [juestia-n En S o v i e t ' C " " m relations, us ^'ell 'J
Caatra and the US. is the continuation -of US retOnoJ^-'uice overaigl
available evidence points to the canctusEOn th-H Cuhii now h.is full contra] ov
the SAM jystenn, thui 'ea^inj flic Soviet* oriJy the cj|Hic[r.y w ^ i v f ndvice backed
up by tEicEr potitica] S.<xd ecurtacnLc Levcragr. On- trie olfter hand, thr evi<letiftf i i
not Sufi) ai to [wrrnit us wholly (o endudxi the Mssibility th.it thii Tj'SSP. luJ
retained some sort of phv*isil restraint on an artiUit fiftng. KhruslicEwv ^^ou!d
have an iiicsfltive to maintain 'such a TQSttaint hecuusc the urKr^rnmeLcd poijejiton of ttic S.\^ls vrou\d Jiv* the ^^^Dlat[L Castro un cmpHifi.int itiuiience over
a vEtaL Soviet inttfrCJt- Khrtshchcv must caku]Jt* tn^t En the event of a U-2
shdrtldo^n. the US vnjuld rctiligtc ihirptv against Cubi. This u l d tanfront
Ktiruitichev with thr unhappy dilemma ai facEnj up to- the US in circumstanced
even less propitious than those of October !3(3i. Or &f publEcly reneging On his
ofc-repeatcd promises to support Cittjo.
5-1. In the p u t few mOflthj Cutra and fihrushphrv h^vtj piiLlidy and privately elabOTSttd i common position against th(; V-2. Sights. They liavc mdj-sited thai the flights wi]] nflt he tel#ftiled much [angrr and that. Lf political
persuasEon iiils to ttet^f the US, theD a U-2 wiJl be shot down. They ha^*
ilrttehed a rimitible which would bring the issue to a Evrad after the US eLtfctEon. Castro h i i rtitftrii-sd thai he wi]] take his 5 * to *h next UN" Central
Assembly and exhaust the pnsstbl-e politkit rernedies before ordcrEn^ 3 thoof'
dowp. . Khrushchev hu uken pirti (0 stress Cjstro's rE^ht and ability to u^e the
S.-VNE system add h u ^amed that the USSR w(H it^nd t y Castro En the
of US35. Though me surprise move in the midst of the US election
p ^
cannot be adtidcd r it jttraJ more LLkety that the ^."SSR Snd Cub^ ^vilL conLLnue
to tise ttc nert ffrv months to agitate the t T -2 Isstte and1 sound out the U5 On
possible compromises. Both Khnishchev and Castro hive [ct it be Joiowm that
they wauld not object to satellite Ur oblique photography. They have- l
hintctt vaguely that somt form of inspection nn the gtdund mi*St be
g
in return for inipMtJofl oi nearby US territory. CfljtJQ and truushchev hope
this coiflfcinattan of wOnningE, thfeats, and compromric offen will trt effective En
eserting pressure on tha U5. Even ii lhii jpfifijich Es rruitt-S, Cistno probnblj'
estimates that En the p n X f l i he can ^En jj-mp,nthy for Eci position, begin to
mobilize L"N mrmbfrri on Liij side, and raise The polecat coiti to the U$ of fetaUatian for the jhootdnwn o 4 V-i,
56L I n sum,, we baLEfive that CjstrO wiiJ t[iif\k it prudent to wait untit jfter
the US elections: to force ttw overflights Esatte. At the s,ime tEmer ^ve think tw?
i i fully determined to [aunch J tititflf effort for fninial UN" conaideTatiOn 0^ the
->

ap-rf?r

matter, if lie obtains ra satisfaction from the US- it Jiis ompaiijn does not
succeed, there ia considerable danger that, u a last rewrt, he would order a
ttioptdown, calculating that the U5 ^OTJ]<3 not refiEiat-e in force or that, if it
did. the f eiuJtkng hue and rry would bricig overflights Co 4ti end- In the interim,
there will he a possibility oi an impulsive reaction by Castro, There is aim
the chance of an unauthorised shontdDwn. but in view oE the [apor&io'rt to
Castro of thts mltler, the d # n c of su.cn an action s^em (o us to bV small.
Toward tha US
57. KJwishchev, In supporting Cuba's position on ovprfhghrs. may igain have
urf*ed CasCrO to explore the possibilities fw a noa-m*LLiatiDai of relations ^vith
the US, Castro probah3y cotitidws such an effort useful -to build a record of
Cuban reasonableness ind ftfiKibilirj- in preparation For Cuba1* appeal to the
UN. In my case, \v be-licvr (ii*t Castro has A serious interest in impTfl^n;;
reTariortt with tile V. Ths U5 -economic -deruat prrjgram has hurt Cuba and
TVII! corttinue to do so, Moreover, *j partial reirOluttGnE Fail to rmaterialurfr in
Latin America, he ii increasingtv forced to give up the notion that relations
with tNe US ire a short-term prablnn dKtined to be rwpL away by tha tide
of Iwmisphefic revolution. Furthermore, th* 3on*ef a US-Soviet atmosphefe cf
detent* persists, the- more hs must eonrn himself with 4 possible Lack of support
frftm his pibron in A crisis.
SS. Hii interest ifl stabiJizin^ reiaU-nnJ with the US wars with elements in
Castrohj bempeftttient, with hla strong revoEutionary bent, and w^th his recumrtg
cOilvictiDUi that th* US price for rrOfmaJijJtion v^oyld be TiOtninj [tt% than his
own dilappeannce- Ha cltwly coniiders US acceptance of his regime to be
a Inog-rangc uid chancy prospect to which be cannot commit his polifles.
Neverrlueless, he has made various overtures tx7W*rd. t i e US from time to time,
We expect future efforts, perhaps including SOJTbB moderation of his conduct,
intended Do (often US resistance M * rapproctwment. Wp think there it virtually
no chance, howEvet, that he wtfl accede *t any varly dile to the cortditiflns which
the US has stated.12
Latin American Policies

59. Castro ts first o all a revotiidonary tnd has expended much energy and
effort encouraging violent revolution elsewhere.3* He bas provided asiistaftce.
tu an assortment of Communist tnd Dun-Commufist reroWaionariES, Frimarily
this has taken it* focm -oi prarjasjadda, limited rinandal aid, political iodocbiDatioa, and training in fMbvenive tecbxuqves and guerrilla warfan, (In 1S63
" OD * J d f L9S4 * St*tt Deputmedt fpdkmuaiv reiunted die loagftflndiii US p
Chat tiwi* *r* tvra rltrncnti in (be- Cuban iinaitiim whlrfi rt list ncptabkr "Cirtm'i tiff
orf dffpiDOeocj- wtfli tfce USSB whJcb. art tantajoouaf ra Ja44t 4nmmiD4[i flrf the crjime *nd
(he- HBEiiintfCt of CaHKl1! pnwwHiia ef pdrvertbon ebawlvera iiL Uw aeEnisph^rt."
11
Fw 4 detailed, Wltutiy.by-r^uiitr' aSmatt fll Cfttmnunitt Uid CartrOdlt f teengjcfas,
najfl h ami eppgrtnnitiEi, tt* NIE Bu/90-44, ""CaoumnuH Poterutution ID Latui
ll
for TJElB fiOOlidentiAn In Anpirt 1SS4, Sfflrt.

SH0R
^-100 Latin Americas tripled to C-j]jn: several hundred cf the^n probablv
ived training In terrors and g.T;fi^rs:Ea m-Sthods while there.) Tine Castro
j
has und^rtakcri cli/sct supply or JOcne arms to extremist groups {eg ,
the Cttfaan arms cache discovered [n Veft*zutLi last November) but prefers to
p w i d e funds fof the purcLuise- of weapons [YQCTL other sources.
0, Although these effort h:me helped strengthen extreme Leftist
in J number of Latin .American countries, there have brtm na
y
revolutions and, erc+pt Ln Venezuela and Guatemala, viay little violent revolutionary activity. Fndscd. Castro mvtt view develo-pTflents avtr the past y&n
i!i duappQ-intinff. In VcnezucL.T_ lodg the pfto-ritv- target in Casira's revolutionarv
pLans. the Communist andi Caitroist graups failed dismally in their terrorist
attempts to disrupt the DecwnbrT election acid prevent an orderly suctessinn
of government, In Panam.-i, the ctimjte cA opinion which Citrie Lnta being with
the rtti-US riats irt januin- swmed t& oficr A special opportuniti.- fat aggressive
violent action, by the CiStjoists J gainst 3 ^-ulnerablc, olig-Lrchic rejuae, Havana
imm.*dLabelv ujgecE this court*, but (he Castrois-is in Pan*cfta preferred to givij
priority tfl tactics aimed at gradually increasing their influcrtce within the
established political system. In Bnri!h the removal of Coulart in April dimtned
tht prospects of the extreme- LeFt foe escrtinj and rjpandin; political EnSuciice;
the CisteJlo Branco soMemmWthis broken reLations with Cuba, leftiits have
brtii rrrnOvied Erom. Emportant Eritllian ^ovijrtimenc jobs, and the variaus lotat
Communists und CaiCroist group* are in disarray. In aurrt, Castro'j revalutionaiv
linp*i have suffeced notable setbacks during the pist yeai, some of them
*ccurrulg despite circum5tinces which h apparent ly tnaught ptopttitjus for
i
SI, These development! have ska Leaded to stiffen th* anti-CjstrO position
of most of the fticmber ganemmtnts of the Organization nt American States.
The OAS arfoptijon on 26 Jjuly of diplomatic, trade, and shipping utictkins againit
Cuba is primary iniportant in its psydiu-log,tt7a I ;adrer thjn LLJ economic iiapactr
But Cutro obnoojsly feeJs that Cuba's political isolitiofl in tfic henusphcre is
rfg^g
to his cause; he will try to impede impEerruentatiOn ai the sanctions as
aj other actions which u.-rjuld reinfnTicc this isoLation.
fi, We believe that Ctstro and his nevoiutionarv theorist. Che Cuevjj-i, have
become somewhat [eil Ean-gqHAC about their diances1 fcjr o^uick rtvfltutionary
In their spereheS and piopiganda on the subject, thev will probably
bot or cold at various times 33 they have irt the p u t . " but they almost
certainly will continue ta aid and &-ain porentiat revqlutioTiaries. They
may prtw for early aggrcss?v action on the part af CJifroist groups in. some
Latin American countries, even though the immediate c^anon of these groups
seem powi here, their primary hope would be that the jovemmenr/s ccujnteraJitaganLie larjef segments of the population., eventually producing
" In a nujm ipeecfc ca 3 July 1964. Cwtro one* apin dclivcfea a gmtttl ipped
[FvofutiDa in- Latin America, aiding 1 Ee1*- -nfWdl D enMmj-gHiier.t for "ftc hflu;
(i5Dariei~ af Vitzturli ind (hrt

2\

S^?ET

-O^e favorable for exploitation. The Cubas

have difficulty in persuading even siron^ iympaihi^ers to undertake- the- Erst
step of this JoeniriO; thece Li JIQ pLelhara of billing mara-TS In Latin
A. nucntjef of other factors a3so muitatc a.jinst ^uu;k Ca?*r>i3t
these range from (he- dungjne*s of the Cuban shtHi- Atndo^- to t h t increased
cffcctlvenesi f>f the security forcesanc t t t incrriiscdrt^va^^:^ff1i<? the
threatin many Latin American
S3. There is danger, aunechdess,. that
or participating in revolutions during the period of thii estitnate, and this
mAv tncreaae ove* a tender tirnt-ipan. The- basic? af the LJtin American
tiqftpopuktion prcitiirtt On [uniied i^SOuTCes. and rales ai economic and
social dev^toptneot which da not keep pace with, the rising expectations nf the
peep]*!menu jntinu[n| EnstouiUtv ^nd ^rCwjng popular oiiW^nfMrJoci with
estahlished poUrJtal parties and LDitLtutions. TLies* cunditi(Mi3 arc readiLv eaj]aitabJe hy estrrmists of various jihadci. tudden cfiingu in<l revoluttOniiy
situation t mujt be expected". DepeiHiing on the- narurt nf such a situation, a
few bvodied Castroist jcti'.ijts Or a imail number <ii Cu.binrjupptied *cjports
could, provide thfr iitirjil cnipetui of av*n the decLsiir1* factor in aa attempr to
iJi estatliEricd jo-vernmtnL But Cue Csudoats would not neceaemerge ax t^e dominariC *kn*enC in ths revatutiortary

22

%mRE\

ftnr and
9(W of
0* p
m t i u 4indtr tid_[>frHatoWn P*t
Ifcr ihajnfcrmotinft n u VH gJ.i}ieV*3prtnr
p=i*rti

tfpa t e m He ad a pti? r p
AriTE-CrUVEHMlEHT ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA
Guerrilla activity in Bol i v i a ^ Santa Cms &&partm*nt
and unrest aaang tin miners continue to plague President
t h e ared f o r c * s ftave
Over tti* c o u n t e r i n s u r ^ a n e y frffort in the troubled San Ignaci
Sin Simon reeirjn of Santa Cruz
Department from tne national
polices Police units failed to
wipe out the guerrillas in
Augusti encountered t*o
and created additional antigovernient fietltinent by pillaging.
Army eojmanders ar* optimistic
about crushing the <ltggidentsh
but the efficiency and coupetent
leadership of tha eurrilla
sugE#Bt the campaign may b# a
long one.
subversive- groups re also operating
in other

j ar 4*soclated with former

vice president Juan Lechin'sNational Leftist Hevoluticmary
Party (PHIN) and the r i g h t i s t
Bolivian Socialist Fald (fSB)

"and personnel in
bean threatened by
claiming: 10 be FSB

flue

Antlgovernment
tions and violence erupted la
the mine areas Last irtefc lq protent against th# beatttiff of Lacliiri by Pai1 political police.
Communist and Falangist pine
leader^ again caLltd for
inaurrectinfij and deaaqded
a popular government beaded by"
Lech i n , SOPO 2,500
turned out for an
f
daaonfitration in La Fix on 13
Augusttbe largest niuuber oppos i t i o n leaders have been able to
muster for sojne
i s also having bin
troubles witJiiFt trie party
go ve mtoe n t , Pro-Pa x forces won
by only a very narrow margin ia
the 4 August election of; o f f i cers for Congress against a s u r prising degree of united opposition.
Party leaderst opposed to
a break with Cuba t banaged to
PK into a difficult
regarding tin ing of the
formal announcement, Paz1 inplication in the Leebin beating
and the attempted assassination
of Vice President Birrientos on
14 Augustthe fifth attempt
within a year--has created: public ressntnent against POE and
other {orernnent offietalE. BarTient&a feels tttat unless tbe
lawlessness is quickly stopped,
i t could gfrofl^ into a serious
situation.

Page

1
BOLIVIAN GOVERJfJiENT IMPOSES STRICT COHTROLS OVER OPPOSITION
The 'HplotM to overthrow
Victor Piz Egtenss
weekend appears to hive
been fabricated by the
nant i s an excuse to cracK
on the opposition 4nd
law and order under a st^te of
*isgs*

tton loaders had twen trying to

turn tnia labor nnreat into manifestations agiluat the tjovarnjvent,
and Paz ns; concerned that th*
situation HienC get out of band
during De GnulU's 29-29 Septeabe>r v i s i t .
powers
to ensure internal aedurine th* v i a i t and coot r e l labor unr*st * Tltey q^y also
provide a pretext for re-eqt-beovernaieiLt. fluthoritT in.
the
nit

Foner president Kernm Sileg

Zuazo and *x - ittce President Juan
Lee bin bad ettgiged in plotting
for several souths* but they did
not have the capability to overthrow the fortrnffent at this
tin*. The govera&ent poreover,
would not tave l e f t Leebin fre*
if i t had convincing proo/ of
big involvaent in 9 coup i t CAmpt. NQ impcutant a i l i t i r y
leaders or units FBT& laplidated
in tls* plot, and any serious a t at m coup would havo resome p i l i t ^ r v support.
The povrnttsnt i I s o claims that
tbjft so-called j n e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y
in Santa Cru Department wag part
oT th plot; y#t, the amr announced l a s t Friday that the lust
of the guerrillas had tjetn. driven
th* border into Brazil.
to Pas' 4ftclal0n to crack down
on the opposition i t tb.ls time,
RlotQ, violence, and tarro^tsn
afljoclntd with the nationwide
Btrilca hid b#cono inetrlousj fay the end
of the n e k . Minersd threatening
to, Etrik* for hiffiier wi^cs, had
already seized four mine o f f t c l i l e to protest tbo
f
to pay s a l a r i e s .

25 Sept 4

INTEL

Circtmstancas
the reported atteant to agasslaatfl Vice President Sarrlentoe On
20 Sept*sb*rthe seventh t r y in
a jearare unclear.
It say
be part of t cappaiEU designed to
drive hiai qvt of the countrr^cr.
Barrientos nay himself buve> aliged the
bombing to twister bis public
iipaffe and s/tren^tJi^ Many people
nonetheless bltne the govern
crettnff gtc/wia^ resentaeat
against P K . flarrlsntoa has
steadily gained povtr ltd
g
since the elections, and is cur-*
rently engaged with Pax ta a
struggle for control of peasants
iq La Pax Department Pe% has
nad ropaated attempts to reaov*
Barrieatos Iro& the political
cen by fiff*rimf him foreign
diplomatic posts, bwt so far he
has refused.
It &*** onXy *
matter of^ipe before a

WISELY SUMMARY

Page

21

Hemisphere
B0LT7IAN DEUOHSTRATlOlfS HOST SERIOUS TV- FOTJTtTEES TEAHS
The v i o l e n t antigovErnise
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s that have e r u p t e d
ID every major c i t y in Bolivia
since 21 October represent the
t t challenge to political
Utr in tlw fourte*n-year
rul* of the Nationalist Revolutionary itov*meiit Clftt)
Both r i g h t i s t and l e f t i s t
opposition parties re behind
the outbreaks, but they have
used thedr followers in the universities and second a ry schools
to spearhead t n e i r demonstrations. At the outset the prisary grievance uaa press cefleorship ipposed by th sovtrniiftQt
under a atat*-of-attffe declaration iaaued en 20 September,
However, the ^mpaasiq b
to protests against th*
eot'a repreg*lv# measures: which
have cmifltd *V*T*1 deaths. The
govErfintent has granted sqe concessions to th* students,, including the revocation of censoruhlp, but enough uomentun hid
already been gathered tv turn
the tfepongtrations into derandg
that President PIE relinquish
control ot the government,
Is apparently determined to stand his ground
d

30 Oct 64

put down ttilg ehtllsnga to his

rule. He is presently relying
primarily on the national pollee the peasant militiaw and
loyal llHH HtlUia units to quell
the disorders. In tba capital,
these forces luv* so far been
able to contain the demonatrators. The situation in provincial citiesf particularly in
Qruro where.local nine** are
now in full revolt* is fur mor*
seriousp howevert Fvmvr police
are deployed in these localities and toe loyalty of local
militia units is questionable.
The ultiuwte outeone biceres
on whethflr the amoti forces Till
remain loyal to Paz. At the
oraDt. the pi 11 tary does not
seem inclined to sbiit a l l e giance, although there ire r e ports that some low-mult ing offieers are plotting a coup.
Vice President Barrientcs
is luintalnin? an apblguous
poaltion. If 1i4 cane out
strongly- for Pait the situation vpuld probably be eased
sorewhat, His continued s i lence, however, will encourage efforts to overthrow the
gov ernnen t,

I INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIDCAHV

Pig*

L8

7
Western HealsphereTUHMOIL IN BOLIVIA
The military Leaders who
President Pii ste.nasoro an 4 Uovembar nave H O T yet
formed a government although
radiobroadcasts continually refer to i military junta, Genera L Alfredo Ov&ndo Candid, the
codMande-r in chief of the Bolivian ar*ed forc#t, supposedly
neida tha "Junta.1* General Hugo
Su.ii1*>! Guzaan the commanding
general of tha a m y , his announced that he will be a member
of the junta, but his status is
unclearH
Vice President Barrtentos,
the- hey fijfura in the flutter of
Paa, was scheduled to confer with
Ovando ao 9 Hovftdber repardipg
the jfom of government to b eatablij

tlon of the Ing&vl Rflginent, a

security d*tacttrae:nt of the army
general s t i t t , lo. La Pti on the
orning of 3 Movsnber. Botti
Ovando and &uire were held
brie/Ly by the JimtinaflrE.
It is
unclear whether Barrlentns was
directly to^jinected wltn the La
Paz u.nrlsinf; ha claims he had
oottiinff to do *ith i t ,
KartbelAES. ho announced His support of tne r e b e l s . Other m i l i tary units*most opposition political parties, and the nipere joined
the rebellion as tne day progressed.
Paz resigned on 4 Hovember when i t tiflcii** evident
that a c i v i l war would ensue if
he Jttemptod to remain in
He Left for Lirtr Peru,

The absence i* any affective government, with resultant

violence and chaos, provides an
opportunity fc-r Connuniate and
other flxtreniet elements to exert
thoir influence in tne formation
of a new government. E*treidel e f t i s t Jua-n Lechlnt *x - vice
Th* aiHtir? revolt *
president
and heRd of the N
triggered by the mutiay of a. porLeftist Hevolutiop*rjf Prty
has already tried to forca his
participation in the junta. He
appears to naif* failed* but his
a t t i t u d e can bo expected to influence those who will or(mia
an tnteritf government+ Commun i s t Inroads can b# contra lied
only if ttia new governnent quickLy
iaposes strong military rule.
The natioti f s t i n aiiners,
who are under Communist and

Pn Eitcnnn

Kov 6 4

CURRENT IKTEL

leftist Leadership tat

tha most partH are alto a furca
ta tie reckoned with. The jni.ne
Leaders announced on
that they wj,lL tight the
if necessary unless
role i

law Stid order

is the most pressing problem
presently facing the army leaders. Sacking of government offices and looting nave continued.

KDV

G4

REVIEW

30

Western
BOLIVIAN JUHTA STILL Iff

The new military j

,
headed by General ftene Barrientas h
is managing tp maintain a precarious hold on the reins of government by avoiding any actions Thich
might drive certain p o l i t i c a l parties a ad powerful interest groups
into open Opposition, Tie j u n t a ' s
La.ck of qualified administrators
is causing considerable confusion
in ibe government's aifiairs*
Comniinist and pro-ConmlltliSt
supporters of farmor vice president Juan Lecbin. are asking gains
anon; urban labor and peasant organizations, that were formerly
controlled by Puz Estenssoro and
the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR) . In La P a t , c o n struction workers, s t r e e t
workerst municipal enp j U n d

flour u i l l

unions

have fallen under the

of ttie Communists- asd J>chinigt3.
The loyalties of the large t a i l road workers'federation and the
teachers'federation are presently
divided.
in addition, a ne peasant federation baa been formed by
Lecblnist elements to absorb ttlCSft
peasants who used to b# controlled
Student organizations* heavily
infiltrated by Coonninista and
LechlDl3tBd seised control nf radio Stfttlonls in JLa Pqz ad Cocbabamba last ireek, apparently witb
th* sanction of military authorities.
The j u n t a ' s strategy, meanwhjl* , has been outlined by Minister of Economy Julio Ean
GoLtla, He sayfi the regime

i t s weakness, but that it

i s doing a l l i t can to buy tine unt i l it is militarily strong enougn
to prevail in any arved conflict
which might develop, A large increase to the sizfl of tte military
i s the cornerstone of this policy.
For t a c t i c a l
part 104t tbe fltudect3f miners_
and libor groups continue to clain
ttiey support ttft junta. They too.
howaver N. are buying tine in order
to organize, strengthen their membership, and develop their strategy
Tlie primary objective of the
Communist Party <PCB) la to i n f i l t r a t e and work for a. common front
witb, Lechin's Wat loci 1 Left 1st Revolutionary Party (PREN). By Ltthe PCS poas no iauiedlate
to tbe Junta* An alliance
between the PCS and PflTM, howtvtr,
would represent a cou^ent^atiOD of
manpower and weaponry which could
seriously challenge the
for control oj the
The Junta BO. f i r bas not bsen
recognised as the governmsnt at
Bolivia by any country. Venezuela
and Costa nlci brote diptorntic
relations with Bolivia laat week,
most Latin An*rlcan
ar malntalqing a
see ".ttitude. Th* Latins are
p r i u r l l T concerned sbant tbe
s t a b i l i t y of the juntt, the ma
neuverlngQ of extTeae l e f t i s t
elements,and tbe Junta f 6 p
for raturning tbe country to
civilian m l * . Junta ehflr
talk of holding electlone in
six months to R year.

/proved for"-'-

"."J

13 Nov

ISTELLIG"- 1 WEEKLY REVIEfl

20

Western Hemisphere
BOLIVIAN JUHTA MOVES TO ffIN PUBLIC SUPPOflT
at the> Bolivian
junta were busy- this week bringing order to their chaotic ministries and junta president
Qentral HeDe Barrientos traveled
outside La P*s in search of papular support*

slons aided at forantl&n of a

ChrifitLan DemOcritic Pirty in
wJiicb they hapfl to include ta
Social Ctirietian Part'

As part of this effort to

win public favor, the junta has
abolished the "Oppressive1' measures and organizations t> th*
Pas regime. The state of siege
and prees censorship hflve been
lifted, and the secret police

organization bas betin J bo 11 s ti-a d r

his public speechesr

has stressed th*t political parties htVfl an "unusual clinat*

of f^eedoa" id which to operate,
but wa.m*d tfiat aqy jrOup which
attempts to provoke disorder
will be dealt with
Political ltiderHd tha-m,-

hard at work to strengthen

and expand th*ir organizations,
have talked mien of party a l Lianc*s and national fronts.
Representatives of tn.9 r*LatiV*ly
strong csntsr-riffht Bolivian Socialist f l a n g e <FSB) Ind Of tne
sun LI social Democratic
and Bolivian Deavccratic
(ADB) p a r t i e s have begun discus-

Leebin and t h e C
appear to Lav* th J,unp on other
p a r t i e s aa they a l l vifl f o r c o n t r o l Of peasant and labor
izBtlans XP. and around La
that wore foraarly- undr thacontrol of Pax Esteussora* 1

fB
CUHREKT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

17

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I * fnt ulcb nJu-fiTilt* JmcntLc
14.

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CENTRAL

I I OKilirjCj l l L t l t

y*arfrfl-nd j ^ ^ i c u l a s r i j i n the jtiJ- giosn if/

l ^
In ^hn l^J^yi-'nTi t i n inflia-tcy ore in.
tui 1 originj tExlr anct carefully iiurt^ircd t i t a vl:K Oi ^
110411 t l M s t ei^leLl/ iitJi-n-Jiit#.ah TV.Ss lc t i e , in.

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of

h
vl^h. a.

JO peMCnt

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in. vesltk accustujitlHi iml tl

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Hip.L

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their nnliVoocrr; nn ;Q ri.Kg r*l.].il>cc ^ c r

vtra hirtj' m n PE/cnehces Li "i
atC.

I .

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D i n r M l n j d-p?cc in
*rJ irifetp and
p^tT.>7rlt/- eriiio^r: on
hi
aasett, i n t
til* */jirv;-vp of V DV-"= n
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in

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fhi?

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pt f - t i t l j i n <QIUl*TTt -rttti tllfl- &^;* r .i r -In -i-Cui:-.! I^Llvinn inuji. ft
=nfT.'lHr of -*y contiLcbG bellcva tj-.Lt-t Lit r^. d.en; Jo p.* in the raccnt
cvqrLiira-- of Pat Zf-iertiMTi ir- & : : v j n . f V n Lrninrtom ae-jniiiL fl/
tin.1-, H i cdco cf the in
Ov .hat title tic a fa. Una r
A / i fltttrptlnn iiatlKl-'M; i^<:h DCITC ynefilSVC-ll Lr-.-i. Itiij- drtj I n
7 - r tlO".Lnn tV pni i t w ^ P ^ - r ^ all. L"ht fli,irjli^.D npLi frWJ ^hc Iff
iri frirt piilHiHTnn-L c-njc-tLt,, in. a-nfl-itvT.pTtn jyrlcn 'nr
lrkhJDtrlPl upart out o f ttuc vrkbt nid icrtfl th? IUC- uf D^DUi.lt.'u
Thin w u l ' I ti'.TTrtuc]_l;,r HJT* ii> Kj-il-n" >hio^pia e-rJ Dc-livia., cjnnp
H i l l e I i t ^iot yec rc*fiy ta tLce^t Uilv ^ , I thinJt. 11 nat ceo '.
ftttli.:it a C-JI:111I1J.1TV to

If.

ICML'EL

In trtic

l(y 3>
tLhn

ic

it
In
T

- recent

t i n ^ i V i r F *\ ttiuvt-ih t * ptg^iMJin^ [rJ* or lepn an DciwdiiiiFL Tlie

l i j v l t * J furtl<zipan,D /Trm nin VrUiDrlDfxJr have arrived th3 are wsty
iMiti'L CL-fltUOC^E f-DT C^lllpi1G hO.W LreiS ILM. AIU iirJ 'bin; "Jt-^tn i n V
roui4r ThF tntrtpa-pmurp eiv-ln. ptv^dfnvtiy ttdt 'tltcv vlUL Kivt the
M i J r r ^ f t in. L'pcmtlwj,, nn *:lYraia* p ay Au^fuct 19^5, t u t t^ * * v ^ * i

l j t H Mill MqglM UHtH L ^ .

B.

Ifee JnJLirieciihfl i r e i*t ifllr^ my tirpiamtKn 1"S? t l n r

Jtii- JU Uinj

hnavn for yoarn. FB-LLUTTI tdj proijee f n n tbta In tbe b i i i t Mut* or

tbe CuFKjil K1FlhJd VOFla itrflftlln^ Of t i l l .

9.

it I-i or pcrc3nnlH ^ducntcd r

ioJ che 15SE fee- t j

aian. tbat tbert I D sa flca.1 tetirecii

-Hi^ti - j l c i . -at- 4iK<nC?ntd - i n
irHlucirlfiLXrLitloriL However, I ail

hlLr 1 nna" of ru> cfqciXl

Htiipoon.tj or t S i s eoenodlty to tbe USES or i t s
j
LOiili c ^ f ^ i n the CTty^it pttfftii f \'.n * * p o H * f V * i that oSuntTyr
it trr^ iirft- ' h i t thw rnci-ntJjr Osciar^d LndGiK-clDit floijirj|;ii on

U MF Id l i i Jo**.

SiKi ULE ir, the l u t ^inr u tua hive

i.< tin.

Sli* Jt?thjn'l#[iJ* fGT nawitLac i n ^ t J of V?

i c e i tn l o a t i e producer* (UID. I&tanecla 1 1
*irf t h t Hiiajnixq ic^l-ttn; J a b t r t i t a . C b t
drpcoi -trcLi jniTem&n: n a ton! I D i t r
i t s inta;jtijit Jn tH* great e*flfr&ntijHu-

ll..

of tiw nru SSai

Tt*

ralttr

a* pifl:eL

ii villln^

1*

pn-t of KI^CTTZI piu^d tin *c t t * Covlet S I * * . Iv s.B

p
to nirt4H In. t i l t CDnatli(uij t ! u : 1>jt JfaiAjiwi t i n InO
I i *ifY rnJed ofp*itJ to Jirii nalei. HmrfTrttj. -Urir do mrt Juuau
o#r * * **? M * ^ * Pi flttflt* T t) ciiv tMnr* la t i r Ptpirc

It J

It

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HJ Cdynia and.

in

ill

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All tb* V* ^<M. *Mnp*4 In Bitt VMQL cincnift In w

1
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I

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HV
In. J tani'S*E.Llil Letter tn o*n ni t d

fr*H Eh* Tiiuipj^ari, we bid i. rtvnlutlioa h*[" in

PitiiJtat H TKt Amy a i r i th*t LhL< roroUitien. i i

nlut[sn,' tat t h i i 1* Yt^t fht
"Ttvi

in thi* nt?y If

LendorH
Ulp
^
h-ivi t n t ^ f
1
pi-i(Ttl C4H. Lftilia, M l|l* llllMrj' ipAkjfJllia, ICCtpU Lhli BCU
'Mej.nvhi!.ni LiJiiri b n far<d the r^rrflidtnt to o-iVa lit P
a
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j
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EaE BiD^Bf. t * . f * - i M ,
TTii n i o i j t u a ih* *Lne i t y EIUE t h * /
n ' v i t t i n i H ' I do not Icnov fire nhit che; ire v i l t i r a H unr
Hi*.
I t { B4t ^dvlvAbU y*E: (V tfT4l, t* Eli* Tatttl,
6
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C-a-H-F-I-H-H-Jf-T-L-A-L

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T ml OL^U J- '. ri k a r I - n > M r r J 1 "+J_E-HH-H4l-> I 41

1398.

Hemisphere

POLITICKING IN BOLIVIA

e ID anticipation
of *lctlou at eone future <tate
fs now in full swing1 in Bolivia,
Junta president a* r r i en t os
self, tfeapitfr his public
cl&iner on ig Mavemb#r of presidential Ambitions, is acting1
like a candidate. He continues
to stump the countryside drumming up popular support, and he
is making efforts to crear* hi*
own political organization.
i SpeicLjlatlon that
BirricctQ3 will resign from the
junta just before the elections
atid riiD for president iKli thesupport of the Bolivian Sociali s t FBlanpe (FSB) and several
minor r i g h t i s t parties. He
also rumored see It In? in
*ttb the Left.

these discussions, but

sum Her parties a n lining: up
either with ex - Vice President
Juan LechJ-n's National Leftist
Revolutionary Party (PRIH) on
the l e f t , or with the FSB nn

Former president Kerruio

Suaso sees th* posstbilIty that a third eroup will
ener^e- TMs one would be based
primarily on the reoinnts of
the VB. X lOTI* Hat Re volll t i 0 hfl ry
HDVmnt (IfNR) , wbtct ruled Bol i v i a for 12 yeira b*for* PIE
Estsnsaoro'a overthrow. Elles
la c u r r e n t l y attempting to r e vive and reor^amize the HKR as
htg own p o l i t i c a l machineH

U#adwhile other groups S

busy trying to make alllanc*=.
fiJ*ra has emerged from

64

INTELLIGENCE KEEKLV REVIEW

Page 17

e4et4J.ru *KLr anii f itrlatin *ai Trart of

h
nuibartti^i *iUv^ IP BrtlvJ.j
paliticoi

af flu "In* P4 ( H K * WriLJlrAi**

iunf retnin&l "to Eikllvin.j

'Ui-rci Sjtdl.vldluflJ.n

j>d tre n r y pawr Ihunet-j- Bi*J *rt Cftr tha n4tt part Antlmni KrAlli like t * t u ^ c n t * iritis tho IB,, tTot*Kiy wllji Ihrj
l*t*iYlJvi WE J3Dd JufQ lJcJii.ii DmijmrlD'a frcirp, FHlM, i*
Dltbmiflji the airr *HKrtirJl*d th*ij? jreltYiticH
frtiL
fh* iej't vr*Tfl4inH th* H!H*lvtlort #* restfli^tHio", AA Bit
3.

IX i.0- hoped thai VS fBtaGrtlUMI v t U Jiflt

ho4 bftn pjjjeriJii* AJ m i l
Sf Hi* Junta v l l l rcncin Alie
t"hat UI-B i l c t i t o r i n i IA Fun
mijp<jb-t discn oat
vitbmrt fiiuuinijl JUvi* an&
*j>LLt

CM

(K4

lieli or rtu-t
5 All trvn. U
ppt*=ntljf h u
Uic pcLLticil prcupu i n
(1 c t i l l *iH/iht of

A-a

*PrttliU(jh* ha** UipHM'sl *.J4c*rt.ly ijifl, irtillt

i
1

., J*lKjf oaruLLticn* on th* I^rthor^ UilpLam {La PQI to the bopJ

rj Kiu-tli of &-n {iqeeft near rii-W-Ti,) tjiey tr# flrj Ifl Ui*
a4d In t m sj-ea* earrt cii the atronltHi1
t*ay m f a i r l y
Miti-5ornunitit ond ttic
Ercat a.Jo-rlti' of *(H pofiulatijm t+sd had. t-ElJj1 Full of -avu-l^n.u^atl.i
U J H C " J"IW tf tentr^nm. Met ^ fti^unli , Vh^l* til* p ^ U t i w l I\ii4ir
eimcot* u>e
1P lmr/i*iict 1 al* H trwr* i * irt rta*Ki for
ihii i

fi-T**"

XZt

TT

VG "Fl ITM t H r f 111!

lti
p
^
In *.IL-3 Altipliwa icutfi of
Hi* priKijt Iii^h Qjitii^/ v r l t * >rta PiiMtfil Xn 4
l L h t
l
Ul
tH H
U run
^ ^ V V
firm in ttiia fic-ii

6,

tor Cbnilxil, i n nc-r'nlrv; I n T-HT

Ua US f e*flitlinjit# hmva- *nV#r*4 t h * pj-istur* nine* the

CcnltaT ulno-in I t s litrij-t c^plt f b r rin>5 l l n ^ r
Jjtd AQCD lore n v ^ 4 vWp^^tJ-'lfl rcr
rkLnfl ftrf i r t v ^ t c Qcapuilc* A m r i an Ui-r use of tlie V?
I 4 tCJi4Jr t o develop nnv a i n a * fof ftn-ib-nl. oJid H 1 *
-that- ttd.A *iJ3T[Hti|rf- ^?nfy ctuM be- rpent aart <-'
private D[tfjKtf4tiHU v&a tre iiTulvcd irt

h / i f .H..T-H .Tr

Hemisphere
BOLIVIAN JUNTA LEADER PREPARES

TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT

Junta President
Hen* Harrientos, during one of
his weekly t?*p3 to the- provinces, declared that ha would
M
cc<nsenlhh to be a. coKpronise
presidential candidate ID the
elections scheduled for 30 Hay,

Meanwhileh earlier indications that Barrlentos would a#ek

political support from c e n t r i s t
groups, as well as his omn Popular Christian Movement (UPC)
which *aa launched ott L January,
ire being borne ot. He c U l n s '
to have the support of Hernan
S t i e s f reorganized Hatianai Revolutionary Movement, He il^a
sftfims to be interested in
r e c r u i t i n g tue Authentic Revolutionary Party, headed by Walter
Guevara Arze.
ptlsthe
r i g h t i s t BgUvian Socialist
FaLah^e (FSBj and Juan Lechin'a
National LeTtlst Revolutionary
Party (PRIHJapparenti7 wilL
be excluded froi* the Barrientos
bandwagon. Campaign t a c t i c s ,
howevsr, Include efforts to
undercut these parties ind to
draw off SOBB nf their nemberIn such A anneuver Last

15 Jan 65

CURREWT

eek, Birrientos heatedly attached

pro-CotUnuniat labor LadT Lech In
during * press conference but
refrained from criticizing the
PHEtf.

Barrlentos continues to bes that he can t r u s t or use

a number at persona with Coanu^
niaitaavcJfErouadg+Antonio Ar-

Cerira.L Barrientos
to b growing acre t?alfuaured
and seeas confident that he can
flonp*te tmcceaaftilly with the
professional nollticiani* + Apparent Ljr he ia workinf we LI ith
the coaaander of the
forces, general

~E WEEKLY

Page 16

OVER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY Of BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF

Barrientos i s
minad. ta stay on as president
of the BoHvlan Junta in spit*
pi his presidential candidacy
in tie national a u c t i o n s now
Sch*duLed for 2fi Sept saber, Bar
rientos feirB that should ha
i*esiefl from in* junta, hla prob
able successor, commander of
the armed forces General Ovando
wouLd annul, the elections and
a a i l i t a r y dictatorship.
Barr1ent oe' r * sLgnat ion
was requested in a cabinet oeet
ing Last ponth, protiblr on th*
basis of a constitutional requireaent that candidatea tor
eiectii^d resign ttaa public office L80 days before the #Lecti date. It is likely t h u
tnis Legal issue nasked th.*
feellnp ol certain offic*r tb*
the nilltarT shdtiLd stay out of
politics. Barrientoa refused
to resign, and nia stand ha*
sine* been lvi3 a legal and
public blessiDE in a press a r ticle bya prominent
tlt
tivnal l

Tb roLationsbip
add Oenartl Ovando
rbains cordial an the surrace
On tho other hand both m*a are
aabltl4M4 for tho presidency,
and th*lr cooperation Is baaed
mainly on th* reep*ct of each
for th* Ather'9 assets, nawly
popul^ritv with
population and
standing vLtd tbe arowd farces
as a reapsctftd co^aander,
Division within ttfl armed
forces over the two Lea4>r4
do*s not ertst ta yet, bat there
ia U t t l * dcubt that oplnloo
groups have developed ov** certain ieffti&e. In sQn*T*lt the
debate ia over the role of the
arsed forces in tbe l i f e of tbe
nation. Ovtodo la believed to
be aiDlu'g at a condition there
the alLitary viLL be the final
arbiter in Bolivlaa affairs.
A Barrlentos gortrnseDt would
probably depend nor* upon c i v i l ians in the deci9ion-flaking
process.
With reR*fd to th* p o l i t i cal partita, Barrtentos a t i l l l a tends to seek allgnfliit with
tbe left-center forces* Hi h i i
broken itfi the riffbtlst Bolivian
SociaLldt Falany* <JFEB)

L2 Feb

CVRJIENT lyTELLIOENCfi lfEEKLT

Page

SECRET
Western Hemisphere
GROWING FOH BOLIYIAJS JUNTA CHIEF'S RESIGNATION

i s increasing pres,
sure on General Barrientas to
r<Jrn the junta ht now
heads by 26 Birch Li rie intends
co r.eain a candidate far th*

that SHouLd he resifiij concundier

of th* armed f q r c e s Central
Ovanda TrtuLd Ldpas a m i l i t a r y
dictatorship.

Bolivian presidency in elections

set for September. The case for
resignation is bated an a con*.
s t i t u t i a n a l requirement that
presidential candidates who h
public office resign ISO days
before the election d
Opposition p a r t i e s and d i s c o n t e n t e d labflf groups are s p e a r heading t h e drive to e e t B i r r i e n toa t o 3tHf> don r HoKver. maoy
Bolivians who are not politically

Opposed to Birri,entO3 including

sne aruy offIcer3--agre* Chat hosho-uld comply v i t h ttia c o n s t i t u t i o n . Thus far, BamentD* has
refused to da so on the grounds
t h a t the re.qu Irene at does not appLy t o ham as head of an interim
governmut. In reaLity h he fears

^Jfcf?,;.i-^1- *>

Mar

IMTELLIOENCE WEEJO.Y

BOLIVIAN POHEH STRUGGLE THREATENS NCT VIOLENCE

The clandestine rivalry

between Bolivian junta president Barrientos and the commander
of the arned forces, General
Ovando* hafl burst into the open
this week and la threataning to
resolve Itself fcv violence.
Barrientos' pdsition s^Enfi to
be the stronger at the moment
as recent events have worked
t-Q hi? advantage, while Ovando
has apparently made some s e r i miscalculations.
Until tbe assassination
attempt against bin on 21 Marchf
Barrientos was losing supportr
and his efforts to force p o l i t ical parties into a coalition
behind hiu had laundered*
Furthermore, tHe prevailing
opinion within the catinet and
tbe oilitary was that ftarriettos had to refiign from the junta
if he wished to campaign for the
presidency. Mews of the sha-otitu
however, innedigrtely n l l i e d
civilian and military sympathy
for bin*
Gvando1e attempt to d i s place Barrientoe as junta president on 22 March* plus his
f l i r t a t i o n with the offer of
a presidential nomination by
center and rightist p o l i t i c a l
parties h has revealed his host i l i t y to Barrleqtos, and Is
forcing all political parties

26 liar

to define their positions.

3arriento*' peasant supporters
in Cochibaaiba Lnd the Nationalist
Revolutionary Uevenent (MNK> are
calling for ov*ndots diJSnisaal
leader HernAn 31 las
his proposed a pacification plan which includes suggestions that elections be postponedd
the cabinet te purged of Ovando
supporters and the tmed forces
blgb comiand1 be reorifinlisd,
Sties baa also rvcosmended that
Darrientos resign from th* juftta
at a later date u d entrust tbe
to * triujflTirate of

sm

The> UNR bas called Out i t s

armed militants to danoostr&te
on bebalf of Barrientofl when
be returns to La Fax from
Cochahamba. Tbe demonstrations
B.re aimed at pressuring Barrientos Into accepting the peacekeeping formula and at securing
a proaisa of substantial UNA
representation in a future government The US Enbassy conaiders violence in La Pa* liJtely
as a result of tpe deQBBtTj

INTELLIGENCE WBEKLTf StftUtART

P*BO

22

Kepisphere
DIFFICULTIES OF BOLIVIA
The difficulties of General
H
Barrientos 1 military government are intensifying a time
parses nd HO solutions are found
for Bolivia's acuts political
and economic problems. KoreOVer , Barri*ntos ' uncertain
leadership givs no assurance
that prospects for stability
Till soon improve.
Barrientos' aabition to
as a popularly elected president
has been an important factor
behind his government's insecurity
Although well lilted by
most Bolivians, tie has been unable to secure much support for
his candidacy froa the political
parti.es. Korov*r, he Is unwilling to pitf* up the junta
presidency despite legalities
n^ candidates to resign
public olfice ISO days before elections* As a result
tjt this impafiS]*, BsrrientO'S ^ith.
drew his candidacy on 30 April
but then naved Last week to
postpone indefinitely tne presidential
elections scheduled
lor 31 Oct&ber. Barrientos
probably engineered the poetpon*dent to gain time to consi
another strategy by which he
Plight becone a constitutional
president, Tbls latest B O V
has brought him under renewed
critlci^B froia most politictl
parties, but his general popularity seems unaffected.
s economic problftas
are closely tied to the political, situation. Vben the junta
first took power last Novembert
it characterized itself as an
interim government and promised

Page

MILITARY
refoTHE a^
well i s a quick return to cons t i t u t i o n a l government. However h i t snon discovered that
i t Lacked the competent;* to
cope effectively with complex
economic problem*,
The most pressing of tbe?er
inherited from the Faz regime,
is the uply situation prevailing in Bolivia's v i t a l tioBininj industry. The tin-atining
areas are c*ntis of extrea*
l e f t i s t and Cop-mnlat influence
which have v-ot been controlled
by any gtivftrnmsQt since 1952.
COHIBOL. the state
corporatioiij i s burdened
with managerial irresponsibility
as well as unruly labor, and
i s cla^a to bankruptcy.
Internationa 1 deficit
financing has been obtained,
but further assistance is predicated on a wide-ranging reform
of present nine labor practices
whicb inordinately; favor the
miners at the expense of efficient production. All attempted reforms have teen strongly
resisted by the miners acting
under their extremist leadership*
Barrlentos is aware that
the miners can be brought under
control only by Military action,
Ha has. indicated Chat his government Is willing to undertake
such an operation, but is Moving
with deliberation because he 1&
also aware that the miners; will
probably put up a stubborn de>fens*. The Miners are armed,
they are fierce fighters, and
they are jjnder determined leadership.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE lYEEKLY SUMMARY

14 May

THHEATS TO HAflRIEtfTOS REGIME IS, BOLIVIA

A turbulent week ia E
opened with a drive by the government to assert itg authority over
the

Cdmnnnist-dominated1

t i n miners

acid soded with Junta chief Barrientos acting to save his regime from.
threats posed by the personal ambitions of hlg principal r*vaLr
armed forces commander Genera l
Ovando,
The military campaign got off
to a food1 s t a r t on Monday,
Before
the day was 5>v*r, miner resistance
had heeh reduced to a number of1
strc-ngholds. Desperate mine labor
leaders attenpted to avert m i l i tary accupjtiort of the Bines and
preserve their personal power by
asking the spripathetJLe student
organization to obtain a truce.
General Crvandodfor reasons nat yet
clear, u n i l a t e r a l l y concluded1 an
a(Te*nent which provided both for
a cease-fire and an end1 t o the
LnersV strike. The agreement
coat the government the i n i t i a t i v e
in that i t also provided t h a t , by
29 Kay, government forces would be
withdrawn from the mi nee they had
occ-upied . Sporadic s t r e e t fighting, however, continued in La Pas
as late as Thursday,
may have l o a t b i g

The-crisis has prectpltited1

increased plottlngf a^Ainst the
overnmdT, and; there have be*n
indications of s p l i t s developing
*ithin the military,

Skillful political
Ing by Barrlentos averted a coup
attfnpt this week. Be arranged
the appointment of Ovancfo as junti
co-p^esldeot and then had himself
appointed c<?-commander of the armed
forces, Qla a,ip Is t o neutralise
Ovandg by bind log1 him HOre closely
to the ^overoment and forclag him
t a share authority over the military.
The reconciliation is hypoc r i t i c a l and probably lapermanect
but ha? eased tensions is military
and c i v i l i a n sectors T A final
showdovn eeeas iDevitabl# T however,
and may only have freeo postponed
for a short time.

otrv*
_ It is more
probable, hoirever h that he acted1
to underlain* Barrlentos and thus
his own ambitionaT A d t victory over the unruly
N wto for years have been
the cope of Bolivia "a economic
*od poLlti^al problems, would
have jrentLy enhanced Barrientos '
power

Th overthrow of pro-US Barrientos by Ova ado vrjuld stem to

it# an eventual l e f t i s t
of Bolivia, to say
ing of the encouragauent i t
fflire the ConMuaiata everywhere in
Latin Anerica,
Succees.fu:l or not
an Ovando HOVE afainat Barrieoto*
could provoke a c i v i l -war from
which the Cdmnunlsts would1 probably emerge aa the ^hief beneflct-

art*s.

Paffe

WEEKLY 5UHMAR

May

AGiNCT

CENTlJU

Intelligence Information Cable

CJSTK. 12 JUNE 1?65

-^"^

INFO.

15 Xl^J
r 7 T T 3 3 OF THS

EJEHRILLA AJTO ?J5

Ef LATH

ERHEETO 'CHE*1 Gtf^TAEA 13 WO

1ONGSP. jicrrsiG AS A C I B 3 E T I O T I S I S E IN CCEA.

0UE7JLEti IS WOT DTJffiCTPTO THE C-TJSJtEULl AKP HBTTOUJTIOKftSr
OF TEE CCWKN1K PARTI3S Uf L A M AMERICA.

OlA

>RMV/4CSJ

NAVY

u W5 (nuUinrtort IHIBOB I* B**ftll?Ltwl Iff

or nTBUhuoq rf whlefa 4B. u r

IB, TlJif. hoc 7DI Mid 7H (Di

AJR

SECQH

KSJ,

CXA/taffiC

HIE

IAIA

FBI

OHf

OCR

Mt

PAGE :

JDIS5EHJ

STATE, ARMI, CBTCSO, CTJICUHI,

OF

..

15

JU3JECT:

1963

TJie September 15th Statement On t h e Dominican

l l b l f c
Honorable J , William Fulb-right

1.
In a lengthy statement released on 15 September
cor J. Vfillijui Jfulbrigtit developed primarily two majathenes concerning the role of the US in the Dominican
rebellion:
a.
The US intervened for the purpose ol the
preventing: victory by a revolutionary forte judged to be
cowBitinist doainateO- 3a said that "There is no doubt tjac
::ie Ji'saL of ionaiLifiisjii rather than danger to American lives
vas Liia (Ajabassaeor Bennett 1 s) prinary or sole reason for
rec&Eiiaending .aiiitary action,
b. At no time did the
cosiawniBts control tiie rebellion prior to the lanoiQg of
UZ ^fti-ines,
'i'lieir participation was to have been expected.
IVe analyze below' these two themes and include as annexes
s on subsidiary points made by the Senator.
2.
Our analysis o; the f i r s t theme shows that'jby
1 2S Santo Domingo \\s,a in a s t a t e of anarchy.
It is
true that o f i i c i a l s of the Embassy in Santo Eoningo as well
as government officials in flashing-ton were concerned, with
growing Communist influence In the Dominican Republic and
the^ alnost immediate rale that some communist a c t i v i s t s
too--: a= e^rly as \;he second day of the r e v o l t .
However,
the trigger ^vhich sent U3 troops ashore was the raortal
threat to the lives of Americans and many other nationals
in a city where law and order had collapsed.
Unruly groups
hati entered the Hatal Embajador on two occasions, once i^L
search of an American citizen; and had fired indiscrirainateljinto rootus tiad corziiors. The premises of several embassies
were iuv&det, and the British vice consul reported to the
U ambassador on the afternoon of BS April that the downtown
slttia-iion was "horrible" and thai nobs of S00-3OG were
saclcins hones in the residential area of Arroyo Hondo where
saany rtiiiei-leans Hveci.

APPROVED POtRRElEtfZ
* SEP

3.
The collapse of the local police forces was almost
complete by April 25, Police Chief Uespradel told the
American public Safety Adviser on that day that his men
were not trained to fight against th& heavy weapons being
used by the r&bals. Some police were in hiding, some were
hiding tn.ej_r uniforms and mixing with the mobs, some were
already the victims of a t r o c i t i e s .
4, By the la.te afternoon of April 2U as Ambassador
Bennett talked to "Jashington shots could toe heard against
the Embassy building r
I t was in this context of anarchy
that the junta leader Colonel BsnOit informed the US
ambassador that tie could no longer guarantee the safety of
foreign nationals. The following day the Papal KunciOj who
had been most active in trying to convince both sides to
lay down their arias, described the marines as
f
i
1h
a humanitarian purpose in protecting lives.
5. Senator rultrright 's second theme develops the
point that at no tine did the cOKraUtiisfs control the rebellion
prior to the landing oi US marines. Our view i s that taken
by i t s e l f t h i s statement i s correct.
The point i s , however,
that by the evening at April 27 the moderate FBE leaders
ot the rebellion, hitherto in shaky control at the aoveuenti
l o s t their nerve ano began abandoning cLieir posts* The
Molina Urena government f e l l and many of ins principal
figures went into asylum. One of '^iia jsost prorainent of
these, Jose ?Stia Gorues; acjinittfld that die coni^unists who
joined the robfll force had in*ilti-(:ev into positions of
inuortance anti that i t TW*IS very aifL J icjlt \o stop theTn.
For his part d woin.n^ Jr^nn Js rsportac to have said on
Jlay 3 tEiat be; wanted to .jet the tru^ii of comnunist infiltr&itio
of the rebellion across to ihe \?&z-lt but thac he cuuld not
ace 'urt^ier jeopardising i*,is own ant! his f sraily' s
b
(See Tab B, idaQorntitjUKi, l1J?iie
by doin so.
hI
in ihe "^Onirtican 3evolt , 7 liay
3. There was then no one in ef:active leadership.
It Is perhaps siyrnificant that the French arn.tassacJor in
Santo Uonin^o describee events there iras following the
c l a s s i c comrauniat oattei'ii," Ho concludes "ha.t his British,

I t a l i a n and Meat German colleagues w r e in agreement that

the "CaauaDO roup", which grew out of the rebellion,
directed "at i t s base" by communists.
7.

In essence, then, on the evening

g of the
th
fi
the f i r s t task facing the US was protecting the
lives 01 Americans ana other foreign nationals.
Its
second t2sJ; was nore complex. The US was iaced with making
the agonizing determination of whether increasingly evident
coinaiLinist participation AH<1 influence within the rebellion
woulci--i.n tne absenca of other leadershipsoon become comislste control.
All available evidence pointed1 toward t h i s
eventuality r

Tab At
Tab 3 :
Tab C:
Tab It:

the Situation in Santo Comin^o on 2S April

The Communist Sole in the Dominican Revolt,
7 Hay 19S5
The Coafflunist ?hole tn the Eoninican Hehel
Hoveraent^ 16-37 Say
GiTiLrcuni5t Connections of Juan Bosch: A FvesEi
Iriterpetation
f n n the Tulbright Speech and j '

CENTRAL

A0EHCY

Intelligence lofonnation Cable

COUNTRY

DAtEOF

DISIfc 1 1 [44 Y 1965

3 KAY 1965

3WKJ.

5UUECT
ABOUT THE SITUATION Itf TSE
AMD ITS DELATION TO CUBA

PUCE 4
DATE

1+

OK 6

1965

J\.

UNITED STATES SRIPS AKE P.ATEOLLING CUBAH KTYS

B.

IN CUE A SFlJCIiiL WEJiPOMS^ IHCLlffilNt MISSILZ IW5T/LLATION3

COASTS.

JIKE iffiADY AKP PiLEP^HEH AGAINST A POSSIELLH ATTACK.

C,

THE IKT^GRATIO?? 0 1 MULTII^TEPJL POHCES IS A>T0 LXSIINGO

I S VERY EABGEHCUS TOR CUBA BECAUSE AN ATTACX ACiClST CJHA CCJLlr RESULT WITHOUT THE UXITED STATES ASSUMING SOLS RSPOSEIBELirJ" YOU I T .
T i l * BUi-hrlkl

1 * . UJI.E

JECRCT
CIA/NMCC
APPROVEDF0RELEASE i

nl vfefcfc. 1M KIT

*" u M

SECRET
D,
CRISISt

AT NO TIME, EXCEPT DUKING THE OCTOBER 1 9 6 2 MISSILE

HS THE UNITED STATES HAD A MORE PttOFrTIOUS ASE JUSTIFIED

OCCASION TO ATTACK CUBA,

.

IP UNITED STATES TflOOPS ARE tfITHDAWN ?EDM THE

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC A SIMILAR SITUATION CEEVOLT) WILL E EEFZATED

IN VENESTJEU^
F.

IN ANY EVIMT, REBELLIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN" GT.HER

CQUNTEIES.

^ ^ _ _ ^

COliHENT:

THERE HAVE BEEN DHSuBSTAWTIATED REPORTS OF AN

COMMUNIST COUP TO TAKE PLACE IN UKDGUAT
MMI^i^Mi^i^B-iB-H

HOWEVER. NEITHER TEE UF,L7A7AX COMMUNIST

P.ARTY <PCU} NOR ANY OTHER LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE OBGANZZ^TIOX APPEARS

PREPARED TO STAGE A COTJP IN URUGUAY.

THE PCU HAS OEGA^fIZEI> PARA-

MILITARY UNITS TO TJiKE TO THE STREETS TO STIMULATE TEE PEOPLE TO

STAGE A COTJNTERJtETOLrTJTlON IN THE EVEST TE^T JOLITiH? PLOTTERS TRY
TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT

2.

MmSGEU:

COHKiraSTFORj ClKCL,4HTa CIMCSO,

OF HESBLACE

'SECRET

CENTRAL

IKTELLEGENCE

AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

CUBA/ DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

M a n d a t o r y R-:-v^

Casa P NL J_3

PATE OF

a MAY 19&S

JWO.

OOOHSBH:

# 4 -

Pont

19&5

1P ALLEGED DIRECTIOM OF RQEL OPERATIONS IN 5AMT0

DOMINGO, PdMlNrcAN REPUBUC SY * t H E u GUCWRA
2 . REFOftTED ARRIVAL OF HIS53LES.AM? ARMS IN CUBA
ISSUED IN
DATf .

62705

REFOET NCX

1*

AS OF 8 MAV ]$$, MAJOR ERNESTO Y H E " GUEVARA Y SERUA, CU9AN

MIMISTER OF INDUSTRIES, WAS DIRECTING REBEL OPtRATIOHS IN SANTO

Q0M]NGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,

^ H B

COMMENT:

COMJECTURE OVER

CUEVARA^S WHEREAF30UTS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY CUBAN EX I LETS AND WNY

RUMORS HAVE EVOLVED A3 A RESULT OF GUEVARA'S ABSENCE FRCM THE
GOVERNMENT SCENE FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO CUBA ON 1 ^ MARCH.

PRESS

COVERAGE OF THIS SPECULATION WAS CITED EN THE RECENT NEW

YOSK TIMES ARTICLE BY PAUL HOFFMAN, ^ MAY*

PREMIER CASTRO HAS

COMMENTED-ON QUERIES CONCERNING "CHE'S" AE1SENCE THAT fT CAN BE

Thii

t w t i h t Eafarmulen

DIA

AEMTTUC5I

ALVCI~2

HAVT

AIR JCS 5ICDEF

.CIA/HM^C

.ID/RR

IHJt NIC

1 , AD/S[ 2

ASSUMED THAT GUEVARA'S TALENTS WILL. BE PUT TO (EE WHERE MOST

MENDED.)
2.

SOVIET VESSELS CARRYING MACHINERY TO CUBA HAVE TRANSPORTED

MISSILES AND WEAPONS IN CRATES WHICH WERE OBSERVED BEING

U
N
L
O
A
D
E
D
, H | ^ H M B H H H I

THE U
N
f
T
E
D

STATES WAS UNAWARE OF WHAT EQUIPMENT THE CUBAN ARMY AGAJN HAS-)
COMMENT:

THE SOVIET VESSEL KASFJY5K EN ROUTE TO CUBA ON 5

CHANGED COURSE TO UNLOAD SUSPECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS IN

BEFORE PROCEEDING TO

3. ON 6 MAY OFFICIAL CONFIDENTIAL ORDERS WERE ISSUED THAT

CUbA WAS iN A STATE OF WAR,
U. ^ ^ | DISSEM: C1NCLANT, CINCSO,

5,

MO DOU&T"THE ABOVE

WITH

END OF MESSAGE

SHOULD BE VIEWED

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory S e ^

NLJ J ^
1G July

SUBJECT:

The Situation in Santo Eoming-O on 23 April

1. Santo Domingo on 23 April 1965 was in a state

of almost complete anarchy. The rebel government of Molina
Urena had collapsed on the previous afternoon and the
Communists and their extremist allies were attempting to
fill the va.uunu The loyalist military leaders were unable
or unwilling to commit their superior force against the
rebel stronghold downtown. The police TJrere impotent and
their few efforts to restore order ended in disaster.
Meanwhile, armed gangs anc individual hoodlums were terrorizing
the city, even the residential areas. The UK Embassy n'as
under iire and American Citizens were in grave danger.
b
The British vice consul vrho toured the downtown
area of Santo Domingo on the afternoon inforraed Ambassador
Bennett that the situation there was "horrible." He said
there were armed bands running all about. T^e Britisher
said he had -taken a :ian who had beeo shot in the leg to
the hospital and there he had found wounded lying all
about on the floors. He added thai 3riti_h residents of
the Arroyo Hondo suburb of Santo Lotuingo reported that an
arped band of tira to three hundred persons were looting
anci sacking residential houses in the area.
3T
Indicative cl ttie state of anarchy in tbe city
that day ^as the problea faced ty loyalist Police Chief
Despr&ael, He told the American public safety adviser on
that day that his riot control forces were almost completely
inactive. They had not been trainee to figilt against the
weapons the ratals har been using against themr
The
chief saic1 that almost every patrol he h ^
in dovrnto^-n Santo >j0minirO haci been wiped out,
_____
the polire -were
off their uniforms and attesiptin^: ice iide, bu.t were nevertheless being tracked COTWTI hy tli^ iiiabs and killed. In "the
afternoon of the sa:.:e &sy r tLie police c.jj-flf T3a_e an atteup
to use a tanl: to help ccnii'jl the ^.oUSj but this ended in
(Lissater when the tank v.'&a exploded oy rebel haaooka fire
and all occupants were

T SEP

JW6
4. T-ie ?olics Post at the Palace of Justice in
towi Santo PoniugQ was overrun by Communist-led rebels at
about 10;30 am LET on the 2Gth and the rebels obtainedmore
arms ana police uniforms* The American Embassy ^ H V s V
^ I ^ H I during Host of the day had little first-hand
information as to what was goine on n the do\mtown areast
but did receive numerous reports of killings. Sporadic
sniping was uccierway in the residential areas where most
of "the American colony lived. Also, there was growing
pervou5i)ess n the diplomatic corps since the promises of
n:ore than one embassy were invaded by armed taobs. These
induced the embassies of itexico, Guatemalat Peru, Ecuadorh
ano 31 Salvador, The nobs were under no control during
rouen of the day and looting- and sacking took place in many
parts of the city, Soiae of the mob actionst however, were
inspired by the rebel-controlled radio stationH Hadio
broaocELsters &ave the aedresses of homes of air foresofficers and otheTraili-taryofficers vho were on the loyalist
side and incite*7 t;ie nobs to sack tlis houses. The is/ives and
chilcr&n of loyalist officers were seized and taken to the
Euarte Bridge and e-tiler targets o* loyalist military action.
5. Th*re were a number of reports reaching the
on the 2th Ji reb&l atrocities. Although these have not
een confirmed j.n detail they undoubtedly reflect an accurate
general picture, A USIS Staff member reported, on 2S April,
for instance, that twelve policemen or soldiers had been
seen bein& summarily shotH The victins had been marched
along; the street, with the mobs crying "pirdon," Then
they wore linec up against a wall and executed+ The
Colonel Calderonr who served under Juan Bosch as chief of
the presidential guard, also met his death under these
circumstances.
6.

on 2^ April 13 policemen who had been gam'ding

house ^ ^ I ^ ^ I ^ I ^ I H **?B overwhelmed by rebels
and their bodies dismembered and slogans written on Trails
wi-tli blood. There were several witnesses to this event.
7. Late on 2t At>ril* Colonel Benoit, an air force
officer on the loyalist ailitary junta then in power, inforciec

the American Ambassador that, in regard to hie sarlier request

for US military assistance, he now wishes to add tba.t American
lives were endangered and that "conditions are of such disorder that it is impossible to provide adequate protection*"
Ha then forma11/ asked, for US intervention to restore public
order.

LSJ LIBRARY

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

CUBA
Of

DOMIKI CAN fiPUEL[C

1965

2& APRIL
J h ARREST OF MILITARY PERSC*J4EL IW O3MS0LACIDH DEL SUR
3 , RPOftTED WJLLIKflNESS OF REBEL ARMY OFFICERS TO KELP
IN SANTO CCMIN&Q

PLAC
PATE ACQ.

IN 57073

5QUKC1
AND
APPSIAI5AL

HELD REPORT NO.

!>

DURING THE NIGHT OF 2b APRIL 1?&5> * NUMBER OF

PERSONNEL IN CONSOLACIGN DEL SUR, PJUAR DEL RtO PROVINCE,

ARRESTED ANO CHARGED WITH THEFT-

ONE CF THE MEN, Dfi. CESALLO

WAS ACCUSED OF GIVING INFORMATEON TO THE UTJtTED STATES GCV

THE! DOCTOR'S LICENSE WAS REVOKED, BUT HE LATER WAS RELEASED
THE CHARGES COULD NOT BE PROVED*

THE OTHER MILITARY

SENTENCED, BUT THtlR SENTENCES WERE COMMUTED WHEN THEY AGREED TO

FIGHT WHEREVER NEEDED.
2.

UNIDENTIFIED REBEL/ARMY OFFICERS WERE

H M H ^ H v - ^ M

1-Stc)

TblT ^QAilfriAl CDDCAJCS LSjzrSB^IkS iff^-i'rp tlffl ^3^1w|i.J JJ^fc^fC i)i t^f "UtadlCd SlatC4 V^^^ft "the T^ujnmp Qf tbt
I jijit TliJtf l l h L7rC i s a , 753 u d 75^. >** irmtminMii oc prvriaLJ^o of ^hfrti nr #ny nrtn-npy u an
by lawT-

OIA

AWFACH

A&/CI 3

NAVY

Wt

JCS

CIA/W1CC

SCDCf

NSA

ME

Ffl!

UHA o a
1NS

ONE o a
TREASURY

EXO

IN 57073

GECRCT
TO GIVE HELP TO SANTO DOMINGO, IF ASKED.
DtSSW:

COMKWESTFOR, CINCSO,

flTJO OF MESSAGE

3TATEMEJ7T - FACT
Statement ! Senator Fulhright nns said that i t is entirely possible, if not likely, tbat if the military xs allowed
to retain its power i t will overthrow any future government
that displeases i t " and at the saae tise said that the military
"must be substantially reduced In size and sons of tne more
irresponsible generals pensioned ofi or sent on lengthy diplomatic holidays abroad".
Fact; Military reform was one of the aajor object!vas ol
the Seld government and Hector Garcia Godoy tins consistently
stated tbat he feels railitary reforms must be initiated under
his retritte. The US country team has recoinmendetf that v/e press
Garcia Godoy "energetically to initiate feasible reductions
and reforms". Garcia Godoy has already taltan the major step
of removing General TJessin iroai command because o insubordination, thus asserting civilian supremacy over the military,
The 3eld regiiae tool: some very important stops to eliminate
corruption in the military and General insert exiled ei^ht top
r u l i n g officers who ^/ers anons the aost venal. Garcia Godoy
S s endorsed this lattor action and has prohibited the reentry
of these officers into the uominican Republic.
At t h e saao time both Garcia Godoy and t h e U"
y
team are c a r i o u s of the fact that military reform SbflU Jjt
be pusbed too rapidly for two major reasons. First the nfl-^
cutback in military sti**ftsth votild severely sha^e the AraeU
Forces confidence in the net? re-tEe. In this connection It
be noted that the Dominican nilitfiry leadership is
an awareness of the need Jor ohanSe and is reportedly
on plans for roforra. Second, the new regime needs a
corapetent military force that will be prepared to combat the
ejected ipsargent activities of the e^trenists wLO have used
thl revolution to eqaip and train themselves for p i c m U *
warfare
?or these reasons the country team has recommended
a gradual cutbac!: in tne military to about 60% of their pre^
crisis strength.

APPZQVEb FOff

19D1

2.
Senator Fulbright said the U3 acted: "unil a t e r a l l y and i l l e g a l l y " and the OAE acted "after the fact"
Senator Fulbright further said that intervention should not
liave been undertaken "without the advance consent of out Latin
American a l l i e s . "
Tact: The dangerous situation cave loped i& the
He-public so quickly that thsre was l i t t l e time to obtain the
support of I^tin nations before taking action.
On 2G April
i t rapidly became- clear that the lives and property of U3 and
other foreign nationals in the Dominican Republic Were in
danger. The incident on the morning of. 27 April at the Hotel
dor demonstrated that US lives could have been lost at
moiaent. That none tfere i s oply a tribute to the spa ad
v/itli viiich US .Marines could ranch the embattled TJ3 citizens.
I t has frequently been noted by students of the O&E that ooe
o$ the organisations najor l i a b i l i t i e s is the slovr pace with
whicii i t "-^OrilS. Ambassadors niist be convened; receive an
i n i t i a l request or action; consult their governments, deliver
long speeches outlining the positions of their home countries,
and1 then finally act.
I t is highly improbable, given this
scenario, that the CAii v/ould have been able to act on 3 Aprijt
President Johnson did f in iaat, nanage to consult with most
Latin American Ambassadors that night and explain why v/e f e l t
i t necessary to tai:e action so quickly* I t should be noted,
in t h i s contort, that a l l n^jor steps taken since then have
been done as CAZ actions. This includes the establishment o:?
tSte intGr-Auerican ?e[ice Force, the extension of economic
5id to pay U:e salaries of public eaploye-es during tho revolution, anc the lon^ t arduous negotiations that recently culninatsd ir: the i n s t a l l a t i o n or the Ejector Garcia Godoy s

Statement 3. Senator Fulbright said that "the danger

to American lives TO more a. pretext than a reason for the massive
United States intervention that began on the evenlag of April 28
. * In fact, no American lives were lost in Santo Domingo until
the marines began exchanging fixe with the rebels after the Zflth;
reports of the widespread shooting that endangered. American
li
turned out to be grea,tly ejciggeratodtN*

FACT

See Tab A

Statement 4* Senator Fulbright said; 1hUS intervention

has alienated our real friends in Latin America." "It is not
possible at present to assess the depth and extent of disillusion with the US on the part of democrats and reformers
in Latin America, I myself think that it is deep and widespread, tpIntervention reflects a grievous misreading of the
temper of contemporary Latin American politics."
Fact.
Eetancourt said that Bosch deserved to be overthrow) because
he was trying: to play ball with the Communists and, in turn,
was being undermined by them, Bet&ncourt characterized Bosch
as an irresponsible president wbo had set hack the democratic
process in the Dominican Republic for years to
Comment by US political scientist Robert Alexander, who
has long been a friend of liberal parties In Latin America,
described Bosch*s attitude in mid-1964 as so negative and
violent that tils return to power In the Dominican Bepublic
ld be a "disaster."
In a conversation ctl 2 nay 1965 Between Eocmlo Betancourt,
Arturo Morales Carrion, and Arthufl Schlesingea:, Eetancourt
said the following: "He (Bosch) Is the best short story writer
and the worst politician in Latin America, and lie should spend
the rest of his life writing short stories*17 Betancourt,
according to SchlesiQCfer, regards It as essential to prevent
Bosch's return, and believes tnat Figueres (fanner President
of Costa Rica) can persuade him to retire from politics.

Statement 5* Senator Tulbright accused; the administration

of confusing Communist support o a political movement and
Communist control. According to the Senatort "Intervention
on the basis of Coomtunist participation as distinguished trom
control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake of. panic
and tJLwldlt? which reflects a grievous misreading of .,,
Latin American politics/1
Fact* It ie Interesting to note t h e o intonof Communist
diploioat
influence I D the rebellion formed by a tfi
who opposes US intervention on moral aa
^^^^^^^_^^ was sent by his ^overmneiftt to Santo
ou an official investigating tour In mid-June reported that
"Communist influence In Dominican developments had been
enormous and continues to **a'\ ^Mdescribed rebel leader
Caamano as a useful St&oge of the Communist, but did not say
whether Caamano was a ComnmniGtt He also said that Tide!
Castro had been expected to arrive in Santo Domingo In May

Statement 6. Senator Fulbrigbt, In criticising the US

actions in ths Dominion Republic, declared that the US must
recognise that most of the popular support in Chile is Soar
a Froup of "rambunctious, l e f t i s t Christian Democrats. We
charged that the U3 doea not truly understand social revolution Dec a use of i t s -comiortable and rich conservative" status
Fact: The U3 Government has since the very be
waroly supported the election of Eduardo Frei, Chriatiaa
Democrat leader, to the presidency and the subsequent election
of a majority of the Christian I>emocrats In the Chamber of
Deputies. The Senator is cwrect, and indeed merely echoes
an off i c i a l position that Chile is an esample of an advance^
democracy as ^pressed by ambassador Stevenson at tne United
Nations last November. Secretary Buslt told Chile's Ambassador
TtaQiC on 6 Aueust 19G5 that he wanted the Ambassador to know
that the U5 ia in full sympathy with the program of Chile Aor
social and e c o r ^ i c development. The Secretary added that
"there is no ideological argument betwe&n Chile and the
States /'

/nc.o
IS October
No. 3533/65
Copy-No,

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

THE FALL OF CHE GUEVAHA

AND THE
FACE 0? THE CUBAN REVOLUTION^

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 2333/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
D i r e c t o r a t e of I n t e l l i g e n c e
IS October 1955
INTELLIGENCE
The F a l l _of Cha Guevara and t h e Changing Face
the "Cuban fievbltttion
Summary .1 + Fidel Castro's willingness to drop Ernesto
'Che" Guevara confirms the shift in Cuban policies
that has been under way for about the past year.
Guevara's fall from pow*r apparently resulted, from
his persists tit opposition to the practical policies
recommended fay the Soviet Union. His views on Cuba's
economic development and foreign policyreflecting
his general opposition to Soviet advicefoots, seem
to have played, a rolet
r

2, Guevara f who has been considered.

most H i l i t a n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y spokesman, disapproved
of C a s t r o ' s alignment with the. TJSSH in t h e SinoSovlet d i s p u t e and of h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to diminish
Cuba's r o l e as a c a t a l y s t and supporter of r e v o l u t i o n s An Latiii America aa4 Africa.. This s i d e of t h e
controversy has been amply t r e a t e d elsewhere. Tills
paper concentrates more on the d i s p u t e between t h e
two r-en over economic policy*
r

3. While he was in favor with Fid!el Castro,

Che Guevara was one of the most important architects
of the Cuban economy. He retained! this role for some
time, eveat after his industrialisation plan had been
proven wrong and some c-f his other policies were
being challenged. Not Until July 1954, when President Dorticos became the Minister of.Economy and the
Director of the State Planning Board (JVCEVJMX)f did
Guevarafs position really begin to wsaJcen, Since

that time Fidel Castro has dedicated most of his 1

energies to Cuban internal matters t and to flading
remedies for the disastrous effects of the
early policieslargely tiiose engineered by
1 nd 135 tr i al j^z at i o n G u ev ara ' s Great e st Fa i 1 ur e
4. From the outset Guevara had encouraged the
rapid nationalization and centralization o the
economy, and by the spring of 1961 the Cuban economy
TMa.s almost entirely state owned * Although he was
not a trained economist, Guevara convinced Castro,
against the objections of Carlos; Rafael Rodriguez
and others, that accelerated industrialization was
necessary. He maintained that a diversification of
agricultural production and increased Investment in
industry was required to end fdependence on sugar and
Cubans "economic enslavement * by the US, By the
time Guevara and Castro admitted, In late 1963, tiat
the industrialization plan must be scaled down to
reassign resources to sugar production, Guevara's
policies had trough the economy- to its lowest point
Since Castro cane to power
Cuevarans Dispute ^ith the National Bank
5. Because of the failures of the economy
Castro tfas paying increased attention to otner advisers by the end of 19G3. In February 19S4 some
of the strains and tensions tritbin the regime cane
into tbe open* Marcelo Fernandas Font^ the President of the National Bani t published, an article in
the ideological journal Cuba Sociali3ta
on the history and functions of a "socialist11 bank. In the
next issue o the saute journal Guevara reacted
angrily* He charged that Fernandez still thought
in terms of "classical economics" and! even 'Vulgar
economies"; tbat be sought to make the Bank instead
of the Finance Ministry the center of tbe Cuban
economy; and! that Be wanted to control investment
credits through the National Bank.
6.

la the May issue of Cuba Socialista Fernandas

tried to defend himself without taking issue
Guevara or even mentioning his name. Fernandez
said that socialist planning cooild take a monetary
form with the bank necessarily playing a prominent
role. A fourth article, by Luis Alvarez Rom, Minister

of Finance and a close Guevara associatet appeared!

in the July Issue and attacked! Fernandez * position..
By, the time that issue appeared, Fernandez had been
removed fron the National Bank and given the position
of Minister of Foreign Trade He was replaced by
Salvador VI las oca Forjcte-~aJiOther close Guevara, associate. Banking and finance were both in the bands
<?l* Guevara
7M Guevara's outlook, which approximated
present "day Chinese*- ^rather than Sovieteconomic
practice, was behind the controversy* A series of
articles id tfa&atra Industria, the official organ of
Guevara's Wtuxstry of Industries, spelled out tie
opposition to the Soviet proposals for encouraging
greater financial responsibility and independence in
enterprises* Guevara objected to Soviet tendencies
to place individual plants on a. sell-supporting
basis,
B, Thus Guevara's war on the role envisioned
for the Cuban National Bank by Fernandez was only
part of a much larger war against decentralisation,
relative autonomy, financial flexibility, and greater
material incentives* Guevara^ publication explicitly
expressed disagreement with "the emphasis given to
material Interest'7 by the Soviet economist Y. G.
X-ibenaan, whom it charged with advocating change in
the "methods of collective incentive, abandoning
the old! formula of reward basetf oa the fulfillment
of plans in order to move to more advanced plans."
The new Soviet economic treads were seen by Guevara
as a threat to the moral Incentive as the "predominant
form" in Cuba's construction of socialismt
Guevara's Polemic Over Centralisation
9, One of Guevara's most powerful economic opponents was Professor Charles Eettelheitf, a French
economist of Cotnmutiist persuasion. Bettelaeici had
Several trips to Cuba at Castro's request and
helped convince him in the latter part of 1$63
that the economy should be based on agriculture for.
the neit deca.de* Tie also warned against centralisation* Because of his advice Castro made preliminary
investigations into the decentralization ct authority
and in 1&63 began experimetit* in. local autonomy in
towns. But despite these experinflatst and despite

declaration of a sis-year sugar plan, Bettelheim

was outweighed by Guevarastill the strongest voice
on Cuban economic affairs
10* la March IS64 Guevara declared that 1rit^is
supremely Important for us to defend energetically on
all fronts the principle of central organisation of
the economy*+h For Guevara trcentraliaation" *as a
principle frow which tno Cubans could not depart without sacrificing ideological purity. For Bettelneia,
however, centralization was a weans to be prudently
employed only as it was necessary for planning. In
an article in Cuba Socialists in April, Bettelbeijn
suggested that~a~"cer"taih" liberty of local Inter- ,
change" as flell as "individual production" would be
just as beneficial in Cuba as in the Soviet Union*
Ee tried to tell Cubans that they had. nationalised
too nucn and.too fasta slap at Guevara,
11 T A month later Guevara accused Bettelheim
of making a "mechanical analysis/' but was concerned
mostly with the suggestion that .it might be mor^
profitable to nationalize only large industrial units,
and leave small enterprises in private hands* Much
of tbe argument centered on the empregas consolidadas.
(consolidated enterprises3, the Cuban bodies under
the Ministry Of Industries Which controlled a grouping of similar but otherwise independent units,
Eettelheim said that this often meant artificial and
inefficient collectivisationas in the case of
garages. But Guevara replied that "to say an empires a
consolldada is an aberration is to say that tbe Cuban
revolution is an aberration." Guevara argued ultimately that administration really mattered less than
principle of collectivityt and his arguments
Over those of
Porticos Challenges Guevara
12, In July 1564 two important cabinet appointments signalled the power struggle over Internal economic policy which culminated in Guevara*s eliminationH
President Itorticos was appointed to ttto p&jor posts in
an attempt to Improve the isanagem^nt of the badly disorganized economy> While this Move -was apparently
aimed at taking a portion of the administration of economic affairs from the hands of Guevara, Che did nevertheless register a success of his own. In tbe same

month his closest protege, Orlando BorregoT was

uaxied to tne new post of Minister of the Sugar Industry*
13. It seemst however, that the
of Dortlcos was the turning point for the economic
policies and fortunes of Guevara, I>orti.c03 began
to ass vine overall direction of the economy and It
was rumored that th* National Bank and the
Ministry (both headed by Guevara followers)
be merged with the Ministry ol Economy and JTJC2PLAN*
The merger never took place, probably because the
opposing sides became fixed and tne growing tensions threatened to bre&Jc into the
Even so, E&rticos won an important victory when one of Guevara's central points was
quietly suppressed. Referring to the consolidated
enterprisesf Castro said in August that they ^sometimes Become boring, tedious, intolerable. It
would be better to have a garage that works well and
gives people good service, Tha$ is much Piore important than to go around putting up A huge sign
to advertise that this place belongs to an empress
consolidada,
Who knows how much paint has" been
wasted putting1 up names of empresss consoIJLd.adaa?+H
Some eapresas coasolidadas were disbanded late in
the year, ana Castro again ridiculed them as a
ri
Haniair in January
Guevara's VifeTfs On Foreign Policy
An admirer of Chinese foreign policy,
Guevara persistently had agitated for export of the
Cuoan revolution to the rest of Latin America and
even to Africa.* His manual oa guerrilla warfare
has been widely circulated in Latin America and he
was a prominent figure in planning invasions against
at least five Caribbean states in 195S. Guevara has
been, justly described as a, roving incendiary andrevolutionary An Argentine, he reportedly assisted
tbe pro-Coflinunist Arbenz regime in Guatemala before
it was overthrown in 19 54* Later he traveled, to
where tie met Fidel Castro in IS56.
IS. Guevara never wavered from his firm revolutionary stand, even as other Cuban leaders began
to devote most Of their attention to- tbe internal

-5-

problems of the revolution. Moreover, Castro^ e^

tensive popularity in Latin America decreased shaxply
once ha committed the regime to rapid socialisation.
His call for Communist revolutions, after his es*.
pousal of Marxism in December 1961, had not been"received with the enthusiasm of his earlier revolutionary incantations. Indeed, various Latin American parties apparently opposed Cubans assistance to Fekisgcriented revolutionary gfrotips. Even so, Guevara coa
tinned to press for Cuban aid to Latin American
revolutionaries His policies generally prevailed,
17, About mid-1964, however, the reelme began
to accelerate the process of institutioaalizaticunattending to Internal economic problems and party
organization, Revolutionary iervor ttas tempered
and Cuba began to follow Soviet advice more closely*
Relations with China deteriorated during 1964^ as
witnessed by a 50 percent drop-off in air travel
between the two countries* Relations became further
strained by November *hen Cuba took a pro-Soviet
posturo at the Havana Conference of Latin American
Communist Parties. Tbe presence of Raul Castro at
the bead of a blgb-leveX Cuban delegation to the
consultative conference of Conwrttnist Parties in Moscow in Mirth 1365 confirmed for the Chinese Havanars
Be* Revisionist11 posture/ Guevara, however, apparently still strongly opposed maderatiop in Cuban
foreign policy.
The Abrogation of Guevara's Policies
13. In early Decenter 1964 Guevara had departed
on a threes-month trip to the United Nations, Africa,
and Peking. Meanwhilet Castro had lost faith in
Guevara's theories and may have already decided
against his ''dogmatisthl views in favor of the R e visionist" economic school headed! by President Dorticos
andi Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. A clear indication ot
this caae on 31 January 1365 when Castro announced
that material Incentives would be emphasized.. He
said that the 5T000 best cans cutters of th^ 3.965 harvest i^ould! receive rewards suet as motorcyclesT trips
abroad, and expensive vacations at Cuban resorts*
19. It took Guevara only a short time to respond
publicly. While in Algiers he Ttrote a letter to the
Uruguayan leftist veekly Marcha- Sn it he declared

-e-

that "the correct instrument for the

g f
the masses must be- fundamentally of a moral nature+fl
In Cairo the following ttonth Guevara again criticized Cuban economic policies. Incorrectly, Jbe
called then copies of the model of economic development ifoscow had imposed on the countries of Eastern
Europe when irno one had the guts to object*"
0, An interview published in the gyp
periodical 41 Taliah in pril was the last encotn
passing public definition of Guevara's policies*
In it he vehemently attacked tbe economic reforms
adopted I D Yugoslavia as well as "the Libermun experiment" io the USSR, In criticis Ing Yugoslavia,
Guevara condemned its reaction against Stalinism
and ita resort to the use of material incentives*
The t*o primary issues be singled cut Bad direct application to the Cuban situation. One was sorters*
participation ip managementt which he said Cuban
workers -wanted in. order to gain e*tra benefits. This,
he said, constituted "social oppression" and a kind
of exploitation. The second issue, that of workersf
profit sharing;, irae one be knew had teen approved in
Cuba before ha left* The official labor orgati
Trabajo in December 1364 had announced a profitsnaring scheme called the Contract Fage Pilot Plan,
Guevara must have been particularly irked wh^n
Trabajo chose to identify the- worker's compensation
as "tba prize." His statement in ^1 TaJLIab
therefore another sharp criticism of the
leadership and "liberalf' economic policies
21, Guevara returned to Havana on 13
and was greeted by both Castro and Certicos.
was reported by the Havana press to have taade an
appearance on 20 March, hut oe then slipped out of
sight* One of the first moves against his power
clique canie in mid-June when National Bank President
Salvador Vilaseca was removed from his post and installed! as rector of Havana University r
22. Castro's 25 July speech dramatised the
shift away from Guevaraws views. Castro spoke at
length about the need for a regular system of local
authority* Earlier, in the face of conflicting;
''conservative11 and "literal" views represented by
Guevara add Bettelheim, Castro had supported Guevara
in preventing the JTJCEI flocal coordina.tIt)% boards3

-7-

from exercising any roa.1 authority. Now, however, be

reversed his stand* He called for the decentralization
of local administrationt and announced that extensive
reforms would begin to organize a completely new
trative apparatus Castro heatedly denounced
centralised system and graphically described the problem He said that when a. dogr made a mess in the street
of some provincial town1, the central authorities bad
to be called to remove it. On 23 September Castro
again made it perfectly clear that Guevara*s views irere
in disfavor Then h*a said: frLet me go on record that I
am a defender of local development and administration*"
Another of Guevara's cherished theories had been abandoned*
Cuba Withont_Gtievara
23, With tbe announcement of the Central Committee
of tho Communist Party on 1 October, it was clear that
Guevara, his followers and. his policies were out of
favor* The only three ministers excluded from the
central committee were Luis Alvares Rom (the Finadee
Minister who had sided with Guevara JLn the National
Bank dispute), Orlando Eorrego (Gucvarra's closest
protege), and Arttiro Guzman (the Acting Minister of
Industries)* Salvador Vilaseea P o m e (the former
National Bant President) was also excluded. These four
were the only high-level Cubans not included in the
Central Committeeand were also the only ones who had
been intimately involved with Guevarafs economic policies. Moreovert the party's new five-maa Economic
Committee was headed by President Uortlcos and staffed
with adherents o "liberal" economic views.
2 4 ^ In a speech on 3 October, Castro read what
he said was a letter from Guevara+ The main idea it
contained was that CHe felt his revolutionary talents
now could he better used elsewhere It said at one
point, "I tChe) can do what is denied you fFidel) by
your responsibility as head of Cuba," Thus there is no
doubt that Castro^ more cautious position on exporting revolution, as well as his different economic approach, led to Che's downfall. Castro recently said
that the Cuban revolution must find solutions according to its own "spirit and peculiarities." But from
now on Cuba, will probably pattern both its domestic
and foreign policies more in accord with Soviet advice.

-S-

25r flith this realignment, already strained relations with China, tfill probably deteriorate further,,
Last November at a meeting' OJP Latin AmericaQ Comiaunist Party delegates in Havana, Cuba agreed to support
the orthodox parties rather than Peking-oriented! *
militant groups. Relations vi.th China, deteriorated almost imnect lately after the Havana conference,, Guevara
visited JPeklng In February apparently in an attempt to
explain the Cuban position, only to be sharply rebuked
by the CbinesG* After resuming his African trip lie
continued to vent his ''dogmatic" views, xrhich generally
reflected Chinese positions*
2Gt
In any case Chini now has clear Justification
for attacking Cuba as a "revisionist '* regimea charge
it has never publicly Hade, ffith the fall of Guevara
and the general acceptance of Soviet advice in domes**
tic and foreign policies, the Cuban revolution has
entered a neip piiase. The shift In Cuban foreign policy
vhich baa teen en train si nee 1964 now is confirmed;
with Guevara's fall.

-9-

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

^

i -

J
IHFORMATIOM PIPORT. Jf*oi f kHALLY EVAtU^TCO

^SFPTKKlMffl

1966
ABOUT "CUE"

STATUS ftri> Tiff CUlttN T I N ^ L *

FOB MW>UrTlOHS 1M [^TlN

AMERICA

-HSOURCE

IN THB NOT

OF

nnno -era- nJ3iM

MM

Dste

-01024

SOF 2

L
WITH GUEVARA*

T H E

T W 1 I T SKCKKCY B K I N G

PMCW

'

ON GlfLVflRii'S STATUS JS TO PROTECT UEU AGAINST POSSIBLE ASSASS1 HATIOS

S BY Atffl-RKVQLUTIONABY K L F H K N T S TftllLR HIS MvOl ,UT ION A RY
IS S

CAU^ FOft SUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST HEVOT^TtON 3N 0E

T ASUODEiT 1*SUB &V 197O d AND COMPLETE li

IS CHABGED K1TB TilE TASK OJV SECUHIKC

" lOll THE KXECUTION OF TlLKEK

4,

FIELD DISSBM:

ClNCPAC, PJICH.T, Tf,ChVt AlVAC, StATK,

USFJ, SAt4^ CIKCUST, CIHCSO.

[Cl

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report
Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian
Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966

March 1967
Wo. 0627/67

This

g th^ natieuul
thv mt:nnin^ of Titk-

(Mi-use of
I6 h H-ttJCHin 103 a m i
its rnflitvmEEsicHi or JV\<:];iDn
iy (in

lo or n>

"

'V
38

FOREWORD

Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian

Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966, the second of OCI T E
intelligence studies to deal with'A free world Communist
jarty. should be read in conjunction ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^^^^^^Jgory,
intelligence studies are aimed at situations where
study and analysis in some d^pth seem likely to shed
light on longstanding US security problems, to give
warning about an emerging problem, or to assist the policy maker in considering ways of coping with any such
problems, These research papers appear on no definite
schedule but rather as a suitable subject happens to coincide wiUi the availability of the special manpower resources required.
Assistance In the preparation of this paper has
been received! Irom various components of the Directorate
of Intelligence, notably the Research Stafi, It has been
informally coordinated with the Office of National Estimates. Comments should be directed to the Office of Current Intelligence,

ffo

SK

ED 12951

SHSKiiT

C O N T E N T S

FOREWORD

.,.*

* * * > * - - . * . * * , . . . . . * . . , , , , .

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I.
II.

INTRODUCTIOEJ

, .

....,

,*<*....*,**.,_...

,-..,.,.

PCC Policies and Programs, 1957-19GG .,.....

The PCC in National Politics After l&57 + . 4 i .,

Relations With Leftist Splinter Groups... ^ .

The Split in the PCC . . . , . . , , , . . , tw ...,,. i 4

12
jr_ 4

FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC ........

1?

Castroifim and the PCC

+1+

tttt

PCC-Soviet Relations and the Sino-Soviet

Dispute ,
*.,..,,,
w
+4

IV.

vii

T H E COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN N A T I O N A L

POLITICS

III*

Relations With Peking

,,*.,,.

ASSESSMENT,.*.....,.,..,... 11

*.,.,,.

ANNEX A:

15
2
24
29

The Colombian Communist Party fPCC) *nd the

Venezuelan Communist Party fPCV}t A Comparison of Experiences Since 19 58,..^
ft-1

111

Illustrating

Tablei

Map

Estimated Membership of Colombian

communist and Pro-CoramuniBt Organizations* ...,...*,**,,,...

14

Selected, Areafi of Colombian Guerrilla

Activity, June 1S&6, .,..
4ll.

16

AND CONCLUSIONS
The years 1957-19GS offer; a special opportunity to 3tudy foreign and domestic influences
on the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) because
the period covers both the rise of the Blno-Soviet
dispute and an era when the chief question for the
party domestically vas whether a policy of violence
or
of orthodox political activitythe via
o r the:
via pacificaprovided
the most
ro
p
most promTiT
d to
t power. With
i h the overthrow of dictator
Gustavo Hojas Pinilla in May 19 57, the PCC found
itself in circumstances seemingly conducive to
growth, Lite its fellow Communist party in
Venezuela (PCV) the following year, it regained
legality after a prolonged; period of suppression;
it enjoyed a reputation of consistent opposition
to the despised dictatorship; and it faced bright
prospect3 of advancing its national political status
through orthodox political activity, In August 1966
the part/, although still legal, was politically
ostracizedregarded generally as obstructive at
test and subversive at w<?ret. Its national organisation was largely intact and retained at least the
nominal backing of the principal Communist rural and
paramilitary forces; but a pro-Peking faction had
formally broken away in 1964, and raUoh of the party's
youth following 11had been drained away to this and
-other "ultreleft factions advocating the via armada*
After regaining legal status in 1957, the PCC had
firmly adhered to a program which placed primary
emphasis on the via pacifica or mass struggle. The
party refused to alter this "soft line" in ite fundamentals j despite its long and pragmatic experience
with guerrilla warfare and other rural violence in
Colombia and! despite its influence over a number of
active paramilitary forces in tho countryside. The
party did make some adjustments after 1964 to enhance
the role of the "armed, struggle" in Colombia in an
attempt to answer the criticism of th "ultraleft,"
assume a more militant facade, and undercut the diesi deuce within its own ranks. These modifications,
which gave a stronger endorsement of the Communistinfluenced paramilitary bands, were probably more a

ET

matter of shrewd semantics than a departure from

the via pacifica
The Communist main line of action throughout
this period was toward the development of a "national
patriotic fxont" in opposition bo the National Front
Coalition government under which the traditional
Liberal and Conservative Parties shared equally and
exclusively iJfi all elective and appointive offices*
Communist success in undeirmining this 1N constitutionalized" arrangement requited that the party concentrate
its resources and those of its pro-Comnunist allies
in support of the strong but minority dissident faction of the Liberalsthe Liberal Revolutionary Movement ^MHL)* Thistfefecto-xorganisation was just as
determined after 13 60 to disrupt the National Front
a.s were the Comnuinists, This projected PCC-MJLL
alliance failed, however, because the moderate majority faction of the MKL increasingly shimsiod overt
cooperation with the Communists, and the old guard
Communist leaders seemed to lack the flexibility and
imagination to demonstrate to the skeptical "ultra-left" elements inside and outside the party the "correctness1* and efficacy of the via pa.cif.ica as a policy.
The secession of the hard-1 inexs in ~~I964~to form a
pro-Faking rival party (the FCC-ML) contrasts with
the experience of the Venezuelan Communist party which
held together through 19G5.
The foreign influences on the partyessentially
thai sane as those bearing upon the PCVwere inseparable
from the domestic conflict over the via pacifica versus
the via, armada. The example of the Cuban revolution
and Cuban stimulation of the "ultraleft" were partlyresponsible for the hard-liners' attack on the F C C ' B
via pacifica line, though Colombian public opinion
was'"less stirred1 by the Cuban example- than opinion in
Venezuela, Though both the PCC and the PCV were Moscow orientedr the Colombians gave the USSR their full
support in the Sino-Eovict dispute while the Vens2uelans sought to avoid the issue under the guise of
neutralism, Moscow gave firm backing to the FCC'3
program, including the attitude toward guerrilla warfare* Moscow could also be credited with substantial
indirect assistance to the FCC when Castro agreed,
at the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist

TET
No

parties in late 196 4, to coordinate his

efforts in the hemisphere through orthodox party channels, Peking *P inf luenco, on the other hand, seems to
have consisted of little more than providing ideological support for the Colombian hard-liners.
Ho precise and definitive assessment is now possible as to the relative weights of tins foreign an4
domestic influences on the PCC over this nine-year
period, tut it certainly seems to have been domestic
factors which were mainly responsible for the principal development in party policy during 1966. This
was a tendency, reflected in the resolutions of the
10th Party Congress and elsewhere, to give additional
emphasis to the policy of the via armada in an apparen
effort to recapture the Leadership of the extreme left.

NP Foreign ifoiftem '

I.

INTRODUCTION

This study seek3 bo identify and evaluate the

principal forces influencing the course of the
Colombian Communist Party eluding the period from the
fall of the Rajag Pinilla dictatorship in May 1957
to the and of the Valencia administration in August 1966. With this aim in view, the paper first
examines the impact of domestic political events on
tne program of the FCC and then the relevant developments in international Communism.
In thia examination it is useful to compare the
PCC's experience with that of the Communist Party
in adjacent Veneauela (the PCV) during the ye-axs which
followed the ouster of the Perez Jimenes dictatorship
in January l5e. * Both parties emerged with legal
status after a protracted period of suppression under authoritarian rulea suppression muchttOr-Gsevere
in Venezuelaf however, than in Colombia. Perhaps until 1962 both parties had relatively bright prospects
for improving their positions in national politics
through ordinary political methodEj the Communist
prospects in Venezuela seemed especially briqbt, partly
because the prevailing political climatE was more
radical there than in Cola-nbia* Hut opportunities
for Communist exploitation were plentiful in both
countrias, a6 coalition regimeswith their inherent weaknessesstruggled to restore representative,
constitutional government anc1 copo with various economic and social problems left unsolved by the ousted
dictators *
The PCC and the PCV Were each torn With internal
dissension over the issue of whether to pursue power
primarily by overt political action (variously
termedr in Latin American Communist parlance, the
mass struggle, via parliamentaria and via paclfica)
or by revolutiaii (the armed struggle or Iucha~
armada). On this critical issue neither party
fallowed, a policy of complete consistency. A

EI1?IH*jU.in>?BTn
]

variety of pressures, and influences gradually led

the PCV to choose the armed struggle, with emphasis on guerrilla warfare, after 1963H even
though it had1 little experience in this tactic or
capability for carrying it out> On the oth.e:rr
handr the Colombian party, in spite of its extensive experience and. substantial assets for conducting
warfare, generally held to the via
as the primary way to power.
Both parties were traditionally oriented toward Moscow, yet they chose divergent paths in trie
Sino-Soviet dispute. The Colombian party gave
solid etippa-rt to the USSR and the PCV took a neutral stand in an effort to reduce conflicts between hard-liners and soft-liners within the party*
Eaoh party was subject to strong pressures to follow Cuba's revolutionary example--pre a a ujres of both
a direct and an indirect nature, since Castro's appeal to left-wing -opinion in Venezuelar and, to a
lesser extent in Colombia, tfas one of tho political facts of life in those countries.
The Colombian paxty formally split in
15 64, largely as a result of differences over
domestic strategy and tacticsr and* to a lesser
degree, over its stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The PCV maintained1 a facade of unity through 196 5.

II. THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL POLITICS

The position of the FCC has been much affected
by Colombia's traditional two-party system, of
government (now modified by the agreement for a
bipartisan National Front) and by the extensive
rural Violence which has troubled the country
for nearly two decades.
Since its formal establishment in 1930, tha
PCC has been severely limited, in influence by this
two-party system, under which Liberals and Conservatives have monopolized cower by constitutional procedures throughout most of tho 20th
century. Tho nominal membership of these two
parties has included tho vast majority of the
people cutting across all class and regional
lines of the countryt each, in this sense, has
been a truly national party. Liberal and Conservative affiliation, which is generally "inherited" rather than baead on clear
i o
Conviction approaches a kind, of religious
fervor, sometimes transcending loyalty to the
nation. The political monopoly of the Liberal
and Conservative parties explains in part the
weakness: of the Communist Party and other riinor
parties*
Partisan attitudes caused a gradual breakdown
of constitutional government In the late 1940s,
marked particularly by the serious Tioting in
the capital in 194 3 (the flogotaao) and the widespread rural strife known ag la vjolencia which
began after that date and gtill continues, although greatly diminished since then. This
highly complex phenomenon of rural unrest cannot be attributed to any single cause? its geographical centers have been continually shifting
and much of the guerrilla activity has always
been apolitical and little rnore than organized
banditry. During the years 194B-1953 rural violence was largely motivated by the deep hostility
between the Liberal and Conservative parties,
including family and clan vendetta?. In subsequent years, the causes have been primarily economic and EDcia.1, including robbery, land seizure.

and protection racketeering among the p

Banditry lias become a full or part-time way
life for many of the elements participating, Hguever, political motives are still present, and are
seen eapecially in conflicts among local caudillos
to maintain their spheres of dominance and in their
determined efforts to block the re-estahlighment of
departmental and central government authority.
ti number o peasant leaders in various parts of
the country have been pro-Comiriuni&t and in varying degrees have followed the guidance of the party. In
some rural enclavEs, such as Viota and Sumapaa t Coirirraunist leaders havo exercised dir&ct control. Some of
the largest active or partly active guerrilla hands
have been under tho sway o Communist chioftaine qr
tended to adhere to the party line, In recent years,
the party's role in violence haa been publicized by
government counterinsurgency campaigns which have concentrated! to a large degree on the centers of Communist rural paramilitary strength. The PCC, however,
although consistently attemptino to exploit la viol&ncia, has not been a key factor in promoting violence t
The PCC was outlawed during mo3t of the dictatorship of Rojas Piniila (1953-1957) but regained
its legal status under the pro-visional military
junta (1957-195S} and seemed prepared to exploit the
social, economic and political problems confronting
the subsequent elected government--and in particular
the weaknesses inherent in the newly devised National
Front.
Under this arrangettent, the two traditional
parties agreed to share equally and exclusively all
elective and appointive offices at local and national
levels for sixteen years; that ieT for four presidential t&rms beginning in 1958 and ending in 1974. The
presidency was' to be alternated between them every
four year3, Ho one could hold any governmental appointment without some acceptable version of the
Liberal or Conservative lahel. At the conclusion of
this agreementj which was incorporated, into the Constitutionf the parties presumably were to resume normal competition for political
fi
-4-

The National Fr^nt was born of a recognition by

both the Liberals and the Conservatives that their
deep-rooted animosities had to be bridledt that
they had to live together peacefully in order to establish an effectivo, stable administration and
avoid, another doso of dictatorial rule. In many
respects it appeared to be a plausible method for
re-establishing representative government, restoring
economic and. political stability, and implementing a
bipartisan program to reduce rural violence.
All other parties were frozen out by the National
Front agreement. The Ccmniin.istsf because of the generally right-center orientation of the two major parties, were reduced largely to working with radical
minority elements of the Liberal Partyincluding
students and organized urban labor--to develop alliances which might exert a significant influence on
national politics. The Communists, nevertheless, derived certain opportunities from inherent weaknesses
in the National Front, The fundamental defect was
that the Liberal Party clearly commanded a majority
of the electorate, and many Liberal elements were reluctant or openly opposed to a self-denying bipartisan
peace treaty. Moreover, the divisions existing within
each of the traditional parties placed additional
strains on the arrangement which the Communists wore
in a position to- exploit. The PCC apparently recognised that dissolution of the National Front might
lead to military intervention, but thought therE was
a good chance that it would produce a new order in
tfhich Communists, could participate directly and play
a greater role in national politics*

i
,

i
I
*

The National Front's weaknesses wero apparent

even before the inauguration of the first Liberal administration under Alberto LLeras C a m r g o in 1953j
and in early I960 the liberal Party split. Alfonso
Lropea Mieholsan, son of a formEr president, estahlished a strong, minority Liberal organieation which eventually adopted the name Liberal
Revolutionary Movement (MRL)* At least until late
1962 It was strongly prD-Cafitro in its leadership,
anti-US in many o its policies, favorable toward
cooperation with the PCC in elections and other political activity, and adamantly opposed to the
-5-

national Front* These policies

which paralleled thoae of ttlQ
PCC, suggested the makings of a
powerful "national patriotic opposition frond." At the height
of its power in 1962, the M R L ,
with tha backing of the Communist
and pro-Communist vote, was emerging as a major challsnc/e to the
viability of the government coalition. IJI thin year r Lopes ran as
a protest presidential candidate
against Conservative Guillermo
Leon Valencia and. won almost one
fourth of the total popular vote.
In addition, the MKL substantially
increased its representation in
Congressr many of these lsgislative seats being filled by Communiats and pro-Communists under the
camouflage of trie MEL label.
ALFON5Q iOPEZ MICHELSEN

Factionalism, in the ConservaLeader oF hh MKL, rhe

tive Paxty proved to he an even
greater limitation on the effecFatly Faermn
tiveness c-f the National Fxont.
The PCC .
The Conservatives, traditionally
hostile toward any kind of cooperation with the Communists, were even niora eeriougly divided than the
Liberals. Actually, several autonomous organizations
knovn as the Ospinistas, Laureani3ta3, Alzatistas,
and Leyviata5--titles derived from the namas of the
Principal leaders--were incladed under the Conservative label. After ftojas Pin ilia returned bo the- country [1958) and organised his followers under the National Popular Alliance (flNP) in 1961, still another
so-called "Consexvativep faction entered the electoral lists*

Liberal
with

PCC Policies and Programs, 1957-1366

Throughout its 3 5-year history, the PCC has been
atxongly oriented towaxd Moscow and responsive to the directives o the CPSLJ and the twieta in Soviet international

-6-

policies. The old! guard leaders were products af the Stalin

era but had, little difficulty in giving lip service to
denunciation of the "cult of personality" under the
de-stalinization program, while in fact carrying an
party business as in the days of Stalin. Gilbetto
Vieira White and his group had seised control of the
party in 1947 from the then Secretary General, Angus to Duran--wh.Dr after his expulsion by Vieira, formed!
a splinter party which has persisted in tho region
around Barranquilla but has never posed a serious; threat
to Vieira's leadership. As Secretary General, Vieira
was virtually unchallenged in hia dictatorial control
over party policy at least until the Sino-Soviet dispute became public and tho Caetro revolutionary example began to have an impact on Colombian radicals*
A shrewd interpreter of the Colombian political
scene, Vieira. developed skill over the years as a
party bureaucrat and manipulator of the Central Commit tea, In contrast to the party
situation in neighboring Venezuela,
Vieira's control faced no serious
competition from younger dynamic
leaders possessed of strong followIngjj within the party ranks and inclined toward experimentation with
radical programs, Moreover, vieira
managed to avoid exile or imprisonment, either of which would have
paved the way for others to praompt
his position* Iiie long tenure thus
provided continuity of programs,
but moant conservatism and even
stagnation The clandestine operations of the party had been limited
and! ineffective during the regime
of Rojas Finj.Ua (1953-1557) and
even the comm.unig.t guerrillas were
used oiily to maintain the status
quo in the araas where the party
exercised strong influence, such
a.a Viota, Sumapaz and northern
WHITE
Tolima. The objective of retaining legality was evidently a prime
Gftneral of the PCCH 1947congideration in party policy
-7-

In its personal characteristics the CCP leadership had; little to attract help from anyone outside
the party who might b& interested in disrupting the
National Front. At least to the Colombian public,
the Communist leaders were notably lacking in dynamismt
iBiacrination and. political opportunism! they seemed contant to receive their modest stipends* occasional
junkets bo the bloc countries* and such limit eel foreign subsidies and other support as might fall to
their lot.
The. principal Colombian Communist policy was
a firm and unconditional advocacy of the primacy
of the via pacifica, or parliamentary struggle. The
party did accept the aimed struggle under appropriate
circumstances in designated local areas, but during the late '50B and early 'CDs it insisted that
the political consciousness of the worker class
had not matured to the requisite level for launching a general revolution.
As the principal action for developing the party's
mass strength, the PCC has on more than one occasion
since 1957 called for the organization of a "great
patriotic front of national liberation*1' At the time
the party reacquired legal status in 1957* Vieira insisted that Communists would, nave to emerge frcnn their
cooson of. isolationr cast <? their dogmatic orientation, and work with any group opposed to the National
Front. At the 9th Congress in 1961 F the party identified the MEL as the principal vehicle for this purpose.
On tha critical issue of armed struggle the party's statements up to 196 5 wore ambiguous and essentially semantic modifications of its traditional theme
of "selfdefense" by the peasant masae-s where justified; by the oppressive actions of the oligarchic" security forces. - In 196 5, however, the PCC formulated
what it claimed to be a unique policy which it hoped,
would satisfy those-who were clamoring for action and
yet not risfc the party's legal status. The political
resolution of the party's Tenth Congress in January
1966
In Colombia thejr-e: is opening an original Revolutionary way, based on the use of all methods

and forma of mas a struggle, combined according

to concrete local and general conditions. Peasant guerrilla war is Dne of the highest forms
of mags s t o g g l e and only pros per a and grows
where it is linked with th masses- At present,
although peasant guerrilla ^ar is not yet the
principal form of struggle it is becoming more
important every day.
in this "unique policy," the PCC recognized!
that "the guerrilla movement forms a part of tho
combined political situation" and that "its perspective should be analyzed in relation to this ovex-all
situation*" The party further asserted that guerrilla action "tends to promote and create certain subjactive and indispensable factors for the emergent
triumph of the revolutionary situation in Colombia-"
It defended its ancient policy of self-defense of the
rural masses as "correct/* and as having produced a
lh
vigorous guerrilla movement urherever- the official
forces in cooperation with the Yankee military had
waged war against the mass eg in ths countryside*"
The PCC in National Politics After 1957
When the PCC regained freedom to operata overtly
in 195 7, its political position and prospects were
better than at any time in the past decade, bat
less favorable than the PCV's in Venezuela, when the
dictatorship was overthrown there. Unlike their
comrades in Venezuela in 13 58, the Communists could:
take no credit for helping overthrow the hated authoritarian regiitte, and they were excluded from office
by th& provisions of the National Front,
The party did hava substantial support in the organized labor novesient, among university studentsj and
in the various intellectual classes* Even anng the
students, however, the Cotnnujjaiet potential wag markedly
less than in Venezuela, where the university population wag concentrated in the fitrategically located
central University in Caracas. Colombian students,
being- dispersedfiibpnga number of universities in
Bogota and in provincial cities, hava been more- difficult to organise for large-scale demonstrations and

RET
Ho Foreig

have been generally ie H a inclined to challenge the

govemiaent on purely political issues than students
in various other Latin American countries.
On the otiier handj the party had one a&sat which
was uniqua among all Latin AiuericaD Communist organisations; prolonged; experience in rural violence (la
violencial and guerrilla warfare, including a k n o w "
edge of the problems connected with coordinating
scattered paramilitary groups of leftist and; Communist orientation* However, not until Castro had demonstrated successfully the application of guerrilla warfare methoda in Cuba aid this Communist paramilitary
strength assume special significance In party eyesJ
Despite the many deficiencies in party thinkingt the serious domestic problems confronting the
National Front and the divisions within that coalition gave the FCC & chance to expand its national
influence- in the MRL and the "national democratic
front the Communists had a promising means of *xploitlng t^.eae divisions, and in 1360 they estimated
their prospects fox disrupting the traditional twoparty system in Colombia to be the best in the entire
history of the party.
These prospects dependedT howevor, oft the maintenance of a basic unity among a number of competing leftist elements* Thora was some reason for
the PCC*3 optimism until the end of 1962 r when
serious dissension began to plague the MHL r and
various pro-Oommuniat leftist elements- began to
challenge the PCC T s line on the via pacifica
These elements were much influenced By Cuban developments and by Chinese revolutionary ideology
(aa will be discussed later) aftd with good, reason
the Comnunistg publicly blamed the irChinese party
directorsand privately tii& "Che Guevara faction" of ths Cuban regime:OT provoking the attacks on the via pacifica which absorbed the party's
attention.
The dissension inside the MRL, partly attributable to the ieaua of armed struggle and indirectly
to foreign influencer was mainly caused, by
i

-15Sft>

ET

personal ambitions smong the. leaders. One

g p
nominally a part of this maverick Liberal organization,
was the undisciplined "Youth of the MRL (JMRL) t
founded and led by ex-Communist Luis Villar Barda,
who was a proponent of lucha armada for Colombia*
Other pno-Castro MF& factions included the "hardline11 group of Alvaro Urine Rueda and the clique
of Camilo Aluna in Call.
But it was Lopez who held th& support of the
majority of the MEL after 19 62. lie moderated the
party's policies. Among other things, he rejected
Cuban-style revolution aa applicable to Colombia
and muted, the party*s pro-Castro propaganda output.
More importantF he fhied away from entering into a
formal alliance witL the P C C a s advocated, by some
radical elements in the HHL--although he did not
eschew informal cooperation with the Communists or
reject their electoral support. (His influence on
trie PCC contrasted with that exerted by the principal ally of the Communists in Venezuela, where the
Castroite Leftist Revolutionary Movement {MIR) was
mere committed, to the armed struggle than the PCV
itself and pushed the PCV in that direction-)
Lopez* position in refusing formal alliance with the
PCC did r however, pro-vide the pro-Chinese minority
in the PCC with further ground for insisting that
the via parliamentarian woyld never bring the Communists to power In Colombia.
j

"

The MRL f Which had reached its high point in national influence in the congressional and presidential
elections: of 1962, fared, very badly in ths slections
of early 1966'reflecting in part its internal dissension. The majority Lopez faction of the MRL therofore seriously considered returning to the regular
Liberal partyr a move which would strengthen the National Front and the Liberal administration of Carlos
Lieras Restrepo, inaugurated in August 1966* Since
the Communist via parliament-aria was directly tied:
to the destinies of the MRE. ae an opposition party,
the PCC prospects wera similarly reduced to a nev lov
by the 19*16 election resultsa decline which had
been under way during the previous two years + The
FCC apparently had only limited influence remaining
-11-

aurr
!to POPS;

among some of .the radical cliques of the MEL and

their pno-Conmfurtiet leaders.
Relations with the Left!at Splinter_ Groups
The Communists' problems were compounded by
sterile battles with organizations which should
logically have been natural allies in developing
the united front tactic against the government*
After 1$58, a nuraiber of x/adical leftist groups
of limited strength were formed in Colombia to
promote urban and rural violence Host of them
ware inspired by the Castro revolution and. the
Chinese line on wars of national liberation?
their leaders maintained liaison with the Cuban
and Chinese governments and probably obtained
some financial support in thgEe capitals, spine
of these groups wore led by apostate Communists
f o r example, Luis Villar, Alfonso Romero Buj
and Pedro Abcslla Larottawho, after being expelled from the PCC r had siphoned off many Communist youths and sympathizers to build the new
organizations. They also occasionally attempted
to recruit among pro-Communist guerrilla bands*
The TCC eventually branded roost of these groups
as r charlatans, false revolutionaries, and ultraleftists,"
The first of these subversive organisations
to launch into the armed struggle was the WorherStud&nt-Psasant Movement {MOECJ, initially organized in early 19 59 under another name* Cuba
supplied training for the key leaders and algo
some financial aid. Antonio Larrota, one of the
founders, had just returned from a long
j
in Cuba as a revolutionary protege and agent
of the Castro regimei Eduardo Aristi^aJsai and such
other M & E C leaders as Eduardo Ariemendi and
Pedro atoila alao found encouragement and
sponsorship in Havana.
The United Front for Revolutionary Action
(FUARj likewise had the blessing of Castro, who
sent it funds through Gloria Gaitan and Luis
Emiro Valencia. It was organized in early 1962

sent

by renegade Coiununists and native Marxists to

promote the armed a truckle * and, tried to absorb all the small revolutionary groups and to
e.nliet some active c/usrrilla leaders under the
FDAH banner. These efforts were largely unproductive, however,, and most of tha Cuban subsidies
appear to have been squandered or to have been appropriated by the 1S3S idealistic members. The
FUAR dissolved itself in 1965.
Lifce the MOEC and FUAR, the National Liberation
Army (ELNJ was inspired, and financed in part by
Havana. The ELN, initially the paramilitary arm
of the Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement
{JKRL), has engaged in limited guerrilla action.
it was responsible for the attack made in January
196 5 on the town of Simaccta in northeastern
Colombiaan attack which may have been directly
:
financed by Cuba, since the EI.H
leaderF Pabio VazquezF ie known
to have been in EJavana in late
1964.
Th* ahoxt^lived United Front,
established in 1964 hy th* renegade Catholic priest Cajniio Torreg
RftEtrepo to promote revolutionary
change in Colombia, also seems to
have been largely inspired by th&
Cuban example * The United Front
gained, some popular support and.
hence received, qualified endorsement from the PCC. H ewevet,
Torres was tilled when his guerrilla unit was engaged in action
with Colombian military forces in
early 19 66, His activities received extensive euloc/Iea from the
Cuban propaganda machine, including special praise.from Castro fox
his choice of the "path of revolution" j but there is no evidence
that Cuba financed them*

FAB! O VASQ Ltf

Leader of ths ELM, the- Cuban NdliirttH LibsrotiOA Army .

ET

EPSHI ,
^^
COMMUNIST:. ORGAN

The Split in the PCC

The major blow to the PCC came T*her the party split
in early 1964 over the armed struggle ie&ue and trie si noSoviet diaputa. The splinter party formed by the dissidents and expelled leaders oalled itself the PCCMarxist-Leniniat (PCC-KL), thus laying claim to the
mantle of "true" Colombian. Coinnunisiru This revolt
cost the regul.*r party prestige, the loss of a substantial number o members--including many party
youthand disruption in its national organization*
Although the PCC-ML attempted, to proselytize
among the pro-Castro revolutionary organizations,

its inepiration and: ideology wero largely influenced by China, After the Havana Conference of
Latin American parties in late 19 64, at which Castro
implicitly abandoned; hi& Hlneutralism" in the SinoSovlst disputeF the PCC-tM, turned hostile toward; the
Cuban regime* It alleged that the Cuban leader had
fallen pr*y to the "revisionists,Hl and had trans f a m
himself into an enemy of "the working class and the
Chinese people.,.and hence of the Communist parties
of the world.lh
Even the timing of the rift wag tied to the- debate over armed struggle. In one cf its initial publi
cations, the PCC-ML denounced the old guard, central
committee leaders for not adequately supporting a
major bastion of Communist guerrilla strength in
Marquetalia, after the gcvernwejat forces launched a
sizable campaign there in May 19Si to eradicate subversion. The FCC-ML insisted that
Marque tali & must be the beginning off the
war of liberation in Colombia..., It is
necessary to substitute the revolutionary
principle of active guerrillas for the false
and conservative principle of fself-defense**
*..any peaceful method, as a principal form
of taking power^ is definitely out of the
question in Colombia; parliamentary and
legal resources, together with other forms
of mass struggle, can only be used as secondary and complementary aspects of the principal
form of strugglethe use of armT The national leadership [of the PCCj is miBtaken in
its
i
The top leaders of the Pec closed. r$t\ks in the
face of the party revolt, and. admitted that the ideological roots of their problems "originated in the
aubjectiva concessioro which the party has been making to thos-e extremist tendencies of the eo-called
left-" They denouncad local extremists and openly
accused Pefcing of bfling the inspiration and major
cause of diasengion within the party* But even though
the split had come largely on the issue of the lucha

-15DiB6im

AWM Of COUNUUH GUERRRU ACTIVITY

MINE

armada, of tfhich Castro wag the test known Latin American practitioner, the FCC leaders nat only refrained
from condemning the Castro regime for promoting revolutionary adventurism of trie left, tut actually praised
the Cuban socialist experiment and its significance
for the Communist movement in the hemispherer although
they were rather noncommittal when relating; th& Cuban
revolution to the armed struggle in Colombia. This
propaganda treatment of Cuba derived from the FCC
leaders' consciousness of Castro's ties with Moscow
and of hia appeal to various leftist elements in
Colombia rather than from any possible enthusiasm of
their own for imitating his rise to power.
The PCC f s extensive experience with guerrilla warfare and the phenomenon Of rural violence {la violonciaj ,
and Its involvement in various attempts to combine
scattered qitierrilla groups into a coordinated movement probably led. to an awareness amon$ tha FCC leadership that Cagtro's guerrilla success wag a product
of unique conditions and circumstances rather than a
universally applicable experience, The decimation of
the resources of the Venezuelan ComircuniEt Party and
the Movement of the Revolutionary ^eft wae additional
confirmation of its b l i f
PCC antagonism toward the ultraleft promoters
of the lucha armada was expressed frequently both
before and after tho party aplit. While the FCC-iML
was a-linking epithets at the old Guard, soch as
"^hrughciieviat revisionists"and raising Castro to
the ranlt of "No, 1 Khrushchevist"the PCC tag denouncing the pro-Chinese as "anti-Soviet divisionifits
The verbal conflict aesumed scomo of the features of
the Sino-Soviot dispute in a teapot, but was limited
to the issue of armed struggle and particularly
guerrilla warfare,
The 10th Congress of the PCC in early 196 6
formally stigmatised the PCC-ML as "traitors who
have deserted th* great party and who pretend to
carry out a revolution without a party r a revolution
without Marxism-Leninism." A key resolution of the
Congress stated:

-17-

The party must pursue its firm

struggle against the disastrous 'ultraleftist1
tendencies, which are characterised by empty
revolutionary phraseology without foundation
in Colombian reality7 against the dogmatic
thesis that the via armada is the only form
of struggle worthy of revolutionaries, accompanied in practice by passive opportunism
before Yankee, imperialism and its oligarchicmilitarist instruments: against the depreciation
of the Just struggles for the worker, masses and
toward the political activities which can advance them in overt and legal f
By Communist definition the "ultraleEt" thus
included, not only the party traitors and defectors
but the pro-Communist splinter groups seeking to
launch the lucha. armada* Occasionally, the FCC
singled out specific names in its counterattacks
against these groups, always reserving special invective for the apostate Communists who went to
Peking in search of aid.
The renegade priest Carailo Torres was described
more sympathetically toy the FCC leadership, which,
neverthelessf lamented: his departure from the orig^
inal parliamentary path of his United Front organisation to join the lucha a m a d a a departure mbde ^
without "consulting" the PCC. Ths sacrifice of his
life In a guerrilla action "was a valiant and heroic
deed, but this is not the principal form of struggle
for the majority of the Colombian
l "
Criticism of "ultralaftiste," how&ver, has
been muted since early 19 66 s.3 the PCC has been
making tentative efforts to collaborate with and
gain control over the violence-prone ELN and MQEC.
in retrospect, the Tenth. Congress may have marked
the beginning of a new PCC policy pha&e which will
feature ^ somewhat gr.eater enipha&i-e on axened strug
without necessarily abandoning the over-all precepts
of the via pacifica policy.

-lao F^n^-t^n Dis

SECRET

iio

Foreign

III, FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC

Varied foreign pressures on the PCC, when seen
against the backdrop of domestic political factors,
have also contributed! to dissension irt the party*
The example: of the Cuban revolution, in combination
with tangible Cuban aid for programs of violence,
stirred the splinter groups of the "ulfcraleff to
actions which opposed the efforts of orthodox PCC
leaders to promote the mass struggle through, a national
patriotic front, Tfiefie groups also found supplementary
encouragement from Peking and, at Least until the PCC
split and the Havana Conference of Latin American
Communist parties in 19&4, the Cuban influence apparently acted as an indirect stimulus to the pro-Chinese
hard-line elements within the PCC.
Castroism and the PCC
In many parts of Latin America the principal impact of the Cuban revolution was its provocative example fox radical leftist elementst Colombia was a
special case, ranking high on the Cuban priority list
for external subversionj probably second on the South
American continent only to Venezuela. Moreover, the experienced Colombian guerrilla bands, of Communist and
pro-Communist orientation undoubtedly made the target
more attractive to the Cubans* Castro himself seemed,
to regard Colombia in a spocial way. He had been in
the country at the time of the bloody BogotaZD of April,
1949 and was a personal friend of Gloria Gaitan,
daughter of the leftist liberal leader Jorge Gaitan
whose assassination had touched off the rioting+ Yet
it was probably Che Guevara, a principal architect of
Cuban subversive policy in Latin America, who was
largely responsible for Havana'a decision to circumvent the FCC and, turn to the militant leftist groups
to promote rural and urban violenco in Colombia,
During the 15 61-65 period, the MQEC, FUAR, ELB F
and JMRl were the principal recipients of Cuban aid
which wfas dispensed in a sporadic, poorly planned, and
largely ineffective manner. Direct cash grants probably
totaled less than $250,000 but political and guerrilla

-19-

ET

trainingr propaganda subsidies, and travel for

of these organimations probably coat Cuba several
that amount. In addition to tangible forms of aid, all
of these groups were the beneficiaries of stimulation
and guidance from Cuba? anti sooner or later, all o them,
with tho possible exception of the ELN, fell out with
the PCC over tho latterhs prog rani of mass struggle.
The PCC V3.3 well aware of Cuban relations with the
leftist groups in Colombia. Castro1a caah grants to the
FUAR, for example, were public s&cret3 in Colombia, only
the specific sums being in doubt. The PCC had! good
reason to resent this Cuban meddling deeply, As
previously notod, Castro'E aid went in many cases to
men who had been expelled from the party, in addition,
the PCC feared, the government might charge it with complicity in the subversive activities of these Cuban-supported organizations and suspend its le^al status.
Nevertheless, the PCC'3 public position toward
as expressed in party statements and propaganda,
was invariably eulogistic after 19 59, Tho Communist
press in Colombia gave extensive coverage "in defense o f
the Cuban revolution and gcurerrunentj called for solidarity
with Havana against the "imperialists," praised Castro's
achievement as an example in the construction of socialismT and even acknowledged; that Cuban experience had
been incorporated into the tactics of the "self-defense"
guerrilla organizations in Colombia. The party probably
spoke with greater sincerity in its repeated endorsements
of the decisions- taken at the Havana Conference, at
which the Cubans agreed to curb their scattered subversive efforts in Latin America and. coordinate their
activities through orthodox Corranunist channels. The PCC
gave similar unqualified approval to the Elavana Tricon tinent Congress in early 19 66 which called for active
"solidarity*1 with Latin American revolutionary movement5*
Despite such public praise, there nevertheless is
reason to believe that the PCC was sharply critical and
resentful of Caetro'a "extracurricular" subversive
antics in Colombia+ Top FCC leaders in early 1*64,
when discussing the problems arising from the ultraleftist groups which followed, the "Cuban and Chinese
linesj" reportedly stated that the "Guevara factionlh
-20-

lie Foreign

in Cuba openly backed revolution in Latin

through groups other than the Conununiat partieE^ Pedro
Abella of the WDEC and Luis Villar liorda of the JMEL,
both eM-Cofnmunifitfir were pointed up as exampleE of ultraleft leaders who had used Cuban and Chinese aid to
corrupt the Colombian Communist TToutri. The FCC is
reported to have sent a letter of protest on Jlbella's
activities in Cuba and to have received a reply from the
Cuban Communist Party promising appropriate action, ftt
about the same time, the PCCwhen answering a circular
front the Brazilian Communists inquiring about attitudes
on holding a Latin American Communist conference to discuss the Sino-Soviet disputestated that it approved
such a meeting but not in Cuba. The FCC pointed out that
participants in any meeting in Havana would! be restricted
in their discussion of "certain actions of Cuba" against
other parties in the hemisphere.
The PCC had learned, apparently juat before
sending this letter to the Brazilian comrades, that
Che Guevara hid been disparaging its position and
policies, in a meeting with a Colombian Communist
delegation in Havana, al3o attended by en-Communist
Luis Villar Borda r Guevara repDxtedly had insisted
that conditions were xipe for re^iolution in Latin
America, He noted, however., that in many countries, ineluding Colombia, the Communist Party was a hindrance
to sucrh a programj and he added that the PCC would
popular support if it continued to act and think in a
" i "
manner.
After the Havana Conference of Latin. American
parties, the Cuban regime apparently altered its subvexeive policies toward. Colombia and conformed to its
agreement to work through orthodox channels., fhe Cubanfinanced Simacota incident which occurred in January
1965 seems to be an exception. It was probably too
well advanced to bs stopped by the Cuban regime. Meanwhile, the ultraloftist Colombian leaders are believed
to have Io3t their Cuban subsidies and other support+
The Colombian Communists and the Cuban leaders also
probably reconciled same of their differences on armed
struggle in Colombia and; discussed a coordinated approach
to this facet of the PCC program at the Tri-Continent
Congress in Havana early in 196 6.

-21-

No Pore ig^jKB sew

Th&re is gome evidence that the rapprochement was

at l&ast in part^ on the PCC's greater willingness
to support armed action in Colombia beginning possibly
in Late 1965. The Cuban Government hag not abandoned
its preference for the Iucha armada in Colombia, In
his anniversary address on ,2b July 1966, Castro praised
the Colombian guerrilla movement and indirectly borated
the PCC leadership and its policies.
The extensive Cuban propaganda coverage on Colombia
is almost entirely devoted to the Communist-influenced
guerrilla bandlE and their activities. For ax ample,
Havana radio disseminated the decisions of the "Steond
Conference of the Southern Guerrilla Bloc," which was
held "somewhere in the foxestM in the spring o
For its part, the PCC has faithfully carried out
the bar/gain reached, at Havana in 19 64, which required
that the Latin American parties give ample expire a sio-n of
^solidarity*1 with the Cuban regime. However, solidarity
is probably still defined by the party as it was when
Secretary General Vieira wrote, in an article in
Problems of Peace and Socialigm in.1963,
Our solidarity tfitb Cuba can best be. shown
by propaganda and explanation and carrying
Out extensive work among the massas to
explain the results of the Cuban revolution,
PCC-Soviete Ralatigtia and the 5ina-Soviet Dispute
The PCC ha? traditionally displayed an unconditional
to Moscow; hence, its e^rly endorsement of
the Soviet position in the dispute with China merely
reflected historical consistency. The Colombian party's
response included periodic homage to the Declarations
of Moscow in 1957 and i960, recognition of the CPSU as
the "vanguard of the Conununigt and1 working class movement,' and. ample condemnation of the "divisionist
Chinese leaders. The story is accurately and succinctly
outlined in a TASS dispatch in early 1966t describing an
interview between CPSU Central Committee Secretary Suslov
and Colombian Secretary General VieiraJ
"Once again
the complete unity of views of the CPSU and the PCC was
affirmed on the problems examined,-

Vieira has lon^ been regarded by the Kremlin as

one of the moist trustworthy of the Latin American
Communist leaders. Be has attended almost all CFSU
congresses and other key international Communist meetings
over the past several yearsF including the Havana meeting
of Latin American Communist parties in late 19G4 and the
subsequent gathering in Moscow. He has raada other
special trips to the Soviet capital, presumably to coordinate PCC policy. For example, he was reportedly there
in August 19 64 at the time when the party had split
and the pro-Chinese elements were organizing the
PCC-ML. Other PCC leaders, such as the late Filibegto
Barrero and Joae Cardona floyos, have also been held In
high regard by the Kremlin.
in the Sino-Soviet disputej the Colombian party held
firmly to the Soviet line in contrast to the evisiva
"neutralism" of the generally pro-Soviet party in Venezuela, The PCC gave unqualified and regular praiaa to
the CPSTJ as the vanguard of the international movement,
the savior of world peace, the defender of peaceful coex istance, and the genuine fount of Marxism-Leninism.
It just as consistently upbraided the "Chinase leaders"
with such epithets as divisionists, schismatics, tools
playing into the hands of the imperialist camp, exporters of artificial revolutionF and Maoist d*ifier3.
The FCC's formal comraitment to the CPSU Hide came
at the 9th Congress in 19 61 am? was reiterated at the
10th Congress in early 1$$&* Similar resolutions reaffirming this position were adopted, at various intervening plenums of the central committee. In additionr
the party followed the Soviet lead at international
meetings, such ae those held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960
and at th East German Party Congress in Berlin in 1963
In return for the PCC'a stand, on the Sino-Soviet
dispute, the CF5TJ has backed the ECC in sueh propaganda media aa *AS, Hovosti, Radio Moscow, Pravda,
and XaTreStia- Ample space has also been allotted to the
bi
party in Probleras^ of_ Peaca_ and SocialismVieira 1 s speech at the ZJjrd C P S U Congress of March
and April 1366 was well publicized. At that time, he
lauded the CPSU as the builder of socialism and peaceful coexistence and the defender of "world peace* u He
-23S o F^Mi ?t Vise em

Mo i

then outlined the decisions of the 10th FCC Congress

indicated that p a new and: original revolutionary" path
was opening up in Colombia, based, on the v&e of all
forms and methods of struggle of the masse a, among
them armed etrugg/le* But he admitted, that the struggle
would be "long and arduous" and that the PCC "cannot
Conquer a still strong and cru*l enemy with mere ultrarevolutionary phrases." Acknowledging the CPBU a,e
p
the vanguard detachment of the international movement,p
and "the glorious Cuban revolution as our greatest
stimulusT* he then denounced "the stubborn campaigns to
downgrade the indestructible work of the soviet power
and the schismatic maneuvers against the communist international movement."
Relations With Peking
The militant Chinese advocacy of wars of national
liberation was an inspiration and natal comfort to tha
various elements both inside and outside the PCC who
insisted! on the armed, struggle. After 1961 when the PCC
had unequivocally sid.ed with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet
dispute^ the party's problems with the pro-Chinese elements began to multiply, particularly when the latter
began to seek material aid and guidance from China* The
attitude of the radicals within the party is clearly
reflected in a letter to the central committee written
by Carlos Arias^ a former candidate member who had
expelled from the party in 1363 and was later a top
leader of th PCC-ML, Arias denounced the party's
arbitrary handling of
The Sino-Soviet problem which you /the
central committee? had tried to conceal
against all evidence;,,the treason which you
will commit by supporting nonrevolutionaries
in the coming elections;.*.,History will
decide who and how many are to blame for
delaying the Colombian revolution and who
scourged the revolutionaries of the PCC.
The people already know who insults the
revolution and tha Chinese leaders; who insults the revolution and the Cuban leaders?
who refers to Venezuelan revolutionaries

-24-

adventurers? and who insults the

Colombian ravolutionaiies * *
A.

Arias further noted that the central committee had not

only expelled him. from the party but, in the same session,
had also "condemned Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese revolution. This is a splendid ta3k which North American
Imperialists are probably applauding."
The Chinese sought to inspire
the ultraleftist groups and the
dissident elements within the PCC
in an attempt to promote the armed
revolution in Colombia and to undercut the policies and prestige
of the orthodo* party. Travel o
pro-Chinese leaders to Peking was
heavy and included representatives
of the MQEC, FTJAR, JHRL, and the
PCC-ML* Pedro AJbellaj Luig Villar
Borda, Leonftr.bole.da,Pedro Vasquei nendo-n, liduardo Aristizabalr
and Manual Manotas Manotas were
aroon^ those who went to China during the years 1963-65 to present
their plans 'to the Chinese and to
obtain assistance and guidance.
After the PCC-ML was formed in
1964t however, the Chinese apparently limited their paramilitary
training, financial aid, and other
support primarily to this organization and to the M O E C

PEWO VASQUEZ
^ ^ . ^ r^i9 1nThe PCC_Ml_t ihl

China"^ aid to its sympathispro-fttkinfl CbmmunJiriplrrnerpQr+y,

e.rs in Colombia seems to have
been niggardly+ Although some
of the travelers to Paking mayhave received small cash grants, the one regular
source of financing h^a been through the WCMA agency
in Bogota * The amounts paid in salaries and for
other services to the local Communist HCHA
tives are not believed to exceed 515D per month.
Emphasis

addled

> a

&jn

Although the FCC attempted to prohibit the dissemination of Chineae propaganda in Colombia after 1962 and
expelled the pro-Chinese NCNA employees from the
party, the latter still retain their agency positions and. apparently a till receive the small monthly
payments, Thare ie some ground for. considering the
PCC-ML to be a poorly disciplined party, not in close
touch with Peking, since its two factlong have contended for control of the flCNA agency and the agency
has remained independent of both,
3 B prom i a eg to its sympathizers in Colombia
for propaganda support, scholarships, paramilitary
training, and other assistance have probably been far
more lavish than the actual cash outlays. Pelting has
disseminated, sporadic propaganda in support of the P C C ML r branding the "orthodox" l&aders "revisionists" and
endorsing the nrrevolutionary struggle bo seize power
through a patriotic anti-imperiali&t poptilai
revolution.*" The Chinese hava also financed guerrilla
warfare training and "scholarship" programs, reportedly
in Worth Korea and Vietnam as well as in China.
The PCC response to Chinese collaboration with
its enemies has been sharp. Top central committee manbers, well aware of the travels to Peking of such
"traitors" as Pedro flbella (and the purpose of such
pilgrimages}, are known to have discussed in early 1964
the pressuree and problems which such activities were
placing on. the party. Besides trying to stop Chinese
propaganda emanating from the HCHA ofifice in BogotaT the
PCC also attempted to stifle party dii sense ion of the
Chinese line and of Peking's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute* Chinese sympathizes were threatened
with expulsion.
Whether Vieira and his colleagues exaggerated
the Chinese responsibility for che PCC's internal problems Is debatable, but they certainly sought to link
the pro-Chinese dissidents with the "ultraleft aharlatana" who insisted on irameciiate revolution in Colortbia.
Vieira wrote in 19 65 that such groups had seized upon
the false and misleading Chinese position to attack the
PCC and its program.

-26-

tt&

SECRET

ET

The PCC'fi general sensitivity tin the.

o the party split was, illustrated by it a sharp response ta a September 196 4 article in El Tiempa,
the loading daily of Bogota, which had described
the expulsion of leaders from the partyr tha splits
in regional Communist committeest and the disintegration of the PCC organization* In its rebuttal
in Voa Fjoletaria, the party insisted that the great
majority of members had. remained, loyal to the ortho^
dox PCC F attacked "the methods of the Chinese leaders'' and charged that the principal objective of
the deviation!at "ultrarovolutionaries11 was to attack tho PCC rather than the true enemies^^"ttie
reactionary national forces and Yankee imperialists*1

snt

LV. ASSESSMENT
During the period under review (Kay 19 57 August 1966) ttie PCC managed to maintain its legal
status and the unity of the old-line loaders headed.
by Vielra. it kept the party organization intact
and retained, the loyalty of the majority of the
rank and. file membership as wall as Its influence
over traditional rural enclaves and the principal
pro-Communist paramilitary loaders in the countryside* The close ties with the Soviet party were
challenged only by a few defectors*
Balanced against these accomplishments, which
were largely holding operations, axe the substantial
reverses to Communist strength and potential in comparison to the party's outlook as late as 19fi2. The
program failed to prevent an internal split or to
satisfy the demands: of the radical leftist groups
who were inclined to pursue the armed struggleF
During this period r foreign and domestic influence a on tho party were intertwined and, of courset
reacted on each other No firm conclusions are possible about their relative weights. Neverthelesst
the developments rehearsed in this paper do suggest
certain very tentative generalizations on how these
influences have operated in the case of the Colombian
party.
The FCC was ran throughout this period by an
g
leadership whose own inclinationsparticularly
on the Jiey issue of the armed struggleeeem to have
accorded fairly well with the Moscow line, if Moscow
had favored intensifying the armed struggle, there
might have been some test of their allegiance* The
party's formal split in 1964 over the Sino-3oviet
dispute o course reflected Its previous support of
Moscow's side in international Communist meetings,
as contrasted with the "neutralist1* position taken
by the Venezuelan Cominunist party; hut t also probably reflected somewhat less flexibility in the FCC
leadership at dealing witJi party dissension, The FCV,

-29Dies dirt

SEC

plagued with more serious internal conflict over the

armed struggle issue, did stay together through 19 65.
The Cuban influence on the PCC wae indirect and
in one sense more a domestic influence than a foreign one, in that it had! a strong appeal (though, as
time went on, a diminishing one) too the radical leftist
opinion in Colombia, and Havana subsidized to soine: extent the splinter groups which competed with the FCC
for leftist support. This situation was reflected in
the: P C C s attitude toward the Castro regime. The tec
split in 19&4 came largely over the issue of the armed
StruggleF of which Fidel Castro vas the hemisphere's
leading exponent, but it was Peking that wae publicly
bLamed by the FCC leadership; Cuba, both on that occasion and subsequently, was praised, Castro*3 known
alignment with Moscow would of course have made it
embarrassing for the PCC to be publicly critical of
him, but his Moscow tie did not prevent the PCC from
being critical of his regime in a 1964 cammunication
to Brazilian Conimunista.
The extent of Peking^ actual influence in Colombian Communist circles has bean very small, despite
the readiness of the proponents of the armed struggle
to invoke Chinese ideological support.
rather than foreign, factors seam to
have been mainly responsible for the principal 1966
development in PCC policyt a reappraisal of party
policy on the luctta armada in an apparent effort to
recapture the leadership of tho extreme left through
more tangible support and guidance for the guerrilla
forces. The propaganda facet of this modified! policy
appeared in the resolutions of the 10th Party Congress, which recognized that the armed struggle was
the "principal form" in certain local areae and that
guerrilla warfare had reached a "new stage" of development, it is similarly reflected in the PCC T s
formation in 1966 of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FAJ%Cjt a "general staff" for coordinating rural
Communist: subversion; the FARC has issued an open invitation to membership la* all leftist guerrilla elements, active or- in process of being organized. The
repgTted! Communist liaison with the ELM and the favorable Communist attitude toward this organization's

No F e r W d n Di-

KJ*
RK
No

guerrilla activity also suggest increased emphasis by

the PCC on this aspect of it3 program, In addition,
there Is evidence o closer cooperation bstveen the
PCC and tho Cuban regime since the. Havana Conference
in late 19 64 and particularly sinrt the Tri-Continent
Congress in early 19$6, as partly revealed In Cuban
and Colombian propaganda and in the appointmant of
Central Committee member Manual Cepeda Vargas as
permanent P C C representative in Havana*
The changes of early 1366 probably da not add
up to a basic shift in the PCC T s long ad^etence to
the primacy of the via paclfica, but they do suggest
a greater sensitivity to domestic pressures and
ibl some increased tactical flexibility.

-31-

4EC

So '

ANUEX A
THE COLOMBIAN CQMMTJHIET PARTY (PCCJ
AMD THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY
A COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCES SINCE 195JJ
FCC

PCV

X. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS
AND INFLUENCES
Legal statue

and political status

after overthrow
of dictator

Party outlawedr
regained legal statue
after ouGter of dictator
Rojaa Pinilla,
May 1957?
retained1 legal status
throughout period

Outlawed 1950-5S;
regained legal status
after ouster o dictator
Perez Jimenez r January 1958; the government suspended
political activity
of party and principal ally r Movement of
the Revolutionary
Left (Hip), 1962.

Little change: from previous periodj limited!

national influencej political atmosphere conservative compared to
Venezuelaj strong potential opportunity through
cooperation with dissident Liberal faction,
HRL F and other leftist

Highly favorable;
party had considerable public credit
for contributing to
ouster of Perez
Jimenez; strong leftist orientation of
all political groups;
united front in labor,
movement; potential
close allies for P C V
in factions of Democratic Action Party
fAD) and Democratic
Republican Union

A-l

SBKRET
Ho Fa+ei$n

PCV

FCC
Party program

Consistently
primacy of via pacificaj
rejected lucha armada ~g
principal form for entir
country; certain modifications to defend
Commufnist
forces

Via

until
with increaaing
of violence;
f

principal fzorni after

1962f Initial emphasis on urban violence;
after 196 3, emphasis
on the "prolonged!
struggle1* through
guerrilla warfare

Central gomiftitte* r e tained closa-knit

unity in support of via
paaif_ica.

Serious divisions
over lu-cha armada;
leadters shifted in
attitude over the periodr tout no overt
split; MIR ally split

PCC split into proSoviet and pro-Chinese

organisations in 1964;
running battle with
other radical groups
favoring lucha aimada;
i in youth auxiliary

Principal leaders imprisoned f party and

MIR ally seriously
divided Internally
and between themselveaj party political aHeetB ehaxply
depletedf national
organization dis^
rupted.

Alliances

informal cooperation
with MKL for political
and electoral actionj
HKL factionalism reduced effectiveness
front tactic after

Ma rxis t r pro-Cast ro
Mlfl; pro-Castro elements of UKD? 3ympathy or nisolidarity" from other leftist elements.

Potential for
conducting
guerrilla war

Relatively strong; party

had long experience with
rural violence and guerrilla warfare, enclaves
of rural support, and
varying control over
several active guerrilla
leaders.

Negligible) peasant
support limited; no
trained leaders In
guerrilla warfare and:
no experience with
this form of subversion

Program impact on
top
i

resuits

. : -

PCC

FCV

II. INTERNATIONAL IKFLDEHCEE

Traditional
orientation

Pro-Soviet

Fro-Soviet

Position on
Sino-Soviet
disput*

unconditionally prosoviet fnom the outset;

condemnation of Peking

Sought to avoid the

issue under guise of
neutralism; followed
Cuban stand.; refused
to criticize the Chinese

Cuban impact

Disrupted pec relations

with the leftist groups
favorincj the lticha
armadat contributed to
dissension in the MEL

Strong, dominant, and

directj equally strong
on MIR and other allies; probably largely
determined the adoption of the lucha
armada

Party r
and attitudes
toward

Publicly eulogistic;
privately resentful and
critical

Close; party sensitive

to Cuban views and
guidance

Cuban aid

Ineffectual
approach to radical
leftists favoring
guerrilla warfare and
violence; 3. challenge
to the FCC program of
via paciflca; Cuban
propaganda in part a
criticism of party
leaders

Substantial training,
propagandar and other
aid? assistance
granted, PCV allies
provoked no resentment in party

Chineeft
influence

to party
Split into pro-Soviet
and pro-Chinese organizations in 1964; party
blamed. Chinese for its
troubles with the ultraleft

Limitedj PCV lucha

arraada program coincided with Peking
revolutionary line,
but Cuban example
predominant

hDissem

No

Forei-grt

Err

PCC
Chinese

aid

PCV

Limited financial and

training aesistance to
PCC-ML and to ultraleft leaders; Colomhiana
oftan took initiative in
seeking aid from

Considerable solidarity and propaganda

support; negligible
financial Assistance;
some training and
guidance

Party relations
with Poking

Hostile

Friendlyi occasional
liaison

Party relations
with Moscow

completely servila
to Moscow throughout
period; reciprocal ap^
proval from CPSU

Strained by SinoSoviet disputer

steadily improving
since Khrushchevhs
political demise in
1964 and Havana Conference of Latin
American parties

PCC-PCV relations

Propaganda 3upport for

the PCV lucha armada
and ofcberdjjffIcul tic s;
party concerned by the
Venesuelan program;
occasional Liaison; some
opexational assistance

Party absorbed in
its own problems and
hence little cooperation with PCC? borrowed from Colombian
"self-defense" theory
to justify guerrilla
warfare; radical MIB
elements conducted;
liaison with pro-Chinese faction and
other lucha.
leftists in Colombia

A-4

WJfflflw,

CONTENTS

THE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION

1
r., T

L TI-1E INSURGENCY

IL. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

,4

i l l . THE EAfeHlEttTO& REGIME . . , , , . , .

IVH THE MILITARY

v. THE oprosnroN

__ U
S

r .,

VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

. THE OUTLOOK

9
9
, . 10

C 1

n
BRAZIL

mTY
-

^BRAZIL

P A ttAG U A Y

.'HDT n-tJC hBhhniLT hUTHfr^TrAir"

5593E frf ? CIA

Ana el gsmdra* otttirlnni

1.aW

ca

THE SITUATION IN BOLIVIA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the situation in Bolivia and the probable impact of toe

present insurgency on it, over the nest year or so.
CONCLUSIONS
A, The present insurgency in Bolivia is organized and supported
by Cuba* Its seriousness lies In the possibility that the insurgents inay
eventually provide a rallying point for rn&ny disaffected elements which
hh
have been unable to coalesce.
^

B, Over the next year or so, there is little chance that tho insurgents
will be able to bring about the overthrow of tho Bairientos regime,
but it is also unlikely that the regime will be able to stamp out the
insurgency,
C A prolongation and expansion of the insurgency would impose
severe financial and psychological strains on Bolivia, greatly hindering
the economic development and social amelioration that are essential
to the achievement ol stability in that country. Defense costs for a
protracted guerrilla war would add heavily to the already serious deficit
in die- national budget, would further limit public investment, and
would threaten, the govenunent's stabilization program. | ^

D. If tiie government's cotinterguerrilla operations are protrajcled

and unsuccessful, that would encourage other disaffected elements to
undfirtalte more active opposition to the government Jt would also
seriously damage the morale of the military. In these circumstances,
the: tenure of the BartieAtos regime would become precarious.

C 3

DISCUSSION
I. THE INSURGENCY
' L. Armed resiitancu to central Authority has long been commonplace In the
BoUWjn hinberlamd. Concern regarding thft present itWUf gency is a consequence
of conclusive evidence that it is organized and supported by Cubfl. From tllii
source the insurgents have received leadership and training, modern automatic
and a body of TEvnluLiarjary doctrine. [

E. In March 19CT A Bolivian army pitiol clashed with a guexriUa. bftnd north
af Camirih in southeastern Bolivia (see map); A month, later jutes Regis Dehray,
a French intellectuaEh and Cif0 Rnherta BuStOS, an Argentine Cnmmunisth vere
captured in the [tt3 area. Debriy is a friend o Fidel Custro and a publicist
for his revolutionary theories^ his airest tn itself ensured, worldwide publicity
Inr the Csjnki hand, Debray and BusWs added to- the SGnsatinn by declaring
thai the leader of (lie guerrilla mOveuMTit hi Bolivia, ivas none Other than liracstn
('Che") Guevara.
S, "Ehz" disappEaicd in March IMS under circmnsCaTices which raised some
doubt that he WttS itiU ahvc Sinte t W there have been SCMS of confheting
iud UTicon&nned reports and rumors'as to Jiis whcneabouls. Somewhat stronger
evidence has recently become available: it suggests Guevara's present* In Bolivia
at some time during the past year. But whetherr or not "Che" is in. PolEvia, it
is claar that th* Camiri gucrTiHas ara lad by someone who keeps in contact with
Cuba Jew! who is well versed in the Cueuarii doctrine nf revolution.
A, A- main thertie of the Castro-Gevara-Dehrfly docfrina is that city-hred
"revolutionary" parties cannot effect a real revolulin-nthat, its in Cuka* the
revolution must originate as a gutixUli gwwv*men* in the remote- binrerlarid.
By ils survival ftfid continuing deGance, such a jjueiiriflii movfiment will demonstrate the poweilessness of tlie regLrrue and Will draw to itself true- revolutionary
spirits- Eventually the guerrilla movement wi]] win the 5jnnpthy and support
Of Ul oppressed pcpulatiue and will itself constitute the basii for the development af the truly lev&lutiocxarjf pohticaE party- Tins theory is, oi course, A
recapitulation of the Cuban experience from the Castroist point of view.
5, The available evidence irtdLMtP-S that the CainH bat*d numbers only about
100 men. Although the nominal ccunmaiida- is a Uolfvian, it is evjdenl Ull
tlR cadrt is composed of Cubans and & Bolivians txiicX*4ii Cu-ba- [
1 It appears that the
p had planned to spend more time in rccniitmeTiTflDd training, that it
discovered before it was ready to begin active Opertttions, and that its
leaders rtflUw that its. consequent dependence on its Cuban cadre mftv prove
politica!3)f disadvantsgeous by prdvotdiig a nationftlitric floljvifln reaction.

fl, Since thejr discovery these gucrrutas have operated in an area extending
from Cnmiri northward for 150 milts to Samaipata
on the Cochabamba-Santa
p
hh
highway (see map). This area lies in the fifteen fonthUls of the
^
til* elEvation varies from L.SOO to 9,000 feeL J.I is ipUrsrly populated^ the
availability a supplies, especially food, is meager. A a is limited by the
nwtb-aoutll pattern of the ridgclines. Moreover, thick fmlage on the slopes
provides concealment fox the gnerrilki. they arc we]] protected from observation u.a& Attack from the air. Aimy patrols approachiog on foot up rugged
strEamheds arc highly vulnerable to being ambushed,
7, Couahergucnilla operations in Such terrain would be e
difficult fee
, we31-br&incdF and well-motivated forces, T

The
g
times managed Co amtuah aroiy patrols', innidirjF
ties Tvithout permitting tli-a aijiiy unit* bo closer ThE guerrilla^, howecrr have
hcen compelled to abandon their hase campj ^nd the Bolivian army has recently killed or capLiured z, few of them,
fi. The Bolivian army numbers about 15d000 men, o whom only about 5,000
in MAT""Supported units arc reasonably well-equipped,1 Its cffectiveneRS is
limated: by the fact that its conscripts serve only a one-year tour of dutyh leaving
a minunal period of service after the completion of hasic training. The army
])*? eommiLted ttiQfQ than 2^000 men to containing (he 100 CHmiri guerrQIa?,
but feu> of (hem are Erom MAP-suppoiied: units,

9. Sevieral smaU guerrilla batids, Jn addition to that in the

area, probabfy ciist in other similarly Enaceessiblc areas (see fiiap-)- Soma
be composed of Ordinary, undisciplined Bolivian outlaws,
calJons that two such bands (those Ift the AJto Eeni and diapfli^ areas) may be
aFganiEfltlDDally connected with the Camiri Insurgents. As yet they- hftva nngagisd
in no active operations, but tliey could of caujse be used to divert and distract ths JJoUvian cannterguerrula
10, It is evident thiit the imtiativc in launching Hue Bolivian insurgency canre
from Havana. rUhffT than ^roffl any of the three Jocal Communist parties. 3 /]"
| Since the Camiri band becflmc
the Central CocfimSttee of the pro-Soviet party bas pubdkly endorsed
1

In addition, ilwre tiv 2,400 men in UM air fa BJKI L,M m to* ifver tunl lntt navnl fotaa.
*S*c -rJK* tabk Cup- a an& 7 ) f w brief deatripHJOdi al JOUJGCJ orgsnCEatloiM ID

n
movement

Ujn short, the guerrilla* arc quite willing to accept local Communist assisthi!f Vis and ^ b e n it suits their own plans, but are careful not to
identify themselves ^ith or subordinate thcmsclvns to any local CwmwnLSt
party, ' In accordance with Cuban doctrine, they expect to organizQ the true
revolutionary party on the basis cf the guerrilla movement itself.
11, It is unclear whether the guerrillas have won the sympathy of the ^sarse
rural population In the areas in which they Operate, although it is notable
that they have paid well for the food supplies they have taken and have provided msdteal services to Lhe V^]&ges lliey have entered- Their greatest potential .source of rEcruits is the large number of unepnnlcyed afwJ bitterly disalfCcted
till mijiefsN but the miners r* getleratty reluctant to leave the Albiplano and
no far only a small number of them have actually Ireen. reovJt^d- The distance
of (he guerrilla ToCmc from urban centers discourages the particlpalioti of dlaafifecLed students.

||r THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

13. Bolivia experienced a real political and social revolution In J.95&, bait
resulting governments made Only limited progress toward solving basic political
and economic problems. The fervent nationalism of the revoluttondiy leaders
could not transform the- country into an integrated nation. More than half the
population axe Indians 'who i p t i k Quechai Of AymaiA I'ithcr than Spanish; there
arc strong geOgra.pbi*fil and cultural barrier* to the d l
f
J
14. EnJtially the 1952 JievolutUm, aparked! by annpeslna and ininer
directed by the National Scvrjlutionaiy Movement (MNfi) h attempted ta alter
radically the nulstbg 5Ociid conditions." It natittnHliEed the tin mines, expecting
it ii u. mafOr prtrfuMr t ttrt. BoliVll'a per iipHA J
tmada troty tlfl* nf HflW nnd is well W o w ilic Wffl)
population t fltout 90 prtQt

EL

pxudurt

thereby to gain the means to carry out its other intended reforms. It freed the
Indian from the control of absentee landlords, gave him. land and cha vote, and
sought to give trim education. Bur. the nationalized tin mines produced deficits
instead of profits * and agricultural production iel\. Tliese factors, cn-mtined wfEii
.fiscal and managerial irreEpcinsLl>itHy, produced a staggering Jnflaiion. The government's, eiforts to control inflation and to rationalize tin production were bitterly resisted by the miners, whe virhmlfy cantroiied the uiLiicSb as well a s b y a
Jeft-wlMg fiction at tha MNH vnder Juan LecFiFn Oquendo. J ~ ^
y running for n. third presidential term fa
drove a sizable factEoiTolHiC MNE (including former President licrnan
: Suazo, L9S&-19S0 J inEio opposition. Forced thereby to seek military support,
Ffli grudgtngiy accepted the Air Force comrfiaTidfflf, General Rnua BamctUo*
Ortuno, as his running mate. Mutual suspicion grew between the twuN and Paz,
unable, to control increasing resistance to his rule, was finally ousted by the
rrdHtary lEad!ershlp In N&vcmbex lOoJ.
111. THE BARRIENTOS REGIME
15r Although the discredited MNH lcadershjp was tbkrown out, the military
Icaderi who Coot cotlUol plftd^cd enntinuance of thje MNR rcvoluiion. The twn
main figures in the provisional government wcra General BanienfOS and Cental.
Alfredo Qwtftdo GandiB, who became co-presidents. Barrientos fin]"oyed rnsidlcrable populai-ity, based largely on the bnld hearing he had shown in the face
of several previous attempts to assassinate him. Ha prepared for election to
the coonstitotionfll presidency by presenting tjLmSeLT as an advocate of ChrJLstiAn
democracy and by fortttJflg a coalition at misoellatieoyg political fragments called
the Bolivian Revalutionai-y Front (FEB) see Labla. In the election held on 3
JyJy 1966 Bftrrientos woo 61 percent of dirt votfr- This impressive victory WAS fa
much -a- tribute to his skillful manipulation of disparate politicaJ forces as it was
to his popular appeal.

' Tht gCnrtnunmt tin flntrrpTtH?r C O H I B O L r Suffering fram

o^ur^imcDf, wjis flirtJrfr jJnjMei by bLrn^ ipi^E of PlIimanaSB
rtSult produDtim fell from 3.1J300 tBirt In 1&5S ta lSjflOD En Ififlfl
ntln Ln Olfl lutLtir

tin pffcfiS and

and mrruprtoju fa p
UM miMt tott 51 flullran

POLITICAL PARTIES

{FR3)

The

July 1W7)
This parly * tr*n!ed t y BflnHcntW n? hu pcrmnJ
h ] f-W Mie 1BBB prcstlanbla] eJ&dtlOfl. It it
of Lit fHifliJWil fgDpwien without Emtch. g
ID ideology.: Ha pOpuJu Sijppflrt b dfflwn aLinniE a tluaivdy JfiXJtn tlw ^mn^EHnAi of (t* CcHibabtritba *rst,

PopuJai Christian
(MFC}

Authentic.

Puity

Ltft

Party of the
(HRJ

Thu; pnjty Ex u uff.iluMJl of Ul4 MNRr It is fed by

Wflltw CI^WWB Ar^t, D. uMderats who hft the p^rty
nwer Fg/x decismn td Strit a SCCQIK) term Ja l'&CTJ.
It iLm poUpt ifJO.DOO vote^ but Silica
h
it w staiten In the l9Wa at a
party and itill praftfilM t l w Iwijggr, Jt b ram far
BKirt mjodsrab th*R Lo^hin J j PSlif tad among otbrr
i t i o p recngniiei Uw iuJ far US i H . The PIE 1IB3
i n asUmated maribecibip of i,isO0 aiud Jf
itudenti i

Party
Cian, by

(PSD)

plup iiift tlM- MNR

pnaftHioQiib; it Is
ID the poat-1953 pgldrical CDHACKL

Itj

mcmhcriln lx citimitad to be

This t ppjfc*bly Aill (be latgstt poUtlcsl party In

Bolivia, h u t it eplit ioU? ttmoe lctni led try Pita,
j
d Audndo, vrith Lhw Brrt twi ID ="!= Tht
faction '.Vnial 5.G persent cJ Am vote in. t b t 1EHSJ
; tbf AIiade fatticia A p?tCCLt The Sllej
factibu did nQl paitfclpts En ili= ekcnon.
PflJty of
)
in LM7>

This ptuty' v a * ferm3 in 1^44 ni t vvihide for Juui

LKIUIJ 1 ! aspimBfiai flittJ hti *3rpil-lslaD froin the- HNH.
It d i e * Eta Hrepgth fmm labor, b4[n tnt ittfllKDtl*)
*TH(jrig the miiuftn*. tut Lt) LnJjuenoe Eiaf JedEned

1
(FSB)

by fp tfld TTilddl* fll*U cLemejits in ilie

(t orlgbudly di**1 iii iosplratfCHi from
und Iddian. fascfeni, During die H^H trt
it w&fl WBSH^QlJy plottznj D^aJnrt ilj OiUWDlh D
to the czteslt nil Eaunching an in^jgency. l t h i t rt^Lnjrf flOUK pKftlge rinoS Lbti 19C4 COUp
ii t h e ncJy HlpJKifitlCiri p i r t y w^th quSahuitiaJ
tfcD En QOTljfeis- In Lfl6e B poUcd l i p e r n t
Uit

DadftflwtOc Fsit/

Ntitfftr inlhKEitlal, Che pariy

^ l
b=tvrcen JOuthTJal
It fill flirted
meet

AJOW l o g g e d

In

r 3
BOLIVIAN t&LJnCAL. PAitTIES

Faxty (J
ovj"et")

(Outlnwed ui

(Outlawed in lBffTJ

IT DT/fccri

(OudAWEdrn 1BFTJ

Thfe party bnx >n cffiinpijtd luembflTjiup of 5J0OO.

rtihHcalty jt hit 1in reUtivE^ dadle, having bo=D
flH8Slt ia cOOpEnte with PflK in th4 past jnd hrfng
seriouJ)' ][mlQ64 by Jacfc of funds at ptwcfll, Mflrt
g Ib Strength ii tonatretnitcd Ln La Paa. HM Tcskm
around Iha minE^ jind OoctabafijEia. A Isftlit frfflftl
by this party rcaetvcd 33jffl)f> vfirt Ln itie
rftctira, 3 percent t)t Uus ifllal
Tlij parly iplit frtonrfiE:PCB ^ 19fl5h
DF pcraani! rivJiiti wdthln (h* PCE
wqucnfly Jt acp(ed Chinesa recagnltlpii and.
lid nnd at caiae to be-Lbejed pro-OlllllME. Its prcf air
h Id eatliYtatftj at 5M En J.,000,
After bfliag split iar JtvcrjJ yean, tha
i l tfieorcOCflfly ltax been unified SlflM
y 1SCG. Ib tcbiE meEnbenbfp IS- not aiara thnn
i. itw hua&rcd- The POH Ji :nftrt influwprisL in UM
ndnlng wgloai and among La Pfl7 fietory WDTIOCTJ.

.*

16. The electoral arravigeimeTit between Barrieifltos and the FRB pr&vcd to
be no i(iHB tnan a temporary expedient. BftrritntOS' sure victory gave, patronage
and Second wirtd K) parties hitherto destined to oblivion, fjn retutn he was given
political respectability and legitimacy, Despite constant avowals of support for
the Front Barrientos stowed little subsequent interest in it. He prefers to rule
as a sort of constitutional caudLLlo. Opposition parties, on occasion, have negotiated with him about joining thfl gavjBunrnGnr, but he has ra}ected ovrjrture
both the Bolivian Socialist Fiinnge (FSB) And the Andnide faction of ths
As bLs mosl eruuia] ^unport enmes from the TniUtaiy, Eh* u r ^ t u p of the Front
in July USftT and the reshuffling uf lihe cabinet in Aagust xvere o-f little real impoiftr
The iuiEviJual parties of the former coalition c o n d ^ * to be flligncJ with the
BarrieriEos government and their more important lcadWj are in the pew h
IV. THE MILITARY

IS. E*lb BartiintOS add the military 1 ealizfi that they depend On each other.
B&rrienCQA could mat have become president and could not remain, in office without the united Support of thfl military. The mtlEtary, Jfor their parth doubt that
they could control tba couxrtiy without such political arid popular Support as
B?JTJextos is able to contribute to (hi p&rltl*f !hipr Both the milttfliy leaders Odd
BarriEQuDa realise thai a split within UM military would spe]l disaster, BoLh are
therefore careful to avoid provoking Such A Jplit.
IS.

L 3

L
2CJ.1

V. THE OPPOSITION
Sir Cut off from patronage and influence, Bolivian opposition parties WW frflgmEnbcd and powerless. They reprw&nt regional Or Special interests and find caOpeffttion with other parties difBcult, ven the KIN ft Is now divided, ItadcrIE99, and wjLh IsUle Influence in impurtant scctOis of the popuJatiDiL Pax Is En
Peru, Lcchin in Chile, and Siles tn

5J&, Opposition parties have sought to take advantage c l the government^ unpopu3arity aniong students and m'lLitrt 4S well S its inability to end the [nsui. Elements of the FSB have from buna to time attempted to form

Wfief tie Outbreak of the insurgency the

were outlawed along with the three Communist

and PEIN

3. The Bolivian Communists are as frag(iient*d as the- nOn-Communist oppusilicin-, During the MtiR era the PCB maintained a live and [et live reJatiOnshlp with the Paz Adminiitfation. |
Ifr behaved
i to maintaJa its legal

2^

1964 coup caught the. PCE just as it was about to split JntO ^fO-Sovit find
"^wo-Chiriese* 'itctkins- A furtue* blow was ^kaJt bo the party in May 1&65I, when
the government neeupied the mirjes and arrested Communist and luftist labor
Jaadnrs.
VJ. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS
5A. The revolution In 165& was followed l>y fl prOnrdCt&d period o eDaDom^c.
deteriaratioii and a raging inflation. Since lSGi, however, ihe: economy's growth
rate his averaged Over five percent annually, prices have been reEatively stable,
and international reserves have climbed from i low of $4 nnUion in t9S2 to t3rf
million in June: 1967, For the- mast part, this recaveify has been SJHuCTed by substantial growth of imports and exports, increased domestic and foreign private'
Investment, and large Inflows nf eeonomtc

C 3

L
5. High Cm prices have contributed to this improvement, but so lias the gpvemtnent^s economic po]Jcyr Eardcntns has pledged bis government to a progfim of stfibihzatLon and development and has Instituted ^ s c a ' policies1 tiaat Seek
Co bring public ^venues in approximate balance with public expenditures. He
hftS fllso Iftkcn advantage of his freedom bom doctrimure political commitments1
to seek new foreign private investment, A heresy to most Bolivian politicians.
, Nowhere has this effort to impiora the. economy baati more evident than
arrieDW
policy toward the State cnterprisea. Prior to the. LQB4 coup these
in
enterprises: constituted a major drain on. the economy1.* Now their efiLrierjcy
has been increased, and In the case of tin has combined with higher world prices
Over the JasL three yeais- to produce an operating surplus which has been aitti
for pubEc investment. On the other hand, the overall tscal situation has
weakened Stnce 1S64 because of tlie growing hudgetflry deficits of the central
g&vcnunBiiL These- deficits have, had to be financed Increajbgly by die central
bank aincc the aLminatlon at TJS direct budget SuppciTt This Inflationary form
oi financing his risen from Tesj th*n One percent of ccntreil guvamment expenditures in 1664 to 1.0 percent in 19fl5 and1 about IS percent Ifl }$Q&, t u t has no* yt
had a marked effect an n J
27. For mtwt Bolivians, however^ stabilization and deve-bprnent programs hftve
little meaning. The LB52 revolution raised expect atinns, but did not permanently
improve the standard of living Ear many. Impatience over the lack of progress
in folElhiig its goals has -abated pockets oi resentment in urban area* and among
students *n<i mineri. The 1&B4 eoyp not only ended the domination &f labor
over mine management but tha goven-wiSnfs subsequent efl&ria to achieve dnCiencv threw hundreds of mtoexs Out of work nd cut wagea drjiticallv-. Although B&rrieniOS has subscquandy raised miners' wages, their political emASculatifln by him his left deep hatreds. While it iucccaded Ir\ forcing the miners
bacfc to wonVh the govenuneriE's decisive and ruthless iupprassion of demonstrations in May and June his intensiEed the miners' disg^ection.
Vf[. THE OLfTLOOK
SIS- The CastiO jicgimc, during the aessicrn of the Lfltin AmerJcan Solidarity
Organisation. In Havana in Jnly and August 1667, once again pun!id=t3 its
determinatiOfi to encourage: violent revolutions in L^(in America, Fidel Castro
piabably regards the crpportuTretiefi fnr tnt iasurgenta In Bolivia as more favorable
(at l e o s ^ i the lonj run) tEiAO is- the case wi5l Qtbex active insurgency movemeiitfr*^
IConseqyemJy 'we believe
ha wiU'maTce special efforts to sustain tha guerriJlfl operatiorij In Bolivia through
finnncial and Cechnical aid. Ttlis does1 not imply substantied
J

rm 19W, (dd erjMria occoirnted far TS pmtflJli *A fnrrigD chaBge eSiUulS tmra
=rpnrti. Ttic average VNXM price Etn BnlivJau tin m w from S l , l 3 m 1B63 to +1JW Oi 1984,
readied afaJgbof tlJti Ln lBSS, O.T4 diflppcd to ijl.tll tn I98fl jind tn abotil ^LSO in mld-^F7,
*lB fldditlOQ 1)0 CQM1BOL, ti*e ramt impgrUtnt pubUf enterprise* aT Ac NaUCanl PttraIfioni CorpOrntiDn, [be BflHrtaO DewelflpiftMiit Cftparatibn, jinj OH BolEri&n NIUODBJ

10

C 3

n 3

The guerrillas wil) be operating in almost inftccessiblfl areas, MoiecvKT, Oubin

doctrine anticipates that, once launched, [Jiey will live off the country, obtaining
even arrrlJ by capture. In any case, the ultimata success or failure of the Bolivian
insurgency will depend on Hi ability to win adherents from the *Jre*dy
l t
of the B l i i
li
29. O^er the next year or so, there 15 IittEe ctwmcc that the EnSurgents will
be able to bring about the overthrow of the Barrientos government. They
themselves contemplate a more prolonged Operaticrau The government is in
nirm control of the vital areas of the country LB. Paz, Cwhabamba, and t i e
mine?. It will prohably contimie to receive the im[ted support -of the military
establishment, on which Its tenure of office, icjiends; the firagmented political
OppGfiitinn is not likely to be able to combine, effectively against it. Put ft
is gnlEkely that the government will be able to stamp otit the insurgaB5yr
30. The longer ihe gtiertilk movement survives, the more tt wJll tend to
undcmitTi* the Barricntns government. Up to now guerrilla activity Jjas had
litHe effect on economic perfonnnan<>e, Defense costs for a. T/rot^Mlcd guerrllLi
WELT would add heavily to the already serious deficit in tha national budget;
vj&uld further limit public investment; amj would thiBatefl the government^
stabilimifla prngram. Prolonged insecurity would a!st> discaurag* the foreign
capital investment that Iklivte needs to expkJt its ufltappad ^jjourecs. Mo^eovw,
labof unrest; especIaJty in the mines, would hinder production, wJtli widespread
ccnnomJc repercussions.
31. A protracted and futile WuntttgucniHa ^mpAign -woulii tncotn:ag.& oppOBielements l-o iticreuse their opposition to- the govtmniEnC, whether oar not
they allied themselves directly with the gueorrLltas. Even jon-ie of DarrlentCs'
present political supporters might defect. The government itself could stimulatie
resentment and. opposition (as did the Batista regime in Cuba) tf, through its
frustration QVEX the insurgency, it reacted brutally to itudent nr rniner protests.
33. Military morale would also be seriotisly damagBd hy a long and UIJSLLCCCSSful campaign^
~( Repeated failLU'e against the insurgcntSj
combined with srt^in in maintaining cOntnJ-1 at the mines, might lead eventually
to disaffection fit the- irmv. TJartHeularEv Amonz EUnJkr oBGcerfi^^
33. yaitientus wiJI almost certainly seeJ: mcreflsing aid, principally m m the
US, in coping with the insurgencv- and with its ecoaomiic and Snincial consequafioes. Although eager to obtain iocrcased technical and material miliEary
aid, he would he rajramety rductant tn sanction 3. mnitBry intervuDtioii in
force, by either The already concerned neighboring states M fcy the OAS, lest
that ptc/vota e. natinnaltstJe reaction and make patriotic heroes of the-

LBJ LIBRARY
MT61LHJENCE__ACE.

Mandatory

JWTINli

. r

Information Cable

IN
FAGf ! OF 2

UIA

ij-tflDEF

JCB

Afi**r

>.:n i

Hi*.

acn

DPI

SERVICE
Tti* -

rJAV/

I t ^iL

at tfa

'.'.- ' . 1 ' * "

&", J niJu 1A, H J r ,

IhlTELLIGE WCt.

THIS IS AN IKFOHMATJOM REPOFfT. MOT FlNALLV

CITE

** OCTOBER ID67
I'ENKZUELA/CUBfr

301:
5L.BJICT :

OF STUPEtiT AT CENTRAL UNIUE;figITY DP"

UENEZUELA TQ'LfiUNCtf A ^ T I - U N I T E D
TO PROTEST

U * . INVOLVEMEMT

STATES

L DNE

IK DlATH O f EHHE5T0

"CKE"

GUEVARA,

1-Sftj

I.
STUDENTS ftT CENTRflL

12 FES 1397

IN

FAGf 2

Of

2 PACES

rcJtJI J

I.HIVER5ITY DF VENEZUELA <UC^>, TO-PROTEST THE- ROLE OF THE

5TATE5 IN THE BEA7N OF ERNESTO "CHE" -GUEVARA, ARE OR&AW.IJINQ."
KSTRAriQEJS

flGftlNST

QH^ OR SEVERAL DF THE FOLLOW I N C :

A UNITED

STATES BUSINESS, THE HOME DF A UNITED STATES C I T I Z E N , THE UNITED

E7ATI5 EK3AS5Y DR SIMILAR TARGETS..
CO!flMETj

W,flSSS rinE (JOT IN SESSION AT UCV AND

THE CAMPUS TS ALMOST DESERTED,

ALSO, PRESS REACTION T O DATE ON

DEATH HAS MOT J R P L : C A 7 E D

3.

| ^ H 1 DIESEJ1 j

THE URiTED

5TATE f ARMY, N A V f , A l R r

STATES.:
CINCSO,

SANITIZED

SANITIZED'
bfonnatibn CaBte

u&s&iStFss: -. u % m

B.0,

f OST 1 7 OCTDBER

CUBA/USSR

TO HAVAHA

2,
ACQ

CONTENT OF PlfiCUSflmys BKPlEBIf #SEGTJI AND CDBAK

PREMIER FtDEL
OCTOBER

{SUMMARY;

THE WSPJTCH OP EHNESIO

TO E0L1YIA AMD CASTHO^S PL7L1CT i m
EEVOLUTIONAEY i C T m T T Iff L 4 T I * A ^ J T A .
THE EASTS OF E I 3

HESEECT

TO THE

DUKXNC
POLICY.

COBA EVALUATED

COPY LSI UfSlAKV

-731*0

"WETEE KOSVCIN TISIT AS PRODUCTIVE, -ALTHOUGH I T WAS CLEAR *EBAT DIVEBGEKT

VIEWS CQNTimiBDTO EECST REGARDING RETOWTTIONAinr ACTIVIST IK LATHS'
AMERICA -

ENTJ EUlffllAETJ

IN THE EftLL OF I 3 e 6

INIDHHEU BfiEZ^KEV TEAT EBKESTO flCHEH tiUETABAt fflTH HER AND i

ITJBNISHED BY CDBA, EAD GOKE TO BOLIVIA TO MOUNT A REVOLUTION
THAT COUNTRY. M l f l H H
IN JUHB 1967, JQREZBHET, UT H^SPONSS TO A
AEOUT GUEVARA
BEPLTSD TEAT BE (GUEVARA) KAS THERE

US LATIff

H^r ETPHESSED HIS

H I S HAFFO

AT THE PAILORE OF CASTRO TO <3IYE THE SOVIET UUION ADVANCE KOIICE

OONCEiUfING THE DISPATCH OF GUEVARA, ASD IN STRONG TERilS CRITICIZED THE
5
4

<WLiyjUB&Utt

-73L4U

MGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

OF CASTBO TO UNDERTAKE GUEHEILLA ACTIVITIES IS BOLIVIA

0 3 OTHER LATIN AFRICA* COUNTRIES.

BREZHHEV STATES! ttLAT SDCE

ACTIVITIES ITCHE HARMFUL TO TOE TRUE IHTERE OT s OF TOE CQHHTOflSI CAUSE

^ D IHCJUIEED AS TO "TOAT S M U T ' CASTRO HaJ> ID fDMEHT HE7CUUTI0N IK
LATIK AMERICA VlTEm

A^PEOPEEATE CQQBOINATI0S * n a THE OTHER

'"SOCIALIST" COUHTRtES,
2.
IT
'-v

"-V-

.APPEARS TEAT CASTRO WAS IEHITATED AT

SOVIETS
DECIDED TEAT A YISIT TO CUBA BY <TM OP THE SOVIET J^EATEBS ffAS
ADVISABLE.

caisis

VL^S

K5H THE y I S l T H ^ B ^ c o m ^ ^ B E ^ ^ ^

EEUPTED

is m

smnra

0F

^^^

SITBsEQUENTLy|

HrjJDLE

^ ^

IT

DECtDED TEATFKEHIER KOSTfilN WQULD VISIT THE UKEEED STATES

TO ADDRESS THE UNITED M4TI0JHS GEKEEAL iSSEHBLT CONC^NIHG THE
HIDIILE EAST C R I S I S , IT WAS AGREED THAT EDSTGEN WOULD RETCHH TO
MOSCOW VIA HAVANA.
3.

THE PHIMAtty P T J E E O ^

0 F

KOSTOH^S TEIP TO HAVAKA 6^30

JUHE L967 TtAS TO IHliOEM CASTRO CONCEHMEra TEE MIDDLE EAST C R I S I S ,

TO EXSUIH SOVIET ftJLlCY REOAHDCfli THE C R I S I S ,

A SECGHDAEY

Cf>PV

-73140

4 ore

""T

BUT IMPORTANT REASON FOR SEE TttEP *A3 TO DISCUSS WI1H CASTRO THE
SUBJECT OF COBAN RBttJLBTttJHAltY ACTIVITY IK LATIN AHEHICA.
EOSKJTJT REP^^ 1 '*^ THE
TC2W THAT CASTEO WAS HflRttlHG TEE CaMHDKlST CAVSB TEEOUGH HIS
SJKJNEOREHIP

OF GUEHBILLA ACTIYITT Df LATIH AUEBICA AND TSKOUGH

PKOVETilKG SUPPORT TO VARIOUS AKTI-GOTEEKHERT GROUPS, WHICH ALTHOUGH

THEY CIAIUKD TO HE "SOCIALIST' 1 OR COHHUHXSr, IEEE ENGAGED IN DISPUTES
WITH THE "LEGITIMATE" LATItf AMERICAN COMlimi&S PARTIES I * E , , THOSE
FAVORED B7 THK B5SR.

EDStGIK SAID THAT THE EKTHRHECIKE 3TSUGGLDE

AMONG TEE YABI0U3 LEFT RSVULOTIQNAR7 GROUPS WR PLAYING INTO 'SEE

HMDS OF THE IMPERIALISTS AKu WERE lEAKEtflHG AND DIVEKEim

tEE

EETORTS OF THE "SOCIALIST WORLD1' TO "LIBE2A1E" LATHI

4.

REPLYING TO KO3TCIN CASTBQ

THAT "CHE" GHEY4R& HAD GORE TO BOLIVIA IK ACCORDANCE WITH

THE SAME "RIGHT" AS 2E4T UXDSR 1EICE GUE7AEA HAD COME TO CmU
AID CASTEO IK THE-RETOLUTIGffART fiTRUGCiLE 1CAIKBT BATISTA;

TEE

GOPV

IN -73140

FACE 5 &e

WJJ

WGE5

OF EVERY LATIN AMEBICAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO TES LIBERATION OF HIS

COUNTKY AND THtf ENTIRE CONTINENT OP LATE! AMERICA*

CASTRO TEEtf

SAID THAT HE WISHES TO EXPLAIN THE BEVOLUTIOKAIIY T24DITIGN IN

LATIN AMERICA, USD WENT ON TO DESCRIBE TEE SEATS OF THE LEADIHG
LATIN AMERICAN "LIBERATORS," KOTAELY EOLIYAB AND SAN MARTIN,
5.

ATSQ ADDED THAT CUBA DID NOT AGBEH WITS THE. SOVIET

APPROACH TO irWABS OF NATIO(NAL LIBERATION* TJT LATTJT AliEElCA*

EE

ACCUSED THE USSR OF HAVING TOT9ED ITS BACK UPON ITS OW HEV0LUTIO1TAHY
TRADITION AKD OF fiAVIHG UOTOD TO A POINT 1HERE IT WOULD HEFOSE TO
SUPPOET ANY REVOLUTiOlTAST HOTSUEltr UKLESS THE ACTIONS OF THE
LATTER COHTRIBUTED TO TEE ACHIEVEMENT OP SOVIET OBJECTIVES,
AS COKTHASTEU TO IMTEBNATIOKAL COJtHUIIIBT OBJECTIVES,

CASTRO SLA ID

TEAT Iti EECEJtfT YEAES TEE SOVIET UNION SAD HOT EOHOHED TEE
PRINCIPAL AIM OF TBUE OOiaiflNISH, I . E ^ THE LIBERATION OF MANKIND
THHOUGHOUT THE TORLD, CASTRO COHCLTJDED BY STATING TETAT HEGARDLES3
OF THE ATTITUDES 0$ THE SOVIET GNIGN, CUBA TODLH SUPPORT ANY
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT flHJCH I T CONSIDERED WA COHTniBUTHJG TO
TEE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIYE*
6,

DESPITE THE OPSff DISAGREEMENT CONCEreSINC

ACTION, TSS DISCUSSIONS WITH EOSTGIN CONGESSIKG ECONOMIC

1.3(a)(

COPY

IN -73140

PAGE 6 Of 6

MILIT^BY AID ERQH THE SOVIET UHlOIf TO CUBA 1EHB HELD IN AK AMICABLE
ATMQSPHEKE*

THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY WEEE WILLING TO COHTIHUE

TO SUPPLY CUBA WITH COKSTJJERABLE AMOUNTS OP ECOHOUIC AID AKD T5AT THE
MILITARY AID PfiOGHAMS, ESPECIALLY THOSE CO2iCE2HED t r i m TEE
OF TEE OmAH A3KED fOBCES, KOUU) BE
7.

AFTER EOSYGXN'S BEPAHTDfiE TBS CUBM LEADEH3HIP ASSESSED THE

VISIT AS HAVING BEEN A USEFUL ONE*

TEE CTE4N LEAPBRS JUDGED THAT

E&E CLIARLY BXPLAINEO TEE CUBANfiETOLUTlQHABYATTITUDE TO TEE SOVIETS,

BUt TEAT THERE HAD BEEN HO SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETTTEEN
TE^ TWO KATIONS.

TEE COBAIfS WERE ESPECIALLY PLEASED TO SEE THAT

ALTHOUGH MAJOR HISAGREEMEJJT EXISTED IN TEE POLITICAL SECTOR, RELATIONS

IN TEE ECONOMIC AND UILITART SECTORS EAU REMAINED OK A FRIENDLY AND
BASIS.

t^JVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE,

WHITE HOUSE, DIA, ARMT, WWf, AIR,

3
S
I

FIDEL CASTRO DELIVERS EtftCOY OH

T * l * v i i i *nd H*d*o S*rvic* i n Spanish OlUU CHT 1? Ostr fi? 7/E
[E?#*ch by Cuban Prim* H in l i t e r Fidel Ctstra from Havtn* 1 1 p i p (ta-la flevcducicln At a
public etr*aiy in tritrute ia Em** to Che Cuevra< l i v e J

[Text] Revolutionary conracfei; I t v u a day In July er August of 1955 Wrwti we fir at

net El Che, And in oft* niflht, as h* t e l l * In his accounts* he became a. future Gr-ufj^
eiiwditicnary. But at t h a t time that expedition, had neither ships, vtapora, (iw troops
this tfas th* v*} El Che, together vith Raul, Joined th* f i r s t two groups on
listSince then, 12 year a havfl i* by, j s year* fratich-t vith strucgl** M 4 ofcstru<;tiens.
fhroufih the a* yer 4ath rtaped niny viluatle ami irreparable l i v e s t frit t t the
t i n e , ttiroueh these yfara, extraordinary fe^ple enerccd i n our revolution md ver*
noldcd aaoris th* nen of the vlvtion* And ties <tf affect ton and friendship wire
aaons these nen *nd the people^ ties vhich went further than i t i t pcfrslble to
Toniaht we ere eatliered her* t you *n4 I* to t r y to tscpress these tent*.rants In totc
with regard t t w *Jhw as on* of tlw nost ra4aillar J one of th* moat adiaired, me of
the nost beloved., and,, without any dcubt, the nost ejctrioPdlrtary of our tOfJAdcs tJ
rfi^olutiort, t * *pr*si these eentlaents to hln and t o the heroes who bare ^oje
have f a l l e n beside hin*-hls internationalist -rmy which has been vritiflc a
C-f
6
Che Vis one ot those persona whftn everybody liired H inm*diateIy because of h*s
because of Ms nature, because of hi* naturalness, because of h i s eonrad^s^i?,
ir fcis pflrpvnality, because of his oritnallty. even tefore h i s other sinc-*a^
iftsrc reveaied, Sur^ne those f i r s t mooents he VJS the doctor of outf troop, *r+^
our bonds emerged apd thus cur feelings eperked. Ke was seen to be lnpren&td with a
profound s p i r i t of hatred and conteapt for iwjwrialisinj not only bee BUS & h-i,
tiakcup vas alrtsdy considerably developed, Wt because' only a short tins imf-m he h
had the opportunity to witness in Guatemala tfte criminal inperlalist Inter^oiitlon
the irtrtenary soldiers who ever threw the revolution in that country*
For 4 cv*n such as he, wany arguoefits were not necesaary* I t was enouijri Tor hin to
!cTt01/ that Cuba lived vnder a aljallaj lituition.. I t was enough for hia t h i t
even deterained t o fight that situation tflth weapons In hand.. I t vaz enough ^fd
to know that those) nen were Inspired by genuinely rtvoluticnary and p a t r i o t i c r
That vas qoro than enough. Jji this sanner, one day near the end of November
he bffan the trip to Cuna vlth u*, I r e c a l l that th oroisina was very d i f f i c u l t f&r
hlA because. In tho tlrcunitJrice* undflr vhich I t vas neeensary t o oreanite t * , ,
departure, he covtld not *ven obtain th* pedicinoa that he needed, and he Euffrre?d A
at tacit ttt asthma during the *nttfi croaslnj vlthout any rallflf, but

7
*$*"

HHHH

CJBA

Me arrived, We be can the i l r s t nsrc!:e - Ve siirrertei: the f i r s t setback* An* a f t e r

a Ttu vcc>-a, at c e t acaih, 3& you ter^u, that s n a i l ;CroUf> of those wiio wort l e f t or the
Granaa c*?citior,* d e continued to be the doeter of oar troop.
T:se f l r i t victorioue b a t t l e vas wa^ed acd Che then becaoe a a o l d i e r of our troops at
tEis sanj +ir-r :E was s t i l l 'Jhs d
T!w eecorai vlctsriaus ^attje vas wa^ed *nd C!to the soldier be case tfce pout d i t
of *!:e soldiers 1ft tiiat b a t t l e , for trie f i r s t tine actonplisting one c f V;isa
exploits uhlch e^aractepis^i j.ia ir+ a l l the
Our force continuect t e iev^top and 3 battle of extraordinary inportimce at that tine
wage*. The situation ires GlffteuH, Reports HCK errwtous In nany aspects, Vt
itsre ceir-E i o tta1: a stronel:- defended position in full daylight. In the nnpnins,
at t!w CE& of t ^ soa. I t vas well Jnacd and u Lad cne-ny tr&opa a t oi^r rear, very
iwsp* Under cuidltlDns ot cor.fuslor.ixi vhicti i t vai n<j*=ar7 t o asl: tlie eien t o tiaUe
a juprens e f f o r t , after Cocraie Juan Al=sida had bcEwi ane or t i e aost d i r f l c u l t
DiMions, =na of t* fUrM* stf 11 did ^ot ;v* ei5ou5:i aen. I t lacked nn attacking
f o r a , wftlch could trjlar^t- tlw operallpn. At that BOntnt, c;*, Urn uas s t i l l t i e
doctor, ask-d roi* three or taur.nen, ancrng Uiem 3 nan with an autonatle r i f l e / ' In *
natter o f socopdj he quickly bt=a to asaut* the nlision of attack irm tsat direction.
On tiiat occaElon : was not only a distinguished n g h t c t but ; alto was a aistinuii
doctor, filvi^ a s s i s t a n c e to the uounlpd conMde= and a t the sane tine tarlnc for the
wounded cnacr/ s o l l d e r s . ^ndfeJnrii t was necessary to abandon that position, ante

and joined L&eti i n the column later.

t n

Mhich

ti L ^ ! L f r f t ^

he v a d cuts toxins a* a capabl*

J

trave

^ ^ ^ ^ ^*o * ** b* done dOt3 not a l t . d= a o t wait

to be asLeaV-apriwd a n d c 0D plet & d the i d w i o n . n i s ii* dd during t l * battic o f

U
Er.i M did t h i S | t m p en an occasi, B & 1 ^ntjioncd I n the early s t
of a l ^ t r a y a l . our apwiLL force vas stUcfecd by
teen

tethsw uaS . t i l !
our yoiffig amy-and at the n0Heiit u& considorcd the posaUiUt
. a= bt did , * , left rapidly to bvlnf back tite r

this elicited

n fr

39 October 1JG7

1IHHK

CUBA

Che u&s an unbeatable Soldier, cornea Oder* Vrota a. alli.tary standpoint Che
an extraordinarily capable mm, extraordinarily brsve, ctra.ardijiarll7
If he had an achilles heel as a guerrilla, that schilleo heel uns his excessive
aggressiveness. It has his absolute scorn for danger. The *ntfiles try to
ion; about ha death. Che vat A caster* of
"Che was an artist in guerrilla warfare* He. demonstrated this an, infinite
or tines f but above- i l l in two extraordinary exploits. One of the* WAS th*
Invasion, t t the head of a column, a ctilixan which v* pursued by thousands of
*QIdlers through territory that Vis. absolutely open and wiknora* fle a ceoapl
Catdlo a formidable P U i t ary
But, In addition, he demonstrated i t in Ms b r i l l i a n t campaign In Las Villas, iml
ha demonstrated It above a l l In hla daring attach on the city of Santa Clara,
entering a city defended by tanks, art i l l err* and several thousand Infantry
with a column of barely JOG oen<
two exploits nark hln ad an extraordinarily *cle chief* a taster, an
or revolutionary warfare* Neirerth.elest after his- htroit and glorious
death they attract to deny the vfcracity or worth of Jits guerrilla contepts and
The artist can die, particularly when he is an art l i t tn such a dangerous
as the revolutionary struggle, but vrhst cannot 4ie under any circumstances
is the art to which he dedicated AS life and to uhith he dedicated his Intelligence
Why Is it so Strange that thl= artist aJwUd die in a battier It is auch
extraordinary that on -the suny accaslons that he risked his lire he was not
during 50&C battl1e,: L Han; vere the tlces in which It was necefar/ to talte action
to prevent htn from Getting killed, in actions of nlnor Importance, And so In a
, til one of the nan? battles that he wagedj ho lost his life,, Ue do not
enough evidence to toake u. Judcnent i s to a l l the circumstances
battle, as to the decree In which he cay have acted in an overly
nanner, but we repeat that if is a jgutrpilla iie had an achilles heel # that achlij.es
heel Wat his excea^ive aggressiventts t his absolute contempt for
That Uai where i t was difficult to agree pith hijq^ because tre understand
his l i f e , his experiencer\hia ability ZA a veteran chief r his presttgfrj
*verythLis that he signified In l i f e , were much core, incomparably Boft
than he perhaps realized hltaself. *ftit idea that nen have a fealative value; L ._
In history nay have profoundly Infltitn ed his conduct; the idea that causes cannot
be defeated when nen f a l l and that the un;entatnaW. march of history does not stop
nor will It stop because the coaoanderj fall F Jui<l this Is certain, this cannot
doubted. This shows hli faith In mankSnd, hs faith lr\ Ideas t his faith tn
an
Vet, as I ialA t fev dafs a^o> I would: have wholthearttdly ulshed tc have & ten
s the Bolder of victories, molding voider his leadership f nolding under his
directicnT^* victor lea* because wen of hi* experience, of his caliber, of his
singular ability ire uncoonon nen. (fe re able to appreciate a l l the value of
his ejtanple and we haire the post absolute conviction that this exaaple
serve a& enrulation tnd will serve tc?itplns aen similar to hljn J*roa tlie
the peoples.

1,HH ,

19 octet*.- IS(!T

* "

*"

te his.
pen like ^.ici,

- ssr-s.-r.rM str

r
te

ita

ta fill flat M. tt*-ft,^ d^ft" r MI fT

B i l l tap/ o

a a

l i i B I e I r tB

u .

oi>ini, ry clearly vheB

mtlan ttat If
uat'U.

Solidarity

*"*

but nlllions

ear

\F

ur>

S p n s

19
I t is not th&t we think tlut in the practical orcer of revolutlocar-jr
his dcatfi Is to have irsnediate reparation*, i t is that El Che, iipa
up aras a^ain, vas not thinking about an inMdiate victory, he Pas not
about a. SKift victory against the forces of the oligarchies and of laperlaltan
His experience cuerrIlia nintf was trairteS for * long s t r a i t of 5. 10, 15,
or 20 years if necessary*
And he vas ready to s t r i d e &, 10, 15* 20 years, his vhoie l i f t , i f iwo
and It Is with this MP& perspective thst bis death**hIs example, I ou^ht to
y - v i l l have a tremendous repercussion, utXl have an iwinclbje i n f l n c e
In vain they try to deny his ability as a eoursandEr *ft4 hit experience,
thai* who ellns to the stroke or Iticlc* Che vas a military eowaander vho was
tx*raordir.arilj- capable, but when we recenber El Che, "hea we think ab&ut
El Ctw* we are not thinking basically abfraS his nllitar? virtues* Jfo, for war
t* a nepna to and end, war i s a tool of Fvalut1onarles. V?hat io lrportartt
evslutiODj t^at Is important i s tJ) revolutionary cause, the revolutionary
s*the rcvoltitlonary objectives* the revolutionary sentinent^ tJti; r e v f l l t i
vlrrjffi.*,*Artd i t in llCthl* + ^ l d i *n-the field of ideas, in the field or
in tEie fieid of revolutionary virtues, in the field of irstelligcnce+ aside
his nilitary v i r t u e s , ttiat ve feel th toenendotts ioss HOP the nsTtHutlona
scvencm;, becsust Che^ in bis extraordinary jJersonaH^, had virtues
rarely apptar tocetfter, Ke Mas outstanding as an incotnparabl- aan of
Clse va; net on5y art incoaparable nfift of aetifln, but a Jaaft of profound"int*lleet
of v i s iff nary intelliaemce, a nan of prcf/iufld culture- I tiean to say he was
a man of Ideas and a Han of action*
-r
i t i s nat Just that he Uas bath a ban of prc-f?unri iifras m^t it nan
of action, btit tliat as a revolutionary he had the virtares vhlch could lie
defined as the cost full-necked: ej:prt*iicji of the virtues of a revolutionary,
and integral tasn in the fullest ser.stf of the word, a nan of supreme honesty,
of absolute sincerity, a Kin of stole and Spartan l i f e , a can in vhrae conduct
practically no fault can be found:, Bccau&fr QC his virtues he yas yhat ian be
called a true tod el (>?' a >evolutior.ary, * Speeches can be niade when n*ji die^ virtues
csibe painted eut but few are the tl^eA vhen^ as vn thla D^easlon# vhat ve
about; Che* wht Has a trut esatipl^ of riTOlittionary virtues, can be said uith
r-e justicej more
Xn additior., he had ane-ther quality ub^h i s n<st A quality of ttie intellect, uhich i s r.at a quality of viU F vhicti la not a quality derived fcroo
BtrnggJ*, btit a quality of heart. He uajt an extraordinarily humane
extraordinarily sensitive* Tnat Is Hbff we aay that, vhen w# think ibout his
l i f e , when We think about his eoniuet, this vss the case of a rery rare nan*
because lie was able to bl*nd dti his personality not only the characteristics of
of a nqtt of 3ticn nut a Is a these of a thinking pan, a can of -shining revolutionary
virtues a-id extraordinary huo$n sensitivity' tXended. with a character of iron*
a *rcl vl-ll, and Indomitable
Is vhy he has willed to future generations not only his experience, his
d
j outitarp^RC^soidlei1, but alsfl the vork of bis ttitelli^enet*
ile nr-Ptc #lth the -virtuousity sr a classicist cf the itngiutGe* Hia Jnarrations
of the var are unfurpassaVlt, The profurvdity or his thinking i s impressive*
Me *l=5olutfrly never vrat* on ah/thlns without e^traerbinary seirlomn^ts, without
profundity.

October 19*37

Hfdffl 6

CUBA

Vs do not doubt that acme of hia writing? i / m paaa on to posterity 93

docunents of revolutionary thinking* And so, *s 1 fruit of tiiat vigorous and . , ,
proTourKl Intelligence, he l e f t ua an infinite number of cencricj and atoriea which,
witl;sut Ma work, h i s effort, vould jn=rhipj be forgotten forever.
A tIreIt3J vorker i n the years tint Jie was a t the servics of our country F he did not
!cnw one ulngl* day cr rest- Kiny r*ponslbilltlei vere a&slenei t o hi&, lucb
t h s presidency of the j i a t i m l ban*, the directorship of the planning boerd,
Minist,*y or Industry, as a eooofinder <if Hilitaiyi^fiiDni, as a chief of
of a p o l l t l i a l , ccchncwlc^ or f r a t e r n a l type. His nultifaceted lntfr]llertc# was
capable of undertaking any taaJc witfi a inaxinun of i s sura nc* i n any f i e l d , i n any
way of thinking. And thus he rtprt rented our country i n a t r i l l la at tnanntr In tan/
international conferences. In the *2j*e caroiti* that he brilliantly led: i o l d l t m In
cdobst, i n Ott satie way h* was r model work** In any of the i n s t i t u t i o n s t& which
he Vis assigned,
liloi ther* wers do days ftf reat, no hours of rest* If w looked a t h i s
vindou t l j lisftts burfte<l u n t i l l a t e at night. He vas studying o r t b e t t e r said,
workire t>ecai:$e he atvdlid a l l the probltoi. Jte was a t i r t l e s s r?dr. His
for kno^led^ was p r a c t i c a l l y I n s a t i a b l e , and tlwj hours lie did not s^eep, he
He dedicated regular day5 c-rr to volunteer worlc, Ht was the inspiration and the top
promoter of teat vork which today occupies hundreds of t)iausandf c-f persons
the r a t i o r , , He was the f rooster t>T that activity which daily grows t r o t t e r
OJT our p e o p l e .
As a revolutionary* =s a corununist rtvolutlonapy, really communlaV, he lad infinlt*
faith in noral vajues, he had i n f i n i t e faith In ttit conscience or nen andwe wgjit
to say ItIn h i s conception lie saw ulth absolute c l a r i t y that n o r a l i t y wa* t)> basic
for tli* con&trtctiDn of con&unlsn In human society.
ffe tb.sugjit, dev*Jcped, *hd Wrote about nany things. Ap4 there I s BOCK thing that
ought to IK said on a day like today. It Is that Che's writings, ClieJs p o l i t i c o I
and revolutionary tho^eiits, will Jiave a peirdner*t valve i n the Cuban revolutionary
promts s f.sa the iHrvolTJtionarjr process at l i t in America. And ve have no *!o\ibt"tlat
the value of hi* i i e a s - - o f h i s iieaa as a ran of a a t i a n , i s a nan of thought, as a
man of proved moral virtues, as a tan of extreme human s e n s i t i v i t y , as a man at
Irre^rMenable condTjet--haTe and shall have universal value.
The imperial i s ta alng victory songa n e r tlie fact of tht guerrilla k i l l e d i n ccabst,
I3:e iBperlalista ting of victory w a r the stroke of fortune vhicfc l e i then t o
eliminate auch ? formidable ban of c e t i o n . Hovever, the iroptrialijtj perhapa
or pretend to Ignore the f2et that the qrality and personality ef tlils flfhttr
of action, va* QM of sany f a c e t s . I t I* a question of p=in--we feel pain not
cvtr what har nrt l o s t i n terms of a nan of action, ue feel tJin v?er what has been
l o s t i n terns cTa virtuous ian; we f>el pain Direr w^iat has been l o s t In terns of a
nan of c ^ u i s i t e human s e n s i t i v i t y and we feel pain over the intelligence which has
been l o s t . I t pains us to think tltat he was onl? 39 a t the moaent of h i s death* *t
piina us to thlnt of IICM cany of the fruits of that intemflenefr arc* that
which wap titveldpitve * n the tlttf, ve have lost the thanes to perceive.

sail* V
have i^s=s sJ tJit dijTic-nsioa of tJ:e l o t s tp the revolutJUmary
tl e:ess, Oils i s the ueil: tde of tJie inperialiat enocj" tolnVlns thst
u:h the p^vsicai nan. I t [125 liquidated his virtues' fcJiinfcins t h o t , alcrcc with tl:e
pJijSiccl c:r.H i t has liquidated liis exs-aple* htiti they do not h e s i t a t e in publishing
in iucii a- Ir.piid*-t tia finer* ^c the pr^st n s t t m l thine in the vsrld, tjie eircuBist;nces*
RO1.' i l s a l ^r.Iversally ncctptedir; wJiicEi ft* trss executed by then after having b*i
seriously t;ounAcd in battle* ?Jiy. h^ve not even reflected on the loathiccveness of the
action. Tfcey have not even rtflect^d: An tjifr inp-adtnee flf thcr adolsslon, And tJiey
Jiave pub 11 t i l e d , as the right of the t!iun, tJifty kavt r*por*ted, c i the ri^Jit of the
and tbfr nerccnsi-les^ tne act of firing at 4 re
jfciomaiy ftglittr who
uojndei. Iftiat la *rrae Is triat Usej' also piii-tt uhy tlwy did I t ,
rJlit i t vould have required anoverulielaine protcsfl t s ti^; ^.JT; claiming t j t i t
would have been topoSSihl* to place such a rtvelutloiury i n the deck ot a court.
only that, they also hive net hesitated In ttcrextng liis remains. And. true
i t Is a fact thit t)je?y announce lisvinc crenattd Jiltf boitr^ thereby
tiieir ft=r # tbtreby defionstratiKg that (?the?y b*liev* thatj V
l i q u i d a t i n g tht piny*lea3 Hf* or t^w fighter, t h e / liquidate his Wests znd liquid*te
exanple*
Che did not f a l l defending an* intermit, dtfendJtsff ar>v causp other titan tht taus*
exploited and the opp^ea^eJ in tjla contlrs^t, Clit did not f a l l defending
other than the cause of r.h* poor, t^c hoiblf, of thin land* And tht
oanner and t3ie j d f l e s s n e t s wl^i/ulijtch he defe^rfrd that caujst Is not even
by his r t i t e s t eneales* BeXore history, the ptn who acted ba h* did, the
do everytnlnc; and >*lve ev^rytliirte for the cavse of the hunblfl, tecosue areaCer wltii
every psialr-C day; ttiey trfcer dper Into the hearts of the pflOplcs with every
day. And the i n p e r i i l i s t trwmles ire a l r ^ i d j beslrjilhi te perceive t h i s - Ttwy will
not la lone to realise that rils dt]j will in tlw Ion run to l i k e a ieed rron vhith
ftmare nany nen deternlned to enulst* hjjn^ .jnany jaen determined .to follcw h i i
And ve arc absolutely convlnetd that the revolutionary cause in tills
continent will recover froa the blow, t>at tlie revolutionary cause In this continent
Will fiot i?t der*t4 by that t j o n .
Kron tne revoXu^ionary fitandpoXftt, froa tJie stsndpsint of our 6uty, licw should
vlc:r Che's exaejple? Do we perhr.ps believe ue have l o s t ]iln7 I t is fcrut that ws
will not =?in ee mv inrltings- I t Is trve that we w i l l not again hear his voice.
3iit Ctie has l e f t t h t uorW a patrimony, J great patrinony. And from that patrijnsny
i/e vho kn(w Jilm so intiflat*Iy can to s considerable degree be his h e i r s . Ke l e f t
us h i s rt'/Dlutitmaiy thaudits. "He l e f t us Ills jrevolutionary yirtnas* He l e f t t= his
for work. In a ifor<V he l e f t us M E
( his w i l l , his tenacity, Ms spirit
AI C1ie: exiaple should ba 3 nodel for our people* d i e ' s eMnpltj ahould
We the Ideal nodel for our peopleI f ut irant t? any how we want our revalutiettfry f i l t e r s f our milltant&j ex:r ften
t o be, Kt should say without iny IiestiCJtion: L*t thtn be Like Che*
If wt want to say hctf tfe Vant tfw w n *>r future neratlciti5 to be> v t shrjulct
Let tl*p be lifco Criet
If we want to say hw we vant our children, to Iw educatedf ve ihovld say
Mu want ttien to t>s educsted in Oier6 s p i r i t .

1967

KHHh o

CUBA

If ue u=rt a nodei of a pan, a pryfcl of a tan who does not belon t e this time, a
of a nan who belortga to future ttaee, from tlie heart, 11. cay that the ticdcl,.
a sineat bleniih in I t s conduct, without a single blemish in i t s a t t i t u d e ,
a ainjle blemish ir. I t s *ttioni-*.that nodtl la die.
If we want t know hotf ve want our children to be, we should cay, witU a l l our
(^revolutionary nLni) aruJ tasart: We want then t o be llkt
Che h i i bitOD* a t o d t l o man not only for our natlot tut for any
nation. CH* r a i t to! revolutionary s t o l c i s a . the s p i r i t of revolutionary sacrifice4
the eosbativeaess/the wcrfcing s p i r i t tf tlie revolutionary to their highcot
Che ptve t];e Ideas of liar^lsh-Lenlrilso thtir freshest, purest, aost
fcr/ t^presslon* Ho nan like him In these titocs bas raised the s p i r i t of
proletarian iftterrtationallsa to i t s highest level* An4 when w e speiki e t a
intcrnatiunallsti iM when one seeVa an ejacple cf a proletarian.
that eKinple, above any csther exatnple, i s the tjatple of
Jn ^;*, a^m: and i n his heart, the flags, the prejudices, th chsuvlnlEas^ the
egoism had Ai5appe2red< He vat will ing to shed en*routly hla blood tcr tht fortune
of 5h^ people, for the cause af any people * He uas ready to the* I t f r t e l y , ready
ta sbe I t instantly * And to his blood V3s hed i n t h i s land vhere lie was: wounded
in various battles. His blood vsa shed in Bolivia for the redemption cf the
exploited ir.A the oppressed, the humble S-rA the poor. That blood j&s shed for a l l
the- exploited, f=r i l l the oppressed * That blood was shed for a l l the peoples of
Anerlca, 2nd I t uTis shed for Vletncn, because he krew t h a t . In figiitJnK
there, he vaz alter iris Vietnam the highest expreaai&n of Tils
I i vhyf cocirsde Indies and sprXlzn+n of the involution, ue should looh t o the
future with firmness si:d dctermination. That Is ujr,' ve should look to the future
^ optlnifiD^ ^nd we trill alvajs *eJr I s p i r i t ion In Clierc example j
atrvgglej inspiration for tenacity^ Inspiration for lntranslEence before
t and Inspiration for internstjonillsm
i s Ui^T ue, &n ttils niglit, after this impressive ertrpo^y* after
ditlebecause of ^t.3 sagnltufl*, discipline, and dtvstionnass
of recognition, wJitch Shflw* that this i s a itr-sitiVe people, which Ah CMS that
I s an appreciative p t o p l t , vhlch fliws that this people knovs how to pay homage to
the ri#Rpry of t];t C0uT3t0S taeft he f i l l in t i t t l e , uhich clicrfs that this people
kr:oH5 how to aclmowledge those who serve I t , which demonstrates how this people
supports the revolutionary etruscle, M thl people raises end v i l l alva/s keep
tht revolutionary tanners and the revolutionary principles-today, at thla
nt of eojtnenoration, vre shall elevate OUT thoughts and, with optimism In tho
^ with absolute cptlnlsa at out the final victory of the, peoples, t * l l die
#ndf Along ultii Mu t the heroes who fought Ltrd f r l l with him; To victory
Fatherland or death, we aha 11 ttlr+!

Ceretioniep
Rtport] Mivana Donestic Television ard Haalo Service* i n Spanl*h tit
O10T CHP on 13 October 19^T bej^Jn. l i v e noverac* of a mass aeetihg in Havana1 a t l a t i d# 1B.
In oemory cf Err*sto die Cuevsra Opening tantro ahtta rficw a larija '
'j
nost of vh.00 re in Dllitar? f^tlsues, gathered vr.&cr the lltfita in tlie
a speaker's platform placed i-t the foot cf the Jose fcirtl Donuueivt.

15 Qct:>lvr 39^7
tJ*c proninest Cuban pt-rsoRalitlca identifiable on the speaker*s plat fora are:
Prine Minister Fidel fesfcro, Deputy Print JUiUster JTiul Castle, President Osvaldo
Dor tic es I, Cvbin Coemmist Rarty Central Coimlttee Organization Secretary Pr Arnando
Jf?rt, Transportation fttnister faurt Chenea, Fcrelrn Kini5t#r Haul Jtoa, Cttaui
's i"s station President: Vilpa Espin, Interior Minister R.;aLra Valdeij Deputy
Forces Minister Jwn AlttelcU, Wlr.itttr Utthout Fortrollo Carlos flaJTl
Cuban Academy of Scier-cta Frejidtjit Antwilb flunes Jjicenez^ and
ACTOA*

Guillen, 'the Cuban poet, open* the prfl/jram ^ith a poeo eulogizing Cuevara +
A pp^jtetion screen or. tJti plaia i5 vfrcd to bJiow a movie on tn unidentified country,
flld f i l clip* of Ciifr Guevara iJit]) Fidel Ca?fro i n t!it Sierra Hacstro t)ien follw*
Tfierc i r e e t i l l sliota of Caniri follcwftd by a f i l n tc^uence or the VBlleerande area
and Bolivian ranstrs witji what jtpp to b* tJ*S* military personnel. The voice of
Guevara i t heard In tit* background vhilff f l l a clips *1ICHS V*S. (jsunteriirsurseney
cperations and $9ll\lti governiDtRt c f f i c U l s . A filled Oucrara tpeech +i:en followa,
the increasiinff victories of tli= pftflplt of Vittnam aga^.nsfc Ya ._e
tht action in Statiltyville, and other Jllberatlcn movejaentt ejfitwher* In
tht
A ttla clip ridlcults the f i r s t five years of the Alliance Fjr ErGeress by
poor Eafcin Aaeriwns, Kasaeint and iws^papcr arijcle* on the return or Che
guerrilla operatloca arc s^ovn. Stejwt tften /olloy of Military and paranil
counfceri^avrgency personnel^ in viriovs countries. Teletype macnlnes and code sound
ar* used to point up the "increasing wave of liberation artrements."
j
t o conclude th* film show are extrtim* closeup*, f i l l i n g the outdoor ecreen,
Che Guevara'* Jfate, the filn ends ^i*li t x c e r p t s of Guevara's speeches being
vjijle the cameras pan t o hufit pbotacurJls o ' Cutvara i l l u m i n a t e d by
TJie eercpoiv continues Wth pan sJtftfi of Jose Jfepti s t a t u e and of the cronvd In the
p l a i e - Siiots of half-aasted Cuban Hflgj are superimpostd on the huge
t^hiic trie crcwd lisfceju to a recorded Ouevara speech.
A fl-un s a l u t e i"aliens and s s the volleys a r e f i r e d Wit canera pans t o the Guevara
p h o t o c t r i l and tJ:en t o tfie uns and t h e i r misale f 2 a s h # i . A trn^ler blows tftps,
P r e a i e r Castro then steps t o the nlerspliarw and. begirjs hia speech a t 014U flt'BP
19 October*

COKDOLET1CE ME$SftOES OJ) ttEWm Of CHE

Ruiaanian Conatinlst Party
Uoowttic Service i n Rucanlan 1800 <iWT 18 Oct 67
[Text] "Cotftrade tficola* CwustE0UT t e c r e t a r y general of the Fumsnian Uoraaunist Party
Central Cflanittee, ha a fient the f o i l w ing c a t l a t o Cocu-sde P i d c l Csatro HUE, f i r s t
s e c r e t a r y of t i Cutan Corqaunist Party (JPCCJ Central Conaittee and p r i a e a i r t i s t e r *
of the J3evolutianary flovernaient of th* Bcpmtlic of Cuba r

,
*

'

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WUHINOrM 2Sb O, C

or rm
LBJ UBR.ARY
Mandatory Revi

34 October 1967

Document *
\EMOB>NDITM FOR: Mr. George Christian
Frad4 &*cr*tory to Th President
The Whit*
qf l1 Chc" C u e v i r a ^ Diary

SUBJECTi

1* Th* original diary of Ernesto "Che11 Guevara da la

ii in the hands of Hie Bolivian Government which it currently negotiating to sell It to the highest bidder* m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ an
unidentified German publishing firm hat already offered Si 00, 000
for the diary provided it is delivered within two weeks. The
Time and Parade Magazine are also negotiating for
In our view, the diary will b published and in the public
in the very near future.
*

2* The diary contain* daily entries from T November I 9 t t

T October 1967* The dUxy relates general field experiences
dosj not contain particularly sensitive information. Although
ke handwriting i* frequently difficult to read, the diary could bt
publlihed in its pxemnt form, The publishers may want to edit
the manuscript, eliminating entries of little interest* "No
i(

3> It appear that the Bolivian Government baj i t s

for" Che public alien of the diary w<eU in hand and that it

1l
J

; , '

- -

rcaent any outaide efforts to

all or wets of It.

:

Director

'

INTELLIGENCE

r?,

* JROUTINE

AGR..CY ^

Intelligence Information Cable

IN

;
OF 2 PAGES

rtAV"f_ A I R J C S

N*A

Kit

AIO

UtlA

OClT

COM

OH"

BCfl

*~-T11U

IS AIM INFORMATION BEFOWT. WOT F I M A L L V EVAI-UATTP

B NOVEtlBER 1967
COUKTRT

SUBJECT

1)

CUBAKf PROMISE--TO BOLIV7AH EXILES TO STEP UP PAGE OF

2}

POSSIBLE ftSSftSSINATIOH OF PROMINENT BOLIVIAN WITHIti NEXT

FEW MOUTHS IN HETAIJ: ATI OH FOR DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA
THELP N O ,

SOURCE

1.

EtAUL ROA GARCIAH CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTERH

UNITED STATES M - H s s V - 1 - H H - H - i - B H H

ON H I S AflRIVAL

CARRIED A VERBAL MESSAGE

FftOM FIDEL CASTRO PUS TO TRE BOLIVIAN EX.XLES IH THE UNITED STATES TO
THE EFFEvCT THAT THE BOLIVIAN. CONFLICT WCfiJLD BE REMEWEP.

THE MESSAGE

A1S0 STATED THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HOT ONLY DID WOT PLAN TO CHANGE
I T S PROGRAM OF

ACTIVITY, BUT IT'MIGHT EVEST STEP UP THE

PACE OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY.

ROA MENTIONED THAT TAMAVO (FMU) , THE.

EOLIVIAJI GUERRILLA, WAS EJTILL .ALIVE,

COMMENT!

-THIS .11AY

REFER TO CtfBAH T.T. LEDWAREO TAMAYO NUNEZ'WHO IS KMOHM AS'

5

11 OCTOBER 1967, "UftBASO" WAS STILL ACTIVE AS OME OF THE FOREIGN

eUEElRILLAS

OvT !ta5

.5

PAGE 2

2,

OF 2 PAGES

A PROMIHENT BOLIVIAN MILITARY FIGURE, POSSIBLY PRESIDENT

RENE BflflfllEFTTOS QRTUHO OR GENERAL ALFREDO avAHDQ CAHEIA, MIGHT BE

ASSASSINATED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS, IN REVENGE FOR THE
DEATH OF "CHE11 GUEVARA,

4,

3
2
1

FIELD

DISEEMI

STATE, ARMY; AIR, CINCLAHTH

CIHCSO.

a
2
I

c
^. .,!

".

;;

i f !>

DERECTORATE OF
INT^LLIGENCJE

Che Guevara- Diary

--\

Special Report

" iVIEW
. ? - '-

15 December I9C
SC No. 00300/67A

1 2 FEB

af Current Intclfigencn.

COtfrJiFinite^
t h t sifi-rmal
have :it?t

Current
The Special

:il!ft LlmDo tlK1 [5:rL%-IOr:i!m uf C t .

This document tonttras iriFurrn;

Lrnit*U Stntti, witElijl the
US Godo. us j men Jed.

i15 the notional defeiuc of the

TiikTfcjLieti(nis TKt anJ T&Jb of the
or icvb^itian o:' it t contents ro ui

*^

CO-MROLS
MUST NOT ]JE RELEASED TO FOE1EJCN
ffrfts:S:fin.( (if DCtD L ~. tllC doL-umtllt must be

r .

:-

"1

THE CHE GUEVARA

?h- diary Of Err.esto "Che" Guevara is the prot r a c t e d memoirs of the i l l - f a t a d c;i:errille movement,
he lug in the Bolivian bachiands from 7 November
co B October 1907.
The amount, which was found with
Guevara a f t e r his Capture, reveals that the g u e r r i l l a
band suffered fron Lfie o u c s t t from dissension ar.d1 ine p t i t u d e tha'J compounded the hardships of jungle ODerations.
Ojevara's novenent ^ i t I:ILEL te i y failed beCiUSC the Bolivian peasants received the g u e r r i l l a s
w:':!; feftr fine
ii
Guevara, i.n his d i a r y , wrofe dimply, without
metdp;lor ar embs 1V i^jii^is pross .
K^ did" not discuss
ideoi.O^itiii or s-jbat.aintive p o l i t i c a l niacters arid
avoided personal r^nir.^t ions ar-.d rcmi nisceTices. He
said v i r t u a l l y noth.mc th^t can be turned inco ir.[jiri.ici :i:a:toE2 or myths.
I t eeens, moreov*r, t h a t
when the di^ry i s ?ub!i&f-.e:f the GJuvara Legend u i 11
or.ly bs dulled by tr:is s^co^nt of the p a t h e t i c s t r y o ^Ic; i ji Bell via.

Attempt ta Export.

The di3ry
v a r a ' 5 II-TIC^:.'" odypsey was a
Croncertftd StteEupt bj- Cuba to Open
the c e n t r a l Ji*ertlar:d oi 5o-Jth
A-erica t o international, o'jcririlla, insur^er.cy , Since the
f i r s t Tri-Csnt.ir.ent; ^onfcrer.ce
in rfavand in Januarv 19t^ , r'i.del
CSBtrc; had DL'tn i n s i s t i n g that
' i t Is the ducy nc evs^v rcvulur^ tu -axe rEvolutian. "
Reais ne^r?1-1 in his P.a^^tnsiVK 'ii-Lthin. r?*vji:iL^n charted
the- Lde-ologieal ihef of C a s t r o ' s
rnilitariL staler, and i t was Left
CO Glievari, presLcnad srevo] Utionarv

consummated to lead the "inevitable struggle."

P a ere

It is- clear fron tr.E diary

that th.e c/uertillas were carei-J 1 ly
Selected and trained r and we^e
well Equipped by Cuba.
A; least
tr.r-=e nanbfirs of t TL-S- csr.tral ^o"imittefl of the Cuban Comrauflist
Party, a/|(5 fjer;ups a dazen o" SO
Other Cuban--aLl followers cf
Guevara and. eji^ftrts in guerrilla
tactics--were with the band. In
incct, Castro ar.c Cuevsra sot tut
systematically to prave Debrav's
corollary to militant <ZA&Zioisn\ :
that the Latin Ar.erican g^scriila
movement ought to be &A internationalized rural insurgency Springing from the rebellion
:rustrats-d and oppressed
Guevara's hopeless struggle
and denise r however, proved o.ily

Dec 67

". r . . * ' ''

BOLIVIA: Area of Guevara'5 Guerrilla Activity

BRAZIL

CHILE

^ : ^.ARGENTINA "

the futility of thofloproach.The

Debray Strategy ar,d the guerrilla
tflCti.CS that Che compiled in his
handbook Cuerrilt-a rfzrfxfg proved
to beempty theoretics - GuEvara
was enable ',;o win the support of
the Bolivian Connu n i s t Party
'PCE-5J and could not prevent hj.a
own yrc-yp from splitting i
GQT\f 1. ic t j.nc factions. ht
support considered essential to
the revolutionary clie-sis was enLirelv lacking. It was, in fact,
the hostility and suspicion of
the Bolivian peasants Lhat forced
the. bird to continue its endless
flight t^rc-uar: the jungles-.
Final jyr after some no p. thii of ineffective caunterguarrilla activity
by Bolivian fM^iy units, the 3uHangars vert ass^g;ie to
operation. The Ranyers, well
trained in. pursuit and harassment,
eventually destroyed most of the

guerrillas*
Failure! Of: t.nc C-

Tactics

A disciplined, J;oy^l r
ory^nized revolutionary
is the first r0-uuirerr.ert
ir the Castro-G^Cvara-Debray blueprint for ir,surgencv. in Cutfi*y-i i Z.^: ivif.fi^G., Guevara said ^hat
"honogsneity r respect for the
LtidEr, oravery, and
with the terrain" are the -S
t i a l characteristics of the guerrilla- band..
In Bolivia,
t of these basi^ concepts werE
or ignored.
The band
enmanged of Cubj n, Soiiviarij
and Peruvian nationslR, none of
whs^i vas very fa^ii^iar t-ith t h e

i l

eone-

acteT.pted to
these deficiencies. ?.-

SPECIAL

Cording to the diary/ he spent

the Hir&t three m n t h s securing
bases of operations and training
and indoctrinating the guerrillas.
-u-ic first attempt at an exploratory familiarization t r k h
the- jungles, hoi^everr was plagued
h-y inaccurate maps and the troiip
he cane di scoUxaqed aiild we a K e nee
by heavy rains, insects, and a
shortage of tooA and water.
Tensions between the Bolivians- dild
Cubans became serrors ir. the first
rflonthE, and the- initial expior5vOCV patrols -were charac
by ineptitude r lagninu Hi
and poor leadership.
Inep t itude
with Havana
I.a Paz were lost as early 3a
January when a trar.smi tt;i" rugtec
because it wa5 Stored in a damp
cave, On 26 February, the band
suffered its first personnel loss
\-he7: a member drowned attempting
tt crO35 a turbulent stream. On
17 .^arch, a seCOn member waa lost
ift A siirulair accident. Thus,
neither of Ch=' initial ohjft-^tive-s--tfd i nina ar.6. exploration.-yas cc^ipleted, and various accidents had already cater, their toll.
On 23 March, tha guerrillas
ambushed a Bolivian patrol and
killed L-ignt o its nembers . A
second battle on 10 Aprii
for- seven ar^y d&ad a r-d also
the first Cuban loss. Capt, Jesus
Juarez Gayol r a funncr vice ^inist^r
of the Ministry of Sui;^r Industries,,
^"a-s killed. Guevara was discouraced
- i t h the re suits uf these skirir.ishesr whiirh. shO-Jfid that the ^uefrillas wert Still divided ard intrained.

15

67

"CHE" GUEVARA in BOLIVIA

,-.?

: vr

ir

;
Sometime En 196-7

"i

Morale
Che was particularly digJit-h. the reluctance of the
Bolivians to work with the Cubans,
and on 12 April reminded them
that "the ^irst blond drayr ^
Cuban." On 25 April r Cftpt. E
Reyes Rcdrigue^ (San LuisJ r a member of the central committee of
che Cuban Comnur.ist Party., was
.killed in sronbat. The loss of
Se,r. Luis 'Ji'as a major psychological
blow Co Giievacar who for the first
tiire was unabashedly despondent,
He mourned that San Luis was "the
bftat man in the guerrilla band"
and a cOTT.r a 3 e "since (San Liiis
was) practically a. ^hild."
The 1OS5 of 5a.i Luis was
a tLrninc poin~ that C-aiiSO-d GUCvara to view the ^-'JerS"! 3-las '
char,cta very critically. Iri biis
mor.thly surjr.ary fsr Apr i 1 r he
pessiiiistically enumc:rte at
leait three :rt3i]0C pr^blens ur.dermining his efforts. Fur the
first tine, he discussed in some
O-etaiJ. the is-ol=tion of tr.c band.
He CDir-alair.ed th.dt "h.e 0?Fi9anLs

ware not responding and that there

had besn ro
ording to C-jevara, the
or Jji.es RcgiS L>ebray and
the Argentine jo'Jjrnalist^ Giro
SUEIOF, th.at r.onth furtiieif i5Oiac-s-d the: iand :rof(i
y- Ch* opined that
"the Aratrleans will intervana
here i; t ror;gLy. " Hi& basic s t r a t egy u-as to arovoko Ut military
intervt-ntion in t a t in America,
but i t seena th.at he -JAS unprepared t3 cope wi^n such a.r. intervention as early ag April.

SPECIAL

the following months,

band suffered a slovr attrition while- morale- continued to
pluirj^et. Several more guerrillas
were lost in skirmishes and
including Guevara, were
an.d incapacitated by
ailments and injuries.
By the end nf July, Guevara W3
cnvphasiiinc; only the "negative
aspects" of the campaign and
reiterated daily complaints abcut
his asthma attacks, ^-e was weak
ill, unable a t times- to carry
awr. kr.apsack.
The band of 22was er.tirely
or. the ciefer.sive in remote And
ur.pl^ttec terrain wf ,ile the CoSilDwiy ill"
liuiar. nili1
:F. effectiveness and
encircling the guerrilL ia.=^. t.i
Guevara va s
int increasingly EeriflUS problems, including chronic food!
afnOrtageS- Once, during d long
period on reduced rations r nenbers c th-e i>=nd suffered "fainting 5 pells."
By the end OI August r af:a:
alir.ost tem mon^hs o attrition
ar.d debilitation, Guevara admitted that it Pi-^d been ''with^Lit 4
cJ-?ub- the warst X.Ortt;^ yet. '
Kis illness, Che said, had
"taUsC-5 uncertainty i.'i several
others., .and (.was) reflected
in our onlv e^cnunter (^'ith th-0
This was hiy only adth4t his primacv was
ever doubtad,
Ir. fact, however, Guevara
had disci pi i,ie problems aLfnos'^
ilQ?ii 'iie outset. T^i-sse cesulied
fron the friction hetwean the

15 Dec 67

Bolivians and Cubans in the band,

a/id from the lessening o morale
as the hardships and setbacks increased,. Che's- leadership may
also have been Undermined by bis
Own DJlytical weakness and inability *o sngireei an effective offensive. In LI months, Che had.
not been ahle-to nurture his movement beyond the most preliminary
Of incipient insurgency.
The Guerrillas' Failure r,*ith
In his
War far a, Guevazra explained in detail how the guerrilla, must win
first the sympathy and trust and
then the full collaboration of
the rural peasants in order to
sustain the struggle. In Bolivia r
however, he found this goal impossible from the beginning because of the suspicions, fcfirsr
anc torpor nf the Indian peasants.

were constantly on the

run, trapped in a maze of jungle
arroyos/ During the Last ueeks,
when, he must ha^e known that his
chances were bleak, Guevara continued to writu in the same
brief style with mystic h
for victory. Fie made his
entry on 7 Qctaber, after exactly
11 ^anttls in Bolivia, He said
the clav "was c^ent in a pastoral
setting," but apparently j.t i;as
a peasant VQ^an itrcni that area
Who betrayed the guerrillas to
thE Bolivian forces. The voiilfir.
had been bribed ta ktey the
guerrillas' locatior; F?ecret r but
ChE confided in his last etltry
that he had "little nops
would keep tier

Guevara viS wounded.

p
by Bolivian dangers or.
0 Octcber and died the T?o! 1 ow^ r.g
dav . On HB 0ctO^e.cr Fidel CastrO
adinitLed Cucyi^a's tuiest-. Two
days later, he delivered a
In Aprils Guevara
lengthy eulagy and declared a
that "the peasant base has r.ot
ironth
cf ndiional flourr.ing in
yet been developed although it
Cube,
would appear that through planned
'fzrxor we shall keep some neutral."
He admitted the extent of the.
In the diary, Che
guer ril la 5 ' isolation on 17 April,
connunicatiens -'ith
when he said thet "of all the
Ca.5tro.
Though his transmitter
peasants ue have sEen, there is
was
destro/ed
in Januery r Guevara
only one who appears to be coopercOIPKUJlnicated
through
couriers
ative, but with fear," In June,
and
was
flble
to
recsive
coded
P.or^-over, he warned that *he Boradio
messages
from
Havar.a
r
livian A m y vas "working on tlie
There
were
no
indJcat
ions
of
dif"
peasants and we must he careful
ferer.ces
between
the
two
rcien..
they are not Changed into a
of informers .lh Fearing
bstra/al by virtually
Guevara, his lessons, find
they encounteredf Guevara
M
s
iegend
-were perhaps simultahis D 1 1 O W S ^ S wanoercd in i
neously
stifled.
Though Castro
tion through the aparsely popu
and
other,
revolt
Memories
may
lated
insist that the struggle will
endlessly continue in his na^.e r
The End &f a Legend
thay must now be hauir-g serious
about their prospects,
the
g September
first week of October the guer-

Page 5

SPECIAL REPOKT

15 Dec

V . '"

L,

."

i'giul

CfHTBAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

" ""intelligence Information Cable

PAGE 1 OF l l PAGES

OWLY)

FBI

H/NE BDT.

2B DECEMBER 19G7

CONCERNING FIDEL
. OF VEPTEZUELA; AND CUBAN, CHINESE, AND SOVIET
OF

TO SIATE:
TO JJIA;

NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOilAS L

EKCLUEIVE.FOIi GEURA^ CARROLL

TO M E C / l ! C :

5
4

EXCLUSIVE JFOR ARiTY ACS I , GE^EiL^L YARBDROUOS; KAVY UNI,

ADMIRAL FLITCKEY; A I B ' F O H C Z ATCIN, GKK5RAL THOMAS

TO KSA:

EXCLUSIVE TOR GE^TEAL CARTER

TO F B I :

FOR MR. S . J .

PAPICH

S1THHABY;
5

CIRCUHSTANCES ARE NOT S I P E FOR ARMED

PAGE 2 O F l l PAGES

N A5TTSZHE IN LATIN AKERlCA.

CUBAN. INTERFERENCE Itf LATIN AMEElCA

IE SELF-DEFEATIi'G BECAUSE I T DOES NOT TAXE INtfO ACCOUNT THE VAHYISG

CIECUHETAJTCES T& EACS COTJNTEY, . J T ^EKS .TO ASSERT CONTROL -OVEE IHDIGENDDS
RKVOLUTIOKAitY MOVEJffiWTS , AK1> fiEFJ-ECTS THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE,

WHICH I S HOT APPLICABLE TO TffE EE5T Or LATIN AMERICA,

CASTRO E EFFORTS

HAVE BEJilN MAHEETi BY FAULTY PLANNING AST POOR EXECUTION AtfD HAVE BEEtt
DAMAGING TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES.

THE COKMlflTIST PARTY

OF YEKEZDELA HAS S3 I F TED FROM AMEL> STfiUCGi^ TO POLITICAL ETflUGGLE,

IT

WIW- PARTICIPATE IN TBX 1SS3 ELECTIONS AND HOPES fli.ATEW YEARS TO JOIN A
COALITION GOVERlfflEHT.

I T REJECTS TEE CUBAN SUPPORTED TERRORIST ACTIVITY

OF THE DISSIDENT COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER, DOUGLAS BftAVO,

WHILE TEE

CEINTSE AND CUBAJi TEJEOHIES OF REVOLUTION BDTK CALL JOR IMMEDIATE ARMED
, THE ^QVI'ET ISEOPY I S MD&E FiJSSlBLE,

^3E SOVIET LINE CHANGES

TO'THE DEMANDS OF THE SITUATION IN A GIVEN COUNTBY AT A GIVEN

KE,

1SE SOVIETS CA3W0T TftY TO ELIMINATE CASTRO, HOffEVEJl, FOE WITHOUT

HIM THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WOl?LD BE LOST,

TH UNITED STATES COULD BE

TENG CASTRO BECAUSE HE AIDS ISIPERI ALT Sy BY DESTROYING LATIN AMERICAN

, ENTJ

3.4[b)(U

PAGE 3 OF

FIEEL CASTRO, CUBAt AND IKE .PROSPECTS FOR ARMED REVOLUTION Iff LATIN
I,

AflMKD BETOLPTION_IS KPT POSSIBLE SOW ASTYWKEHE INJLATIN AMERICA

T3X NECE3SAEY CONDITIONS DO NOT EXIST,

HAVE FBQVE-P THISCONCLUSI VELY.

WOULD' RESULT
LEADERS.

FIVE YEARS OF FAILURE

CONTINUED ATTEMPTS AT AflMED REVOLUTION

THS TOTAL LIQUIDATION QF ALL REVOLTjTlQNARY FQaCES AHT?

IT IS NOT A QUESTION. OF PERMANENTLY ABANDONING THE ARMED

STRUGGLE, ONLY OF ADJUST IMG TO CURRENT REALITIES,

IF SOME DAY ARMED

JtEYQI.UTIQN BECOMES AK. APPROPRI ATE FORM OF STRUGGLEt THE COMMUNIST FAHTY
DF YESTEZirELA tPCV) WILL RESORT TO IT.

i ^ ^ ^ i ^ i ^ H . COMMENT: - ^ ^ H E

1.5fe)
3.4(b)t1)

' TELE PARTY IS

WDRilMG DILIGENTLY ON CHEATING A NEW ARMED ENTITY CAPABLE OF MOUSTING AN
LNSU7HECTI0N,
AREA,

TfllS PARAMILITARY ARM WILL OPERATE UAINLY IN THE CARACAS

H ^ H H I ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B n H .

THE SOVIETS WTTJ THE COHKUNTST PABTIES

OF LATIN AMERICA HAVE JLAJ3E TJG TTECESSAHV ADJUE'XMEKT AKS EAVE SSl^TE:
THE STRUGGLE TO TEE POLITICAL AJIENA.*

IN GUATEMALA THE CEANCES OF A

SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION ARE. BETTER THAN. ELSEWHEEE, T>UT STILL ARE NOT GOOD,
CHILE IE THE ONLY COUNTRY IK LATIN AMERICA WHERE A COMMUNIST REGIME'COULD
COME TO POWER BY POLITICAL
5

2.

FIEEL CASTRO'S POLICY OF EXPORTING VIOLENT REVOLPTLOM TO

3 TSE LATK AMERICA IS RASED 0 3 FAHTAEY, KOT_KEALITY,

THIS I S PARTLY

1-Sfe)

IN

PAGE 4

BECAUSE CASTRO GETS .EBUOKEOUS IMTOflMATIOK FROM LATIN

WHO HAVE T^flSO^AL AffD SPECIAL POLITICAL

XTTCESESTS

TO ADVANCE.

UNAVOIDABLE liESTJLT HAS BEEN A SEEIES OF REVERSES AND DI 3ASTERS.

HAS TfflJS BECOME A NEGATIVE FACTCfft IN 3SE LATIN AMERICAN

DANGEKOUS TO ALL

REVOLUTION
ifOVEMEMTS.

XSE OVERRIDING

AMERICAN

T0AT CASTBO POSES FOTt LATIN

AMERICA ARE FROELElS OF '^CONTROL" AHTJ

"IKTEHVEOTIOH"

CK CDNTBOLLIJiTD ^IHE MOVEMEin?S A^fD CROUPS EB SUPPORTS.

EY S I S INSISTENCE
CASTRO SEES THS

JAS REVOLUTION AS A CONTINENTAL REVOLUTIOiN BUT ACTUALLY

THE TACTORS AKD FORCES IK THE FUNDAMENTAL SITUATION ALL HAVE NATIONAL
CKA2ACTEJH AhT> ARE JJIFFEREKT IN EACH CpfUMTRV.

THE JiATIONAL REVOLUT1QHARY

LEADERS lii EACn COUNTRY MUST CONTROL THEIR MOVEMENTS AKD AHE BEST
TO v^grc DECISIONS,
3,

AGGRAVATING THE jpROBLEM I S THE FACT THAT CASTRO I S

TAT8G

SERIOUS IKTEBNAL ECOSOHIC AND POLITICAL CHIEIS ETEAMING FHOU HIS

3 HULE,

SIKCJE CASTflO UAEES ALL THE EECISIONS, MflNY OF THEM AHE

INEVITABLY ITBONG AND TEE VTEEELS OF GOYERNUEHT MOVE SLOWLY.

ANOTHER

T OF HIS PHSOAL DICTATORSHIP I S THE FAILURE TO INSTITUTIONALIZE

5 OF 1 1 PAGES

IN SPITE OF CASTRO'S DOMESTIC FAILURES,

EE STILL HAS POPULJUt SUPPORT tt CUBA BUT HOff LONG HE CAX CONTINUE WITS
TJKFUlJrLLETJ YEAJLLV PEOillSEEI QF BaEAD I S VERT L^CEETAIX,

SROtTLTJ H BE

SUCCEEDED BY H I S BUOTHEIt RAUL, THE ENSUZNG RULE Y VIOLENCE AltTJ TERROR

WOLTJ) NOT LAST LONG, FOR ffrmOUT FIDEL THE HEGIHE T/O7JLB FALL,
4.

A S j m VJJSTORICAL FIGURE. CASTRO IS IMPOKTAHT TO ALL liATJN

INSPIRATION,

A, 1ND SO I S THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, BUT ONLY

KPT AS A HODSL.

LATIN AMERICA MUST BE GRATEFUL FOR CASTRO'S SHOWING

THAT A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION IE POSSIBLE JUST NINETY MILES FROM TS2

UNITED STATES, EVHN I F HIS REVOLUTION WAS ttOT A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION.
CASTRO

TTAS

HOT A

THK COHinJNlSTS.

FACT, HIS JtEVOLUTION FOUGHT AGAINST

', ffHO KNOWS WHAT CASTHQ I S ?

PERRAPS HE "IS

ir

IILREGULAil COiGTUNlST/ 1
TEE FAULTINESE OF CUBAN PLAKNIKG IE ILLUSTRATED FY THE BOLIVIAN

CATASTROPHE_ANH

TjE_I?EATH_QF "CHE" GUEYAfiA}_F0K__WHICH

ARE RESPONSIBLE.

CASTRO

WHILS OtTEVAJtA f S DEATH WAS A GREAT DISASTER

AND A WOItLD TRAGEDY, I T IE IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND HOW G1JEVARA CO'Jl^D

5
4
3

"i

4
j

S
1
r: I.

IK

PACE 6 Or 31 PAGES

COiQIIT SUCH A ELUNDES AS TO GO TO BOLIVIA Aim EEHSDUALLY J.TTftT) TEE

ARMED STRUGGLE.

H WAS ACTUALLY A FOREIGNER I N BOLIVIA AND STEELED AN

TO TALE TO T&E PEOPLE *

ONE CTJBAK INSTRUMENT TO CONTROL

IN LATIN AilEHlCA I S ..THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDAEITY ORGANIZATION (I-ASOJ-

IN PRACTICE, S O E V E R , JUASO I S A KEQATTVE FACTOR ANT AS

ELEiLEST Of DIVISION; I T WILL !NOT LAST LOHG,

TEE COAarCNIST PARTY Of VENEZUELA AM3 _TjQU_GLflS_BRftyO>

DI5S ISE
6,

I^KAUEfi OF TELE

OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
ITEm CQUMLTtflST PASTY OF YSKEZTJEJA (PCV) SEEKS TO PURSUE ITS

POLICIES AMD ADVASCE ITS DTTEJIESTS BY POLITICAL MEANS TSRDrJGH A

LEI-TIET FRONT AND WITHOUT TERRORISTS.

IN SHITTING TO TH POLITICAL

STRUGGLE TEE PCV LEADERSHIP I S TJNQUESTIONABLY RIGHT,

ALL PLANS OF

TEE PCV ARE BASED "ON TB mPi'JJAMENTAL ASEESEMEKT THAT THE CUJtHENT GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA IS STABLE AND SUCCESSFULLY REFORMIST IN NATURE
THIS IMPORTANT ^RANSFOJttiATIDN11 HAS CUT TKE G&OlftTO TROM UNDEH THE
COifiTJ^IET ATTEMPTo TO CHANNEL DI&CONTEKT ALONG TEE LIVES OF ARHED
THE PCV PREFERS SUCH A GOVERNMENT TO A MILITARY UlCTATOHEHIP AND
THAT ffJTHlN A FEW YEARS TEEEE I S THE DEFINITE POSSIBILITY TEAT THE
PARTY MAY EJE ABLE TO JOIN A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

THE PARTY WILL

PAGE 7

OF

CERTAINLY PAHTICIPJ1TE IK THE 196B ELECTIONS AND VSIX SAVE

TELE GOYEftHHENT I S LIKELY TO PERMIT THIS SIKCE I T WILL BE CONVENIENT
FOR I T TO DO SO,

MHIHI^H~

C C M M S H T

'

^ K V I S ILLEGAL AMD
1.5(6)

PARTICIPATE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS,

THE MAIN KEVOLTTTIONAEY

JW VEMEZTJELA AM THE PCVT T^IB REVOLUTIONAJLT PAKTT OF rNATIONAL 1ST
ETTEGHATION (PAIN) , THE PRIETO WING OF THE fttTLING DEMOCRATIC ACTIOX
PAHTF {AD) ; Aim TEE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE CFDP) .
7#

DOUGLAS BRAVO AMD HES DISSIDENT COMMUHIET PALS JX? NOT

CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY FIGHTING FQECE.

BRAVO REt>ftEEElTTS

STRICTLY A CTFBAK EFFORT ASD I F CASTRO'fflTHTRAWS HIE SUPPORT t BRAVO'S

EFFORTS ffOULIi COLLAPSE IN "TWO MINUTES."

- ^ - ^ - H CO1UIEHT:

1967 BRAVO FA3

ABOCT FUSES FROM CIttKA THAT TTERZ BEItfG HELU UP BY THE CUBSNE.
^ ^ ^ ^ M M I H H
LEVEL I S LOW.

WHILE BRAVO I S BRAVE AND EARING, HIS

A MEASURE OF HIS STUPIDITY. I S THAT HE STILL VTEffS THE

REVOLUTION AS A MILITARY PROBLEM,

IN ACTUAL FACT, BRAVO r S MILITARY

OPERATIONS ARE OKLT IEOLATEE TERRORIST. ACTS--

ALTHOUGH HE EMPHASIZES
5
i

2
1

PAGES

OPEItATIOKS IN RtfRAXi AREAS, FOR EVERY TEEROItl'ST ACT HE CAHEIES : OUT IN

THE' COUNTRYSIDE', THERE ARE NIKETEtfN 1H TEE CITY.

THEHE I S MO.

POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCORD BETWEEN THE PCV AND DOUGLAS B&AVO JUTO H I S

GTJiKRlLLA FOltCES.
8,

BECAUSE Or INTEEWiUi CU&AWf PEOSLEUS^ CASTflO 15 PEEPEKAra FOR A

JSIGN VICT'OP.Tf AjpfD IE PRESSUEING ERAYO TO CO INTO ACTION

EVE EDiLE VICTORIES,

ERAVO, HOWEVEH, IS UNABLE TO DELIVER THE

AND NEEDS.

VICTORIES THAT

TENSION IS MOUNTING BETWEEN

BRAVO ASD HAVANA BECAUSE BRAVO IS WOT 3 0 STRONG AS EE HAS LEO CASTRO
TO 3ELtEY ASH, JH FACT^ IE GETTING WEAKER*

. W M M M i

COMMENT:
4(b)[Tj

'FRICTION
BSTHTEN

THE CUBANS JLNTJ 1HE VESEZTJELAaS IN BRAVOrS FORCES AM)

THE CUBANS ITfTZXOtt

XO IK^DRM FIDEL CASTRO THAT BRAVO HAD 0RO33LY

EXAGOEJIATED THS SIZE OF HIS FORCES AHU -1HE IHPOKTA^CE OF H I S TEATS,

N_L CHINESE AgD SOVIET OSEORIES OF H&yOLTJTEQjT

9.

THE CSJSESE AND CUBAN THEORIES DF DEVOLUTION ARE SIMILAR,

CALLING FOT1 IMMEDIATE ARMED STRUGGLE.

THE CHINESE, HOWEYEflj CALL

FOR A LONG FAR BY THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEASANTS,

THE CHINESE HAVE NO

4
3

H-x.

.^ 1

9 OF

.^ixjrir.

INFLUENCE OR I1[PORTNCE IN LATIN AMERICA,

THE CUBAN THEORY CALLS FOR

GUERILLA WABFAKE BY SMAli GROUPS 0 ? GtfEttRlLMS USING SMAJJL ARMS, NOT

HEAYY

flEAPCKS.

IXPJSJLIENCE.

JULES itEGIS XiEERAY I S TOTALLY DEVOID OP BSTOLUTIONAEY

TiiilLE USBHAY I S NO DOUBT TRE AUTHOR OP REVOLUTION ffTTHIN

A RSVOLUTIOxT^ H3S BOOK IS BAStD EHTIRELY ON THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE,

TOTAliV IrlTTERENT FROM TEE VEtfESUELAK EXPEBIESfCE, AJH3 IRRELEVANT TO
LATIN AMERICA.
10,

IHTEEEST IN THE BOOX WILL DIMINISH TO JUST NOTHING

TEE SOVIET THE DRV OF REVOLUTION CALLS TOR ALL FOftMS AND

HETEOIJS OF STRUGGLE.

TSETtE I S HO SINGLE FORit THAT CAN BE SUCCESSFUL,

TO FAVOR m i l ARJED STRUGGLE ^LONE IS PUHE J3OGMAT15M.

NOT EAVE A SINGLE LINE OR POLICY FOR LATZH AMEBICA.

TSE SOVIETS DO
THEIR LIKE CHANGES

ACCORDING TO TK5 DEMANDS OF A SITUATION IN A GrVEN COUNTEY AT A GIVEN

TlMJi.

THE SOVIETS ARE PJEGVIDISG KEITHER FIfcAKCLAL OR MILITAJIT SUPPORT

TO TES PCV AKD A5E KOT DICTATING WHAT .THE FCV POLTCY SEOITLD
UI3CITSSIOS5 BETWEEN" THE PCV A5TJ MOSCOW "'ARE

THE PCT RECEIVES A SUBSIDY, FHQM ABROAD.

I T IE BELIEVED

a_4((,)[i)

THIS SUBSIDE COlffiS FROM THE USER.)

o
2

4
3
2
1

1-Sfc}

IN

PAGE 2 0

PAGES

TEE SJJT0-BO7IET S P L I T HAS, OF COURSE, ADVERSELY AFFEClTD in THE

INTEEKATXQKAL COMMUNIST UOVEtfEHT.
ALSO IUD A POSITIVE EFFECT,

IN LATIH AMERICA, HOtfEVKR I T HAS

I T HAS ESCOOHAGED TEE COilKDNlST TRADERS TO

SEASCH FOR TEE IB OWJJ SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF REVDLTTION MID HAS
PKOMOTED lm& EfEVELOPlIENT- OF GHEATEH INTJEPENDENCE^

PRECISELT ONE OF THE

BAD EFFECTS OF CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN LATIN. AMERICA HAS BEE^ TO TrFUX

LEADERS TO SLEEP' 1 BY ATTEMPTING TO DO THEIK WORK TOR THEM.

THE S I K O -

SOVIET SPLIT TENDS TO COUNTER TEAT.

13.

CASTRO POSES PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS, BUT I T TOO I S

FOR 1HEM TO TRY TO ELIMINATE HIW,

1ITH0TJT CASTRO, TRE REGIME

EDOH FALL f AND T3E CUBAN EEYOLUTION WOULJJ BE LOST,

THERE I S SOME

TRUTH TO THE VIEW TEAT CASTRO I S A2T irNWirTXNG COLUiBORATOR OF IMPERIALISM

IN LATIN AJt^KICA FOR CASTRO HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS
DISASTERS OF SEVERAL HE VOLUTION Aft Y MOVEMENTS, E3PECIAJL1Y TffE DEATH OF
P1

CHEn| GUEYARA AND THE BOLIVIA^ CATASTROK-LEM

I T COULD lTELL -EE THAT TEE

UNITED. STATES TOLERATES CA5TRD BECAUSE CA^TBO AIDS "IMPERIALISM 11 BY

PESTEGYING REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, THUS COING GREAT DAMAGE TO TSE
SOVIETS AfTD TO COMMUNIST PARTIES.

SECURITY LEAKS lit CUBA COULD EL

M S POSSIBLE FOR SUCH DISASTERS AS THE GUERRILLA

OK
5

I
JJ-4(bj(D

\M

PAGES

3.4(bHD

THE COAST DF VENEZUELA, THE ARREST 0 7 THE COMMUNIST

BELTRAMIM, AN& THE BOLIVIAN FAILURE,

DISSEif:

QWJJT,

CINCLANT

ONLY,

'INFORMATION

REPORT " -INFORMATION- REPORT

CENTRAL JNTELUGENCf

thrti/ c ^ i i f l f l r 111

j nni! bid UOTH! cjmigt li

tlu
dj<:i not

ir,d i i lh
pf
A ttf[ee oC prg^ UidcriUlp ami idqininejcCv* n h L l i L j ,
-I-P^ "pjwrt fpf lii" pTtiCitncial ?.p4,fJ.Llart.1.
DJ r Ltn tn' vn.p\tlt,cLf>lc< ayp^PTtfl
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iH Hi rc*OEniii tH
it" U I J I C for (S* ^n^ipuljr w f f n t " ri^nirtJi ra

H d

Ov^nJo ^ t H conttnw* f t njpj" t i - , H W C M I . i t the *Lcu*tion

-ctviL *r Itrujta fluL, Svnudui It prepprgJ t^ Jp**c
* th*

INFORMATION

REPORT

INFORMATION

REPORT
TEI

Dart*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
L

r4O 'ACE1

1.

T^DUB^ Pr<i-lJ*nt R*n+

pg.F<ni

tjrn*J hln Boiid thh iLiLlLLiy r h i i y.^Cn^ TII-CJ 44 h l i

fh< nCltC-T?. In pddllign t * th* i i l c i . r y 1 ivo
liter.

A. lucciiifuL fJl4rt bo dlili>d[.t l i r r LcoEfti 4mi*t luv*

Any iuck ^aLlcie-il e*l[E.ie<n

winter n tit*-nnrn b HKJt E-ti-d.t1 6* J
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the -CooBU-nCit F*rt]f nJl intCvlj.. EIU Tf*t.tji-(.c

3.

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auny iiBM*dd

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, i

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Cuban Subversive Activities in Latin America; 1959-1968

Special Report

WEEKLY REVIEW

Februnry
SC

12 FLB tS97

JfClAL REPORTS j r r Supplements to th- Cuntnt [nte^iWeekliLLs istufJ by the Office of Curtenf
Reaoris arc published separately to- i
'we ircjrmcjii Of 3 Subject. The/ arc prfl^Gtred by
Hie Qffici^V Curie nr [mflHisencc, the Office of bjpnomic Rtsearch, th.L- afcee of Siraiegjc RcseuTdi. and [h,^Lrccioiate of
Scic-mL; iizia T^ijnalogy, Special R^jjo:ts arsreoordincited JS
approprLre ^nionJn.' DirccLuiaces of CIA.Jfcil, except for tlic
riomul iUbstsriMYL! eSCiiail^e with (?t3;cr ipfilti^s at ihc warkin^
l;vcl. luve r.Ot been c t ^ d i n i T f d OUtEid^CJA unicSi specificity
indi^CdJ,

TlicSPtClAL REPORT caffcjidS cTusLfitd information affcmin^ Nic njticn;L? dtfense J H thi UnitcnSSinos. wi^]ijn the miiinins of Tirk Jo, wtii^ns 7^J arid 7 9 4 ^ f t|ic US Cocich ss
ai;wniii-LLi. l i i tr^in5n|tiiion o: iev?lniQ^ orife contents to o^ rcccipl by ^n LinjuL|(Sri2-;<] person is prohLbit^cl
/

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
:

i ^T-:C[AL REPORT MUST NOT Be R t L f A S B D TO

] ^ GOVERNMENTS and fflUJL be handled ^JtllirWe
of spcciilc Jjssemiration control
^

CUBAN SUDVFR5IV1-ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA: |959-lMS

The essence of the Castro regine's policy on

armed, rebellion in the hemisphere ^as established
in the early rnonths of Che regime's existence
has not rtiate r i a l l y changed, since then.
The r
sho^S that "export of the revo 1 litiOn'" ha3 been a
doninant a ^ i t i o r . of Castro's next to unaintajLi
his own firm ^ ' i p on power at hone.
Indeed j the
Cuban Leader is a "compulsive revolutionary" J A
rian whe sees hir.scLf as inoth.tr Simon ^nLivar,.
destined to bring a new " ree^O^i and unity" to
L a t i n Amarica,
Castro has ?een c o n s i a t s n t in {.".his cream,
although he hAS pyrsye^ i t vitn varying degrees
of i n t e n s i t y flin.ee 13 53,
fio"e57^r^ he has shCuJn
i i l f
capable o :rjGdelating h i s overt ftMd covert
for revolution i n Latin Ar^er"icar depending on his assessment o the factors governing
the sit - j.atio^l - The evidence i s overwhelminq rhAt
Ctibd made special a d v e n t u r i s t i c e f f o r t s in 19G7
tc- esLabLLsh "Other Cubas and Victna.ic.s" in Latin
fiirs r i c a ,
Castro has yeetl eingiilarly 'JnG ucces F
5 ful r howe v e r , in ACllieving anv- xeal break tin roughs
in the
hOjiLSpliare.
Dt-s^itS nine y t u r s of e f f o r c , no
g u e r r i l l a group i " r.atin fijuerica coTisti^iites a
s e r t o u s threat to any tfoverrinent ^oday.
The <Je^i3f
of -he Gj.evarA-le^ veritusre in s o l i via proves that
even when cmba PL:~S i t s " f i r s t team" i n t o A count r y , i t will be ioOmed io faiLure in th.e absence
of real ^usiJlAr support, (or Lh.s g u e r r i l l a cause,
On nhc ot-h.er hand, wh^le these ha^aS-si^inta are
r;iin.or nnd c o n t a i n a b l e , t.^ey pose BK pensive- ch. a l ienees tc? tilO I.atj,n rjneJTican governments invulvc-^j
and f^rc-a then to t i e up resources t h a t are badly
needed eisawhure.
Early
C a s t r o wage-cl
during 19 57 a.nd 1
dj^er.oQS Cuban
hi? 5 SLLT.ec. pc^e r ,

revolution
aa an i n nt.
Once
however, i t

SPECIAL

became evident ^hat. he had set

fnr hinself the goal of "liberating LA^in America from US
domination."
The e a r l i e s t
p\iblit: raar.ifestatio:l S of t h i s
y mission were the

Feh

t
r

armed expeditions that s e t forth

frejr. Cuba to such Caribbean count r i e s as Panama r EJaiti, tficaxagua,
dnd che Doirinicar. Republic during
tha f i r s t e i g h t o r nine months of
1959 .

conducting sL&veirsive operations

uere e s t a b l i s h e d at honifl d,I\<Z
abroac. Radio Havana'g i n t e r n a t i o n a l Eftrvlce was inaugurated
on May Day L961, ar.d has beajned
an increasing stream of propaganda, to the Americas ever s i n c e .

in prlvata statements during

thj.S period , CdstrO mft^C i t known
^.hat he looked upon his success
in CubA as merely the f i r s t Gtfi^e
in a CC-ntincnt-wide e f f o r t . Forme r l'enezuel = r, prSSi<3ent Jioinu 1 o
Ritan^ourt said that Castro- carce
to Caxa^as in. January 19 59-seazets'Xy tlirco weeks after aas"jjr.ing power "--to e n l i s t cooperation and f i n a n c i a l hack.ir.-g for
"the faster plan against the
grir.gos . "
Castro sounded the Jceynote
ror ul^an SUi)version on 26 July
i960, when, he said, "We promise
to continue making Cuba the QKanple ^hat czt\ convert the cordillera of the Andes intc the Sierra
Kaestra o tnc rtjocriciri continent,.
TC:e fo 11 ouir.q 5epte^isr, he i s sued h i s ^inging " f i r s t d e c l a r a tion, nz Elava^a," which unnistaVably showed ^hat he looked jpO/:
th-s CuLiari Kevoiytion *S the va^"
gi!d:d of a general .Latin A.T.CriC311
p o l i t i c a l upheaval.
The Cuban subversive effort
gradually becajne A ocrs carefully
organized er.dea.vor far different
Ircn the f i r s t hastily organ i^-Sd
ard i l l - c o n c e i v e d raids of 19 59
and early 19h"Gr 3y 1961-1962,
Cuban support bega^; taking nany
and t r a i n i n g t c such tangibles
Js financing and communications
support as well 313 SQCfle military

Page 1

During; this period the

Cuban agency for foreign espionatft and, subveriiiortj the General
Directorate of Intelligence (DCI),
^aa established within the
Ministry of I n t e r i o r
The DGI
hejiefitcd irofli the advice of a t
l e a s t five Soviet i n t e l l i g e n c e
experts from thu V-eJTW ^e^finri irig .

This organisation sent over

$1 miUi.^ In Ui currency to
thE V e n e z u e l a n i n S L; rqe Jit; s akr.fi
between i9fiL and L9fii , and o v e r
^5 5 200,0GO t o Marco Antc-r.io ^on
Sosa i n Guatemala i n 19SJ.

II

From l a t e 13 61 t h r o u g h
L963, 'Jhe CllJj an re a; i ne step ced
UD the terr.po of i t s foreign Operations L The ^ost spectacular
ftwr.l: d-jr i Me t h i s period VJas
the discovery ot a cache of
th^ee tQI^-S 0- weapons on a
VenezuElar. beur': in NovenilseIT
19&3. "he weapons included
l i g h t au c DTI a c i c r i las An d
sub ma en me gUTi y d e f i n i t e l y
i d e n t i f i e d as among those
sbipped to Cuba ftOrt BclnilJO
in 1959 and 13-6CI. The^e were
also mortars, bazookas, r e COilless r i z l a s , dnd ajr.-nu n I *i on
Of Ln5 mar.ufaeturt: . The no^or
of a smal.1 Jjoat fgund r.ear the
cache s i t e was one of GCVC^al
Cuba hari e a r l i e r scquired frrcir.

SJECIA1, REPORT

16 P e b $9

seized
by the Venezuelan authorities
shortly a f t s i Tihe discovery of
the Caihe indicated that the
equipment was intended for the
paramilitary arm of the Venezuelan
Party for Plan Caracas
at disrupting the p r e s i dential elections in December u-r
that yearL

At least LrSOO to 2,Q0Q La^ir.

Aniericans received e i t h e r guerr i l l a warfare trainif.9 or. p o l i t ical, indoctrination in Cuba betwaan 19fil and 1 9 6 4 .
Disagreement
the
USSR, 1964
By 1964r Castro's indiscriminate subversive efforts
had brought aim into disagreement with Soviet Leaders and
into conflict with leaders of
most of the principal orthodox
Canuiunist parti-es ir. Latin
Air^rita. During a BtCfet meeting in Havana in November 196 4,
the Soviets helped to work out
A secret compromise agreement
which called for suppurt to
insuryenty efforts in A fcV
Latin Anerican countriesj but
specified that in all cases
the local Communist Party should
determine whether violent, or non
violent means were to be

during t h i s period, Cubai;- rained guerrillas also t r i e d to

LMltittte operations ir.
?erii ^n^ in Argentina.
agents in La Paz tried to
Late Bolivian groups to take up
action against the ?az
Government,
Finally,
financial assistance was
sent te. Brazilian subversive
elements seeking to establish
g u e r r i l l a training camps in the
s^ate of Goias, as well as to
peasant leader Francisco Julian
and ther.-governor Leonel jJrizola..
After Cuban Foreign Minister Hoa's
son, Raul ^oa Kguri, was appointed
ambassador to Brazil in April
1 9G3, he served as a channel for
funds and guidance t<J
subversives. At One
point Eloa desc-jribed Huizola as
^he Brazilian with the greatest
y poTientiaL.
Two
-couriers were on t h e i r way
tc- Brazil with Clandestine funds
earmarked for Brizola and his
flGOCiateg When Pres-ident Goulart
vas overthrown in April 1964.

A.s a r e s u l t of thjg. meeting and setbacks in Venezuela,

Panama, and Bra.zi L during
19fiJ and ;964, Castro nuted
his re vu- L ut i on ary e xho r t a t i ons
for about a year a.n,^ n.a^"rowed
his focus to thre-a COUTLtries
Venezuela r GuatEmala, and
C C lo^ib i a - "Wh E re bona fide guer
r i l l a bands were m the field
ac C i ve1y engag i ng go Ve r n forces.

In shortj curing this peak

ericd of Cubdn subversive e f f o r t s ,
Castro encouraged in axi almost
haphasard fashion d ^ide variety
of ^xtr^T.iat groups in many counto begin th.E armed struggle.

The Cubans began

away at ^he edges af the agree
me-nt uich the Soviets during
19E5,
At the r r j - C o n t i n e n t
Conference in January 13f>6 ,
Castro issued a more

Page 3

5 F EC I Air REPORT

16 f e b 6 8

q
assets, Moreover, there
is evidence that Castro has created a special 60-man intelligenc

c a l l for insurgtr.Cy in Latin

lea.
Ciihat"i propaganda returned
to the ir.cre s t r i d e n t pitch noted
in 19 63. The operational ttphasiSj howeverr i i coaic-arison with
the e a r l i e r years, changed tu
the selercec l i s t of target C3L..1sVenezuela, Guatemala,
a.nd Bolivia,
^lsevhere r
the Cubans sought TDIE general
QppOrtunities that would land.
chsnjjel^fis IQ foreign exploitation .

ind ccimmarido unit an niiTil o th.t

JJCI t o promote an^ support armed
clandestine penetrations Ln v a r ious Latin American c o u n t r i e s .
Cl^ja' s fishing v e s s e l s are apparently a t the disposal of t h i s
unit^ which was f i r s t i d e n t i f i e d
&1lowing i t s involvement in a
landing l o s t May i n Vens2i:elar
The DGI s wEiich fnflr.agus a l l oi
Cub-a'a espionage arid
a c t i v i t i e s , was formed in
following a genEral
t i o n o Cuba's i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y
and foreign i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r n
I t s d i r e c t o r genural i s
Pineicoknown as "fled
Beard"--who has been cLoaely

Current. ^upcart --tech an i sirs

i s

Even in those countries,

there is no signifi
eE^CV

under way ,

the

bsen developing 6
ir-crSnani sm while they -^ai
a s u i ' ^ b l o opportunity ^^d ade-

DIREOOKATE OF INTELLIGENCE
QtilZI OF THE DIBFCIOIt
JQWF1 HDVliSri

^nrniAL i.itrirtri'iiN ctrr

it tgr1 ^
1 - CvAi

L~^ilrn. J,n|r-E.3 ^ r j

r
IMlEkll

Page 4

SPECIAL RPdJlT

16

x-

associated ^ i t h Haul CAStru since

19 5 7 a:i Vifts been working with
Uuban foreign intelligence since
ID 59 r
fJnder a:_s leadership and
the t u t s l a g e of several Soviet
, the DCl has ijfter^
into a highly professional i n t e l l i g e n c e organization
alo"-g c l a s s i c Soviet lir.es.
The iDGl Lft divided into
three operational units,
Thes =
are a department of i r legal
e a r n e r s / ' an. " i l l e g a l "
tit^ar-rr.ent, .sr.d a department of
"national Liberation,"
The <iepartrient of le-^-a^ centers w : >
duets operations by hiindl.i.nc
i t s acrsr-.ts "hrcuigh C^ban. diplomat i-^ ^riiCio^S--in Lati:i Araerica these e x i s t only in ?iexioo
an^ Jamaica.
The i l l a q a l tiehanc^e^ agents &f:aJerTT.anently ir, countries
with whi=h Cuba dtm rrot have
dipXcanatic zrelitions.
This 13
dine: dLroctLy from Havana hy
Ci t o ^ l i - a t e d systun &- cazzmtinications .
The nationsi
l.i i a r a t i o r . deparLmsr.t i t perhaps 7ri-j Lar^esc in the Dili
and i s rspa:i3i.ble or proP.Ctir.g P-r.d directing revaluticrazry a c t i v i t y i" I-Jtin ?.r.e.ri c i And othftr areas af tile
ycrld^
Ti^.cse ';hree units are
by various support

The DGI's rncthods cr

t r a i n i n g , ind aag
roraign a.gtr:ts rsveal
. h.ich. degree oJ; ^rofeEsiflnS 1i
h e are two basic c a t j
these agents : one
i s a deap-MV*r clandestine
group--recruited, trained, i - d

"run" hy tJic i l g
"departnent--charged with
collecting informatisn as well
as per.tftr&ting local governments .
The second grou^ is recruited find
d ^ ^ the"department o nal i b s r a t i o n Co guide and
support revolutionary a c t i v i t i e s .
Guerrill?- warfare t r
or the l a t t e r grouo is
Ln ndtiOfia.1 u n i t s ranging in s i z e
from three to Si.
Courses y&uallv
l a s t three to SU months, although
in 5 7?ccia! caFieE- they may l a s t AS
long as a year.
Training covers
a l l asDHCts of g u e r r i l l a warfare,
including weapons hjndLi^g, ejsplosivss , saiiutftse . deir.ul^ t i on ,
m i l i t i r y t a c t i c s \ sor&at er.gmuerand means of cc^ntenr.cj a n t i ^ent a c t i v i t i e s r
At l e a s t
,
Latin Americans ace known
to have gone to Cuba far such
t r a i n i n g since 136i.
Tnis M'-L-rrjer by no nieans
"e:3regftr.'_3 a jnaxiirtTn figure for
the guerxilla potsnti^l.
Many
o: these trdi:ieea, for instance ,
have in ";urn trainu^ others when
they returned to th*ir home counbecame di's i 1.1'JS icne^ I'L^'" the
d i f f i c u l t i e s Q$ i n i t i a t i n g anr.ed
rtVOlmtlOTl r ^nd Le'^ the field
to more enthusiast t i r Cd5 tra.i t e s .
The onlv ifttarnation.il mDoeratiun anoncf these trai.-ieas appears
to involve these whose countries
are n
In the le-st year or SO r
has demonstrated an irJfjroved c a p a b i l i t y to
clandestinely with i t s
This a b i l i t y has not
been t r a n s l a t e d irtto a

FLEPORT

IS Pflb 60

noticeably ranre s u c r a s s m l subversive e f f o r t , a t least partly

because the Latin Junerican 50vE have heccae increasingly
of the danger,
Presumably
for the same reason r there hat
been less evid.ei1.-CC of Latin JVmerlcans traveling to Coba for trainir.g, and there have- been fevjer
and fewer imports of Cuban efforts to JCunf, Latin A f r i c a n revolutionary groups^
Other support and prosaganda ^chinisras include ?fl^;O
Havana, which today is tjeami r.g
^nprOKilnataly 170 hours a week
in Fcrtu^uase, Spanish, and even
Creole, QUCCrSuu, and Guara:li to
Latin America.
I t also t r a n s mits Open cade Enessa^es tu CLiban
intelligence 1 agents,
Ciiba ' S
l i t e r a t u r e d i s t r i b u t i o n aaaarafjs provides the gloa
Cuba, the t h e o r e t i c a l .ii
C n t i s a L ^hou-gh t r speschss by
Cuban T?I"3eT57n~ pannillec ormr
and the economic review tfannraui
L a t L noane r i ^ a n a .
biavana's afservice P
has sLtri^-je-rs and r#ch.roughouc the world.
e(v.t>lOyi.Les f UTictio^ a a an
-^e yatheifi.ng and supp a r t r.schan i Fjr..
A.L t.h.e prasen"
t^TH3^ Cuba i s a l s o supporcincj
B = ver=l l o c a l CO^TsuniKt newspapers and ^ e r i o d i c a l s - - t h e rr-jos t
r e c e n t exansle bsingf "he Uruguayan r a d i c a l l e f t d a i i y newsp a p e r C.-3C/CL2. ,
In addition to trie conof t h i s snatigrt
end the growth arid
\rn5roVt'ment ar i t s clandestine

i1 age &

service and prt>t?aaanda niacbiner

Cuba nas been able to bring abo-ut
lilfiited international OoOpt;rntinn
of national movienie.nts and oarties
in some areas,
this has htlped
to create or strengthen infrastructures upon which future revolutionary a c t i v i t i e s nay be b u i l t ,
by making i t easier to channel
funds t move agents and leaders,
transmit communi-cations r arid
Obtain false docuuvefitS ,
croups providing such
support to thE VeneKuCIan PQvenent were uncovered in Coloiribia
in 19&6, and one: <jf tha Colombian
^lovamencs has cho&en t^ie- Ven&iuelan harder r-e-gion AS i t s area
of g u a r r i l l a operations. Thus
i t can support Ver.tzueLans moving
e i t h e r way across the bnrirr
i t s jwittbers are in position ta
cross inco Venezuela themselvas
Th.e Salvador an Conrnunist Party
has provided Salvadoran duturaento GuatcrcalartS for travel
to bloc countries, and also provided sanctuary for
and Kordurans,
The Current Situation
AS i s evident, C a s t r a ' s behavior in advocating dnd ASSisting revolution has not a l-vaya
1 Oy ica 1 and r-ea 1 i 51 ic . He

y h,a3 been canny enOJcr.,

however, to keep his risks lo>-.
The form and e-Ktcnt of rus efforts r VOCAl and materialj
variea with changing circum
but his essential the^e continues
lie insists that revolutionary vio
lence is necessary to bring about
any meaning cu L charge LP Lacir.

SPECIAL REPORT

, he claims that
g u e - r i l l a u n i t s , wbtn hoidly lr.-u.r
can take t o the f i e l d , sustain
znenselves theiti, c
the conditions that will
their eventual success"Chs" Guevara's i l l - f a t e d
efforts in Bolivia and Cuban i n volve nr.ent in the- inGUresnt Landing in Ucf-C?Uu 1 a l a s t year are
excellent examples of Castro's
theories, in accion,
His a^civi= ies during 195'/ And his aic-rwpS^tetS ^J Ledcjes--as recent -as
12 January 13 6 B - - to " i t i J f i l l his
duty DE s o l i d a r i t y " -with revaiuti3nftrit.L!i t.;LrO'jghout tne ^ovLdr
clearly demonstrate niG deterir.inatLon. to Fc-read his ri
Uis declaration o?
Sovamber IE*61 that he -^o'jld not
support vroald-b-E- in a ilif g^nt groups
vhich wetv not UMdsr the control
of the orthodox pro-HciECow Com-TJ^istSr tas^i"= lias CDntinu^d to
^ive r o r a l , natc-riAA, and financ i a l sufioort and. t^aininq to s e lected groups.
r'urth.Ermore , he
r.zde i t c l e a r in. speec^ifts during
LQ7 that he does ncz f e ^ l
nv Z\*i I960 agreement JMd
r.is s s r s i s t = n t thesis -hat v
^svoiut^on is rificessary to
about any meaningf^l aolic

: I

or s o c i a l chanoj.
on z-'
of
i ons he f L ur.c a c c u s A
(i-etrayal ut
Cotnmunist p a r t i e s in Ver.aL an.d Oolonu^icL r ^hich do ."ot
f u l l s u n p o r t to d i s s i d e n t
jue^riLla^.
Ks ippaartd p a r t i c u l a r l y ir!-:ad t h a t a Soviet d e l e g a t i o n had been t r y i n g tc improve

Page

ralatinr.E and e-Kp^nrf trade in

and Ver.eiuclft.
He COrflp
that members of zhe
r.ist canp--obvio\j;iJy the
Unionwho ^ t a l with oligarchies
in countries where insurgents; are
active are betraying tfct; revolutionaries ..
Hii state^ients uurir.y 1367
reflected his intense d i s i l l u s i o n nent witil the urban based proCOrtOiunist p a r t i e s in ger.T.IJH sajne theme w^i -jropoundedl by h i s theory tiical adJi;ies Pegis ^ebray, wr.a is
guJL^hln-g in a Bolivian ]Ail

for hia role in the insurgency

Cebray's t h e s i s , which
r e f l e c t s Castro's and Guevara's own h.ir.kingr i s th<Lz Latin
America needs A dvrnacuc, qfiensive, ruraL-iase-d g u e r r i l l a acticn
ir^ -whicin t-ie basic quezrilla
group
takes, precedence over the J?b5,1based party and, in fact,
the
In h i s speech in March 1967,
Castro VeynOtO-d Lhese jdeaR i y
Stating:
"If, in any nation.,
those who c a l l the-T.selvas Connun i s t i rjo rlOX- kr.aw haw t o f u l f i l l
tli^ir iufA'r we w i l l support chose

who--evea though they do not c a l l

t,iei^sel vet a Conmu-iists --behave like
real Communists in the StXU9q),e,"
A^airir on 1.2 January 196B, Cascro
referred ta thu T^f-in /iineEican
parties by ipplica.L-.lon when he
spC-ke of so^i? p a r t i e s being in
the "reargiiird"' ot the anti-imit struggle.
of LA50

The

SPECIAL REPORT

Yr.c i i r s l i Latin A.-^aricar.

y O r q a n i z a t i o n to n fe r e r.Cu

IS

(LASOJ closed on 10 August 195 7

witri & major idec-lsjgical s t a t e ment on Cohan foreign policy and
a. blueprint for oli<2arj,ty with
Latin American g u e r r i l l a s by
Castro. Althcagh he made an effort to- pay hoirage tu pro-Soviet
Communists by s t a t i n g that "in
soans countries violent revolution may not tis an irmedia-te.,
bur: 2 future task , '" he Left no
doubt That Ci-a views "armed
Striiggle" as the on.Lv valid course
Lo achieve "national, liberation."
fie aisc indicated that Cuba -^
red Lo advance this
The cohxfrrtnce and! Castro1*
to a m i l i t a n t foreign aolicy widened s - i i l further the
policy differences ijacweea Cuba
ar;d t!ni [iro-Soviec Comr.'jnist aart - a s r a:id caused discontent among
the Savie:ts theF.selves.
This
challenge to Sovj.ec influence in
t:he E.ati^ American COKUr.u r\ i s t nove rxsnt and Ci&tro h S calculated affronts ^o My y 'J 3-v r however, :l^ve
r;Ot ::xc^i^ted the Soviets to r e t a l i a t e by ecor.umic aid ci^tbicks .
On the other hiijid r the Soviets
w i l l prCrjSij^y iontinila to tjivs
p r i v a t e encoririge;iLCn t to
rrienda in "ine COrtl"Lir--is?:
tc pers^a^C CASt^Q to c
radical ^-oliciaB. Th&y can -3lsO
he expected ~o continue efforts
to huild diplomatic r commercialr
,sr.d Oth.iit ^OritacLs witfl Latin
Ar.erica. despite Castro's rar.t-

Cmrr/Snt
for the past y e a ' , thereforej
Havana'a e f f o r t has beCri to lay

Page 3

a solid foundation lor future

revoluticnary action, to attempt
to unite feuding factions of the
extrene lezt ur.^er one leaderEfiiy r
to extel revolutionaries who
to take Up the fight, r e ^
of whether they are
ride CD^ununistSj and in
and Bolivia actually to send in
trair.ee- guba^ Army officers and
central crarunittHe members to advise and lead
Ir. Bolivia, the Cubans nade
s real effort to t r a n s l a t e their
revolutionary theories into pract i c a l guerrilla action by
EirVieitO "Che" Guevara and
high Cuban o f f i c i a l s to
the guerrilla movemer.t and tu begin a contir-ent-wide a r ^ t i movensnt ta s t a r t "Other VietnamE."
The a l l but complete annihilation
of the mSurgent.^ by the Bolivian
Arniy, and the death oi "Cke" Guej however, have se-v^rely ddmttlft myth of Cuban g u e r r i l l a
invir^-ibiLity and wiLl probably
di^i the enth-JSiasn for tha tiir.e
bsing o OffC Latin Ajnsrican r-evOii.it iO::^ f i

wha have be^n.

ering g u e r r i l l a

activities-

In Ve,ie2ueLa. -C'jban funds,

training, prcpaganda support, and
sone advisers are going to two
separate dissident croups, Tht
:-3ovemept of the Revolutionary
Left (>:1R> and nougLas Qravans
group. Last Mayr Venezuelan glierriLLar escorted by Cuban jailita.ry
personneL, iftn-dcfl near the coastal
village of Hachurucuto.,
Four Cuija:15 irvalved JLH the Xsndxng were
l a t e r captured by Venezuelan a^There -Are ir,-di cations

X6

t h a t othsr landings took place during 19 67, and a t l e a s t one: irnpartar.'. Landing occurred in JvLy L9 66,
guerrillas are
being hard pressed by gcverri'inent fcrces,
In August, their
urban t e r r o r i s t organization was
paralyzed by vhe arrest and capture of a nunber af 1^5 leaders.
Thera 1=; also in forma t ion indicating tr.at fricLj,on has developed between the Cuban a:Kl
Venezuslr.ntf-C-n&crsof the guerr i l l a groups.
The fjbans ars
s a t i s f i e d with the revolutLO
3nth-Js i a.snft of nOii" Ver,-52-ue 1 an
fOnpa^iiotis r and tha Vsne2uhlans
?CSt.Lr.- ~ha ' ' a d v i c e ' the Cubuns
are gi^i^tj thtir, t:ie same iiype o
f r i c t i o n that developed in Bolivia.
Cuba
Lias b^sn tiviMcj Assict^uce and
guidance ^o c L j s r r i l i a and t a r groupB for; more than thre
recent a m y Opc:ratio^5
againsl. tht; insurganta ar^d lJie
E i
of rightist vigilant
have played havoc with
and are
3 t i l l captble of
attacks
geve r.nineri.t. T
3n GuaceT.s 1 an
en. lf> J a n
uary- c l e a r l y d
trats
the
y
t^merting capasili Si
officials vare also
Havana radio ^uiclcly DL>iicized the shooting incident and
indicated; that lhcha" Guevara's
deach was instrLJJT.&r.taL in un i ting
the Guatenalar. ^uerri L Las . In
oi the scten rentiatcd Cviban

SPECIAL

offer to help Active guerrilla

groups r the GLatenalar^ rehels can
probably caunt on rtiort trainir.g
and financial Assistance from
Fiavana.
En Colonbia, there wes r c and, intensified guerrilla
activity during 196^. This Cubans
are aivina aasi.stance and! training to several groups
some of
wh.ich are remnants of bandit gangs
that have operated in the country
for years.
The group which has received
by far the most Csjban a i d i s th.O
Army of Nivor,aJ, ^.ibevafcion fELW> ,
^ns of itE numbers were recently
a r r e s t e d w'c\ i 1c t r y i n g t o s l i p
i n t o the country c a r r y i n g
r: i, t i o n r and radio
They r e p o r t e d l v told
Coloribian intulli-^unCL: O^fi^ars
that thiy ari^ a riu^ibet" of other
]\&d yixsx. comc-Letec: a
warfare f o u r s E in Cuba
an.d t h a t tbe vreftponS hAd been
given t o thuif. t h e r e .
Tite ZTA"
itcpyed up i t s a c t i v i t y with at
l e a s t two r a i d s Ln January, i n cluriing tnc amrjus^ slavJL.i^ gf
tliree "CUfCjers of an army p a t r o l ,
follow-up a c t i o n by thtL Tiilit^ry
r^uultC-^ i:1 l:h^ k i l l i r . q af five
ELlf

P a r t y \F-ZZ) i s r e p o r t e d l y t r y i n g
t o c o n v e r t i t s guaxxLlla arm, t h e
Revolutionary Prised f o r c e s (F'AfiC) ,
i n t o inacrivft " a e l f - c e f e n s e - " groups
This fallows a. r e q u e s t frcu-n t h e
&ovj.et Urtion t o avoid any i n c i d e n t s Lhat might complicate i t s
nevlv e s t a b l i s h e d

?eb 63

SECRET

r e l a t i o n s with the Coicarihian COVsrmnent.

I t is j>i7Obable t h a t
nany FARC g^er^j-llas , rather than
lay dmrn tiieir arir.s , ^ i l l join
force? with the SLN Of the newly
fonr.ed Popular Army of Li 13elation
(EPL) .
This new group has e s t a b lished i t s e l f in "QrthwtStern Colombia, has carlied out several
isolated attacks and reportedly
is making preparations for ^ul.1scala- g u e r r i l l a warfare if the
government carrier out i t s threats
to T.ove i:ito the arefi,
this
group is Lh.e g u e r r i l l a arm of
the pro-Chinese Coi^rn^nist Party
of ColciRbiar btit nay seek a.q sistAUCe from the CdJ3.!fl5 if r.O
cth.er .RQ'jrr^ uf aid develops,
(ies naps following t e x t fox l o titri Of insu^ge^t groups in
and C o l o n b i i j

a i v e n an7?le n o t i c e
tjiat i t i rite-ids to c o n t i n u e i t s
a f o ? a rj an da , t r a i n i n g , and
o i a l s u p p o r t cO a e l e c t e J ^f
t i o n a r y g r o u p s - - e s p o c i a 1,1^
i n C Qr Lonb v a , Gua t eina 1 a r and Ve,^fizuela+
Given C a s t f ^ 1 - g a a l of

?agiilO

developing and exploiting- opportunities for further armed violence, plus the vulnerab
that exist in pnar.y Latin
countries, sew outbreaks
Castro-sponsored
violence in Latin Ai
be
e^pectEd,
Such ventures
have
l i t t l e chance of success,
unJLesa th.ey exploit genuinely
popular antigovernment causes
develop a. brO-ao peasant base ar,d
a charismatic indigenous leader,
Giitvars's defeat in Bolivia shows
that despite Cuba's necriariisn for
sponsoring guerrilla groups And
C=is^rOrs willingness to in f i l t r a t e
Vey Cuiian Arm,y officers into selected countries, thesft efforts
will at beat produce only
harassrr.rjnts of the: central
ernflwnts for the fortseeAfcle future r The danger increases, however, iv-, ^.hcise countries -where
p o l i t i c a l and economic development has hftcn marginal, antl wh
a threat af a spLir; jn the usufil
guarantors u S t a b i l i t y - - L . C. ,
the TRilitary or oLigirchyis a
grcwj,n= p o s s i b i i i t y ,
Should triis
occur, what had heen minOf disturbanccs iii the countryside cauls
suddenly mushroCTd inta a p o l i t i cal forrjt out of proportion to
i t s numbers..
fBB#PSBBW^^"W!"BBBGr^

SPECIAL REPORT

16 Feb

BOLIVIA: Area of Gufirrills Activity

VENEZUELA; Areas of Gorilla Activity

r.
GUATEMALA: Arw of GuerriFU Activity

i *

*.

**-:

. JO

COLOMBIA: Areas of Gueirflla Activity

FARC-23O/1O&

Si1 !
J .

H -

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

- . < :;

Political Trends in Cub&

Special Report

15 March 1968
SC No. 00761/6SA

1 Z FEB

REPORTS are supptontnls TO tlic Current Jritej^Wcektiei Lsnued by lufc Office of Current
["he 9^:c]aL Reports a;e pubLiEhcd separably lo |
e trcitrnujit ai u subjud. TKey are pro^bred by
CurrenT Lnt^llisilicc. tin-1 OiTicc df E^tiomic Research, tli d f f i w of SUJti^ii Rraejrck, and tll^Tir-rcCQrate of
5;jcncc and Te\hnelony. SpdCiat Rcporls ir^coordinj(crf ai
sc-Sgjt for tit?
SubstJciTJve ^H_;h^fl^C with QLhcroECilcie&at the working
[eveI, have not b n C^rd]]i3tcd outsidjfClA unlei-j
JSEECIAL

5 PEC IA J.. RFJ'ORT tpffuins Stassified infornialion affeccin^ Elit naijoiijl d?;'er.seyff the L'nirc^Stacci. wiihin thcmeajijni; of Title IS. seciyfti 792 and 'P'Wpi 1 Lh= u s Code, 3s
3mended. Els (:jrtS;un-jiOfl or fcveEaLjon or*ls corlents to or reby un unauUf"1"^^- person ES prohibitt
D[55EMINAT[OM CONTROLS
:.'. S O C I A L REPORT MUST NOT BE
GOVERNMENTS and must be handled!
'^rk af specific dJ5serinination co]itrol pip
1/7.

TO
1

- !

1!''}

*'-

'-;"

POUTJCAL TRENDS IN CUBA

The strident bellicosity and adventurism chara c t e r i s t i c of Cuban foreign policy since early 1956
have: obscured a nuMber of modifications in domesticpolicy that have- significantly changed the nature
Of the revolution an d the role of Fidel Castro. With
the gradual instituticnalization of the regime, he is
increasingly dependent on the governing apparatus he
has created to implement his policies.
Castro is s t i l l unquestionably in charge and is
effective in portraying himself as the l i f e force nf
the revolution^ The military and Security forces
are fervejitly loyal, and Castro s t i l l enjoys a large
degree of popular support, especially among the youth,
the peasants, and the poor working c l a s s . Despite
h.ia continued prfi -e cii nen ce , however, Castro has increasingly isolated himself during the past two years.
Meaningful political dialogue has almost ceased, and
the regime has become- considerably more inflexible.
Castro seeTtiB to distrvst the bureaucracy he has created and has surrounded himself with a "Cult Of guerr i l l a heroes" in order to preside over i t b e t t e r .
Castro's contact with the Cuban masses has also
been reducedpartially as a. result of the harriers
imposed h<f the bureaucracy.
He is s t i l l obsessively
messianic, but his direct appeals to the! people: have
decrea&od. In i9f5? he made o-Tily I t major Speeches ,
fewer than in any year since I9fil.
Political discussion has been effectively
s t i f l e d in the bureaucracy and in the press, and the
condemnation Of a dissident "miCrOiactiOn" in January
was fl reminder of the dangers of questioning Castro.
Perhaps realizing that A political vacuum is being
created balnw him, Castro has dramatically emphasised
the importance of a small "cult of guerrila b e r o e s ' - confidants from his original 56th of July Movement
who constitute the second rung of leadership.

SPECIAL REPORT

15 Mar 63

 . , *J

..

- L_

."_.

'

v "u -

^-.

_ ri.i

Last ycd.rH Red ErigadCS were constituted for agricultural work

and for military t r a i n i n g . .These
Fr/offl nid-19 64 until early
were replaced in November Jby
196G, the regime hewed, to an e s sentially KM derate domestic course. Che" Guevara agricultural b r i gades. The Union of Youth ComGreat efforts- were made to rationalize the badly mismanaged; economyt munists, With a membership of
over 100,0(10, provides leadership
and material incentives were used
and cadres for the regime's efin an effort to increase lagging
forts acnong the youth acidt funclabor productivity. The revolutions as a testing ground for
tionary purists, such as the late
future party members.
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who argued
that only "moral incentives" were
necessary, found their advice
The nV regipen i s also a
ignored by CflStro, By early 19G7,
result Of Castro 1 s concern that
low labor productivity is a major
i t became clear that the
cause of Cuba's continued c-COwas shifting back And that
nOmic plight. With the virtual
"moral incentives" were again in
abolition Df "material incenVOgUC.
. . .
tives," workers are expected to
volunteer long hours Of overtime.
Last summier, antibureaucracy
in January, private consumers and
drives were widely publicized, and
public transportation systems
government ministries were forced
were affected when gasoline was
to reduce their staffs by as much
add#d to the long l i s t ol rationed
as 75 percent. Special party comgoodsr Castro has emphasized the
missions reassigned excess workers
need for hard work and sacrifice,
to agricultural production and
pointing
out that "the revolution
penalized more than 16,000 adrcinis
the
abolition
of the exploitaistratc-rE who were accused of a l tion Of human labor hut not the
lowing bureaucracies to flourish.
abolition of human work,"
The regime was probably correct
in i t s belief that the burgeoning
ministries harbored many surplus
The Cult of the Guerrilla
workers, but the pervasiveness of
Castro's "antiburaaucracy" camSince 1959, Castro's most
paign suggests that he saw a poimportant power base hjS b**fi estCntiftl threat tp scone of his
sentially the Sajfle small group
policies,
from his 26th of July Movement
vho form the top echelon in the
i l i t a r y and security forces.
Castr& continues to be p a r t i c Armed forces minister Saul Castro,
ularly concerned with Cuban youth.
his vice ministers, the memtoetrs
During tho past two years, vigorof the General Staff, and virtuous new campaigns have been
ally all the top officers, are
launched to mobilize them behind
loyal 26th of July veterans. This
the revolution and to expose: the?!
is
also true of Interior Minister
to "guerrilla experience + " In
R&rniro
Valdez and. the other
196S, a youth brigade was organized
iisportent
figures in the security
to trace "Che" Guevara's 195 8 march
forces.
Until
the end of 1965r
through eastern and central Cuba.
The

Page 2

SPECIAL REPOHT

IS nar

. t

in.-.-..;-.'
r_~

.'7

' I '-',"!

>i

_;

t'-i.

".

t.

however, Dnly eleven 2SJuly inem.brfi h*ld pofitfi in the 25-man

party directorate. In October
I?55 r when Castro's "prototype
party" wa'a, fDimalized as the Cuban
Communist Party fFCC) r the ?fi July
group emerged with six of the
eight politburo posts and about;
two thirds of the central, committee meinber 5 h i p. Ee r v i ceir;e n
comprise at least one fifth o
the psrty membership, v^hich now
totals 60,000.
In addition, sbout half of
the gcverTinnent mir.isters are ir.ilLtary officers whose ranl{ dates
their Service with Castro's
Politburo member JUftn
, a semiliterate former
parking lot attendant-r frequently
served aa the act.lno minister of
armed forces in 196? r
Following
the ^ervaiiivc a
drives last year, it ie
that military officers ha^e assumed
Larger r^les in directing the min-

la'^e 19G7, an3 especially since the death, of "Che"

Guevara in Bolivia in October,
th,e regirrie has beer; taking neaau:es to glorify that Jfith July
group. Elaborate mythologies
have ^ein contrived and folkloit
has been encouraged to illustrate
the '"heroic guerrillani exploits
of Castro, Guevara, and the other
ireva-lutio-naries who fought in the
Sierra Maestra against Batista.
In November, the Cuban Communist
Party daily r Granjna, began a
series of feature articles estaling the guerrilla doctors ho
fought in. the Sierra Maestra .
Military service continues
to be obligatory fOJ7 niales

CASTRO
16 and i s viewed as a required
badge of fevolutionary valorParticipation in the anti-Batista
and Bev a* PigfS campaigns are
causes"for adulation, Some c i v i l
ian leaders arc appearing more
y ir? military a t t i r e r
the usOAlW dapper President Sorticoi has begun to con
fatigues irt one of his aux
r f l ] ? s as chief of the m i l i t i a ,
in his spee-Ch on 2 January,
declared !:hat 19 6 6 vjould. he k riown
as ihe "Yeac of the Heroic Guerrilla, "

ne the past nine years,

Fidel Castro has devoted himself
with varying degrees of intensity
to developing a governing apparatus of tCntal powCJf under his heyemony, durable governing institutions, and a definitive ideology
tut th-e revolution. While Strengthening his own abssO J,u t ism r he has
institutionalised the regime with
the hope that it will survive him.

5PECIAi REPORT

15 Mar

in pursuing these objectives,

p initially manipulated
d
balanced political factions
then slowly united them. In
196JL, he was balancing the radicalism of the 26 July Movement
with the "orthodoxy" of the "old;H1
Cconunist5 L Latert he directed
the: gradual coalescence of these
factions and began constructing
a united revolutionary party and
a government bureaucracv. This
pruCtSS was often tumultuous, and
in March 1962 it was marked by
the purge of leading "old" Communist ftnibal Escalante and hllh.areds of his followers* TVo years
later, Castro resisted the 26
July group, which was pressing
for another purget and forced the
pendulum bac*; to the center. By
the end ct l9G5r however, this
group emerged in the superior
position because Castro invested
it with a dominant role in the
party.
Through, the entire process
of balance and assitfiiatiart between 1961-6 5, there was an active and at tinea violent competition of ideas, Castro profited
from (.Tie debates that boiled beneath hid, but stayed aloof in
his role as supreme arbiter.
Ry so elevating the martial
cjlt of the "guerrilla lieto,"
Castro is excluding from prominence ail but his most trusted
folLowers from the Batista struggLe and. a few others who joined
hjm at that time..
Press Discussions
During the fiT&t seven
of the revolution, many aspects o
the process of political develop-

were reflected irt the Cuban

press. For the past two years,
howeverr the regime has insisted
that the presG should, not discuss
substantive issuesr but should
only set forth official policy,
fi7 1961, ten of the 14 daily
newspapers published in Havana before the revolution had been appropriated by the rc-gime, Th.e
two major papers to survive were, which represented th* iroldH1
, and aeVOlucLOn., the
organ of "the 26 July group. These
two papers were the principal vehi
cles for the ideological debates
between the two groups during t^ie
first few years, of the revolution,
ven after the two groups were
joined in t^ie prototype party and
after the Escalante purge in 19 62,
Caatro penrftLt-^d their journalisti
fencing to continue.
With the founding of -he
FCC in October 19G5, Granina began
publishing ftS the official party
d
ing both Hoy and
UtlJ-ike the^., however r
^ranma is a typical Communist
papersterile and largely uncontroversiaL- It devotes about AQ
percent of its coverage to domestic issues, bat the buLK of
this concerns agriculture educationr and youth activities. Periodically it carries a. cluli political columnr
The theoretical journal Cuba
Socialista was published monthly
from the spring o 1561 until February 19&7* It had an editorial
board of five, including three
"old ColraTiUnist theoretj.ciansu. Like
the prc-GraroLa newspapers t it was
frequently used by spokesmen of
various groups as a vehicle for

SPECIAL REPORT

Mar 6

I-

1 ^'

'

Kir>i.
:';>
'ik'

i'-

i..

i r
/-

relatively o w n discussions of doHEstic issues. it was T&oat dramatically used in this fashion in
1964 when the dispute between "Che1
Guevara ar.G his opponents was made
public in %ts n

yA.

Cuba Socialista was

p
by Fensamientci C n t i c o a tedious
journai than is essentially a
"revolutionary's Reader's Digeat"
of ol Castro speechES and tomes
by Various proponents of Cuba's
foreign policy. It ha & an edi*orisl toard of six young ciilitar.ts from the philosophy department at the Ur.ivers LtV C-
Havana who were associated with
Regis Debray. Unlike its predecessor, Perisajnien t.o Crifcico does
not diBCUSS dainestic issues.
The "Hiczr

Ths exposure ot a dissident

ofactian" ir. January W A S the
latest example of Castro's efforts to prevent [>olicy discussions from Dt: j.cj nating in the
bureaucracy. From 21 to 26 January, the central cormtt-ee of
tine PCC met to hear Haul Castro's
charges against
and a "micr
y
grtji:p of dissidents, including
Cer.trEil corrunittee meT.be rg R^non
and Jase Matar, L'ltJLy, ESCalnnte Was- sentenced
to a L5-yeav pi-JtsorL termx arid 34
Tninor bureaucrats received lesser
sentences. Calcines and Matar
were expelled from the central
COTnFii ttee , and the farmer also
lost his party membership,
:-:scalante, -*no had been exiled to Czechoslovakia and the
U5SP after his purge in 1962^ was
allowed to return to Cuisa in Late

Page

and to retire to a state

farm, Accnjxiing to Raul Castro r
Escalante was soon busy again,
leading ha antiparty clique in
of the Soviet lir.e on "all
issues" that have caused the
strain in relations between Havana
and Moscow* In rCality r tlie group
no serious threat to the
and its menhers were
guilty of little more than darinq
to question high policy matters.
Their trial vas probahly staged
as a warding to othEr rial contents
o.nd dissidents that O^positior.
to Fidel Castro's polj.cj.es will
not be tolerated*
Party

state

3y the end Ofj llJ^j, thepai'Cy had ente-red its final stages
of organization It had a membership or 55,000 and Ar, elaborate
apparatus etendir.g to all lev-el $ .
Sir.re thenH it has increasingly
taken Command through it a Own organization r throuqh the mags organizations it controls, and
through the state acV.inistration
r Local) T
C4Etru envisions the party
as a foil and overseer lo the
rest: of the burfiaucracy ar.d has
endsavored to Xeep it a small
"vdrL^'jar^" ornjaniza-t-ion , Most of
its important posts are occupied
by 2 of July veterans, and it
has cltarly become the political
of tite "guerrilla heroes,11
It appears that Tneir.befship
will not be expanded significantly
beyond the present 6O r OQQ cr the
nexr. feu years, but eventually the
party will probably absorb a large
portion of the youths in the Union
of Young Couuminists t The first

SPECIAL REPOET

15 Mar 6 3

I- ! '

party congress has been postponed

and, according to Castro, it will
r,ot take place before 1970.
In August 1967 t politburo
ff.ember Guillermo Garcia was norted
party chief in Driente replacing
''Did"1 Communist ArmandQ Acosta ,
who had been political boss in that
eastern province since 1962, This
past January , fnrrriEr health minister Jose Maehado Ventura Was
appointed as the politburo's. represantative on the Matanzas provincial party bureau, and, in
February, Major Rogelio Acevedo
received a simiLar post in Camaguev L The aBsigrunents of these
coman^antes as fjerconal
between Castro and the provincial pa.rty organs nay be an
indication of his cautious approach to the buraaucxacy--even
within the party.
:.-

Dy the- end Of 1967, the stats

istratjon was finally constliuted throughout Cuba as an
outgrowth of the Committees for
the Defense of the Revolution
fCDR>, Cuba's largest mass oroaniTation with a claimed nembership o 2 million. Over 5,000
assemblies were held last September for the "election" pf
about 22,000 local adrninistrators
for Cuba's 4i regional and 321

municipal administrations
lfl^QOD of these representatives
were e-l*cted from the
h
CDft haa served && & r.e
watchdog apparatus s.T\d as the
regime's basic administrative
Outlook
Castro's first priority is
to continue the "revoi'J
process" and to ''prepare" tiie
youth, to join in leadership with
him and the "guerrilla cult,"
In the meantimej there nay
be some "rationalists" in the
bureaucracy who see advantage in
the H1 liberal" econ-om-e and political policies thit are being discussed in some East EuropeaTi Cofltnuntries.
l losing t^ie exnose of the
dissident 'hJdicrofaction" in January, however, they will be even
more reluctant to criticize the
regime. In any casej they re
disorganized and subject co both
party controls an^J the scrutiny
Of the security forces. They pose
no threat to Castro, and with
the- muting of poLiticaL and press
discussions, there is little they
can do to expound their views.

Page

-REPORT

15 Mar

'

'

Seccfet
Diutat

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Latin American GtUfrrifia Today
IEIH31IIMRT
EXENrflDHSEbllll
lull]
IATLJUG ?II1

N!

4<

22 January 1071
No. 0354/71

SPECIAL REPORTS ure Mippl^mcrn.-; to t|ic Current Intelligence Watties Issued by the Office of Current rntc!lience.
TlK-

Rq:tfrte Hnj pLtbli^Sik:<J supUI'Jkly 10 permit n\r>rc

isttL1 [rcaLnivnt of a subject. Tlicy ;irc iuvpired by

SU^L-L^J

o Current JnttltiKen^j. the OtTLii of" Econcnnu Research, the Odtict flf Strategtc Rcwsareh, and tho Directwdtc of
Science 3nd Tec3iiiOrCigyr Speciuf Repyrts nit coofJiiuited aa
nppnopriate jfreng the Dtrcetorjtw of CLA but, except for the
nufcLul subsLuntive cxt-hLin.nc wiiSi o t K e r ^ i t L 1 ] ] ^ ^ ^t the
level, how

nt?t bMtn c c u j F t i h u t t d outubJc C3A unless

WARNING
The SPECIAL REPORT contains classificil infornsutioa
ing the national defense of the United StiLies. vriiimi the miRot Title I3 3 section 793 ami 7P4. of the US CoJe: ff5
. Its tunsruiiiiun ur rcvclatlojl oi itiCOslterns to r rcby an u]]jniF5oriiiiiJ i^FSun K [jrpTijr>ited by

J'JtSSEMiNATION CONTROLS
THE 5PECJAL RFPOKT MUST NOT RF. RRLEASED TO
FOREtCN GOVERNMENTS 41 nd must be hiindk-rl within the
frjinewoik of iprLjfit d[sS(?rncnatiun nontrol provisions of
DCID 1/7,

jram

THE LATIN AMERICAN GU EH Ft ILL A TODAY

For mgre than ten years Fidel Castro has been encouraging and aiding Latin
i
revolutionaries to take to tha- back lands and mountain of their own countries
to imitate his guerrilla campaign and victory. Today, however, there arc fawer than
1.000 ruraa guerrillas holding out in only a few coumrpes. They are vvaak, of declining
importance, gnd do not pose serious threats to the governments. Guerrilla insurgency in
the hinterlands became increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant in many Latin American countries in me decade of the 1960s as societies urbanized and modernized at
accelerated rate&.
As rural guerrilla fortunes have faded, however, a nuw breed of revolutionary has
appeared in Efie crt^es. In Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala urban guerrillas
fave engaged in spcciacyler acts of Terrorism and violence. Sir foreign ambassadors have
been kidnaped during the last three years, of whom two ware murdered. About a dozen
Other diplomats and a Jarge number of goviernmejii officiate also hav been kidnaped.
Robberies of bante and arms depots, airlfne hijackings., anon, sabotage, and killings of
polrce and security officiate have reached unprecedented proportions in several countries. Terrorism is likely <o increase in at least 3 half-dozen Latin American countries this
year and couJd challenge [he govemrnent& o- Uruguay and Guatemala.

The Rival QaeniUa Afar a

Prgminent Students of the Cuban
that Castro never intended to wage a rural
gjueMla war wnen hia landed in Cuba from
Mexico, in 195S. but that he hoped to join in a
quick urban putsch. HrS tapariente during the
preceding ten years as a itudent radical, i d vanturef, and viDfant revolutionary w acquired
in the Cities. Even a.fte' Cistra was forced tnto the
Sifrrra aft&r hits enpaditign founderad, he tontin UECI to rely heavily on urban support groups.
His radio appeals were beamed mainly to rtiiddleClflSSr nationalist aildiencas. and in April 19&8 ho
nerped1 organiie an aborTitfe natiDnaJ itrike in the
towns and citiej.
Castro's Small guerilla band wori some:
skirmishes with regular military forces, but ullirmatfiFy the Batista regime sol lapsed

Rapart

Castro captured the imagination of an oppre5ssdr

disenchanted middle, class through highty effective, public relations, One* *n power, how&V-er,
Castro quickly alienated urban groups through his
fadital appeals lo peasants and workers.
regime exa^garated1 and glorified the
p
rnents &f Castro arid his guerrilla colleagues, and
Created a rural, agrarian mystique for tfie revolution.
In the months following Castro's victoryH
and ravglutionarias fram a numbar of \-3t\n
American ojimtfies uniucceKfully attempted to
initiate flue/rilla struggles in their own tountriei.
&y 1960 Castro and Ctis Guevara were giving
support to sucri revdlutianaries un a large state.
Misinterpreting their oivrl experiences^ thfly
recommended tfiat rural guerriJIa niatfiods be
employed an<J gave little consideration to urban
tactics, Ld^g* numbers of Latin American youths

2 January 1971

Dissent

that guerrilla action must be an exclusively ruial

phenomenon without Significant aid From the
cities, Hi5 Revolution Within ihe Revolution became the new Cuban manifesto on guerrilla war.

traveled to Cuba For training in rural g

techniques, and Guevara's guerrilla handbook was
widely distributed and used throughout the
hemisphere. In fact, this Cuban leaders and their
nary disciples were so confident of these
that from 1959 through 1965 almost
Every country in Latin America skirmished with
revolutionaries inspired at supported by Havana.
A few of these efforts endured, but by middecade most of the remaining gueu ilia band's were
of declining importance.
These efforts failed principally because the
Cuban laagers themselves refused tD understand
the true dynamics of bow they came to po^ver
ar>d because they imposed an unworkable strategy
on their followers, A? rapidly as, new guerrilla
efforts wtra conceived, however, iecurlLy and
CDunterinsurgenr forces in many Latin American
countries were expanded and became mofe effective. The rural guerrillas also failed because of
ifleptness and disputes over leadership, tactics,
and ideology, (generally, they were poorJy trained
and equipped despite Cuban effortshand, desiring
quick results, were unprepared psychologically
far protracted conflict. Rural guerrillas have, been
unable in virtually every instance to attract significant middies lass support, mainly baeauM
their programs and campaigns have been directed
at ruraJ groups.
In 1966 and 1967 Cuba attempted tD revitalize waring guerrilla fortunes In the hemisphere tlirough an intensified, reckless commitment to continental rural guerrilla war, The Latin
American Solidarity Organization was founded as.
a hemispheric revolutionary front. It held its first
Conclave the summer of 1967. In the meantime,
Che Guevara with 16 other Cubans was spearheading a new guerrilla effort in Bolivia. Cuban
aduJsers were also operating with guerrillas in
Guatemala and Venezuela, and possibly in
Colombia, Ca&tro insisted more stridently than
ever that meaningful change could result only
from violent struggle in the countryside. The
French Marvist, Regis Debray, earlier had published a treatise expanding the point, asserting

Special Report

Cuba's efforts to "ex.po*tr" the revolution

reached then zenith during this period. Guevara's
summary defeat in Bolivia in October 1957 and
the concurrent failures of guerrillas elsewhere
demonstrated more clearly than before the bankruptcy of Havana's approach. Young revolutionaries throughout Latin America began to
reappraise Cuba's strategy. Castro unintentionally
contributed to an accetcfalion of this re-evaluation by publishing Guevara's field diary. Che's
poignant memoire of ineptitude, hopeless
meanderings in dense jungles, and flight f'Om
encircling Bolivian troops has undoubtedly convinced many young revolutionaries that other
tactics can lead more quickly to dramatic results.
K is ironic that Che's detailed account of his awn
defeat is likely to endure as a more permanent
legacy than his guerrilla handbook or speeches,
MarigheHa* the Brazilian author of the
Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla has replaced
both Guevara and Debray as the primary theoTelrcian OF violent ^evolution in (he hemisphere.
Debray. who was recently released from a Bolivian prison after serving more than three years of a
30-yaar tami for his part in the Guevara fiasco,
admitted on 30 December that he had underestimated the importance of urban terrorism. He
now claims to be rethinking his entire treatise on
guerrilla tactics, and has endorsed urban terrorism.
Guevara's precipitate failure also led to a
reappraisal of tactics in Cuba, During 19&3 and
the first half of 1969. Havana appeared to be
withdrawing from revolutionary liaisons, in Latin
America. Cuban support to revolutionaries in
Venezuela and Colombia terminated, and guerrillas in other countries were told to acquire their
own fundi and arms. Castro, however, was reluctant to amend his rural guerrilla strategy and wai
l o a t h t o share the spotlight as foremost

-2-

22 January 1971

SEC

revolutionary in the hemisphere with Marighella.

Nevei'tn.eEest, during the second half of 1969
there were >igns of a gradualif grudgingCuban
acceptance of urban methods as urhan terrorists
accelerated their ictivities in a number of LatinAmerican cities. In Noveiribai 136?/ Marighella
was killed, and two- months later CaitrO came out
in support gf his- line by publishing the MtniSince then, Havana has ba&n more
cautious About indorsing revolutionary
s. Both urban and rural tactics now -are
Supported, and in view of events in Chile, the
nonviolent path to power is also publicly acceptedat least there. Underlying the- pragmatism
of thus approach, .however is the same enduring
commitment to rural guerrilla methods that has
Characterized the Cuban revolution since the early
1960s. Cuban leader continue to predict that in
most countries rural insurgency will be decisive in
the long run and that urban tactic* should us
employed to Create favarabte conditions for rural
Conflict. Marighella himself was making plans to
initiate rural guerrilla warfare in Goiai- State prior
to his death.
Today. Guatemala may be the only country
receiving material Sup-port from Cuba for guerrilla
operations A few Cuban adViserS are in the
Guatemalan countryside, and Cuban funds have
been provided!. In other countries, Havana appears
to ba giving little more, than training and propaganda support to revolutionaries. Cuban intelligence agents have been active in Chile since A I*
lenders inauguration, and it is pottibte that Cuba
comld increase its contacts with South American
terrorists under Chilean cover. In the long run.
however. ruraT guernJIa methods increasingly will
be- replaced with activities in the cities,
The Orwtt 0 / fft* Utiwrt Gusrrffla

The urban guerrilla groups that have Sprung

up since Che Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia are directalbeit more sophisticalerJ^descendants of
the rural guerrillas of the 1960s. They have

From Havana's mistakes of the last

decade, but because most of them operate in
highly urbanized societies, they realise thai rural
methods ace not applicable anyway. They
youngmost of them a-r-e believed to be in
early twentiesfrom fliiddla-flass backgrounds,
and are frequently either university or foimer
uniuer-sfty students. Except in Argentina ths
urban cjuerrilFas. generally (Jrofesi to be MarKisti.
In the "few instances where they have riiscitfsed Of
publicized Hieir political programs t^iese me vague
but ultranationalistic. Today's urban reYglutfoFiary desires quick remedies for social and economic ills and has chosen the tactics 0( terror ism
in the cities to achieve rapid resultsgr at let to
make dramatic headlines.
In general, the UTban guerrilFa.
Havana-"s theoretical line by ascribing lon<j-term
importance to the rural Struggle and to the peasantry, tut in practice he concentrates or confrnes
hii activities in urban 2unes. \n an interview published in October 1970 ir> the CLiban Communist
Parly daily, for eample, a Tuparnaro admitted
that plans called for e-xtending the s.trurjgle into
the CDuntryside, but "nat w]th the characteristics
of typical rural-guerrilla warfare." He emphasized
instfrJtf that, at feast In Uruguay, future operations in the countrywide would consist of briefr
tomrmando-type raids launched from the cities.
Thus, although urban revofutionahes look ta
Hivana as the spiritual center of revolution in
Latin America, they are zealously nationalistic
and prefer to maintain tactital and financial independence, Cuba has provided training for some
urban guerrillas, ba.tl them With propaganda support, a-nd grants hiwan to revolutionaries and
political prisoners, but there is no evidencer of
more extensive contacts. There are indications
that Havana would like a large share of the
action, but it is- probably known among young
revoluhanaries that Cuba has bean heavy-handed
and arrogant in dispensing aid in the pest.
While Cuba has persisted in emphasizing the
rural nature of its revolution and has

Special Report

22 January 1971

SECRET

Diaem

Latin America

Btfflps ALl^^i^T.P

POPULATION
- S5C.GM-3GO.toQ
4 6DC.0DC-1j00ft,MQ

e Cwr 1.M0.00&

Sfcial

CCEJH

-4

SECRET

January

SECRET
Diuem
/

concentrated on rural tactic? for revolutionaries,

the rest of Latin America ha*, been urbanizing al
accelerating rales, in 1940 there were five Latin
American cities with mare than a mlllron inhabitants; in 1960 there were, mini. It is Estimated
that today there are 17, and that in ten years
there will be 36. Mexico Cily. Sao Paulo {SfazilJ.
arid Euenos Aires already have more than five
million residEnts, and four Other cities have more
than 2.5 millFon. By the End pf this decade fjve
more cities, will surpass trie five-million Jewel, and
another five will have more than 2.5 millrDn
people. The accEle rating rate of Urbanization is
also reflected in the growth of cities of a quarter
million inhabitants gr more. In 1970. 19 Latin
American cities had between oQOrOQQ and one
milJion Infiabptants, and another 32 had between
250.MQ and 500,000 residents.

was Jlijacked to Cuba. Five US cftizens

ware threatened with death unrsss several
tion^/iesincluding a tap Micaraguan [trrorist
leaderwEre- reliasad frgm Costa Rican jailj.
Urban revoluliOnariEi also Struck in the Damrnican Hepublic last April *fhert tha US Air Attache
wai kidnaped and later raFaased in exchange for
prisoners. Terrorists, have stolen millions af dalTars, ransacked arms depots, engaged in various
kinds of sabotage, and murdered local and1 foreign
officials-. They contributed directly to tha collapse of the Ongania government in Argentina,
a/ld have undermined Stability in several Other
count riES-,

As urban terrarism t]SZ incr-Gasadr contactsand collaboration among urban-based activists

have also been On the rise. Bolivia is the- prrncipal
focus of Insurgent interest in South America, afld
The. new revolutionary in Latin America
A number of foreigners, have participated in ELN
comes from these cities-. In his Afinitnentwl,
activilias since last summer. Individual Urupuayafl
Marighella said tJnat it is H'jdeal" when the urban
and perhaps Chilean advisers in urban terrorist
guerrilla ''operates in his own city." In Uruguay
techniques were in Bolivia last $eptennbe*. Three
and Brazil, and possfhly in other count*i*4r guerChilean revolutionaries, rymorftfl to be members
ri 11 as follow Marighella's advice, organizing them- Of th& Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR}
selves into four-or five-man ''firing groups." Each
were hilled in Bolivia last summer, and three
group ij a largely autonomous tactical squad that
others wera allowed to return to Cnile after b*ing
initiates Us own operations a r t d has little contact
captured- MIR rmrrtbers reportedly also hid conwith Dther groups. Ma r lljheJ la also emphisizfls in- tacts with ilia Uruguayan Tupamaros and are aldividual action, suggesting, for example, th-at asleged to have participated late last year in a meatsassinations should be performed by one guerrilla
ing of insurgents from several South American
"in absoMe Secrecy and in cold blood.1' 5uch
countries that was supposed to establish an "inrigid compaitmentalization accounts in large part
u&rnatignal
for the ability of urban terrorists to resist pa I its
raids.
Argentine- terrorists reportedly Irave contacts
with terro-ristii from neighboring countries, and
Urban terrorists have: been responsible for
there is some collaboration betwsEn Brazilian and
the. kid'napmfl.s af S\K fonefgr arnbassadars sFnce
Uruguayan urban guerrjllas. Contacts are not exAugust 19Satwo were murdered. Thr^e U5 mftitensive, however, and it appears, that terrorists in
tary offitErs have been killed by terrorists during
most countries are primarily concerned with susthe last threa yean, and at least *ight other fortaining their own activities. The Tupamaros and
eign diplomats or officiate ^are Itidnjp^ed for
the ChFFean MIR are the two groups mast likely
ransom in 1970, Local officials are also targets af
to engage in projelytizing. If the MlR or the
terrorist actionparticularly in Guatemala. AirArtamirana faction of the Chilean Socialist Party
plane Jiijackings have become Common, and in
is permitted to aid terrorists in Other countries, in
October 1970 The first combined hijatkingfact. Santiago could become the primary revO'
occurred when a Costa Rican airliner
lutionary capital in Latin America. Although

Special Report

-e

22 January 1971

4>

SEG*ET

Havana has provided some trsirifng and

urban guerillas with propaganda, tris Cubans apparently have few contacts with South American
terrorists.
Tlie new breed of urjjan revolutionary has
been most active in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. These Countries had almost rlo difficulties
with ri^al guerrillas during the. 1960s and Tew
manifflstation&of urban violence until tto last few
years. Guatemala, however, has had a long history
of rural and urban violence, which intensified
during much of the dacade of the sixties. Urban
terror recently has become more irnpo-rtant there
than has Castro-lrne guerrilla Struggle, hut revolutignanei maintain a significant capability for both
kind? of action. In Boliwa there have been two
abortive guerilla eppsades since 1967r and revolutionaries appear increasingly interested in adopting new urban method?. In Colombia and
Venezuela rural guerrilla! Continue to operate in
the Countryside, but they are the weakened and
disheartened remnants of large anrj important
guerrilla groups that were threat! in the mid
1960s, Thft Current status of the revolutionaries in
each of these countries ii described in tile follgwIn-g paragraphs.
Uruguay

The National Liberatio-n Movement

(MLWJHMttat known a; the Tupamarosis a
revolutionary Marxist organization that has had a
SfMCtacurar and rapid rise to promJnence during
the last faw years. Since lala 1969 it has been the
mtHl actfve and Successful insurgent group in
South America. It has kidnaped a total of seven
Uruguayan and foreign officials during this
period, and three of themthe British ambassador, a US agronomist, and the Brazilian consulare still in captivity.
The Tupamaros are highly organized flfld
disciplined, and through audacious and ingenious
offensives have bean a disruptive force far out of
praportio-rl to- their numbers. They initially enjoyed considerate public sympathy1, but lost

much of this support after they mu'tfered a US

AID official last August. NevBrtheresS. they are
likely tD remain a significant disruptive force- for
some time to come, especially in the Tense politfcal atmotphEre that probably will precede the
presidential etettlon in
Named after Tupac Amaru, a Peruvian
Indian who organized an important uprising
against Spain in 1730d the movement was
founded pn northern Uruguay in 1962 by Raul
Senrjic, It was not active until 196 when it began
to conduct sporadic robberi&S for money, arms,
and supplies such 35 police uniform!and identification papers. Until 1967, the movement concentrated its activities in areas outside of metropolitan Montevideo, but later turned more and
more- to urban violent*.
From 196? through 1969, the Tupamaros
succeeded In rjortraying themselves as romantic,
qu[xotic revolutionaries- They attempted ID
minimize personal violence and excesses, and
gainftd tan side rable popularity and publicity BS
seff less Robin Hoods. In elaborate puolig relations
efforts, the TupamarDS rerJiEtributed to the poar
some of the money they had stofen, as well as
food, milk, a:nd other provisions. They also "axpoiad'" afteged financiaf frsuds through the diswmmation or" compromising stolen documents,
which did cause considerable alarm in government
and financial circles, By daring daylight robberies,
they accumulated farge sums of money, often
robbing banks by recruiting employees or by disthernselvesai policemen or guards.
On & October 1969, about 40 Tupamaros
raided the small town of Pando, rohbing threa
hanks, taking over the police and fire stations,
and severing communications. There were casualties on hoth sides, and the Tupamaros claim that
members ca:ptured by police wfire tortured and1
killed. The Panda raid marked a major turning
point for the guerrillas, who thereafter turned
incraailngFy to muider and other axtiame forms
of urban vfolence.

Special Report

22 January 1971

SE!RET

SEC]
n Disism

activitiesespecially the murder of

police and security dTfiCpaJSin-Creased in late
19S5 and early 1970. In late July 1970, an
Uruguayan judge was kidnaped but later relcas*d
unharmed. On 31 July, US AID offidaJ Daniel
Mitrione and the Brazilian consul ^ere kidnaped;
on 1 August. US agronomist Claude Fly, was
abducted. Mi trio ne was killed on 10 Auguit after
the Pacheco gover n ment refused to negotiate whth
the terrorists- Tuparrwo demands for the release
of all imprisoned guerrillas in exchange for F3y
and the Brazilian gradually faded in the fat* of
government intransigence. By mid-5eptember the
terror ills retreated further and agreed to re-lease
the captives if major news media publicized their
political manifesto. Although two Montevideo
papers and a magazine subsequently printed the
treatf5ein violation of government censorship
tflWithe hostages have not been released.
government's determination not to
negotiate with the guerrillas has been complemented by a considerable show of force. At^
gressive counter insurgency campaignsespecially
An unprecedented crackdown following the
August kidnapmgshave resulted \f\ significant
guerrilla losses. In August, Congress authorized a
20-day, limited ilate-of-siege a* thousands of
soldiers and policemen scoured the Montevideo
area in search of the terrorists. A number of
important guerrilla leaders, including Raul Sendic,
were Apprehended. As a result, an estJrna-ted 250
to 300 Tupanwosare currency imprisoned. Accord ing to Some estimates, only about 150
Tupamaros remafn active,
A hard cone of the Tupamaro organization
weathered the government's counte-i-terrorist campaign, however. During the last few months, of
1970 terrorists remained1 wary active. They took
over cinemas to make political promulgations,
assaulted important Communications facilities,
robbed banks, and in early Novernbef they carried1
Out one of the largest jobberies, in the country's
history, In conjunction with these spectacufar
Operations, they have also conducted a persistent
campaign of lowleveF harassment designed to

Special Report

attract constant publicity and to keep security

forces off balance. Finally, on & January 1S71
they added another hostage to the list of foreigners being held, when UK ambassador Jackson
was kidnaped. Uruguayan police- estimate tnat
about 50 Tupamaros participated in this elaborately coordinated kidnaping in the streets of
Montevideo.
Trie Tupamaros. hive a fairly extensive base
af support among students and youths', who form
a potentially large reservoir af new recruits. Student and faculty federations at universities and
secondary Schools are dominated by extreme Eeftl5ts and Communists who sympathies with or
overtly Support guerrilla demands. In lite August,
for example, secondary school students demonStialBd violently in Montevideo in favor of the
Tupamaros- This resulted in t government decre*
cJosirig the schools until th-e beginning of the new
academic year this Mafch. Students have been
relatively quiescent in recent months, during the
Uruguayan spring and summer, but student Commfttees for the Support of the Tupamaros hav&
appeared.
The Tup*maros also have been supported by
fairly large numbers, of middle-class professionals.
Who increasingly are disenchanted wffh the
quality of life and economic stagnation in
Uruguay. Middle-dau support probably has continued to diminish, however, since the Pando raid.
mainly because of the terrorists' increased
emphasis on murder and other extreme forms of
violence. One Tupamaro leader has stated publicly that the chivalrous tactics employed before
the end at 1969 have been replaced by greater
revolutfonary milltance. There have been reports
of division within Tupamaro ranks over thisjdeC'S-ion, and it PS clear that if it is followed, much
middle-class support wi]l be lost.
The Tupamaros have demonstrated remarkable resiliency, determination, and1 skill since las.t
summer, and it is likely that, because tJiey enjoy
extensive support from students and youths, they
will remarn a formidable Force in Uruguay for

12 January 1971

SECRET
VWo Fa/iigH

sonie time. The baldly Executed Jackson kidnaping shows that the terrorists retain the capability ta carry out complex arid important assaults and that Iha government's refuse] to negotiate arid police dragnets have had onry limited/
results. Immediate Tupamaro objectives and their
full capabilities are not known, hut it i j likaly
that the t&frorists- will remain actfve in th* Coming
months, perhaps building toward a concerted,
large-scale campaign Of urban terrorism to Coincide with the period preceding the presidential
lti
fctrtit

Since September 199r Brazilian security

forces have moored aggressively and effect ivefy
against suspected leftist terrorists. A substantial
number Of terrorists have beer rounded up, arid
.-"la

Carlos Lanurci Engaging in Guerrilla Tnining

two Of the mast rmpcirtent Brazilian guerriJIa

leaders and theoreticians have been killed and
others exiled. In early November 1970 the government launched a massive- tDunterterrorist
operation Fn several major cities in an attempt tD
frustrate a terrorist campaign they had learned
about from captured documents. Estimates of the
rmrnber of persons arrested ir> the Operation vary
from 5O0 to more than 5r0Ou, which has proYoked Widespread criticism of the polios and the
military.

Ditsem

Terrorists ar SlfH able to carry out major

operations, however. This was demonstrated
dramatically on 7 December when Swiss Ambassador Euqher was ffidflaped in Riode Janeiro and
held nearly si* weeks for ransom. After proIracted negotiations the government on 14 January released 7rJ polfti^al prisoners-, who v*ere
f l o * n to Chile J*"I exchange for the ambassador.
For the first time, however, the govern merit
forced the terrorists to reduce thefr original demands significjnily by adhering to a Firm negotiating posture. The guerrillas dropped ^their
demands for the publication of communiques and
for free railroad transportation and yielded when
the. government refused to re-lease a total of 37
Otrier prisoners. The terrorists., in facl, ware the
net losers in the Etcher aTfair. inasmuch as their
credibility and their image of Invincibility in krdnap case? vere undermined seriously,
The National Liberating Action (ALNh
Of the two mast important terrarist groups, in
Brazil, has been active for about three years.
Forrner officials of the Soviet-line Brazilian CommunFst Party (PCB) who spirt off in opposition to
the party's nonviolent policies form the core of
the Al_Nr5 readership as well as that of most of
the other major terrorist groups. Carlos Manghella, the author of the Mtnimmua} of tht Urban
Guerrilla and the foremost B^aziKan revolutionary
Of rodent years, was the ALN's leader until he was
killed by police in November 1569. His deputy,
Joaquim Camara Fftrreirar took over, but died in
October 1970 resisting arrest. In September 1969
ALN membersr working jointly with a student
group closely affiliated with the ALN, kidnaped
U5 Ambassador Elbrick. He was releaseal unharmed wherr IS terrorists WMere flown to MexicOL
Most Of them went on to Cuba, where they were
greeted by Fidel Castro.
The Popular
ftevolutionary
Vanguard
(VPR], a second1 important terrorist group. [5
headed1 by Carlos Lamarca, a former army captain
and counter!nsurgency specialist who deserted in
January 1959. The VPR was responsible for ttie
first sigmfpc-anL terrorist action agaiost a foreign

Special Report

1971

SEGRET

national in Brazil when, in Qc-tob*r ISfifl. they

killed US Army Captain Charles Chandler in Sao
Paulo, in March 1970 VPR militants kidnaped the
Japanese consul-general in Sao Paulo. He wfls later
leased in exchange for five imprisoned terror
ists. In April 1970 the- US consul fn Rio Grande
do Sul failed an abduction attempt by the VPR
when hiE ran down one of the terrorists in his car.
In Jun 1970 VPR terrorists working with the
ALN kidnaped til* West German ambassador.
Forty pnsoners were flown to Algeria ta secure
hii relaase. The Eucher kidnaping in December
was the most recent esample at VPR capabilities.

The numher of militants taking part ifl tar'

norrst operations is probably not mars than
1,000, Most are former university students, but
rriany are cashiered military and police personnel,
extreme leftist labor figures, and prgfessfonal
Criminals. There is a good deal of sympathy far
some of the terrorists* goals among intellectual*
and the radicaJ clergy, Several priests, hauo bean
accused of assisting llie ALN's support sector, and
military and security officials are convinced that
terrorist* have important contact! among tlie
Brazilian clergy. Marighella devoted a paragraph
in the MtitintatiuJ1 to the Ciergyr saying thai "the
prfeit fho is an urban guerriJJa i; an actrve ingredient" in the struggle.
Sorro terroris.[iparticularly \n the- AL.M
have received training in Cuba, and1 Uruguayan
terrorists have- assisted Brazilian* in illegal border
crossings and in obtaining passage to other coun-

Special Report

tries, BratPfifln revolutionarias are proba.t?fy

largary -self-sufficient JS a resuft of robteries of
financial institutionE- It is poJSrfate that Havana
aJio has. provided some financial backing, but
there is no firm evidence of this. Marighella w
long onE of Caslr'O's favorite revolutionaries. He
attended the conference of the Latin Ameficgn
Solidarity Organization in August 1967, and he
may bave returned to Brazil witb definite commitm-ents of Cuban support at a tfrne u^bftrt
Havana was StiN relatively generous In fJiSpensing
aid.
Urban terrorism appears to ba becoming a
test ierfous prg-blem in BraziJ, even though kidnapings, robberieij flntf sabotage sre lively to continue. Terror rst capabNTtira appear to have declined during 1970 a* police becamE more effec>
tive in apprehending and hilling important guerrilla leaders as well as 3 significant number of
militants. The government's performance in the
recent Eucher kidnaping1 enha-n-ced its prestige,
just a* the terrorists" capitulation an many im*
portant points during the negotiations probably
strengthened the hand af those military and
security officials who advocate a stronger line in
dMling with terrorists. It is possible. ther*fort,
that urban terrorism has atready reached iti peak
in Brazil and may nov* be declining m importance
and intensity. Terrorists retain the capability to
carry out many types of asiaults antf acts of
sabotage, nevertheless, and undoubtedfy wiJl
remain a de-stabilizing factor in Brazil tor some
time.
A rgtntinn
Although Argentina experienced a brief episoda af Cyban-SLrpportEd rural guerrilla action in
late 1953 and Early 1964, urban terrorism did not
become a problem until 1969. Some Peronists
and other extremists in the labor and student
sectors have long engaged in occasional acts of
urban violence and strikes, but the phenomena at
bank robberies, kidnapings, and other spectacular
acts of urban terrorism are relativeFy new. Unlike
terrorists in neighboring countries^ most af

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22 January 1971

SECRET
flfo foreign Dt

whom identify with da sir tutftOr1 MaopSt doctrines,

the bulk of Argentine urban revolutionaries claim
to ba left-rting Peronists. Very little is known
about thsir structura and mambersJiI p. There m-ay
be as many as- a cloven small groups, some of
which reportedly are attempting to form coalitions or to merge forces. The Peronisi Armed
Forces group appears to be tha most active.

tions. Four weeks later, a similar raid was made

on a town near the capital. In October, the home
of the US Defense Attache was fire-bambed, and!
Dlher explosive devices were found at the homes
of two other US officlils. Later In the month
terrorists forcibly entered the homes of three US
military officers and made off with arms, uni*
forms, and identity documents.

During the early months of 1970, terrorists

concentrated or raiding small police and military
posts and on robbing banks. In March, members
Df the Argentine Liberation Front, a group
formed in late 1969 or early. 1970 from the. union
of three earlier revolutionary groups, seized a
Paraguayan consul in Buenos Aires and demanded
the release of two imprisoned leftists. The government rejected the diinand. Paraguayan President
StrOeSSner, who was vacationlno in Argentina at
the time; en-dorsetf the- Ongania govern mint's
decision and the terrorists later released their
captive. This was the first case in Latin America
In which a government successfully defied the
demands of kidnapers of a foreign diplomat.

Terrorism- in Argentina is less spectacular

than in Uruguay or Erajil, but the Aramburu
murder and its aftermath d&monstrate what a
small and fanatical group can achieve. It is likely
thai terrorist bands will increase their activities
this yearr aiming especially at US officials. Although they have not demonstrated many of the
capabilities af the Tupamaros or of one or two
Brazilian terrorist groups, Argentine urban bands
are slowly increasing their potential both by
experience and probably through their contacts
with the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR. Argentine security and police forces haue not yet had
much success In haJtlrtg them, and relatlveFy few
guerrillas hawe been imprisoned.

An almost immediate reaction to this escaPfldfl was the attempted abduction of a Soviet
diplomat, apparently by right-wing extremists led
by an official of the Argentine Federal Police,
The effort was foiled by the pallca. One af the
most spectacular events of the year was the kidnap and murder of former president Pedro
Aramburu. He was abducted Dn 29 May, and the
kidnapers, who later identified themselves as
Montorwros, said Dn 2 June that he had been
tried and executed for crimes allegedly committed when he.headed a provisional government
from 1955-58. The military government of President Qngania, seriously embarrassed, was ousted
by the armed forces a week later.
Terrorism has continued during the administration of General Levlngston. On 1 July 1970 a
15-man commando group, whose members identify themselves as Montoneros, terrarizecl a small
town near Cordoba. They robbed a hank, occupied the police- station, and severed communica-

Special Report

Little is known about the extent of support

and sympathy for the-terrorists, but as in Bril
and Uruguay, youths and students probibly &
count for a substantial portion. Elements af
Argentine's highly politicized labor federations
probably sympathize generaNy with terrorist
objectives, ar>d It is also known that some radical
priests, members of a group known in Argentina
as the Third World1 Movement, have contacts in
terrorist circles, Lmt December a "Third World"
priest was given a twD-year suspended prison sentence Tor his alleged contacts ^ith terrorists involved in the Aramburu murder. Measures announced by the government late last year were
designed to move Argentina gradually toward
constitutional government during the next four or
five years, but they Are not expected to have a
major impact in reducing terrorists' activities. It is
likely, in fact, that terrorist activity will continue
to increase during the next few years and may
pose a more serious- problem to the government.

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2 January 1971

SEC

aett

NoFo
/

ately, and counter ins urgency forces picked off

the guerrillas systematically in skirmishes during
the next fftw months. By early September, when
Because of its- geographic location in the
eight guerrillas were hilled In a fire-fight, the ELN
cente* of South America and the weakness <?f it?
pa 11 tic a I institutions, Bolivia has long b*en a probably had bean reduced to half jts original
Size. By the end of October, Chato Peredo had
target of crosi-border sjbversian. In 1970 revofubeen captured and about 55 guerrillas killed. A
tionaries from Bolivia and other 5outh American
few remained in the countryside and eight, incountries, with Cuban. support, attempted to
cluding- Peredo and three Chileans, were granted
avenge anal vindicate Che Guevara by reviving his
iafe conducts to Chile. Rural gueuilla activity
National Liberation Army (ELN). Even though
ceased.
ELN rural guerrilla effort* failed a second time,
revolutionaries ha^e continued their attempts to
give the impression that a Continental guerrilla
The ELM is unusual in the recent history of
movement is Jjeing farged in Bolivia. There were
insurgency in the hemisphere because (?f the sigreports last November that a "South Amerkan
nificant leveJ of cooperation and support it reLiberation Army" was trying to begin operations
ceives from revolutionaries in nEarby countries.
in Bolivia, and Cuban propaganda continue! to
The original pronouncement of the ELN, left at
place heavy emphasis o-n the international charthe site of the Teoponte' raid, indicated that six
acter and support of revolutionary activity in
Chileans, four Argentines, two Brazilians, and two
Bolivia. Despite this outside interest and rhetoric,
Peruvians were ELN members, Subsequent inforefforts to revfve rural guerriJIa action have b&ftr>
mation and body counts show that at least the
completely frustrated. In recent months, moremajorlly of these were with the guerrillas. The
over, the ELN appears to be taking an increased
present ELN, unlike the original, howeverH has
interest in urban guerrilla methods and" it is likely
Bolivla.n.s in command, antf there are- no conthat rural efforts will be abandoned, at least
firmed reports that Cuban personnel are currently
temporarily.
in Bolivia.

Bnlivia

The present ELN is the offspring of the

movement founded and led by Guevara until it
was all but obliterated in 1967, Inti Peredo, one
nf the survivors of that effort, began to reorganize
revolutionary cadres in 1968 and 1969. About 50
Cuban-trained guerrillas infiltrated Bolivia in
1969, demonstrating Havana's continued interest
in guerrilla warfare. In September 1969, however,
Inti was hilled in a police raid, and leadership
passed to his brother Chato.
On 19 July 1970, the resuscitated ELN began another phase of guerrilla activity by overrunning a mining camp at Teaponte, north of La.
PaJ, About 75 guerrillas, many of them students
from La Pa*, dynamited the instaNation and
seized two German employees as hostages, The
Bolivian Government later released tfrfl political
prisoners in order to free the hostages. The ELN
forced to take the defensive almost immedi-

Special Report

In July 1970 the Uruguayan press

the text Of A letter allegedly written by Chato
Peredo and addressed t o the Uruguayan
Ttipamaro terrorist group. It announced the establishment of "formal" relations between the
Tupamaros and the ELN. Chatq said that "in the
near future we must give more and more proof of
integration not only in the sense of help, but also
jn the interchange o-f militants." In January 1970
a committee for the support of the ELN was
formed" in Chile. Socialist Senator Carlos AltamiraTiQ was named director and The than presidential candidate, Salvador AI lends, was identified as a member. This committee was. publicized
heavily by Cuba's official media, but thus far
Havana appears to have done no more than provide psychological support.
Fallowing the collapse of its rural guerrilla
operation, the ELN appears to be shifting

11 -

SEQRET

2? January L971

SEC

emphasis to urban tactics wilh the help at individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chifean advisers.

lish&d statements now warn mat

will "tight to the final victory in the mountains
and the cities.'" Earlier statements-did nat refer tg
urban activities. So fari howe*efh the ELN has
dJempnstrated a linnited capacity for urban activities. It fobbed A payroll truck in L j Paz in December 1969 but lost several trained guerrillas jn the
process. It has carried out well-publicized murders
of several oT Its politicaF opponents in the lait IS
months., including two in the capital recently. It is
probably also respond bl-e far some of the bam faings that occur sporadically in La fa?, and the
dynamiting of the USlS offlc* in Santa Cruz OH 7
December
Like the FAR In Guatemala, the Cubanoriented El_rJ is not the anly violent revolutionary group in Bolivia. Trm pro-Chinese Communist
Parly began its own militant operations in October When party members seized a cattlfl ranch and
handed It ovar to peasant groups, The action was
designed to gain sympathy from the- peasants and
to croate a baa for future guerrilla operation?,
The government's subsequent seliure of this
property practically annulled the party's gains,
however.

to be active. Significant nu:mb4rs i\f

univars-ity stud*nti are ELN members or sympathizers, and the labor unions, which hava A long
tradition of radicalism* may also contribute membe/S. "Rie ELN has. made it clear in rapflatad
jnnouncemantt that it intends to persevere in the
struggle-, and propaganda support from Cuba has
continued. It is likely lhat individual Chilean and
Uruguayan revolutionaries will continue to
donate their servFces. Havana provides propaganda
SU|>(>ort and is in close contact with ELN cadres,
but it is not known if material backing has been
provided.

During the last two or three yrs there has.

more violence and terrorism in Guatemalaa
country of only five million peopEEthan lr> any
other country in the hemisphere. It is estimated
that terrorist activities since 1967 have resulted in
an sewage of about W deaths a montha third of
whom hsvB been policemen. It is also believed
that about 50 prominent businessmen have been
abducted for ransoms averaging about $200,000.
The major perpetrator of the violence is the
Rftbel Armed Forces (FAR), a pro-Cuban revolutionary group with both urban a.nd rural wings, In
January 1963, two high-ranking members of the
US military gioup ifl Guatemala we*e murdered,
by the FAR, and in August US Ambassador Ma-ln
was killed: resisting a kidnap attempt The F A R
was the first Latin American tfirrnTlst group to
rort to kidnappings, assassinations, and other extreme forms of urban violertca.

One faction of the Trots.kyist R*^oluliona.ry

Workers. Party is also committed to guerrilla activities, but me gf its batter trained members
have joined the ELN. The pro-Soviet Communist
Party is opposed to guerrilla activities and. m a
result, many of its more activist members have
joined the El_N.

Since 1969 the FAR has escalated its activities. In the autumn, guerrillas overran an oil-clrilling camp near the Mexican bordarr occupied a
rural town, temporarily seised farms in gutlying
areas, and increased assassinations in rural areas.,
In December, the FAR launched a particularly
violent but unsuccessful campaign to dfsrupt the
March 1970 presidential election. FAR cadres
killed more than a dozen security officials, the
right-wing candidate for mayor of Guatemala

Because oFtha continued interest of Bolivian

and foreign revolutionaries in maintaining an aCinsurgency in Bolivia, the ELN probably will

Special Report

Disstm

12-

SEC

22 January 197]

City, and a highly regarded editor of the country's leading riewipspeT. Fire bombings in downtown Guatemala City caused damage estimated fn
the minions of dollars.

periodic c o n t i c t s w r t h t h e S*ndinist National

Liberation Front (FSLN) in. Nicaragua and the
Honduran Francisco MorazDn Movement. FAR
instructors, reportedly were dispatched1 to train
numbers of the Salvadoran Revolutionary Action
group in July 1969. Only in Nicaragua, howvever,
where the small and harried FSLN ii active
sporadicaUy, have revolutionaries dared to tiring
their embryonic units out into the open.

In 1370. urban terrorism largely

rural offensives. On the eve of the election the
FAR secured the relaaSe of a captured colleague
by kidnaping the Guatemalan foreign minister,
and a week later it obtained the release of two
other guerrillas jn exchange for the aJjducted US
Labor Attache. After the election in March. West
German Ambassador Von Sprati was kidnapedHe was filled on 5 April when the government
reversed its earlier policy and refused to negotiate
with the terrorists.

In October 1970 the hijackers of a Costa

Rican airliner identified themselves as members, of
the United Revolutionary Front of Central
America. This was the first publi-c mentfon of this
sobriquet, but fragmentary clandestine- reports in
ea'ly 196^ cited a group called the United Revolutionary Forces of Centrat America. It is not
Itkely that a united or coordinated Central American revolutionary group enisti at this tirna in
more than a propaganda context.

guerrilla operations apparently haw been

mini ml zed temporarily, but guerrilla safe zones
have been established in the hinterlands, perhaps
as havens for urban terrorists on the run. In
mid-September 1970. a two-month lull in urban
activities ended with dozens of bornbings, asiassinatipns, kidnapjngs, and various scattered acts
of sabotage.
Guatemala has been one of the top countries
an Havana 'a list of targets, since the early 1960s.
ano today it is probably the- only country in the
hemisphere where Cuban guerrilla advisers are in
the ffeld. It is believed that at least 40 revolutionaries trained in Cuba were infiltrated into
Guatemala late in 1959, In February 1969, the
FAR reportedly received" $40,000 frorn Havana,
and in May 1370 it received another $15,000. In
early October two more Cuban cjgrriira
arrived in Guatemala
ing bo

nd rural methods.

Havana's expectations, frorn the FAR

com me-nmrate with its investm&nt."

Special Report

The FAR has engaged in some cross-border

operations, mainly into neighboring Mexico and
Honduras In search of safehavens. It was fn such a
Maclean h i d e o u t , however, where Marcos
Antonio Von Sosa, a veteran of Guilernalan guerrilla struggles Since I960 and leader of the now
moribund 13th of November RevQlutfonary
Movement, was killed by a Mexican Amny patrol
in May 1970,
Terrorism is not the work of the FAR atone.
The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) is a l
committed! to armed revolution even though its
long-term Strategy calls for preparing the masses
prior tp violent operations. Since 1962 the- party
has tried to g-iln control over its own guerrilla
factions, and it hai had a history of rivalry with
the FAR, interspersed with occasional abortive
periods of unification. Party leaders reportedly
are afraid that the paliticaJ gains, they have made
might be lost by an all-out terrorist campaign, but
this has not prevented them from applauding and
masterminding acts of assjssfnation and ot-her

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RET

22 January 1971

SECRET

/
violence. In August 197Oh for example-, thia party
)Ut>licly commended terrorists In Uruguay who

terroristsin early December, and US of

have escaped kidnaping in recent months largely
because of heightened security precautions-. FAR
tMrO-ristS sp&nl almost two days in early December following and attempting to kidnap a US
diplomat. They were deterred because ot the effective security measures h* used, but the FAR
can be expected to persevere- in such efforts.

The upsurge of terrorist activity in November reitJlt&d frt one af iris harshest crackdowns in
memory. On 13 November Preside/it Arana declared a 30-day state of siege thai was extended in
December for another month. Stringent counterinsurgenty measures were adapted that resulted
in the death of a I least one guerrifla leader and
the capture of another. The governmentrS action-5
were so exaggerated that the Air Force mistakenly attacked a ftee-t of Salvadoran shrimp
boats in the Pacific believing they were engaged in
11 Melt activity, Four boats were sunk,, two
S l d
ware killed, and IB wounded.
Right-wing countertenor ists ha also beer
active an a large scale- Their operations were
nesponsibfe for many deaths during the Tecent
State Of Sfage. Piefirderit Arana has admitted1 privately that the government is unable fuJly to
cgntroP counterte-rror, for most of which pa Ike
and WCUrlly officials are responsible. Government
and right-wing sources aTie believed responsible for
the recent murdars of two prominent politicians.
On 15 January congressman Ada If p Mijannasa.
WaN-known intellectual wtio had been confined to
a wheelchair^was killed. On 17 January one of
Guatemalan leading labor officials was machine
gunned. The continuing inclusion of prominent
political figure* on the government's clandestine
assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of
rotributory viole-nce in motion.

The Armed Forces of National Liberation

(FALN) was one of the primary recipients of
Cuban support for many yearsr as well as cine of
the most active and formidable1 guerrilla groups in
the Jiemisphere, From 1962 through 1964 it combined a high level of urban terrorism with rural
operations. In 1963, the Betanwurt administration probably was more beleaguered find threatened by terrorists -arid guerrillas than any Latin
American government since Batista's in Cuba,
From 1962 through 1964 urban terrorists burned
factories, murdered police and security personnel,
kidnaped a popular Spanish athlete, and engaged
In various acts of sabotage. In early 1962 the US
Embassy was bombed. US businesses were rajded.,
and two U5 military advisers were kidnaped,
RuraP Operations v/ere Carried on simultaneously,
and spectacular acts juch as the seizure of aVenezuelan merchant ship on the high seas warecarried out.

Neither the government nor the left-w[ng

terrorists are- likely to achieve a decisiVft VICtSTy in
the near future. US citizens and other foreigners
win continue- to be major targe-ts. A US businessman was beaten and killedperhaps by Tight-wing

Special Report

Since the peak of activity from 1962

through 1964, insurgency ha> fallen to such insigniffcar.ce in Venezuela that there are now probably Jess than 100 guerrillas divided into several
rival guerrilla factions, and only isolated acti of
urban violence occur. Rural guerrillas continue to
decline in importance and pose no direct threat tD
the government. They have conducted a few small
raids and ambushes during the last few years, but
are not capable of sustained operations and fife
expected gradually to abandon the struggFe or
nesgrt to banditry. Low-level vioJence and crime
could increase in the cities this year, but this will
not be a serious- problem.

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22 January 1971

SECRET
a Foretm Diisein

Guerrilla fortunes declined steadily under

the Leoni administration' (1964-1969)d however,
and in. 1966 the Venezuelan Communist Party
(PCV) formally abandoned violent tactics, Under
the leadership of Douglas Bra^o, H>me FALN
cadres spfit with Ida PCV over thus decision, endeavoring with, Cuban aid to revive rural gue-rrilfa
insurgency. By 1967H however, tha FALN had
fallen JntD such lassitude and incompetence-h I hat
Castro publicly denounced Bravo m a "pseudorevo I Ut-icmary." Cuban guerrilla advisers, including
at least tv/D members pf the Central Committae
of the Cuban Comrnurii&t Party who had tieen
attached to the FALN, were- withdrawn by early
1969. Other farms of Cuban support also drifru"
up. The Pro-Castro Movement of the- Revolutionary Left (MIR) has been active since 1960r l/i
September 1969 il split inta three rival factions,
two Df which, compete with a total of abgut 40
guerritlas in ilia field. The Ml Ft h received
Cuban aid! in the past, but today it is inactive and
unpromising from Havanahs paint of view.

Caracas., and an attempted bombing. The US

Embassy m Caracas has speculated that the recant
split of the PCV into two factions could result in
sharper competition among extremist groups and
an increase in violence and crime. PCV dissidents,
including about a third af the party's ieaders, are
forming a new party less subserviftnl to Moscow.
This faction COUld rftyjrt to robberies in order to
fund its activities, even though the use of violent
methods would he a departure frotm the peaceful
approach that all factions of the PCV have endorsed since 1966. Thus, despite the current low
level of violence and crime and tha possibility
that it will increase somewhat this yeair there is
virtualry no chance that terrorism or guerrilla
activity will Ije renewed on levels comparable to
those of the EVI id- 1960s.

Rural Violence Jias been an integral part af

Cotombian life since 1948 when rampant banditry and guerrilla strife that lasted a decade were

Guerrilla fortunes were sg dim by 1969, in

fact, that President Caldera instituted a wlderartgirl^ p-icificiiion program in March aimed at
absorbing Comrnunisti arid guerrillas into the
Ifrgal pofptical framewark. He offered an amnesty
to guerrfllas who would ^ y dowfl thsir arms,
legalized thft Commurist Party, Established relations with the USSR, reorganized th* security
forces and restrained aggressive armed forces,
operations against the guerriflas. The pacificjilion
pfan has been successful in attracting some jgerrFllas aw-ay from their mountain redoubts and
probabty has undermined moral* Jrid added to
the divisjans among thosft wha remain in the
field.
Some Venezuelan officials appear to oe apprehensive that smalF bands- of Kevolulicmarres
may saek to emulate the successes oF terror ists in
other South Arm&rican countries. Tne defense
minister laid publicly on 11 January that the
government is conce/ned at>OLtt a possible increase
In terrorism. He cftad as avldartca the murtfer of a
forrner guarrilfa by FALIV members, a bormbing in

Special Report

An ELN Guerrilla Training Camp

unleashed. During the 1960s three rival guerrilla

forces looking to Moscow. Havana, and Peking for
support emerged from the rermnants of earlier
rural struggle. None prospered for long, howaver.
and all have: declined appreciably during the last

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22 January 1971

SEQKET

few year?. They no longer attract young recruitJ

or receive much publicily in the cities or on the
campuses. In- all, there are prc-bably only about
600 guerrillas <n Colombiaa country of 21 million people,
The guerrillas have generally confined their
activities to marginal mountain areas, and ihey
now engage mare in banditry thin in guerrilla
warfare.. Because of these activities, they still
cause trouble in the countryside and1 to the
security forces, who have great difficulty counterattacking.
The Army of National Liberation (ELN) is
the (most active guerriHa group in Colombia. It has.
enjoyed considerable prominence there and in the
rest gf Latin Amenca since l^fifi, when Ft began
guerrilla operations and lost in battle its most
famous. Sonthe guerrilla priest CamllO Torres. In
early September l9?0 the ELN ambushed an
army patrol, killing s*ven soldiers and wounding
eight, It was the most serious gue*HI Fa Action of
kind rn Colombia in more than a year.
The ELN suffers from internal fissures, and
frequent defections, however, and its urban support apparatus, in Bogota is reported to be In
disarray. Cuban advisers, may have been in trie
field with the ELN in 1955 end 1967, but Havana
flpparsntly had cut off all aid by 1969. The ELN
is reported to have 13& men under arms, but they
are divided into four groups and operate- In scattered ar&asThe Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the action arm of the pro-Soviet
Colombian Communist Party, is larger than the
ELN but less active. Operating in four mam
groups, the FARC* policy sine"* fate 19SB hm
bean to avoid provoking the government, because
j & reluctant to have the FAR jeopardize
y established Colombian-SaVlet relations or
the legal rol-e of the- Communist Party, Somesmatl clashes with military forces taka place from

Special Report

The PopufaT Liberation Army (EPL) is the

aclion arm of the- pro-Peking Cornmunist Party of
ColomtjiaVMarxist-Leninlsl. K reportedly consists
of some- 150-200 men in five groups. The- ElPL
avoids flashes with supc-rpar forces, but has. attackad smaU, isoJated towns, ranches, and police
posts. Such raids apparently are the product of
the EPL'S weakness and its need to acquire provisions and publicity. There ii no evidence that
the EPL receives reguFai financial support from
Peking.
These guerrilla groups have not engaged in
significant urban violence and appear to have little capacity for such action. Thay do not pose
serious challenges to the- government, and are
lihe-ly to continue to fads in importance.

Rural guerrilla insurgency probably will be

eschewed as a viable method by Latin American
revolutionaries, in most countries in the foreseeable future. Although the Cubans 4r likftly to
continue emphasizing this approach and some
urban revolutionaries, vwill eKpr5 the belief that
urban and rural tactics should be employed
simultaneously, fewer and fewer volunteers 'e
likely to be enlisted for rural actmn. Guatemala*
where all forms of violence and terrorism remain
at unprecedented levels, may be tris only country
where a resurgence of rural guerrUla activity is
possible. The Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR) and the Cubans will probably continue ta
encourage and perhaps materially support revolutionaries from oilier Central AmerFcan countries.
The potential for revolution in those countries is.
not very great, however, and it is unlikely that
new rural guerrilla groups will emerge in the net
year OT SO.
Urban revolutionaries in South America have
been far mare successful than their rural counterparts in embarrassing governme-nts and in upsetting stability. They have won Important concessions from the governmentsespecially in
forcing the release-of political prisoners. In Argentina, they were able to exploit the weaknesses of

-16-

SEGftET

22 January 1971

Dinem
th&tfftD

the Ongartia regime and they contributed to a

Change of government After they kidnaped
murder*d a former president. Thiis ysar,
activities may increase In Argentina and Bolivia,
continue at relatively hl<jh levels, in Brazil
Uruguay, and they cauld be initialed by
fanatical bands at any tirn-e in several otJier countries. Prospects ire. therefore, that terrorist ac*
liwity will inereiie in as many as half a dwen
South American countries.

the jame policy despite important t;idnapings.

Kidnaped foreign official were murdsred in each
country as a result, but guerrillas suffered significaflt losses pf popularity for thflir brutality. Although thfc Brazilian Gowernment in the- past ACceded quickly to terrorist demands, il adopted a
tougher line in the recent Bucher kidnaping and
undoubtedly will uphold this firm position in
future dealings with guerrillas.

in thft entire South American continent,

however, there are probably no mare than 3 r 000
active urnani revolutionaries. Police and countertei H>rist techniques became more sophisticated
and effective in 1970, and terro-rists have been
dealt hard blow* rn several Countries. Irtiporta-nt
guerrilla leaders in Uruguay, Brazil, and Guatemala have been kilfEd or captured,and large numbers of terrorist* are in jail- Thus, although internal security forces probably will not be able to
extirpate terrorist groups, they may Continue to
Increase their capabilities in neutralizing and suppressing them. Terror ills succeeded at first largely
because governments were surprised, confused*
and unprepared to de*l with thsm. During 197Or
however, is terrorist methods became better
known the Guatamalan Government adopted a
firm policy of refusing ta negatlate^ vrfith terrorists, and the Uruguayin Government persisted in

Small bands of violent uTban revolutionaries

may be able to harass and embarraw Latin American governments for som.E time to Come, twt
they are not likely to pose serious challenges to
any vMh the possible exceptions of the regimes of
Guatemala arid Uruguay. In Guatemala, FAR-inN
tliled violence and right-wing cauntGTterror already amount to a small-scale, bloody civil war
that could Increase in proportion depending en
what actions the gowe-mment takes. In Uruguay,
the Tupamaros Continue to demonstrate a remarkable ability tD carry out spectacular operations. They probably can add other hostages to
the three faieigntrs they already hold, and lhay
Will undoubtedly sustain and seek to Increase
terrorist activities of all kinds in the months preceding the November 1971
r

Special Report

17

CfKK
SECRET

22 January 1971

Ssferet

Secret

t
jcret

UrRNEOFIRRELUK
DATLJUII2M1

OUTGOING

MESSAGE

jjiJ:..;.;. j . ; | ~ . r ; i
a[ *

0.1F

v i

4G

INFO

F4LE

Irt

Wt4

i ^j

L^J

IKi

-*

**

PMll*

0
COHP

rj

0
0

WESTERN HEMISPHERE BR1ED CI UHH 7t*-Q7t-V

//BOLIVIAt THE ASSASSINATION THIS WEEK IN PARIS OF GENERAL
JOAdUIN ZENTENOi BOLIVIAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE-, BEARS A HARKEB
i

SIMILARITY TO THE MURDER Or COLONEL RAHON TRABAL^ THE URUGUAYAN

MILITARY ATTACHEi MHO UAS SHOT IN HIS PARIS APARTMENT IN DECEMBER

//BOTH HEN HAS DISTINGUISHED CAREERS IN ERADICATING LEFTIST
SUBVERSIVE CROUPS IN THEIR OMN COUNTRIES BEFORE BEINfi POSTED TO
PARIS-

TRABAL HAD SERVED AS CHIEF OF MILITARY SECURITY IN URUGUAY

AND HAD EXERCISE* A PRIMARY ROLE IN PLANNING AND DIRECTING THE

CAMPAIGN AGAINST TH TUPAMAROS.

HE REPORTEDLY RECEIVED A DIPLOMATIC

ASUGNflENT AT THE REdUEST OF ARMY SUPERIORS MHO RESENTED HIS AflBlTION

AND DEMONSTRATED ABILITY-

ZENTENO, ON THE OTHER HAND* HAS ACHIEVED

INTERNATIONAL PROMINENCE IN lit? FOR TRACKING DOUN AND CAPTURING

CHE GUEVARA-

SUBSEQUENTLY HE ROSE TO THE POSITION OF COHRANBER IN

CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCESTHC SECOND J1OS T POWERFUL. POSITION IN

BOLIVIABUT WENT INTO "flOLDEN EXILE" IN 1173 FOLLOWING A SEROUS
DX-SAGREEfJENT WITH PRESIDENT BANZER OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ANJ> POLITICAL
BATE'
UBJT;
EXT:

ST OliER THAN THE liiyiPTS OPflCC 'S PBOMIBJTED

CL BY;

TMPDET

OUTGOING

MESSAGE
'LJ.

IMAL
rn

our o 0
jt^^art

UAEABll

0 -<*.
0

.NTO; HLC

WM<I

.//
//IN EACH CASE THE ASSAILANTS WERE UNIDENTIFIEDi
PREVIOUSLY UNKKOUN TERRORIST ENTITIES CLAlfTEB RESPOMSIBILITV FOfi
THE ACTION*

A GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE RAUL SENJUC INTERNATIONAL

BRIGADE {NAMES FOR THE FOUNDER OF THE TUPA(1AROS> TOOK CREDIT FOR
TRAHAL'S ^EXECUTIONi" WHILE THE "CHE GUEVARA INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE"
ma PROCLAIM ITS TRILJDPH IN ELIMINATING ZENTENO-//V
//IT IS POSSIBLE THAT EITHER OR 90TH ACTIONS ARE THE UORK
OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* BASED IN ARGENTINA^ THAT CALLS
ITSELF THE REVOLUTIONARV ORDINATING JUNTA*
THIS CROUP
LED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN BOLIVIA* URUGUAY.
PARAGUAY* CHILEn BRAZIL* AND ARGENTINA AND DEDICATED TO THE VIOLENT
OVERTHROW OF niLlTAflY-BACKED GOVERNHENYS IN THOSE COUNTRIES*
OF BANKING FIRHS IN BUENOS AIRES UHO HAVE BEEN THE VICTlttS OF
TERRORIST KIDNAPING OPERATICNS HAVE SAID PRIVATELY THAT THE RANSOff
MONEY THEY PAID NEVER REACHED LATIN AMERICA^ BUT UAS PAID IN (SOLD
AND DEPOSITED IN BANKS IN BEIRUT* LEBANON AND IN UNflARKED SWISS
DATE;
OJHGr

BXT:

tv

2
CL BY:

IMPDET

OUTGOING

MESSAGE
''T

OJ1F

&*****

CQtV.

FILE

*4MJ

re

PtH

IH ITALY.
//IN

LATIN AMERICA TERRORISTS HAD flEiMERAl LY CONFINED THEIR

ACTIONS TO THEIR OblN COUNTRV,

fiANY STUDENTS OF I[*TERNATIONAL

TEPROftli-n, KOMEVER, NOU PRE&ICJ THAT OPERATIONS HILL BE flO&ELED ON

THE A C T I V I T I E S OF HI&DLE EASTERN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS ANP MAY
OCCUR ANYt-HGR-

PARIS HAS BEEN I D E N T I F I E D AJ A CENTER FOR I N T E R -

NATIONAL TERRORIST A C T I V I T Y

AND UAS REPORTaLV TO BE THE SITE OF

A yORLD COHCRESS OF SUBVERSIVE 6ROLJPS I N OCTOBER

CL B:

Ctt HISTORfCAL REVIEW PROGRAM

3"3 u-. C
3 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy I n s p e c t o r General

SUBJECT:

Statement by C

Tconcerning

h i s assignment B o l i v i a In. 19G7and-3w.s

in t h e c a p t u r e of Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA
de l a Serna
Memo dated 29 Hay 1975

"

'

'"

'".

1. Th* undersigned met withL

with
....
J contract
employee, on 2
2 and
3
June
to
obtain
his
story
about
his
d 3 J
assignment to Bolivia in 1967*-*.This query is. based upon ref
interview, during which(_
Wentinned that he had retransmitted an order from ColonelF,, ^ L
Commander o the 8th Division of Die Bolivian Army, to a
Bolivian sergeant, which resulted in the execution of Ern
'Che^
GUEVARA de la Serna, Cuban leader of the. gu&rrillas then.
operating in Bolivia,
J5aJ- that Jiis assignment cime about after ran
held itf Miami in June or July of 1967, at'which time
he was a.tase officer worhing for the Miami office. He had
been selected for the job interview because- of his paramilitary training an experience He was asked if he would
a^Tee to serve withT
^l a fellow Cuban, tfe
ed, He was told that hefcrasttf go to Bolivia 'with
_^~>here they would be engaged in training intelligence
teams ftfT the 2nd Ranger Battalion of the Eighth D.nr^ionjf
the Bolivian Army, He was a.l$o told that he an<rr
,1
would be assigned to the 2nd Hanger Battalion as Advisors
and would be based in the town qf Esperansa. While in Miami, he and/
^ JweTe given briefings about the political ^nd
euerrxlla sztuatioa in Bolivia, and he was given a refresher
course m communications . F
"kndf"
"Ivere told
that there were strong indicationa^tha^GuevaTff^w&s leadia*
the guerrillas. Among the instructions c3jteffrthn-*w.as^;a clear
one that in the event that the Bolivj^rr^Srnty captured
th
should do everything possible ("to Iteep hifiL alive,
(t
-3,
They ^ere introduced to their future "cale""officef ""
in Washington r who was to be in liaison, with the Bolivian
forces in Santa Cruzt

4* Prior to their departure, both^^_, Jp.nd ^ rr

wore, issued false U*S. re-entry permits*ln the names of
*}an.d(T H respectively. ."These were
received in NewTork City just prior to "their departure, on
30 Jxily for La Pas on a 3 ran iff Airliner flight* The!" case
officer had preceded then and met then on 31 J.uly t 7,3^,
the La Pai airport. !..,.,* J]"believes that Bolivian^ visas'
e stamped in their re-entry "permits\ \ .,
'
5, The caae officer and another American took them to
meet/"'
~\ to isrhoin they were introduced as
experts on guerrilla warfare* He issued each a personal card
in which.were handwritten his instructions to all civilian'
and military officials that, thev be ?iven full support*. At
ten that morning, they m e t ^
r}Cojnjiander"in-Chief
1
of the Bolivian Armed Ftvrr.ft* L A 1IXSantar
VSSJL ftmtll aootit a month
Crui

latex thatf

^ ^ G

J*

> ) ' While in

La PSii roSiev instructions were issued, to thejn about their

mission. After about a. week there3. they were flown to Sa-nta.
de la Sierra.for a.few'days
y and introduced to Colonel

"^J^JConunander of the. Eighth hDivision

ii +
Conunander
of
the.
Eighth
Division
+
^arrangsd for/^ w ..
__
i j t ^ e American
J

f
T'&fficer in

charge
training the 2nd
g of^the military"mission
y

i
"
f
J
Ranker Battalion,'
to come to -Santa "Cruz
to meetf.
Jand

, O They ware also introduced to itajoTcTJ

G-2 c-f the fi^hth Division.. After 3 or 4 days in.Santa Crui,
T
^3-ndL ..
,Tw&nt to La' Esperansa, where they were
quartered at-the Bolivian officer5T compound, n In La Esp&ran.Z3L
they m e t ^ _
^ the Coramander of the 2nd Hanger Battalion,
an d-'Captain
^
'
'
' '

6* ^Prior to their departure from La Pas # /

%J
iwere issued Bolivian unifoTdis and creofentials as
captains in the Bolivian Army, Nev&rthelesSj they
did not'
deceive Bolivian Army -insignia. Later,P
J waj s given by
L
. - ,*,ta,.Ja Bolivian t^i-color cap-Thsigftia which he wore

Cescarapela.) * C

t111^*.

--JJwexe issued Snith ahdWsson

t doable-actioji aUtomaT-xa* piStolg. EJuring their activities' as inanda<ivisotij Umy .a^sunted the role of Bolivian
'as foreign
, although,
g theyy were kjiovm
j
g advi'soTS to a
i
f
P
I
number of Bolivian officers'*.. P
Isaid that he learned later
that .the American Ambassador Jfad prohibited anyone other" tha.n
he and[
jfron becoming involved in the anti-guerrilla
activities in the field.)
^ Despite thsir apparent status as Bolivian .officers,
Jsaid that they never ^ete given orders by hi^herg Bolivian officers (One exception to this nrule
was the
c
vhich Colonelf
..._3 is sued
tq
.
"]
^^
^Y
^
K
a'^s OKCcuiorij ifT
,_ story 15 to be believed.)

ft. r

^ has a*5i

to Santa Cruz and[

tJ

assigned to La ESperanza* where the l a t t e r cqitducted^most o

th intelligence training. As time went by,^
J, 0 ^ 11
duties ffra.vita.ted to becoming basically those of an^dyi$or.
He said'that his case officer was aware of and approved of this
development. Among the things whichr
sj aTtdT
J
attempted ta accomplish was the preservation oE the l l v e s - o t captured g u e r r i l l a s , for the c o l l e c t i o n of i n t e l l i s e n c e about
the g u e r r i l l a ' s l o c a t i o n s , as well as for bumanitirian reasons,
f
J s a i d t h a t he= saved the l i f e of Jose C a s t i l l o Chavez,.
^ t r a v e l i n g for that purpose to VallegTande from Satita Cruz, -. vrhere he spoke b r i e f l y to C a s t i l l o a t the Kuestxa Senora de
Malta Hospital, At t h i s t i m e '
/leaTned of the i n t e n t
fC_
' *yt t h e Ranger's, to Ti^ye the p r ^ ^ e r executed.
/"
jd
jt
,,_
jjpreva.1 led. on Major/"
.^jjand^
Tiak'e his side, ' The prisoned was flown^to Vallegrande
f
icoveTftd a l l medical CQSts and carried out a two-week
^interrogation. Th^ -resulting twenty-page interrogation report
provided the Bolivians with a complete concept of the
. g u e r r i l l a ' s strategy, which turned out to he the key to
Guevara's capture, according taf
.1 This report was
attributed by the Bolivians to fre from -their own people.
3, This important development vas followed by an ^
*-,
encounter in late .September between a unit led by a L t v ^
J
and the remnants of the guerrillas. . Durins this action, a Cuba*
lieutenant named yiguel; the Bolivian Coco Peredo;.and a
Bolivian physician named Jose Guticrres Ardaya were Killed.*
f
_ ifravelled by jeep to Putara,- where the bodies 'were
^ located" and througli the- infQruiation he ha.d learned from
C a s t i l l o he was able tc establish that the men were from
Guevara's forward element. Upon his return to Santa Cruz,
f
ladvisedT
,-..
j7that the 2nd Ranker Battallion
shouldHe immediatBly deployed, with the reraai^ing two-weeks
of t h e i r training cancelled.V
Accepted this advice

J
and the'
Puc^ra, and the-Headquartersof
the dangers "were
were moved toi Puc^r,
q
the Eighth Division were moved
to
Vallegrande.
fj
--J
d
V l l d
fj
J
role,, suggesting
continued in-his
i
n advisory
y
g g g areas for etx^o
l l as the
h d
l t
th InteJUis n c &
deploynent as well
deployment
off the
.teams. On the 8th of October, conta-Ct was ^^tahUshed with
Guevara's remaining forces(At this time[... ^-Jwas' in
1
Vsli^*rand:e andf
{) in ^sp^raniaO 0^ t h e a*> ^ a 3 o r
" Ir&oorted over the radio that "the chief" had. been
captured.
"1 thefl flew av^r the ar^a in a PT-fi carrying;
with him a PRC-lO^adio with which he was able to communicate
vith. the Bolivian forces- He then confirmed that: Guevara-was
lh
the chief" vbo had be^n captured. He returned to Vallegrande
wheres he told/J
Tthat Guevara had been vounded and
captured.
***
.

Jit.

-4-

ID. That day F"

,,t]was sent to Higueras to
interrogate the guerrilla prisoner^ and assembled the
, .
captured, docunc-nts. Since Colajisl
Jvss planning to flyby helicopter to Higueras bn the 5 t h ^
listed him on _.
the evening of the th if li^ could accompany him to intarrogitt
Guevara. f~
Iconsulted Vils sta and agreetd, (The
helicopter"had ftfom only for a pilot arid two ToassenfcersO
['
^prepared a lOO-vord message to' the ..
J
"in code reporting Guevara's capture and asEidg that an ftabassy
representative be sent to the area to prevail upon t h t
ffeoJ-iwiajis to spare Guevara's l i f e , since, he did^not^believe
[;that"hg-3ain^r3iKgfcgd^^^^flg^o~T~^'Thtg~nrefissaga vas prepared '
^for the" scheduled 10 a~*m, trattsmsL-^s-ioit of 9 October t - and
was not transiftitted to the relay point in Asuncion, Paraguay
u n t i l about 10:30 a.m., afterC
-^arrived in lUgueras
and ^et nil his radio-transfliitter an *US-'4S.

1:L

*C

^lZ '

J111^ the P^lotC.

3 set

out by helicopter stem Vallegrande a t 7 : l S a . n u on

^
and arrived
in
Hisueras"as-about
7":iO
a,in*
f
j
J ^ n ^ MajorT
Jwhen they v i s i t e d Gu&vara in
c h l room .whichVas his improvised j a i l * Guevara would
not answerf"
jiw]>en spoken .to + . He was. bound, hand, arid ootN
a n d h a d a r & g iiouTTa +

- . , - ,

b.nd Majoy^
Jthen reviewed thd captured
documents andf
jjobtained perinission .from*
1 to
photqarapn a i r the papers^ including Guevaraf s a l a r y y and also
. : iJ permission ta retain the original accommodation
addresses found,
(

fa

13* WhileL
"l^nd all the other Bolivian officers
(with the exception o f a Lieutenantf
J) were 'pnr side of
the village attending to other milir&xy affairs ^ . ^ .
J
Temained in Higueraa as the highest ranking "Bolivia.^ cjfficer1'
In- t h i s capacity he ansvered a call received an-the military
field telephone and answered as Captainf
~\ He was given
the code numbers 500 and GOG as orders flnich. Vere to be
implemented hy coimnand o^ "higher- authorities^... He said that
the connection waa nat cl.ear and he could not recognize the
voice but I t could have b^en that o Major
T In any
casej[
"jsaid that, since i t was a l i n t only available
to the military h.e was confident that i t was order re^
transmitted through military channels- He said that he
that S00 referred to Guevara t oOO to the -word execute and
700 to the preservation-of Guevarra's l i f e . These simple
codes had been identified to hisn

14. .Uponr
Tr<3tUTH,f if-f J t o l { i ^ iil1
ge imdf
.Joo* i t as a f authentic order and
no eflorf tJr have i F confirmed, C PK*- Jasked" if

life could be preserved sin.ee he had thase Instructions,

f
- Ireplied that his own positigri ^ould
a k be. iplaced
(tl t
m in
k de

jeopardy if he did not coi^ly. L P ^ J * ? *

S, ?
the attempt anyway, f fi'-^ Mbelieves that!
Jhad
resigned hinSel^
already resigned
h i n S l to the inevitabilityy of Guevara's

J
h was J.n
J sympathy
th
th ^
execution.,) ff
Jsaid
that he
vish but
that i t vasSiot in his power to reverse the-order, .
HetoI d r - V Mthat he was well aware of the treatment which
Fidel fed lietid out to Cubans and told him to execute Guevara
in any manner which he might chcos*- f
J s a i d that he
_
'had" %o leave TEOT Yallegrande at lO^D.a^m,11 ait^vouldsend
\
a helicopter back to picl; up Guevara's 'body at 2 p.m., and
'as a friend", asked-- that the body be ready, f
J
^
reiterated his r^qu^st that the order be appealed and
/
agreed to niak* the attempt, aud said ]ie would adv^e i t he .-

vere
IS Failin* a cqunter-mandin"^ of the order and as the
senior "Bolivian officer" left in HisuerasX m
j s a i d he
vas left vlth the implementation'ofthe e^e^ution. After
F
^LeftX
liias^ahi.e.Jto t a l k to Guevara, who
-^
L
i d e n t i f i e d f T\< _ J e i t h e T as a Fuer^O-Iii^aii vy* Cuban .
.'wftvlf-inn for* U.S. irttelliEence. Hti said, he made t h i s judgment
on'the ba^is
o;the questions asfced .and o.nr ^V
J
While r
'i'rv- Vasvith-Guevara., shots vere fired ia
j
^ d f C\
"later determined that these involved the
prisoners. Recognising
execution off two othe? prison
gg these shots .
h
l
G
a
b
l
a
n
c
h e d vhen
vhen
for vhat they were, 'neverthelesss> Guevara-blanched
r \ \ Iconfintied -that he too would l?e execute*j although
r
later c5mi>osing himself.
.
.

16. After
After leaving Guevara,^ v'^
^ --jj^ ^1 41 4aa sergeant
sergeantof
of
the order to execute Guevara. and^er\truse^
the
mission
to
him^ ^
th
i i o
to h
He was told no fire below the r head. The order was given to
the sergeant at 1:00 p-m. and
< { 1 heaxd the shots fired
at Guevara at 1:20 p.m.r At 2:^0 'p + pir, tha helicopter returue
to Kiguera5. A Father
'Jperfarmed the last r i t e s and
Guevara's remains wexe ^ t r a p p ^ to one of the helicopter 1 5
5kid,5 and
' ^accampanied: them to Vallegrande, where
t^iey land^l at zHo p^m. ' \ ' ^"said that he lost: himself
auickly in the crowd gathered at4:he airport, but that
J t o o t charge of the remains and was photographed,
^ a i d that the t i t l e o the photograph, which aoceaved
in the press , gave an incorrect identification of

the nane^

'

Jused,

F T

*fri-r$&^*r<:iijJvnX*t&*L,

RELEASED PER PL - 10 3-52$ (J"FK ACT)

I
^
DATE Jj-S-*3

-e17 f.
3 s a i d h e reported t h e executions t o Major
Oand t h e h llief of Operations, af^
J
then, was taken bac^ t o i d e n t i f y tfis5"oet7T3-(T^Ehe--tEiT.c.e _..
h
fc
d
S t C
i v t h the
executed guerrillas / ' They
thsn
drov*
no Santa
Cruzviththe
documents films and equipment and then flew-to
La
PHI,
1
vhere^ t l , - . ^contacted n his
cise officer- 'He was taken to
a home where t h e ^
J* d other Americans were briefed, by
"him. Every thing *~w IvicTl he had be&n able tp retain^was turned
injthen to bo carried by a special courier to
_ ^ V,^_ .Chen- fleyr back to Santa. Crui Xere a< i
b / GensTaL Porter,CINC50UTH, was to pict him
w
up for a,"flight to the Caaal Eone- This plaTie arrived with
a f l a t t i r e on the 10th ox l l t l i . r The U.S. tfissijia. a^m-at fr
a C-54, was then flown to Santa Crua .and Tie _ and r
Jf
. were flown ba-ci: to La- Paz. After o^erniEhtiTig therej .atntchei
C-130 1 carried then" to Panama where-^
?wa-s as Iced to
relate his stprv to General Pcrter. After-E weets in Panama,
r
'nanti^
.
^Jwere documented as GS-16s' so that they
, j^oulti board s. over^boolted Eailitary flight to Ch&rlottej
South Carolina, After j;heir arrival there, they jiouxiieyed
to Miami, WhereP
^ b r i e f e d General Cushmau. ^
j
believes that in both Kigh-level briefings he men-Cloned
ovm personal' role in the execution of Guevara,) . ,L