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P. Takis Salpeas, BS, MSCE (Civ.

Eng), MSSC (Systems Eng), MASCE, CCM1


1

Senior Vice President/Division Manager Rail and Transit Systems,


Parsons Transportation Group
100 M Street SE, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20003
PH : (202) 775-3390 / FAX (202) 775-6087
e-mail: takis.salpeas@parsons.com

Abstract
Modern rail rapid transit projects represent major capital investments, reflective of
their complex technical nature in a diverse and highly developed urban landscape.
They pose significant challenges in design, engineering, constructability, and
contracting that must be overcome for successful completion. However, as compared
to equivalently scoped projects built 25 to 30 years ago, todays projects, when
effectively managed, are more likely to:

Satisfy higher safety, quality, and level of customer service requirements;


Provide higher community acceptance;
Initiate passenger service 30-35% faster from contract award; and
Cost 25-30% less in comparable dollars.

The trends in this study are derived from an extensive and well-tested database of 30
years of transit construction projects on the Washington Metrorail System. Though
the trends draw largely from productivity gains in the overall U.S. construction
industry, they still deserve to be acknowledged in discussions about the increasing
value of rail rapid transit projects. These patterns can strengthen cases made on the
grounds of environmental or economic development benefits.
Many U.S. rail transit systems, notably many light rail transit (LRT) systems, have
pursued aggressive expansion in recent decades. This study should encourage transit
agencies or other researchers to conduct similar examinations of cost and productivity
trends. Additional cases similar to the one presented here would be useful for the
industry in demonstrating the increasing efficiency and value of rail transit projects.
This paper does not present a forecast of future conditions; it is intended to highlight
important advances being made in the U.S. engineering and construction industry for
public transit projects. Although construction cost trends appear to satisfy the goal of
better-faster-cheaper, much work remains in ensuring these advances continue over
the next 30 years as population grows and mobility challenges evolve.

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Benefits of Productivity Growth in Rail Transit Construction:


The Washington Metro Experience

Benefits of Productivity Growth in Rail Transit Construction:


The Washington Metro Experience
P. Takis Salpeas, BS, MSCE (Civ.Eng), MSSC (Systems Eng), MASCE, CCM1
1

Senior Vice President/Division Manager Rail and Transit Systems,


Parsons Transportation Group
100 M Street SE, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20003
PH : (202) 775-3390 / FAX (202) 775-6087
e-mail: takis.salpeas@parsons.com

Abstract
Modern rail rapid transit projects represent major capital investments, reflective of
their complex technical nature in a diverse and highly developed urban landscape.
They pose significant challenges in design, engineering, constructability, and
contracting that must be overcome for successful completion. However, as compared
to equivalently scoped projects built 25 to 30 years ago, todays projects, when
effectively managed, are more likely to:

Satisfy higher safety, quality, and level of customer service requirements;


Provide higher community acceptance;
Initiate passenger service 30-35% faster from contract award; and
Cost 25-30% less in comparable dollars.

The trends in this study are derived from an extensive and well-tested database of 30
years of transit construction projects on the Washington Metrorail System. Though
the trends draw largely from productivity gains in the overall U.S. construction
industry, they still deserve to be acknowledged in discussions about the increasing
value of rail rapid transit projects. These patterns can strengthen cases made on the
grounds of environmental or economic development benefits.
Many U.S. rail transit systems, notably many light rail transit (LRT) systems, have
pursued aggressive expansion in recent decades. This study should encourage transit
agencies or other researchers to conduct similar examinations of cost and productivity
trends. Additional cases similar to the one presented here would be useful for the
industry in demonstrating the increasing efficiency and value of rail transit projects.
This paper does not present a forecast of future conditions; it is intended to highlight
important advances being made in the U.S. engineering and construction industry for
public transit projects. Although construction cost trends appear to satisfy the goal of
better-faster-cheaper, much work remains in ensuring these advances continue over
the next 30 years as population grows and mobility challenges evolve.

148

148

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013


79B_PB_4out_Same_55924_ASCE.job_Process Black_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Cyan_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Magenta_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Yellow_10/08/2013_10:00:39

Benefits of Productivity Growth in Rail Transit Construction:


The Washington Metro Experience

Benefits of Productivity Growth in Rail Transit Construction:


The Washington Metro Experience

P. Takis Salpeas, BS, MSCE (Civ.Eng), MSSC (Systems Eng), MASCE, CCM1

P. Takis Salpeas, BS, MSCE (Civ.Eng), MSSC (Systems Eng), MASCE, CCM1

Senior Vice President/Division Manager Rail and Transit Systems,


Parsons Transportation Group
100 M Street SE, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20003
PH : (202) 775-3390 / FAX (202) 775-6087
e-mail: takis.salpeas@parsons.com

Senior Vice President/Division Manager Rail and Transit Systems,


Parsons Transportation Group
100 M Street SE, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20003
PH : (202) 775-3390 / FAX (202) 775-6087
e-mail: takis.salpeas@parsons.com

Abstract

Abstract

Modern rail rapid transit projects represent major capital investments, reflective of
their complex technical nature in a diverse and highly developed urban landscape.
They pose significant challenges in design, engineering, constructability, and
contracting that must be overcome for successful completion. However, as compared
to equivalently scoped projects built 25 to 30 years ago, todays projects, when
effectively managed, are more likely to:

Modern rail rapid transit projects represent major capital investments, reflective of
their complex technical nature in a diverse and highly developed urban landscape.
They pose significant challenges in design, engineering, constructability, and
contracting that must be overcome for successful completion. However, as compared
to equivalently scoped projects built 25 to 30 years ago, todays projects, when
effectively managed, are more likely to:

Satisfy higher safety, quality, and level of customer service requirements;


Provide higher community acceptance;
Initiate passenger service 30-35% faster from contract award; and
Cost 25-30% less in comparable dollars.

Satisfy higher safety, quality, and level of customer service requirements;


Provide higher community acceptance;
Initiate passenger service 30-35% faster from contract award; and
Cost 25-30% less in comparable dollars.

The trends in this study are derived from an extensive and well-tested database of 30
years of transit construction projects on the Washington Metrorail System. Though
the trends draw largely from productivity gains in the overall U.S. construction
industry, they still deserve to be acknowledged in discussions about the increasing
value of rail rapid transit projects. These patterns can strengthen cases made on the
grounds of environmental or economic development benefits.

The trends in this study are derived from an extensive and well-tested database of 30
years of transit construction projects on the Washington Metrorail System. Though
the trends draw largely from productivity gains in the overall U.S. construction
industry, they still deserve to be acknowledged in discussions about the increasing
value of rail rapid transit projects. These patterns can strengthen cases made on the
grounds of environmental or economic development benefits.

Many U.S. rail transit systems, notably many light rail transit (LRT) systems, have
pursued aggressive expansion in recent decades. This study should encourage transit
agencies or other researchers to conduct similar examinations of cost and productivity
trends. Additional cases similar to the one presented here would be useful for the
industry in demonstrating the increasing efficiency and value of rail transit projects.

Many U.S. rail transit systems, notably many light rail transit (LRT) systems, have
pursued aggressive expansion in recent decades. This study should encourage transit
agencies or other researchers to conduct similar examinations of cost and productivity
trends. Additional cases similar to the one presented here would be useful for the
industry in demonstrating the increasing efficiency and value of rail transit projects.

This paper does not present a forecast of future conditions; it is intended to highlight
important advances being made in the U.S. engineering and construction industry for
public transit projects. Although construction cost trends appear to satisfy the goal of
better-faster-cheaper, much work remains in ensuring these advances continue over
the next 30 years as population grows and mobility challenges evolve.

This paper does not present a forecast of future conditions; it is intended to highlight
important advances being made in the U.S. engineering and construction industry for
public transit projects. Although construction cost trends appear to satisfy the goal of
better-faster-cheaper, much work remains in ensuring these advances continue over
the next 30 years as population grows and mobility challenges evolve.

148

148

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

149

149

Introduction

Introduction

Modern rail rapid transit projects, like extending Metrorail in the U.S. capital region,
are advanced through a multi-year rigorous environmental process, political
consensus building, complex funding approvals, highly litigated private property
acquisitions, and extensive public outreach. These projects represent major capital
investments and are complex infrastructure undertakings constructed in diverse and
highly developed urban environments.

Modern rail rapid transit projects, like extending Metrorail in the U.S. capital region,
are advanced through a multi-year rigorous environmental process, political
consensus building, complex funding approvals, highly litigated private property
acquisitions, and extensive public outreach. These projects represent major capital
investments and are complex infrastructure undertakings constructed in diverse and
highly developed urban environments.

Rail rapid transit construction projects worldwide and in the U.S. especially, have
come under attack as being very costly. Clichs like Metrorail costs out of control,
appear frequently in anti-transit, auto/highway promotional media and/or in literature
provided by those pushing projects to lower capacity modes (i.e., bus rapid transit)
and/or High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT) Highway Lanes.

Rail rapid transit construction projects worldwide and in the U.S. especially, have
come under attack as being very costly. Clichs like Metrorail costs out of control,
appear frequently in anti-transit, auto/highway promotional media and/or in literature
provided by those pushing projects to lower capacity modes (i.e., bus rapid transit)
and/or High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT) Highway Lanes.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend Metrorail against myths and negative
clichs by detailing the significant benefits derived from these investments in terms of
speed and capacity and/or overall community value. Rather, this paper strongly
counters the notion that building Metrorail today would be prohibitively more
expensive as compared to equivalent projects built 25, 30 or 35 years ago.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend Metrorail against myths and negative
clichs by detailing the significant benefits derived from these investments in terms of
speed and capacity and/or overall community value. Rather, this paper strongly
counters the notion that building Metrorail today would be prohibitively more
expensive as compared to equivalent projects built 25, 30 or 35 years ago.

Over the last quarter century, our society as a whole has increased Regulatory
requirements, demanded higher Performance-based services and continually asked for
improved Customer service. This RPC factor can add significantly to the total cost
and time frame of project implementation. Despite this, Metrorail construction trends
have appeared to satisfy the BFC goal: Better-Faster-Cheaper, as compared to
equivalent scope projects built 30+ years ago, based on this study of the Washington
Metrorail System.

Over the last quarter century, our society as a whole has increased Regulatory
requirements, demanded higher Performance-based services and continually asked for
improved Customer service. This RPC factor can add significantly to the total cost
and time frame of project implementation. Despite this, Metrorail construction trends
have appeared to satisfy the BFC goal: Better-Faster-Cheaper, as compared to
equivalent scope projects built 30+ years ago, based on this study of the Washington
Metrorail System.

Metrorail projects built today, compared to equivalently scoped projects built 30 years
ago, are more likely to satisfy higher safety, quality, and customer service levels;
provide higher community acceptance; utilize advanced technology, circuitry, and
material; initiate passenger service 30-35% faster; and cost 25-30% less in
comparable dollars. These trends have created an outstanding value. Every five years
approximately 1 billion passenger trips are safely and reliably accommodated by the
107-mile, 86-station Metrorail System in the Washington, DC region.

Metrorail projects built today, compared to equivalently scoped projects built 30 years
ago, are more likely to satisfy higher safety, quality, and customer service levels;
provide higher community acceptance; utilize advanced technology, circuitry, and
material; initiate passenger service 30-35% faster; and cost 25-30% less in
comparable dollars. These trends have created an outstanding value. Every five years
approximately 1 billion passenger trips are safely and reliably accommodated by the
107-mile, 86-station Metrorail System in the Washington, DC region.

Metrorail construction projects have realized significant cost and time reduction gains
consistent with overall U.S. construction industry productivity gains. Factors
primarily affecting construction productivity are real wage trends, project
management, technology and analytical methods, contracting innovations and
competition, owner organization, design standardization, labor organization, skills
and training, project uniqueness, and funding and oversight.

Metrorail construction projects have realized significant cost and time reduction gains
consistent with overall U.S. construction industry productivity gains. Factors
primarily affecting construction productivity are real wage trends, project
management, technology and analytical methods, contracting innovations and
competition, owner organization, design standardization, labor organization, skills
and training, project uniqueness, and funding and oversight.

Although general productivity gains significantly benefited rail transit construction,


these projects are still expensive because their general productivity rates are still
below what economists call the potential growth rate and are a drag on the

Although general productivity gains significantly benefited rail transit construction,


these projects are still expensive because their general productivity rates are still
below what economists call the potential growth rate and are a drag on the

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

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149

149

Introduction

Introduction

Modern rail rapid transit projects, like extending Metrorail in the U.S. capital region,
are advanced through a multi-year rigorous environmental process, political
consensus building, complex funding approvals, highly litigated private property
acquisitions, and extensive public outreach. These projects represent major capital
investments and are complex infrastructure undertakings constructed in diverse and
highly developed urban environments.

Modern rail rapid transit projects, like extending Metrorail in the U.S. capital region,
are advanced through a multi-year rigorous environmental process, political
consensus building, complex funding approvals, highly litigated private property
acquisitions, and extensive public outreach. These projects represent major capital
investments and are complex infrastructure undertakings constructed in diverse and
highly developed urban environments.

Rail rapid transit construction projects worldwide and in the U.S. especially, have
come under attack as being very costly. Clichs like Metrorail costs out of control,
appear frequently in anti-transit, auto/highway promotional media and/or in literature
provided by those pushing projects to lower capacity modes (i.e., bus rapid transit)
and/or High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT) Highway Lanes.

Rail rapid transit construction projects worldwide and in the U.S. especially, have
come under attack as being very costly. Clichs like Metrorail costs out of control,
appear frequently in anti-transit, auto/highway promotional media and/or in literature
provided by those pushing projects to lower capacity modes (i.e., bus rapid transit)
and/or High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT) Highway Lanes.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend Metrorail against myths and negative
clichs by detailing the significant benefits derived from these investments in terms of
speed and capacity and/or overall community value. Rather, this paper strongly
counters the notion that building Metrorail today would be prohibitively more
expensive as compared to equivalent projects built 25, 30 or 35 years ago.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend Metrorail against myths and negative
clichs by detailing the significant benefits derived from these investments in terms of
speed and capacity and/or overall community value. Rather, this paper strongly
counters the notion that building Metrorail today would be prohibitively more
expensive as compared to equivalent projects built 25, 30 or 35 years ago.

Over the last quarter century, our society as a whole has increased Regulatory
requirements, demanded higher Performance-based services and continually asked for
improved Customer service. This RPC factor can add significantly to the total cost
and time frame of project implementation. Despite this, Metrorail construction trends
have appeared to satisfy the BFC goal: Better-Faster-Cheaper, as compared to
equivalent scope projects built 30+ years ago, based on this study of the Washington
Metrorail System.

Over the last quarter century, our society as a whole has increased Regulatory
requirements, demanded higher Performance-based services and continually asked for
improved Customer service. This RPC factor can add significantly to the total cost
and time frame of project implementation. Despite this, Metrorail construction trends
have appeared to satisfy the BFC goal: Better-Faster-Cheaper, as compared to
equivalent scope projects built 30+ years ago, based on this study of the Washington
Metrorail System.

Metrorail projects built today, compared to equivalently scoped projects built 30 years
ago, are more likely to satisfy higher safety, quality, and customer service levels;
provide higher community acceptance; utilize advanced technology, circuitry, and
material; initiate passenger service 30-35% faster; and cost 25-30% less in
comparable dollars. These trends have created an outstanding value. Every five years
approximately 1 billion passenger trips are safely and reliably accommodated by the
107-mile, 86-station Metrorail System in the Washington, DC region.

Metrorail projects built today, compared to equivalently scoped projects built 30 years
ago, are more likely to satisfy higher safety, quality, and customer service levels;
provide higher community acceptance; utilize advanced technology, circuitry, and
material; initiate passenger service 30-35% faster; and cost 25-30% less in
comparable dollars. These trends have created an outstanding value. Every five years
approximately 1 billion passenger trips are safely and reliably accommodated by the
107-mile, 86-station Metrorail System in the Washington, DC region.

Metrorail construction projects have realized significant cost and time reduction gains
consistent with overall U.S. construction industry productivity gains. Factors
primarily affecting construction productivity are real wage trends, project
management, technology and analytical methods, contracting innovations and
competition, owner organization, design standardization, labor organization, skills
and training, project uniqueness, and funding and oversight.

Metrorail construction projects have realized significant cost and time reduction gains
consistent with overall U.S. construction industry productivity gains. Factors
primarily affecting construction productivity are real wage trends, project
management, technology and analytical methods, contracting innovations and
competition, owner organization, design standardization, labor organization, skills
and training, project uniqueness, and funding and oversight.

Although general productivity gains significantly benefited rail transit construction,


these projects are still expensive because their general productivity rates are still
below what economists call the potential growth rate and are a drag on the

Although general productivity gains significantly benefited rail transit construction,


these projects are still expensive because their general productivity rates are still
below what economists call the potential growth rate and are a drag on the

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

overall project budget. The cause for this lack of overall improved productivity gain
is complex and varied. Rail transit construction is not immune from the main issues
slowing productivity gains down, the so called gra ndma syndrome a reluctance to
abandon tried and tested processes.
Background
In 2011, approximately 750,000 passengers daily u sed the 86-station, 5-line, 170 km
Metrorail System in the U.S. Capital Region (Washington, DC/MD/VA). In
November 2002, Civil Engineering Magazine liste d WMATAs Metrorail system as
one of the 40 projects of the century, see Figure 1 b elow.
Figure 1-One of 40 Projects of the Century
WMATAs Metrorail System is a landmark in civil
engineering history, one off the 40 projects of the
century recognized in Novem ber 2002 by the
American Society of Civil E ngineering. Among its
peer projects are the Hoover Dam, the Panama Canal,
the Empire State Building, t he Brooklyn Bridge, the
Golden Gate Bridge and the Erie Canal.

The replacement value of the WMATA Metro rail System exceeds $25 billion
today. Metrorail engineering and construction is c onsidered the largest single project
of its type in the U.S.
The infrastructure of the 2-track network includes 85 km of underground (35 km of
cut and cover box and 45 km of bored tunnel), 73 km of surface and 12 km of aerial
structures, including several bridges and fo ur underwater structtures. The
infrastructure includes almost 60,000 parking spac es at stations; 21,000 or which are
located in 15 multi-level parking structures. The M etrorail System also includes 100
traction power substations supplying 700 million kWh of power. In addition, the
system is operated via 100 fully automatic train co ntrol based interlockings, 8 railcar
storage and maintenance yards, almost 600 esc alators, 220 elevators, and 1,000
railcars. It features hundreds of communication s facilitiess, scores off ventilation
shafts, extensive station air conditioning (chiller p lants) and hhundreds of appliances
required for underground water disposal from the tu nnels.

150

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150

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

overall project budget. The cause for this lack of overall improved productivity gain
is complex and varied. Rail transit construction is not immune from the main issues
slowing productivity gains down, the so called gra ndma syndrome a reluctance to
abandon tried and tested processes.
Background
In 2011, approximately 750,000 passengers daily u sed the 86-station, 5-line, 170 km
Metrorail System in the U.S. Capital Region (Washington, DC/MD/VA). In
November 2002, Civil Engineering Magazine liste d WMATAs Metrorail system as
one of the 40 projects of the century, see Figure 1 b elow.
Figure 1-One of 40 Projects of the Century
WMATAs Metrorail System is a landmark in civil
engineering history, one off the 40 projects of the
century recognized in Novem ber 2002 by the
American Society of Civil E ngineering. Among its
peer projects are the Hoover Dam, the Panama Canal,
the Empire State Building, t he Brooklyn Bridge, the
Golden Gate Bridge and the Erie Canal.

The replacement value of the WMATA Metro rail System exceeds $25 billion
today. Metrorail engineering and construction is c onsidered the largest single project
of its type in the U.S.
The infrastructure of the 2-track network includes 85 km of underground (35 km of
cut and cover box and 45 km of bored tunnel), 73 km of surface and 12 km of aerial
structures, including several bridges and fo ur underwater structtures. The
infrastructure includes almost 60,000 parking spac es at stations; 21,000 or which are
located in 15 multi-level parking structures. The M etrorail System also includes 100
traction power substations supplying 700 million kWh of power. In addition, the
system is operated via 100 fully automatic train co ntrol based interlockings, 8 railcar
storage and maintenance yards, almost 600 esc alators, 220 elevators, and 1,000
railcars. It features hundreds of communication s facilitiess, scores off ventilation
shafts, extensive station air conditioning (chiller p lants) and hhundreds of appliances
required for underground water disposal from the tu nnels.

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013


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150

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

150

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

overall project budget. The cause for this lack of overall improved productivity gain
is complex and varied. Rail transit construction is not immune from the main issues
slowing productivity gains down, the so called gra ndma syndrome a reluctance to
abandon tried and tested processes.
Background

overall project budget. The cause for this lack of overall improved productivity gain
is complex and varied. Rail transit construction is not immune from the main issues
slowing productivity gains down, the so called gra ndma syndrome a reluctance to
abandon tried and tested processes.
Background

In 2011, approximately 750,000 passengers daily u sed the 86-station, 5-line, 170 km
Metrorail System in the U.S. Capital Region (Washington, DC/MD/VA). In
November 2002, Civil Engineering Magazine liste d WMATAs Metrorail system as
one of the 40 projects of the century, see Figure 1 b elow.

In 2011, approximately 750,000 passengers daily u sed the 86-station, 5-line, 170 km
Metrorail System in the U.S. Capital Region (Washington, DC/MD/VA). In
November 2002, Civil Engineering Magazine liste d WMATAs Metrorail system as
one of the 40 projects of the century, see Figure 1 b elow.

Figure 1-One of 40 Projects of the Century

Figure 1-One of 40 Projects of the Century

WMATAs Metrorail System is a landmark in civil


engineering history, one off the 40 projects of the
century recognized in Novem ber 2002 by the
American Society of Civil E ngineering. Among its
peer projects are the Hoover Dam, the Panama Canal,
the Empire State Building, t he Brooklyn Bridge, the
Golden Gate Bridge and the Erie Canal.

WMATAs Metrorail System is a landmark in civil


engineering history, one off the 40 projects of the
century recognized in Novem ber 2002 by the
American Society of Civil E ngineering. Among its
peer projects are the Hoover Dam, the Panama Canal,
the Empire State Building, t he Brooklyn Bridge, the
Golden Gate Bridge and the Erie Canal.

The replacement value of the WMATA Metro rail System exceeds $25 billion
today. Metrorail engineering and construction is c onsidered the largest single project
of its type in the U.S.

The replacement value of the WMATA Metro rail System exceeds $25 billion
today. Metrorail engineering and construction is c onsidered the largest single project
of its type in the U.S.

The infrastructure of the 2-track network includes 85 km of underground (35 km of


cut and cover box and 45 km of bored tunnel), 73 km of surface and 12 km of aerial
structures, including several bridges and fo ur underwater structtures. The
infrastructure includes almost 60,000 parking spac es at stations; 21,000 or which are
located in 15 multi-level parking structures. The M etrorail System also includes 100
traction power substations supplying 700 million kWh of power. In addition, the
system is operated via 100 fully automatic train co ntrol based interlockings, 8 railcar
storage and maintenance yards, almost 600 esc alators, 220 elevators, and 1,000
railcars. It features hundreds of communication s facilitiess, scores off ventilation
shafts, extensive station air conditioning (chiller p lants) and hhundreds of appliances
required for underground water disposal from the tu nnels.

The infrastructure of the 2-track network includes 85 km of underground (35 km of


cut and cover box and 45 km of bored tunnel), 73 km of surface and 12 km of aerial
structures, including several bridges and fo ur underwater structtures. The
infrastructure includes almost 60,000 parking spac es at stations; 21,000 or which are
located in 15 multi-level parking structures. The M etrorail System also includes 100
traction power substations supplying 700 million kWh of power. In addition, the
system is operated via 100 fully automatic train co ntrol based interlockings, 8 railcar
storage and maintenance yards, almost 600 esc alators, 220 elevators, and 1,000
railcars. It features hundreds of communication s facilitiess, scores off ventilation
shafts, extensive station air conditioning (chiller p lants) and hhundreds of appliances
required for underground water disposal from the tu nnels.

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

151

Figure 2: Washington Metropolitan Area T ransit Authority System Map

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

151

Figure 2: Washington Metropolitan Area T ransit Authority System Map

ure 3: Metrorail Network Development


Figu
135 Million Labor Hours of Construc tion; 3 Phases Completed.
4th Underway to the Washington Dulles Internaational Airport

Phase I: 1972 - 1982

ure 3: Metrorail Network Development


Figu
135 Million Labor Hours of Construc tion; 3 Phases Completed.
4th Underway to the Washington Dulles Internaational Airport

Phase II: 1983 - 1992

39 Miles; 43 Stations; $ 8 Billion;


90 Million Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Phase I: 1972 - 1982

42 Miles; 27 Stations; $ 7 Billion;


24 Millioon Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Phase III: 1993 - 2004

Phase II: 1983 - 1992

39 Miles; 43 Stations; $ 8 Billion;


90 Million Construction Labor-Hours Worked

42 Miles; 27 Stations; $ 7 Billion;


24 Millioon Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Phase III: 1993 - 2004

Phase IV: On going

Phase IV: On going

23 Miles; 11 Stations;

23 Miles; 11 Stations;

26 Miles; 16 Stations; $3.6 Billion;


$21 Million Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Silver Line Exxtension to Du


ulles Airport aand
Loudoun Coounty, 23-milees, 11-stationss,;
(Phaase 1; 12 Miless; 5 Stations; too be Completedd 2013;
Phase III to be Compleeted 2016)

*NOTE
E: The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA ) is the manager for the Silver Line Extension, under special ggovernmental aagreement.

26 Miles; 16 Stations; $3.6 Billion;


$21 Million Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Silver Line Exxtension to Du


ulles Airport aand
Loudoun Coounty, 23-milees, 11-stationss,;
(Phaase 1; 12 Miless; 5 Stations; too be Completedd 2013;
Phase III to be Compleeted 2016)

*NOTE
E: The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA ) is the manager for the Silver Line Extension, under special ggovernmental aagreement.

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URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

151

Figure 2: Washington Metropolitan Area T ransit Authority System Map

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

151

Figure 2: Washington Metropolitan Area T ransit Authority System Map

ure 3: Metrorail Network Development


Figu
135 Million Labor Hours of Construc tion; 3 Phases Completed.
4th Underway to the Washington Dulles Internaational Airport

Phase I: 1972 - 1982

Phase II: 1983 - 1992

39 Miles; 43 Stations; $ 8 Billion;


90 Million Construction Labor-Hours Worked

42 Miles; 27 Stations; $ 7 Billion;


24 Millioon Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Phase III: 1993 - 2004

Phase IV: On going

ure 3: Metrorail Network Development


Figu
135 Million Labor Hours of Construc tion; 3 Phases Completed.
4th Underway to the Washington Dulles Internaational Airport

Phase I: 1972 - 1982

Phase II: 1983 - 1992

39 Miles; 43 Stations; $ 8 Billion;


90 Million Construction Labor-Hours Worked

42 Miles; 27 Stations; $ 7 Billion;


24 Millioon Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Phase III: 1993 - 2004

Phase IV: On going

23 Miles; 11 Stations;

26 Miles; 16 Stations; $3.6 Billion;


$21 Million Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Silver Line Exxtension to Du


ulles Airport aand
Loudoun Coounty, 23-milees, 11-stationss,;
(Phaase 1; 12 Miless; 5 Stations; too be Completedd 2013;
Phase III to be Compleeted 2016)

*NOTE
E: The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA ) is the manager for the Silver Line Extension, under special ggovernmental aagreement.

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013

23 Miles; 11 Stations;

26 Miles; 16 Stations; $3.6 Billion;


$21 Million Construction Labor-Hours Worked

Silver Line Exxtension to Du


ulles Airport aand
Loudoun Coounty, 23-milees, 11-stationss,;
(Phaase 1; 12 Miless; 5 Stations; too be Completedd 2013;
Phase III to be Compleeted 2016)

*NOTE
E: The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA ) is the manager for the Silver Line Extension, under special ggovernmental aagreement.

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

Productivity Analysis
America is more productive today than at any oth er point in
history because it is more efficient at producing goods and
services. In 1870, the typical U.S. household requ ired 1,800
hours of labor just to acquire its annual food supp ly; today it
takes about 260 hours of work. Despite falling employment,
American factories output is up because produ ctivity has
climbed steadily though workers wages and ben efits have
not increased much; productivity is up 40.4% since 2001.
Productivity reflects the joint efforts of many influ ences such
as, changes in technology; capital investment; th e level of
output; utilization of capacity, energ
gy and mat erials; the
organization of production; managerial skills; and the
Source: U
US Labor
characteristics and efforts of the work force .
Rising
Deparrtment
productivity indicates less time involved per unit o f output, a
favorable sign of efficient use of resources in the economy.
Gains in productivity reduce costs and can lead to bboth lower prices, as well as higher
real wages.
Overall U.S. productivity has grown at an annual rate of more than 2% per year on
average over the last 40 years. Strong productivit y growth is another reason for low
inflation. Construction, in general, is a major bene ficiary of low and stable inflation.
When productivity grows at 2.7% a year, the sta ndard of living doubles every 27
years; at 1.4% it doubles every 51 years; at 5% it dooubles every 14 years.
The factors that influence productivity gains in th e rail transit construction industry
include market size, structure, competition and cusstomization. Although not the only
indicator, construction project duration is an important measure of overall
productivity. The results of an analysis of Metrora il System construction duration by
major element is in the final table in this section. T hese data indicate that most project
elements have experienced considerable productivity gains. Related cost savings are
analyzed in the following section.

r Factors in Rail Transit Construction Productivity


Figure 4: Primary
Wages
20%
Design
Standardization
10%

Labor Or ganization,
Skills an d Training
8%
Proj ect Uniqueness
5%
C ontracting
Inn ovation and
Co mpetition
12%

Owner
Organization
10%

Fundi ng and
Overrsight
5%

Technology and
Analytical Methods
15%

152

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152

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

Productivity Analysis
America is more productive today than at any oth er point in
history because it is more efficient at producing goods and
services. In 1870, the typical U.S. household requ ired 1,800
hours of labor just to acquire its annual food supp ly; today it
takes about 260 hours of work. Despite falling employment,
American factories output is up because produ ctivity has
climbed steadily though workers wages and ben efits have
not increased much; productivity is up 40.4% since 2001.
Productivity reflects the joint efforts of many influ ences such
as, changes in technology; capital investment; th e level of
output; utilization of capacity, energ
gy and mat erials; the
organization of production; managerial skills; and the
Source: U
US Labor
characteristics and efforts of the work force .
Rising
Deparrtment
productivity indicates less time involved per unit o f output, a
favorable sign of efficient use of resources in the economy.
Gains in productivity reduce costs and can lead to bboth lower prices, as well as higher
real wages.
Overall U.S. productivity has grown at an annual rate of more than 2% per year on
average over the last 40 years. Strong productivit y growth is another reason for low
inflation. Construction, in general, is a major bene ficiary of low and stable inflation.
When productivity grows at 2.7% a year, the sta ndard of living doubles every 27
years; at 1.4% it doubles every 51 years; at 5% it dooubles every 14 years.
The factors that influence productivity gains in th e rail transit construction industry
include market size, structure, competition and cusstomization. Although not the only
indicator, construction project duration is an important measure of overall
productivity. The results of an analysis of Metrora il System construction duration by
major element is in the final table in this section. T hese data indicate that most project
elements have experienced considerable productivity gains. Related cost savings are
analyzed in the following section.

r Factors in Rail Transit Construction Productivity


Figure 4: Primary
Wages
20%
Design
Standardization
10%

Proj ect Uniqueness


5%
C ontracting
Inn ovation and
Co mpetition
12%

Owner
Organization
10%

Fundi ng and
Overrsight
5%

Technology and
Analytical Methods
15%

Project
Management
15%

Labor Or ganization,
Skills an d Training
8%

Project
Management
15%

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013


81B_PB_4out_Same_55924_ASCE.job_Process Black_10/08/2013_10:00:39
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Magenta_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Yellow_10/08/2013_10:00:39

152

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

152

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

Productivity Analysis

Productivity Analysis

America is more productive today than at any oth er point in


history because it is more efficient at producing goods and
services. In 1870, the typical U.S. household requ ired 1,800
hours of labor just to acquire its annual food supp ly; today it
takes about 260 hours of work. Despite falling employment,
American factories output is up because produ ctivity has
climbed steadily though workers wages and ben efits have
not increased much; productivity is up 40.4% since 2001.

America is more productive today than at any oth er point in


history because it is more efficient at producing goods and
services. In 1870, the typical U.S. household requ ired 1,800
hours of labor just to acquire its annual food supp ly; today it
takes about 260 hours of work. Despite falling employment,
American factories output is up because produ ctivity has
climbed steadily though workers wages and ben efits have
not increased much; productivity is up 40.4% since 2001.

Productivity reflects the joint efforts of many influ ences such


as, changes in technology; capital investment; th e level of
output; utilization of capacity, energ
gy and mat erials; the
organization of production; managerial skills; and the
Source: U
US Labor
characteristics and efforts of the work force .
Rising
Deparrtment
productivity indicates less time involved per unit o f output, a
favorable sign of efficient use of resources in the economy.
Gains in productivity reduce costs and can lead to bboth lower prices, as well as higher
real wages.

Productivity reflects the joint efforts of many influ ences such


as, changes in technology; capital investment; th e level of
output; utilization of capacity, energ
gy and mat erials; the
organization of production; managerial skills; and the
Source: U
US Labor
characteristics and efforts of the work force .
Rising
Deparrtment
productivity indicates less time involved per unit o f output, a
favorable sign of efficient use of resources in the economy.
Gains in productivity reduce costs and can lead to bboth lower prices, as well as higher
real wages.

Overall U.S. productivity has grown at an annual rate of more than 2% per year on
average over the last 40 years. Strong productivit y growth is another reason for low
inflation. Construction, in general, is a major bene ficiary of low and stable inflation.
When productivity grows at 2.7% a year, the sta ndard of living doubles every 27
years; at 1.4% it doubles every 51 years; at 5% it dooubles every 14 years.

Overall U.S. productivity has grown at an annual rate of more than 2% per year on
average over the last 40 years. Strong productivit y growth is another reason for low
inflation. Construction, in general, is a major bene ficiary of low and stable inflation.
When productivity grows at 2.7% a year, the sta ndard of living doubles every 27
years; at 1.4% it doubles every 51 years; at 5% it dooubles every 14 years.

The factors that influence productivity gains in th e rail transit construction industry
include market size, structure, competition and cusstomization. Although not the only
indicator, construction project duration is an important measure of overall
productivity. The results of an analysis of Metrora il System construction duration by
major element is in the final table in this section. T hese data indicate that most project
elements have experienced considerable productivity gains. Related cost savings are
analyzed in the following section.

The factors that influence productivity gains in th e rail transit construction industry
include market size, structure, competition and cusstomization. Although not the only
indicator, construction project duration is an important measure of overall
productivity. The results of an analysis of Metrora il System construction duration by
major element is in the final table in this section. T hese data indicate that most project
elements have experienced considerable productivity gains. Related cost savings are
analyzed in the following section.

r Factors in Rail Transit Construction Productivity


Figure 4: Primary
Wages
20%
Design
Standardization
10%

Labor Or ganization,
Skills an d Training
8%
Proj ect Uniqueness
5%
C ontracting
Inn ovation and
Co mpetition
12%

Owner
Organization
10%

Fundi ng and
Overrsight
5%

Technology and
Analytical Methods
15%
Project
Management
15%

r Factors in Rail Transit Construction Productivity


Figure 4: Primary
Wages
20%
Design
Standardization
10%

Labor Or ganization,
Skills an d Training
8%
Proj ect Uniqueness
5%
C ontracting
Inn ovation and
Co mpetition
12%

Owner
Organization
10%

Fundi ng and
Overrsight
5%

Technology and
Analytical Methods
15%
Project
Management
15%

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

153

Figure 5: Construction Project Duration by Major Element


Elem
ent
Num
ber

Basic Project Element*

1.

Real Estate

2.

Cut and Cover Station

3.

At-Grade Station (excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

4.

Aerial Station (excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

5.
6.
7.

At-Grade Lines (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

8.

Aerial Lines (excl of Trackwork/Systems)

9.

Built in 1970s
Duration in
days

Built in late
1990s/2000s
Duration in days

153

Figure 5: Construction Project Duration by Major Element


Percentag
e Change
in
Duration

Elem
ent
Num
ber

Basic Project Element*

N/A

N/A

N/A

1.

Real Estate

1,530

1,124

-27%

2.

Cut and Cover Station

790

780

-1%

3.

At-Grade Station (excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

1,374

1,050

-24%

4.

Aerial Station (excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

Parking Structures

820

609

-26%

5.

Cut & Cover Lines (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

780

860

10%

6.

1,095

930

-15%

7.

At-Grade Lines (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

1,095

1,050

-4%

8.

Aerial Lines (excl of Trackwork/Systems)

Tunnel Line (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

1,715

1,140

-34%

9.

10.

Automatic Train Control

1,953

1,075

-45%

11.

Communications

818

827

1%

12.

Running Track

760

820

13.

Trackwork: Double-crossover

760

14.

Trackwork: Equilateral Turnout

760

15.

Traction Power

16.
17.

Built in 1970s
Duration in
days

Built in late
1990s/2000s
Duration in days

Percentag
e Change
in
Duration

N/A

N/A

N/A

1,530

1,124

-27%

790

780

-1%

1,374

1,050

-24%

Parking Structures

820

609

-26%

Cut & Cover Lines (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

780

860

10%

1,095

930

-15%

1,095

1,050

-4%

Tunnel Line (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

1,715

1,140

-34%

10.

Automatic Train Control

1,953

1,075

-45%

11.

Communications

818

827

1%

8%

12.

Running Track

760

820

8%

820

8%

13.

Trackwork: Double-crossover

760

820

8%

820

8%

14.

Trackwork: Equilateral Turnout

760

820

8%

850

840

-1%

15.

Traction Power

850

840

-1%

Elevators

792

492

-38%

16.

Elevators

792

492

-38%

Escalators

792

492

-38%

17.

Escalators

792

492

-38%

18

Fare Collection

577

547

-5%

18

Fare Collection

577

547

-5%

19.

Railcars

2,809

1,296

-54%

19.

Railcars

2,809

1,296

-54%

20.

Rail Yards

947

960

1%

20.

Rail Yards

947

960

1%

Cost Analysis

Cost Analysis

Rail transit customers today are far more demanding and discriminating consumers
than at any other time in American history. Though U.S. median household income
fell over the last decade when adjusted for inflation due to the troubled economy,
median household income has grown substantially since construction began on the
Metrorail System. As reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, median household income
in 2010 dollars increased from $43,479 in 1975, $44,616 in 1980, and $48,423 in
1990 to $49,445 in 2010. In a related trend, the U.S. now has more vehicles than
licensed drivers. In 2009, there were 1.19 vehicles per licensed driver, compared to
1.07 in 1990 and 0.96 in 1980. These rises in standard of living require rail transit
projects to offer substantial mobility advantages if they are to attract users and

Rail transit customers today are far more demanding and discriminating consumers
than at any other time in American history. Though U.S. median household income
fell over the last decade when adjusted for inflation due to the troubled economy,
median household income has grown substantially since construction began on the
Metrorail System. As reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, median household income
in 2010 dollars increased from $43,479 in 1975, $44,616 in 1980, and $48,423 in
1990 to $49,445 in 2010. In a related trend, the U.S. now has more vehicles than
licensed drivers. In 2009, there were 1.19 vehicles per licensed driver, compared to
1.07 in 1990 and 0.96 in 1980. These rises in standard of living require rail transit
projects to offer substantial mobility advantages if they are to attract users and

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

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Yellow_10/08/2013_10:00:39

153

Figure 5: Construction Project Duration by Major Element


Elem
ent
Num
ber

Basic Project Element*

1.

Real Estate

2.

Cut and Cover Station

3.

At-Grade Station (excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

4.

Aerial Station (excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

5.
6.
7.

At-Grade Lines (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

8.

Aerial Lines (excl of Trackwork/Systems)

9.

Built in 1970s
Duration in
days

Built in late
1990s/2000s
Duration in days

153

Figure 5: Construction Project Duration by Major Element


Percentag
e Change
in
Duration

Elem
ent
Num
ber

Basic Project Element*

N/A

N/A

N/A

1.

Real Estate

1,530

1,124

-27%

2.

Cut and Cover Station

790

780

-1%

3.

At-Grade Station (excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

1,374

1,050

-24%

4.

Aerial Station (excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

Parking Structures

820

609

-26%

5.

Cut & Cover Lines (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

780

860

10%

6.

1,095

930

-15%

7.

At-Grade Lines (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

1,095

1,050

-4%

8.

Aerial Lines (excl of Trackwork/Systems)

Tunnel Line (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

1,715

1,140

-34%

9.

10.

Automatic Train Control

1,953

1,075

-45%

11.

Communications

818

827

1%

12.

Running Track

760

820

13.

Trackwork: Double-crossover

760

14.

Trackwork: Equilateral Turnout

760

15.

Traction Power

16.
17.

Built in 1970s
Duration in
days

Built in late
1990s/2000s
Duration in days

Percentag
e Change
in
Duration

N/A

N/A

N/A

1,530

1,124

-27%

790

780

-1%

1,374

1,050

-24%

Parking Structures

820

609

-26%

Cut & Cover Lines (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

780

860

10%

1,095

930

-15%

1,095

1,050

-4%

Tunnel Line (excl. of Trackwork/Systems)

1,715

1,140

-34%

10.

Automatic Train Control

1,953

1,075

-45%

11.

Communications

818

827

1%

8%

12.

Running Track

760

820

8%

820

8%

13.

Trackwork: Double-crossover

760

820

8%

820

8%

14.

Trackwork: Equilateral Turnout

760

820

8%

850

840

-1%

15.

Traction Power

850

840

-1%

Elevators

792

492

-38%

16.

Elevators

792

492

-38%

Escalators

792

492

-38%

17.

Escalators

792

492

-38%

18

Fare Collection

577

547

-5%

18

Fare Collection

577

547

-5%

19.

Railcars

2,809

1,296

-54%

19.

Railcars

2,809

1,296

-54%

20.

Rail Yards

947

960

1%

20.

Rail Yards

947

960

1%

Cost Analysis

Cost Analysis

Rail transit customers today are far more demanding and discriminating consumers
than at any other time in American history. Though U.S. median household income
fell over the last decade when adjusted for inflation due to the troubled economy,
median household income has grown substantially since construction began on the
Metrorail System. As reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, median household income
in 2010 dollars increased from $43,479 in 1975, $44,616 in 1980, and $48,423 in
1990 to $49,445 in 2010. In a related trend, the U.S. now has more vehicles than
licensed drivers. In 2009, there were 1.19 vehicles per licensed driver, compared to
1.07 in 1990 and 0.96 in 1980. These rises in standard of living require rail transit
projects to offer substantial mobility advantages if they are to attract users and

Rail transit customers today are far more demanding and discriminating consumers
than at any other time in American history. Though U.S. median household income
fell over the last decade when adjusted for inflation due to the troubled economy,
median household income has grown substantially since construction began on the
Metrorail System. As reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, median household income
in 2010 dollars increased from $43,479 in 1975, $44,616 in 1980, and $48,423 in
1990 to $49,445 in 2010. In a related trend, the U.S. now has more vehicles than
licensed drivers. In 2009, there were 1.19 vehicles per licensed driver, compared to
1.07 in 1990 and 0.96 in 1980. These rises in standard of living require rail transit
projects to offer substantial mobility advantages if they are to attract users and

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

achieve societal benefits. However, higher levels o f speed, comfort and convenience
all come with higher levels of project cost.
Rail transit projects that are advanced to constructtion fully satisfy all environmental
regulations and reach a local consensus during thee lengthy environmental process for
the final selection of the project. This public dial ogue often leads to cost increases,
changes in scope, and expansion or enhancement s to satisfy system users and nonusers. Adding amenities into project designs incr eases project costs, but ultimately
this process leads to a better project with higher community acceptance.
Along with the cost demands made on rail constru ction projects, the overall value of
construction continues to increase significantly eac h year. The U.S. market represents
about one-quarter of the worlds total $3.4 trillion construction market. Total
construction employment is more than 6.7 millioon workers (about 6 percent of the
nations total non-farm, private sector employmen t). The U.S. annual construction
rate is now in excess of $807 billion (U.S. Cen sus Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce, November 2011; U.S. Census Bureau News, January 3, 2012).
Yet despite these increasing expenditures and cost demands, Metrorail construction
has become systematically more efficient and less e xpensive due to increases in
productivity. Nearly 80 of each dollar invested to build the Metrorail System went to
construction contracting, real estate acquisition, pro curement of railcars to run
passenger service and payment for insurance coverrage; this spending is supplemented
by investment in project design services and projec t management cost by the agency.
Twenty major elements account for more than 95% of the total cost for a typical
Metrorail construction project. These elements can be grouped into five basic
categories; real estate; stations and parking; lines; s ystems; railcars and yards.
Figure 6: Metrorail Construction Cost Tr ends; 1970-2003 by Element

154

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154

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

achieve societal benefits. However, higher levels o f speed, comfort and convenience
all come with higher levels of project cost.
Rail transit projects that are advanced to constructtion fully satisfy all environmental
regulations and reach a local consensus during thee lengthy environmental process for
the final selection of the project. This public dial ogue often leads to cost increases,
changes in scope, and expansion or enhancement s to satisfy system users and nonusers. Adding amenities into project designs incr eases project costs, but ultimately
this process leads to a better project with higher community acceptance.
Along with the cost demands made on rail constru ction projects, the overall value of
construction continues to increase significantly eac h year. The U.S. market represents
about one-quarter of the worlds total $3.4 trillion construction market. Total
construction employment is more than 6.7 millioon workers (about 6 percent of the
nations total non-farm, private sector employmen t). The U.S. annual construction
rate is now in excess of $807 billion (U.S. Cen sus Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce, November 2011; U.S. Census Bureau News, January 3, 2012).
Yet despite these increasing expenditures and cost demands, Metrorail construction
has become systematically more efficient and less e xpensive due to increases in
productivity. Nearly 80 of each dollar invested to build the Metrorail System went to
construction contracting, real estate acquisition, pro curement of railcars to run
passenger service and payment for insurance coverrage; this spending is supplemented
by investment in project design services and projec t management cost by the agency.
Twenty major elements account for more than 95% of the total cost for a typical
Metrorail construction project. These elements can be grouped into five basic
categories; real estate; stations and parking; lines; s ystems; railcars and yards.
Figure 6: Metrorail Construction Cost Tr ends; 1970-2003 by Element

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013


82B_PB_4out_Same_55924_ASCE.job_Process Black_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Cyan_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Magenta_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Yellow_10/08/2013_10:00:39

154

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

154

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

achieve societal benefits. However, higher levels o f speed, comfort and convenience
all come with higher levels of project cost.

achieve societal benefits. However, higher levels o f speed, comfort and convenience
all come with higher levels of project cost.

Rail transit projects that are advanced to constructtion fully satisfy all environmental
regulations and reach a local consensus during thee lengthy environmental process for
the final selection of the project. This public dial ogue often leads to cost increases,
changes in scope, and expansion or enhancement s to satisfy system users and nonusers. Adding amenities into project designs incr eases project costs, but ultimately
this process leads to a better project with higher community acceptance.

Rail transit projects that are advanced to constructtion fully satisfy all environmental
regulations and reach a local consensus during thee lengthy environmental process for
the final selection of the project. This public dial ogue often leads to cost increases,
changes in scope, and expansion or enhancement s to satisfy system users and nonusers. Adding amenities into project designs incr eases project costs, but ultimately
this process leads to a better project with higher community acceptance.

Along with the cost demands made on rail constru ction projects, the overall value of
construction continues to increase significantly eac h year. The U.S. market represents
about one-quarter of the worlds total $3.4 trillion construction market. Total
construction employment is more than 6.7 millioon workers (about 6 percent of the
nations total non-farm, private sector employmen t). The U.S. annual construction
rate is now in excess of $807 billion (U.S. Cen sus Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce, November 2011; U.S. Census Bureau News, January 3, 2012).

Along with the cost demands made on rail constru ction projects, the overall value of
construction continues to increase significantly eac h year. The U.S. market represents
about one-quarter of the worlds total $3.4 trillion construction market. Total
construction employment is more than 6.7 millioon workers (about 6 percent of the
nations total non-farm, private sector employmen t). The U.S. annual construction
rate is now in excess of $807 billion (U.S. Cen sus Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce, November 2011; U.S. Census Bureau News, January 3, 2012).

Yet despite these increasing expenditures and cost demands, Metrorail construction
has become systematically more efficient and less e xpensive due to increases in
productivity. Nearly 80 of each dollar invested to build the Metrorail System went to
construction contracting, real estate acquisition, pro curement of railcars to run
passenger service and payment for insurance coverrage; this spending is supplemented
by investment in project design services and projec t management cost by the agency.
Twenty major elements account for more than 95% of the total cost for a typical
Metrorail construction project. These elements can be grouped into five basic
categories; real estate; stations and parking; lines; s ystems; railcars and yards.

Yet despite these increasing expenditures and cost demands, Metrorail construction
has become systematically more efficient and less e xpensive due to increases in
productivity. Nearly 80 of each dollar invested to build the Metrorail System went to
construction contracting, real estate acquisition, pro curement of railcars to run
passenger service and payment for insurance coverrage; this spending is supplemented
by investment in project design services and projec t management cost by the agency.
Twenty major elements account for more than 95% of the total cost for a typical
Metrorail construction project. These elements can be grouped into five basic
categories; real estate; stations and parking; lines; s ystems; railcars and yards.

Figure 6: Metrorail Construction Cost Tr ends; 1970-2003 by Element

Figure 6: Metrorail Construction Cost Tr ends; 1970-2003 by Element

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

155

155

These trends are derived from an extensive and well-tested database, unparalleled
in the U.S. rail transit industry. This chart represents an initial assessment, a work
in progress, of a check-the-trends study, and may result in more refined and
further validated future studies. Any attempt to draw strict numerical conclusions
at this phase of the study may result in errors. These trends, although
approximations, give a sense of direction, general patterns, and overall
performance insight.

These trends are derived from an extensive and well-tested database, unparalleled
in the U.S. rail transit industry. This chart represents an initial assessment, a work
in progress, of a check-the-trends study, and may result in more refined and
further validated future studies. Any attempt to draw strict numerical conclusions
at this phase of the study may result in errors. These trends, although
approximations, give a sense of direction, general patterns, and overall
performance insight.

These costs are only construction contracting costs except element #1, which
represents an average real estate acquisition price. These costs are based on
completed construction contract values. It should be emphasized again that the
purpose of this tabulation is not to establish numerical conclusions; it is only to
check-the-trends of Metrorail construction costs, based on true, apple-to-apple
comparisons.

These costs are only construction contracting costs except element #1, which
represents an average real estate acquisition price. These costs are based on
completed construction contract values. It should be emphasized again that the
purpose of this tabulation is not to establish numerical conclusions; it is only to
check-the-trends of Metrorail construction costs, based on true, apple-to-apple
comparisons.

Figure 7: Cost Comparison by Major Element (In thousands of 2002 dollars)


Description

Element
#

Unit of
Measurement
Median Home
Price

Cost
*YESTERDAY*
MD: $162; VA:
$198; DC: $188

Cost
**TODAY**

YESTERDAYTO-TODAY
Cost Trend

1.

Real Estate

MD: $195; VA:


$319; DC: $250

MD: 20%; VA:


61%; DC: 33%

2.

Cut and Cover Station *

Station

86,310

64,640

3.

At-Grade Station *

Station

24,840

17,220

4.

Aerial Station*

Station

37,860

5.

Parking Structures*

Space

6.

Cut & Cover Line *

7.

Figure 7: Cost Comparison by Major Element (In thousands of 2002 dollars)


Description

Element
#

Unit of
Measurement
Median Home
Price

Cost
*YESTERDAY*
MD: $162; VA:
$198; DC: $188

Cost
**TODAY**

YESTERDAYTO-TODAY
Cost Trend

1.

Real Estate

MD: $195; VA:


$319; DC: $250

MD: 20%; VA:


61%; DC: 33%

-25%

2.

Cut and Cover Station *

Station

86,310

64,640

-25%

-31%

3.

At-Grade Station *

Station

24,840

17,220

-31%

30,250

-20%

4.

Aerial Station*

Station

37,860

30,250

-20%

13

-28%

5.

Parking Structures*

Space

13

-28%

1,000 Route foot

18,430

13,153

-29%

6.

Cut & Cover Line *

1,000 Route foot

18,430

13,153

-29%

At-Grade Line *

1,000 Route foot

2,340

1,750

-25%

7.

At-Grade Line *

1,000 Route foot

2,340

1,750

-25%

8.

Aerial Line *

1,000 Route foot

12,500

8,700

-30%

8.

Aerial Line *

1,000 Route foot

12,500

8,700

-30%

9.

Tunnel Line *

1,000 Route foot

19,373

11,006

-43%

9.

Tunnel Line *

1,000 Route foot

19,373

11,006

-43%

Route-mile

3,640

2,500

-31%

10.

Automatic Train Control

Route-mile

3,640

2,500

-31%

Station

1,270

930

-27%

11.

Communications

Station

1,270

930

-27%

Route-mile

2,390

1,925

-19%

12.

Running Track

Route-mile

2,390

1,925

-19%

10.

Automatic Train Control

11.

Communications

12.

Running Track

13.

Trackwork: Double-crossover

Unit

680

620

-9%

13.

Trackwork: Double-crossover

Unit

680

620

-9%

14.

Trackwork: Equilateral Turnout

Unit

180

120

-33%

14.

Trackwork: Equilateral Turnout

Unit

180

120

-33%

15.

Traction Power

Substation

5,250

2,660

-49%

15.

Traction Power

Substation

5,250

2,660

-49%

16.

Elevators

Unit

290

260

-10%

16.

Elevators

Unit

290

260

-10%

17.

Escalators

Unit

550

475

-14%

17.

Escalators

Unit

550

475

-14%

18.

Fare Collection

Station

1,020

870

-15%

18.

Fare Collection

Station

1,020

870

-15%

19.

Rail Cars

Car

2,030

1,900

-6%

19.

Rail Cars

Car

2,030

1,900

-6%

20.

Rail Yards

Car Stored

568

405

26%

20.

Rail Yards

Car Stored

568

405

*(Excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

26%

*(Excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

83A_PB_4out_Same_55924_ASCE.job_Process Black_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Cyan_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Magenta_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Yellow_10/08/2013_10:00:39

Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi on 08/30/16. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

155

155

These trends are derived from an extensive and well-tested database, unparalleled
in the U.S. rail transit industry. This chart represents an initial assessment, a work
in progress, of a check-the-trends study, and may result in more refined and
further validated future studies. Any attempt to draw strict numerical conclusions
at this phase of the study may result in errors. These trends, although
approximations, give a sense of direction, general patterns, and overall
performance insight.

These trends are derived from an extensive and well-tested database, unparalleled
in the U.S. rail transit industry. This chart represents an initial assessment, a work
in progress, of a check-the-trends study, and may result in more refined and
further validated future studies. Any attempt to draw strict numerical conclusions
at this phase of the study may result in errors. These trends, although
approximations, give a sense of direction, general patterns, and overall
performance insight.

These costs are only construction contracting costs except element #1, which
represents an average real estate acquisition price. These costs are based on
completed construction contract values. It should be emphasized again that the
purpose of this tabulation is not to establish numerical conclusions; it is only to
check-the-trends of Metrorail construction costs, based on true, apple-to-apple
comparisons.

These costs are only construction contracting costs except element #1, which
represents an average real estate acquisition price. These costs are based on
completed construction contract values. It should be emphasized again that the
purpose of this tabulation is not to establish numerical conclusions; it is only to
check-the-trends of Metrorail construction costs, based on true, apple-to-apple
comparisons.

Figure 7: Cost Comparison by Major Element (In thousands of 2002 dollars)


Description

Element
#

Unit of
Measurement
Median Home
Price

Cost
*YESTERDAY*
MD: $162; VA:
$198; DC: $188

Cost
**TODAY**

YESTERDAYTO-TODAY
Cost Trend

1.

Real Estate

MD: $195; VA:


$319; DC: $250

MD: 20%; VA:


61%; DC: 33%

2.

Cut and Cover Station *

Station

86,310

64,640

3.

At-Grade Station *

Station

24,840

17,220

4.

Aerial Station*

Station

37,860

5.

Parking Structures*

Space

6.

Cut & Cover Line *

7.

Figure 7: Cost Comparison by Major Element (In thousands of 2002 dollars)


Description

Element
#

Unit of
Measurement
Median Home
Price

Cost
*YESTERDAY*
MD: $162; VA:
$198; DC: $188

Cost
**TODAY**

YESTERDAYTO-TODAY
Cost Trend

1.

Real Estate

MD: $195; VA:


$319; DC: $250

MD: 20%; VA:


61%; DC: 33%

-25%

2.

Cut and Cover Station *

Station

86,310

64,640

-25%

-31%

3.

At-Grade Station *

Station

24,840

17,220

-31%

30,250

-20%

4.

Aerial Station*

Station

37,860

30,250

-20%

13

-28%

5.

Parking Structures*

Space

13

-28%

1,000 Route foot

18,430

13,153

-29%

6.

Cut & Cover Line *

1,000 Route foot

18,430

13,153

-29%

At-Grade Line *

1,000 Route foot

2,340

1,750

-25%

7.

At-Grade Line *

1,000 Route foot

2,340

1,750

-25%

8.

Aerial Line *

1,000 Route foot

12,500

8,700

-30%

8.

Aerial Line *

1,000 Route foot

12,500

8,700

-30%

9.

Tunnel Line *

1,000 Route foot

19,373

11,006

-43%

9.

Tunnel Line *

1,000 Route foot

19,373

11,006

-43%

Route-mile

3,640

2,500

-31%

10.

Automatic Train Control

Route-mile

3,640

2,500

-31%

Station

1,270

930

-27%

11.

Communications

Station

1,270

930

-27%

Route-mile

2,390

1,925

-19%

12.

Running Track

Route-mile

2,390

1,925

-19%

10.

Automatic Train Control

11.

Communications

12.

Running Track

13.

Trackwork: Double-crossover

Unit

680

620

-9%

13.

Trackwork: Double-crossover

Unit

680

620

-9%

14.

Trackwork: Equilateral Turnout

Unit

180

120

-33%

14.

Trackwork: Equilateral Turnout

Unit

180

120

-33%

15.

Traction Power

Substation

5,250

2,660

-49%

15.

Traction Power

Substation

5,250

2,660

-49%

16.

Elevators

Unit

290

260

-10%

16.

Elevators

Unit

290

260

-10%

17.

Escalators

Unit

550

475

-14%

17.

Escalators

Unit

550

475

-14%

18.

Fare Collection

Station

1,020

870

-15%

18.

Fare Collection

Station

1,020

870

-15%

19.

Rail Cars

Car

2,030

1,900

-6%

19.

Rail Cars

Car

2,030

1,900

-6%

20.

Rail Yards

Car Stored

568

405

26%

20.

Rail Yards

Car Stored

568

405

*(Excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013

*(Excl. of line/trackwork/systems)

26%

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

Conclusions
The tabulation shown on this page compares the actual budgets of two Metrorail
extension projects with a what-if budget that was developed by applying the full
range of cost trends discussed previously. The what-if budget reflects the total cost
for the project if the cost trends were not realized. Hence, the analysis is intended to
represent a pre-trend budget, not a future year analysis. To develop the what-if
budget, the actual cost of each element was increased against the value of its
downward trend. For elements exhibiting upward cost trends, (i.e., real estate) a
decrease was applied. A composite trend was computed for each element by
incorporating systems and trackwork trends where applicable. A mid-point of linear
extrapolation of these trends was then estimated. The trends derived as follows:

Line-Trackwork & Systems


Stations
Parking Structures
Railcars
Real Estate
Rail Yards

-30%
-25%
-28%
- 6%
35%
-16%

Figure 8: Metrorail Construction Total Costs Comparison


For Two of the Most Recent Extensions (in Year of Expenditure Dollars)
-ActualProject Budget costs at
completion
Green Line
Blue Line
Extension to
Extension
Branch Ave. to Largo (b)
$ mil
$ mil
(1)
(2)

-What-ifCost Trends Not Realized

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

156

What-if-to-Actual
Cost Differences

Major Budget
Line-Items

Green Line
Extension to
Branch Ave.
$ mil
(3)

Blue Line
Extension
to Largo
$ mil
(4)

Green Line
Extension to
Branch Ave.
$ mil
(3-1)

Blue Line
Extension
to Largo
$ mil
(4-2)

410

265

Line,
Trackwork &
Systems

530

345

120

80

260

115

Stations

325

145

65

30

40

29

Parking
Structures

51

37

11

30

32

Railcars

32

34

50

19

Real Estate

33

12

(18)

(7)

125

Rail Yard

145

20

$915M

$460M

Total Costs

$1,116M

$573M

$201M
*22%*

$113M
*25%*

Notes:
Green Line Extension: (6.4-mile, 5-station, 31% underground, 23% aerial and 40% at-grade) opened to passenger
service 1/13/01; the rail yard opened to revenue service 3/1/03
Blue Line Extension: (3.2-mile, 2-station, 85% underground, 5% aerial and 10% at-grade) opened for passenger
on 12/18/04.

Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi on 08/30/16. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

156

Conclusions
The tabulation shown on this page compares the actual budgets of two Metrorail
extension projects with a what-if budget that was developed by applying the full
range of cost trends discussed previously. The what-if budget reflects the total cost
for the project if the cost trends were not realized. Hence, the analysis is intended to
represent a pre-trend budget, not a future year analysis. To develop the what-if
budget, the actual cost of each element was increased against the value of its
downward trend. For elements exhibiting upward cost trends, (i.e., real estate) a
decrease was applied. A composite trend was computed for each element by
incorporating systems and trackwork trends where applicable. A mid-point of linear
extrapolation of these trends was then estimated. The trends derived as follows:

Line-Trackwork & Systems


Stations
Parking Structures
Railcars
Real Estate
Rail Yards

-30%
-25%
-28%
- 6%
35%
-16%

Figure 8: Metrorail Construction Total Costs Comparison


For Two of the Most Recent Extensions (in Year of Expenditure Dollars)
-ActualProject Budget costs at
completion
Green Line
Blue Line
Extension to
Extension
Branch Ave. to Largo (b)
$ mil
$ mil
(1)
(2)

-What-ifCost Trends Not Realized

What-if-to-Actual
Cost Differences

Major Budget
Line-Items

Green Line
Extension to
Branch Ave.
$ mil
(3)

Blue Line
Extension
to Largo
$ mil
(4)

Green Line
Extension to
Branch Ave.
$ mil
(3-1)

Blue Line
Extension
to Largo
$ mil
(4-2)

410

265

Line,
Trackwork &
Systems

530

345

120

80

260

115

Stations

325

145

65

30

40

29

Parking
Structures

51

37

11

30

32

Railcars

32

34

50

19

Real Estate

33

12

(18)

(7)

125

Rail Yard

145

20

$915M

$460M

Total Costs

$1,116M

$573M

$201M
*22%*

$113M
*25%*

Notes:
Green Line Extension: (6.4-mile, 5-station, 31% underground, 23% aerial and 40% at-grade) opened to passenger
service 1/13/01; the rail yard opened to revenue service 3/1/03
Blue Line Extension: (3.2-mile, 2-station, 85% underground, 5% aerial and 10% at-grade) opened for passenger
on 12/18/04.

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013


83B_PB_4out_Same_55924_ASCE.job_Process Black_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Cyan_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Magenta_10/08/2013_10:00:39
Yellow_10/08/2013_10:00:39

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

156

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

156

Conclusions

Conclusions

The tabulation shown on this page compares the actual budgets of two Metrorail
extension projects with a what-if budget that was developed by applying the full
range of cost trends discussed previously. The what-if budget reflects the total cost
for the project if the cost trends were not realized. Hence, the analysis is intended to
represent a pre-trend budget, not a future year analysis. To develop the what-if
budget, the actual cost of each element was increased against the value of its
downward trend. For elements exhibiting upward cost trends, (i.e., real estate) a
decrease was applied. A composite trend was computed for each element by
incorporating systems and trackwork trends where applicable. A mid-point of linear
extrapolation of these trends was then estimated. The trends derived as follows:

The tabulation shown on this page compares the actual budgets of two Metrorail
extension projects with a what-if budget that was developed by applying the full
range of cost trends discussed previously. The what-if budget reflects the total cost
for the project if the cost trends were not realized. Hence, the analysis is intended to
represent a pre-trend budget, not a future year analysis. To develop the what-if
budget, the actual cost of each element was increased against the value of its
downward trend. For elements exhibiting upward cost trends, (i.e., real estate) a
decrease was applied. A composite trend was computed for each element by
incorporating systems and trackwork trends where applicable. A mid-point of linear
extrapolation of these trends was then estimated. The trends derived as follows:

Line-Trackwork & Systems


Stations
Parking Structures
Railcars
Real Estate
Rail Yards

-30%
-25%
-28%
- 6%
35%
-16%

Figure 8: Metrorail Construction Total Costs Comparison


For Two of the Most Recent Extensions (in Year of Expenditure Dollars)
-ActualProject Budget costs at
completion
Green Line
Blue Line
Extension to
Extension
Branch Ave. to Largo (b)
$ mil
$ mil
(1)
(2)

-What-ifCost Trends Not Realized

What-if-to-Actual
Cost Differences

Major Budget
Line-Items

Green Line
Extension to
Branch Ave.
$ mil
(3)

Blue Line
Extension
to Largo
$ mil
(4)

Green Line
Extension to
Branch Ave.
$ mil
(3-1)

Blue Line
Extension
to Largo
$ mil
(4-2)

Line-Trackwork & Systems


Stations
Parking Structures
Railcars
Real Estate
Rail Yards

-30%
-25%
-28%
- 6%
35%
-16%

Figure 8: Metrorail Construction Total Costs Comparison


For Two of the Most Recent Extensions (in Year of Expenditure Dollars)
-ActualProject Budget costs at
completion
Green Line
Blue Line
Extension to
Extension
Branch Ave. to Largo (b)
$ mil
$ mil
(1)
(2)

-What-ifCost Trends Not Realized

What-if-to-Actual
Cost Differences

Major Budget
Line-Items

Green Line
Extension to
Branch Ave.
$ mil
(3)

Blue Line
Extension
to Largo
$ mil
(4)

Green Line
Extension to
Branch Ave.
$ mil
(3-1)

Blue Line
Extension
to Largo
$ mil
(4-2)

410

265

Line,
Trackwork &
Systems

530

345

120

80

410

265

Line,
Trackwork &
Systems

530

345

120

80

260

115

Stations

325

145

65

30

260

115

Stations

325

145

65

30

40

29

Parking
Structures

51

37

11

40

29

Parking
Structures

51

37

11

30

32

Railcars

32

34

30

32

Railcars

32

34

50

19

Real Estate

33

12

(18)

(7)

50

19

Real Estate

33

12

(18)

(7)

125

Rail Yard

145

20

125

Rail Yard

145

20

$915M

$460M

Total Costs

$1,116M

$573M

$201M
*22%*

$113M
*25%*

$915M

$460M

Total Costs

$1,116M

$573M

$201M
*22%*

$113M
*25%*

Notes:
Green Line Extension: (6.4-mile, 5-station, 31% underground, 23% aerial and 40% at-grade) opened to passenger
service 1/13/01; the rail yard opened to revenue service 3/1/03
Blue Line Extension: (3.2-mile, 2-station, 85% underground, 5% aerial and 10% at-grade) opened for passenger
on 12/18/04.

Notes:
Green Line Extension: (6.4-mile, 5-station, 31% underground, 23% aerial and 40% at-grade) opened to passenger
service 1/13/01; the rail yard opened to revenue service 3/1/03
Blue Line Extension: (3.2-mile, 2-station, 85% underground, 5% aerial and 10% at-grade) opened for passenger
on 12/18/04.

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

157

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

157

The construction phase for the Green Line extension began with the award of the first
major construction contract in September 1995 and was completed 65 months later in
January 2001. Similarly for the Blue Line extension, construction began in March
2001 was completed in 45 months on December 18, 2004. As shown in the table
below, if the cost trends had not been realized, the Green Line extension would have
cost $202 million (22%) more than the actual cost. Similarly, the Blue Line
Extension to Largo would have cost 25% more, or about $113 million. It should be
noted these are based on year of expenditure dollars. Normalization of these costs to a
common year could provide for a significant increase in the savings calculated. The
difference in savings between the two projects may reflect among other factors the
limited number of construction contracts, the Design-Build delivery method utilized
for the Blue Line Extension to Largo and the continued productivity gains between
the mid-90s and the early-00s of the mid-point of construction for these two
projects. The 6.5-mile, 5-station Green Line extension was completed via 25 major
prime contracts low-bid awarded while the 3.1-mile, 2-station Blue Line extension
was completed via only two major design-build/best-value awarded construction
contracts.

The construction phase for the Green Line extension began with the award of the first
major construction contract in September 1995 and was completed 65 months later in
January 2001. Similarly for the Blue Line extension, construction began in March
2001 was completed in 45 months on December 18, 2004. As shown in the table
below, if the cost trends had not been realized, the Green Line extension would have
cost $202 million (22%) more than the actual cost. Similarly, the Blue Line
Extension to Largo would have cost 25% more, or about $113 million. It should be
noted these are based on year of expenditure dollars. Normalization of these costs to a
common year could provide for a significant increase in the savings calculated. The
difference in savings between the two projects may reflect among other factors the
limited number of construction contracts, the Design-Build delivery method utilized
for the Blue Line Extension to Largo and the continued productivity gains between
the mid-90s and the early-00s of the mid-point of construction for these two
projects. The 6.5-mile, 5-station Green Line extension was completed via 25 major
prime contracts low-bid awarded while the 3.1-mile, 2-station Blue Line extension
was completed via only two major design-build/best-value awarded construction
contracts.

It should be emphasized again that the purpose of


this analysis is not to establish numerical
conclusions; it is only to check-the-trends of
Metrorail construction costs. Although Metrorail
construction trends appear to satisfy the BFC goal:
Better-Faster-Cheaper, there is still a lot of work
remaining for all stakeholders to make sure costs
continue to trend in the right direction, with even
steeper slopes, over the next 25 to 30 years. This
Source: American Public Transportation
Association via the New York Times
will be necessary for the taxpayers who pay for
these projects to be assured they are getting the
most bang for their buck. This may support the goal to add another 60 to 70 miles
of Metrorail extensions by 2025, as adopted by the WMATA Board of Directors in
March 1999, to be realized.

It should be emphasized again that the purpose of


this analysis is not to establish numerical
conclusions; it is only to check-the-trends of
Metrorail construction costs. Although Metrorail
construction trends appear to satisfy the BFC goal:
Better-Faster-Cheaper, there is still a lot of work
remaining for all stakeholders to make sure costs
continue to trend in the right direction, with even
steeper slopes, over the next 25 to 30 years. This
Source: American Public Transportation
Association via the New York Times
will be necessary for the taxpayers who pay for
these projects to be assured they are getting the
most bang for their buck. This may support the goal to add another 60 to 70 miles
of Metrorail extensions by 2025, as adopted by the WMATA Board of Directors in
March 1999, to be realized.

These productivity and cost trends are not the only reasons to be optimistic about the
future of the transit industry. Since 1995, growth in transit ridership (31%) has
outpaced growth in both U.S. population (16%) and vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
(24%). Though the number of transit trips dipped during the recession, it is again on
the rise. The analysis in this paper lends support to the conclusion that the rail transit
construction industry is substantially increasing productivity and lowering costs,
building the case for continued expansion of such facilities to meet growing demand.

These productivity and cost trends are not the only reasons to be optimistic about the
future of the transit industry. Since 1995, growth in transit ridership (31%) has
outpaced growth in both U.S. population (16%) and vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
(24%). Though the number of transit trips dipped during the recession, it is again on
the rise. The analysis in this paper lends support to the conclusion that the rail transit
construction industry is substantially increasing productivity and lowering costs,
building the case for continued expansion of such facilities to meet growing demand.

Disclaimer:
This is a summary complied for this conference from similar papers previously presented by the author
at several professional gatherings. This presentation is an abstract of a 2-year in-depth study, based on
the 30-year development of the Washington Metro Rail System (WMATA) where the author was the
Executive Manager for nine years, in charge of engineering and construction. Concepts,
methodologies, data, figures, findings and conclusions included in this presentation are not by any
means and forms the responsibility of my previous (WMATA) and present (Parsons) employers.
Responsibility for errors and omissions lies solely with the author.

Disclaimer:
This is a summary complied for this conference from similar papers previously presented by the author
at several professional gatherings. This presentation is an abstract of a 2-year in-depth study, based on
the 30-year development of the Washington Metro Rail System (WMATA) where the author was the
Executive Manager for nine years, in charge of engineering and construction. Concepts,
methodologies, data, figures, findings and conclusions included in this presentation are not by any
means and forms the responsibility of my previous (WMATA) and present (Parsons) employers.
Responsibility for errors and omissions lies solely with the author.

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2013

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157

The construction phase for the Green Line extension began with the award of the first
major construction contract in September 1995 and was completed 65 months later in
January 2001. Similarly for the Blue Line extension, construction began in March
2001 was completed in 45 months on December 18, 2004. As shown in the table
below, if the cost trends had not been realized, the Green Line extension would have
cost $202 million (22%) more than the actual cost. Similarly, the Blue Line
Extension to Largo would have cost 25% more, or about $113 million. It should be
noted these are based on year of expenditure dollars. Normalization of these costs to a
common year could provide for a significant increase in the savings calculated. The
difference in savings between the two projects may reflect among other factors the
limited number of construction contracts, the Design-Build delivery method utilized
for the Blue Line Extension to Largo and the continued productivity gains between
the mid-90s and the early-00s of the mid-point of construction for these two
projects. The 6.5-mile, 5-station Green Line extension was completed via 25 major
prime contracts low-bid awarded while the 3.1-mile, 2-station Blue Line extension
was completed via only two major design-build/best-value awarded construction
contracts.

The construction phase for the Green Line extension began with the award of the first
major construction contract in September 1995 and was completed 65 months later in
January 2001. Similarly for the Blue Line extension, construction began in March
2001 was completed in 45 months on December 18, 2004. As shown in the table
below, if the cost trends had not been realized, the Green Line extension would have
cost $202 million (22%) more than the actual cost. Similarly, the Blue Line
Extension to Largo would have cost 25% more, or about $113 million. It should be
noted these are based on year of expenditure dollars. Normalization of these costs to a
common year could provide for a significant increase in the savings calculated. The
difference in savings between the two projects may reflect among other factors the
limited number of construction contracts, the Design-Build delivery method utilized
for the Blue Line Extension to Largo and the continued productivity gains between
the mid-90s and the early-00s of the mid-point of construction for these two
projects. The 6.5-mile, 5-station Green Line extension was completed via 25 major
prime contracts low-bid awarded while the 3.1-mile, 2-station Blue Line extension
was completed via only two major design-build/best-value awarded construction
contracts.

It should be emphasized again that the purpose of


this analysis is not to establish numerical
conclusions; it is only to check-the-trends of
Metrorail construction costs. Although Metrorail
construction trends appear to satisfy the BFC goal:
Better-Faster-Cheaper, there is still a lot of work
remaining for all stakeholders to make sure costs
continue to trend in the right direction, with even
steeper slopes, over the next 25 to 30 years. This
Source: American Public Transportation
Association via the New York Times
will be necessary for the taxpayers who pay for
these projects to be assured they are getting the
most bang for their buck. This may support the goal to add another 60 to 70 miles
of Metrorail extensions by 2025, as adopted by the WMATA Board of Directors in
March 1999, to be realized.

It should be emphasized again that the purpose of


this analysis is not to establish numerical
conclusions; it is only to check-the-trends of
Metrorail construction costs. Although Metrorail
construction trends appear to satisfy the BFC goal:
Better-Faster-Cheaper, there is still a lot of work
remaining for all stakeholders to make sure costs
continue to trend in the right direction, with even
steeper slopes, over the next 25 to 30 years. This
Source: American Public Transportation
Association via the New York Times
will be necessary for the taxpayers who pay for
these projects to be assured they are getting the
most bang for their buck. This may support the goal to add another 60 to 70 miles
of Metrorail extensions by 2025, as adopted by the WMATA Board of Directors in
March 1999, to be realized.

These productivity and cost trends are not the only reasons to be optimistic about the
future of the transit industry. Since 1995, growth in transit ridership (31%) has
outpaced growth in both U.S. population (16%) and vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
(24%). Though the number of transit trips dipped during the recession, it is again on
the rise. The analysis in this paper lends support to the conclusion that the rail transit
construction industry is substantially increasing productivity and lowering costs,
building the case for continued expansion of such facilities to meet growing demand.

These productivity and cost trends are not the only reasons to be optimistic about the
future of the transit industry. Since 1995, growth in transit ridership (31%) has
outpaced growth in both U.S. population (16%) and vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
(24%). Though the number of transit trips dipped during the recession, it is again on
the rise. The analysis in this paper lends support to the conclusion that the rail transit
construction industry is substantially increasing productivity and lowering costs,
building the case for continued expansion of such facilities to meet growing demand.

Disclaimer:
This is a summary complied for this conference from similar papers previously presented by the author
at several professional gatherings. This presentation is an abstract of a 2-year in-depth study, based on
the 30-year development of the Washington Metro Rail System (WMATA) where the author was the
Executive Manager for nine years, in charge of engineering and construction. Concepts,
methodologies, data, figures, findings and conclusions included in this presentation are not by any
means and forms the responsibility of my previous (WMATA) and present (Parsons) employers.
Responsibility for errors and omissions lies solely with the author.

Disclaimer:
This is a summary complied for this conference from similar papers previously presented by the author
at several professional gatherings. This presentation is an abstract of a 2-year in-depth study, based on
the 30-year development of the Washington Metro Rail System (WMATA) where the author was the
Executive Manager for nine years, in charge of engineering and construction. Concepts,
methodologies, data, figures, findings and conclusions included in this presentation are not by any
means and forms the responsibility of my previous (WMATA) and present (Parsons) employers.
Responsibility for errors and omissions lies solely with the author.

Urban Public Transportation Systems 2013

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