SYLLABI SET I.B.

PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMAIN

Republic vs. Vda. de Castillo
No. L-69002. June 30,1988.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO,
FLORENCIO T. CASTILLO, SOLEDAD LOTA CASTELLO, CARLOS L. CASTILLO, NIEVES
KATIGBAK CASTILLO, MARIANO L. CASTILLO, HIPOLITA DYTIAPCO CASTILLO, AIDA
CASTILLO HERRERA, HERMITO HERRERA, JOSE L. CASTILLO, LILIA MACEDA CASTILLO,
TERESITA L. CASTILLO, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATANGAS and THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, Veloso, J.
PARAS, J.:
Land Registration; Public Land; Res Judicata; Shores are properties of the public
domain intended for public use, and not registrable.There is no question that one
of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final judgment must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter (Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; that
shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil
Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions of
the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their
inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private
ownership or confer title upon the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259
[1965], citing the cases of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et al., 98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et
al. v. Rodriguez, et al., 13 SCRA 704).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Resjudicata does not apply since the lots in litigation are
of public domain.Petitioner contends "that 'Lbts 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always
formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof.
Consequently, the same were not subject to registration, being outside the
commerce of men; and that since the lots in litigation are of public domain (Art.
502), par. 4 Civil Code) the registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate said lands as private property, hence, res judicata does not apply. (Rollo,
pp. 37-38).
Same; Same; Ownership;Accretion;Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake
differentiated from foreshore land or land adjacent to the sea.Lakeshore land or
lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be differentiated from
foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides (Castillo, Law on Natural
Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67) Such distinction draws importance from the
fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners
of the estate to which they have been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil.
423) while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not
available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no
longer needed for public use (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; No accretion shown to exist in the case at bar.But said
distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion shown to
exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants of
the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to
make it habitable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere Possession ofland does not by itselfdivest
automatically the land ofits public character.The defense of long possession is
likewise not available in this caae because, as already ruled by this Court, mere
possession of land does not by itself automatically diVest the land of its public
character (Cuevas v. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1968]).

(7) Republic vs. Vda de Castillo

FACTS:
1. Respondents are the registered owner of Lots 1 & 2 Psu -119166.
2. Republic sought to annul their titles contending that the land covered by the titles
have always formed part of Taal Lake and being of public ownership cannot be
subject to private registration.
3. Respondents defense:
a. Action has prescribed
b. Accretions on the bank of a lake belong to the owners of the estate to which they
have been added
c. Open and continuous possession of the land by the respondent
ISSUE:
Whether or not private parties may own the disputed lots?
HELD:
No. The lots in question are public in nature and are outside the commerce of man.
They cannot be acquired by prescription nor does possession of it will divest it of its
public character. And although accretion on the bank of a lake belong to the owners
of the estate to which they have been added, there is no accretion to speak of in this
case because the increase in the area of the land is due to the occupants who filled
up the lots with shells and sand to make it habitable and compatible to their duckraising livelihood.

Mendoza vs. Navarette

G.R. No. 82531. September 30, 1992.*
DOMINGO T. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. MARIA MENDOZA NAVARETTE, EMETERIO
NAVARETTE, BENEDICTA NAVARETTE and GEMINIANO NAVARETTE and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
That the surviving legal heirs of the said Teodoro Mendoza at the time of his death
are his wife, Eugenia Aquino, and his two (2) children; the herein plaintiff Domingo
Mendoza and defendant Maria Mendoza, married to Leoncio Navarette; Mendoza vs.
Navarette, 214 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 82531 September 30, 1992
PETITION to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Land Registration; Homestead; Free patent over private land void.A Free Patent
issued over a private land is null and void. In the 1952 case of Vital vs. Anore, this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, held: Whether a Torrens title, based
on a free patent granted by the Government under the provisions of the Public Land
Act (Act 2874) and issued under the provisions of the Land Registration Act (Act
496), has the validity and effect of a Torrens title issued as a result of judicial
proceedings need not be passed upon. The rule laid down in Ramoso vs. Obligado et
al., 70 Phil. 86, that a homestead patent, once registered under the Registration
Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title, x x x is only true and correct if the
parcel of agricultural land patented or granted as homestead by the Government,
after the requirements of the law had been complied with, was a part of the public
domain. If it was not but a private land, the patent granted and the Torrens title
issued upon the patent or homestead grant are a nullity.
Same; Fraudulent registration; Action for quieting of title imprescriptible in favor of
person in possession of the property.xxx [T]he petitioners open, public, adverse
and exclusive possession of the three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property and its
illegal inclusion in the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title issued to Leoncio
Navarette give the former a cause of action for quieting of title, which is
imprescriptible in favor of a person in possession of the property. The allegations in
his complaint before the trial court are sufficient for such a cause of action.

Maneclang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

No. L-66575. September 30, 1986.*
ADRIANO MANECLANG, JULIETA, RAMONA, VICTOR, ANTONINA, LOURDES, TEODORO
and MYRNA, all surnamed MANECLANG, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and ALFREDO MAZA, CORLETO CASTRO, SALOME RODRIGUEZ,
EDUCARDO CUISON, FERNANDO ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES
CORDERO, CLETO PEDROZO, FELIX SALARY and JOSE PANLILIO, respondents.
PETITION to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
FERNAN, J.:
Civil Law; Contracts; Compromise Agreement; Stipulations in agreement which
partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership of the fishpond which was
originally a creek, null and void, as said creek is a property of the public domain not
susceptible to private appropriation; Creek, concept of.The stipulations contained
in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership
in favor of herein petitioners of the fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by
the lower and appellate courts, was originally a creek forming a tributary of the
Agno River. Considering that as held in the case of Mercado vs. Municipal President
of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek, defined as a recess or arm extending
from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging
to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the
Torrens System in the name of any individual [Diego v. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil.
494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 455]; and considering further that neither the
mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which
prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its
conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of
the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and of
no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
Same; Same; Same; Finding that subject body of water is a creek belonging to the
public domain, a factual determination binding on the Supreme Court; Denial of due
process, not a case of; Publication of notice of public bidding suffices as a
constructive notice to the whole world.The finding that the subject body of water
is a creek belonging to the public domain is a factual determination binding upon
this Court. The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its dulyconstituted municipal
council is clothed with authority to pass, as it did the two resolutions dealing with its
municipal waters, and it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right
to due process as mere publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a
constructive notice to the whole world.

Santos vs. Moreno

No. L-15829. December 4, 1967.
ROMAN R. SANTOS, petitioner-appellee, vs. HON.FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary
of Public Works & Communications and JULIAN C. CARGULLO,
respondentsappellants.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
BENGZON, J.P., J.
Property; Ownership of streams and canals.Pursuant to Article 71 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 and Article 408(5) of the Spanish
Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates
over which they flow. The channels, therefore, of the streams in question,
which may be classified as creeks, belong to the owners of Hacienda San
Esteban. The streams, considered as canals, of which they originally were,
are of private ownership in contemplation of Article 339(1) of the Spanish
Civil Code. Under Article 339, canals constructed by the State and devoted
to public use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by
private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for private
use must be of private ownership.
Administrative law; Exhaustion of administrative remedies; When motion for reconsideration
not required; Case at bar.Whether a litigant, in exhausting available administrative
remedies, need move for the reconsideration of an administrative decision before he can
turn to the courts for relief would largely depend upon the pertinent law, the rules of
procedure and the usual practice followed in a particular office. Republic Act 2056 does not
require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as condition precedent for judicial relief.
From the context of the law, the intention of the legislators to forego a motion for
reconsideration clearly manifests itself. The provisions of the Act underscore the urgency
and summary nature of the proceedings authorized thereunder. Moreover, petitionerappellee
assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act 2056 and the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications to order the demolition of dams across rivers or streams.
Those questions are not within the competence of said Secretary to decide upon a motion
for reconsideration. They are purely legal questions, not administrative in nature, and should
properly be aired before a competent court.
Same; When administrative appeal not necessanj; Case at bar#As to the failure of
petitioner-appellee to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of the President, such appeal
could be dispensed with because said Secretary is the alter ego of the President. The actions
of the former are assumed to have the implied sanction of the latter.
Remedial law; Venue; Real actions distinguished from personal ones.The mere fact that the
resolution of the controversy in this case would wholly rest on the ownership of the streams
involved herein would not necessarily classify it as a real action. The purpose of this suit is to
review the decisions of the decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
to enjoin him from enforcing them and to prevent him from making and issuing similar
decisions concerning the streams in question. The acts of the Secretary are the object of the
litigation, that is, petitioner-appellee seeks to control them. Hence, the suit ought to be filed
in the CFI whose territorial jurisdiction encompasses the place where the respondent
Secretary is found or is holding office. For the rule is that outside its territorial limits, the
court has no power to enforce its orders.
Administrative law; Judicial review, scope of; Case at bar.In reviewing the decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the CFI shall confine its inquiry to the
evidence presented during the administrative proceedings. Evidence not presented therein
shall not be admitted and considered by the trial court. Accordingly, the lower court erred in
conducting a trial de novo.
Constitutional law; Constitutionality of Republic Act 2056.Republic Act 2056 provides for an
expeditious administrative process to determine whether or not a dam or dike should be
declared a public nuisance and ordered demolished. And to say that such an administrative
process, when put to operation, is unconstitutional is equivalent to saying that the law itself

is unconstitutional. In Lovina v. Moreno, L-17821, Nov. 29, 1963, we held said law
constitutional.
Public nuisances, abatement of; Scope of application of Republic Act 2056.Republic Act
2056 applies to two types of bodies of water, namely, (a) public navigable rivers, streams,
coastal waters, waters or waterways and (b) areas declared as communal fishing grounds.

Hilario vs. City of Manila

No. L-19570. April 27, 1967.
JOSE V. HILARIO, JR., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee,
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS, CITY ENGINEER OF MANILA, FERNANDO BUSUEGO and
EUGENIO SESE, defendants-appellants, MAXIMO CALALANG, intervenor; DIRECTOR OF
MINES, intervenor.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
BENGZON, J.P. J
Ownership; River banks.A river bank is part of the bed of the river. Banks of a river refer
to those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during such
high floods as do not cause inundations or to the point reached by the river at high tide. The
nature of the banks always follows that of the bed and the running waters of the river.
Same; Accession; River banks are of public ownership.Since all beds of rivers are of public
ownership, the banks, which form part thereof, are also of public ownership, including those
banks which are formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a
private estate.
Same; River bed defined.The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground
covered by its waters during the ordinary floods.
Same; Elements of a river.A river is composed of the running waters, the bed, and the
banks.
Same; Ownership of the elements of a river.Since rivers are of public ownership, it is
implicit that all their three component elements are also of public ownership.
Same; Meaning of natural bed of a river.The natural bed of a river is not synonymous with
its original bed. Even if a river leaves its original bed, the new bed will still be considered its
natural bed as long as the change of course is due to the force of nature. The word natural
must have been used because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river
always to have a bed and banks.
Same; Private ownership of river banks prior to the Civil Code.Under the Siete
Partidas the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following the rule in
Roman law. Under the Law of Waters and the old Civil Code, all river banks are of
public ownership, except river banks which had already become of private
ownership under the Siete Partidas. Privately owned river banks are subject to a
public easement in the interest of navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
Same; Easement on river banks.The easement on river banks of private ownership
effectuates the policy of the law to devote all banks to public use. However, it does not
authorize future private appropriation of river banks.
Same; Law governing river banks formed in 1938.River banks formed in 1938 due to the
shifting of the course of the river to a private estate are of public ownership. They cannot be
considered of private ownership under the Siete Partidas which were repealed by the Law of
Waters of 1866.
Same; Physical distinction between river bed and banks.Plants can and do grow on the
banks of rivers while plants could not have grown in the bed as the latter is constantly
subject to the flow of the waters.