Journal of Psychology and Theology

Copyright 2006 by Rosemead School of Psychology

2006, Vol. 34, No. 3, 260-265

Biola University, 0091-6471/410-730

THEORETICAL ISSUES IN THE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY
AND RELIGION: SOME COMMENTS ON
REBER, NELSON, SLIFE AND
WHOOLERY, AND RICHARDSON
SIANG-YANG TAN
Graduate School of Psychology
Fuller Theological Seminary

have recently done this in providing specifically

Judeo-Christian perspectives on psychology in the
areas of human nature, motivation, and change. The
four major articles in this special issue of JPT are
therefore timely and significant in advancing the dialogue on these crucial theoretical issues.
I am grateful to be invited to respond to, and comment on these articles. I will do so commenting on
one article at a time, in the following order: (1) Reber
on the problems of a secularized psychology; (2) Nelson on missed opportunities in dialogue between
psychology and religion from a historical perspective;
(3) Slife and Whoolery on how psychologys theories
and methods are not theologically neutral and therefore are actually biased against its main theistic consumers; and finally (4) Richardson on some
hermeneutic reflections on psychology and religion.

The article briefly responds to and comments on the

four major articles by Reber, Nelson, Slife and
Whoolery, and Richardson in this special issue of the
Journal of Psychology and Theology. While a substantial case has been made for how secularized and
reductionistic psychology is, and how psychology is
still greatly influenced by logical positivism and scientism, there is a danger of overstating this case and
thus throwing out the baby with thebathwater. A
healthy respect for good science in psychology is still
valid and possible without succumbing to scientism
and logical positivism. Ultimately we need to depend
on the Holy Spirit, and the community of the church
and its historic traditions, to more fully appropriate
truth, including biblical psychospiritual truth.

his special issue of the Journal of Psychology and Theology focuses on a crucial
topic: theoretical issues in the relationship
between psychology and religion. While significant
progress has been made in recent years in the integration of religion or spirituality and psychotherapy
in the mental health field (e.g. see more recently,
Richards, 2006; Richards and Bergin, 2000, 2004,
2005; Sperry & Shafranske, 2005; see also Hodge,
2004; Tan, 1996, 2001b, 2003b; Tan & Johnson,
2005), more attention needs to be given to some
basic theoretical issues in the relationship between
psychology and religion. Miller and Delaney (2005)

1. Reber: Secular psychology:

Whats the problem?

Reber describes the main problems that he sees

as stemming from the failure of secular psychologists
to acknowledge and appreciate the religious experiences of the people they study, as well as the ethical
resources of religion in general. He specifically discusses how the efforts of secular psychologists to disentangle psychology from religion are actually inconsistent with what early secularists intended in their
recognition of the significant and essential role of
religion in academia and the domain of interdisciplinary ideas. This is an important and valid point:
secularized psychology today has departed from

Requests for reprints should be sent to: Siang-Yang Tan, Ph.D.,

Graduate School of Psychology, Fuller Theological Seminary,
180 N. Oakland Avenue, Pasadena, CA 91101. Email:
tri-fyi@dept.fuller.edu
260

SIANG-YANG TAN

original secularism! If modern secularized psychology is to be truly secular in the original meaning of secularism historically speaking, then there would be
more critical self-reflection and even an appropriate
level of suspicion of secularism itself!
Reber than argues that whenever secular psychologists have attempted to exclude religion in their
research they have ended up with a more limited
capacity to describe and understand the full spectrum
of human experience. Finally, he asserts that secular
psychologists disregard of the ethical and spiritual
resources of religion actually leads to a number of
problems that prevent them from a better recognition and evaluation of the moral assumptions and
implications of their theories, research, and therapy.
Reber therefore concludes that religion must not
be relegated to second-class status or an inferior discipline if a true integration of psychology and religion is to be achieved. Both disciplines need to
engage in a fair and genuine dialogue about the
worldviews, values, and ethics that are mutually best
for the study of the full range of human experience.
Overall, Reber makes his case well, with good historical evidence and arguments. However, more
specifically, in his strong criticism of prayer as a secular psychotherapeutic technique, he states that it
would have to be substantially different from religious
prayer because it is tied to an anti-religious worldview
or belief system. He concludes that without including
God, secular psychologists who study religion end up
not really studying religion as experienced by the
majority of religious people. While Rebers criticism
here may be true in many situations, I believe that he
has overstated his case. Religious phenomena such as
prayer in the psychotherapeutic context (e.g., see Tan,
1996; Tan & Johnson, 2005) or as a form of religious
coping (e.g., see Pargament, 1997; also see Paloutzian
& Park, 2005; Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger & Gorsuch,
2003) have been studied in ways that do not reduce
them to purely psychological, psychosocial, or even
biological phenomena (see Pargament, 2002). Prayer
as a coping mechanism or psychotherapeutic intervention can be very much a religious experience as in a
religious context!
2. Nelson: Missed opportunities in dialogue
between psychology and religion

Nelson provides a succinct but good overview of

the historical development of attitudes toward science and religion. He notes that studies of the natu-

261

ral world, human behavior and theology were all

essential parts of an integrated body of knowledge in
the Middle Ages. However, a significant divide has
occurred between science and religion in modern
times up to the present. He traces the historical reasons for such an unfortunate split between science
and religion, focusing especially on the development
of positivism in Western views of epistemology and
the philosophy of science.
Positivism and the associated naturalism that followed have resulted in more dogmatic formulations
of science that emphasize methodologies that are
quantitative. Earlier views of science in the early
modern period were more flexible according to Nelson. He asserts that the recent dogmatic view of science that rigidly adheres to reductionistic naturalism
and quantitative methodologies has led to reduced
dialogue with religion, and even attempts to replace
religion with science.
Nelson also notes that Freud and early psychologists tried hard to establish psychology as a real science and therefore enthusiastically accepted positivism while rejecting other alternatives. However, it
is clear today that positivism is philosophically problematic and even untenable, but modern psychology
is still dominated by such a positivist approach. This
domination of positivism in psychology has hindered dialogue between science and religion, and
also impeded overall progress in psychology, according to Nelson. He therefore proposes a return to a
more comprehensive and modest conception of science (to replace the rigid scientism that has developed) that can include a number of other possible
approaches to theory and research, emphasizing
hermeneutic options as particularly appropriate and
potentially helpful to psychology as a discipline. Nelson believes that in order to have a more complete
knowledge of the world, both explanation and
understanding are needed, and it is his conviction
that a hermeneutic approach to the world best produces understanding, a view that has been elaborated by Richardson in this special issue of JPT. From a
historical perspective, Nelson asserts that a return to
the original Baconian view of science that is open to
broad inquiry and flexible methodology would lead
to more significant advances than the current dogmatic and narrow scientism view.
Nelson has provided a helpful and succinct historical perspective and analysis of how psychology
has ended up being such a reductionistic, positivist
science leading to scientism or the worship of such a

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COMMENTS ON REBER, NELSON, SLIFE and WHOOLERY, and RICHARDSON

narrow and dogmatic science. I agree with Nelson

that a return to an earlier Baconian view of science as
being more open and flexible in methodology would
benefit psychology and the integration of science
and religion (also see Jones, 1994; Tan, 2001b).
Hermeneutic approaches, and other narrative and
more qualitative options for investigating truth or
knowledge of the world need to be accepted alongside the quantitative methodologies of todays still
overall positivist science that is dominating psychology. However, this does not mean that good science
that uses quantitative methods has to be discarded
or negated. It can be appreciated, with its philosophical and methodological limitations freely acknowledged, and a fair openness to the other approaches
already mentioned that are less quantitative or even
non-quantitative.
3.Slife and Whoolery: Are psychologys main
theories and methods biased against its
main consumers?

Slife and Whoolery take the critique of reductionistic, positivist psychology up a few notches! As
Slife has previously done in his widely published critiques of modern scientific psychology (which are
cited in this article), he and Whoolery strongly dispel the common myth that views therapeutic and
experimental methods as theologically, if not philosophically, neutral to the subject matter they are
dealing with. They critique the myth of neutrality in
therapeutic methods (which are often founded or
based on naturalistic assumptions that conflict or
even contradict theism), and the myth of neutrality
in research methods (even experimental, quasiexperimental and correlational methods are not as
objective as they seem because there are philosophies of science that underlie their use, such as
ontological naturalism). Their insightful critique of
the myth of neutrality in research methods has also
recently been raised by others in the controversy
over empirically supported psychotherapies and
the problems related to the assumptions, findings
and reporting in controlled clinical trials (Westen,
Novotny, & Thompson-Brenner, 2004; also see
Tan, 2001a, 2002, 2003b). Furthermore an American Psychological Association 2005 Presidential
Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice has recently
adopted a more comprehensive definition of evidence-based practice as the integration of best
research evidence with clinical expertise and client

values (see APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006).

Slife and Whoolery specifically critique the naturalistic assumptions of objectivism, materialism, and
reductionism. While they provide much food for
thought and deeper reflection on the serious problems with such a naturalistic approach to science,
they sometimes overstate their case. For example, in
considering the implications of objectivism in particular, they assert that even researchers who are theistic
(or believe in God) end up working to eliminate their
own religious values in using the reductionistic
methodologies of science so-called. They claim that
such religious values are not allowed to guide theistic
researchers in deciding what methodological design
is best for them to use, how best to define and operationalize the constructs of the design, and even how
to interpret or explain their data or results. These
researchers supposedly are not permitted to use what
they believe is the truth in conducting their research
studies. Instead, they are forced to use the logic of
these naturalistic and reductionistic methods, which
requires the elimination of any religious assumptions
and values the researchers may have. I find this a
strong overstatement and hence not a fully accurate
critique of modern psychological science. There is a
tendency to fall into such extreme logical positivism
and reductionism but not all psychological theory or
research today is that extreme. In fact, Brown, Murphy, and Malony (1998) have described a Christian
approach called non-reductive physicalism that tries
to avoid the problems of reductionism in a physicalistic, embodied view of the soul, although not all scholars will agree with such a view.
Some psychologists of religion for example have
allowed their religious ideas and values to inform
them in their research (e.g., see Paloutzian & Park,
2005; Richards, 2006; Spilka, et al, 2003), although
there are others who are more like the logical positivists described by Slife and Whoolery. Besides,
Jones (1994) has already cogently argued that such
an elimination of values, religious or otherwise, cannot be fully achieved, a point footnoted by Slife and
Whoolery. Methods of research in modern psychology today, especially in the area of the psychology of
religion, are not all narrowly positivist and reductionistic. There is an openness to investigating religious phenomena using more flexible methodology
and greater openness of conceptualization, including ideas of religion and theism. There is a danger
here of throwing out the baby (good science) with

SIANG-YANG TAN

the bathwater (scientism or the worship of reductionistic , positivist science).

Slife and Whoolery therefore end up emphasizing
the centrality of the activity of God, even in research,
and hence proposing a seriously theistic inquiry or
method of research. They describe four major characteristics of a fully theistic approach to inquiry that
would make it distinct from the naturalistic philosophies underlying modern scientific methods. First, a
theistic perspective does not accept the naturalistic
convention that method must be rule-following.
Instead, it would allow, at times, questioning and
even replacing core method rules or assumptions
rather than rigidly or slavishly following such rules. A
fully theistic approach will therefore be more phenomena-driven rather than method-driven. Second,
fully theistic researchers will maximize the possibility
of rupturing or challenging their assumptions in their
research studies in order to avoid simply confirming
their own biases. They need to be explicitly aware of
their most cherished assumptions or biases, and also
of alternative assumptions that are viable. Slife and
Whoolery therefore emphasize the need for true
humility in theistic science. Third, a fully theistic
approach means that theistic researchers need to
engage in rather than detach or disengage from the
phenomenon they are investigating. Such engagement or relational connection and intimacy with
what we care about should be based on agape love.
Finally, a fourth characteristic of a truly theistic
approach is a valuing of unpredictability and hence a
revision of the traditional reliance on predictability
in naturalistic science. Theistic researchers need to
value the unpredictability of the ruptures and violations of their hypotheses or assumptions and expectations. This is what will more often lead to
paradigm shifts as Kuhn (1970) has observed, and to
really significant contributions to science ultimately
(Feyerabend, 1975).
Slife and Whoolery have provided a strong critique of naturalistic science based on logical positivism, and argued that since theists or people who
believe in God are the main consumers of psychological information, the assumptions and biases of the
major theories and methods of mainstream psychology today actually conflict with the assumptions and
biases of their main consumers who are theists.
Their emphasis on the need to make these underlying assumptions and biases explicit is a valid and
good one. Their proposal for a theistic approach to
inquiry and research is enlightening and helpful. But

263

they tend to overstate their case at times, and throw

out the baby with the bathwater.
4.Richardson: Psychology and religion:
Hermeneutic reflections

In this final article, Richardson provides a

hermeneutic alternative (ontological hermeneutics)
to the naturalistic and reductionistic approach that
has dominated scientific psychology until today characterized by scientism, relativism, and dogmatism. In
reviewing relevant literature on hermeneutics which
became a distinct procedure in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century for the interpretation of the bible
and classic texts, Richardson focuses on the work of
Friedrich Schliermacher (1768-1834) on the
hermeneutic circle, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)
on a general theory of interpretation for the human
sciences, and more recently Charles Taylor on
sources of the self and other related topics.
Richardson contends that hermeneutic ontology
provides an alternative view of the human realm that
is more plausible than conventional naturalism, and
obviously more receptive to the moral ideals and spiritual realities explicated by the great religions of the
world. He advocates a more basic, practical, and
moral kind of understanding constructed together by
people everywhere as they try to interpret the meaning of events, texts, works of art, social reality and the
behaviors of others in order to relate to them following the narratives of their own lives. Yet, Richardson
concedes that there is still a place for scientific knowing that includes a more instrumental approach
toward the world, hence not throwing out the baby
with the bathwater! Such a hermeneutical approach is
essentially dialogical, and requires courage and
humility to pursue it well and authentically.
Richardson critiques integrationist thinking with
its dangers of domination of one partner (e.g., religion) by the other (e.g., science). However, he also
fairly points out that integrationist thinking is often a
sincere effort at combining psychological methods
of inquiry with religious faith or vision. Integrationist
theorists use psychological methods as a critical or
objective approach that can help in negating false
claims, exposing erroneous biases, and identifying
inauthentic motives in an appropriate way. He calls
these worthy aims. Such integrationist thinkers also
use religious meaning to meet genuine needs and
longings in a modern context that is often shallow
and lacking in substance and meaning. It seems

264

COMMENTS ON REBER, NELSON, SLIFE and WHOOLERY, and RICHARDSON

therefore that the integrationist approach pulls

together the best of both worlds! Richardson quickly
cautions however, that it is not that simple! The danger is that mutual estrangement or surreptitious
domination can result in attempts to integrate science and religion. He therefore suggests that dialogue and mutual influence as outlined by ontological hermeneutics are essential to avoid such danger.
He concludes that hermeneutics provides a pathway of understanding, composed of life-stories that
are interconnected. This pathway is not totally under
ones control, and includes many surprises and at
times even humbling, unwanted insights. He is
aware that a hermeneutic ontologys emphasis on
human uncertainty and limitations may make some
religious people uncomfortable because they may
perceive this to be undermining religious faith. However, he believes that a deeper appreciation of
human limitations and uncertainty with appropriate
humility as created human beings will help us to
depend more on Divine mercy than our own artifacts. What is crucial according to Richardson, is
therefore the conviction that God is a God of truth.
While Richardson makes some good arguments
for an ontological hermeneutic approach to the integration of psychology and religion, and he does not
throw out the baby (good science) with the bathwater (scientism and logical positivism), he does not go
far enough when he states that all we require is the
conviction that God is a God of truth. From a more
biblical, Christian perspective, the need to have personal faith in Jesus Christ, and to depend on the
power and presence or guidance of the Holy Spirit
to more fully understand and appropriate truth,
including psychotheological or biblical psychospiritual truth, cannot be overemphasized (see Tan,
2001b). The deepest hermeneutic then is the appropriate interpretation of biblical truth, guided by the
Holy Spirit who inspired the writing of the Scriptures in the first place. There is also the need for corporate guidance in the community of the church,
including a basic knowledge of church history and
tradition over many centuries.
Concluding Comments

The four major articles by Reber, Nelson, Slife

and Whoolery, and Richardson in this special issue of
JPT have made a substantial case for how secularized
and reductionistic psychology is, being still greatly
influenced by logical positivism and scientism. How-

ever, there is a danger of overstating this case and

thus throwing out the baby with the bathwater. A
healthy respect for good science in psychology is still
valid and possible without succumbing to scientism
and logical positivism. Ultimately, we need to depend
on the Holy Spirit and the community of the church
and its historic traditions to more fully appropriate
truth, including biblical psychospiritual truth.
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AUTHOR
TAN, SIANG-YANG. Address: Graduate School of Psychology,
Fuller Theological Seminary, 180 N. Oakland Avenue, Pasadena, CA 91101. Title: Professor of Psychology. Degrees: BA,
PhD., McGill University. Specializations: Cognitive-behavior
therapy; religious psychotherapy; intrapersonal integration and
spirituality; lay counseling; pain; epilepsy; and cross-cultural
counseling, especially with Asian Americans.