THENATUREANDIMPORTANCE

OFLIBERTY
CHARLESFRIED*

What is liberty, and why is it important? Why do we care

aboutit?ThefirstpremisethatIofferhereisthatlibertyisan
expressionofwhatisvaluableaboutusashumanbeings.Itisa
natural law idea; that is to say, it is a moral imperative based
onwhatisfundamental(anothermoralidea)aboutourhuman
nature.1
Iwouldsaythatwhatisimportantaboutus,whatmakesus
moralhumanbeings,isourindividualcapacitiestothink,rea
son,choose,andvalue.ItiswhatKantcalledourfreedomand
rationality.2Individuals,therefore,aretheelementaryparticles
ofmoraldiscourse.Ourvalueisourtakingindividualrespon
sibility for our lives, and our choices. And if a person is to
count as a personand here we have the difficult questions
about the beginning and the end of lifethen we are all
equally valuable in this same way. It is from that base of our
equal responsibility for ourselves that we choose our goods:
thatwechoosewhattomakeoftheonlylifewewilleverhave.
Myliberty,then,ismyabilitytochoosethatlife.Noonehas
therighttointerferewiththatchoice,exceptasitistofurther
hisowngood.Butthatgoodoftheotherisworthnomorethan
mine because he is not worth any more than I am. There is,
therefore,arightofmutualnoninterference:anequalright.By
thesametoken,nobodycaninterferewithordraftanotherper
son to help him achieve his own good if the other person has
notchosenvoluntarilytoenlistinthatcampaign.

*Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard University; Associate Justice, Supreme

JudicialCourtofMassachusetts,19951999;SolicitorGeneraloftheUnitedStates,
19851989.ThispiececomprisesProfessorFriedsnotesforachapterinabookon
libertythatwillbepublishedinlate2006byW.W.Norton.
1.SeegenerallyJOHNRAWLS,ATHEORYOFJUSTICE(1971).
2.See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 116
(H.J.Patoned.&trans.,HarperTorchbooks3ded.,1956)(1948)(declaringthatto
everyrationalbeingpossessedofawillwemustalsolendtheIdeaoffreedomas
theonlyoneunderwhichhecanact).

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Thereareconclusionstobedrawnfromthesepostulates;for
example, that liberty is a relation among persons. Liberty is
violated when someone else interferes with it. Gravity, tigers,
and disease do not interfere with my liberty; other people do.
Inaddition,Icanmakeyourgood,thatwhichyouchoose,part
ofmygood.ButthenImustworkthroughyou,throughyour
liberty,andnotuponyou,notinspiteofyourliberty.
And what is interference? It can be hindering you for your
sake, for your good. Or hindering you for my sake, for my
good. When do I hinder you in that second sense; when do I
hinderyouformysake?Therearetwoways.First,whenIdis
regard you. Second, when I use you, as when I trick you or
threatenyouorforceyouinsomewayoranother.
Theissueofhinderingothersbydisregardis,infact,concep
tuallythemostdifficult.Itispretty easytotellwhenIhinder
you in the second sense: when I use you, when I trick you,
whenIforceyou.Theseareclearcutviolationsofliberty.But,
howcanwetellwhenIamhinderingyouby,forinstance,just
failing to help you, by just disregarding you? The picture I
have is of my driving down the middle of the highway at
eighty miles per hour, disregarding that you are coming the
otherway.AmIhinderingyourliberty,ordoesyourdemand
that I regard you hinder mine? It is out of this dilemmathis
dilemma of when do we hinder each other by disregarding
eachother,justgoingourway,runningovereachotherthat
we derive, in a very general sense, the concept of property.
Whichiswhypropertyissocloselyrelatedtoliberty.3
PropertydescribesthewholeIwillcallitthendimensional
space, as it is much more than threedimensionalndimen
sional space in which I may operate as a free person without
being hindered by you as you go about in pursuit of your
goods. You may not violate my property, you may not enter
myndimensionalspace.Butthatndimensionalspacemustbe
definedsomehow.Isitdefinedbylibertyitself,orisitconven
tional,orisitalittlebitofeach?
If it is conventional, if our property in ourselves and our
property in the outside world which we have assimilated to
ourselvesiswhollyconventional,thenofcourseitsboundaries
are established by convention. If it is the creature of conven

3.SeeJOHNLOCKE,SECONDTREATISEOFGOVERNMENT32(C.B.Macphersoned.,
Hackett Publg Co. 1980) (1690) (describing liberty as the ability to dispose and
orderoneswholeproperty).

No.1]

TheNatureandImportanceofLiberty

tion,itisthecreatureofothers.Andthatisaseriousproblem
for liberty and one which the friends of liberty have sought
many ways to solvethe social contract tradition is such an
attemptand the enemies of liberty have sought to exploit
fromtheverybeginning.4
Now, there are, however, certain natural, not conventional
features of my property in myself and my property in the
world.Mostimportantly,becauseitderivesfrommylibertyto
reason,tochoose,todecide,ismylibertyofthemind.5Thatis
whyitisnotsurprisinganditisnotperversethattherealmof
liberty of contract which, in the Nineteenth Century was cele
brated, has gradually shrunk, and why the First Amendment
rights have become as robust as they have.6 It is also why,
whenthinkersandtherearemanyofthem,forinstanceCass
SunsteinpromiseusaNewDealfortheFirstAmendment,7I
shiver because I know what the New Deal did to our other
property liberties. And I shiver to know what that New Deal
holdsinstoreforlibertyofmind.
Sothatisonenaturalpropertyrightthatwehavethatisnot
conventional.ButIthinkthereisanotherone,andithasalotto
dowithwhyweareholdingthisSymposium,whywearelaw
yers, why this is a subject for law. When students graduate
fromthislawschool,weproclaimthattheyarereadytoaidin
theshapingandapplicationofthosewiserestraintsthatmake

4.See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 16 (Norman

Danielsed.,1975)(criticizingRawlssconceptionofsocialcontract);seealsoAnita
L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U.
CIN.L.REV.461,462n.3(1987)(Thesocialcontracttheoriesadvancedbycontem
porary thinkers who continue in the contractarian tradition of Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant depict an idealized moral conception of persons as free, rational, and
equal....)(quotingDAVID A.J. RICHARDS,TOLERATIONANDTHE CONSTITUTION
41(1986)).
5.See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT 170206 (2004); see also Charles Fried, The New First Amendment
Jurisprudence:AThreattoLiberty,59U.CHI.L.REV.225,233(1992)(statingthatthe
free speech doctrine is founded upon personal autonomy and freedom of the
mind).
6.SeeBoyScoutsofAm.v.Dale,530U.S.640,644(2000)(holdingthatastates
applicationofitspublicaccommodationslawtorequiretheBoyScoutstoadmita
homosexual member violated the organizations First Amendment right of ex
pressiveassociation);Cohenv.California,403U.S.15,26(1971)(concludingthat
thestatedoesnothavethepowertocriminalizethepublicdisplayofafourletter
expletivebecausegovernmentdoesnothavethecapacitytoforbidcertainwords
withoutalsorunningasubstantialriskofsuppressingideasintheprocess).
7.See,e.g.,CassR.Sunstein,ANewDealforSpeech,17HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J.137(1994).

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us free. Of course, law is that engine, that system, whichde

finesthisndimensionalliberty.Butifitistodothat,ifitisto
defineourliberty,itmusthavecertaincharacteristics.Andits
characteristicsarethatitmustbestableanditmustbeformal.
Thatistosay,itmustseektoattainacertainneutralitybetween
thecontendingpartieswhowouldseektorealizetheirvarious
goods.
Thatiswhyalibertarian,orlibertydriven,viewoflawasks
atleasttwothingsofasystemoflaw.Itasksthatitbereasona
blystablesothatwecanrelyonit.Werealizeitisdifficultto
derive from some general principles what all of the laws de
tailsare,althoughthelibertyofthemindcansobederived.But
weinsistthat,whateversocietygivesus,itwillatleaststaystill
long enough that we can order our choices, make our plans,
andlive:Thelawmustnotbeamovingtarget,sotospeak.
And the second thing is why it is that the friends of liberty
arealsodecriedintheworldoflawasformalists.8Ialwaystell
mystudents,Tocallanargumentaformalistargumentisnot
atermofabuse.Andthereasonforthisisthat,whenthelaw
is formal, when those who adjudicate do so not purposefully
but formally, indeed formalistically, there is an attempt to
honor the law as the definition of our property, our liberty
space, and not to change that definition, not to change those
boundaries for the competing goods of the persons who are
contendingwithinthosespaces.
Finally, what then of love, of friendship, of generosity, of
music,ofart,andofscience?Arethesenotthethingsthatare
valuable about us? Yes, they are, if they are freely chosen. If
they are ours, they arise out of our deliberate personal, indi
vidualchoices.Andiftheyarenot,theirvaluedisappears.
Mydearfriendandfrequentinterlocutor,MichaelSandel,is
the only one on this Symposium panel who really stated the

8.See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 799
(1989) (describing legal pragmatists attack on formalism based on first
principles);seealsoDuncanKennedy,TheStagesoftheDeclineofthePublic/Private
Distinction,130U. PA. L. REV.1349,135152(1982)(describingthecollapseofthe
formalists distinction between the public and the private spheres); Cass R.
Sunstein,NakedPreferencesandtheConstitution,84COLUM.L.REV.1689,1697,1718
(1984)(positingthattheLochnerdecisionstheoreticalbasisisunderminedbyack
nowledging that the market status quo is truly just the result of previous
governmentchoices).

No.1]

TheNatureandImportanceofLiberty

competingpointofview,asbestarticulatedbyAristotle.9This
alternativeperspectiveassertsthatfreedomsometimesrequires
that government and law not be neutral with respect to ques
tionsofthegoodlife,withrespecttomoralandreligiousques
tions. Freedom is not a matter of autonomy or choosing
whateverwehappentowant.Rather,tobefreeistoliveacer
tainmodeoflife:thegoodlife.ProfessorSandeladmittedthat
this conception of freedom and rights could be termed judg
mental or moralistic, particularly because, under this rubric,
deciding what rights people possess requires one to consider
the purpose and moral worth of the social practices that give
risetosuchquestionsaboutrights.
Asanexampleofthisunderstandingrightlyputintopractice
inhisestimation,ProfessorSandelrecountedthemajorityopin
ioninPGATour,Inc.v.Martin.10Writingforthemajority,Jus
ticeStevensconcludedthatthepurposeandessenceofgolfhas
nothingtodowithwhetherornotagolfcartisused,andthere
fore the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires the
PGATourtoallowcartstobeusedbydisabledcontestants.11
Itisquiteinteresting,becausethereisanothercaseinwhich
JusticeStevenstriedtousesimilararguments,butdidnotsuc
ceed.InBoyScoutsofAmericav.Dale,heknewwhattheessence
ofbeingaBoyScoutis,anditdidnotincludesomedistastefor
homosexualrelations.12ThatwasnopartofbeingaBoyScout,
andheknewthat.
WhatwasatstakeinDalewastheabilityoftheBoyScoutsto
defineforthemselveswhatitisthattheirparticularassociation
meant:notforAristotle,andnotforProfessorSandel,andnot
forJusticeStevens.ThereasonthatMartincameoutthewayit
did is that, to fall under the sway of the ADA, golf or a golf
tournamenthastobeeithercommercialorapublicaccommo
dation,similartoahoteloramovietheater.13Ifgolf,however,

9.See Michael J. Sandel, Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of Govt, Har
vard Univ., Remarks on Panel I: What is Liberty? Competing Philosophical and
JurisprudentialPerspectivesonLibertyatthe24thAnnualFederalistSocietyStu
dentSymposiumonLawandPublicPolicy:LawandFreedom(Feb.25,2005).
10.532U.S.661(2001).
11.Seeid.at68386.
12.See 530 U.S. 640, 66670 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that theBoy
ScoutsLawandOathexpressesnopositiononsexualmatters).
13.SeeMartin,532U.S.at67577(notingtheADAspublicaccommodationre
quirementandfindingthatthePGAsgolftoursongolfcoursesmeetthatrequire
ment).

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had been a religious ritual then I suppose that Justice Stevens

wouldtrytothedothesamenumber,butIdevoutlyhopehe
would,onceagain,havebeeninthedissent.