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POTENTIAL

FAILURE MODE AND


EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(FMEA)
REFERENCE MANUAL

The content of this document is the technical equivalent of SAE J-1739.


Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) should be used by
suppliers to companies subscribing to QS-9000 or equivalent document.

First Edition Issued February, 1993 Second Edition, February, 1995 Third Edition, April, 2001
Copyright 1993, 1995, 2001
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation

FOREWORD
1st and 2nd Edition
This reference Manual and Reporting Format was developed by the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) teams at Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, working under the auspices of the Automotive
Division of the American Society for Quality Control (ASQC) and the Automotive Industry Action Group
(AIAG).
The ASQC/AIAG Task Force charter is to standardize the reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats
and technical nomenclature used by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors in their respective supplier quality
systems. Accordingly, this manual and format, which is approved and endorsed by Chrysler, Ford and
General Motors, should be used by suppliers implementing FMEA techniques into their design/
manufacturing processes.
In the past, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors each had their own guidelines and formats for insuring
supplier FMEA compliance. Differences between these guidelines and formats resulted in additional
demands on supplier resources. To improve upon this situation, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors agreed
to develop, and, through AIAG, distribute this Manual. The work group responsible for the Manual was led
be George Baumgartner of Ford Motor Company.
This Manual provides general guidelines for preparing an FMEA. It does not give specific instructions on
how to arrive at each FMEA entry, a task best left to each FMEA team. This Manual also is not intended to
be a comprehensive FMEA reference source or training document.
While these guidelines are intended to cover all situation normally occurring either in the design phase or
process analysis, there will be questions that arise. These questions should be directed to your customer's
Supplier Quality Assurance (SQA) activity. If you are uncertain as to how to contact the appropriate SQA
activity, the buyer in your customer's Purchasing office can help.
The Task Force gratefully acknowledges: the leadership and commitment of Vice Presidents Thomas T.
Stallkamp at Chrysler, Norman F. Ehlers at Ford, and J. Ignasio Lopez de Arriortua of General Motors; the
assistance of the AIAG in the development, production, and distribution of the Procedure; the guidance of
Task Force principals Russ Jacobs (Chrysler), Steve Walsh (Ford), Dan Reid (General Motors), and Rad
Smith; and the assistance of the ASQC Automotive Division Reading Team. This team, led by Tripp Martin
(Peterson Spring), reviewed the Manual for technical content and accuracy and made valuable
contributions to form and content. Since the Manual was developed to meet specific needs of the
automotive industry, the ASQC voluntary standards process defined by ASQC policies and procedures was
not used in its development.

Additional copies can be ordered from AIAG and/or permission to copy portions of this Procedure for use
within supplier organizations should be obtained from AIAG at 248-358-3003.

FOREWORD
3rd Edition
The FMEA 3rd Edition (QS-9000) is a reference manual to be used by suppliers to DaimlerChrysler, Ford
Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation as a guide to assist them in the development of both
Design and Process FMEAs. This reference manual is intended to clarify questions concerning the technical development of FMEAs.
This reference manual is consistent with the Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force charter to standardize the reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats and technical nomenclature used by suppliers to
DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. Accordingly the FMEA, 3rd
Edition Manual is written to provide guidance for the supplier. The manual does not define requirements, it
does provide general guidelines intended to cover situations normally occurring when preparing FMEAs
during the design phase or process analysis phase.
This manual is the technical equivalent of SAE J1739, for Design and Process FMEAs. However, it does
not include an application for Machinery FMEA. Interested parties in Machinery FMEA may refer to SAE
J1739 for a related example.
The Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would like to thank the following individuals, and their
companies, who have contributed their time and efforts to the development of either this edition of the
FMEA manual or earlier editions.
3rd Edition
Kevin A. Lange - DaimlerChrysler
Steven C. Leggett - General Motors Corporation
Beth Baker - AIAG
Earlier Editions
Howard Riley - DaimlerChrysler
George R. Baumgartner - Ford Motor Company
Lawrence R. McCullen - General Motors
Robert A. May - Goodyear
Tripp Martin - Peterson Spring

Mark T. Wrobbel - DaimlerChrysler


Rebecca French - General Motors
Mary Ann Raymond - Bosch
William Ireland - Kelsey-Hayes

In addition, the Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would like to thank the following individuals from
the SAE J1739 work group who contributed significantly to the technical changes and improvements in this
edition.
William D. Carlson - DaimlerChrysler
Glen R. Vallance - Ford Motor Company
Carl S. Carlson - General Motors Corporation
This manual is a copyright of DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation, with
all rights reserved. Additional copies may be obtained from AIAG, Southfield, Michigan, by calling 248-3583003. Supply chain organizations of DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company or General Motors Corporation
have permission to copy forms used in this manual.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Number
General Information ................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview .........................................................................................................................................
What Is an FMEA ............................................................................................................................
Manual Format ................................................................................................................................
FMEA Implementation ....................................................................................................................

1
1
1
2

Design FMEA .............................................................................................................................................. 7


Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 9
Customer Defined ........................................................................................................................... 9
Team Effort ..................................................................................................................................... 9
Development of a Design FMEA ............................................................................................................... 10
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)

FMEA Number ........................................................................................................................


System, Subsystem, or Component Name and Number .......................................................
Design Responsibility .............................................................................................................
Prepared By ............................................................................................................................
Model Year(s)/Program(s) ......................................................................................................
Key Date .................................................................................................................................
FMEA Date .............................................................................................................................
Core Team ..............................................................................................................................
Item/Function ..........................................................................................................................
Potential Failure Mode ...........................................................................................................
Potential Effect(s) of Failure ...................................................................................................
Severity (S) .............................................................................................................................
Suggested Evaluation Criteria ................................................................................................
Classification ..........................................................................................................................
Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure ..........................................................................
Occurrence (O) .......................................................................................................................
Suggested Evaluation Criteria ................................................................................................
Current Design Controls .........................................................................................................
Detection (D) ..........................................................................................................................
Suggested Evaluation Criteria ................................................................................................
Risk Priority Number (RPN) ...................................................................................................
Recommended Action(s) ........................................................................................................
Responsibility for the Recommended Action(s) .....................................................................
Action(s) Taken ......................................................................................................................
Action Results .........................................................................................................................

13
13
13
13
13
13
13
15
15
15
17
17
19
19
19
21
23
25
25
27
27
29
29
31
31

Follow-Up Actions ...................................................................................................................................... 31


Process FMEA .......................................................................................................................................... 33
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 35
Customer Defined ......................................................................................................................... 35
Team Effort ................................................................................................................................... 35
I

TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued


Page
Number
Development of a Process FMEA ............................................................................................................. 37
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)

FMEA Number .........................................................................................................................


Item .........................................................................................................................................
Process Responsibility ............................................................................................................
Prepared By ............................................................................................................................
Model Year(s)/Program(s) ......................................................................................................
Key Date ..................................................................................................................................
FMEA Date ..............................................................................................................................
Core Team ..............................................................................................................................
Process Function/Requirements .............................................................................................
Potential Failure Mode ............................................................................................................
Potential Effect(s) of Failure ....................................................................................................
Severity (S) ..............................................................................................................................
Suggested Evaluation Criteria ................................................................................................
Classification ...........................................................................................................................
Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure ...........................................................................
Occurrence (O) .......................................................................................................................
Suggested Evaluation Criteria ................................................................................................
Current Process Controls ........................................................................................................
Detection (D) ...........................................................................................................................
Suggested Evaluation Criteria ................................................................................................
Risk Priority Number (RPN) ....................................................................................................
Recommended Action(s) .........................................................................................................
Responsibility for the Recommended Action(s) ......................................................................
Action(s) Taken .......................................................................................................................
Action Results ..........................................................................................................................

37
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
41
41
43
45
45
47
47
49
51
53
53
55
57
57
57

Follow-Up Actions ...................................................................................................................................... 57

APPENDICES
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

Design FMEA Quality Objectives ............................................................................................


Process FMEA Quality Objectives ...........................................................................................
Design FMEA Block Diagram Example ...................................................................................
Standard Forms for Design FMEA (1 and 2 column for controls) ...........................................
Design FMEA Example ............................................................................................................
System FMEA ..........................................................................................................................
Standard Forms for Process FMEA (1 and 2 column for controls) ..........................................
Process FMEA Example ..........................................................................................................
Occurrence Evaluation Criteria With Cpk Values ....................................................................

Il

59
60
61
62
64
65
68
70
71

GENERAL INFORMATION
Overview

This manual introduces the topic of Potential Failure Mode and


Effects Analysis (FMEA) and gives general guidance in the
application of the technique.

What Is an FMEA

An FMEA can be described as a systematic group of activities


intended to: (a) recognize and evaluate the potential failure of a
product/process and the effects of that failure, (b) identify
actions that could eliminate or reduce the chance of the
potential failure occurring, and (c) document the entire process.
It is complementary to the process of defining what a design or
process must do to satisfy the customer.
All FMEAs focus on the design, whether it be of the product, or
process.

Manual Format

This reference document presents two types of FMEA: Design


FMEA, and Process FMEA.
This manual should be used by suppliers that subscribe to QS9000 or its equivalent. FMEA teams are allowed to use the
guidelines listed herein in the manner that will be most effective
for a given situation.

FMEA Implementation

Because of the general industry trend to continually improve


products and processes whenever possible, using the FMEA as
a disciplined technique to identify and help minimize potential
concern is as important as ever. Studies of vehicle campaigns
have shown that fully implemented FMEA programs could have
prevented many of the campaigns.
One of the most important factors for the successful
implementation of an FMEA program is timeliness. It is meant to
be a before-the-event action, not an after-the-fact exercise.
To achieve the greatest value, the FMEA must be done before a
product or process failure mode has been incorporated into a
product or process. Up-front time spent properly completing an
FMEA, when product/process changes can be most easily and
inexpensively implemented, will minimize late change crises. An
FMEA can reduce or eliminate the chance of implementing a
preventive/corrective change that would create an even larger
concern. Communication and coordination should occur
among all FMEA teams.
Figure 1 depicts the sequence in which an FMEA should be
performed. It is not simply a case of filling out the form but
rather of understanding the FMEA process in order to eliminate
risk and plan the appropriate controls to ensure customer
satisfaction.
There are three basic cases for which FMEA's are generated,
each with a different scope or focus:
Case 1:

New designs, new technology, or new process. The


scope of the FMEA is the complete design,
technology, or process.

Case 2:

Modifications to existing design or process (assumes


there is a FMEA for the existing design or process).
The scope of the FMEA should focus on the
modification to design process, possible interactions
due to the modification, and field history.

Case 3:

Use of existing design or process in a new


environment, location, or application (assumes there
is an FMEA for the existing design or process). The
scope of the FMEA is the impact of the new
environment or location on the existing design or
process.

Although responsibility for the preparation of the FMEA is


usually assigned to an individual, FMEA input should be a team
effort. A team of knowledgeable individuals should be
assembled (e.g., engineers with expertise in design, analysis/
testing, manufacturing, assembly, service, recycling, quality,
and reliability). The FMEA is initiated by the engineer from the
responsible activity, which can be the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (i.e., produces the final product), a supplier, or a
subcontractor.

Potential
Failure
Mode

- Unintended
Function

- Intermittent
Function

- Partial/Over/
Degraded
Function

- No Function

What can go wrong?

What are the


Functions, Features or
Requirements?

Function
Reqt's

Subsystem

What
are the
Effect(s)?

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

What
are the
Cause(s)?

How bad
is it?

C
S l
e a
v s
s

O
c
c
u
r
Detection

How can this be


prevented and
detected?

How often
does it
happen?

Prevention

Current
Controls
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

- Changes to
Standards,
Procedures,
or Guides

- Special
Controls

- Process
Changes

- Design
Changes

What can be done?

Recommended
Action(s)

How good is this


method at
detecting it?

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SEQUENCE

Actions
Taken

S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
R.
P.
N.

Figure 1. FMEA Process Sequence

It is not appropriate to compare the ratings of one teams FMEA


with the ratings of another teams FMEA, even if the product/
process appears to be identical, since each team's environment
is unique and thus the respective individual ratings will be
unique (i.e., the ratings are subjective).
A review of the FMEA document against FMEA quality
objectives (see Appendix A and Appendix B) is recommended,
including a management review.

Follow-Up

The need for taking effective preventive/corrective actions, with


appropriate follow-up on those actions, cannot be
overemphasized. Actions should be communicated to all
affected activities. A thoroughly thought-out and well-developed
FMEA will be of limited value without positive and effective
preventive/corrective actions.
The responsible engineer is in charge of ensuring that all
recommended actions have been implemented or adequately
addressed. The FMEA is a living document and should always
reflect the latest level, as well as the latest relevant actions,
including those occurring after the start of production.
The responsible engineer has several means of assuring that
recommended actions are implemented. They include, but are
not limited to the following:
a. Reviewing designs, processes, and, drawings, to ensure that
recommended actions have been implemented.
b. Confirming the incorporation of changes to design/assembly/
manufacturing documentation.
c. Reviewing Design/Process FMEAs,
applications, and Control Plans.

special

FMEA

DESIGN FMEA

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
IN
DESIGN
(DESIGN FMEA)

DESIGN FMEA
INTRODUCTION
A Design Potential FMEA is an analytical technique used
primarily by a Design-Responsible Engineer/Team as a means
to ensure that, to the extent possible, potential failure modes
and their associated causes/mechanisms have been considered
and addressed. End items, along with every related system,
subassembly, and component, should be evaluated. In its most
rigorous form, an FMEA is a summary of the teams thoughts
(including an analysis of items that could go wrong based on
experience) as a component, subsystem, or system is designed.
This systematic approach parallels, formalizes, and documents
the mental disciplines that an engineer normally goes through in
any design process.
The Design Potential FMEA supports the design process in
reducing the risk of failures (including unintended outcomes) by:

Aiding in the objective evaluation of design, including


functional requirements and design alternatives,
Evaluating the initial design for manufacturing,
assembly, service, and recycling requirements,
Increasing the probability that potential failure modes
and their effects on system and vehicle operation have
been considered in the design/development process,
Providing additional information to aid in the planning of
thorough and efficient design, development, and
validation programs,
Developing a ranked list of potential failure modes
according to their effect on the customer, thus
establishing a priority system for design improvements,
development, and validation testing/analysis,
Providing an open issue format for recommending and
tracking risk-reducing actions, and,
Providing future reference, e.g., lessons learned, to aid
in analyzing field concerns, evaluating design changes,
and developing advanced designs.

Customer Defined

The definition of Customer for a Design FMEA is not only the


End User but also the design-responsible engineers/teams of
the vehicle or higher-level assemblies, and/or the
manufacturing/process-responsible engineers in activities such
as manufacturing, assembly, and service.

Team Effort

During the initial Design FMEA process, the responsible


engineer is expected to directly and actively involve
representatives from all affected areas. These areas of expertise
and responsibility should include but are not limited to
assembly, manufacturing, design, analysis/test, reliability,
materials, quality, service, and suppliers, as well as the design
area responsible for the next higher or lower assembly or
system, sub-assembly, or component. The FMEA should be a
catalyst to stimulate the interchange of ideas between the
functions affected and thus promote a team approach.
9

DESIGN FMEA
Unless the responsible engineer is experienced with FMEA and
team facilitation, it is helpful to have an experienced FMEA
facilitator assist the team in its activities.
The Design FMEA is a living document and should:
Be initiated before or at design concept finalization,
Be continually updated as changes occur or additional
information is obtained throughout the phases of
product development, and
Be fundamentally completed before the production
drawings are released for tooling.
Considering that manufacturing/assembly needs have been
incorporated, the Design FMEA addresses the design intent and
assumes the design will be manufactured/assembled to this
intent. Potential failure modes and/or causes/mechanisms that
can occur during the manufacturing or assembly process need
not but may be included in a Design FMEA. When not included,
their identification, effect, and control are covered by the
Process FMEA.
The Design FMEA does not rely on process controls to
overcome potential design weaknesses, but it does take the
technical/physical limits of a manufacturing/assembly process
into consideration, for example:

Necessary mold drafts


Limited surface finish
Assembling space/access for tooling
Limited hardenability of steels
Tolerances/process capability/performance

The Design FMEA can also take into consideration the


technical/physical limits of product maintenance (service) and
recycling, for example:

Tool access
Diagnostic capability
Material classification symbols (for recycling)

DEVELOPMENT OF A DESIGN FMEA


The design-responsible engineer has at his or her disposal a
number of documents that will be useful in preparing the Design
FMEA. The process begins by developing a listing of what the
design is expected to do and what it is expected not to do, i.e.,
the design intent. Customer wants and needs as may be
determined from sources such as Quality Function Deployment
(QFD), Vehicle Requirements Documents, known product
requirements, and/or manufacturing/assembly/service/recycling
requirements should be incorporated. The better the
definition of the desired characteristics, the easier it is to identify
potential failure modes for preventive/corrective action.
A Design FMEA should begin with a block diagram for the
system, subsystem, and/or component being analyzed.
10

DESIGN FMEA
An example block diagram is shown in Appendix C. The block
diagram can also indicate the flow of information, energy, force,
fluid, etc. The object is to understand the deliverables (input) to
the block, the process (function) performed in the block, and the
deliverables (output) from the block.
The diagram illustrates the primary relationship among the items
covered in the analysis and establishes a logical order to the
analysis. Copies of the diagrams used in FMEA preparation
should accompany the FMEA.
In order to facilitate documentation of the analysis of potential
failures and their consequences, a blank Design FMEA form is
available in Appendix D.

11

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

12

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
1)

FMEA Number

Enter the FMEA document number, which may be used for


tracking.
Note:

2)

System,
Subsystem, or
Component Name
and Number

For an example of items 1-22 see Table 1.

Indicate the appropriate level of analysis and enter the name


and number of the system, subsystem, or component being
analyzed. The FMEA team members must decide on what
constitutes a system, subsystem, or component for their
specific activities. The actual boundaries that divide a system,
subsystem, and component are arbitrary and must be set by the
FMEA team. Some descriptions are provided below and some
examples are provided in Appendix F.
System FMEA Scope
A system can be considered to be made up of various
subsystems. These subsystems often have been designed by
different teams. Some typical System FMEAs might cover the
following systems: Chassis System, or Powertrain System, or
Interior System, etc. Thus, the focus of the System FMEA is to
ensure that all interfaces and interactions are covered among
the various subsystems that make up the system as well as
interfaces to other vehicle systems and the customer.
Subsystem FMEA Scope
A Subsystem FMEA is generally a sub-set of a larger system.
For example, the front suspension subsystem is a sub-set of the
chassis system. Thus, the focus of the Subsystem FMEA is to
ensure that all interfaces and interactions are covered among
the various components that make up the subsystem.
Component FMEA Scope
A Component FMEA is a generally an FMEA focused on the
sub-set of a subsystem. For example, a strut is a component of
the front suspension (which is a subsystem of the chassis
system.)

3)

Design Responsibility

Enter the OEM, department, and group. Also include the


supplier name, if applicable.

4)

Prepared By

Enter the name, telephone number, and company of the


engineer responsible for preparing the FMEA.

5)

Model Year(s)/Program(s)

Enter the intended model year(s)/program(s) that will use and/or


be affected by the design being analyzed (if known).

6)

Key Date

Enter the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the
scheduled production design release date.

7)

FMEA Date

Enter the date the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.

13

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

14

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
8)

Core Team

List the names of the responsible individuals and departments


that have the authority to identify and/or perform tasks. (It is
recommended that each team member's name, department,
telephone number, addresse, etc., be included on a distribution
list.)

9)

Item/Function

Enter the name and other pertinent information (e.g., the


number, the part class, etc.) of the item being analyzed. Use the
nomenclature and show the design level as indicated on the
engineering drawing. Prior to initial release (e.g., in the
conceptual phases), experimental numbers should be used.
Enter, as concisely as possible, the function of the item being
analyzed to meet the design intent. Include information (metrics/
measurables) regarding the environment in which this system
operates (e.g., define temperature, pressure, humidity ranges,
design life). If the item has more than one function with different
potential modes of failure, list all the functions separately.

10) Potential Failure Mode

Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which a


component, subsystem, or system could potentially fail to meet
or deliver the intended function described in the item/function
column (i.e., intended function fails). The potential failure mode
may also be the cause of a potential failure mode in a higherlevel subsystem or system, or be the effect of one in a lowerlevel component.
List each potential failure mode associated with the particular
item and item function. The assumption is made that the failure
could occur but may not necessarily occur. A recommended
starting point is a review of past things-gone-wrong, concerns,
reports, and group brainstorming.
Potential failure modes that could occur only under certain
operating conditions (i.e., hot, cold, dry, dusty, etc.) and under
certain usage conditions (i.e., above-average mileage, rough
terrain, city driving only, etc.) should be considered.
Typical failure modes could be but are not limited to:
Cracked
Loosened
Sticking
Fractured
Slips (does not hold full torque)
Inadequate support (structural)
Disengages too fast
Intermittent signal
EMC/RFI
NOTE:

Deformed
Leaking
Oxidized
Does not transmit torque
No support (structural)
Harsh engagement
Inadequate signal
No signal
Drift

Potential failure modes should be described in


physical or technical terms, not as a symptom
necessarily noticeable by the customer.

15

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

16

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
11) Potential Effect(s) of Failure Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure
mode on the function, as perceived by the customer.
Describe the effects of the failure in terms of what the customer
might notice or experience, remembering that the customer may
be an internal customer as well as the ultimate end user. State
clearly if the failure mode could impact safety or noncompliance to regulations. The effects should always be stated
in terms of the specific system, subsystem, or component being
analyzed. Remember that a hierarchical relationship exists
between the component, subsystem, and system levels. For
example, a part could fracture, which may cause the assembly
to vibrate, resulting in an intermittent system operation. The
intermittent system operation could cause performance to
degrade and ultimately lead to customer dissatisfaction. The
intent is to forecast the failure effects, to the teams level of
knowledge.
Typical failure effects could be but are not limited to:
Noise
Erratic Operation
Poor Appearance
Unstable
Intermittent Operation
Leaks

12) Severity (s)

Rough
Inoperative
Unpleasant Odor
Operation Impaired
Thermal Event
Regulatory Non-Compliance

Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a
given failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the
scope of the individual FMEA.
A reduction in the severity
ranking index can be effected only through a design change.
Severity should be estimated using Table 2 as a guideline:
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis. (See Table 2.)
NOTE:

It is not recommended to modify criteria ranking


values of 9 and 10. Failure modes with a rank of
severity 1 should not be analyzed further.

NOTE:

High severity rankings can sometimes be reduced by


making design revisions that compensate or mitigate
the resultant severity of failure. For example, run
flat tires can mitigate the severity of a sudden tire
blowout and seat belts can mitigate the severity of
a vehicle crash.

17

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

18

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

Table 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
12) Severity (S) (continued)

Table 2. Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria


Criteria: Severity of Effect

Effect
Hazardous
without
warning

Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
warning.

Ranking
10

Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
with warning operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning.

Very High

Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function).

High

Vehicle/item operable but at reduced level of performance. Customer very


dissatisfied.

Moderate

Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer


dissatisfied.

Low

Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced


level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied.

Very Low

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most
customers (greater than 75%).

Minor

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of
customers.

Very Minor

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers (less than 25%).

None

No discernible effect.

13)

Classification

This column may be used to classify any special product


characteristics (e.g., critical, key, major, significant) for
components, subsystems, or systems that may require
additional design or process controls.
This column may also be used to highlight high-priority failure
modes for engineering assessment if the team finds this helpful
or if local management requires it.
Special product or process characteristic symbols and their
usage is directed by specific company policy and is not
standardized in this document.

14) Potential Cause(s)/


Mechanism(s) of Failure

Potential cause of failure is defined as an indication of a design


weakness, the consequence of which is the failure mode.
List, to the extent possible, every potential cause and/or failure
mechanism for each failure mode. The cause/mechanism
should be listed as concisely and completely as possible so that
remedial efforts can be aimed at pertinent causes.

19

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

20

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
14) Potential Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s) of Failure
(continued)

Typical failure causes may include, but are not limited to:
Incorrect Material Specified
Inadequate Design Life Assumption
Over-stressing
Insufficient Lubrication Capability
Inadequate Maintenance Instructions
Incorrect Algorithm
Improper Maintenance Instructions
Improper Software Specification
Improper Surface Finish Specification
Inadequate Travel Specification
Improper Friction Material Specified
Excessive Heat
Improper Tolerance Specified
Typical failure mechanisms may include but are not limited to:
Yield
Chemical Oxidation
Fatigue
Electromigration
Material Instability
Creep
Wear
Corrosion

15) Occurrence (O)

Occurrence is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism


will occur during the design life. The likelihood of occurrence
ranking number has a relative meaning rather than an absolute
value. Preventing or controlling the causes/mechanisms of the
failure mode through a design change or design process
change (e.g., design checklist, design review, design guide) is
the only way a reduction in the occurrence ranking can be
effected. (See Table 3.)
Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause/
mechanism on a 1 to 10 scale. In determining this estimate,
questions such as the following should be considered:

What is the service history/field experience with similar


components, subsystems, or systems?
Is the component a carryover or similar to a previous
level component, subsystem or system?
How significant are changes from a previous level
component, subsystem, or system?
Is the component radically different from a previous
level component?
Is the component completely new?
Has the component application changed?
What are the environmental changes?
Has an engineering analysis (e.g., reliability) been used
to estimate the expected comparable occurrence rate
for the application?
Have preventive controls been put in place?

21

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

22

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
15) Occurrence (O)
(continued)

A consistent occurrence ranking system should be used to


ensure continuity. The occurrence ranking number is a relative
rating within the scope of the FMEA and may not reflect the
actual likelihood of occurrence.
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system, that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis. (See Table 3.) Occurrence should be estimated using
Table 3 as a guideline:
NOTE:

The ranking value of 1 is reserved for Remote: Failure


Is unlikely.

TABLE 3. Suggested DFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria


Probability of Failure
Very High: Persistent failures

High: Frequent failures

Moderate: Occasional failures

Low: Relatively few failures

Remote: Failure is unlikely

16) Current Design Controls

Possible Failure Rates

Ranking

> 100 per thousand vehicles/items

10

50 per thousand vehicles/items

20 per thousand vehicles/items

10 per thousand vehicles/items

5 per thousand vehicles/items

2 per thousand vehicles/items

1 per thousand vehicles/items

0.5 per thousand vehicles/items

0.1 per thousand vehicles/items

< 0.010 per thousand vehicles/items

List the prevention, design validation/verification (DV), or other


activities that have been completed or committed to and that
will assure the design adequacy for the failure mode and/or
cause/mechanism under consideration. Current controls (e.g.,
design reviews, fail/safe designs such as a pressure relief valve,
mathematical studies, rig/lab testing, feasibility review,
prototype tests, road testing, fleet testing) are those that have
been or are being used with the same or similar designs. The
team should always be focused on improving design controls;
for example, creating new system tests in the lab, or creating
new system modeling algorithms, etc.
There are two types of design controls to consider:
Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or the
failure mode from occurring, or reduce their
rate of occurrence,
Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the
failure mode, either by analytical or physical
methods, before the item is released to
production.
23

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

24

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
16)

Current Design Controls


(continued)

The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if


possible. The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the
prevention controls provided they are integrated as part of the
design intent. The initial rankings for detection will be based on
design controls that either detect the cause/mechanism of
failure, or detect the failure mode.
The Design FMEA form in this manual has two columns for the
design controls (i.e., separate columns for Prevention Controls
and Detection Controls) to assist the team in clearly
distinguishing between these two types of design controls. This
allows for a quick visual determination that both types of design
controls have been considered. Use of this two-column form is
the preferred approach.
Note:

In the example included here, it is clear that the team


has not identified any prevention controls. This could
be due to prevention controls not having been used
on the same or similar designs.

If a one-column (for design controls) form is used, then the


following prefixes should be used. For prevention controls,
place a 'P' before each prevention control listed. For detection
controls, place a 'D' before each detection control listed.
Once the design controls have been identified, review all
prevention controls to determine if any occurrence rankings
need to be revised.

17) Detection (D)

Detection is the rank associated with the best detection control


listed in the design control. Detection is a relative ranking,
within the scope of the individual FMEA. In order to achieve a
lower ranking, generally the planned design control (e.g.,
validation, and/or verification activities) has to be improved.

25

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

26

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis.
It is best to have detection controls in place as early as possible
in the design development process.
NOTE:

After making the detection ranking, the team should


review the occurrence ranking and ensure that the
occurrence ranking is still appropriate.

Detection should be estimated using Table 4 as a guideline.


NOTE:

The ranking value of 1 is reserved for almost


certain.

TABLE 4. Suggested Detection Evaluation Criteria


Detection
Absolute
Uncertainty

Criteria: Likelihood of Detection by Design Control


Design Control will not and/or can not detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control.

Ranking
10

Very Remote Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.

Remote

Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.

Very Low

Very low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.

Low

Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism


and subsequent failure mode.

Moderate

Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.

Moderately
High

Moderately high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

High

High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.

Very High

Very high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.

Almost
Certain

Design Control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and


subsequent failure mode.

18) Risk Priority Number (RPN) The risk priority number is the product of the severity (S),
occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings.
(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value (between 1
and 1000) can be used to rank order the concerns in the design.

27

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

28

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

TABLE 1. DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
19) Recommended Action(s)

Engineering assessment for preventive/corrective action should


be first directed at high severity, high RPN, and other items
designated by the team. The intent of any recommended action
is to reduce rankings in the following order: severity,
occurrence, and detection.
In general practice when the severity is a 9 or 10, special
attention must be given to ensure that the risk is addressed
through existing design controls or preventive/corrective
action(s), regardless of the RPN. In all cases where the effect of
an identified potential failure mode could be a hazard to the end
user, preventive/corrective actions should be considered to
avoid the failure mode by eliminating, mitigating, or controlling
the cause(s).
After special attention has been given to severity rankings of 9
or 10, the team then addresses other failure modes, with the
intent of reducing severity, then occurrence, and then detection.
Actions such as, but not limited to, the following should be
considered:

Revised Design Geometry and/or Tolerances,


Revised Material Specification,
Design of Experiments (particularly when multiple or
interactive causes are present) or other problem-solving
techniques, and,
Revised Test Plan.

The primary objective of recommended actions is to reduce


risks and increase customer satisfaction by improving the
design.
Only a design revision can bring about a reduction in the
severity ranking. A reduction in the occurrence ranking can be
effected only by removing or controlling one or more of the
causes/mechanisms of the failure mode through a design
revision. An increase in design validation/verification actions will
result in a reduction in the detection ranking only. Increasing
the design validation/verification actions is a less desirable
engineering action since it does not address the severity or
occurrence of the failure mode.
If engineering assessment leads to no recommended actions for
a specific failure mode/cause/control combination, indicate this
by entering None in this column.

20) Responsibility for the


Recommended Action(s)

Enter the name of organization and individual responsible for


each recommended action and the target completion date.

29

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

30

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

DESIGN FMEA

DESIGN FMEA
21) Action(s) Taken

After the action has been implemented, enter a brief description


of the actual action and effective date.

22) Action Results

After the preventive/corrective action has been identified,


estimate and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and
detection rankings. Calculate and record the resulting RPN. If
no actions are taken, leave the related ranking columns blank.
All revised ratings should be reviewed. If further action is
considered necessary, repeat the analysis. The focus should
always be on continuous improvement.

Follow-Up Actions
The design-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring that
all actions recommended have been implemented or adequately
addressed. The FMEA is a living document and should always
reflect the latest design level as well as the latest relevant
actions, including those occurring after start of production.
The design-responsible engineer has several means of ensuring
that concerns are identified and that recommended actions are
implemented. They include, but are not limited to the following:

Ensuring design requirements are achieved,


Reviewing engineering drawings and specifications,
Confirming incorporation in assembly/manufacturing
documentation, and,
Reviewing Process FMEAs and Control Plans.

31

32

PROCESS FMEA

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
IN
MANUFACTURING AND ASSEMBLY PROCESSES
(PROCESS FMEA)

33

34

PROCESS FMEA
INTRODUCTION
A Process Potential FMEA is an analytical technique used by a
Manufacturing/Assembly-Responsible Engineer/Team as a
means to ensure that, to the extent possible, potential failure
modes and their associated causes/mechanisms have been
considered and addressed. In its most rigorous form, an FMEA
is a summary of the teams thoughts (including an analysis of
items that could go wrong based on experience) as a process is
developed. This systematic approach parallels and formalizes
the mental discipline that an engineer normally goes through in
any manufacturing planning process.
The Process Potential FMEA:

Customer Defined

Identifies the process functions and requirements


Identifies potential product and process-related failure
modes,
Assesses the effects of the potential failures on the
customer,
Identifies the potential manufacturing or assembly
process causes and identifies process variables on
which to focus controls for occurrence reduction or
detection of the failure conditions,
Identifies process variables on which to focus process
controls,
Develops a ranked list of potential failure modes, thus
establishing a priority system for preventive/corrective
action considerations, and,
Documents the results of the manufacturing or
assembly process.

The definition of Customer for a Process FMEA should


normally be the End User. However, the customer can also be
a subsequent or downstream manufacturing or assembly
operation, a service operation, or government regulations.

Team Effort

During the initial development of the Process FMEA, the


responsible engineer is expected to directly and actively involve
representatives from all affected areas. These areas should
include but are not limited to design, assembly, manufacturing,
materials, quality, service, and suppliers, as well as the area
responsible for the next assembly. The Process FMEA should
be a catalyst to stimulate the interchange of ideas between the
areas affected and thus promote a team approach.
Unless the responsible engineer is experienced with FMEA and
team facilitation, it is helpful to have an experienced FMEA
facilitator assist the team in its activities.

35

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

36
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
INTRODUCTION (Continued)
The Process FMEA is a living document and should be initiated:
Before or at the feasibility stage,
Prior to tooling for production, and
Take into account all manufacturing operations, from
individual components to assemblies.
Early review and analysis of new or revised processes is
promoted to anticipate, resolve, or monitor potential process
concerns during the manufacturing planning stages of a new
model or component program.
The Process FMEA assumes the product as designed will meet
the design intent. Potential failure modes that can occur
because of a design weakness may be included in a Process
FMEA. Their effect and avoidance is covered by the Design
FMEA.
The Process FMEA does not rely on product design changes to
overcome weaknesses in the process. However, it does take
into consideration a products design characteristics relative to
the planned manufacturing or assembly process to assure that,
to the extent possible, the resultant product meets customer
needs and expectations.

DEVELOPMENT OF A PROCESS FMEA


The process-responsible engineer has at his or her disposal a
number of documents that will be useful in preparing the
Process FMEA. The FMEA begins by developing a list of what
the process is expected to do and what it is expected not to do,
i.e., the process intent.
The Process FMEA should begin with a flow chart of the general
process. This flow chart should identify the product/process
characteristics associated with each operation. Identification of
some product effects from the corresponding Design FMEA,
should be included, if available. Copies of the flow chart used in
FMEA preparation should accompany the FMEA.
In order to facilitate documentation of the analysis of potential
failures and their consequences, a Process FMEA form has
been developed and is in Appendix G.

1)

FMEA Number

Enter the FMEA document number, which may be used for


tracking.
Note:

For an example of items 1-22 see Table 5.

37

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

38
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
2)

Item

Enter the name and number of the system, subsystem, or


component for which the process is being analyzed.

3)

Process Responsibility

Enter the OEM, department, and group. Also include the


supplier name if known.

4)

Prepared By

Enter the name, telephone number, and company of the


engineer responsible for preparing the FMEA.

5)

Model Year(s)/Program(s)

Enter the intended model year(s)/program(s) that will use and/or


be affected by the design/process being analyzed (if known).

6)

Key Date

Enter the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the
scheduled start of production date.
Note:

In the case of a supplier, the initial FMEA due date


should not exceed the customer required Production
Part Approval Process (PPAP) submission date.

7)

FMEA Date

Enter the date the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.

8)

Core Team

List the names of the responsible individuals and departments


that have the authority to identify and/or perform tasks. (It is
recommended that each team member's name, department,
telephone number, addresse, etc., be included on a distribution
list.)

9)

Process Function/
Requirements

Enter a simple description of the process or operation being


analyzed (e.g., turning, drilling, tapping, welding, assembling).
In addition, it is recommended to record the associated
process/operation number for the step being analyzed. The
team should review applicable performance, material, process,
environmental, and safety standards. Indicate as concisely as
possible the purpose of the process or operation being
analyzed, including information about the design (metrics/
measurables) of the system, subsystem, or component. Where
the process involves numerous operations (e.g., assembling)
with different potential modes of failure, it may be desirable to
list the operations as separate elements.

10) Potential Failure Mode

Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which the


process could potentially fail to meet the process requirements
and/or design intent as described in the process function/
requirements column. It is a description of the nonconformance
at that specific operation. It can be a cause associated with a
potential failure mode in a subsequent (downstream) operation
or an effect associated with a potential failure in a previous
(upstream) operation. However, in preparing the FMEA, assume
that the incoming part(s)/material(s) are correct. Exceptions can
be made by the FMEA team where historical data indicate
deficiencies in incoming part quality.
List each potential failure mode for the particular operation in
terms of a component, subsystem, system, or process
characteristic. Assume that the failure could occur but may not
necessarily occur. The process engineer/team should be able to
39

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

40
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
10) Potential Failure Mode
(continued)

pose and answer the following questions:

How can the process/part fail to meet requirements?


Regardless of engineering specifications, what would a
customer (end user, subsequent operations, or service)
consider objectionable?
Start by comparing similar processes and reviewing customer
(end user and subsequent operation) claims relating to similar
components. In addition, a knowledge of the design intent is
necessary. Typical failure modes could be but are not limited to:
Bent
Burred
Hole off-location
Cracked
Hole too shallow Hole missing
Handling damage
Dirty
Hole too deep
Surface too rough
Deformed
Surface too smooth
Open circuited
Short circuited
Mis-labeled
NOTE:

11) Potential Effect(s) of


Failure

Potential failure modes should be described in


"physical" or technical terms, not as a symptom
noticeable by the customer.

Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure


mode on the customer(s).
Describe the effects of the failure in terms of what the customer
might notice or experience, remembering that the customer may
be an internal customer as well as the ultimate end user. State
clearly if the failure mode could impact safety or cause
noncompliance to regulations. The customer(s) in this context
could be the next operation, subsequent operations or
locations, the dealer, and/or the vehicle owner. Each must be
considered when assessing the potential effect of a failure.
For the end user, the effects should always be stated in terms of
product or system performance, such as:
Noise
Erratic operation
Effort
Unpleasant odor
Operation impaired
Intermittent operation
Leaks
Rework/Repairs
Scrap

Rough
Excessive
Inoperative
Unstable
Draft
Poor appearance
Vehicle control impaired
Customer dissatisfaction

If the customer is the next operation or subsequent operation(s)/


location(s), the effects should be stated in terms of process/
operation performance, such as:
Cannot fasten
Cannot bore/tap
Cannot mount
Cannot face
Damages equipment

12) Severity (S)

Does not fit


Does not connect
Does not match
Causes excessive tool wear
Endangers operator

Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a
given failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the
41

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

42
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
Table 6. Suggested PFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria
Criteria: Severity of Effect
This ranking results when a
potential failure mode results in a
final
customer
and/or
a
manufacturing/assembly plant
defect. The final customer should
always be considered first. If both
occur, use the higher of the two
severities.
(Customer Effect)

Criteria: Severity of Effect


This ranking results when a
potential failure mode results in a
final
customer
and/or
a
manufacturing/assembly plant
defect. The final customer should
always be considered first. If both
occur, use the higher of the two
severities.
(Manufacturing/ Assembly Effect) Ranking

Very high severity ranking when a


potential failure mode affects safe
vehicle operation and/or involves
noncompliance with government
regulation without warning.

Or may endanger operator (machine


or assembly) without warning.

10

Very high severity ranking when a


Hazardous
with warning potential failure mode affects safe
vehicle operation and/or involves
noncompliance with government
regulation with warning.

Or may endanger operator (machine


or assembly) with warning.

Very High

Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of


primary function).

Or 100% of product may have to be


scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in
repair department with a repair time
greater than one hour.

High

Vehicle/Item operable but at a


reduced level of performance.
Customer very dissatisfied.

Or product may have to be sorted


and a portion (less than 100%)
scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in
repair department with a repair time
between a half-hour and an hour.

Moderate

Vehicle/Item operable but Comfort/


Convenience item(s) inoperable.
Customer dissatisfied.

Or a portion (less than 100%) of the


product may have to scrapped with
no sorting, or vehicle/item repaired in
repair department with a repair time
less than a half-hour.

Low

Vehicle/Item operable but Comfort/


Convenience item(s) operable at a
reduced level of performance.

Or 100% of product may have to be


reworked, or vehicle/item repaired offline but does not go to repair
department.

Very Low

Fit and Finish/Squeak and Rattle item


does not conform. Defect noticed by
most customers (greater than 75%).

Or the product may have to be


sorted, with no scrap, and a portion
(less than 100%) reworked.

Minor

Fit and Finish/Squeak and Rattle item


does not conform. Defect noticed by
50% of customers.

Or a portion (less than 100%) of the


product may have to be reworked,
with no scrap, on-line but out-of-station.

Very Minor

Fit and Finish/Squeak and Rattle item


does not conform. Defect noticed by
discriminating customers (less than
25%).
No discernible effect.

Or a portion (less than 100%) of the


product may have to be reworked,
with no scrap, on-line but in-station.

Effect
Hazardous
without
warning

None

43

Or slight inconvenience to operation


or operator, or no effect.

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

44
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

12) Severity (S) (continued)

scope of the individual FMEA. A reduction in severity ranking


index can be effected through a design change to system,
subsystem or component, or a redesign of the process.
If the customer affected by a failure mode is the manufacturing
or assembly plant or the product user, assessing the severity
may lie outside the immediate process engineers/teams field of
experience or knowledge. In these cases, the Design FMEA,
design engineer, and/or subsequent manufacturing or assembly
plant process engineer, should be consulted.
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system, that is consistent, even if modified for individual
process analysis. (See Table 6)
Severity should be estimated using Table 6 as a guideline:
NOTE:

13) Classification

It is not recommended to modify criteria for ranking


values of 9 and 10. Failure modes with a rank of
severity 1 should not be analyzed further.

This column may be used to classify any special product or


process characteristics (e.g., critical, key, major, significant) for
components, subsystems, or systems that may require
additional process controls.
This column may also be used to highlight high priority failure
modes for engineering assessment.
If a classification is identified in the Process FMEA, notify the
design responsible engineer since this may affect the
engineering documents concerning control item identification.
Special product or process characteristic symbols and their
usage is directed by specific company policy and is not
standardized in this document.

14) Potential Cause(s)/


Mechanism(s) of Failure

Potential cause of failure is defined as how the failure could


occur, described in terms of something that can be corrected or
can be controlled.
List, to the extent possible, every failure cause assignable to
each potential failure mode. If a cause is exclusive to the failure
mode, i.e., if correcting the cause has a direct impact on the
failure mode, then this portion of the FMEA thought process is
completed. Many causes, however, are not mutually exclusive,
and to correct or control the cause, a design of experiments, for
example, may be considered to determine which root causes
are the major contributors and which can be most easily
controlled. The causes should be described so that remedial
efforts can be aimed at those causes which are pertinent.
Typical failure causes may include, but are not limited to:
Improper torque - over, under
Improper weld - current, time, pressure
Inaccurate gauging
Improper heat treat - time, temperature

45

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

46
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
14) Potential Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s) of Failure
(continued)

Inadequate gating/venting
Inadequate or no lubrication
Part missing or mislocated
Worn locator
Worn tool
Chip on locator
Broken tool
Improper machine setup
Improper programming
Only specific errors or malfunctions (e.g., operator fails to install
seal) should be listed; ambiguous phrases (e.g., operator error,
machine malfunction) should not be used.

15) Occurrence (O)

Occurrence is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism of


failure will occur. The likelihood of occurrence ranking number
has a relative meaning rather than an absolute value. Preventing
or controlling the causes/mechanisms of failure through a
design or process change is the only way a reduction in the
occurrence ranking can be effected.
Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause/
mechanism on a 1 to 10 scale.
A consistent occurrence ranking system should be used to
ensure continuity. The occurrence ranking number is a relative
rating within the scope of the FMEA and may not reflect the
actual likelihood of occurrence.
The Possible Failure Rates are based on the number of
failures that are anticipated during the process execution. If
statistical data are available from a similar process, the data
should be used to determine the occurrence ranking. In all other
cases, a subjective assessment can be made by using the word
descriptions in the left column of the table, along with any
historical data available for similar processes.
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual process
analysis. (See Table 7)
Occurrence should be estimated using Table 7 as a guideline:
NOTE:

The ranking value of 1 is reserved for


failure is Unlikely.

47

Remote:

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

48
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
Table 7. Suggested PFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria
Likely Failure Rates*

Ranking

> 100 per thousand pieces

10

50 per thousand pieces

20 per thousand pieces

10 per thousand pieces

5 per thousand pieces

2 per thousand pieces

1 per thousand pieces

0.5 per thousand pieces

0.1 per thousand pieces

< 0.01 per thousand pieces

Probability
Very High: Persistent Failures

High: Frequent Failures

Moderate: Occasional Failures

Low: Relatively Few Failures

Remote: Failure is Unlikely

*For associated Ppk calculations and values, see Appendix I.

16) Current Process


Controls

Current Process Controls are descriptions of the controls that


either prevent to the extent possible the failure mode or cause/
mechanism of failure from occurring, or detect the failure mode
or cause/mechanism of failure should it occur. These controls
can be process controls such as error/mistake proofing,
statistical process control (SPC), or can be post-process
evaluation. The evaluation may occur at the subject operation
or at subsequent operations.
There are two types of Process Controls to consider:
Prevention:

Detection:

Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or


the failure mode from occurring, or reduce
their rate or occurrence,
Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the
failure mode, and lead to corrective
action(s).

The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if


possible. The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the
prevention controls provided they are integrated as part of the
process intent. The initial rankings for detection will be based
on process controls that either detect the cause/mechanism of
failure, or detect the failure mode.
The Process FMEA form in this manual has two columns for the
process controls (i.e., separate columns for Prevention Controls
and Detection Controls) to assist the team in clearly
distinguishing between these two types of process controls.
This allows for a quick visual determination that both types of
process controls have been considered. Use of this twocolumn form is the preferred approach.
49

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

50
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
16) Current Process
Controls (continued)

If a one-column (for process controls) form is used, then the


following prefixes should be used. For prevention controls,
place a 'P' before each prevention control listed. For detection
controls, place a 'D' before each detection control listed.
Once the process controls have been identified, review all
prevention controls to determine if any occurrence rankings
need to be revised.

17) Detection (D)

Detection is the rank associated with the best detection control


listed in the process control column. Detection is a relative
ranking, within the scope of the individual FMEA. In order to
achieve a lower ranking, generally the planned process control
has to be improved.
Assume the failure has occurred and then assess the
capabilities of all "Current Process Controls" to prevent
shipment of the part having this failure mode or defect. Do not
automatically presume that the detection ranking is low because
the occurrence is low (e.g., when control charts are used), but
do assess the ability of the process controls to detect low
frequency failure modes or prevent them from going further in
the process.
Random quality checks are unlikely to detect the existence of an
isolated defect and should not influence the detection ranking.
Sampling done on a statistical basis is a valid detection control.

51

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

52
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
17) Detection (D) (continued)

Suggested Evaluation Criteria


The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual
product analysis. (See Table 8.)
Detection should be estimated using Table 8 as a guideline.
NOTE:

The ranking value of 1 is reserved for Certain to


Detect.

TABLE 8. Suggested PFMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria


Detection

Criteria

Almost
Impossible
Very
Remote
Remote

Low

Absolute certainty of nondetection.


Controls will probably not
detect.
Controls have poor chance
of detection.
Controls have poor chance
of detection.
Controls may detect.

Moderate

Controls may detect.

Very Low

Inspection
Types
A B C

Cannot detect or is not checked.

10

Control is achieved with indirect or random


checks only.
Control is achieved with visual inspection only.

Control is achieved with double visual inspection


only.
Control is achieved with charting methods, such
as SPC {Statistical Process Control}.
Control is based on variable gauging after parts
have left the station, or Go/No Go gauging
performed on 100% of the parts after parts have
left the station.
Error detection in subsequent operations, OR
gauging performed on setup and first-piece
check (for set-up causes only).
Error detection in-station, or error detection in
subsequent operations by multiple layers of
acceptance: supply, select, install, verify. Cannot
accept discrepant part.
Error detection in-station (automatic gauging with
automatic stop feature). Cannot pass discrepant
part.
Discrepant parts cannot be made because item
has been error-proofed by process/product
design.

High

Controls have a good


chance to detect.

Very High

Controls almost certain to


detect.

Very High

Controls certain to detect.

Ranking

Moderately Controls have a good


High
chance to detect.

Suggested Range of Detection Methods

6
5

Inspection Types:
A. Error-proofed
B. Gauging
C. Manual Inspection

18) Risk Priority Number (RPN) The risk priority number is the product of the severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings.
(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value (between 1
and 1000) can be used to rank order the concerns in the process.

53

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

54
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
19) Recommended Action(s)

Engineering assessment for preventive/corrective action should


be first directed at high severity, high RPN, and other items
designated by the team. The intent of any recommended action
is to reduce rankings in the following order: severity, occurrence, and detection.
In general practice, when the severity is 9 or 10, special attention must be given to ensure that the risk is addressed through
existing design actions/controls or process preventive/corrective action(s), regardless of the RPN. In all cases where the
effect of an identified potential failure mode could be a hazard
to manufacturing/assembly personnel, preventive/corrective actions should be taken to avoid the failure mode by eliminating or
controlling the cause(s), or appropriate operator protection
should be specified.
After special attention has been given to severity rankings of 9
or 10, the team then addresses other failure modes, with the
intent of reducing severity, then occurrence, and then detection.
Actions such as, but not limited to, the following should be
considered:

To reduce the probability of occurrence, process and/or


design revisions are required. An action-oriented study
of the process using statistical methods could be implemented with an ongoing feedback of information to the
appropriate operations for continuous improvement and
defect prevention.

Only a design and/or process revision can bring about a


reduction in the severity ranking.

The preferred method to accomplish a reduction in the


detection ranking is the use of error/mistake proofing
methods. Generally, improving detection controls is
costly and ineffective for quality improvements. Increasing the frequency of quality controls inspection is not an
effective preventive/corrective action and should only
be used as a temporary measure since permanent preventive/corrective action is required. In some cases, a
design change to a specific part may be required to
assist in the detection. Changes to the current control
system may be implemented to increase this probability.
Emphasis must, however, be placed on preventing
defects (i.e., reducing the occurrence) rather than
detecting them. An example would be the use of
statistical process control and process improvement
rather than random quality checks or associated
inspection.

If engineering assessment leads to no recommended actions for


a specific failure mode/cause/control combination, indicate this
by entering None in this column.

55

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

56
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA

PROCESS FMEA
20) Responsibility for the
Recommended Action(s)

Enter the individual responsible for the recommended action,


and the target completion date.

21) Action(s) Taken

After the action has been implemented, enter a brief description


of the actual action and effective date.

22) Action Results

After the preventive/corrective action has been identified,


estimate and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and
detection rankings. Calculate and record the resulting RPN. If
no actions are taken, leave the related ranking columns blank.
All revised ratings should be reviewed and if further action is
considered necessary, repeat the analysis. The focus should
always be on continuous improvement.

Follow-Up Actions
The process-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring
that all actions recommended have been implemented or
adequately addressed. The FMEA is a living document and
should always reflect the latest design level as well as the latest
relevant actions, including those occurring after the start of
production.
The process-responsible engineer has several means of
ensuring that concerns are identified and that recommended
actions are implemented. They include, but are not limited to
the following:
Ensuring that process/product requirements are achieved,
Reviewing engineering drawings, process/product
specifications, and process flow,
Confirming the incorporation of changes in assembly/
manufacturing documentation and,
Reviewing Control Plans and operation instructions.

57

PROCESS FMEA

58

APPENDIX A
DESIGN FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES
Note: Specific Program Requirements take precedence

1. DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS

The FMEA drives Design Improvements as the primary


objective.

2. HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES The FMEA addresses all high risk Failure Modes, as identified by
the FMEA team, with executable Action Plans. All other failure
modes are considered.

3. A/D/V OR DVP & R PLANS

The Analysis/Development/Validation (A/D/V), and/or Design


Verification Plan and Report (DVP&R) considers the failure
modes from the FMEA.

4. INTERFACES

The FMEA scope includes integration and interface failure


modes in both block diagram and analysis.

5. LESSONS LEARNED

The FMEA considers all major lessons learned (such as high


warranty, campaigns, etc.) as input to failure mode
identification.

6. SPECIAL OR KEY
CHARACTERISTICS

The FMEA identifies appropriate Key Characteristics candidates


as input to the Key Characteristics selection process, if
applicable due to company policy.

7. TIMING

The FMEA is completed during the Window of Opportunity


where it could most efficiently impact the product design.

8. TEAM

The right people participate as part of the FMEA team throughout the analysis, and are adequately trained in FMEA methods.
As appropriate, a facilitator should be used.

9. DOCUMENTATION

The FMEA document is completely filled out "by the book",


including "Action Taken" and new RPN values.

10. TIME USAGE

Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an effective and efficient use of time, with a value-added result. This
assumes Recommended Actions are identified as required and
the actions are implemented.

59

APPENDIX B
PROCESS FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES
Note: Specific Program Requirements take precedence.

1. PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS The FMEA drives Process Improvements as the primary


objective, with an emphasis on Error/Mistake Proofing solutions.

2. HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES The FMEA addresses all high risk Failure Modes, as identified by
the FMEA team, with executable Action Plans. All other failure
modes are considered.

3. CONTROL PLANS

The Pre-launch and Production Control Plans consider the


failure modes from the Process FMEA.

4. INTEGRATION

The FMEA is integrated and consistent with the Process Flow


Diagram and the Process Control Plan. The Process FMEA
considers the Design FMEA, if available as part of its analysis.

5. LESSONS LEARNED

The FMEA considers all major lessons learned (such as high


warranty, campaigns, non-conforming product, customer
complaints, etc.) as input to failure mode identification.

6. SPECIAL OR KEY
CHARACTERISTICS

The FMEA identifies appropriate Key Characteristics candidates


as input to the Key Characteristics selection process, if
applicable due to company policy.

7. TIMING

The FMEA is completed during the Window of Opportunity


where it could most efficiently impact the design of product or
process.

8. TEAM

The right people participate as part of the FMEA team


throughout the analysis, and are adequately trained in FMEA
methods. As appropriate, a facilitator should be used.

9. DOCUMENTATION

The FMEA document is completely filled out "by the book",


including "Action Taken" and new RPN values.

10. TIME USAGE

Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an


effective and efficient use of time, with a value-added result.
This assumes Recommended Actions are identified as required
and the actions are implemented.

60

APPENDIX C
DESIGN FMEA BLOCK DIAGRAM EXAMPLE

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)


BLOCK DIAGRAM/ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMES
SYSTEM NAME:
YEAR VEHICLE PLATFORM:
FMEA I.D. NUMBER

FLASHLIGHT
1994 NEW PRODUCT
XXXI10D001

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMES

TEMPERATURE: -20 TO 160 F


CORROSIVE: TEST SCHEDULE B
SHOCK: 6 FOOT DROP
FOREIGN MATERIAL: DUST
FLAMMABILITY: (WHAT COMPONENT(S) ARE NEAR HEAT SOURCE(S)?
OTHER:

LETTERS = COMPONENTS
NUMBERS = ATTACHING METHODS

= ATTACHED/JOINED

VIBRATION: NOT APPLICABLE


HUMIDITY: 0 - 100 % RH

------- = INTERFACING, NOT JOINED

= NOT INCLUDED IN
THIS FMEA

The example below is a relational block diagram. Other types of block diagrams may be used by the FMEA
Team to clarify the item(s) being considered in their analysis

SWITCH
ON/OFF
C
2

BULB
ASSEMBLY
D

HOUSING
A

4
1

PLATE
E
+

BATTERIES
B

COMPONENTS
A. HOUSING
B. BATTERIES (2 D CELL)
C. ON/OFF SWITCH
D. BULB ASSEMBLY
E. PLATE
F. SPRING

SPRING
F
-

ATTACHING METHOD
1. SKIP FIT
2. RIVETS
3. THREAD
4. SNAP FIT
5. COMPRESSIVE FIT

61

Key Date _________

Model Year(S)/Vehicle(s) _____________________

Item

Function

Potential
Failure
Mode

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

O
c
c
u
r

Core Team ___________________________________________________________________________________________

Design Responsibility _________

Current
Design
Controls
- Prevention
- Detection

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

____ Component ___

____ Subsystem

____ System

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

of

Recommended
Action(s)
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

FMEA Date (Orig.) _________

Prepared By

Page

FMEA Number

Actions
Taken

S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.)

R.
P.
N.

APPENDIX D

STANDARD FORM FOR DESIGN FMEA

62

Item

Function

Core Team

Potential
Failure
Mode

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s)

Component

Subsystem

System

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

Key Date

O
c
c
u
r

Design Responsibility

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Recommended
Action(s)

of

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

FMEA Date (Orig.)

Prepared By

Page

FMEA Number

Actions
Taken

S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.)

R.
P.
N.

APPENDIX D

STANDARD FORM FOR DESIGN FMEA

63

Component 01.03/Body Closures

Subsystem

Function

64

Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim

Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact

12
C
S l
e a
v s
s

Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware

11

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Corroded
interior
lower door
panels

10

Potential
Failure
Mode

O
c
c
u
r

17

18

19

Recommended
Action(s)

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

SAMPLE

Body Engrg &


Assy Ops
8X 09 15

4 112 Add team


evaluation using
design aid buck
and spray head

Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\

None

Drawing evaluation
of spray head access

28

A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15

8 280 Add team


Body Engrg &
evaluation using Assy Ops
production spray 8X 11 15
equipment and
specified wax

Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness

7 196 Add laboratory


Combine w/test
accelerated
for wax upper
corrosion testing edge verification

7 294 Add laboratory


A Tate-Body
accelerated
Engrg
corrosion testing 8X 09 30

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Design aid investigation


with non-functioning
spray head

Vehicle general durability


testing- as above

Vehicle general durability


test veh.
T-118
T-109
T-301

16

Current
Design
Controls
Detection

21

Evaluation
showed
adequate access

Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas

7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.

21

28

28

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
Actions
Taken

(Rev.) 8X 07 14

Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm

FMEA Date (Orig.) 8X 03 22

Entrapped air prevents 5


wax from entering
corner/edge access

16

Current
Design
Controls
Prevention

of 1

1234

Prepared By A. Tate - X6412- Body Engr

Page 1

FMEA Number

Physical and Chem Lab


test- Report No.1265

15

2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified

Insufficient wax
thickness specified

6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low

14

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

13

(Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Design Responsibility Body Engineering

Front Door L.H.


H8HX-0000-A

Item

Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops

MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)

System

APPENDIX E

DESIGN FMEA EXAMPLE

Appendix F System FMEA


To help illustrate the meaning of System, Subsystem, and Component FMEAs, two
examples have been constructed below in Figure F1 (for Interfaces and Interactions)
and in Figure F2 (for Item, Function, and Failure Modes).
EXAMPLE 1: Interfaces and Interactions

Subsystem B

Subsystem A

Subsystem C

System
Subsystem D

Environment

Figure F1. Interfaces and Interactions


The FMEA team is responsible for specifying the scope of its respective FMEAs. The example in Figure
F1 shows that the team has specified Subsystems A, B, C, and D along with the surrounding environment
as comprising the System that must be considered while completing the System FMEA.
INTERFACES:

SUBSYSTEMS ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED VIA INTERFACES.


In Figure F1, interfaces between subsystems are shown where Subsystem A touches
(connects with) Subsystem B, B touches C, C touches D, A touches D, and B touches
D. The Environment also touches each of the subsystems listed in Figure F1, which
requires that the Environmental Interfaces be considered when completing the
FMEA.
NOTE: Each Subsystem FMEA should have its Interfaces included in its respective
Subsystem FMEA.

INTERACTIONS:

A CHANGE IN ONE SUBSYSTEM MIGHT CAUSE A CHANGE IN ANOTHER


SUBSYSTEM.
In Figure F1, interactions between subsystems can occur among any of the interfacing
systems (e.g., Subsystem A heats up, resulting in Subsystem D and Subsystem B also
gaining heat through the respective interfaces, as well as Subsystem A giving off heat
to the environment). Interactions might also occur among non-contacting systems via
transfer through the environment (e.g., if the environment is composed of high
humidity and Subsystems A and C are dissimilar metals separated by a non-metal
composing Subsystem B, Subsystems A and C can still have an electrolytic reaction
due to the moisture from the environment). Thus, interactions among non-contacting
subsystems can be relatively difficult to predict but are important and should be
considered.

65

EXAMPLE 2: Items, Functions, and Failure Modes


Figure F2 (see next page) describes a method of showing the Items, Functions, and Failure Modes in a
tree arrangement that can assist the team in visualizing the System, Subsystems, and Components.
At the System Level, the descriptions will tend to be much more general than for the Subsystems and
Components (Components will usually have the most specific descriptions).
The tree arrangement is arranged as follows for the System, Subsystem, and Components:
ITEM
Design Objectives (a statement of design objectives is often helpful)

- FUNCTION 1
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE A
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE B
etc.....

- FUNCTION 2
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE A
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE B
etc.....
- etc.....

66

67

Potential Failure Mode(s):


seating position is not
comfortable

Function:
provide comfortable
transportation

Potential Failure Mode(s):


chain breaks frequently
Tires require frequent
maintenance

Function:
provide reliable transportation

Potential Failure Mode(s):


difficult to steer
difficult to pedal

Function:
ease of use

Design Objectives:
1) minimum 3000 hours of riding
without need for maintenance
and 10,000 hours of riding for
design life.
2) accommodates male adults
comfortably to the 99.5th
percentile
3) ... etc. ...

Bicycle

System Level

Figure F2. Items, Functions, and Failures

Chain Assembly

Seat Assembly

Sprocket Assembly

Rear Wheel Assembly

Front Wheel Assembly

Handle Bar Assembly

Potential Failure Mode(s):


finish (shine) deteriorates
paint chips

Function:
provides pleasing appearance

Potential Failure Mode(s):


structural failure of seat support
excessive deflection of seat
support

Function:
provides stable attachment for
seat support

Frame

Subsystem Level

Sprocket Tube

Lower Rear Tube

Lower Front Tube

Potential Failure Mode(s):

Function:
support frame assembly
production methods (welding)

Potential Failure Mode(s):


length of frame mounting points
too long
length of frame mounting points
too short

Function:
provides dimensional control
for correct finished frame
geometry

Potential Failure Mode(s):


structural failure
excessive deflection

Function:
provides structural support

Upper Frame

Component Level

Key Date _________

Process Responsibility __________

of

FMEA Date (Orig.) _________

Prepared By

Page

FMEA Number

(Rev.)

Requirements

Process
Function

Potential
Failure
Mode

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
O
c
c
u
r
Current
Design
Controls
- Prevention
- Detection

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Recommended
Action(s)
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
Actions
Taken

S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results
R.
P.
N.

Core Team _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Model Year(S)/Vehicle(s) ____________________________

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

APPENDIX G

STANDARD FORM FOR PROCESS FMEA

68

Requirements

Process
Function

Potential
Failure
Mode

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
O
c
c
u
r

Key Date

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s)

Core Team

Process Responsibility

Item

Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
Current
Process
Controls
Detection

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Recommended
Action(s)

of

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

FMEA Date (Orig.)

Prepared By

Page

FMEA Number

Actions
Taken

S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.)

R.
P.
N.

APPENDIX G

STANDARD FORM FOR PROCESS FMEA

69

Front Door L.H./H8HX-000-A

11

10

12

Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure

Potential
Failure
Mode

To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion

Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware

Requirements

Process
Function

Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low

Spray head
deformed due
to impact

Spray time
insufficient

15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention

70
8

17

SAMPLE

Operator instructions and


lot sampling (10 doors /
shift) to check for
coverage of critical areas

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

Visual check each hour1/shift for film thickness


(depth meter) and
coverage

16

Current
Process
Controls
Detection

9X 08 26 Job #1

2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads

5 Test spray pattern at


start-up and after idle
periods, and preventive
maintenance program to
clean heads

Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough

14

O
c
c
u
r

13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure

C
S l
e a
v s
s

16

Key Date 9X 03 01 ER

Process Responsibility Body Engrg.

Core Team A. Tate Body Engrg., J. Smith-OC, R. James-Production, J. Jones-Maintenance

Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s) 199X/Lion 4dr/Wagon

Item

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)

18

19

70 None

7 392 Install spray


timer

Maintenance
9X 09 15

Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01

Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15

MFG Engrg
9X 10 15

20

Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date

21

Actions
Taken

Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05

Temp and press


limits were
determined and
limit controls
have been
installed control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=1.85

Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line

49

35

70

R.
P.
N.

22
S O D
e c e
v c t

Action Results

(Rev.) 9X 11 06

Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line

FMEA Date (Orig.) 9X 05 17

5 175 Use Design of


Experiments
(DOE) on
viscosity vs.
temperature vs.
pressure

Automate
spraying

of 1

1450

Prepared By J. Ford - X6521 - Assy Ops

Recommended
Action(s)

Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer

D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c

Page 1

FMEA Number

APPENDIX H

PROCESS FMEA EXAMPLE

APPENDIX I
SUGGESTED PFMEA OCCURRENCE EVALUATION
CRITERIA WITH Ppk VALUES
Probability
Very High: Persistent Failures

High: Frequent Failures

Moderate: Occasional Failures

Low: Relatively Few Failures

Remote: Failure is Unlikely

Likely Failure Rates*

Ppk

Ranking

> 100 per thousand pieces

< 0.55

10

50 per thousand pieces

0.55

20 per thousand pieces

0.78

10 per thousand pieces

0.86

5 per thousand pieces

0.94

2 per thousand pieces

1.00

1 per thousand pieces

1.10

0.5 per thousand pieces

1.20

0.1 per thousand pieces

1.30

< 0.01 per thousand pieces

1.67

Sample Calculation
Sample Calculation to determine Ppk value from a likely failure rate of 5 per thousand pieces.

Defect rate =
0.05
2

5
=
1000

0.05 .

= 0.0025 divided by 2 for out-of-specifications high or low.

Using a "Z" table the associated "Z" value is 2.81 for a tail value of 0.0025.
1. Z =

SL - x
s

where:
x = Average
SL = Specifications
2. Ppk =

min (SL upper - x, x - SL lower)


3 s

3. Replace using Z
4. Ppk =

Note:

Z
2.81
=
= 0.9367 ~
= 0.94
3
3

The above Ppk values are to be used by the FMEA team as guidance to assist in determining an
occurrence ranking when valid statistical data is available. No other use of the above Ppk values
is intended.

71

Glossary
Control Plans

The control plan provides the process monitoring and control


methods that will be used to control characteristics.

Design Intent

List of what a given component/subsystem/system is expected


to do or not do.

Design Life

The time period (e.g., cycles, time, mileage) for which the design
is intended to perform its requirements.

Design Validation/Verification (DV)

A program intended to ensure that the design meets its


requirements.

Design of Experiments (DOE)

Methods that identify factors that affect the mean and variation
with minimum testing/experimentation.

Error/Mistake Proofing

Each OEM may have its own unique definition for Error/Mistake
Proofing. Confer with the OEM for the appropriate definition.

Feature

A measurable product characteristic (e.g., radius, hardness) or a


measurable process characteristic (e.g., insertion force,
temperature).

Pareto

A simple tool that can assist problem solving that involves


ranking all potential problem areas.

Process

The combination of people, machines and equipment, raw


materials, methods, and environment that produces a given
product or service.

Process Change

A change in processing concept that could alter the capability of


the process to meet the design requirements or the durability of
the product.

Quality Function Deployment (QFD)

A structured method in which customer requirements are


translated into appropriate technical requirements for each
stage of product development and production.

Root Cause

The root cause is the reason for the primary non-conformance


and is the item that requires change to achieve permanent
preventive/corrective action.

Special Process Characteristic

A special process characteristic (e.g., critical, key, major,


significant) is a process characteristic for which variation must
be controlled to some target value to ensure that variation in a
process or a special product characteristic is maintained to its
target value during manufacturing and assembly.

Special Product Characteristic

A special product characteristic (e.g., critical, key, major,


significant) is a product characteristic for which reasonably
anticipated variation could significantly affect a products safety
or compliance with governmental standards or regulations, or is
likely to significantly affect customer satisfaction with a product.

Vehicle Campaign

Recall of vehicles for rework or safety inspection.

72

73

74

Inside Back Cover

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