Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
First Edition Issued February, 1993 Second Edition, February, 1995 Third Edition, April, 2001
Copyright 1993, 1995, 2001
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation
FOREWORD
1st and 2nd Edition
This reference Manual and Reporting Format was developed by the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) teams at Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, working under the auspices of the Automotive
Division of the American Society for Quality Control (ASQC) and the Automotive Industry Action Group
(AIAG).
The ASQC/AIAG Task Force charter is to standardize the reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats
and technical nomenclature used by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors in their respective supplier quality
systems. Accordingly, this manual and format, which is approved and endorsed by Chrysler, Ford and
General Motors, should be used by suppliers implementing FMEA techniques into their design/
manufacturing processes.
In the past, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors each had their own guidelines and formats for insuring
supplier FMEA compliance. Differences between these guidelines and formats resulted in additional
demands on supplier resources. To improve upon this situation, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors agreed
to develop, and, through AIAG, distribute this Manual. The work group responsible for the Manual was led
be George Baumgartner of Ford Motor Company.
This Manual provides general guidelines for preparing an FMEA. It does not give specific instructions on
how to arrive at each FMEA entry, a task best left to each FMEA team. This Manual also is not intended to
be a comprehensive FMEA reference source or training document.
While these guidelines are intended to cover all situation normally occurring either in the design phase or
process analysis, there will be questions that arise. These questions should be directed to your customer's
Supplier Quality Assurance (SQA) activity. If you are uncertain as to how to contact the appropriate SQA
activity, the buyer in your customer's Purchasing office can help.
The Task Force gratefully acknowledges: the leadership and commitment of Vice Presidents Thomas T.
Stallkamp at Chrysler, Norman F. Ehlers at Ford, and J. Ignasio Lopez de Arriortua of General Motors; the
assistance of the AIAG in the development, production, and distribution of the Procedure; the guidance of
Task Force principals Russ Jacobs (Chrysler), Steve Walsh (Ford), Dan Reid (General Motors), and Rad
Smith; and the assistance of the ASQC Automotive Division Reading Team. This team, led by Tripp Martin
(Peterson Spring), reviewed the Manual for technical content and accuracy and made valuable
contributions to form and content. Since the Manual was developed to meet specific needs of the
automotive industry, the ASQC voluntary standards process defined by ASQC policies and procedures was
not used in its development.
Additional copies can be ordered from AIAG and/or permission to copy portions of this Procedure for use
within supplier organizations should be obtained from AIAG at 248-358-3003.
FOREWORD
3rd Edition
The FMEA 3rd Edition (QS-9000) is a reference manual to be used by suppliers to DaimlerChrysler, Ford
Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation as a guide to assist them in the development of both
Design and Process FMEAs. This reference manual is intended to clarify questions concerning the technical development of FMEAs.
This reference manual is consistent with the Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force charter to standardize the reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats and technical nomenclature used by suppliers to
DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. Accordingly the FMEA, 3rd
Edition Manual is written to provide guidance for the supplier. The manual does not define requirements, it
does provide general guidelines intended to cover situations normally occurring when preparing FMEAs
during the design phase or process analysis phase.
This manual is the technical equivalent of SAE J1739, for Design and Process FMEAs. However, it does
not include an application for Machinery FMEA. Interested parties in Machinery FMEA may refer to SAE
J1739 for a related example.
The Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would like to thank the following individuals, and their
companies, who have contributed their time and efforts to the development of either this edition of the
FMEA manual or earlier editions.
3rd Edition
Kevin A. Lange - DaimlerChrysler
Steven C. Leggett - General Motors Corporation
Beth Baker - AIAG
Earlier Editions
Howard Riley - DaimlerChrysler
George R. Baumgartner - Ford Motor Company
Lawrence R. McCullen - General Motors
Robert A. May - Goodyear
Tripp Martin - Peterson Spring
In addition, the Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would like to thank the following individuals from
the SAE J1739 work group who contributed significantly to the technical changes and improvements in this
edition.
William D. Carlson - DaimlerChrysler
Glen R. Vallance - Ford Motor Company
Carl S. Carlson - General Motors Corporation
This manual is a copyright of DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation, with
all rights reserved. Additional copies may be obtained from AIAG, Southfield, Michigan, by calling 248-3583003. Supply chain organizations of DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company or General Motors Corporation
have permission to copy forms used in this manual.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Number
General Information ................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview .........................................................................................................................................
What Is an FMEA ............................................................................................................................
Manual Format ................................................................................................................................
FMEA Implementation ....................................................................................................................
1
1
1
2
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
15
15
15
17
17
19
19
19
21
23
25
25
27
27
29
29
31
31
37
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
41
41
43
45
45
47
47
49
51
53
53
55
57
57
57
APPENDICES
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Il
59
60
61
62
64
65
68
70
71
GENERAL INFORMATION
Overview
What Is an FMEA
Manual Format
FMEA Implementation
Case 2:
Case 3:
Potential
Failure
Mode
- Unintended
Function
- Intermittent
Function
- Partial/Over/
Degraded
Function
- No Function
Function
Reqt's
Subsystem
What
are the
Effect(s)?
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
What
are the
Cause(s)?
How bad
is it?
C
S l
e a
v s
s
O
c
c
u
r
Detection
How often
does it
happen?
Prevention
Current
Controls
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
- Changes to
Standards,
Procedures,
or Guides
- Special
Controls
- Process
Changes
- Design
Changes
Recommended
Action(s)
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SEQUENCE
Actions
Taken
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
R.
P.
N.
Follow-Up
special
FMEA
DESIGN FMEA
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
IN
DESIGN
(DESIGN FMEA)
DESIGN FMEA
INTRODUCTION
A Design Potential FMEA is an analytical technique used
primarily by a Design-Responsible Engineer/Team as a means
to ensure that, to the extent possible, potential failure modes
and their associated causes/mechanisms have been considered
and addressed. End items, along with every related system,
subassembly, and component, should be evaluated. In its most
rigorous form, an FMEA is a summary of the teams thoughts
(including an analysis of items that could go wrong based on
experience) as a component, subsystem, or system is designed.
This systematic approach parallels, formalizes, and documents
the mental disciplines that an engineer normally goes through in
any design process.
The Design Potential FMEA supports the design process in
reducing the risk of failures (including unintended outcomes) by:
Customer Defined
Team Effort
DESIGN FMEA
Unless the responsible engineer is experienced with FMEA and
team facilitation, it is helpful to have an experienced FMEA
facilitator assist the team in its activities.
The Design FMEA is a living document and should:
Be initiated before or at design concept finalization,
Be continually updated as changes occur or additional
information is obtained throughout the phases of
product development, and
Be fundamentally completed before the production
drawings are released for tooling.
Considering that manufacturing/assembly needs have been
incorporated, the Design FMEA addresses the design intent and
assumes the design will be manufactured/assembled to this
intent. Potential failure modes and/or causes/mechanisms that
can occur during the manufacturing or assembly process need
not but may be included in a Design FMEA. When not included,
their identification, effect, and control are covered by the
Process FMEA.
The Design FMEA does not rely on process controls to
overcome potential design weaknesses, but it does take the
technical/physical limits of a manufacturing/assembly process
into consideration, for example:
Tool access
Diagnostic capability
Material classification symbols (for recycling)
DESIGN FMEA
An example block diagram is shown in Appendix C. The block
diagram can also indicate the flow of information, energy, force,
fluid, etc. The object is to understand the deliverables (input) to
the block, the process (function) performed in the block, and the
deliverables (output) from the block.
The diagram illustrates the primary relationship among the items
covered in the analysis and establishes a logical order to the
analysis. Copies of the diagrams used in FMEA preparation
should accompany the FMEA.
In order to facilitate documentation of the analysis of potential
failures and their consequences, a blank Design FMEA form is
available in Appendix D.
11
Subsystem
Function
12
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
1)
FMEA Number
2)
System,
Subsystem, or
Component Name
and Number
3)
Design Responsibility
4)
Prepared By
5)
Model Year(s)/Program(s)
6)
Key Date
Enter the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the
scheduled production design release date.
7)
FMEA Date
Enter the date the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.
13
Subsystem
Function
14
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
8)
Core Team
9)
Item/Function
Deformed
Leaking
Oxidized
Does not transmit torque
No support (structural)
Harsh engagement
Inadequate signal
No signal
Drift
15
Subsystem
Function
16
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
11) Potential Effect(s) of Failure Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure
mode on the function, as perceived by the customer.
Describe the effects of the failure in terms of what the customer
might notice or experience, remembering that the customer may
be an internal customer as well as the ultimate end user. State
clearly if the failure mode could impact safety or noncompliance to regulations. The effects should always be stated
in terms of the specific system, subsystem, or component being
analyzed. Remember that a hierarchical relationship exists
between the component, subsystem, and system levels. For
example, a part could fracture, which may cause the assembly
to vibrate, resulting in an intermittent system operation. The
intermittent system operation could cause performance to
degrade and ultimately lead to customer dissatisfaction. The
intent is to forecast the failure effects, to the teams level of
knowledge.
Typical failure effects could be but are not limited to:
Noise
Erratic Operation
Poor Appearance
Unstable
Intermittent Operation
Leaks
Rough
Inoperative
Unpleasant Odor
Operation Impaired
Thermal Event
Regulatory Non-Compliance
Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a
given failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the
scope of the individual FMEA.
A reduction in the severity
ranking index can be effected only through a design change.
Severity should be estimated using Table 2 as a guideline:
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis. (See Table 2.)
NOTE:
NOTE:
17
Subsystem
Function
18
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
12) Severity (S) (continued)
Effect
Hazardous
without
warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
warning.
Ranking
10
Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
with warning operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning.
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most
customers (greater than 75%).
Minor
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of
customers.
Very Minor
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers (less than 25%).
None
No discernible effect.
13)
Classification
19
Subsystem
Function
20
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
14) Potential Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s) of Failure
(continued)
Typical failure causes may include, but are not limited to:
Incorrect Material Specified
Inadequate Design Life Assumption
Over-stressing
Insufficient Lubrication Capability
Inadequate Maintenance Instructions
Incorrect Algorithm
Improper Maintenance Instructions
Improper Software Specification
Improper Surface Finish Specification
Inadequate Travel Specification
Improper Friction Material Specified
Excessive Heat
Improper Tolerance Specified
Typical failure mechanisms may include but are not limited to:
Yield
Chemical Oxidation
Fatigue
Electromigration
Material Instability
Creep
Wear
Corrosion
21
Subsystem
Function
22
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
15) Occurrence (O)
(continued)
Ranking
10
Subsystem
Function
24
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
16)
25
Subsystem
Function
26
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis.
It is best to have detection controls in place as early as possible
in the design development process.
NOTE:
Ranking
10
Very Remote Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.
Remote
Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Very Low
Very low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Low
Moderate
Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Moderately
High
Moderately high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
High
High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Very High
Very high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.
Almost
Certain
18) Risk Priority Number (RPN) The risk priority number is the product of the severity (S),
occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings.
(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value (between 1
and 1000) can be used to rank order the concerns in the design.
27
Subsystem
Function
28
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
19) Recommended Action(s)
29
Subsystem
Function
30
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
DESIGN FMEA
DESIGN FMEA
21) Action(s) Taken
Follow-Up Actions
The design-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring that
all actions recommended have been implemented or adequately
addressed. The FMEA is a living document and should always
reflect the latest design level as well as the latest relevant
actions, including those occurring after start of production.
The design-responsible engineer has several means of ensuring
that concerns are identified and that recommended actions are
implemented. They include, but are not limited to the following:
31
32
PROCESS FMEA
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
IN
MANUFACTURING AND ASSEMBLY PROCESSES
(PROCESS FMEA)
33
34
PROCESS FMEA
INTRODUCTION
A Process Potential FMEA is an analytical technique used by a
Manufacturing/Assembly-Responsible Engineer/Team as a
means to ensure that, to the extent possible, potential failure
modes and their associated causes/mechanisms have been
considered and addressed. In its most rigorous form, an FMEA
is a summary of the teams thoughts (including an analysis of
items that could go wrong based on experience) as a process is
developed. This systematic approach parallels and formalizes
the mental discipline that an engineer normally goes through in
any manufacturing planning process.
The Process Potential FMEA:
Customer Defined
Team Effort
35
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
36
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
INTRODUCTION (Continued)
The Process FMEA is a living document and should be initiated:
Before or at the feasibility stage,
Prior to tooling for production, and
Take into account all manufacturing operations, from
individual components to assemblies.
Early review and analysis of new or revised processes is
promoted to anticipate, resolve, or monitor potential process
concerns during the manufacturing planning stages of a new
model or component program.
The Process FMEA assumes the product as designed will meet
the design intent. Potential failure modes that can occur
because of a design weakness may be included in a Process
FMEA. Their effect and avoidance is covered by the Design
FMEA.
The Process FMEA does not rely on product design changes to
overcome weaknesses in the process. However, it does take
into consideration a products design characteristics relative to
the planned manufacturing or assembly process to assure that,
to the extent possible, the resultant product meets customer
needs and expectations.
1)
FMEA Number
37
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
38
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
2)
Item
3)
Process Responsibility
4)
Prepared By
5)
Model Year(s)/Program(s)
6)
Key Date
Enter the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the
scheduled start of production date.
Note:
7)
FMEA Date
Enter the date the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.
8)
Core Team
9)
Process Function/
Requirements
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
40
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
10) Potential Failure Mode
(continued)
Rough
Excessive
Inoperative
Unstable
Draft
Poor appearance
Vehicle control impaired
Customer dissatisfaction
Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a
given failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the
41
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
42
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
Table 6. Suggested PFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria
Criteria: Severity of Effect
This ranking results when a
potential failure mode results in a
final
customer
and/or
a
manufacturing/assembly plant
defect. The final customer should
always be considered first. If both
occur, use the higher of the two
severities.
(Customer Effect)
10
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Minor
Very Minor
Effect
Hazardous
without
warning
None
43
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
44
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
13) Classification
45
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
46
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
14) Potential Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s) of Failure
(continued)
Inadequate gating/venting
Inadequate or no lubrication
Part missing or mislocated
Worn locator
Worn tool
Chip on locator
Broken tool
Improper machine setup
Improper programming
Only specific errors or malfunctions (e.g., operator fails to install
seal) should be listed; ambiguous phrases (e.g., operator error,
machine malfunction) should not be used.
47
Remote:
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
48
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
Table 7. Suggested PFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria
Likely Failure Rates*
Ranking
10
Probability
Very High: Persistent Failures
Detection:
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
50
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
16) Current Process
Controls (continued)
51
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
52
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
17) Detection (D) (continued)
Criteria
Almost
Impossible
Very
Remote
Remote
Low
Moderate
Very Low
Inspection
Types
A B C
10
High
Very High
Very High
Ranking
6
5
Inspection Types:
A. Error-proofed
B. Gauging
C. Manual Inspection
18) Risk Priority Number (RPN) The risk priority number is the product of the severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings.
(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value (between 1
and 1000) can be used to rank order the concerns in the process.
53
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
54
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
19) Recommended Action(s)
55
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
56
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
PROCESS FMEA
20) Responsibility for the
Recommended Action(s)
Follow-Up Actions
The process-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring
that all actions recommended have been implemented or
adequately addressed. The FMEA is a living document and
should always reflect the latest design level as well as the latest
relevant actions, including those occurring after the start of
production.
The process-responsible engineer has several means of
ensuring that concerns are identified and that recommended
actions are implemented. They include, but are not limited to
the following:
Ensuring that process/product requirements are achieved,
Reviewing engineering drawings, process/product
specifications, and process flow,
Confirming the incorporation of changes in assembly/
manufacturing documentation and,
Reviewing Control Plans and operation instructions.
57
PROCESS FMEA
58
APPENDIX A
DESIGN FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES
Note: Specific Program Requirements take precedence
1. DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS
2. HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES The FMEA addresses all high risk Failure Modes, as identified by
the FMEA team, with executable Action Plans. All other failure
modes are considered.
4. INTERFACES
5. LESSONS LEARNED
6. SPECIAL OR KEY
CHARACTERISTICS
7. TIMING
8. TEAM
The right people participate as part of the FMEA team throughout the analysis, and are adequately trained in FMEA methods.
As appropriate, a facilitator should be used.
9. DOCUMENTATION
Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an effective and efficient use of time, with a value-added result. This
assumes Recommended Actions are identified as required and
the actions are implemented.
59
APPENDIX B
PROCESS FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES
Note: Specific Program Requirements take precedence.
2. HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES The FMEA addresses all high risk Failure Modes, as identified by
the FMEA team, with executable Action Plans. All other failure
modes are considered.
3. CONTROL PLANS
4. INTEGRATION
5. LESSONS LEARNED
6. SPECIAL OR KEY
CHARACTERISTICS
7. TIMING
8. TEAM
9. DOCUMENTATION
60
APPENDIX C
DESIGN FMEA BLOCK DIAGRAM EXAMPLE
FLASHLIGHT
1994 NEW PRODUCT
XXXI10D001
LETTERS = COMPONENTS
NUMBERS = ATTACHING METHODS
= ATTACHED/JOINED
= NOT INCLUDED IN
THIS FMEA
The example below is a relational block diagram. Other types of block diagrams may be used by the FMEA
Team to clarify the item(s) being considered in their analysis
SWITCH
ON/OFF
C
2
BULB
ASSEMBLY
D
HOUSING
A
4
1
PLATE
E
+
BATTERIES
B
COMPONENTS
A. HOUSING
B. BATTERIES (2 D CELL)
C. ON/OFF SWITCH
D. BULB ASSEMBLY
E. PLATE
F. SPRING
SPRING
F
-
ATTACHING METHOD
1. SKIP FIT
2. RIVETS
3. THREAD
4. SNAP FIT
5. COMPRESSIVE FIT
61
Item
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
O
c
c
u
r
Current
Design
Controls
- Prevention
- Detection
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
____ Subsystem
____ System
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
of
Recommended
Action(s)
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
Prepared By
Page
FMEA Number
Actions
Taken
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.)
R.
P.
N.
APPENDIX D
62
Item
Function
Core Team
Potential
Failure
Mode
MODEL YEARS(S)/Vehicle(s)
Component
Subsystem
System
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
Key Date
O
c
c
u
r
Design Responsibility
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Recommended
Action(s)
of
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
Prepared By
Page
FMEA Number
Actions
Taken
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.)
R.
P.
N.
APPENDIX D
63
Subsystem
Function
64
Support
anchorage for
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window
regulator
Provide proper
surface for
appearance
items
- Paint and
soft trim
Ingress to and
egress from
vehicle
Occupant
protection
from weather,
noise, and
side impact
12
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Deteriorated life of
7
door leading to:
Unsatisfactory
appearance due
to rust througH
paint over time
Impaired function
7
of interior door
hardware
11
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Corroded
interior
lower door
panels
10
Potential
Failure
Mode
O
c
c
u
r
17
18
19
Recommended
Action(s)
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
SAMPLE
Insufficient room
between panels for
spray head access\
None
Drawing evaluation
of spray head access
28
A Tate
Body Engrg
9X 01 15
Conduct Design
of Experiments
(DOE) on wax
thickness
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
16
Current
Design
Controls
Detection
21
Evaluation
showed
adequate access
Based on test, 3
additional vent
holes provided in
affected areas
7
Test results
(Test No. 1481)
show specified
thickness is
adequate. DOE
shows 25%
variation in
specified thickness
is acceptable.
21
28
28
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
Actions
Taken
(Rev.) 8X 07 14
Based on test
results (Test No.
1481) upper
edge spec raised
125mm
16
Current
Design
Controls
Prevention
of 1
1234
Page 1
FMEA Number
15
2
Inappropriate wax
formulation specified
Insufficient wax
thickness specified
6
Upper edge of
protective wax
application specified for
inner door panels is
too low
14
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
13
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA)
System
APPENDIX E
Subsystem B
Subsystem A
Subsystem C
System
Subsystem D
Environment
INTERACTIONS:
65
- FUNCTION 1
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE A
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE B
etc.....
- FUNCTION 2
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE A
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE B
etc.....
- etc.....
66
67
Function:
provide comfortable
transportation
Function:
provide reliable transportation
Function:
ease of use
Design Objectives:
1) minimum 3000 hours of riding
without need for maintenance
and 10,000 hours of riding for
design life.
2) accommodates male adults
comfortably to the 99.5th
percentile
3) ... etc. ...
Bicycle
System Level
Chain Assembly
Seat Assembly
Sprocket Assembly
Function:
provides pleasing appearance
Function:
provides stable attachment for
seat support
Frame
Subsystem Level
Sprocket Tube
Function:
support frame assembly
production methods (welding)
Function:
provides dimensional control
for correct finished frame
geometry
Function:
provides structural support
Upper Frame
Component Level
of
Prepared By
Page
FMEA Number
(Rev.)
Requirements
Process
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
O
c
c
u
r
Current
Design
Controls
- Prevention
- Detection
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Recommended
Action(s)
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
Actions
Taken
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
R.
P.
N.
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
APPENDIX G
68
Requirements
Process
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
O
c
c
u
r
Key Date
Model Years(S)/Vehicle(s)
Core Team
Process Responsibility
Item
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Recommended
Action(s)
of
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
Prepared By
Page
FMEA Number
Actions
Taken
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.)
R.
P.
N.
APPENDIX G
69
11
10
12
Potential
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potential
Failure
Mode
To cover inner
door, lower
surfaces at
minimum wax
thickness to
retard corrosion
Deteriorated life of
Insufficient
Manual
wax coverage door leading to:
application of
wax inside door over specified Unsatisfactory
appearance due
surface
to rust through
paint over time
Impaired function
of interior doo
hardware
Requirements
Process
Function
Spray heads
clogged
- Viscosity too
high
- Temperature
too low
- Pressure
too low
Spray head
deformed due
to impact
Spray time
insufficient
15
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
70
8
17
SAMPLE
16
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
9X 08 26 Job #1
2 Preventive maintenance
programs to maintain heads
Manually inserted
spray head not
inserted far
enough
14
O
c
c
u
r
13
Potential
Cause(s)/
Mechanism(s)
of Failure
C
S l
e a
v s
s
16
Key Date 9X 03 01 ER
Item
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA)
18
19
70 None
Maintenance
9X 09 15
Mfg Engrg
9X 10 01
Mfg Engrg
9X 12 15
MFG Engrg
9X 10 15
20
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
21
Actions
Taken
Automatic spray
timer installed operator starts
spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
Rejected due to
complexity of
different doors
on same line
49
35
70
R.
P.
N.
22
S O D
e c e
v c t
Action Results
(Rev.) 9X 11 06
Stop added,
sprayer checked
on line
Automate
spraying
of 1
1450
Recommended
Action(s)
Add positive
5 280 depth stop to
sprayer
D
e R.
t P.
e N.
c
Page 1
FMEA Number
APPENDIX H
APPENDIX I
SUGGESTED PFMEA OCCURRENCE EVALUATION
CRITERIA WITH Ppk VALUES
Probability
Very High: Persistent Failures
Ppk
Ranking
< 0.55
10
0.55
0.78
0.86
0.94
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.67
Sample Calculation
Sample Calculation to determine Ppk value from a likely failure rate of 5 per thousand pieces.
Defect rate =
0.05
2
5
=
1000
0.05 .
Using a "Z" table the associated "Z" value is 2.81 for a tail value of 0.0025.
1. Z =
SL - x
s
where:
x = Average
SL = Specifications
2. Ppk =
3. Replace using Z
4. Ppk =
Note:
Z
2.81
=
= 0.9367 ~
= 0.94
3
3
The above Ppk values are to be used by the FMEA team as guidance to assist in determining an
occurrence ranking when valid statistical data is available. No other use of the above Ppk values
is intended.
71
Glossary
Control Plans
Design Intent
Design Life
The time period (e.g., cycles, time, mileage) for which the design
is intended to perform its requirements.
Methods that identify factors that affect the mean and variation
with minimum testing/experimentation.
Error/Mistake Proofing
Each OEM may have its own unique definition for Error/Mistake
Proofing. Confer with the OEM for the appropriate definition.
Feature
Pareto
Process
Process Change
Root Cause
Vehicle Campaign
72
73
74
Back Cover